subject:"Re\: The Incessant Arguments about MWI"



On Monday, December 2, 2024 at 2:20:37 PM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:



On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 4:16 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:



On

*> Anyone who strays into and supports MW has fallen for Trump physics*


 
*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen +5 times I've heard it from you. *


*"Trump physics" is a symbol for **your...*


 
*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen +6 times I've heard it from you. * 


*Editing my comment like that is a form of lying, and you've done it 
numerous times. Who does that remind you of? AG *


*John K Clark   **rrr*

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-02 Thread Brent Meeker

On 12/2/2024 6:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 7:11 AM Alan Grayson
wrote:

/> Why should I read Deutsch? I've read enough of his stuff to
know he's totally deluded in his MW dream. With MW you won't even
know that slit experiments result in interference patterns. AG/

*It's odd you should mention the two slit experiment because back in
1986 in his excellent book "/The Ghost in the Atom/" David Deutsch
proposed a way to test if Everett's Many Worlds idea is correct, and
it involves the two slit experiment. It would be difficult (not
impossible) to perform but Deutsch argues that it's not Many Worlds
fault because the reason the experiment is so difficult is because the
conventional view says conscious objects obey different laws of
physics than non-conscious objects and Many Worlds says they do not,
so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties.*

*I**n Deutsch's experiment, to prove or disprove the existence of many
worlds other than this one, an**intelligent (and
presumably conscious) quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal
plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The
quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit
the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a
document for each and every electron saying it has observed the
electron and knows which slit they all went through. *

*It is very important that the documents do _NOT_ say which slit the
electrons went through, they only say it went through _one and only
one slit_ and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now _AFTER_ the
electron has passed the slit butjust _BEFORE_ the last electron hits
the plate, the mind uses quantum erasure to completely erasethe memory
of what slits all the electrons went through, but all other memories,
including all the signeddocuments, remain undamaged. *

*Then after thousands of electrons have been observed and all
which-way information has been erased, develop the photographic plate
and look at it. If you see interference bands then the Many World
interpretation is correct. If you do not see interference bands then
there are no worlds but this one and the conventional interpretation
is correct.*

Brent

*In the Many Worlds model all the other worlds will converge back into
one universe when the electrons hit the photographic film because the
two universes will no longer be different (even though they had
different histories), but their influence will still be felt. In the
merged universe you'll see indications that the electron went through
slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only, and
that's what causes interference.*

*
*
*John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis
*

gia

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 4:16 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On
>
> *> Anyone who strays into and supports MW has fallen for Trump physics*
>
>
>
> *Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
> witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
> the 19 dozen +5 times I've heard it from you. *
>
>
> *"Trump physics" is a symbol for **your...*
>


*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen +6 times I've heard it from you. *

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*

*rrr*

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, December 2, 2024 at 1:28:09 PM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 2:30 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> Anyone who strays into and supports MW has fallen for Trump physics*


 
*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen +5 times I've heard it from you. *


*"Trump physics" is a symbol for your flawed reasoning when it comes to 
supporting MW. Doesn't mean you support or admire Trump. AG*
 

*John K Clark  *

 

989 


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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Monday, December 2, 2024 at 7:17:25 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 7:11 AM Alan Grayson wrote:

*> Why should I read Deutsch? I've read enough of his stuff to know he's
totally deluded in his MW dream. With MW you won't even know that slit
experiments result in interference patterns. AG*

*It's odd you should mention the two slit experiment because back in 1986
in his excellent book "The Ghost in the Atom" David Deutsch proposed a way
to test if Everett's Many Worlds idea is correct, and it involves the two
slit experiment. It would be difficult (not impossible) to perform but
Deutsch argues that it's not Many Worlds fault because the reason the
experiment is so difficult is because the conventional view says conscious
objects obey different laws of physics than non-conscious objects and Many
Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses
quantum properties.*

*Who claims conscious objects obey different laws than non-conscious
objects? Anyone other than the master himself, Deutsch? What is a mind that
uses quantum properties? Is it any wonder why the proposed experiment can't
be performed? I'm sure the book was a best seller, in the fiction
department. AG*

*I**n Deutsch's experiment, to prove or disprove the existence of many
worlds other than this one, an** intelligent (and
presumably conscious) quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate
that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum
computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various
electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document for each and
every electron saying it has observed the electron and knows which
slit they all went through. *

*It is very important that the documents do NOT say which slit the
electrons went through, they only say it went through one and only one slit
and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now AFTER the electron has passed
the slit but just BEFORE the last electron hits the plate, the mind uses
quantum erasure to completely erase the memory of what slits all the
electrons went through, but all other memories, including all the
signed documents, remain undamaged. *

*Then after thousands of electrons have been observed and all which-way
information has been erased, develop the photographic plate and look at it.
If you see interference bands then the Many World interpretation is
correct. If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but
this one and the conventional interpretation is correct.*

*Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results
of a measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function
collapses, in effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace
so you get no interference. In the Many Worlds model all the other worlds
will converge back into one universe when the electrons hit the
photographic film because the two universes will no longer be different
(even though they had different histories), but their influence will still
be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron
went through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only,
and that's what causes interference.*

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at Extropolis
*
gia

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 2:30 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> Anyone who strays into and supports MW has fallen for Trump physics*

*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen +5 times I've heard it from you. *
*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
989

>
>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-02 Thread Brent Meeker

On 12/1/2024 11:31 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, December 1, 2024 at 10:05:49 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

Probabilities are like energies. Physically they take different
forms: frequentist, Bayesian, credence, wagers... And like
energies there is there is a common mathematical theory which they
obey and which can be used to transform between the different forms.

Brent

Concerning Deutsch, I didn't read the link, but since he's a MW
cultist, I would expect him to downgrade the concept of probability by
claiming it can't be rigorous defined -- since MW has a real problem
defining probabilities among multiple branches. Of course, many
fundamental concepts in physics and mathematics can't be defined
*rigorously*, so I assume Deutsch is just blowing smoke up our
collective butts in an effort to justify MW. In response to his BS, I
gave the example of "finite mathematics" where infinities are
disallowed because they seem unjustified from a rigorous POV. BTW, can
you say something about the common mathematical theory underlying the
different types of probabilities you mention. AG

Sure. The modern mathematical foundation of probability, now referred
to as "measure theory" is due to the Russsian mathematician Andrey
Kolmogorov: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_axioms Like all
mathematics it doesn't have any application built into it. The
applications come from applying it the different forms I mentioned above.

Brent

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 7:11 AM Alan Grayson wrote:

*> Why should I read Deutsch? I've read enough of his stuff to know he's
> totally deluded in his MW dream. With MW you won't even know that slit
> experiments result in interference patterns. AG*
>

*I**n Deutsch's experiment, to prove or disprove the existence of many
worlds other than this one, an** intelligent (and
presumably conscious) quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate
that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum
computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various
electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document for each and
every electron saying it has observed the electron and knows which
slit they all went through. *

*Then after thousands of electrons have been observed and all which-way
information has been erased, develop the photographic plate and look at it.
If you see interference bands then the Many World interpretation is
correct. If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but
this one and the conventional interpretation is correct.*

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at Extropolis
*
gia

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, December 2, 2024 at 9:19:39 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 10:53 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> Who claims conscious objects obey different laws than non-conscious 
objects? *


*Anyone who claims that an observation or a measurement causes the collapse 
of Schrodinger's quantum wave, that's who. *


 
https://www.google.com/search?q=laws+of+physics+for+conscious+entities&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS922US922&oq=laws+of+physics+for+conscious+entities&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRigATIHCAIQIRigAdIBCTMxNDE1ajBqN6gCCLACAQ&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

Currently, within the established scientific understanding, there are no 
distinct "laws of physics for conscious entities" as consciousness is not 
considered a fundamental physical property, meaning it is not directly 
governed by the known laws of physics; however, some theories attempt to 
bridge the gap between consciousness and physics by exploring concepts like 
quantum mechanics and emergent properties, suggesting that consciousness 
could arise from complex interactions within a system governed by existing 
physical laws, but not directly described by them.
 *I'm sure the book was a best seller, in the fiction department. AG *
*I'd ask you to read "The Ghost In The Atom" or Sean Carroll's even better 
book "Something Deeply Hidden", **however I know there's not a snowball's 
chance in hell of you ever reading either one, much less reading any of 
their technical research papers; I doubt you even read my short post. But 
of course that will not prevent you from expressing very strong opinions 
regarding the quality, or lack thereof, of those two excellent physicist's 
work.*
*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
*

r5r 

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Monday, December 2, 2024 at 9:19:39 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 10:53 AM Alan Grayson wrote:

