### Re: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi Stephen P. King Forgive me if I bring up Leibniz again, but to my mind he gives the most thorough descriptions as to how the world works. And so logical that you can figure out many things on your own. Monads are capsules of objects of the mind consisting of mental substances if they have only 1 part, and I suggest that composite substances must be composite monads Being nonextended, and also since there is no such thing as space, they have no locations. So they are nonlocal. They are mental. And they are alive. Each monad has either a soul (animals and vegetables), a spirit (man), or, like rocks is a bare naked monad and has what I would call a dark, drowsy soul. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-16, 11:45:19 Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers On 9/16/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Leibniz was not a solipsist, since he took it for granted that the world out there was actually there. If a tree fell in a forest and nobody heard it, it still would have fallen. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. Dear Roger, I agree with you, but if you read L's writings you will find that he depended on God to act as a universal observer that could distinguish all of the aspects of the world *and* other monads from each other *and* see the relationships between them. This is the essence of the idea of a pre-established harmony. For God, all things are given but once and there is no need to compute the relations (which is an infinite NP-Hard computation!). I claim that God *is* the computation of all things and all the things as well. Bruno represents this in his work as a Universal Dovetailing of all possible computations. But we fail if we do not understand that from our finite and incomplete view that the PEH is simply not accessible. We must consume resources and do our version of the universal computation ourselves to gain the knowledge. We cannot just download the results from God's Cloud. You might note that downloading itself is a computation that requires resources to be consumed! Knowledge is never free. I claim that bisimulation is interaction and that our local computations, implicit in our observations of the world around us, is a reflection of the eternal PEH of God. Plato saw this and sought to explain it with the allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line. Silly humans ignore the requirements of local reality and imagine that they can just download God's view and not have to do the hard work for themselves. Sorry, there is no such thing as a free lunch! -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/17/2012 9:21 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Forgive me if I bring up Leibniz again, but to my mind he gives the most thorough descriptions as to how the world works. And so logical that you can figure out many things on your own. Dear Roger, I too have found Leibniz' Monadology to be a wonderful theory. I have my copy of Nicholas Rescher's translation and annotated /Monadology/ always on my desk. One reason is that it sets up a mereology that is very different from the relation of wholes and parts that is implicit in classical physics and common intuition. Monads are capsules of objects of the mind consisting of mental substances if they have only 1 part, A monad is a complete whole and always is a complete whole. If you break a monad you will get two complete monads. If you combine two monads you will get a complete monad. I see the mind in the same way and thus a monad is the perfect model of a mind. and I suggest that composite substances must be composite monads No. That would be a violation of the complete wholeness principle. I have a question. In some religions there is the word Holy. What does it mean to you? Being nonextended, and also since there is no such thing as space, they have no locations. So they are nonlocal. They are mental. And they are alive. I use a different set of definitions for those words. I see a QM system as a Monad. Internally, it is never seen. Internally, it is a mind. Externally, it appears as a center of mass. Each monad has either a soul (animals and vegetables), a spirit (man), or, like rocks is a bare naked monad and has what I would call a dark, drowsy soul. All things are either a monad or part of the surface of a monad. We need to learn to see things from a point of view that is not bound to 2d surfaces bounding 3d volumes to understand fully what this means. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi Stephen P. King Leibniz was not a solipsist, since he took it for granted that the world out there was actually there. If a tree fell in a forest and nobody heard it, it still would have fallen. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-15, 13:29:01 Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers On 9/15/2012 9:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King And then there is Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, identity there meaning that you only need one of them, throw the rest away. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. Hi Roger, Yes but! We have to solve the other minds problem or be content to simmer in our solipsist state of being. This requires something external to the singleton sets of objects. We need to have room to make copies of that would be otherwise identical objects. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi Stephen P. King The other minds problem (How do I know that there are other minds ?) is indeed an impossible to crack nut if you are a solipsist. So solipsim is perhaps the only philiosophy impossible to disprove. Or prove, I think. Leibniz was not a solipsist. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-15, 13:29:01 Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers On 9/15/2012 9:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King And then there is Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, identity there meaning that you only need one of them, throw the rest away. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. Hi Roger, Yes but! We have to solve the other minds problem or be content to simmer in our solipsist state of being. This requires something external to the singleton sets of objects. We need to have room to make copies of that would be otherwise identical objects. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/16/2012 8:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King The other minds problem (How do I know that there are other minds ?) is indeed an impossible to crack nut if you are a solipsist. So solipsim is perhaps the only philiosophy impossible to disprove. Or prove, I think. Leibniz was not a solipsist. Dear Roger, Maybe Leibniz did not understand that the solipsist view is the only consistent view of a single mind. It can only access reflections of itself; self-reference is the essence of its nature. The monad has no windows, it cannot exchange substances with other monads. All interactions between monads are given only in terms of synchronization of their respective internal dynamics. I am trying hard to understand exactly what this idea means, as I believe that it is a way to make sense of how QM systems interact with each other. QM systems are exactly like monads in that as pure systems, they have no windows. snip -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi Stephan, I would like to quibble about your statement: For God, all things are given but once and there is no need to compute the relations . in terms of the OMEGA Point (OP). Both in MWI and SWI, God (or whatever mechanism) is able to compute the OP. But I suspect that the computation is not once and for all due to human and other (even spiritual) consciousness exercising free choice. As a result God must have to continually compute OP, especially if SWI is the physical reality. It may be that the MWI computation is 'once and for all', if MWI are the multiple physical realities. But then there will be multiple OPs as well. Richard On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 11:45 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 9/16/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Leibniz was not a solipsist, since he took it for granted that the world out there was actually there. If a tree fell in a forest and nobody heard it, it still would have fallen. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. Dear Roger, I agree with you, but if you read L's writings you will find that he depended on God to act as a universal observer that could distinguish all of the aspects of the world *and* other monads from each other *and* see the relationships between them. This is the essence of the idea of a pre-established harmony. For God, all things are given but once and there is no need to compute the relations (which is an infinite NP-Hard computation!). I claim that God *is* the computation of all things and all the things as well. Bruno represents this in his work as a Universal Dovetailing of all possible computations. But we fail if we do not understand that from our finite and incomplete view that the PEH is simply not accessible. We must consume resources and do our version of the universal computation ourselves to gain the knowledge. We cannot just download the results from God's Cloud. You might note that downloading itself is a computation that requires resources to be consumed! Knowledge is never free. I claim that bisimulation is interaction and that our local computations, implicit in our observations of the world around us, is a reflection of the eternal PEH of God. Plato saw this and sought to explain it with the allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line. Silly humans ignore the requirements of local reality and imagine that they can just download God's view and not have to do the hard work for themselves. Sorry, there is no such thing as a free lunch! -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/16/2012 12:35 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hi Stephan, I would like to quibble about your statement: For God, all things are given but once and there is no need to compute the relations . in terms of the OMEGA Point (OP). Hi Richard, A good friend of mine (who I was just talking to a moment ago) and I once gave a talk on Tipler's OP theory. I am quite familiar with it. Both in MWI and SWI, God (or whatever mechanism) is able to compute the OP. Yes, the computation occurs in the Unitary evolution of total quantum wave function of the Universe - All that exists. This leads to a nice equation H=0. This is the Wheeler-Dewitt Equation. We see something very interesting in this equation. The time variable t vanished (becomes zero). This has the effect of making the unitary evolution equivalent to a automorphism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automorphism. Inmathematics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics, an*automorphism*is anisomorphism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomorphismfrom amathematical object http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_objectto itself. It is, in some sense, asymmetry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetryof the object, and a way ofmapping http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map_%28mathematics%29the object to itself while preserving all of its structure. The set of all automorphisms of an object forms a group http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_%28mathematics%29, called the*automorphism group*. It is, loosely speaking, thesymmetry group http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetry_groupof the object. But I suspect that the computation is not once and for all due to human and other (even spiritual) consciousness exercising free choice. And I agree with this suspicion! We have free will exactly because our existence as finite creatures that find ourselves in physical shells and so all kinds of things is exactly described somewhere in that set of automorphism. The question that we need to ask is: What is it that break the total global symmetry of the Universe such that I have this notion of freedom to chose from a set of alternatives that seems equivalent in value to me -all other things being equal? What is is that breaks that symmetry? As a result God must have to continually compute OP, especially if SWI is the physical reality. No, I am claiming *we are pieces of the computation* and to us it looks like it is many computations that seem to have nothing at all to do with each other and these computations can be arbitrarily extended if certain conditions are met. It may be that the MWI computation is 'once and for all', if MWI are the multiple physical realities. But then there will be multiple OPs as well. There are many and there is only one. The Many is the collection of fractured and broken collection of Images of the One. Richard -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi Stephen P. King And then there is Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, identity there meaning that you only need one of them, throw the rest away. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-14, 13:29:27 Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers On 9/14/2012 11:53 AM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 7:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Godel numberings are not unique. True, there are a infinite number of ways you could do Godel numbering. Hi John, Yes, but my point here is that this is the same thing as having an infinite number of names for one and the same thing. This makes it impossible to be absolutely sure of what John Clark or Stephen P. King is. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity And you can use any one of those Godel numbering schemes to show that there is not a single one of those infinite number of structural relationships that are powerful enough to do arithmetic and be consistent and complete. The hope is that the scheme mathematicians are using is consistent but incomplete, if it's inconsistent that would be a disaster. Mathematicians get around this problem by defining a unique naming scheme. My point is that this cannot be done at a meta-theoretical level when we have to include a multiplicity of names for the same of multiple entities that are evaluating models of the mathematical scheme. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/15/2012 9:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King And then there is Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, identity there meaning that you only need one of them, throw the rest away. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 9/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. Hi Roger, Yes but! We have to solve the other minds problem or be content to simmer in our solipsist state of being. This requires something external to the singleton sets of objects. We need to have room to make copies of that would be otherwise identical objects. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 30 Aug 2012, at 04:40, Terren Suydam wrote: hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all computations have been performed in a timeless way. OK. And not only they all exist, (in the same sense as all prime numbers exist), but they all exist with a particular weighted redundancy, independent of the choice of the U in the UD. If so, it follows that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the infinite computations going through my state. That's correct. Otherwise, I think the physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the particulars of how the UD unfolds. Yes. Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence is actually zero. Which is a contradiction. This does not necessarily follows. We can be relatively rare. To exists more than an instant, we need only to have enough normal computations going through or state, but the initial state can be absolutely rare. The same might be true for the origin of life. Logically, as I am agnostic on this, to be sure. Bruno Terren On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you. Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to just formulate clearly. Dear Bruno, Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result. ? On the contrary, everything I say depends on the fact that diagonalization does not apply to computability. The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never be at the ultimate level, I can' agree more, given that the ultimate level (the one we can mistake with primitive matter) consists in a sum on infinitely many computations (how ever we solve the measure problem). we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it. OK. It is the comp truncateness. Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and abstract and the other concrete an physical. In our setting physical needs to be (re)defined. The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just 1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition and only have a bet of its truth and nowhere to cash in if it where true by many other 1-p's). The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of a witness in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies. Yes, it is hard to make sense. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon. Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming panprotopsychism: everything is aware So you quit comp, here, right? and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD rides on the unitary evolution of the QM system and thus each and every QM ssytem is an observer and has some level of awareness. It is for this reason that I am motivated to assume that the universe is quantum and that the classical picture is just an image that the universe generates via our interactions with each other. You abandon comp to come back to physicalism, but then you lost the comp explanation of both consciousness and matter. Comp gives both a conceptual explanation of the coupling matter/consciousness, and a way to test it from the solution of the measure problem (already mathematical for the measure one which give already the quantum-like logics). Bruno Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/14/2012 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to just formulate clearly. Dear Bruno, Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result. ? Dear Bruno, On the contrary, everything I say depends on the fact that diagonalization does not apply to computability. Then how do we explain Godel numbering schemes? The ability of one string of numbers to stand for some other is the essence of computational universality, no? The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never be at the ultimate level, I can' agree more, given that the ultimate level (the one we can mistake with primitive matter) consists in a sum on infinitely many computations (how ever we solve the measure problem). But this statement implies a contradiction that you do not address! To say that at some ultimate level there is something, even a sum on infinitely many computations is to simultaneously also claim, and nothing else. At the ultimate level the ability to distinguish X is true from X is false cannot exist. Thus we cannot make claims of some type of something, here computations, at the ultimate level and thus implying that there are no not-computations without explaining the means by which they are distinguished from each other. You seems to just saying that there is nothing except computations and offer no explanation as to how the computations are excluded from the non-computations at the ultimate level. You have to invoke a plurality of levels in order to have distinguishability, difference itself vanishes at the ultimate level. we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it. OK. It is the comp truncateness. Please elaborate! Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and abstract and the other concrete an physical. In our setting physical needs to be (re)defined. I agree. The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just 1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition and only have a bet of its truth and nowhere to cash in if it where true by many other 1-p's). The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of a witness in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies. Yes, it is hard to make sense. Witnesses have to be, in some way, independent of influence or control; so how would you explain this in your thinking? For example, we claim that 1+1=2 because all possible examples of such are true and discount the false claims as improper coding or reference. This makes a witness something that has in its 1p a model of 1+1=2 and there are many different witnesses that are accessible to us that believe that 1+1=2. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon. Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming panprotopsychism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Dualism: everything is aware So you quit comp, here, right? Yes, but I am still trying to salvage comp as I do not see it as completely inconsistent with panprotopsychism. It is only your rejection of the necessity of physical implementations that causes the divorce, IMHO. and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD rides on the unitary evolution of the QM system and thus each and every QM ssytem is an observer and has some level of awareness. It is for this reason that I am motivated to assume that the universe is quantum and that the classical picture is just an image that the universe generates via our interactions with each other. You abandon comp to come back to physicalism, but then you lost the comp explanation of both consciousness and matter. Comp gives both a conceptual explanation of the coupling matter/consciousness, and a way to test it from the solution of the measure problem (already mathematical for the

