Re: Remarks on an idea on First-Order Logical Duality

2012-07-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Jul 2012, at 15:34, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Computations are not proof. There are similarities, and there are a  
lot of interesting relationships between the two concepts, but we  
cannot use proof theory for computation theory


What goes to Another intriging duality : The Curry-Howard  
isomorphism between computer programs and mathematical proofs. It  
seems that both have the same structure after all.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%E2%80%93Howard_correspondence

And, as the Stephen mentioned paper makes use of Category theory and  
Topos Theory (That is a variation of CT) to discover the duality  ,  
The curry howard isomorphism can be reshaped in terms of category  
theory.


What all these dualities say is that math structures can be  
expressed as particular cases of a few, more encompassing  
categories. And 2) since the human mind arrange his knowledge in  
categories, according with the Phillips paper I mention a few posts  
ago, this bring light about the nature of reality . No only the  
phisical world is mathematical, but this mathematical world has a  
few patterns after all. That economy may say something about  the  
reality, that for me is related with the process of discovery both  
conscious and mechanical discovery: the natural evolution has  
discovered the mathematical essence of reality and organized the  
brain in categories. And scientist create hypotheses by applying  
their categorical intuitions to new fields of knowledge, for example  
to discover new mathematical structures or new relations between  
existing structures. At the same time, if the mathematical reality  
is not so simple, it would have been not discoverable in the first  
place, and it would not exist.



Actually I wrote, and did not send a reply on some of your remark on  
category theory. I agree that category is very interesting. But  
category are nice and smooth only around the first person notion. In  
fact in the math part of AUDA, categories and non boolean toposes can  
be used to model the arithmetical first person (the one we can  
canonically associate to self-referential machine). They are solipsist  
by nature, not by doctrine, and this correspond to the simple fact  
that we build our own private mental space, so the first person is  
intuitionist. category unfortunately don't handle well the second  
recursion theorem, and the whole intensional part of non constructive  
math, which makes them hard to use for the non first person  
hypostases.
Also, category theory is abstract and difficult. It is already hard to  
find people with some maturity simultaneously in quantum physics,  
mathematical logic and philosophy-of-mind-computer-science, so  
adding the category notion tends to make the intersecting set empty.


Category are useful for the functional part of comp, and awkward for  
the intensional part of computer science.


The Curry-Howard isomorphism is *very* interesting, and was the main  
reason I made a little teaching on the combinators (and lambda terms)  
some year ago on this list, but of course that kind of things tend to  
be quickly technical, so I have come back with the numbers instead.
For those who remember the combinators S and K, the typing of SKK  
gives the well known proof of A - A from the axioms A-(B-A),  
and A-(B-C) -. (A-B)-(A-C) which gives the types of K and S  
respectively.


Note that the Curry-Howard isomorphism highlights the fact that proof  
and computations are different concept, as the proof are related to  
the programs and not the execution, and this does not fit well with  
the measure problem on the computations, where we can use instead the  
correspondence between some proofs of sigma_1 proposition and the  
computations, but we can still relate all this in some categories  
indeed. All this is a bit too much technical, and there are many  
technical open problems.


Note also that the Curry-Howard isomorphism was also at the start only  
linking constructive proof with programs, but people like Jean Louis  
Krivine (and some others) have extended it on non constructive proofs,  
and this might be useful in the future of the AUDA program. No doubt  
on this, even if I am not sure of Jean-Louis Krivine choice of the way  
to extend it.


Bruno

PS I am re-connected!




2012/7/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

Le 29-juil.-12, à 07:34, Stephen P. King a écrit :


 Dear Bruno,

 From http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/awodey/preprints/fold.pdf
 First-Order Logical Duality
 we read:
 In the propositional case, one passes from a propositional theory   
to a Boolean algebra by
 constructing the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the theory, a  
construction
 which identifies provably equivalent formulas (and orders them by  
provable
 implication). Thus any two complete theories, for instance, are  
‘algebraically
 equivalent’ in the sense of having isomorphic Lindenbaum-Tarski  
algebras.

 The situation is precisely analogous to a presentation 

Re: Remarks on an idea on First-Order Logical Duality

2012-07-30 Thread Alberto G. Corona
Computations are not proof. There are similarities, and there are a lot of
interesting relationships between the two concepts, but we cannot use proof
theory for computation theory

What goes to Another intriging duality : The Curry-Howard isomorphism
between computer programs and mathematical proofs. It seems that both have
the same structure after all.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%E2%80%93Howard_correspondence

And, as the Stephen mentioned paper makes use of Category theory and Topos
Theory (That is a variation of CT) to discover the duality  , The curry
howard isomorphism can be reshaped in terms of category theory.

What all these dualities say is that math structures can be expressed as
particular cases of a few, more encompassing categories. And 2) since the
human mind arrange his knowledge in categories, according with the Phillips
paper I mention a few posts ago, this bring light about the nature of
reality . No only the phisical world is mathematical, but this mathematical
world has a few patterns after all. That economy may say something about
 the reality, that for me is related with the process of discovery both
conscious and mechanical discovery: the natural evolution has discovered
the mathematical essence of reality and organized the brain in categories.
And scientist create hypotheses by applying their categorical intuitions to
new fields of knowledge, for example to discover new mathematical
structures or new relations between existing structures. At the same time,
if the mathematical reality is not so simple, it would have been not
discoverable in the first place, and it would not exist.