*> Who claims conscious objects obey different laws than non-conscious
objects? *

*Anyone who claims that an observation or a measurement causes the collapse
of Schrodinger's quantum wave, that's who. *

*That's pure BS. I studied QM with very learned professors in first-rate
universities, and I've viewed many videos, and nothing of the sort is ever
claimed, not even by Penrose for example. It's just your private position,
which is delusional. And what kind of conscious objects are you referring
to? De Broglie never distinquished conscious from inanimate objects when
making his conjecture of the wave properties of matter. Please stop your
misleading BS. AG *

*> **I'm sure the book was a best seller, in the fiction department. AG *

*I'd ask you to read "The Ghost In The Atom" or Sean Carroll's even better
book "Something Deeply Hidden", **however I know there's not a snowball's
chance in hell of you ever reading either one, much less reading any of
their technical research papers; I doubt you even read my short post. But
of course that will not prevent you from expressing very strong opinions
regarding the quality, or lack thereof, of those two excellent physicist's
work.*

*Anyone who strays into and supports MW has fallen for Trump physics, and I
wouldn't waste my time reading their justifications. Of course, much is
hidden. That's a given. But the huge proliferations of worlds or branches
by trivial human actions, and animals, and microscopic creatures, is proof
enough that the theory you love is catagorical nonsense. AG *

*John K Clark*
r5r

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 10:53 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> Who claims conscious objects obey different laws than non-conscious
> objects? *


*Anyone who claims that an observation or a measurement causes the collapse
of Schrodinger's quantum wave, that's who. *

*> **I'm sure the book was a best seller, in the fiction department. AG *


*I'd ask you to read "The Ghost In The Atom" or Sean Carroll's even better
book "Something Deeply Hidden", **however I know there's not a snowball's
chance in hell of you ever reading either one, much less reading any of
their technical research papers; I doubt you even read my short post. But
of course that will not prevent you from expressing very strong opinions
regarding the quality, or lack thereof, of those two excellent physicist's
work. *

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
r5r

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, December 2, 2024 at 4:42:38 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 2:31 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*>Concerning Deutsch, I didn't read the link, but*


* t**hat won't for rent you from pontificating on things you know 
absolutely nothing about  because that is your defining characteristic. *

*John K Clark*


I put that comment in to get a rise out of you, and as expected you fell 
for the bait. Why should I read Deutsch? I've read enough of his stuff to 
know he's totally deluded in his MW dream. With MW you won't even know that 
slit experiments result in interference patterns. AG


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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 2:31 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*>Concerning Deutsch, I didn't read the link, but*


* t**hat won't for rent you from pontificating on things you know
absolutely nothing about  because that is your defining characteristic. *

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
pob

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Monday, December 2, 2024 at 12:31:46 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, December 1, 2024 at 10:05:49 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

Probabilities are like energies. Physically they take different forms:
frequentist, Bayesian, credence, wagers... And like energies there is
there is a common mathematical theory which they obey and which can be used
to transform between the different forms.

Brent

Concerning Deutsch, I didn't read the link, but since he's a MW cultist, I
would expect him to downgrade the concept of probability by claiming it
can't be rigorous defined -- since MW has a real problem defining
probabilities among multiple branches. Of course, many fundamental concepts
in physics and mathematics can't be defined *rigorously*, so I assume
Deutsch is just blowing smoke up our collective butts in an effort to
justify MW. In response to his BS, I gave the example of "finite
mathematics" where infinities are disallowed because they seem unjustified
from a rigorous POV. BTW, can you say something about the common
mathematical theory underlying the different types of probabilities you
mention. AG

My point in referencing "finite mathematics" was just to illustrate that
ambiguities can exist in ideas we take for granted, such as limits in
mathematics, so what Deutsch is claiming is not at all unusual in the
foundations of mathematics and physics. AG

On 12/1/2024 12:48 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Saturday, November 30, 2024 at 1:55:52 PM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:10 AM smitra wrote:

*> What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions about
probability, Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot be rigorously
defined in a physical context as David Deutsch explains here
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
*

*Interesting video, thank you for recommending it. I think Deutsch does a
good job highlighting the fact that any theory that attempts to deal with
fundamental reality is going to have a problem when it comes to
probability, but if Many Worlds has a problem rigorously defining
probability then the other fundamental quantum interpretations do it even
more poorly. And if Many Worlds is true, or nearly so, and if intelligent
creatures who enjoy gambling exist in some of those worlds, then they are
going to develop something close to the thing that in English is called
"probability" and they are not going to worry very much about a rigorous
definition of it or the deep philosophical problems that it may entail. *

* John K Clark *

No question about it; Deutsch is a genius and fits the definition of
cultist. Consider this; can we ever get to the limit in any calculus
problem? And this isn't a version of Zeno's paradox. AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-01 Thread Alan Grayson

On Sunday, December 1, 2024 at 10:05:49 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

Probabilities are like energies. Physically they take different forms:
frequentist, Bayesian, credence, wagers... And like energies there is
there is a common mathematical theory which they obey and which can be used
to transform between the different forms.

Brent

Concerning Deutsch, I didn't read the link, but since he's a MW cultist, I
would expect him to downgrade the concept of probability by claiming it
can't be rigorous defined -- since MW has a real problem defining
probabilities among multiple branches. Of course, many fundamental concepts
in physics and mathematics can't be defined *rigorously*, so I assume
Deutsch is just blowing smoke up our collective butts in an effort to
justify MW. In response to his BS, I gave the example of "finite
mathematics" where infinities are disallowed because they seem unjustified
from a rigorous POV. BTW, can you say something about the common
mathematical theory underlying the different types of probabilities you
mention. AG

On 12/1/2024 12:48 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Saturday, November 30, 2024 at 1:55:52 PM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:10 AM smitra wrote:

* John K Clark *

No question about it; Deutsch is a genius and fits the definition of
cultist. Consider this; can we ever get to the limit in any calculus
problem? And this isn't a version of Zeno's paradox. AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-01 Thread Brent Meeker

Probabilities are like energies. Physically they take different forms:
frequentist, Bayesian, credence, wagers... And like energies there is
there is a common mathematical theory which they obey and which can be
used to transform between the different forms.

Brent

On 12/1/2024 12:48 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Saturday, November 30, 2024 at 1:55:52 PM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:10 AM smitra wrote:

/> What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions
about probability,
Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot berigorously
defined in a physical
context as David Deutsch explains here
*https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s*
/

*Interesting video, thank you for recommending it. I think Deutsch
does a good job highlighting the fact that any theory that
attempts to deal with fundamental reality is going to have a
problem when it comes to probability, but if Many Worlds has a
problem rigorously defining probability then the other fundamental
quantum interpretations do it even more poorly. And if Many Worlds
is true, or nearly so, and if intelligent creatures who enjoy
gambling exist in some of those worlds, then they are going to
develop something close to the thing that in English is called
"probability" and they are not going to worry very much about a
rigorous definition of it or the deep philosophical problems that
it may entail. *

*John K Clark *

No question about it; Deutsch is a genius and fits the definition of
cultist. Consider this; can we ever get to the limit in any calculus
problem? And this isn't a version of Zeno's paradox. AG

lad

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-01 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, Nov 30, 2024 at 03:55:08PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:10 AM smitra  wrote:
> 
> 
> > What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions about
> probability,
>  Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot be rigorously defined in 
> a
> physical 
>  context  as David Deutsch explains here
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
> 
> 
> Interesting video, thank you for recommending it. I think Deutsch does a good
> job highlighting the fact that any theory that attempts to deal with
> fundamental reality is going to have a problem when it comes to probability,
> but if Many Worlds has a problem rigorously defining probability then the 
> other
> fundamental quantum interpretations do it even more poorly. And if Many Worlds
> is true, or nearly so, and if intelligent creatures who enjoy gambling exist 
> in
> some of those worlds, then they are going to develop something close to the
> thing that in English is called "probability" and they are not going to worry
> very much about a rigorous definition of it or the deep philosophical problems
> that it may entail.  
> 
>    John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> lad
> 

Agreed - this is an interesting presentation, and getting a deeper
understanding of his Constructor theory is on my TODO list.