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 7:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Godel numberings are not unique. True, there are a infinite number of ways you could do Godel numbering. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity And you can use any one of those Godel numbering schemes to show that there is not a single one of those infinite number of structural relationships that are powerful enough to do arithmetic and be consistent and complete. The hope is that the scheme mathematicians are using is consistent but incomplete, if it's inconsistent that would be a disaster. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/14/2012 11:53 AM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 7:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Godel numberings are not unique. True, there are a infinite number of ways you could do Godel numbering. Hi John, Yes, but my point here is that this is the same thing as having an infinite number of names for one and the same thing. This makes it impossible to be absolutely sure of what John Clark or Stephen P. King is. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity And you can use any one of those Godel numbering schemes to show that there is not a single one of those infinite number of structural relationships that are powerful enough to do arithmetic and be consistent and complete. The hope is that the scheme mathematicians are using is consistent but incomplete, if it's inconsistent that would be a disaster. Mathematicians get around this problem by defining a unique naming scheme. My point is that this cannot be done at a meta-theoretical level when we have to include a multiplicity of names for the same of multiple entities that are evaluating models of the mathematical scheme. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 14 Sep 2012, at 16:00, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/14/2012 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to just formulate clearly. Dear Bruno, Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result. ? Dear Bruno, On the contrary, everything I say depends on the fact that diagonalization does not apply to computability. Then how do we explain Godel numbering schemes? The ability of one string of numbers to stand for some other is the essence of computational universality, no? I will explain this on FOAR, soon or later, as I have promised. I have already explain this two or three times here. All the magic is there: we can enumerate the computable function, yet we can't diagonalize against them, as the result does not lead to a contradiction, but to a non stopping program. Universality requires just to accept that we have non stopping programs, and no theories to predict in advance which one stop or not. The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never be at the ultimate level, I can' agree more, given that the ultimate level (the one we can mistake with primitive matter) consists in a sum on infinitely many computations (how ever we solve the measure problem). But this statement implies a contradiction that you do not address! To say that at some ultimate level there is something, even a sum on infinitely many computations is to simultaneously also claim, and nothing else. This does not follow. At the ultimate level the ability to distinguish X is true from X is false cannot exist. ? There is no ultimate level. It was a manner of speaking. Thus we cannot make claims of some type of something, here computations, at the ultimate level and thus implying that there are no not-computations without explaining the means by which they are distinguished from each other. You seems to just saying that there is nothing except computations and offer no explanation as to how the computations are excluded from the non-computations at the ultimate level. There are not. The UD dovetails on the oracle too, from the 1p. You have to invoke a plurality of levels in order to have distinguishability, difference itself vanishes at the ultimate level. ? we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it. OK. It is the comp truncateness. Please elaborate! The finite description of your brain that the doctor put in his data folder. Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and abstract and the other concrete an physical. In our setting physical needs to be (re)defined. I agree. The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just 1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition and only have a bet of its truth and nowhere to cash in if it where true by many other 1-p's). The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of a witness in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies. Yes, it is hard to make sense. Witnesses have to be, in some way, independent of influence or control; so how would you explain this in your thinking? For example, we claim that 1+1=2 because all possible examples of such are true No. Some claims this because they got the idea in: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x and discount the false claims as improper coding or reference. This makes a witness something that has in its 1p a model of 1+1=2 and there are many different witnesses that are accessible to us that believe that 1+1=2. The reason why believe this are personal, and does not influence the reasoning. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon. Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble. Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean = anymore than soap means pope, except if artificially defined. But even than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or soap. If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings together with decoding can express, he is right, we can encope pope with soap as well, but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use to do it. Bruno Marchal wrote: That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all. How using only arithmetics? Bruno Marchal wrote: Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously in a faithfull manner in arithmetic. It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should study the subject. You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the validity of what you are studying ;) Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark numerous times. It is like saying You should really study the bible to understand why christianity is right.. Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are willing to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous). Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the problem. You created a problem which is not there. Nope. You try to talk away a problem that is there. Bruno Marchal wrote: It seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it? But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel numbers in arithmetic itself. ? a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... , which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s... (s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality. I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' - there is no such axiom in arithmetic). Bruno Marchal wrote: This would need another non-unique embedding of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse). Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number. Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I confuse everything? Bruno Marchal wrote: For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look at this website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html And now you refer to a site pretending having found a flaw in Gödel's proof. (sigh). You could tell me at the start that you believe Gödel was wrong. I tried to be fair and admit that Gödel did prove something (about what numbers can express together with a meta-level). If you believe that Gödel proved something about arithmetics as seperate axiomatic systems, then the site clearly shows numerous cricitical flaws. It is not pretending anything. It is clearly pointing out where the flaws lie (and similar flaws in other related proofs). I haven't even see any real attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little more than denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction. The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they abstract so much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the proof) and because they are dogmatic about authorities being right. That's why studying will not help much. It just creates more abstraction, further hiding the error. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34427624.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. On 9/13/2012 6:40 AM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble. Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean = anymore than soap means pope, except if artificially defined. But even than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or soap. If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings together with decoding can express, he is right, we can encope pope with soap as well, but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use to do it. Bruno Marchal wrote: That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all. How using only arithmetics? Bruno Marchal wrote: Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously in a faithfull manner in arithmetic. It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should study the subject. You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the validity of what you are studying ;) Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark numerous times. It is like saying You should really study the bible to understand why christianity is right.. Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are willing to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous). Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the problem. You created a problem which is not there. Nope. You try to talk away a problem that is there. Bruno Marchal wrote: It seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it? But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel numbers in arithmetic itself. ? a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... , which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s... (s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality. I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' - there is no such axiom in arithmetic). Bruno Marchal wrote: This would need another non-unique embedding of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse). Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number. Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I confuse everything? Bruno Marchal wrote: For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look at this website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html And now you refer to a site pretending having found a flaw in Gödel's proof. (sigh). You could tell me at the start that you believe Gödel was wrong. I tried to be fair and admit that Gödel did prove something (about what numbers can express together with a meta-level). If you believe that Gödel proved something about arithmetics as seperate axiomatic systems, then the site clearly shows numerous cricitical flaws. It is not pretending anything. It is clearly pointing out where the flaws lie (and similar flaws in other related proofs). I haven't even see any real attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little more than denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction. The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they abstract so much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the proof) and because they are dogmatic about authorities being right. That's why studying will not help much. It just creates more abstraction, further hiding the error. benjayk -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 12 Sep 2012, at 15:28, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote: Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic, no need of meta for that. You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp, both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- intuitive. There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand the main idea quite well. If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof. Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true, because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers. You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that others share this assumption. Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can human prove to impartial observer that they magically know what they are really representing or that they really understand? The idea is that you can understand what they prove as much as you understand what they assume, and this independently of what is the understanding. If *you* agree with the elementary axioms, and inference rule, then you agree, or show a flaw, with the deduction presented to you. The actual interpretation or belief (or disbelief), in the axiom is private and the scientist is mute on this. A scientist will never say I know, in its field of competence, or even outside (but for some reason that is rare: very often scientist forget the scientific attitude in the field of colleagues, apparently). Bruno How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do this, other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't have that great a track record? The consequences of differing leaps of faith on axioms and ontological bets shouldn't be taboo, if scientific search is to remain sincere somehow, why restrict ourselves to the habitual ones? Fruitful discussion from both of you, so thanks for sharing. m -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 12 Sep 2012, at 21:48, benjayk wrote: Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote: Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic, no need of meta for that. You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp, both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- intuitive. There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand the main idea quite well. If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof. Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true, because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers. You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that others share this assumption. Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can human prove to impartial observer that they magically know what they are really representing or that they really understand? How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do this, other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't have that great a track record? Can we even literally prove anything apart from axiomatic systems at all? I don't think so. What would we base the claim that something really is a proof on? The notion of proving seems to be a quite narrow and restricted one to me. That is why we have other notion than proof---which is of the type belief (no Bp - p in general), like knowledge, feeling, experience, etc. Incompleteness makes possible to recover by intensional nuances: for a fixed machine B (I identify the machine with her beliefs) all the Bp, Bp p, Bp Dt, Bp Dt p, etc. concerns exactly the same arithmetical propositions, but obeys quite different logics (classical, intuitionist, quantum-like, etc.). Bruno Apart from that, it seems human understanding is just delusion in many cases, and the rest is very limited at best. Especially when we think we really understand fundamental issues we are the most deluded. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34425351.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 13 Sep 2012, at 12:40, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble. Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean = anymore than soap means pope, except if artificially defined. Nor do = itself, nor nor. But even than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or soap. No, it is not. It is in the rule governing = on which you agree on. If not you beg the question and take the proving machine for a zombie. When I ask my computer to send a mail, he understands very well (usually), despite the ambiguity and arbitrariness of the coding. Today, it does not observes itself in practice, so the sense is still distributed on a much larger spectrum than the specific task that it implements, but that's is contingent. If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings together with decoding can express, he is right, we can encope pope with soap as well, but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use to do it. Indeed. Bruno Marchal wrote: That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all. How using only arithmetics? Like a german grammar written in german. PA talks arithmetic, so we have to translate in arithmetic. Arithmetic is Turing universal, so we can do that without any trouble. We can even so it without classical logic, only the usual axioms for =, and diophantine polynomial of degree less than 4. It took 70 years to prove this: it is not obvious at all, and I find this quite surprising. Bruno Marchal wrote: Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously in a faithfull manner in arithmetic. It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should study the subject. You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the validity of what you are studying ;) Studying implies questioning the validity all along ;) Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark numerous times. It is like saying You should really study the bible to understand why christianity is right.. You seem to talk about Gödel's work, with weird assertion like I don't need to study it to say ..., where a simple study of Gödel would help you to see that you miss something. Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are willing to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous). LOL (we don't have to study no more). Bruno Marchal wrote: It seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it? But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel numbers in arithmetic itself. ? a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... , which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s... (s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality. I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' - there is no such axiom in arithmetic). There is no problem at all given that arithmetic contains its metalanguage. So we do use a metalanguage, which is just arithmetic itself. The second incompleteness theorem not-provable('0=1') implies not-provable('not-provable('0=1')') *is* a theorem of arithmetic. (this is reflected by the fact that G proves ~[]f - ~[](~[]f)). You do need a part non accessible to the arithmetic-machine to say that ~[]f is true, but the machine can guess that. It is not entirely obvious that we can define provable entirely in arithmetic, or in any programming language, but we can, like we can define it entirely in German, or in Fortran. It is no more ambiguous that we can ask a universal to generate the prime numbers, or send mails. Bruno Marchal wrote: This would need another non-unique embedding of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse). Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number. Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I confuse everything? I can't open a parenthesis and provide in one simple sentence the basic of mathematical logic. It takes time for anyone to understand that metamathematics can be arithmetized. There are many good books on that subject. I would say that the second part of sane2004

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1- indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to just formulate clearly. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon. Bruno On 9/13/2012 6:40 AM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble. Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean = anymore than soap means pope, except if artificially defined. But even than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or soap. If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings together with decoding can express, he is right, we can encope pope with soap as well, but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use to do it. Bruno Marchal wrote: That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all. How using only arithmetics? Bruno Marchal wrote: Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously in a faithfull manner in arithmetic. It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should study the subject. You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the validity of what you are studying ;) Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark numerous times. It is like saying You should really study the bible to understand why christianity is right.. Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are willing to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous). Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the problem. You created a problem which is not there. Nope. You try to talk away a problem that is there. Bruno Marchal wrote: It seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it? But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel numbers in arithmetic itself. ? a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... , which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s... (s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality. I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' - there is no such axiom in arithmetic). Bruno Marchal wrote: This would need another non-unique embedding of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse). Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number. Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I confuse everything? Bruno Marchal wrote: For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look at this website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html And now you refer to a site pretending having found a flaw in Gödel's proof. (sigh). You could tell me at the start that you believe Gödel was wrong. I tried to be fair and admit that Gödel did prove something (about what numbers can express together with a meta-level). If you believe that Gödel proved something about arithmetics as seperate axiomatic systems, then the site clearly shows numerous cricitical flaws. It is not pretending anything. It is clearly pointing out where the flaws lie (and similar flaws in other related proofs). I haven't even see any real attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little more than denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction. The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they abstract so much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the proof) and because they are dogmatic about authorities being right. That's why studying will not help much. It just creates more

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/13/2012 4:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. They are not unique, but however they are chosen they represent the same structure. There is no unique representation of QM: wave functions, Hilbert space, Feynmann paths,... But they all predict the same physics and so represent the same structural relations. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. I have some sympathy with this, but Bruno is trying to explain the physical as computational, so he can't very well assume the physical. Although he frequently refers to eliminating the physical, when asked he quickly says he's only explaining the physical and eliminating it as *primitive*. I don't see that as any more problematic or unusual than explaining quarks by strings or spacetime by loop-quantum-gravity. You're not *eliminating* anything - you're just trying to explain it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to just formulate clearly. Dear Bruno, Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result. The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never be at the ultimate level, we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it. Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and abstract and the other concrete an physical. The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just 1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition and only have a bet of its truth and nowhere to cash in if it where true by many other 1-p's). The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of a witness in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon. Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming panprotopsychism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Dualism: everything is aware and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD rides on the unitary evolution of the QM system and thus each and every QM ssytem is an observer and has some level of awareness. It is for this reason that I am motivated to assume that the universe is quantum and that the classical picture is just an image that the universe generates via our interactions with each other. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/13/2012 1:36 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/13/2012 4:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi benjayk, This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic. 1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced. They are not unique, but however they are chosen they represent the same structure. There is no unique representation of QM: wave functions, Hilbert space, Feynmann paths,... But they all predict the same physics and so represent the same structural relations. 2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless. I have some sympathy with this, but Bruno is trying to explain the physical as computational, so he can't very well assume the physical. Although he frequently refers to eliminating the physical, when asked he quickly says he's only explaining the physical and eliminating it as *primitive*. I don't see that as any more problematic or unusual than explaining quarks by strings or spacetime by loop-quantum-gravity. You're not *eliminating* anything - you're just trying to explain it. Brent Hi Brent, Well said. I agree! I jsut wanted to highlight a different point of view from Bruno's. My comments are not a knock-down of his result, it is just an attempt to focus on a different aspect of it. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote: Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic, no need of meta for that. You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp, both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- intuitive. There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand the main idea quite well. If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof. Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true, because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers. You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that others share this assumption. I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the problem. It seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it? But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel numbers in arithmetic itself. This would need another non-unique embedding of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse). For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look at this website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34423214.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote: Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic, no need of meta for that. You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp, both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- intuitive. There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand the main idea quite well. If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof. Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true, because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers. You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that others share this assumption. Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can human prove to impartial observer that they magically know what they are really representing or that they really understand? How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do this, other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't have that great a track record? The consequences of differing leaps of faith on axioms and ontological bets shouldn't be taboo, if scientific search is to remain sincere somehow, why restrict ourselves to the habitual ones? Fruitful discussion from both of you, so thanks for sharing. m -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote: Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic, no need of meta for that. You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp, both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- intuitive. There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand the main idea quite well. If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof. Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true, because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers. You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that others share this assumption. Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can human prove to impartial observer that they magically know what they are really representing or that they really understand? How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do this, other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't have that great a track record? Can we even literally prove anything apart from axiomatic systems at all? I don't think so. What would we base the claim that something really is a proof on? The notion of proving seems to be a quite narrow and restricted one to me. Apart from that, it seems human understanding is just delusion in many cases, and the rest is very limited at best. Especially when we think we really understand fundamental issues we are the most deluded. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34425351.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 12 Sep 2012, at 14:05, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote: Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic, no need of meta for that. You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp, both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- intuitive. There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand the main idea quite well. If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be unambigous, and thus not really a proof. What? this is nonsense. The embedding is not unique, and thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof. This does not follow either. *Many* embeddings do not prevent non ambiguous embedding. Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense. Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble. That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all. What will be proved will be shown independent of the choice of the embeddings. Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously in a faithfull manner in arithmetic. It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should study the subject. or alternatively a level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true, because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers. Gödel could have used it, like in Tarski theorem, but Gödel ingenuosly don't use meaning or semantic in he proof. It is a very constructive proof, which examplifies the mechanisability of its main diagonalization procedure. This has lead to a very great amount of results, the most cool being Solovay arithmetical completeness theorem for the logic of self-reference. You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, What do you mean by exists beyond the axiom.? What transcendent intelligence is doing here? so that they somehow magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that others share this assumption. No need of that belief. Machine's belief are just supposed to be made of the axioms and the rules generating them, which can include inputs, and other possible machines. It is model by Gödel's provability predicate for rich machines. I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the problem. You created a problem which is not there. It seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it? But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel numbers in arithmetic itself. ? a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... , which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s... (s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality. This would need another non-unique embedding of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse). Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number. For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look at this website:

