Hi Richard Ruquist No, intelligence is a function of mind and hence is inextended. Brain is extended.
Mind is the monad of brain if I may. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/27/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-27, 09:16:20 Subject: Re: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ? Hence, both are extended. QED On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 9:13 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist The more brain, the more mind. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/27/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-27, 09:09:24 Subject: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ? Roger, If the mind were not extended, then animal intelligence would not depend on brain size. Richard On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: It has been asked here-- what in fact is the mind-body problem ? http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/writing/mind-top.html "The Mind Body Problem What philosophers call the mind body problem originated with Descartes. In Descartes' philosophy the mind is essentially a thinking thing, while the body is essentially an extended thing - something which occupies space. Descartes held that there is two way causal interaction between these two quite different kinds of substances. So, the body effects the mind in perception, and the mind effects the body in action. But how is this possible? How can an unextended thing effect something in space. How can something in space effect an unextended thing?" --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Immediately below I give an account of a man being pricked by a pin in Leibniz's world versus such an action in the actual or phenomenal world. In summary, and in addition, 1) They amount to the same account, one virtual and one actual or phenomenal. 2) Our so-called free will is only an apparent one. 3) Because monads overlap (are weakly nonlocal), since space is not a property, monads?an have?ome limited, unconscious awareness of the rest of the universe (including all life). This awareness is generally very weak and generally unconscious. Still, it means that we are an intimate part of the universe and all that happens. 4) The virtual world of the monad of man strictly portrays men as?lind, completely passive robots. However,?is monad is inside of the supreme monad,?hich is his puppet-master. But at the same time, then like as I recall Pinocchio, he becomes seemingly alive in the everyday sense?hat we feel we are alive. but through the supreme monad in which he is?ubordinately enclosed. 5) There is some bleed-through of future perceptions, so we can have some dim awareness of future happenings. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I will just briefly?iscuss actions here by man. Each man is entirely virtual, a monad in the space of thought containing a database of perceptions (given to him by God, of all the perceptions of the other monads in the universe. Some of these (animals) are mindless and others feelingless, with only have corporeal functions (plants, rocks) ). Every monad has an internal source of energy, plus a pre-programed set?f?irtual perceptions continuously and instantaneously given to him by the Supreme Monad, and a set of virtual actions the monad is programmed to virtually desire or will giving him new perceptions as well as every other monad in the universe. All of these must function as virtual agents or entities according to Leibniz's principle of preestablished harmony. Only the supreme monad (God) can perceive, feel, and act. So if God wants you to be pricked by a pain, feel the pain,?nd react, he will cause a virtual monadic pin to virtually prick your sensory monad, and then have you virtually feel pain?s a monad, but actually to feel a real pain in the phenomenal world, and to virtually jump and really jump in both world, one virtually and one physically. How does this differ ================================================== A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION BY MONADS BPersonally, I am looking at the "how is this possible" aspect, first by asking what is possible from the aspect of Leibniz's metaphysics. What is possible is limited by Leibniz's monadology: http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/moneth/monadology.html The principle issue is Leibniz's theory of causation. One account is given at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/ There seems to be some confusion and differing acounts?n how things happen, but my own understanding is that: 1). All simple substances are monads, or which there are 3 types, those just containing bodily perceptions (rocks, vegetables), those containing affective perceptions as well (animals) and those (man) which also have mental perceptions (ie all things mental). 2. Monads can do nothing or perceive anything on their own, but only through God (the supreme monad) according to our desires, which are actually God's 3) All of the actions of lesser monads and the supreme monad God have been scripted in the Preestablished Harmony. 4) Thus causation is virtual, say like in a?ilent movie. No actual forces are involved, only virtual forces. 5) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/27/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: benjayk Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-25, 11:16:59 Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the main points: Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> But let's say we mean "except for memory and unlimited accuracy". >> >> This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY >> >> computers. >> >> >> >> >> > Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than atoms? >> I >> > can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of >> > interacting particles. >> > >> > But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is >> there >> > a reason that computers cannot? >> > >> Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily >> computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense >> already. >> > > Do you have a meta-theory which could explain why we have the conscious > experiences that we do? > > Saying that mind is all there is, while possibly valid, does not explain > very much (without some meta-theory). No, I don't even take it to be a theory. In this sense you might say it doesn't explain anything on a theoretical level, but this is just because reality doesn't work based on any theoretical concepts (though it obviously is described and incorporates them). Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> > Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as >> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea that >> God >> > has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I don't >> see >> > how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since >> > computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do. >> OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can emulate >> everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that. But that's >> simply >> the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the sense >> of >> transforming input/output. >> It is about what something IS (or is like). >> > > Within the simulation, isn't a simulated atom like a real atom (in our > reality)? There is no unambiguous answer to this question IMO. But it only matters that the simulated atom is not like the real atom with respect to our reality - the former can't substitute the latter with respect to reality. Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> since this is all that is required for my argument. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that >> >> definition >> >> >> >> because a human is not a computer according to the everyday >> >> >> >> definition. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate, >> therefore >> >> a >> >> >> > human could exist with the definition of a computer. Computers >> are >> >> >> > very powerful and flexible in what they can do. >> >> >> That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Have you ever done any computer programming? If you have, you might >> >> > realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your >> >> imagination. >> >> Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have programmed >> a >> >> fair amount. >> >> Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our >> >> imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing it >> on >> >> a >> >> computer? It is very hard. >> >> I never said that they can't. >> >> >> >> I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For example >> they >> >> can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and >> which >> >> axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no >> >> computational way of determining that. >> >> >> > >> > There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms to >> > use. >> Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't >> determined a program first. >> >> > You said computers fundamentally cannot choose which programs or axioms to > use. > > We could program a computer with a neural simulation of a human > mathematician, and then the computer could have this capability. That just would strengthen my point (note the words "we program" meaning "we choose the program"). Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> > If the computer program had a concept for desiring novelty/surprises, >> it >> > would surely find some axiomatic systems more interesting than others. >> Sure. But he could be programmed to not to have such a concept, and there >> is >> no way of determining whether to use it or not if we haven't already >> programmed an algorithm for that (which again had the same problem). >> >> In effect you get an infinite regress: >> How determine which program to use? ->use a program to determine it >> But which? ->use a program to determine it >> But which? ->use a program to determine it >> .... >> >> > Guess and check, with random variation, it worked for evolution. But which guessing and checking program to use? ->use a more general guessing and checking program to determine it But which? ->use an even more more general guessing and checking program to determine it etc.... You still never arrive at a program, in fact your problem just becomes more difficult each time you ask the question, because the program would have to be more general. ? Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> > You're crossing contexts and levels. Certainly, a heart inside a >> computer >> > simulation of some reality isn't going to do you any good if you exist >> on >> > a >> > different level, in a different reality. >> So you are actually agreeing with me? - Since this is exactly the point I >> am >> trying to make. >> Digital models exist on a different level than what they represent, and >> it >> doesn't matter how good/accurate they are because that doesn't bridge the >> gap between model and reality. >> > > But what level something is implemented in does not restrict the > intelligence of a process. This may be our main disagreement. It boils down to the question whether we assume intelligence = (turing) computation. We could embrace this definition, but I would rather not, since it doesn't fit with my own conception of intelligence (which also encompasses instantiation and interpretation). But for the sake of discussion I can embrace this definition and in this case I agree with you. Then we might say that computers can become more intelligent than humans (and maybe already are), because they manifest computations more efficiently than humans. Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> And this seems to be empirically true because there is pretty much no >> >> other >> >> way to explain psi. >> >> >> > >> > What do you mean by psi? >> Telepathy, for example. >> >> > Are you aware of any conclusive studies of psi? That depends on what you interpret as conclusive. For hard-headed skepticists no study will count as conclusive. There are plenty of studies that show results that are *far* beyond chance, though. Also the so called "anecdotal evidence" is extremely strong. Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> I am not saying that nature is infinite in the way we picture it. >> It >> >> may >> >> >> not >> >> >> fit into these categories at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so >> by >> >> your >> >> >> own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The UD also contains subjective randomness, which is at the heart of >> >> > Bruno's argument. >> >> No, it doesn't even contain a subject. >> >> >> >> Bruno assumes COMP, which I don't buy at all. >> >> >> >> >> > Okay. What is your theory of mind? >> I don't have any. Mind cannot be captured or even by described at the >> fundamental level at all. >> > > That doesn't seem like a very useful theory. Does this theory tell > you whether or not you should take an artificial brain if it was the only > way to save your life? Of course it is not a useful theory, since it is not a theory in the first place. To answer your question: No. There is no theoretical way of deciding that. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34348098.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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