I might point out that in this lecture, he jumps immediately from the
case of two equal possibilities 1/√2 |x₁>+1/√2|x₂>, where he
eliminates Born rule, probabilities etc to get directly to a decision
theoretic interpretation, to eliminating those tools in general for
the whole gamut of probability theory application. It needs to be done
for more general superpositions α|x₁>+β|x₂>, and I suspect the devil
is in the details there. Most of the simplistic "branch counting"
interpretations fail on that case. Hopefully, it has been done, and he
was resorting to the simplistic case for pedagogical purposes...

Since in my own work, I start from a notion of information (and
complexity), which is intrinsically probabilistic, I'd like to see how
constructor theory might rebase that subject. Again, the topic is way
more complex than can be presented in such a 1 hour seminar.

Hopefully, I'll find the time to dig into this topic in the next few years...:P.

-- 

Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-01 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sun, Dec 1, 2024 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

> On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 9:57:08 PM UTC-7 Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 30, 2024 at 3:37 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
> On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 6:02:49 PM UTC-7 Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> Non-local does not mean that there are specifiable interactions between
> the remote observers. If there were such interactions (FTL , say), then the
> theory would involve only local interactions. FTL interactions are just as
> local as any other interactions. Non-local means that the system depends on
> both x_1 and x_2, when x_1 and x_2 are at different locations (say,
> spacelike separated).
>
> Bruce
>
>
> Isn't spacelike separated a necessary condition for non-local? You write
> as if it's one of possibly several necessary conditions. AG
>
>
> No. Spacelike separation is not necessary. You can have a non-local effect
> whenever something depends on both x_1 and x_2, when these refer to
> separate locations, without any local communication between the points.
> Given points A and B, if whatever happens at A cannot affect B, and vice
> versa, then the relation between A and B is non-local. The points need not
> be spacelike separated.
>
> Bruce
>
>
> Can you give an example of something depending on two separate locations
> where there is no communication between the points? AG
>

Alice and Bob measuring the spin projections of a pair of entangled
particles. The archetypical non-local effect.

Bruce

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-01 Thread Alan Grayson

On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 9:57:08 PM UTC-7 Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Sat, Nov 30, 2024 at 3:37 PM Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 6:02:49 PM UTC-7 Bruce Kellett wrote:

Non-local does not mean that there are specifiable interactions between the
remote observers. If there were such interactions (FTL , say), then the
theory would involve only local interactions. FTL interactions are just as
local as any other interactions. Non-local means that the system depends on
both x_1 and x_2, when x_1 and x_2 are at different locations (say,
spacelike separated).

Bruce

Isn't spacelike separated a necessary condition for non-local? You write as
if it's one of possibly several necessary conditions. AG

No. Spacelike separation is not necessary. You can have a non-local effect
whenever something depends on both x_1 and x_2, when these refer to
separate locations, without any local communication between the points.
Given points A and B, if whatever happens at A cannot affect B, and vice
versa, then the relation between A and B is non-local. The points need not
be spacelike separated.

Bruce

Can you give an example of something depending on two separate locations
where there is no communication between the points? AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-12-01 Thread Alan Grayson

On Saturday, November 30, 2024 at 1:55:52 PM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:10 AM smitra wrote:

*> What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions about
probability, Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot be rigorously
defined in a physical context as David Deutsch explains
herehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
*

* John K Clark *

No question about it; Deutsch is a genius and fits the definition of
cultist. Consider this; can we ever get to the limit in any calculus
problem? And this isn't a version of Zeno's paradox. AG

lad

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-30 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:10 AM smitra  wrote:

>
>
> *> What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions about
> probability, Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot be rigorously
> defined in a physical  context  as David Deutsch explains
> herehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
> *

*Interesting video, thank you for recommending it. I think Deutsch does a
good job highlighting the fact that any theory that attempts to deal with
fundamental reality is going to have a problem when it comes to
probability, but if Many Worlds has a problem rigorously defining
probability then the other fundamental quantum interpretations do it even
more poorly. And if Many Worlds is true, or nearly so, and if intelligent
creatures who enjoy gambling exist in some of those worlds, then they are
going to develop something close to the thing that in English is called
"probability" and they are not going to worry very much about a rigorous
definition of it or the deep philosophical problems that it may entail.   *

 *  John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
lad

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-29 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Nov 30, 2024 at 3:37 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

> On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 6:02:49 PM UTC-7 Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> Non-local does not mean that there are specifiable interactions between
> the remote observers. If there were such interactions (FTL , say), then the
> theory would involve only local interactions. FTL interactions are just as
> local as any other interactions. Non-local means that the system depends on
> both x_1 and x_2, when x_1 and x_2 are at different locations (say,
> spacelike separated).
>
> Bruce
>
>
> Isn't spacelike separated a necessary condition for non-local? You write
> as if it's one of possibly several necessary conditions. AG
>

No. Spacelike separation is not necessary. You can have a non-local effect
whenever something depends on both x_1 and x_2, when these refer to
separate locations, without any local communication between the points.
Given points A and B, if whatever happens at A cannot affect B, and vice
versa, then the relation between A and B is non-local. The points need not
be spacelike separated.

Bruce

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 6:02:49 PM UTC-7 Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:55 PM smitra  wrote:

On 27-11-2024 04:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:

>> So, basically the standard local hidden variables framework.
> 
> Read a little more carefully. "Once all such factors have been taken
> into account 
> the probabilities for a and b should factorize."

They take into account hidden variables and then it should factorize. 
They only generalize a bit, the theory does not need to be 
deterministic, you have a probability distribution that then expresses 
the correlations as an integral over the hidden variables, which is eq, 
(3).

> If it were a hidden variable theory, then the probabilities for a and
> b would depend on those hidden variables, and that is what is
> explicitly ruled out.

No, it's not ruled out, it expicitely depends on the probability 
distribution over huidden variables.

The inclusion of the factor lambda and integrating over it in the 
factorization of eqn. (3) is merely to take account of the possibility of 
hidden variables --  it does not imply that this is a hidden variable 
theory.

> So Brunner is not using a hidden variable
> theory.

It's a hidden variable theory, but not necessarily a classical 
deterministic theory.

The main point is that, even taking unknown joint causal
> factors into account, the probabilities at the remote ends factorize.
> In other words, what happens at A does not affect what happens at B,
> and vice versa. This is the notion of locality that they use to derive
> the CHSH inequality -- nothing to do with hidden variables.

Exactly. The fact that hidden variables and other unknowns are taken into 
account shows that the main result applies to any theory --  hidden 
variables or not. The main result is that any theory that satisfies the 
factorizability condition (3) cannot reproduce the quantum correlations. 
Since factorizability (3) is the condition for locality, it means that no 
local theory can reproduce the quantum correlations. The contrapositive of 
this is that any theory that gives the quantum correlations cannot satisfy 
the factorization condition, and hence must be non-local. In particular, it 
means that quantum mechanics itself is intrinsically non-local, since it 
gives the quantum correlations, but does not satisfy the factorizability 
condition.

It's a hidden variable theory that's not equivalent to QM (when the 
correlations factorize). Locality in these theories does not correspond 
to locality in QM.

QM is what it is, it's a manifestly local theory when we use a local 
Hamiltonian, but the theory is of a different structure than the class 
of theories that correspond to our intuitions. Imposing locality in 
those theories makes them unable account for correlations within QM, we 
need to invoke non-local behaviors in these theories to be able to 
reproduce QM. Does that mean that QM is non-local. No, because what we 
did here was to replace QM by a different theory and then interpret QM 
using that different theory.

I don't think you have understood the basic logic of the contrapositive 
above. Quantum mechanics gives certain correlations. It has been proved 
that no theory satisfying the locality condition can reproduce those 
correlations. Therefore, QM is non-local.

The proper conclusion should be that QM is 
a fundamentally different theory than the class of theories in that 
paper, so stochastic vatriants of classical deterministic theories don't 
fit the bill either.

Rubbish. Bell's theorem applies to all theories, including quantum 
mechanics.

At the end of the day entanglement is a real phenomenon that QM has no 
problems describing via only local interactions.

Unfortunately, you have routinely been unable to provide a local account of 
the quantum correlations. All you have ever done is repeat the claim that 
is in dispute, without providing any evidence that can undermine the proof 
provided by Bell's theorem.

This then naturally 
leads to a Many Worlds picture, because when measuring z-components of a 
singlet state, if everything is manifestly local and Alice finds spin 
up, how can Bob's result now been determined to be spin down, given than 
if Bob's outcome is not pre-determined before Alcie found spin up (we 
know this from Bell's theorem, you don't need a violation of a Bell's 
inequality in a particular experiment to conclude this for any 
particular experiment), unless the two possible outcomes for Bob both 
physically exist?