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34417635.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote: Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion. We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even adress the issue. Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we still need a super-meta (etc...). I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic, no need of meta for that. You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp, both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- intuitive. There is no proof that can change this, and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic). But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: even though the paper actually doesn't even begin to adress the question. Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato than to Aristotle. The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for granted, Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of comp, either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies. My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be honest, varying. You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher. It is simply not my job. OK, but if you are solely a logician, you should concern yourself with logical proofs. You don't even define the assumption of your paper in a (theoretically speaking) logical way and your proof contains many philosophical reasonings. Especially step 8, which is criticial in your reasoning. It uses occams razor (which is philosophical, and not necessarily valid in any mathematical or logical context), you use appeals to absurdity (with regards to aribtrary inner experience being associated to null physical activity), you use additional philosophical assumptions (you assume materialist mechanism cannot mean that physical computations are not *exactly* like abstract digital computations, just enough to make a practically digital substitution possible),... So take my criticism to mean that your proof is simply not what you present it as, somehow being beyond philsophy (which is always on some shaky ground). This is what I perceive as slightly dishonest, because it allows you retract from the actual point by demanding to be given a precise refutation or a specific error (as required in logic or math). But your paper is philosophical, and here this logic does not apply. If you'd admit that I am perfectly happy with your paper. It does show something, just not rigorously and not necessarily and not for everyone (some may rightfully disagree with your reasoning due to philosophical reasons which can't be proven or be precisely stated). If someone believes that physics behaves perfectly like abstract computations would and if he doesn't want to invoke some very mysterious form of matter (which does not rely on how it behaves and also not on how it feels or is perceived to be) to sidestep the problem, yes, than your paper may indeed show that this does not make much sense. Unfortunately most materialist do actually believe (perhaps unconsciously) in some very mysterious and strange (and IMO meaningless) kind of matter, so they won't be convinced by your paper. Bruno Marchal wrote: (kinda digital, digital at some level are not enough for a strict reasoning). You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but actually you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point of view. What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view? I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because the theory cannot react with real oxygen. That's the point. A theory cannot conceivably present and acutal point of view. But then your theory just derives something which you call point of view, which in fact may have little to do at all with the actual point of view. QM does not claim to show how a hydrogen atom leads to a real reaction of oxygen, it just describes it. To make it coherent, you would have to weaken your statement to we can derive some description of points of view, or we can show how some description of points of view emerge from arithmetics, which I will happily agree with. However, this would destroy your main point that arithmetics and its point of view is enough as the ontology / epistemology (we need the *actual* point of view). Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: How am I supposed to argue with that? There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption about what the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a meta-level. On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the meta-level can be embedded at the level. Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides some light on the 1//3 issue. But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at that level on the *meta-level*. This is just false. Sorry, I meant on *a* meta-level (not the meta-level that can be embedded, obviously). If

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: even though the paper actually doesn't even begin to adress the question. Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato than to Aristotle. The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for granted, Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of comp, either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies. My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be honest, varying. You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher. It is simply not my job. and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is not true Nor does any scientific theory prove anything if they are false. and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations can lead to a 1p of view). ? The assumption is comp (yes doctore + CT). The conclusion is that physics is secondary and has to be extracted from arithmetic. The gift is that we can use arithmetic to separate the quanta from the qualia. The point is technical. You say assuming COMP, but COMP is either impossible with respect to its own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible due to matter being non-digital), This is not valid, unless you assume to be primitively material, which is shown to be not the case with the comp hypothesis. or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion Unless you have a flaw in mind, the paper illustrate the contrary. (kinda digital, digital at some level are not enough for a strict reasoning). You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but actually you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point of view. What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view? I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because the theory cannot react with real oxygen. Bruno Marchal wrote: How am I supposed to argue with that? There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption about what the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a meta-level. On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the meta-level can be embedded at the level. Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides some light on the 1//3 issue. But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at that level on the *meta-level*. This is just false. Apart from this level, we can't even formulate representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another meta-level). False. I can only suggest you to study the original paper, or to follow some good course in logic. You just miss the most original and admittedly astonishing part of Gödel's proof. You act like Gödel eliminates the meta-level, but he does not do this and indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because otherwise the whole reasoning ceases to make sense). Gödel does not eliminate the metalevel. On the contrary it shows that machines or formal theory can access to it. Bruno Marchal wrote: You just use fancy words to obfuscate that. It i#s like saying study the bible for scientific education (you just don't understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet). No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem remark. I try to ignore that. I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you ignore the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting like you are only showing rational consequences of some belief. I am not acting like. This is what I do. I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine, open and nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to be doing in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional at all. So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue with your points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as being obfuscation). What you call obfuscation is just the originality. I take a problem usually addressed by philosopher or theologian, and I show that if we assume comp, we can derive testable conclusion. I know that some philosophers are sick at this, but that is a tradition in human history. This is discussed in other

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:19, benjayk wrote: You always refer to studying some paper, Always the same. even though the paper actually doesn't even begin to adress the question. Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato than to Aristotle. How am I supposed to argue with that? There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption about what the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a meta-level. On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the meta-level can be embedded at the level. Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides some light on the 1//3 issue. Ther is no point of studying your paper, if all it presents are more abstractions about points of view, without ever showing how to get from 3-p descriptions to an actual 1-p of view (of course, since this is meaningless). The miracle here is that Gödel's incompleteness renders consistent one of the definition of knowledge (first person) given by Theaetetus. It refutes Socrate's refutation of the definition. Of course Socrate could'nt be aware of CT and Gödel. You just use fancy words to obfuscate that. It is like saying study the bible for scientific education (you just don't understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet). No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem remark. I try to ignore that. I work in a theory and I do my best to help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not is another topic. Bruno Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the correct interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like saying No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can substitute it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then insert the result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X. If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case we can't *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original left to interpret the emulation). Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole universe with an emulation (which is possible according to COMP) It is not. You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your reasoning into account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the contradiction. ? Comp is it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of it. Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I don't see a contradiction yet. If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a level at which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even instantiate an abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality is not digital). Contradiction: ... abstract DIGITAL emulation into reality (because observable reality is not DIGITAL). We can emulate digital features in a non digital reality. But not purely digitally. We have to connect and instantiate the digital features in the non-digital reality. And in doing this we necessarily need something beyond the digital, and thus the reasoning about us being digital is not valid. We can't put a digital computer into our brains. But a real computer (and its requires I/O) is not a digital abstract computer, and thus your reasoning fails. But not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital substitution is meaningless in a non-digital universe. I see no reason for that. Because every digital substitution is bound to be ultimately non- digital. Bruno Marchal wrote: Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and argue that COMP says functionally correct substitution, meaning that it also has to be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't derive anything from this, because a correct implementation may actually require a biological brain or even something more. The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution exist. But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague statement, meaning kinda digital substitution. ? If I have a MAC in the head, I am 100% digital. If I survive in a virtual environment with it, I am 100% digital. No. A MAC + your head isn't 100% digital. Both your MAC and the rest

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: even though the paper actually doesn't even begin to adress the question. Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato than to Aristotle. The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for granted, and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is not true and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations can lead to a 1p of view). You say assuming COMP, but COMP is either impossible with respect to its own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible due to matter being non-digital), or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion (kinda digital, digital at some level are not enough for a strict reasoning). You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but actually you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point of view. Bruno Marchal wrote: How am I supposed to argue with that? There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption about what the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a meta-level. On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the meta-level can be embedded at the level. Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides some light on the 1//3 issue. But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at that level on the *meta-level*. Apart from this level, we can't even formulate representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another meta-level). You act like Gödel eliminates the meta-level, but he does not do this and indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because otherwise the whole reasoning ceases to make sense). Bruno Marchal wrote: You just use fancy words to obfuscate that. It i#s like saying study the bible for scientific education (you just don't understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet). No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem remark. I try to ignore that. I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you ignore the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting like you are only showing rational consequences of some belief. I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine, open and nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to be doing in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional at all. So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue with your points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as being obfuscation). Bruno Marchal wrote: I work in a theory and I do my best to help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not is another topic. Well, I am not saying your being *intentionally* misleading or avoiding, but it certainly appears to me that you are avoiding the issue - perhaps because you just don't see it. You are defending your reasoning, while always avoiding the main point that your reasoning does either depend on unstated assumption (we are already digital, or only the digital part of a substitution can matter), or rely on a vague (practically digital substitution) or contradictory (purely digital substitution, which is not possible, because purely digital is nonsense with regards to matter) premise. The same goes for the derivation of points of view. You just derive abstractions, while not adressing that abstractions of points of view don't necessarily have anything to do with an actual point of view (thus confusing your reader which thinks that you actually showed a relation between *actual* points of view and arithmetics). It doesn't matter whether I like COMP or not. I don't find it a very fruitful assumption, but that's not the issue. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34406752.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

You always refer to studying some paper, even though the paper actually doesn't even begin to adress the question. How am I supposed to argue with that? There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption about what the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a meta-level. Ther is no point of studying your paper, if all it presents are more abstractions about points of view, without ever showing how to get from 3-p descriptions to an actual 1-p of view (of course, since this is meaningless). You just use fancy words to obfuscate that. It is like saying study the bible for scientific education (you just don't understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet). Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the correct interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like saying No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can substitute it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then insert the result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X. If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case we can't *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original left to interpret the emulation). Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole universe with an emulation (which is possible according to COMP) It is not. You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your reasoning into account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the contradiction. ? Comp is it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of it. Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I don't see a contradiction yet. If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a level at which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even instantiate an abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality is not digital). Contradiction: ... abstract DIGITAL emulation into reality (because observable reality is not DIGITAL). We can emulate digital features in a non digital reality. But not purely digitally. We have to connect and instantiate the digital features in the non-digital reality. And in doing this we necessarily need something beyond the digital, and thus the reasoning about us being digital is not valid. We can't put a digital computer into our brains. But a real computer (and its requires I/O) is not a digital abstract computer, and thus your reasoning fails. But not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital substitution is meaningless in a non-digital universe. I see no reason for that. Because every digital substitution is bound to be ultimately non-digital. Bruno Marchal wrote: Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and argue that COMP says functionally correct substitution, meaning that it also has to be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't derive anything from this, because a correct implementation may actually require a biological brain or even something more. The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution exist. But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague statement, meaning kinda digital substitution. ? If I have a MAC in the head, I am 100% digital. If I survive in a virtual environment with it, I am 100% digital. No. A MAC + your head isn't 100% digital. Both your MAC and the rest of your head is a physical object, and thus non-digital. You confuse the notions of physically digital and abstractly digital. In this case the brain substitution might not be digital at all, except in a very weak sense by using anything that's - practically speaking - digital (we can already do that), so your reasoning doesn't work. You lost me here. Any actual substitution can't be purely digital, and so the reasoning doesn't work because it reasons as if the substitution is digital. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34402418.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P. But this makes no sense if you only consider the natural numbers. The just contain 123456789 + * and =. There is no notion of veryifying or ExP(x) or even a function in the numbers. Bruno Marchal wrote: Epistemological existence is about the memory content of such numbers, resulting from their complex interaction with other numbers. In the math part, they are handle by prefixing modalities, and have shape like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex []P(x) and more complex one. Note that those are still arithmetical sentences as all modalities used here admit purely arithmetical intepretations. No, they don't. You are severely confusing level and meta-level. Even the notion of arithmetical interpretation doesn't make sense with regards to numbers. They don't formulate anything regarding interpretations. They just contain simply number relations. You may invoke Gödel in that point, saying that they are more than that. But Gödel is only proving that we can formulate higher level concepts using numbers. He is not proving anything about numbers as a seperate axiomatic system. The proof only makes sense with regards to more powerful systems that use the numbers. Bruno Marchal wrote: For me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the ontology, because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view. ... from the 1p views. But when we search a scientific theory we bet on some sharable reality beyond the 1p view, be it a physical universe or an arithmetical one. If that is want science means, then science is obviously nonsense. There is no thing beyond the 1p view, since everything we have is the 1p view and a 3p view is only an abstraction within it. Yes, science can allow us to find sharable things beyond our *local personal* viewpoint. But in your theory 1p describes all the viewpoints, not one particular viewpoint. Bruno Marchal wrote: How is any of it more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols? T#gtti Hyz# 8P^ii ? Exactly, this is as meaningful as your statements, in a vacuum. The point is simply that axioms by themselves are meaningless. We need to make sense of them, and this itself needs something fundamentally beyond them. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It seems like total nonsense to me (sorry). Because the abstraction provides a way to make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p views and abstract their own idea of what numbers are. NUMBERS CONSCIOUSNESS PHYSICAL REALM HUMAN HUMAN'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBERS Unfortunately this just doesn't work. You never show how numbers can actually have 1p views in the first place. The notion is completely meaningless. It is like saying that a word has a point of view. All you do is reflect in the numbers what is already completely beyond the numbers. But this doesn't make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p view at all. It just shows that you can interpret pretty much everything into numbers. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and computers. OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that you take it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes sense in that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider it plausible, or honestly even meaningful. Then you have to tell me what is not Turing emulable in the functioning of the brain. *everything*! You point here on their material constitution. That begs the question. Brains are material objects, but appealing to their material constitution begs the question? Just to remind you, even according to COMP brains *are* material, non-emulable objects. Given that they are material objects, why would that not matter? I'd say it is *bound* to matter, because it is what is fundamental about them. Bruno Marchal wrote: Rather show me *what is* turing emulable in the brain. The chemical reactions, the neuronal processing, etc. Anything described in any book on brain. There has never been a single chemical reaction in a computer. Just simulated chemical reactions, which just don't do the same as real chemical reactions (like transforming a certain amount of energy from on