2012/7/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 Le 29-juil.-12, à 07:34, Stephen P. King a écrit :


   Dear Bruno,

  From 
 http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/**user/awodey/preprints/fold.pdfhttp://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/awodey/preprints/fold.pdf
  First-Order Logical Duality
  we read:
  In the propositional case, one passes from a propositional theory  to a
 Boolean algebra by
  constructing the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the theory, a construction
  which identifies provably equivalent formulas (and orders them by provable
  implication). Thus any two complete theories, for instance, are
 ‘algebraically
  equivalent’ in the sense of having isomorphic Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras.
  The situation is precisely analogous to a presentation of an algebra
  by generators and relations: a logical theory corresponds to such a
 presentation,
  and two theories are equivalent if they present ‘the same’ – i.e.
 isomorphic –
  algebras.

  The construction of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra is implemented by

  1) identification of provably equivalent formulas
  and
  2) ordering them by provable implication

  1) might be equivalent to your sheaf of infinities of computations


 Computations are not proof. There are similarities, and there are a lot of
 interesting relationships between the two concepts, but we cannot use proof
 theory for computation theory.





  (but requires a bisimilarity measure) and 2) seems contrary to the
 Universal Dovetailer ordering idea as it implies  tight sequential strings
 (but tightness might be recovered by Godel Numbering but not uniquely for
 infinitely long strings). But there is a question regarding the
 constructability of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra itself!


 This is needed for special application of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra.




  Does it require Boolean Satisfiability for an arbitrary
 propositional theory to allow  the construction?


 Not in general. Boolean satisfiability concerns only classical logic, but
 none of the hypostases, except the arithmetical truth,  do correspond
 (internally) to a classical logic.

 Bruno



  It surely seems to! But is there a unique sieve or  filter for the
 ordering of implication? How do we define invariance of meaning under
 transformations of language? Two propositional theories in different
 languages would have differing implication diagrams , so how is
 bisimulation between them defined?  There has to be a transformation
 that generates a diffeomorphism between them.

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Remarks on an idea on First-Order Logical Duality

2012-07-30 Thread Stephen P. King

On 7/30/2012 9:34 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Computations are not proof. There are similarities, and there are a 
lot of interesting relationships between the two concepts, but we 
cannot use proof theory for computation theory


What goes to Another intriging duality : The Curry-Howard isomorphism 
between computer programs and mathematical proofs. It seems that both 
have the same structure after all.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%E2%80%93Howard_correspondence

And, as the Stephen mentioned paper makes use of Category theory and 
Topos Theory (That is a variation of CT) to discover the duality  , 
The curry howard isomorphism can be reshaped in terms of category theory.


What all these dualities say is that math structures can be expressed 
as particular cases of a few, more encompassing categories. And 2) 
since the human mind arrange his knowledge in categories, according 
with the Phillips paper I mention a few posts ago, this bring light 
about the nature of reality . No only the phisical world is 
mathematical, but this mathematical world has a few patterns after 
all. That economy may say something about  the reality, that for me is 
related with the process of discovery both conscious and mechanical 
discovery: the natural evolution has discovered the mathematical 
essence of reality and organized the brain in categories. And 
scientist create hypotheses by applying their categorical intuitions 
to new fields of knowledge, for example to discover new mathematical 
structures or new relations between existing structures. At the same 
time, if the mathematical reality is not so simple, it would have been 
not discoverable in the first place, and it would not exist.


Dear Alberto,

You are pointing out exactly the relation that I was trying to 
explain. Thank you for pointing this out.





2012/7/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be


Le 29-juil.-12, à 07:34, Stephen P. King a écrit :


 Dear Bruno,

 From http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/awodey/preprints/fold.pdf
 First-Order Logical Duality
 we read:
 In the propositional case, one passes from a propositional
theory  to a Boolean algebra by
 constructing the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the theory, a
construction
 which identifies provably equivalent formulas (and orders them
by provable
 implication). Thus any two complete theories, for instance,
are ‘algebraically
 equivalent’ in the sense of having isomorphic
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras.
 The situation is precisely analogous to a presentation of an
algebra
 by generators and relations: a logical theory corresponds to
such a presentation,
 and two theories are equivalent if they present ‘the same’ –
i.e. isomorphic –
 algebras.

 The construction of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra is
implemented by

 1) identification of provably equivalent formulas
 and
 2) ordering them by provable implication

 1) might be equivalent to your sheaf of infinities of
computations


Computations are not proof. There are similarities, and there are
a lot of interesting relationships between the two concepts, but
we cannot use proof theory for computation theory.





(but requires a bisimilarity measure) and 2) seems contrary to
the Universal Dovetailer ordering idea as it implies  tight
sequential strings (but tightness might be recovered by Godel
Numbering but not uniquely for infinitely long strings). But
there is a question regarding the constructability of the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra itself!


This is needed for special application of the Lindenbaum-Tarski
algebra.




 Does it require Boolean Satisfiability for an arbitrary
propositional theory to allow  the construction?


Not in general. Boolean satisfiability concerns only classical
logic, but none of the hypostases, except the arithmetical
truth,  do correspond (internally) to a classical logic.

Bruno



It surely seems to! But is there a unique sieve or  filter for
the ordering of implication? How do we define invariance of
meaning under transformations of language? Two propositional
theories in different languages would have differing
implication diagrams , so how is bisimulation between them
defined?  There has to be a transformation that generates
a diffeomorphism between them.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/





--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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