That is what many-worlds theories maintain. Whenever Bob measures his 
particle from the entangled pair, he must get both possible outcomes, 
albeit in different branches. The problem many-worlds faces is coping with 
the copy of Bob that gets spin-up when Alice gets spin-up when they are 
both measuring particles from a singlet spin state. In fact, if you take 
this result further to the case where Alice and Bob both measure a sequence 
of N entangled pair

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-29 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:55 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 27-11-2024 04:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> >> So, basically the standard local hidden variables framework.
> >
> > Read a little more carefully. "Once all such factors have been taken
> > into account 
> > the probabilities for a and b should factorize."
>
> They take into account hidden variables and then it should factorize.
> They only generalize a bit, the theory does not need to be
> deterministic, you have a probability distribution that then expresses
> the correlations as an integral over the hidden variables, which is eq,
> (3).
>
>
> > If it were a hidden variable theory, then the probabilities for a and
> > b would depend on those hidden variables, and that is what is
> > explicitly ruled out.
>
> No, it's not ruled out, it expicitely depends on the probability
> distribution over huidden variables.
>

The inclusion of the factor lambda and integrating over it in the
factorization of eqn. (3) is merely to take account of the possibility of
hidden variables --  it does not imply that this is a hidden variable
theory.

>
> > So Brunner is not using a hidden variable
> > theory.
>
> It's a hidden variable theory, but not necessarily a classical
> deterministic theory.
>
> The main point is that, even taking unknown joint causal
> > factors into account, the probabilities at the remote ends factorize.
> > In other words, what happens at A does not affect what happens at B,
> > and vice versa. This is the notion of locality that they use to derive
> > the CHSH inequality -- nothing to do with hidden variables.
>

Exactly. The fact that hidden variables and other unknowns are taken into
account shows that the main result applies to any theory --  hidden
variables or not. The main result is that any theory that satisfies the
factorizability condition (3) cannot reproduce the quantum correlations.
Since factorizability (3) is the condition for locality, it means that no
local theory can reproduce the quantum correlations. The contrapositive of
this is that any theory that gives the quantum correlations cannot satisfy
the factorization condition, and hence must be non-local. In particular, it
means that quantum mechanics itself is intrinsically non-local, since it
gives the quantum correlations, but does not satisfy the factorizability
condition.

It's a hidden variable theory that's not equivalent to QM (when the
> correlations factorize). Locality in these theories does not correspond
> to locality in QM.
>
>
> QM is what it is, it's a manifestly local theory when we use a local
> Hamiltonian, but the theory is of a different structure than the class
> of theories that correspond to our intuitions. Imposing locality in
> those theories makes them unable account for correlations within QM, we
> need to invoke non-local behaviors in these theories to be able to
> reproduce QM. Does that mean that QM is non-local. No, because what we
> did here was to replace QM by a different theory and then interpret QM
> using that different theory.

I don't think you have understood the basic logic of the contrapositive
above. Quantum mechanics gives certain correlations. It has been proved
that no theory satisfying the locality condition can reproduce those
correlations. Therefore, QM is non-local.

The proper conclusion should be that QM is
> a fundamentally different theory than the class of theories in that
> paper, so stochastic vatriants of classical deterministic theories don't
> fit the bill either.
>

Rubbish. Bell's theorem applies to all theories, including quantum
mechanics.

At the end of the day entanglement is a real phenomenon that QM has no
> problems describing via only local interactions.

Unfortunately, you have routinely been unable to provide a local account of
the quantum correlations. All you have ever done is repeat the claim that
is in dispute, without providing any evidence that can undermine the proof
provided by Bell's theorem.

This then naturally
> leads to a Many Worlds picture, because when measuring z-components of a
> singlet state, if everything is manifestly local and Alice finds spin
> up, how can Bob's result now been determined to be spin down, given than
> if Bob's outcome is not pre-determined before Alcie found spin up (we
> know this from Bell's theorem, you don't need a violation of a Bell's
> inequality in a particular experiment to conclude this for any
> particular experiment), unless the two possible outcomes for Bob both
> physically exist?
>

That is what many-worlds theories maintain. Whenever Bob measures his
particle from the entangled pair, he must get both possible outcomes,
albeit in different branches. The problem many-worlds faces is coping with
the copy of Bob that gets spin-up when Alice gets spin-up when they are
both measuring particles from a singlet spin state. In fact, if you take
this result further to the case where Alice and Bob both measure a sequence
of N entangled pairs. Many-worlds stat

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 1:29:56 PM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> This is another example of Trump-type behavior*


 
*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen +5 times I've heard it from you. *

 *John K Clark *


You keep doing the same dumb thing and think you're being clever. Who does 
this remind you of? Another dumb thing is to substitute a huge number of 
other worlds you have *zero *contact with, to ostensibly get rid of 
collapse of the wf, and claim you got this from S's equation. When S saw 
the results of slit experiments, do you really think he imagined these 
other worlds on a single trial? AG

kjk

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-29 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> This is another example of Trump-type behavior*



*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen +5 times I've heard it from you. *

 *John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
kjk

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 10:57:14 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 12:22 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> MW is a cult, having some relation to the Trump cult *


*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen +4 times I've heard it from you. *

*John K Clark  *


This is another example of Trump-type behavior. You surely KNOW I don't 
think you're a Trump SUPPORTER, but you continue to distort, thinking no 
one would notice it, or care. AG  

 

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-29 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 12:22 PM Alan Grayson 
wrote:

*> MW is a cult, having some relation to the Trump cult *
>

*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen +4 times I've heard it from you. *

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
9it

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 8:10:11 AM UTC-7 smitra wrote:

On 29-11-2024 15:36, John Clark wrote: 
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 4:40 PM Brent Meeker  
> wrote: 
> 
>> _> As Barandes writes in (which you should watch)_ 
> 
> NO OFFENSE BRENT BUT I'M NOT GONNA WATCH AN HOUR LONG VIDEO BY 
> SOMEBODY I'VE NEVER HEARD OF PROMOTING A THEORY THAT I CONSIDER 
> EVEN LESS CREDIBLE THAN THE "DINOSAURS NEVER EXISTED THEORY", 
> ESPECIALLY WHEN I NOTE IT ONLY HAS 12 VIEWS. 
> 
> THE ENTIRETY OF REALITY CONSISTS OF A UNIVERSAL WAVE FUNCTION 
>>> (UWF), IT DESCRIBES THE POSITION AND MOMENTUM OF EVERY PARTICLE IN 
>>> EXISTENCE AT ANY INSTANT IN TIME. IF A HUMAN COULD OBSERVE THINGS 
>>> FROM THE OUTSIDE HE WOULDN'T NEED TO RESORT TO PROBABILITY, 
>> 
>> _> Really? _ 
> 
> YES REALLY. OR DO YOU DISPUTE THE FACT THAT SCHRODINGER'S EQUATION 
> IS DETERMINISTIC? 
> 
>> _> What about atomic decay?_ 
> 
> WHAT ABOUT IT? MOST BRENT MEEKERS WILL SEE AN ATOM THAT HAS A 
> HALF-LIFE OF ONE HOUR DECAY CLOSE TO THAT TIME BECAUSE THOSE BRANCHES 
> OF THE MULTIVERSE HAVE THE GREATEST QUANTUM AMPLITUDE (OR AS I LIKE TO 
> THINK OF IT ON A BRANCHING 2-D DIAGRAM, THOSE LINES HAVE A GREATER 
> THICKNESS) BUT A FEW BRENT MEEKERS WILL SEE THE ATOM DECAY AFTER ONLY 
> A 10TH OF A SECOND, AND OTHER BRENT MEEKERS WILL HAVE TO WAIT 2 HOURS 
> BEFORE IT DECAYS, AND OTHER BRENT MEEKERS NEED TO WAIT FOR 4 HOURS, 
> AND 8 HOURS, AND 16 HOURS, AND 32 HOURS ETC. AND A VERY FEW BRENT 
> MEEKERS WILL DIE OF OLD AGE BEFORE THEY SEE THE ATOM DECAY. 
> 

What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions about 
probability, Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot be 
rigorously defined in a physical context as David Deutsch explains here: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s 

For practical purposes this is not a problem. But it is a problem for 
formulating fundamental laws of nature in terms of probability if one 
cannot rigorously define probability without resorting to mathematical 
concepts that cannot be physically realized. And while in the MWI one 
may actually get around this issue with probability if one assumes an 
infinite number of effective branches. So, it's then actually more of a 
problem for single universe interpretations, because in such a setting 
there is not going to be an exact physical representation of 
probability. 