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 05 Sep 2012, at 20:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. Hi Bruno, So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p? This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me. Dear Bruno, In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is not a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about representations of 1p not the content of the 1p itself. There are situations when the map is not the territory... The 1p of the machine have no 3p-representations at all. This follows simply from Theaetetus definition of knowledge in arithmetic, with believability played by provability (as we lost Provable(p) - p), and restrict the interview on ideally correct machine. With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent). But you are assuming that numbers can do the work. I beg to differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they do not do anything at all. There is no action in numbers. To represent action we need at least functions to map some object to some other different object. You forget that a universal number associate to each number an action mapping number on number. As I just recall in another post u(i, x) = phi_i(x). So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like 1+1=2 remains true in absence of any thinker. But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it cannot be known in any way? Its truth is its meaning. It has nothing to do with being known or not by an agent. In logic this is universally accepted for arithmetic, but not for more powerful theories. I can only make sense of your claim here if I stipulate that you think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for the content of the statement; such that if the statement is true then it does not matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how you go from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as the particular property of the sentence 1+1=2 to the truth of the intention of the sentence. Good. machines already can know that we can't. Bp - p is not provable for arbitrary sentence. With comp, Truth is only a private hope, somehow. How is the sentence #8$% not equally true in the absence of any thinker and have the same meaning as 1+1=2? #8$% is a sentence, not a proposition. When I say that 1+1=2 is true, I mean only that 1 + 1 = 2, not that the sentence 1+1=2 is true. So if you want to know if #8$% is true, just tell me if #8$% or not. perhaps explain the meaning of it. You might confuse sentence and proposition. It is obvious that IF 1+1=2 means that Stephen Paul King is 42 km high, it is plausibly false, but that would not change the fact that 1 + 1 is equal to 2. What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that there is something above that some how can see the truth of 1+1=2 and know that it is a true sentence and that it is completely immaterial and not a thinker. Plato was a bit more circumspect about assuming such things, I hope! Just saying that 1+1=2, and that such a fact does not depend on me, you, or the physical universe. To be communicated, yes, you need a physical universe, or a human universe, that is some stable sharable computations with the relevant measure, etc. That's the problem I explain we have to solve. It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X - X' changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would be a variable of or in X, X', ... . A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence. Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model- less theories? Are they even possible? In first order logic: A theory has a model (but not as a term in itself) iff it is consistent (that is; does not prove f). We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem). Sure, but that is a separate issue. The 3p description of a

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:16, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P. But this makes no sense if you only consider the natural numbers. The just contain 123456789 + * and =. There is no notion of veryifying or ExP(x) or even a function in the numbers. ExP(x) is a proposition of RA, so that is the kind of thing PA manages all the time. And RA can also handle the sentence ExP(x), in its language, of course, representing it by some number (s(s(s(s(s... s(0...). You might study Gödel 1931, or some books. Bruno Marchal wrote: Epistemological existence is about the memory content of such numbers, resulting from their complex interaction with other numbers. In the math part, they are handle by prefixing modalities, and have shape like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex []P(x) and more complex one. Note that those are still arithmetical sentences as all modalities used here admit purely arithmetical intepretations. No, they don't. You are severely confusing level and meta-level. Even the notion of arithmetical interpretation doesn't make sense with regards to numbers. They don't formulate anything regarding interpretations. They just contain simply number relations. At one level. But my computer already understand that he has to send this post. Despite at some level it is only number crunching. You may invoke Gödel in that point, saying that they are more than that. But Gödel is only proving that we can formulate higher level concepts using numbers. He is not proving anything about numbers as a seperate axiomatic system. As I said. Please take the time to study it. The proof only makes sense with regards to more powerful systems that use the numbers. G* minus G, yes. G no. It is precisely what the number system can prove about itself. Still, the machine can *guess* its G*. Bruno Marchal wrote: For me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the ontology, because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view. ... from the 1p views. But when we search a scientific theory we bet on some sharable reality beyond the 1p view, be it a physical universe or an arithmetical one. If that is want science means, then science is obviously nonsense. There is no thing beyond the 1p view, since everything we have is the 1p view and a 3p view is only an abstraction within it. If I thought you were an abstraction within my 1-view, I would not reply. Yes, science can allow us to find sharable things beyond our *local personal* viewpoint. But in your theory 1p describes all the viewpoints, not one particular viewpoint. Unclear. I don't have a theory, I borrow the comp hypothesis, only. There are 8 (and more) type of viewpoints (first person, third person, first person plural, observable, sensible, etc.) and they can have infinitely many different particular contents. Bruno Marchal wrote: How is any of it more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols? T#gtti Hyz# 8P^ii ? Exactly, this is as meaningful as your statements, in a vacuum. The point is simply that axioms by themselves are meaningless. OK. But axioms are always accompanied by rules. Always. We need to make sense of them, and this itself needs something fundamentally beyond them. Yes. With comp a good notion of truth, but you would beg the question if you use this to pretend that we are more than machine. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It seems like total nonsense to me (sorry). Because the abstraction provides a way to make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p views and abstract their own idea of what numbers are. NUMBERS CONSCIOUSNESS PHYSICAL REALM HUMAN HUMAN'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBERS Unfortunately this just doesn't work. You never show how numbers can actually have 1p views in the first place. (sigh). read the sane04 paper. The notion is completely meaningless. It is like saying that a word has a point of view. All you do is reflect in the numbers what is already completely beyond the numbers. But this doesn't make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p view at all. It just shows that you can interpret pretty much everything into numbers. I just listen to what machine ideally correct can prove about themselves and the logic of their possible observation, and this by using the most standard definition in the

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. Hi Bruno, So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p? This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me. With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent). So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like 1+1=2 remains true in absence of any thinker. It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X - X' changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would be a variable of or in X, X', ... . A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence. We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem). Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 04 Sep 2012, at 22:40, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that the RA level would be enough. Why? No system can reason as if it did not exist, because to be coherent it would than have to cease to reason. Why? You just seem to reason that if you don't exist you would cease to reason. But I don't see the relevance of this to what I said. If PA realizes that RA is enough, then this can only mean that RA + its own realization about RA is enough. Yes, that is why PA can believe that RA is it ontological source, despite being much epistemologically much stronger than RA. Bruno Marchal wrote: I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can be made sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low level is enough. For the ontology. Yes. I honestly never understood what you mean by ontology and epistemology. Ontology is what we take as existing at the base level. In my favorite theory what exist is simply 0, s(0), etc. And nothing else. Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P. Epistemological existence is about the memory content of such numbers, resulting from their complex interaction with other numbers. In the math part, they are handle by prefixing modalities, and have shape like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex []P(x) and more complex one. Note that those are still arithmetical sentences as all modalities used here admit purely arithmetical intepretations. For me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the ontology, because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view. ... from the 1p views. But when we search a scientific theory we bet on some sharable reality beyond the 1p view, be it a physical universe or an arithmetical one. Arithmetic is one possible epistemology. And assuming comp, it is one possible epistemology. I don't even get what it could mean that numbers are ontologically real, as we know them only as abstractions (so they are epistemology). If we try to talk as if numbers are fundamentally real - independent of things - we can't even make sense of numbers. ? I can. One number, two numbers, three numbers, etc. What is the abstract difference between 1 and 2 for example. 1 :) What is the difference between 0s and 0ss? 0s What's the difference between the true statement that 1+1=2 and the false statement that 1+2=2? You just named it. The first is true, the second is false. How is any of it more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols? T#gtti Hyz# 8P^ii ? We can only make sense of them as we see that they refer to numbers *of objects* (like for example the string s). OK. If we don't do that we could as well embrace axioms like 1=2 or 1+1+1=1 or 1+9=2343-23 or 1+3=*?ABC or whatever else. OK. Bruno Marchal wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It seems like total nonsense to me (sorry). Because the abstraction provides a way to make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p views and abstract their own idea of what numbers are. NUMBERS CONSCIOUSNESS PHYSICAL REALM HUMAN HUMAN'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBERS Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and computers. OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that you take it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes sense in that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider it plausible, or honestly even meaningful. Then you have to tell me what is not Turing emulable in the functioning of the brain. *everything*! You point here on their material constitution. That begs the question. Rather show me *what is* turing emulable in the brain. The chemical reactions, the neuronal processing, etc. Anything described in any book on brain. Even according to COMP, nothing is, since the brain is material and matter is not emulable. Right. But that matter exists only in the 1p plural view, not in the ontology. As I see it, the brain as such has nothing to do with emulability. We can do simulations,

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. Hi Bruno, So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p? This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me. Dear Bruno, In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is not a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about representations of 1p not the content of the 1p itself. There are situations when the map is not the territory... With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent). But you are assuming that numbers can do the work. I beg to differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they do not do anything at all. There is no action in numbers. To represent action we need at least functions to map some object to some other different object. So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like 1+1=2 remains true in absence of any thinker. But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it cannot be known in any way? I can only make sense of your claim here if I stipulate that you think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for the content of the statement; such that if the statement is true then it does not matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how you go from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as the particular property of the sentence 1+1=2 to the truth of the intention of the sentence. How is the sentence #8$% not equally true in the absence of any thinker and have the same meaning as 1+1=2? What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that there is something above that some how can see the truth of 1+1=2 and know that it is a true sentence and that it is completely immaterial and not a thinker. Plato was a bit more circumspect about assuming such things, I hope! It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X - X' changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would be a variable of or in X, X', ... . A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence. Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model-less theories? Are they even possible? We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem). Sure, but that is a separate issue. The 3p description of a machine is, in your sentence here, taken from the intentional stance (or point of view) of another entity (that is not the machine in question), so that makes it bisimilar to the 1p of a separate entity. Where is the contradiction to my claim? -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 03 Sep 2012, at 16:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that the RA level would be enough. Why? I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can be made sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low level is enough. For the ontology. Yes. This is precisely the calim that I don't understand at all. You say that we only need natural numbers and + and *, and that the rest emerges from that as the 1-p viewpoint of the numbers. I say that this follows from comp. Unfortunately the 1-p viewpoint itself can't be found in the numbers, it can only be found in what transcends the numbers, or what the numbers really are / refer to (which also completely beyond our conception of numbers). ? That's the problem with Gödel as well. His unprovable statement about numbers is really a meta-statement about what numbers express that doesn't even make sense if we only consider the definition of numbers. He really just shows that we can reason about numbers and with numbers in ways that can't be captured by numbers (but in this case what we do with them has little to do with the numbers themselves). Gödel already knew that the numbers (theories) can do that. He bet that the second incompleteness theorem is a theorem of PA. This will be proved by Hilbert and Bernays later. Then Löb generalized this, etc. I agree that computations reflect many things about us (infinitely many things, even), but we still transcend them infinitely. Numbers can do that to, relatively to universal numbers. It is the whole (technical) point. Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. Bruno Marchal wrote: Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. On some level, I agree. But not far from the level that he survives in his quotes and writings. He does not survive in writing and quotes. That is only a metaphor. But he does survive in the usual sense in the emulation, assuming comp. Bruno Marchal wrote: That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. Which assumes that the world is divided in low-level processes and high-level processes. Like arithmetic. Bruno Marchal wrote: It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. Hi Bruno, So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p? It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X - X' changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would be a variable of or in X, X', ... . -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that the RA level would be enough. Why? No system can reason as if it did not exist, because to be coherent it would than have to cease to reason. If PA realizes that RA is enough, then this can only mean that RA + its own realization about RA is enough. Bruno Marchal wrote: I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can be made sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low level is enough. For the ontology. Yes. I honestly never understood what you mean by ontology and epistemology. For me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the ontology, because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view. Arithmetic is one possible epistemology. I don't even get what it could mean that numbers are ontologically real, as we know them only as abstractions (so they are epistemology). If we try to talk as if numbers are fundamentally real - independent of things - we can't even make sense of numbers. What is the abstract difference between 1 and 2 for example. What is the difference between 0s and 0ss? What's the difference between the true statement that 1+1=2 and the false statement that 1+2=2? How is any of it more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols? We can only make sense of them as we see that they refer to numbers *of objects* (like for example the string s). If we don't do that we could as well embrace axioms like 1=2 or 1+1+1=1 or 1+9=2343-23 or 1+3=*?ABC or whatever else. Bruno Marchal wrote: Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Yes. If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It seems like total nonsense to me (sorry). Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and computers. OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that you take it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes sense in that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider it plausible, or honestly even meaningful. Then you have to tell me what is not Turing emulable in the functioning of the brain. *everything*! Rather show me *what is* turing emulable in the brain. Even according to COMP, nothing is, since the brain is material and matter is not emulable. As I see it, the brain as such has nothing to do with emulability. We can do simulations, sure, but these have little to do with an actual brain, except that they mirror what we know about it. It seems to me you are simply presuming that everything that's relevant in the brain is turing emulable, even despite the fact that according to your own assumption nothing really is turing emulable about the brain. Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, I don't take comp for granted, I assume it. It is quite different. I am mute on my personal beliefs, except they change all the time. But you seems to believe that comp is inconsistent or meaningless, but you don't make your point. I don't know how to make it more clear. COMP itself leads to the conclusion that our brains fundamentally can't be emulated, yet it starts with the assumption that they can be emulated. We can only somehow try to rescue COMPs consistency by postulating that what the brain is doesn't matter at all, only what an emulation of it would be like. I genuinely can't see the logic behind this at all. Bruno Marchal wrote: In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the correct interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like saying No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can substitute it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then insert the result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X. If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case we can't *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original left to interpret the emulation). Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole universe with an emulation (which is possible according to COMP) It is not. You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your reasoning into account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that the RA level would be enough. I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can be made sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low level is enough. This is precisely the calim that I don't understand at all. You say that we only need natural numbers and + and *, and that the rest emerges from that as the 1-p viewpoint of the numbers. Unfortunately the 1-p viewpoint itself can't be found in the numbers, it can only be found in what transcends the numbers, or what the numbers really are / refer to (which also completely beyond our conception of numbers). That's the problem with Gödel as well. His unprovable statement about numbers is really a meta-statement about what numbers express that doesn't even make sense if we only consider the definition of numbers. He really just shows that we can reason about numbers and with numbers in ways that can't be captured by numbers (but in this case what we do with them has little to do with the numbers themselves). I agree that computations reflect many things about us (infinitely many things, even), but we still transcend them infinitely. Strangely you agree for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view. Bruno Marchal wrote: Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. On some level, I agree. But not far from the level that he survives in his quotes and writings. Bruno Marchal wrote: That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. Which assumes that the world is divided in low-level processes and high-level processes. Bruno Marchal wrote: It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.). Your chess example only works because chess is already played on a computer. Yes, you can often substitute one computer for another (though even this often comes with problems),

