Hi Bruno Marchal
My understanding of personal or subjective or 1p filtering
has little to do with where the person is (Washington or Moscow).
it has to do (if I might say it this way) with where the person has been.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/2/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-02, 05:34:11
Subject: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Roger,
On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:28, Roger Clough wrote:
BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just
interaction and some memory.
$$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely critical issue
of self.
Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely necessary. Self
selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own..
That's what intelligence is.
INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES
When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc.
That's an intelligent action.
I agree with you on choice. I use the term self-determination in my defense of
free will.
When I was talking about consciousness selection, it has nothing to do with
choice. It was what happen, in the comp theory, when you duplicate yourself in
two different place, like Washington and Moscow. After that duplication, when
you look at you neighborhood, there is a consciousness or first person
selection: you feel to be in W, or you feel to be in M. You have no choice in
that matter.
Choice is something else entirely, and play no role in the origin and shape of
the physical laws, but consciousness selection (which is a form of
Turing-tropism (generalization of anthropism)).
Selection of a quantum path
(collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces
consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated
reduction. .
BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on G del
is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which
has never make any sense to me.
ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are speculative until
validated by data.
No. All theories are speculative. Period. But when I said quite speculative,
I meant no evidence at all, and contradictory with all current evidences.
Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek t??? means not divisible).
$$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't even seen
one.
The greeks knew that atoms are not divisible, by definition. They didn't knew
that atoms exists, nor do we.
I use atom in the philosophical sense. The current physical atoms where
believed to be such philo atoms, until the discovery of the electron and
nucleus.
The new physical philosophical atoms are the elementary particles, but they are
no more philosophical atoms in string theory.
$$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects.
Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot.
Like the UD. It is a function from nothing to nothing, and as such
0-dimensional. But i don't really believe the geometrical image is useful. With
comp it is better to put geometry in the epistemology of numbers, like
analysis, infinities, and physics. Keeping the ontology minimal assures that we
will not risk reifying unnecessary materials.
I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit
into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue,
so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads.
BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number.
ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that won't
work.
What do you mean by corporeal bodies? With comp + the usual Occam razor,
corporeal bodies belongs to the mind of numbers (+ infinities of numbers
relation).
Those less dominant monads are eaten or taken over by the stronger ones.
It's a Darwinian jungle down here. Crap happens.
BRUNO: Crap happens also in arithmetic when viewed from inside.
Contingency is given by selection on the many computational consistent
continuation.
There are different form of contingencies in arithmetic: one for each modal box
having an arithmetical interpretations.
In modal logic you can read []p by p is necessary, or true in all (accessible)
worlds
p by p is possible or true in one (accessible) world
~[]p or ~p by p is contingent (not necessary)
What will change from one modal logic to another is the accessibility
or the neighborhood relations on the (abstract) worlds.
$ ROGER: That's correct, I was incorrectly limiting numbers to
necessary logic.
OK. Nice. comp reduces the ontology to arithmetic