Saibal

*Can you name any mathematical concept that is perfectly realized in the*
*real world? IMO, MW is a cult, having some relation to the Trump cult when*
*it succumbs to distortions of reality. Deutsch is a good example of the *
*disease afflicting physics today. He just can't grasp the MW is many 
orders*
*of magnitude worse than probability in one world. Really; many orders of*
*magnitude WORSE. You guys keep inventing wholly imaginary universes*
*when you have virtually ZERO  grasp what ONE entire universe IS ! AG *

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 29, 2024 at 8:10:11 AM UTC-7 smitra wrote:

On 29-11-2024 15:36, John Clark wrote: 
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 4:40 PM Brent Meeker  
> wrote: 
> 
>> _> As Barandes writes in (which you should watch)_ 
> 
> NO OFFENSE BRENT BUT I'M NOT GONNA WATCH AN HOUR LONG VIDEO BY 
> SOMEBODY I'VE NEVER HEARD OF PROMOTING A THEORY THAT I CONSIDER 
> EVEN LESS CREDIBLE THAN THE "DINOSAURS NEVER EXISTED THEORY", 
> ESPECIALLY WHEN I NOTE IT ONLY HAS 12 VIEWS. 
> 
> THE ENTIRETY OF REALITY CONSISTS OF A UNIVERSAL WAVE FUNCTION 
>>> (UWF), IT DESCRIBES THE POSITION AND MOMENTUM OF EVERY PARTICLE IN 
>>> EXISTENCE AT ANY INSTANT IN TIME. IF A HUMAN COULD OBSERVE THINGS 
>>> FROM THE OUTSIDE HE WOULDN'T NEED TO RESORT TO PROBABILITY, 
>> 
>> _> Really? _ 
> 
> YES REALLY. OR DO YOU DISPUTE THE FACT THAT SCHRODINGER'S EQUATION 
> IS DETERMINISTIC? 
> 
>> _> What about atomic decay?_ 
> 
> WHAT ABOUT IT? MOST BRENT MEEKERS WILL SEE AN ATOM THAT HAS A 
> HALF-LIFE OF ONE HOUR DECAY CLOSE TO THAT TIME BECAUSE THOSE BRANCHES 
> OF THE MULTIVERSE HAVE THE GREATEST QUANTUM AMPLITUDE (OR AS I LIKE TO 
> THINK OF IT ON A BRANCHING 2-D DIAGRAM, THOSE LINES HAVE A GREATER 
> THICKNESS) BUT A FEW BRENT MEEKERS WILL SEE THE ATOM DECAY AFTER ONLY 
> A 10TH OF A SECOND, AND OTHER BRENT MEEKERS WILL HAVE TO WAIT 2 HOURS 
> BEFORE IT DECAYS, AND OTHER BRENT MEEKERS NEED TO WAIT FOR 4 HOURS, 
> AND 8 HOURS, AND 16 HOURS, AND 32 HOURS ETC. AND A VERY FEW BRENT 
> MEEKERS WILL DIE OF OLD AGE BEFORE THEY SEE THE ATOM DECAY. 
> 

What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions about 
probability, Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot be 
rigorously defined in a physical context as David Deutsch explains here: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s

For practical purposes this is not a problem. But it is a problem for 
formulating fundamental laws of nature in terms of probability if one 
cannot rigorously define probability without resorting to mathematical 
concepts that cannot be physically realized. And while in the MWI one 
may actually get around this issue with probability if one assumes an 
infinite number of effective branches. So, it's then actually more of a 
problem for single universe interpretations, because in such a setting 
there is not going to be an exact physical representation of 
probability.

*Can you name any mathematical concept that is perfectly realized in the*
*real world? IMO, MW is a cult, having some relation to the Trump cult when*
*it succumbs to distortions of reality. Deutsch is a good example of the *
*disease afflicting physics today. He just can't grasp the MW is many 
orders*
*of magnitude worse that probability in one world. Really; many orders of*
*magnitude WORSE. You guys keep inventing wholly imaginary universes*
*when you have zero grasp what an entire universe IS. AG *

Saibal

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-29 Thread smitra


On 29-11-2024 15:36, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 4:40 PM Brent Meeker 
wrote:


_> As Barandes writes in (which you should watch)_


NO OFFENSE BRENT BUT I'M NOT GONNA WATCH AN HOUR LONG VIDEO BY
SOMEBODY I'VE NEVER HEARD OF PROMOTING A THEORY THAT I CONSIDER
EVEN LESS CREDIBLE THAN THE "DINOSAURS NEVER EXISTED THEORY",
ESPECIALLY WHEN I NOTE IT ONLY HAS 12 VIEWS.


THE ENTIRETY OF REALITY CONSISTS OF A UNIVERSAL WAVE FUNCTION

(UWF), IT DESCRIBES THE POSITION AND MOMENTUM OF EVERY PARTICLE IN
EXISTENCE AT ANY INSTANT IN TIME. IF A HUMAN COULD OBSERVE THINGS
FROM THE OUTSIDE HE WOULDN'T NEED TO RESORT TO PROBABILITY,


_> Really? _


YES REALLY. OR DO YOU DISPUTE THE FACT THAT SCHRODINGER'S EQUATION
IS DETERMINISTIC?


_> What about atomic decay?_


WHAT ABOUT IT? MOST BRENT MEEKERS WILL SEE AN ATOM THAT HAS A
HALF-LIFE OF ONE HOUR DECAY CLOSE TO THAT TIME BECAUSE THOSE BRANCHES
OF THE MULTIVERSE HAVE THE GREATEST QUANTUM AMPLITUDE (OR AS I LIKE TO
THINK OF IT ON A BRANCHING 2-D DIAGRAM, THOSE LINES HAVE A GREATER
THICKNESS) BUT A FEW BRENT MEEKERS WILL SEE THE ATOM DECAY AFTER ONLY
A 10TH OF A SECOND, AND OTHER BRENT MEEKERS WILL HAVE TO WAIT 2 HOURS
BEFORE IT DECAYS, AND OTHER BRENT MEEKERS NEED TO WAIT FOR 4 HOURS,
AND 8 HOURS, AND 16 HOURS, AND 32 HOURS ETC. AND A VERY FEW BRENT
MEEKERS WILL DIE OF OLD AGE BEFORE THEY SEE THE ATOM DECAY.



What is also worthwhile to consider in these discussions about 
probability, Born rule etc. the fact that probability cannot be 
rigorously defined in a physical context as David Deutsch explains here:


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s

For practical purposes this is not a problem. But it is a problem for 
formulating fundamental laws of nature in terms of probability if one 
cannot rigorously define probability without resorting to mathematical 
concepts that cannot be physically realized. And while in the MWI one 
may actually get around this issue with probability if one assumes an 
infinite number of effective branches. So, it's then actually more of a 
problem for single universe interpretations, because in such a setting 
there is not going to be an exact physical representation of 
probability.


Saibal




IN ANY QUANTUM EXPERIMENT SUPERDETERMINISM AND MANY WORLDS MAKE

IDENTICAL PREDICTIONS, THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS MANY WORLDS ONLY
NEEDS ONE ASSUMPTION TO MAKE CORRECT PREDICTIONS WHILE
SUPERDETERMINISM NEEDS TO MAKE AN INFINITE NUMBER OF THEM.



_> You're just making stuff up.  Superdeterminism doesn't make any
more deterministic predictions than MWI or Copenhagen, because the
initial conditions are unknown_


 YES THE INITIAL CONDITIONS ARE UNKNOWN AND NEITHER MWI NOR COPENHAGEN
CLAIMS TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THEM, BUT THAT'S OK BECAUSE THEY
BOTH WORK FINE WITH ANY PARTICULAR STARTING CONDITION, THEY EVEN WORK
FINE IF THE UNIVERSE HAS NO INITIAL CONDITIONS AT ALL BECAUSE THE
UNIVERSE IS INFINITELY OLD. AND THE SAME IS TRUE OF OBJECTIVE COLLAPSE
AND PILOT WAVE. HOWEVER THE CASE IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT WITH
SUPERDETERMINISM, IT MAKES MANY DEMANDS THAT THE OTHERS DO NOT.