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a existence a non-zero measure. Terren On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the infinite computations going through my state. Otherwise, I think the physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the particulars of how the UD unfolds. Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence is actually zero. Which is a contradiction. You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we might as well think of it's computations as completed. I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists. Brent Terren On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you. Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Wouldn't that alternative be one in which there are only a finite number of possible persons?...e.g. materialism. Bren On 8/30/2012 7:49 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a existence a non-zero measure. Terren On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the infinite computations going through my state. Otherwise, I think the physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the particulars of how the UD unfolds. Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence is actually zero. Which is a contradiction. You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we might as well think of it's computations as completed. I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists. Brent Terren On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you. Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 30 Aug 2012, at 06:21, meekerdb wrote: On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the infinite computations going through my state. Otherwise, I think the physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the particulars of how the UD unfolds. OK. All what counts should be the relative measure. In some state, some continuations should have a bigger measure, and this should correspond to more computations going in your current states, and the most probable next one. Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence is actually zero. Which is a contradiction. You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, Well, with comp Platonia is just a tiny part of arithmetical truth, and the UD exists there in some provable way. We don't need to think this to make it true. then we might as well think of it's computations as completed. OK. I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists. But this mixes different questions. Computations involving PI might have, from the first person machine's point of view, a high measure, in case the circle idea-program get some relatively local crucial rôle (as it is very probable, as the circle is a key in many part of number theory, and elsewhere). Bruno Brent Terren On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you. Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012/8/29 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in arithmetic. This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would contradict comp. No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD. Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences. Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about in his step 8. I don't recall Bruno ever talking about free floating minds. The only thing he said is that the physical world result of the indeterminacy on the infinite set of computations that goes through our current state (the one assumed perfectly captured at the right substitution level) that diverge on the next step. Quentin Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem. Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white rabbit problem using ideas from game theory? Brent -- -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. Seems pretty precise to me. The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a time. If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi Brent, I didn't wrote what is quoted, it's Stephen ;) Quentin 2012/8/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. Seems pretty precise to me. The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a time. If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/29/2012 2:08 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in arithmetic. This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would contradict comp. No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD. Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences. Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about in his step 8. I don't recall Bruno ever talking about free floating minds. The only thing he said is that the physical world result of the indeterminacy on the infinite set of computations that goes through our current state (the one assumed perfectly captured at the right substitution level) that diverge on the next step. Quentin Hi Quentin, You are technically correct, but that merely sidesteps the point. The problem that I am trying to overcome is the non-uniqueness of Godel numberings. There are an infinite number of currect states (of which our current state is one) and each of these has an infinite number of computations running though them. I agree with this piece of the idea, btw. The states are identical to each other in the sense that there is nothing that distinguishes them so we need a mechanism that relates them in a non-trivial way. What I am considering is a way to define orderings on them; a way to daisy chain them by defining the fixed point of one (a spacial point) to be not a fixed point on the next one. There is a rule involved that relates the possibility of a state to be a fixed point to whether or not it was previously, thereby setting up a precedent rule. The key is to use the use of a constant by a non-standard model of arithmetic as a one-time fixed point (like a unique one time cypher for the Godel numbering), so that we can use the plurality of non-equivalent non-standard models as a boon and not a curse. We end up with strings of strongly related models and a nice way to solve the white rabbit problem. Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem. Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white rabbit problem using ideas from game theory? -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. Seems pretty precise to me. The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a time. If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you. Brent -- Hi Brent, Yes it will eventually generate me, but with a measure zero chance. The UD seems to be ergodic on the Integers. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. Seems pretty precise to me. The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a time. If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you. Brent -- Hi Brent, Yes it will eventually generate me, but with a measure zero chance. The UD seems to be ergodic on the Integers. Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/29/2012 10:52 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. Seems pretty precise to me. The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a time. If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you. Brent -- Hi Brent, Yes it will eventually generate me, but with a measure zero chance. The UD seems to be ergodic on the Integers. Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent I agree but the details of this are being crudely glossed over and they are of utmost importance here! We need a precise definition of the at any stage short of the infinite completion term. I suspect that we can capture this using the uncountable infinity of non-standard models of arithmetic http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-standard_model_of_arithmetic and relations between the models to give us a nice formal model. The existence of non-standard models of arithmetic can be demonstrated by an application of the compactness theorem. To do this, a set of axioms P* is defined in a language including the language of Peano arithmetic together with a new constant symbol x. The axioms consist of the axioms of Peano arithmetic P together with another infinite set of axioms: for each numeral n, the axiom x n is included. Any finite subset of these axioms is satisfied by a model which is the standard model of arithmetic plus the constant x interpreted as some number larger than any numeral mentioned in the finite subset of P*. Thus by the compactness theorem there is a model satisfying all the axioms P*. Since any model of P* is a model of P (since a model of a set of axioms is obviously also a model of any subset of that set of axioms), we have that our extended model is also a model of the Peano axioms. /The element of this model corresponding to x cannot be a standard number, because as indicated it is larger than any standard number/. The x would play the role of the inverse of the epsilon of proximity to infinite completion. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi Terry, I think so too. I wonder if this could be captured by assuming the opposite of Cantor continuum hypothesis? Or by thinking of computations as integers embedded in hyperreal numbers. On 8/29/2012 12:04 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you. Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the infinite computations going through my state. Otherwise, I think the physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the particulars of how the UD unfolds. Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence is actually zero. Which is a contradiction. Terren On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you. Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the infinite computations going through my state. Otherwise, I think the physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the particulars of how the UD unfolds. Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence is actually zero. Which is a contradiction. You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we might as well think of it's computations as completed. I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists. Brent Terren On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you. Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. Terren Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

What you are all missing is this: A particular kind of pattern (in sand or salt) can be generated by generating a specific sound (cymatics). The same pattern would be generated whether or not any human ear was present to hear the 'sound' as an audible experience. The same pattern could be manually generated by other means - sweeping the salt into the desired shapes by hand or tiny magnetic robots, etc. This process would generate no audible experience to anyone. While we have grown accustomed to thinking of sound waves as something that literally exists and causes physical changes, if we pay attention to the process of generating sound, we can realize that it can only be generated by mechanically vibrating a physical object to begin with. Indeed, without a molecule-filled plenum to vibrate, there is no way for sound to propagate between solid objects which are separated by space. This illustrates that the wave itself - the computation, does not exist independently of the objects which are participating in the event. The event has computable aspects - its predictable effects on objects of particular forms and densities, etc, but the sound that is associated with the wave in a human mind is not computable. There is no reason to assume that the vibratory behaviors which we observe with some (but not all) of our other human senses, visual and tactile, is any more of an objective definition than the quality of the sound to our ears. Computation is always only something that material stuff is doing - and material stuff is only a tactile-visual presentation. So why would any kind of oracle requirement of a computation conjure up any quality or possibility of an 'experience'? This assumes that scooping salt in fancy circles makes sound magically appear in the universe. Computation does not need awareness, but awareness needs computation as a way of externalizing experience. Computation cannot be primitive because we would never know about it - nothing would know about it. Computation is an abstract skeleton of relation between objects, but it can never explain imagination or sense itself. Craig On Sunday, August 26, 2012 2:56:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote: I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness are not required). And now a subtle point. Perhaps. The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required for it. Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the form of a some non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say) Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my substitution level, because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence operates outside my brain, and if the doctor copy me at the right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to the oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that oracle. Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of that oracle? Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in this case, he will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of all finite approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle. A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine. That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical world and consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides essential interactions with consciousness as a computational process. Of course that doesn't require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too. Brent Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite interface. The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even infinite non computable one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/R0T6XKcN6JoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/27/2012 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. Dear Bruno, Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean about this! What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I miss what you are asking. Dear Bruno, The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds. SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and, at most, a plurality of references to that one mind. ? After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first person plural handled the many minds. Dear Bruno, I am trying to get you to explain to us in detail how the copy and paste operation of a body (as described in your papers) generates copies of minds that are not identical to each other. BTW, there is a very nice Google Book of Smorynski's article on self-reference here http://books.google.com/books?hl=enlr=id=wwXfHT5ka_8Coi=fndpg=PA1dq=logic+of+arithmetical+self-referenceots=51rs_0l3Mlsig=UhcErZpSm4KTECVdkfLfwMF1LBk#v=onepageq=logic%20of%20arithmetical%20self-referencef=false . That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels? There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels are correct, I would say, by definition. OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world... Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in arithmetic. This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would contradict comp. I have a solution to this! Use the relativization that we can get by relativizing the Tennenbaum theorem! Each mind is associated with a unique constant that it cannot see, as it is its Kleene fixed point. That way we can have a true plurality of unique and distinct minds. Somewhat surprisingly, it was the poker game http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_man%27s_bluff_%28poker%29 of blind man's bluff and the book by Smullyan /What Is the Name of This Book? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0139550623 /that gave me the idea. It

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in arithmetic. This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would contradict comp. No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD. But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences. Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in arithmetic. This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would contradict comp. No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD. Hi Brent, Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors. But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences. Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about in his step 8. Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem. Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white rabbit problem using ideas from game theory? Brent -- -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 26 Aug 2012, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote: I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness are not required). And now a subtle point. Perhaps. The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required for it. Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the form of a some non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say) Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my substitution level, because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence operates outside my brain, and if the doctor copy me at the right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to the oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that oracle. Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of that oracle? Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in this case, he will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of all finite approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle. A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine. That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical world and consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides essential interactions with consciousness as a computational process. OK. Of course that doesn't require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too. It has to have the two aspects, and, a priori, the random oracles rules, as they are vastly more numerous. That's the measure, or white rabbit problem. Physics must be described by something linear at the bottom and involving deep (in Bennett sense) observer, so as to stabilize consciousness on long coherent histories. That would makes us both relatively rare, and yet multiplied in a continuum, if the physical computation manage well the dovetailing on the oracles. The math confirms this, but a refutation of comp is not yet completely excluded too. Bruno Brent Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite interface. The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even infinite non computable one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. Dear Bruno, Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean about this! What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I miss what you are asking. That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels? There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels are correct, I would say, by definition. If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you will not see the difference (except for the price of the computer and memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK? It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.). But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of a physical implementation, In which modal logic? what is universal is that not a particular physical system is required for the chess program. With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and computers. I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions between separate minds implies seperation of implementations and this only happens in the physical realm. No, this is not correct. You fail to appreciate that all implementations and interactions are already emulated in arithmetic, as

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. Dear Bruno, Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean about this! What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I miss what you are asking. Dear Bruno, The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds. SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and, at most, a plurality of references to that one mind. That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels? There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels are correct, I would say, by definition. OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world... If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you will not see the difference (except for the price of the computer and memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK? Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process these seems to be the implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Bruno are not one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can be come him merely by reading a book just changing your name. It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. Dear Bruno, Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean about this! What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I miss what you are asking. Dear Bruno, The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds. SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and, at most, a plurality of references to that one mind. ? After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first person plural handled the many minds. That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels? There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels are correct, I would say, by definition. OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world... Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in arithmetic. If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you will not see the difference (except for the price of the computer and memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK? Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process these seems to be the implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Bruno are not one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can be come him merely by reading a book just changing your name. Yes. comp has no problem with many minds. It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Sun, Aug 26, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: A pendulum is only a metal rod. A clock is nothing but gears A brain is nothing but a glob of grey goo says the robot. There is no clock sauce that makes this assembly a clock. Yes there is, the clock sauce is the information on what the position of the atoms in the clock should be in. You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not do so for a reason. You are the one who is relating everything to the idea of reasons, not me. That is quite simply untrue, I never said everything happens for a reason! I said everything happens for a reason OR everything does NOT happen for a reason. Why this is supposed to be controversial escapes me. Why should we want to justify anything in the first place. You tell me, you're the one who brought up justification. I would never assume that someone has no reason for their belief Then assuming your beliefs are consistent (a gargantuan assumption I admit) you believe that the belief generator in the mind is as deterministic as a cuckoo clock. I don't think in terms of winning debates or proving their unworthiness to myself Baloney. Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so I guess typhoons have free will. Are you being serious? Should we put typhoons on trial and punish them so that they will learn to stay away from our populated areas? You tell me, you're the one going on and on about how the fact that reasons can be complex has something to do with the free will noise. The cuckoo clock can't choose from among the many influences or choose to seek a new alternative, but I can. You choose it because you liked it better than the alternative, so you made the choice for a reason, and the mechanical bird jumped out of the clock at noon for a reason too. For months now you have been chanting the word choose as if it magically sweeps away all problems, it does not I made the reason. And something caused you to make that reason or something did not cause you to make that reason. Cuckoo clock or roulette wheel. Reasoning is a process Yes exactly, reasoning is a process, that is to say it is a series of steps leading to a outcome, a very good example of that would be a computer program. Voluntary manslaughter is not an accident, it is unpremeditated murder. There is a difference. A difference the law is unable to coherently explain which is why criminal law is such a incredible muddle. It sounds like you are saying they [my opinions] are robotic, in which case there is no possibility that your robotic opinions could be any closer to an objective truth than my robotic opinions. Not true. If steps in my reasoning have fewer random errors in them than you have and the process does not start with axioms like everything is true and everything is false then my robotic opinions will be closer to the truth than your robotic opinions. I t's funny that you care about the free market but without any free agency to actually use it. You could make a model approximating how the world economy will evolve if you assume all 7 billion people are rational agents trying to maximize their gain. It's only a approximation because some people are not rational and gain can mean more than just making money, and even so that's far too complex for even a supercomputer to calculate; so we must make due with a simplified approximation of a simplified approximation of the real thing. And I haven't even mentioned things like the weather, earthquakes and technological progress which can strongly influence economies. The communists thought they could figure all this out and history proved them to be not just wrong but spectacularly wrong. The reason doesn't matter even if their was one. Then I don't know what doesn't matter means because X caused Y and X did not cause Y doesn't mean anything. The butterfly wing was the reason. Who cares. I do. The point is that you can't approach the totality of the cosmos and consciousness as a mechanical problem. True, but the totality of the cosmos and consciousness is a mechanical problem or it is not a mechanical problem. I don't think that having reasons or no reasons matters at all. I believe that's true, that is what you think. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons. None of them are the reasons of a clock. Certainly it’s the reasons of a clock. The reason a cuckoo clock runs at the speed it does is the length of its pendulum, a different clock with a different pendulum would run at a different speed because there was a different reason. If you must manufacture reasons, You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not do so for a reason. The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a reason later. You and I are better than cuckoo clocks at justification, at finding the reason we acted as we did but we are far from perfect in this regard, sometimes we think we know why we did something but really do not, and sometimes we don't even have a clue. And think about the debates on this list, once you've shown that your opponent has the belief he does for no reason you feel you've won the debate. Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so I guess typhoons have free will. There are countless reasons which can influence me And there are also countless reasons which can influence a cuckoo clock. but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence And you made that choice for a reason or you made that choice for no reason, and the clock cuckooed for a reason or it cuckooed for no reason. And I don't know the reason you find this simple observation confusing, but I do know you don't understand it for a reason or you don't understand it for no reason. I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor predetermined More of the X is not Y and X is not not Y crap in a desperate attempt to prove that what you want to believe is true; and with a axiom like that you should have no difficulty whatsoever in finding your proof, not that it will tell you anything about how the world works. And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position. Absolutely! If I move from point X to point Y then one of 2 things must be true: 1) I did so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I wanted to. 2) I did NOT do so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I did NOT want to. My question was very specific: Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? There could be disagreement about that, I have my opinion and you have yours, but I know one thing for certain, one of those 2 possibilities must be true. I produce the particular sequence of ASCII characters that I did after your sequence about the free will noise for a reason or I did so for no reason. And I remind you that even a robot doesn't feel like a robot because he's never sure what he's going to do next until he does it. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are proved. All proofs depend on the axioms used and axioms are supposed to be simple and self evidently true, but your basic axiom is everything is true and everything is false and so you can prove or disprove and even prove AND disprove, anything you like. if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they are noise. If they are random then yes they are noise, but if they are robotic then they are not, then it is logical and based on truth. And by the way, they find the word robot offensive, I've seen them cry over the epithet, they ask us not to use the R word and prefer metallic man. The market for eggs is not automatic, nor is it random. The free market has no difficulty whatsoever determining what the price of eggs should be. despite attempts to beat financial markets using technical analysis alone, such attempts repeatedly fail because no formula can account for all real world possibilities. Yes, world economics is much too complicated for a simple formula to describe its richness, and that's why the free market prove to be superior to a planned economy like communism, the planners thought they had it all figured out but in reality they never even came close. And for the same reason nobody has developed a formula about how air moves inside a hypersonic jet engine, but nobody thinks its because the engine chooses to move the air in one way rather than another by using its free will in some vague mystical way. It isn't random, nor is it determined by any historical reason except in hindsight. Except? Not knowing a reason and a reason not existing are two very different things. Why would you speak at all? I am speaking and obviously I am doing so for a reason or I am doing so for no reason; I think I'm doing so

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote: I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness are not required). And now a subtle point. Perhaps. The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required for it. Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the form of a some non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say) Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my substitution level, because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence operates outside my brain, and if the doctor copy me at the right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to the oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that oracle. Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of that oracle? Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in this case, he will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of all finite approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle. A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine. Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite interface. The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even infinite non computable one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 25 Aug 2012, at 22:56, meekerdb wrote: On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can be used as an argument here. Normally?? The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the Bekenstein bound. I don't know in what sense it should be extracted from something else, but if you can do so, please do. It would certainly impress me. UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take 10001000 centuries is not relevant. Oh, OK, you mean assuming the world is generated by the UDA then it follows that the holographic principle (assuming it's true) is also generated by the UDA (along with everything else). I guess you mean generated by the UD (the UD is a program, UDA is just an argument). More or less OK, but it is not clear if you are not forgetting the first person indeterminacy. The real physical world is never generated by the UD, it is only recovered by the machines/programs, from their first person points of view based on the entire (infinite, non computable) domain of indeterminacy. And this can help to see a sort of hologram at play, as that UD* border has to be a fractal structure with itself embedded everywhere. But I have never to much dig on that aspect, to be sure. Unlike Schmidhuber and Tegmark seems to think, comp does not allow to believe that the physical universe is a program among others, at least a priori. It is a richer epistemological invariant, not computable a priori, pertaining to a sum on all computations. Schmidhuber and Tegmark just abstract themselves from the first person indeterminacy, and thus are not really assuming comp, or taking into account the existence of consciousness. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 25 Aug 2012, at 07:30, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/24/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute. But, proving, believing, knowing, defining, etc. Are not absolute, and are all relative to the system actually doing the proof, or the knowing. Once such notion are, even just approximated semi- axiomatically, they define complex lattices or partial orders of unequivalent classes of machines, having very often transfinite order type, like proving for example, for which there is a branch of mathematical logic, known as Ordinal Analysis, which measures the strength of theories by a constructive ordinal. PA's strength is well now as being the ordinal epsilon zero, that is omega [4] omega (= omega^omega^omega^...) as discovered by Gentzen). Dear Bruno, What happens when we take the notion of a system to those that are not constructable by finite means? What happens to the proving, believing, knowing defining, interviewing, etc.? Amazingly, not a lot. That is why I say sometimes that comp can be weakened a lot. G and G* are sound, not only for PA and ZF (which is terribly more powerful than PA, with respect to provability, but, I repeat, the same for computability). If you allow provability to be even more powerful, and accept infinite inference rule, like the omega- rule in analysis, or some axiomatic form of second order logic, or even more non constructive, G and G* will still remains correct and complete. If you continue on that path, G and G* will remain correct, but no more complete. That is the case if you define provability by satisfied by some models of a rich theory. By Gödel completeness, satified in all models of the theory, gives the usual provability. But satisfaction by certain models leads to entities needing some supllementary axioms to be added on G and G*. But the present comp theory does not use completeness of G and G*, only the correctness, and so you need to go really quite close to God, for avoding the consequences of the arithmetical hypostases. Now, to prove this is quite difficult. Solovay announced many of this without proof, and the book by Boolos, the 1993 version gives the detailed proof, but it is technically hard. I use comp, for reason of simplicity, but it can be weakened a lot. I suspect that the real needed axiom is just the assumption of self-duplicability, and not digitalness. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.). With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and computers. Bruno Marchal wrote: With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute. OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true, necessarily. That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubt it less than the yes doctor part of comp, to be specific. I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of what level we think about computation. This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level (unlike comp). Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, not with respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of computations through other computations. Because here instantiation and description of the computation matter - I+II=III and 9+2=11 describe the same computation, yet they are different for practical purposes (because of a different instantiation) and are not even the same computation if we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is actually going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their emulation). Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnally correct substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might be that such a level does not exist, in which case I am an actually infinite being, and comp is false. That is possible, but out of the scope of my study. Bruno Marchal wrote: It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able to converse with Einstein. Apart from the question of whether brains

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote: I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness are not required). And now a subtle point. Perhaps. The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required for it. Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the form of a some non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say) Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my substitution level, because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence operates outside my brain, and if the doctor copy me at the right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to the oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that oracle. Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of that oracle? Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in this case, he will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of all finite approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle. A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine. That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical world and consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides essential interactions with consciousness as a computational process. Of course that doesn't require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too. Brent Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite interface. The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even infinite non computable one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that the RA level was enough. Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he survives through that process. Dear Bruno, Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean about this! That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite different. Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels? It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.). But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of a physical implementation, what is universal is that not a particular physical system is required for the chess program. With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and computers. I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions between separate minds implies seperation of implementations and this only happens in the physical realm. Therefore the physical realm cannot be dismissed! Bruno Marchal wrote: With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute. OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true, necessarily. That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubt it less than the yes doctor part of comp, to be specific. How is Deutsch's version different? I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of what level we think about computation. This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level (unlike comp). I don't understand either. Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, not with respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of computations through other computations. Because here

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Sunday, August 26, 2012 11:12:35 AM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote: On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons. None of them are the reasons of a clock. Certainly it’s the reasons of a clock. The reason a cuckoo clock runs at the speed it does is the length of its pendulum, a different clock with a different pendulum would run at a different speed because there was a different reason. A pendulum is only a metal rod. A clock is nothing but gears assembled by a human mind. There is no clock sauce that makes this assembly a clock. There is no reasoning going by the clock as a clock. The clock doesn't know what time it is. It isn't keeping track of anything. There is no 'it there' to know that it has a face or hands or pendulum. These are all human interpretations for human reasons. If you must manufacture reasons, You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not do so for a reason. You are the one who is relating everything to the idea of reasons, not me. The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a reason later. You and I are better than cuckoo clocks at justification, at finding the reason we acted as we did but we are far from perfect in this regard, sometimes we think we know why we did something but really do not, and sometimes we don't even have a clue. Why should we want to justify anything in the first place. Just because we are complex beings with many interacting levels of influence doesn't disqualify our causally efficacious participation in it. Because something seems less than perfect does not mean that it is an illusion. And think about the debates on this list, once you've shown that your opponent has the belief he does for no reason you feel you've won the debate. I would never assume that someone has no reason for their belief, I put it to them to examine their own assumptions and freely change them if they can make a greater sense. I don't think in terms of winning debates or proving their unworthiness to myself, I win if someone learns something, even if its not the person I happen to be talking to. Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so I guess typhoons have free will. Are you being serious? Should we put typhoons on trial and punish them so that they will learn to stay away from our populated areas? There are countless reasons which can influence me And there are also countless reasons which can influence a cuckoo clock. That's my point. The cuckoo clock can't choose from among the many influences or choose to seek a new alternative, but I can. but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence And you made that choice for a reason or you made that choice for no reason, No, I made the reason. It has no independent existence. Reasoning is a process by which I can make choices, or create new choices. I command my reason intentionally (to some extent). The only reason that I do that is because I can do that. I have the ability to create new reasons, unlike a clock. and the clock cuckooed for a reason or it cuckooed for no reason. And I don't know the reason you find this simple observation confusing, but I do know you don't understand it for a reason or you don't understand it for no reason. I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor predetermined More of the X is not Y and X is not not Y crap in a desperate attempt to prove that what you want to believe is true; and with a axiom like that you should have no difficulty whatsoever in finding your proof, not that it will tell you anything about how the world works. Not desperate at all. I will be happy to explain to you in any form you like, however long it takes why your X must either be Y or not Y edict is a fallacy. This is not a new idea. Even from my thin exposure to mathematics I am aware of how concepts like non-wellfounded sets and incompleteness reveal the arbitrarily simplistic nature of this kind of robotic categorization. The universe is not a logic circuit. And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position. Absolutely! If I move from point X to point Y then one of 2 things must be true: 1) I did so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I wanted to. 2) I did NOT do so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I did NOT want to. Voluntary is not a

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 5:04 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything (or nothing), just like the sentence You can interpret whatever you want into this sentence... or like the stuff that monkeys type on typewriters. A sentence (any string of information) can be interpreted in any possible way, but a computation defines/creates its own meaning. If you see a particular step in an algorithm adds two numbers, it can pretty clearly be interpreted as addition, for example. A computation can't define its own meaning, since it only manipulates symbols (that is the definition of a computer), I think it is a rather poor definition of a computer. Some have tried to define the entire field of mathematics as nothing more than a game of symbol manipulation (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formalism_(mathematics) ). But if mathematics can be viewed as nothing but symbol manipulation, and everything can be described in terms of mathematics, then what is not symbol manipulation? That what it is describing. Very simple. :) Jason Resch-2 wrote: and symbols need a meaning outside of them to make sense. The meaning of a symbol derives from the context of the machine which processes it. I agree. The context in which the machine operates matters. Yet our definitions of computer don't include an external context. A computer can simultaneously emulate the perceiver and the object of perception. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: The UD contains an entity who believes it writes a single program. No! The UD doesn't contain entities at all. It is just a computation. You can only interpret entities into it. Why do I have to? As Bruno often asks, does anyone have to watch your brain through an MRI and interpret what it is doing for you to be conscious? Because there ARE no entities in the UD per its definition. It only contains symbols that are manipulated in a particular way. You forgot the processes, which are interpreting those symbols. No, that's simply not how we defined the UD. The UD is defined by manipulation of symbols, not interpretation of symbols (how could we even formalize that?). It may not be explicitly defined, but it follows, just as human cognition follows from hydrogen atoms, given a few billion years. Entities evolve and develop within the UD who have the ability to interpret things on their own. Jason Resch-2 wrote: The definitions of the UD or a universal turing machine or of computers in general don't contain a reference to entities. The definition of this universe doesn't contain a reference to human beings either. Right, that's why you can't claim that all universes contain human beings. But the set of all possible universes does contain human beings. Similarly, the UD contains all processes, and according to computationalism, would also contain all possible minds. Jason Resch-2 wrote: So you can only add that to its working in your own imagination. I think I would still be able to experience meaning even if no one was looking at me. Yes, because you are what is looking - there is no one looking at you in the first place, because someone looking is occur in you. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: The UD itself isn't intelligent, but it contains intelligences. I am not even saying that the UD isn't intelligent. I am just saying that humans are intelligent in a way that the UD is not (and actually the opposite is true as well). Okay, could you clarify in what ways we are more intelligent? For example, could you show a problem that can a human solve that a computer with unlimited memory and time could not? Say you have a universal turing machine with the alphabet {0, 1} The problem is: Change one of the symbols of this turing machine to 2. Your example is defining a problem to not be solvable by a specific entity, not turing machines in general. But the claim of computer scientists is that all turing machines are interchangable, In a certain sense. Not in the sense where they have to escape their own level to accomplish something in a physical universe. because they can emulate each other perfectly. Clearly that's not true because perfect computational emulation doesn't help to solve the problem in question, and that is precisely my point! You seem to agree that a computer can answer any verbal problem that any person can. So it follows that the right program could answer the question of what a particular person will do in a given situation. Do you agree?