SUPERDETERMINISM WILL ONLY WORK IF THE UNIVERSE (OR MULTIVERSE) IS
FINITELY OLD AND THUS HAD A STARTING CONDITION, AND THERE ARE AN
INFINITE NUMBER OF STARTING CONDITIONS THAT WOULD RESULT IN A UNIVERSE
WHERE SUPERDETERMINISM FAILS, BUT ONLY ONE STARTING CONDITION WILL
RESULT IN A UNIVERSE WHERE IT WORKS BECAUSE IN THAT UNIVERSE
SUPERDETERMINISM WILL NEVER HAVE TO FACE ITS GREATEST ENEMY, THE
SCIENTIFIC METHOD. IN THAT ONE UNIVERSE THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD DOES NOT
WORK AND EXPERIMENTATION IS JUST A WASTE OF TIME.


_> and so produce probabilistic answers in the same way MWI says you
don't know which world you'll be in_.


NO! IN SUPERDETERMINISM THE ULTIMATE REASON "YOU" NEED TO RESORT TO
PROBABILITY IS THAT "YOU" DON'T HAVE PERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE
PREVIOUS STATE OF THE UNIVERSE; BY CONTRAST MANY WORLDS SAYS "YOU"
NEEDS TO RESORT TO PROBABILITY BECAUSE OF THE VERY NATURE OF THE
PERSONAL PRONOUN "YOU". IN MANY WORLDS ASKING "_WHICH ONE WORLD WILL
PRE COIN FLIP BRENT MEEKER BE IN AFTER THE COIN FLIP, THE HEADS WORLD
OR THE TAILS WORLD?_" IS A NONSENSICAL QUESTION BECAUSE BRENT MEEKER
WILL BE IN BOTH WORLDS.


_> Superdeterminism just says those things you think are inherently
random in QM are really determined by unknown initial conditions_


NO! SUPERDETERMINISM DOES NOT SAY ANY OLD STARTING CONDITION WILL
WORK, IT NEEDS ONE VERY PARTICULAR STARTING CONDITION, THE ONE THAT
WILL RESULT IN A UNIVERSE WHERE THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD DOES NOT WORK
AND THUS EVENTUALLY PRODUCE GENERATIONS OF PHYSICISTS AND SCIENTISTS
IN GENERAL FORMING THEORIES THAT WILL BE COMPLETELY 100% DEAD WRONG.


AND YOU STILL HAVEN'T TOLD ME WHY YOU THINK

SUPERDETERMINISM IS A REASONABLE THEORY WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION
BUT THE DINOSAURS NEVER EXISTED THEORY IS NOT. I'M ASSUMING
YOU BELIEVE THAT DINOSAURS ONCE EXISTED, IF I'M WRONG ABOUT
THAT ASSUMPTION PLEASE LET ME KNOW.


_> I don't think it'

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-29 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 4:40 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*> As Barandes writes in (which you should watch)*

*No offense Brent but I'm not gonna watch an hour long video by somebody
I've never heard of promoting a theory that I consider even less credible
than the "Dinosaurs Never Existed theory", especially when I note it only
has 12 views.  *

> * >> the entirety of reality consists of a Universal Wave Function (UWF)**,
>> it describes the position and momentum of every particle in existence at
>> any Instant in time. If a human could observe things from the outside he
>> wouldn't need to resort to probability, *
>
>
> *> Really? *

*Yes really. Or do you dispute the fact that Schrodinger's equation is
deterministic?  *

> *> What about atomic decay?*
>

*What about it? Most Brent Meekers will see an atom that has a half-life of
one hour decay close to that time because those branches of the Multiverse
have the greatest quantum amplitude (or as I like to think of it on a
branching 2-D diagram, those lines have a greater thickness) but a
few Brent Meekers will see the atom decay after only a 10th of a second,
and other Brent Meekers will have to wait 2 hours before it decays, and
other Brent Meekers need to wait for 4 hours, and 8 hours, and 16 hours,
and 32 hours etc. And a very few Brent Meekers will die of old age before
they see the atom decay. *

*>> In any quantum experiment Superdeterminism and Many Worlds make
>> identical predictions, the only difference is Many Worlds only needs one
>> assumption to make correct predictions while Superdeterminism needs to make
>> an infinite number of them.*
>
>
> *> You're just making stuff up.  Superdeterminism doesn't make any more
> deterministic predictions than MWI or Copenhagen, because the initial
> conditions are unknown*

*Yes the initial conditions are unknown and neither MWI nor Copenhagen
claims to know anything about them, but that's OK because they both work
fine with ANY particular starting condition, they even work fine if the
universe has no initial conditions at all because the universe is
infinitely old. And the same is true of Objective Collapse and Pilot Wave.
However the case is completely different with Superdeterminism, it makes
many demands that the others do not.*

*Superdeterminism will only work if the universe (or multiverse) is
finitely old and thus had a starting condition, and there are an INFINITE
number of starting conditions that would result in a universe where
Superdeterminism fails, but only ONE starting condition will result in a
universe where it works because in that universe Superdeterminism will
never have to face its greatest enemy, the scientific method. In that one
universe the scientific method does not work and experimentation is just a
waste of time. *

*> and so produce probabilistic answers in the same way MWI says you don't
> know which world you'll be in*.
>

*NO! In Superdeterminism the ultimate reason "you" need to resort to
probability is that "you" don't have perfect knowledge of the previous
state of the universe; by contrast Many Worlds says "you" needs to resort
to probability because of the very nature of the personal pronoun "you". In
Many Worlds asking "which ONE world will pre coin flip Brent Meeker be in
after the coin flip, the heads world or the tails world?" is a nonsensical
question because Brent Meeker will be in both worlds.*

> *> Superdeterminism just says those things you think are inherently random
> in QM are really determined by unknown initial conditions*
>

*NO! Superdeterminism does NOT say any old starting condition will work, it
needs ONE very particular starting condition, the one that will result in a
universe where the scientific method does not work and thus eventually
produce generations of physicists and scientists in general forming
theories that will be completely 100% dead wrong.  *

> *>> And you still haven't told me why you think Superdeterminism is a
>> reasonable theory worthy of consideration but the Dinosaurs Never Existed
>> Theory is not. I'm assuming you believe that dinosaurs once existed, if I'm
>> wrong about that assumption please let me know.*
>
>
> *> I don't think it's a useful theory because it explains things in terms
> of inaccessible initial conditions. *
>

*You believe that is not also true for Superdeterminism?!  The Dinosaurs
Never Existed theory is certainly idiotc but, unlike Superdeterminism, at
least in it the scientific method still works, and thus it's only a matter
of time before geologists figure out what strange non-biological forces
made all those odd looking rocks that so many people have misinterpreted as
being the bones of huge reptiles.   *

*  John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
8b2

>
>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-29 Thread smitra


On 27-11-2024 04:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 2:21 PM smitra  wrote:


On 26-11-2024 23:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You are talking a lot of nonsense. I refer you to a paper by

Brunner

_et al._, Rev Mod. Phys. 86 (2014) pp.419-478.
This is also available at arxiv.org/abs/1303.2849 [1] [1]
The abstract states "Bell's 1964 theorem, which states that the
predictions of quantum theory cannot be accounted for by any local
theory, represents one of the most profound developments in the
foundations of physics."
Brunner _et al._ go on to derive the CHSH

(Clauer-Horne-Shimony-Holt)

inequality using only local dynamics, and prove that this

inequality

is violated in conventional QM, as well as in many experiments.

This

proves that quantum mechanics is intrinsically nonlocal. (If you

like,

it demonstrates that nonlocal states are intrinsic to the theory.)





And b.t.w. if there is a Bell's theorem purely about unitary QM

that

doesn't invoke hidden variables, you could just state it right

here.


I don't prove Bell's theorem here, but I have referred you to

Bell's

original papers, and also to the review article by Brunner et al.,
above. If you actually do the research for yourself, you can see

that

many authors agree with what I have been saying. You are the one

that

is out on a limb.


I have given you references here, and I have referred you to

Bell's

original papers before.. But you do talk an awful lot of nonsense.



Quote from Brunner's paper:

"To avoid any misunderstanding from the start, by “locality” we
do not mean the notion used within quantum mechanics and
quantum field theory that operators defined in spacelike separated

regions commute. Bell’s notion of locality is different and
is clarified below"


They define locality in terms of factorizability, as in their equation
3.


And if I read on to see what Bell’s notion of locality is, then,
as
expected, it involves local hidden variables.

"Let us formalize the idea of a local theory more precisely.



The assumption of locality implies that we should
be able to identify a set of past factors, described by
some variables λ, having a joint causal influence on both
outcomes, and which fully account for the dependence
between a and b. Once all such factors have been taken
into account, the residual indeterminacies about the outcomes



must now be decoupled, that is, the probabilities
for a and b should factorize:"

So, basically the standard local hidden variables framework.