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science. That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do. It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws are just descriptions of what the universe does. That the universe follows laws means that the universe shows certain patterns of behaviour that, fortuitously, clever humans have been able to observe and codify. It's just a linguistic accident that we use the same term law to mean both physical law and the laws that are passed by parliament. You said you see no evidence that the universe follows laws but the evidence is, as stated, all of science. There would be no point to science if we thought that the universe behaves arbitrarily. Indeed, there is arguably no point to anything if the universe does not follow uniform laws. I assume that when I take a step that the ground is solid, which I base on its appearance and my experience of surfaces with such an appearance being solid. But if the universe did not follow laws, this assumption would be worthless; the ground may open up and swallow me, so there would be no point taking a step forward. Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe and so they will reflect it. Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at some points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest it does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest it does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma? The laws are constantly being revised, which is what science is about. If there were no laws there would be no point to science. Probabilities in quantum mechanics can be calculated with great precision. For example, radioactive decay is a truly random process, but we can calculate to an arbitrary level of certainty how much of an isotope will decay. In fact, it is much easier to calculate this than to make predictions about deterministic but chaotic phenomena such as the weather. Sure, but that is not an argument against my point. Precise probabilities are just a way of making the unprecise (relatively) precise. They still do not allow us to make precise predictions - they say nothing about what will happen, just about what could happen. If you can calculate that something will happen with 99.9% probability, I think that is saying what will happen for practical purposes. Also, statistical laws do not tell us anything about the correlation between (apparently) seperate things, so they actually inherently leave out some information that could very well be there (and most likely is there if we look at the data). They only describe probabilities of seperate events, not correlation of the outcome of seperate events. Say you have 1000 dices with 6 sides that behaves statistically totally random if analyzed seperately. Nevertheless they could be strongly correlated and this correlation is very hard to find using scientific methods and to describe - we wouldn't notice at all if we just observed the dices seperately or just a few dices (as we would usually do using scientific methods). Or you have 2 dices with 1000 sides that behaves statistically totally random if analyzed seperately, but if one shows 1 the other ALWAYS shows one as well. Using 1000 tries you will most likely notice nothing at all, and using 1 tries you will still probably notice nothing because there will be most likely other instances as well where the two numbers are the same. So it would be very difficult to detect the correlation, even though it is quite important (given that you could accurately predict what the other 1000-sided dice will be in 1/1000 of the cases). And even worse, if you have 10 dices that *together* show no correlation at all (which we found out using many many tries), this doesn't mean that the combinated result of the 10 dices is not correlated with another set of 10 dices. To put it another way: Even if you showed that a given set of macrosopic objects is not correlated, they still may not behave random at all on a bigger level because they are correlated with another set of objects! I'm not really sure of your point here. Statistical methods would not only show a correlation between the dice, but also tell you how many observations you need to make in order to be confident of a correlation to an arbitrary degree of certainty. That is the whole business of statistics. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 23 Aug 2012, at 19:08, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 12:49 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: 'You won't be able to determine the truth of this statement by programming a computer' If true then you won't be able to determine the truth of this statement PERIOD. Any limitation a computer has you have the exact same limitation. And there are many many times the ONLY way to determine the truth of a statement is by programming a computer, if this were not true nobody would bother building computers and it wouldn't be a trillion dollar industry. To put it another way, it shows you that it is really just obvious that you are beyond the computer, because you are the one programming it. But it's only a matter of time before computers start programing you because computers get twice as smart every 18 months and people do not. Computers do only what we instruct them to do (this is how we built them) That is certainly not true, if it were there would be no point in instructing computers about anything. Tell me this, if you instructed a computer to find the first even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of two primes greater than 2 and then stop what will the computer do? It would take you less than 5 minutes to write such a program so tell me, will it ever stop? You might say we only do what we were instructed to do by the laws of nature, but this would be merely a metaphor, not an actual fact (the laws of nature are just our approach of describing the world, not something that is somehow actually programming us). We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things because of the laws of nature, and if we do not then we are random. We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is not in the ontology. You are assuming physicalism here, which is inconsistent with computationalism. Bruno Let's take your example 'Benjamin Jakubik cannot consistently assert this sentence' is true.. I can just say your sentence is meaningless. It's not my example it's your example, you said sentences like this prove that you have fundamental abilities that computers lack, and that of course is nonsense. Saying something is meaningless does not make it so, but suppose it is; well, computers can come up with meaningless gibberish as easily as people can. The computer can't do this, because he doesn't know what meaningless is I see absolutely no evidence of that. If you were competing with the computer Watson on Jeopardy and the category was meaningless stuff I'll bet Watson would kick your ass. But then he'd beat you (or me) in ANY category. Maybe that is what dinstinguishes human intelligence from computers. Computers can't recognize meaninglessness or meaning. Humans often have the same difficulty, just consider how many people on this list think free will means something. My computer doesn't generate such questions But other computers can and do. and I won't program it to. But other people will. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote: I don't know either, nobody knows, even the computer doesn't know if it will stop until it finds itself stopping; If a computer stops, it will never know that. If it executes a stopping program, then it can. To stop has no first person meaning. Nobody will ever write in its personal diary that he just died, unless metaphorically, or approximately perhaps, like with NDE, or some dreams. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Bruno Marchal wrote: With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute. OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true, necessarily. I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of what level we think about computation. Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, not with respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of computations through other computations. Because here instantiation and description of the computation matter - I+II=III and 9+2=11 describe the same computation, yet they are different for practical purposes (because of a different instantiation) and are not even the same computation if we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is actually going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their emulation). Bruno Marchal wrote: It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able to converse with Einstein. Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all (due to possible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write a post about this later), that is still not necessarily the case. It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation. And I don't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34347848.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science. That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do. It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws are just descriptions of what the universe does. That the universe follows laws means that the universe shows certain patterns of behaviour that, fortuitously, clever humans have been able to observe and codify. OK, so it is a metaphor, since the laws itself are just what we codified about the behaviour of the universe (so the universe can't follow laws because the laws follow the universe). Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: You said you see no evidence that the universe follows laws but the evidence is, as stated, all of science. Science just requires that the universes behaviour is *approximated* by laws. Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe and so they will reflect it. Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at some points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest it does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest it does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma? The laws are constantly being revised, which is what science is about. If there were no laws there would be no point to science. Right, but this doesn't mean that the laws have to be accurate or even can be accurate. They just need to be accurate enough to be useful to us. -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34347886.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can be used as an argument here. Normally?? The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the Bekenstein bound. I don't know in what sense it should be extracted from something else, but if you can do so, please do. It would certainly impress me. UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take 10001000 centuries is not relevant. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And those theorem are non constructive, meaning that in the world of inference inductive machine, a machine capable of being wrong is already non computably more powerful than an error prone machine. There's something wrong with that sentence. An error prone machine one that is capable of being wrong, and hence non-computably more powerful than itself? Yes. It makes sense because the identification criteria for the inductive inference has been weakened. A machine allowed to do one error (that is synthesizing a program giving a wrong output) will recognize a non computably vaster class of phenomena, even if wrong on some input. See the paper of Case and Smith reference in my url, or the book by Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the main points: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: But let's say we mean except for memory and unlimited accuracy. This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY computers. Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than atoms? I can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of interacting particles. But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is there a reason that computers cannot? Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense already. Do you have a meta-theory which could explain why we have the conscious experiences that we do? Saying that mind is all there is, while possibly valid, does not explain very much (without some meta-theory). No, I don't even take it to be a theory. In this sense you might say it doesn't explain anything on a theoretical level, but this is just because reality doesn't work based on any theoretical concepts (though it obviously is described and incorporates them). Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea that God has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I don't see how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do. OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can emulate everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that. But that's simply the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the sense of transforming input/output. It is about what something IS (or is like). Within the simulation, isn't a simulated atom like a real atom (in our reality)? There is no unambiguous answer to this question IMO. But it only matters that the simulated atom is not like the real atom with respect to our reality - the former can't substitute the latter with respect to reality. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: since this is all that is required for my argument. I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that definition because a human is not a computer according to the everyday definition. A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate, therefore a human could exist with the definition of a computer. Computers are very powerful and flexible in what they can do. That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all. Have you ever done any computer programming? If you have, you might realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your imagination. Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have programmed a fair amount. Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing it on a computer? It is very hard. I never said that they can't. I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For example they can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and which axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no computational way of determining that. There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms to use. Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't determined a program first. You said computers fundamentally cannot choose which programs or axioms to use. We could program a computer with a neural simulation of a human mathematician, and then the computer could have this capability. That just would strengthen my point (note the words we program meaning we choose the program). Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: If the computer program had a concept for desiring novelty/surprises, it would surely find some axiomatic systems more interesting than others. Sure. But he could be programmed to not to have such a concept, and there is no way of determining whether to use it or not if we haven't already programmed an algorithm for that (which again had the same problem). In effect you get an infinite regress: How determine which program to use? -use a program to determine it But which? -use a program to determine it But which? -use a program to determine it Guess and check, with random variation, it worked for evolution. But which guessing and checking program to use? -use a more general guessing and checking program to determine it But which? -use an even more more general guessing and checking program to determine it etc You still never arrive at a program, in fact your problem just becomes more difficult each time you

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:46, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so by your own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated. That's QM+collapse, but the collapse is not well defined, It is well defined in epistemic interpretations. But those rely on an implicit dualism. That is what I thought after reading von Neumann, and London--Bauer, but then reading Shimony I realized that such a dualism does not make sense, and that it leads to solipisism. and many incompatible theories are proposed for it, and Everett showed we don't need it, But then we need to derive the classical world from the quantum. We need to derive the appearance of the classical world. This is well explained by Everett+decoherence. With comp we start from classical arithmetic, and we derive the appearance of the quantum, and then we ca use decoherence to explain the re-appearance of the classical physical worlds. It is really: classical === quantum === classical if we assume comp or weaker. Feynman called the collapse, a collective hallucination, but then with comp so is the wave. It is misleading to use a non understood controversal idea in a domain (the wave collapse in physics) to apply it on complex non solved problem in another domain (the mind body problem). There are no known phenomena capable of collapsing the wave, Decoherence theory provides a mechanism, although the basis problem is open. It is of a piece with the problem of deriving the classical from the quantum. I have never understood the basis problem. It is quite similar to comp. You have to fix a base to do the math, and then you can show that all appearances, from the first person perspective are independent of the choice of the basis. then we can understand empirically why some bases will seem more important, as natiure did a choice of measuring apparatus for us a long time ago, but all this can be described in any basis. My feeling is that Everett got this right at the start. nor any known evidences that the wave does collapse. Collapse appears all the time, LOL. Show me one. and a good theory must save appearances. Everett showed that the appearances are saved, in the memory of the observers. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. If so then we in particular and everything in general is as deterministic as a cuckoo clock because when you add 2 numbers together you always get the same answer. I might add that everything is most probably not deterministic. To stop has no first person meaning. After the instant in time called stop there will be no more entries in my diary, the meaning of that is pretty clear to me. Or to put it another way, death means having a last thought. Nobody will ever write in its personal diary that he just died, But they have written this will be my last entry; I believe the Antarctic explorer Robert Scott wrote something like that in his diary that was found months later next to his frozen body. You are assuming physicalism here, The only thing I'm assuming is that X is Y or X is not Y. which is inconsistent with computationalism. You're creating a straw man opponent, nobody believes that what a thing is and what a thing does is the same. Mind, a abstract concept, is what the brain, a physical object, does. And going fast, a abstract concept, is what a jet, a physical object, does. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I did it for many reasons And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons. None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture reasons, then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and human consumers of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons from the molecular layer as well - of tension, density, and mass. There are no cuckoo clock reasons though. some of them my own. In other words you have not divulged to others some of the reasons you acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you don't know yourself. No matter, they're still reasons. No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives of cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a reason later. Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own. Your argument is that grey must be either black or white. No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or white, and because it is logical we know that everything is either grey or not grey. And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position. It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you have before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant explorations on consciousness and sense-making. And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at your ideas. And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What does your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't refute them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me? Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying attention to them Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such a reason either exists or it does not. What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with anything? That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of what they are, then your actions are deterministic. That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? You are trying to create a diversion to cover up that your approach fails the test of its own limited criteria. If your opinions are robotic or random, then they don't matter and they aren't opinions. This has nothing to do with me or my motives. What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or it does not'? That's an even stupider question, true statements always have uses. An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't mean it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still admitting that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more relevant than saying anything at all. Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense. And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure out how the world works and make it clear that what you really want to do is convince yourself that what you already want to believe is in fact true. And its going to work too because if you take the above as a working axiom in your system of beliefs then you can prove or disprove anything you want, you can even prove and disprove the same thing at the same time. Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature of the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are proved. According to your views, you don't have any views, and neither do any possible readers of your views. That is ridiculous. I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of your stated worldview. All of it is either robotic or random. What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that have to do with not having views?? Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they are noise. Since you mention the price of eggs, lets go with that. The market for eggs is not automatic, nor is it random. Despite attempts to beat financial markets