Read a little more carefully. "Once all such factors have been taken
into account 
the probabilities for a and b should factorize."


They take into account hidden variables and then it should factorize. 
They only generalize a bit, the theory does not need to be 
deterministic, you have a probability distribution that then expresses 
the correlations as an integral over the hidden variables, which is eq, 
(3).




If it were a hidden variable theory, then the probabilities for a and
b would depend on those hidden variables, and that is what is
explicitly ruled out.


No, it's not ruled out, it expicitely depends on the probability 
distribution over huidden variables.



So Brunner is not using a hidden variable
theory.


It's a hidden variable theory, but not necessarily a classical 
deterministic theory.


The main point is that, even taking unknown joint causal

factors into account, the probabilities at the remote ends factorize.
In other words, what happens at A does not affect what happens at B,
and vice versa. This is the notion of locality that they use to derive
the CHSH inequality -- nothing to do with hidden variables.


It's a hidden variable theory that's not equivalent to QM (when the 
correlations factorize). Locality in these theories does not correspond 
to locality in QM.



QM is what it is, it's a manifestly local theory when we use a local 
Hamiltonian, but the theory is of a different structure than the class 
of theories that correspond to our intuitions. Imposing locality in 
those theories makes them unable account for correlations within QM, we 
need to invoke non-local behaviors in these theories to be able to 
reproduce QM. Does that mean that QM is non-local. No, because what we 
did here was to replace QM by a different theory and then interpret QM 
using that different theory. The proper conclusion should be that QM is 
a fundamentally different theory than the class of theories in that 
paper, so stochastic vatriants of classical deterministic theories don't 
fit the bill either.


At the end of the day entanglement is a real phenomenon that QM has no 
problems describing via only local interactions. This then naturally 
leads to a Many Worlds picture, because when measuring z-components of a 
singlet state, if everything is manifestly local and Alice finds spin 
up, how can Bob's result now been determined to be spin down, given than 
if Bob's outcome is not pre-determined before Alcie found spin up (we

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-28 Thread Alan Grayson



On Thursday, November 28, 2024 at 6:08:32 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 5:02 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*> But it* [Many Worlds] *assumes that the measurements by Alice and Bob in 
a Bell experiment can be uncorrelated;*


*The only assumption Many Worlds makes is that Schrodinger's equation means 
what it says. *


BS! When will you cease reading way too much into S's equation than is 
warranted? That will be the end of your days as a True Believer. AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-28 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 5:02 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*> But it* [Many Worlds] *assumes that the measurements by Alice and Bob in
> a Bell experiment can be uncorrelated;*
>

*The only assumption Many Worlds makes is that Schrodinger's equation means
what it says. If that assumption is correct then the entirety of reality
consists of a Universal Wave Function (UWF)**, it describes the position
and momentum of every particle in existence at any Instant in time. If a
human could observe things from the outside he wouldn't need to resort to
probability, but of course that is impossible because the human is also
part of the Universal Wave Function, and that's why humans need to talk
about "worlds" and have to resort to probability. Another name for the UWF
is "Multiverse". *

*So everything is always correlated with everything else because it's all
part of the UFW. However, not all correlations are equal. Sometimes, under
very unusual circumstances and for a very short period of time, a small
number of particles can become highly correlated with each other but have
very little correlation with the rest of the universe; when this rare state
of affairs occurs human beings say that the particles have "become quantum
mechanically entangled". *

*And everything I said in the above would still be true regardless of which
one starting condition the Multiverse started out in, it would even remain
true if the Multiverse had no initial condition at all because it was
infinitely old. *

*> while superdeterminism says their angle selections have a common source
> and are correlated. *
>

*In any quantum experiment Superdeterminism and Many Worlds make identical
predictions, the only difference is Many Worlds only needs one assumption
to make correct predictions while Superdeterminism needs to make an
infinite number of them. *

*And you still haven't told me why you think Superdeterminism is a
reasonable theory worthy of consideration but the Dinosaurs Never Existed
Theory is not. I'm assuming you believe that dinosaurs once existed, if I'm
wrong about that assumption please let me know.*

*  John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
plk

> goe
>
>
>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-27 Thread Brent Meeker

Did you read the word "labeled".  The states considered can be complex 
numbers, or even quaternions, over the reals and yet still be enumerable.


Brent


On 11/27/2024 7:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 8:37 PM Brent Meeker  
wrote:


/> His axiom only assumes that configurations of a physical system
can be labeled by the natural numbers. /


*But the Real Numbers, much less the Natural Numbers, are 
insufficiently powerful to make quantum mechanical predictions, you 
need Complex Numbers: *

*
*
*Quantum theory based on real numbers can be experimentally falsified 
 *

*
*
*John K Clark    See what's on my new list at Extropolis 
*

cvn
**








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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-27 Thread Brent Meeker

On 11/27/2024 4:57 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 7:06 PM Brent Meeker  
wrote:

* >> It may require more calculating power than you have
available**but Newtonian physics can give you an answer for an
infinite number of initial conditions, and if things are not
too fast or too small and gravity is not too strong the answer
will even be correct; but superdeterminism can only give you
an answer if things started out in one very specific starting
condition. *

/
> Who told you that?  It's not t'Hooft's theory.  He just says
suppose there is no free will and no randomness, all evolution is
deterministic. /

*Bullshit. *
You think that is *not* t'Hooft's theory?  Or superdetermism can only 
produce one outcome if things start is specific condition?
*First of all free will is not false, it's gibberish. And _ANY_ 
deterministic theory, not just Superdeterminism, would say there is 
"/no randomness, all evolution is deterministic"/;  for example Many 
Worlds says exactly the same thing because it is also a deterministic 
theory. *
But it assumes that the measurements by Alice and Bob in a Bell 
experiment can be uncorrelated; while superdeterminism says their angle 
selections have a common source and are correlated.  It is not just the 
evolution of the experiment that is determined but also the action of 
the participants and decisions about what to measure.  That's why it's 
*super*determinism.*

*
*What makes Superdeterminism unique, and uniquely stupid, has nothing 
to do with determinism, it has to do with the unique starting 
condition required to make the stupid contraptionwork.*

*>> All the other rival quantum interpretationswill work
regardless of which particular initial condition the universe
started out at, they have no need of specifying one particular
one; by contrast what superdeterminism says is let's assume the
universe did NOT start out in that state, or that state, or that
state, or that state and it must continue making those assumptions
an_infinite_ number of times before it finally gets to one and at
last says yeah it started out in that one.*

/> A simple consequence of deterministic evolution, which is time
reversible./

*Brent, I assume you don't believe in the "Dinosaurs Never Existed" 
theory, but why not? If things are deterministic then out of the 
infinite number of initial conditions the very early universe could've 
started out in, there is one in which nonbiological purely geological 
forces would produce rocks that sentient creatures on a small planet 
around an average looking star would misinterpreted as being bones 
from huge reptiles that existed many millions of years ago. If 
Superdeterminism is a good theory then "Dinosaurs Never Existed" is an 
equally good theory. *

*>> The laws of physics are not the problem,and determinism is
not the problem. The problem is the initial conditions, out of
the infinite number of initial conditions the universe
could've started out in only one of them will guarantee that
experimenters everywhere will always make the wrong choice
when performing their quantum experiments, even when they use
dice or quantum "randomness" on how to set their polarizers or
Stern Gerlach magnet**s because nothing is really random. *

>///In what sense is the choice wrong if it is determined by laws//?**/

*It's wrong because the sequence of orientations generations of 
experimentalists "chose" to set their polarizers and Stern Gerlach 
magnets at were _ALWAYS _the one and only one *
It doesn't imply that Alice and Bob must chose some particular settings, 
only that their choices OR the spin axes be correlated.

Brent

*that will cause generations of theoreticians to form incorrect 
quantum interpretations, such as Copenhagen, Many Worlds, Objective 
Collapse, Pilot Wave and many more. *
*John K Clark    See what's on my new list at Extropolis 
*

goe
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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-27 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 8:37 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*> His axiom only assumes that configurations of a physical system can be
> labeled by the natural numbers. *


*But the Real Numbers, much less the Natural Numbers, are insufficiently
powerful to make quantum mechanical predictions, you need Complex Numbers: *

*Quantum theory based on real numbers can be experimentally falsified
 *

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
cvn


>






>>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-27 Thread PGC



On Tuesday, November 26, 2024 at 2:37:31 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/24/2024 8:34 PM, PGC wrote:

Barandes' work on non-Markovian quantum dynamics is undeniably 
sophisticated and offers potential applications (I appreciate the post, 
thanks), but it exemplifies a recurring issue in alleged foundational 
inquiry. In *"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory,"* for instance, his 
"kinematical axiom", that he states as a physical axiom on the slide, 
assumes natural numbers and sets—*abstract or metaphysical concepts, not 
physical concepts*—while presenting them as part of a physical ontology 
(see minute 11 of the video). This conflation risks undermining the rigor 
and clarity required in foundational inquiry.