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Point, Set, Match: Craig Weinberg! On 8/25/2012 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I did it for many reasons And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons. None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture reasons, then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and human consumers of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons from the molecular layer as well - of tension, density, and mass. There are no cuckoo clock reasons though. some of them my own. In other words you have not divulged to others some of the reasons you acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you don't know yourself. No matter, they're still reasons. No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives of cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a reason later. Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own. Your argument is that grey must be either black or white. No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or white, and because it is logical we know that everything is either grey or not grey. And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position. It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you have before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant explorations on consciousness and sense-making. And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at your ideas. And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What does your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't refute them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me? Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying attention to them Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such a reason either exists or it does not. What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with anything? That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of what they are, then your actions are deterministic. That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? You are trying to create a diversion to cover up that your approach fails the test of its own limited criteria. If your opinions are robotic or random, then they don't matter and they aren't opinions. This has nothing to do with me or my motives. What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or it does not'? That's an even stupider question, true statements always have uses. An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't mean it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still admitting that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more relevant than saying anything at all. Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense. And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure out how the world works and make it clear that what you really want to do is convince yourself that what you already want to believe is in fact true. And its going to work too because if you take the above as a working axiom in your system of beliefs then you can prove or disprove anything you want, you can even prove and disprove the same thing at the same time. Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature of the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are proved. According to your views, you don't have any views, and neither do any possible readers of your views. That is ridiculous. I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of your stated worldview. All of it is either robotic or random. What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that have to do with not having views?? Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they are noise. Since you mention

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things because of the laws of nature, and if we do not then we are random. We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is not in the ontology. You are assuming physicalism here, which is inconsistent with computationalism. I don't see that John is assuming that physics is fundamental. If computationalism=conscious thought arises from some kinds of computation. it may still require that those kinds of computation, the ones giving rise to conscious thought, must also give rise to some form of physics; that there cannot be conscious thought without physics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can be used as an argument here. Normally?? The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the Bekenstein bound. I don't know in what sense it should be extracted from something else, but if you can do so, please do. It would certainly impress me. UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take 10001000 centuries is not relevant. Oh, OK, you mean assuming the world is generated by the UDA then it follows that the holographic principle (assuming it's true) is also generated by the UDA (along with everything else). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 8/25/2012 8:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Decoherence theory provides a mechanism, although the basis problem is open. It is of a piece with the problem of deriving the classical from the quantum. I have never understood the basis problem. It is quite similar to comp. You have to fix a base to do the math, and then you can show that all appearances, from the first person perspective are independent of the choice of the basis. then we can understand empirically why some bases will seem more important, as natiure did a choice of measuring apparatus for us a long time ago, but all this can be described in any basis. My feeling is that Everett got this right at the start. But decoherence is not independent of the basis. It is only in particular bases that one can average over the environment and make the density matrix diagonal. Suppose you did that and then chose a different basis to express the result. In general the transformation to the different basis would generate cross-terms in the density matrix. That the classical world appears as it does must be due to what Zurek calls an ein-selection principle; i.e. that the world only appears stable/classical in certain bases. Everett just accepts that we can choose a measuring instrument that defines a certain basis - but that is equivalent to assuming that a quasi-classical world exists. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Hi John Clark The laws of nature don't prevent me from unintentionally having a car accident. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/24/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 16:53:10 Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers On Thu, Aug 23, 2012? Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The laws of nature are such that they demand that we do things intentionally. This means neither random nor completely determined externally. I see, you did it but you didn't do it for a reason and you didn't do it for no reason. I think? Lewis Carroll best summed up your ideas on this subject: T was brillig, and the slithy toves ? Did gyre and gimble in the wabe; ?? All mimsy were the borogoves, ??? And the mome raths outgrabe. Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying attention to them Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such a reason either exists or it does not. If other people pay attention to my views they do so for a reason or they do not do so for a reason. If other people do NOT pay attention to my views they do so for a reason or they do not do so for a reason. ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Jason Resch-2 wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 11:11 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: So what is your definition of computer, and what is your evidence/reasoning that you yourself are not contained in that definition? There is no perfect definition of computer. I take computer to mean the usual physical computer, Why not use the notion of a Turing universal machine, which has a rather well defined and widely understood definition? Because it is an abstract model, not an actual computer. It doesn't have to be abstract. It could be any physical machine that has the property of being Turing universal. It could be your cell phone, for example. OK, then no computers exists because no computer can actually emulate all programs that run on an universal turing machine due to lack of memory. If you believe the Mandlebrot set, or the infinite digits of Pi exist, then so to do Turing machines with inexhaustible memory. They exist as useful abstractions, but not as physical objects (which is what we practically deal with when we talk about computers). Jason Resch-2 wrote: But let's say we mean except for memory and unlimited accuracy. This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY computers. Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than atoms? I can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of interacting particles. But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is there a reason that computers cannot? Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense already. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea that God has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I don't see how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do. OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can emulate everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that. But that's simply the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the sense of transforming input/output. It is about what something IS (or is like). A boulder that falls on your foot may not be computationally more powerful than a computer, but it can do something important that a computer running a simulation of a boulder dropping on your foot can't - to make your foot hurt. Even if you assume we could use a boulder in a simulation with ourselves plugged into the simulation to create pain (I agree), it still doesn't do the same, namely creating the pain when dropping on your physical foot. See, the accuracy of the simulation does not help in bridging the levels. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: since this is all that is required for my argument. I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that definition because a human is not a computer according to the everyday definition. A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate, therefore a human could exist with the definition of a computer. Computers are very powerful and flexible in what they can do. That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all. Have you ever done any computer programming? If you have, you might realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your imagination. Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have programmed a fair amount. Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing it on a computer? It is very hard. I never said that they can't. I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For example they can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and which axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no computational way of determining that. There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms to use. Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't determined a program first. Jason Resch-2 wrote: For example how can you computationally determine whether to use the axiom true=not(false) or use the axiom true=not(true)? Some of them are more useful, or lead to theories of a richer complexity. Yes, but how to determine that with a computer? If you program it to embrace bad axioms that lead to bad theories and don't have a lot of use he will still carry out your instructions. So the computer by itself will not notice whether it does something useful (except if you programmed it to, in which case you get the same problem with the creation of the program). Jason Resch-2 wrote: If the computer

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Jason Resch-2 wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything (or nothing), just like the sentence You can interpret whatever you want into this sentence... or like the stuff that monkeys type on typewriters. A sentence (any string of information) can be interpreted in any possible way, but a computation defines/creates its own meaning. If you see a particular step in an algorithm adds two numbers, it can pretty clearly be interpreted as addition, for example. A computation can't define its own meaning, since it only manipulates symbols (that is the definition of a computer), I think it is a rather poor definition of a computer. Some have tried to define the entire field of mathematics as nothing more than a game of symbol manipulation (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formalism_(mathematics) ). But if mathematics can be viewed as nothing but symbol manipulation, and everything can be described in terms of mathematics, then what is not symbol manipulation? That what it is describing. Very simple. :) Jason Resch-2 wrote: and symbols need a meaning outside of them to make sense. The meaning of a symbol derives from the context of the machine which processes it. I agree. The context in which the machine operates matters. Yet our definitions of computer don't include an external context. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: The UD contains an entity who believes it writes a single program. No! The UD doesn't contain entities at all. It is just a computation. You can only interpret entities into it. Why do I have to? As Bruno often asks, does anyone have to watch your brain through an MRI and interpret what it is doing for you to be conscious? Because there ARE no entities in the UD per its definition. It only contains symbols that are manipulated in a particular way. You forgot the processes, which are interpreting those symbols. No, that's simply not how we defined the UD. The UD is defined by manipulation of symbols, not interpretation of symbols (how could we even formalize that?). Jason Resch-2 wrote: The definitions of the UD or a universal turing machine or of computers in general don't contain a reference to entities. The definition of this universe doesn't contain a reference to human beings either. Right, that's why you can't claim that all universes contain human beings. Jason Resch-2 wrote: So you can only add that to its working in your own imagination. I think I would still be able to experience meaning even if no one was looking at me. Yes, because you are what is looking - there is no one looking at you in the first place, because someone looking is occur in you. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: The UD itself isn't intelligent, but it contains intelligences. I am not even saying that the UD isn't intelligent. I am just saying that humans are intelligent in a way that the UD is not (and actually the opposite is true as well). Okay, could you clarify in what ways we are more intelligent? For example, could you show a problem that can a human solve that a computer with unlimited memory and time could not? Say you have a universal turing machine with the alphabet {0, 1} The problem is: Change one of the symbols of this turing machine to 2. Your example is defining a problem to not be solvable by a specific entity, not turing machines in general. But the claim of computer scientists is that all turing machines are interchangable, because they can emulate each other perfectly. Clearly that's not true because perfect computational emulation doesn't help to solve the problem in question, and that is precisely my point! Jason Resch-2 wrote: Given that it is a universal turing machine, it is supposed to be able to solve that problem. Yet because it doesn't have access to the right level, it cannot do it. It is an example of direct self-manipulation, which turing machines are not capable of (with regards to their alphabet in this case). Neither can humans change fundamental properties of our physical incarnation. You can't decide to turn one of your neurons into a magnetic monopole, for instance, but this is not the kind of problem I was referring to. I don't claim that humans are all powerful. I am just saying that they can do things computer can't. Jason Resch-2 wrote: To avoid issues of level confusion, it is better to think of problems with informational solutions, since information can readily cross levels. That is, some question is asked and some answer is provided. Can you think of any question that is only solvable by human brains, but not solvable by computers? OK, if you want to ignore levels, context and

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 3:59 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: I am not sure that this is true. First, no one yet showed that nature can be described through a set of fixed laws. Judging from our experience, it seems all laws are necessarily incomplete. It is just dogma of some materialists that the universe precisely follows laws. I don't see why that would be the case at all and I see no evidence for it either. The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science. Evidence against it would be if magical things started happening. Secondly, even the laws we have now don't really describe that the atoms in our brain are rigidly controlled. Rather, quantum mechanical laws just give us a probability distribution, they don't tell us what actually will happen. In this sense current physics has already taken the step beyond precise laws. Some scientists say that the probability distribution is an actual precise, deterministic entity, but really this is just pure speculation and we have no evidence for that. Probabilities in quantum mechanics can be calculated with great precision. For example, radioactive decay is a truly random process, but we can calculate to an arbitrary level of certainty how much of an isotope will decay. In fact, it is much easier to calculate this than to make predictions about deterministic but chaotic phenomena such as the weather. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 3:59 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: I am not sure that this is true. First, no one yet showed that nature can be described through a set of fixed laws. Judging from our experience, it seems all laws are necessarily incomplete. It is just dogma of some materialists that the universe precisely follows laws. I don't see why that would be the case at all and I see no evidence for it either. The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science. That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do. It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws are just descriptions of what the universe does. Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe and so they will reflect it. Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at some points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest it does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest it does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma? Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: Secondly, even the laws we have now don't really describe that the atoms in our brain are rigidly controlled. Rather, quantum mechanical laws just give us a probability distribution, they don't tell us what actually will happen. In this sense current physics has already taken the step beyond precise laws. Some scientists say that the probability distribution is an actual precise, deterministic entity, but really this is just pure speculation and we have no evidence for that. Probabilities in quantum mechanics can be calculated with great precision. For example, radioactive decay is a truly random process, but we can calculate to an arbitrary level of certainty how much of an isotope will decay. In fact, it is much easier to calculate this than to make predictions about deterministic but chaotic phenomena such as the weather. Sure, but that is not an argument against my point. Precise probabilities are just a way of making the unprecise (relatively) precise. They still do not allow us to make precise predictions - they say nothing about what will happen, just about what could happen. Also, statistical laws do not tell us anything about the correlation between (apparently) seperate things, so they actually inherently leave out some information that could very well be there (and most likely is there if we look at the data). They only describe probabilities of seperate events, not correlation of the outcome of seperate events. Say you have 1000 dices with 6 sides that behaves statistically totally random if analyzed seperately. Nevertheless they could be strongly correlated and this correlation is very hard to find using scientific methods and to describe - we wouldn't notice at all if we just observed the dices seperately or just a few dices (as we would usually do using scientific methods). Or you have 2 dices with 1000 sides that behaves statistically totally random if analyzed seperately, but if one shows 1 the other ALWAYS shows one as well. Using 1000 tries you will most likely notice nothing at all, and using 1 tries you will still probably notice nothing because there will be most likely other instances as well where the two numbers are the same. So it would be very difficult to detect the correlation, even though it is quite important (given that you could accurately predict what the other 1000-sided dice will be in 1/1000 of the cases). And even worse, if you have 10 dices that *together* show no correlation at all (which we found out using many many tries), this doesn't mean that the combinated result of the 10 dices is not correlated with another set of 10 dices. To put it another way: Even if you showed that a given set of macrosopic objects is not correlated, they still may not behave random at all on a bigger level because they are correlated with another set of objects! Most scientists seem to completely disregard this as they think there could be no correlation between seperate macro objects because they decohere too quickly. But this assumes that our laws are correct when it comes to describing decoherence and it also assumes that decoherence means that there is NO correlation anymore (as oppposed to no definite/precise correlation). And we have very solid data that there is large scale correlation (psi - like telepathy and extremely unusual coincidences - or photsynthesis). Also there is no reason to apriori assume that there could not be correlation between distant events (unless you have a dogmatically classical worldview) - which would be inherently hard to measure. Using two assumptions we can then

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute. But, proving, believing, knowing, defining, etc. Are not absolute, and are all relative to the system actually doing the proof, or the knowing. Once such notion are, even just approximated semi- axiomatically, they define complex lattices or partial orders of unequivalent classes of machines, having very often transfinite order type, like proving for example, for which there is a branch of mathematical logic, known as Ordinal Analysis, which measures the strength of theories by a constructive ordinal. PA's strength is well now as being the ordinal epsilon zero, that is omega [4] omega (= omega^omega^omega^...) as discovered by Gentzen). It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able to converse with Einstein. If you avoid gently the level confusion for the human person, there is no reason to avoid it for the machines. It is not because universal machine can do all computations, that they can do all proofs, on the contrary, being universal and consistent will limit them locally, and motivate them to change themselves, relatively to their most probable universal histories. Such infinite progression of self-changing machines have already been programmed, by Myhill, and myself, notably. In my more technical work, I use Becklemishev results which extends the soundness of G and G* on such machines, and prove a completeness theorem for the corresponding multimodal logic, with the provability parametrized on the ordinal (I say this for those interested and open to computer science as it is natural in the frame of the comp hypothesis). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so by your own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated. That's QM+collapse, but the collapse is not well defined, and many incompatible theories are proposed for it, and Everett showed we don't need it, if we assume comp or weaker. Feynman called the collapse, a collective hallucination, but then with comp so is the wave. It is misleading to use a non understood controversal idea in a domain (the wave collapse in physics) to apply it on complex non solved problem in another domain (the mind body problem). There are no known phenomena capable of collapsing the wave, nor any known evidences that the wave does collapse. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.