His axiom only assumes that configurations of a physical system can be 
labeled by the natural numbers.  Your complaint could have included that 
he's writing about it in English, which is not a part of physical ontology.


"Only" is already significant. By assuming that configurations of a 
physical system can be labeled by the natural numbers, Barandes implicitly 
adopts mathematical structures as foundational to physical ontology. What 
about a configuration; is this an unambiguously physical notion? This 
warrants scrutiny. Furthermore, as we see later in the video, he doesn’t 
stop at natural numbers and configurations—he also assumes sets, including 
countable and uncountable infinities, as part of the physical framework. 
These are not physical concepts but abstract, mathematical ones.
The move and arguments conflate mathematical realism with physical 
ontology, which is problematic if the aim is foundational clarity. To 
introduce such assumptions without acknowledging their metaphysical nature 
blurs the line between mathematical and physical inquiry, undermining the 
rigor of the approach.
 


Quantum mechanics, in any interpretation (digital mechanism aside), cannot 
fully explain why it appears as it does to specific subjects without a 
precise account of what a subject is and how their interaction with the 
system is modeled. Questions like "Why collapse?" 

Copenhagen gave a clear answer to that by just referring to classical 
physics.  The subject reads the value on the instrument which assumed a 
state corresponding to a projection of the object state.


Copenhagen’s reference to classical physics and the framing of the subject 
as "reading the value on the instrument" conveniently bypasses the critical 
questions of *what* the subject is and how this act of reading interacts 
with the quantum system. While this framing may appear clear on the 
surface, it sidesteps the deeper ontological and phenomenological 
questions: What constitutes the subject, and how does their interaction 
bring about a projection or collapse? Without addressing these, Copenhagen 
leaves the subject as an undefined placeholder. Not that this isn't common 
practice in engineering or fundamental science. But "fundamental" raises 
the bar. Here, I tend to scrutinize such placeholders and with digital 
mechanism, we even get proofs/vast consensus of the field for why the 
ontology necessitates a placeholder in precise contexts.

I’m aware you’re fully capable of recognizing this gap, so I suspect this 
appeal to naivety is more tactical than genuine. Still, let’s not ignore 
that these foundational ambiguities in Copenhagen are exactly why other 
approaches have sought to deepen our understanding. Avoiding these 
questions might be strategically convenient, but it doesn’t advance the 
conversation or solve the interpretational issues at hand.
 


or "Why Many Worlds?" demand assumptions about the subject, their 
properties, and their relationship to both the physical and mathematical 
structures they interpret. Without this clarity, foundational reasoning 
risks either circularity or ambiguity.

Clarity which MWI very much lacks.


Your assertion about MWI's lack of clarity seems to rest on the presumption 
that I am advocating for it. To clarify: I am not an MWI proponent. My 
preference lies with many histories or, more fundamentally, many 
computations-tyoe approaches, which directly relate observer phenomena to 
the arithmetic structures and computations underpinning quantum mechanics 
given the definitions and nuances stated in UDA through self-referentially 
correct machines. This approach avoids the ontological baggage of MWI, it's 
unclear reliance on the notion of "worlds" (which is game for criticism, 
sure), and focuses instead on testable connections between computation, 
arithmetic truth, and observed phenomena.

This said, my critique is broader and applies to any interpretation, 
including MWI, Copenhagen, or collapse models. 

The issue here is not about defending any particular interpretation but 
about emphasizing the need for clear assumptions and definitions in any 
foundational framework. Rather than framing this as a defense of MWI or a 
critique of its clarity, I’m pointing to th

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-27 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 7:06 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

* >>  It may require more calculating power than you have available** but
>> Newtonian physics can give you an answer for an infinite number of initial
>> conditions, and if things are not too fast or too small and gravity is not
>> too strong the answer will even be correct; but superdeterminism can only
>> give you an answer if things started out in one very specific starting
>> condition.  *
>
>
> *> Who told you that?  It's not t'Hooft's theory.  He just says suppose
> there is no free will and no randomness, all evolution is deterministic. *
>

*Bullshit. First of all free will is not false, it's gibberish. And ANY
deterministic theory, not just Superdeterminism, would say there is "no
randomness, all evolution is deterministic";  for example Many Worlds says
exactly the same thing because it is also a deterministic theory. What
makes Superdeterminism unique, and uniquely stupid, has nothing to do with
determinism, it has to do with the unique starting condition required to
make the stupid contraption work.*

* >> All the other rival quantum interpretations will work regardless of
> which particular initial condition the universe started out at, they have
> no need of specifying one particular one; by contrast what superdeterminism
> says is let's assume the universe did NOT start out in that state, or that
> state, or that state, or that state and it must continue making those
> assumptions an infinite number of times before it finally gets to one and
> at last says yeah it started out in that one.*

* > A simple consequence of deterministic evolution, which is time
> reversible.*

*Brent, I assume you don't believe in the "Dinosaurs Never Existed" theory,
but why not? If things are deterministic then out of the infinite number of
initial conditions the very early universe could've started out in, there
is one in which nonbiological purely geological forces would produce rocks
that sentient creatures on a small planet around an average looking star
would misinterpreted as being bones from huge reptiles that existed many
millions of years ago. If Superdeterminism is a good theory then "Dinosaurs
Never Existed" is an equally good theory. *

> *>> The laws of physics are not the problem, and determinism is not the
>> problem. The problem is the initial conditions, out of the infinite number
>> of initial conditions the universe could've started out in only one of them
>> will guarantee that experimenters everywhere will always make the wrong
>> choice when performing their quantum experiments, even when they use dice
>> or quantum "randomness" on how to set their polarizers or Stern Gerlach
>> magnet**s because nothing is really random. *
>
>
> > *In what sense is the choice wrong if it is determined by laws**? *

*It's wrong because the sequence of orientations generations of
experimentalists "chose" to set their polarizers and Stern Gerlach magnets
at were ALWAYS the one and only one that will cause generations of
theoreticians to form incorrect quantum interpretations, such as
Copenhagen, Many Worlds, Objective Collapse, Pilot Wave and many more.  *
*  John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
goe

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-26 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 2:21 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 26-11-2024 23:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > You are talking a lot of nonsense. I refer you to a paper by Brunner
> > _et al._, Rev Mod. Phys. 86 (2014) pp.419-478.
> > This is also available at arxiv.org/abs/1303.2849 [1]
> > The abstract states "Bell's 1964 theorem, which states that the
> > predictions of quantum theory cannot be accounted for by any local
> > theory, represents one of the most profound developments in the
> > foundations of physics."
> > Brunner _et al._ go on to derive the CHSH (Clauer-Horne-Shimony-Holt)
> > inequality using only local dynamics, and prove that this inequality
> > is violated in conventional QM, as well as in many experiments. This
> > proves that quantum mechanics is intrinsically nonlocal. (If you like,
> > it demonstrates that nonlocal states are intrinsic to the theory.)
>



> >
> >> And b.t.w. if there is a Bell's theorem purely about unitary QM that
> >> doesn't invoke hidden variables, you could just state it right here.
> >
> > I don't prove Bell's theorem here, but I have referred you to Bell's
> > original papers, and also to the review article by Brunner et al.,
> > above. If you actually do the research for yourself, you can see that
> > many authors agree with what I have been saying. You are the one that
> > is out on a limb.
> >
> >
> > I have given you references here, and I have referred you to Bell's
> > original papers before.. But you do talk an awful lot of nonsense.
> >
>
> Quote from Brunner's paper:
>
>
> "To avoid any misunderstanding from the start, by “locality” we
>   do not mean the notion used within quantum mechanics and
>   quantum field theory that operators defined in spacelike separated
>   regions commute. Bell’s notion of locality is different and
>   is clarified below"
>

They define locality in terms of factorizability, as in their equation 3.


> And if I read on to see what Bell’s notion of locality is, then, as
> expected, it involves local hidden variables.
>
> "Let us formalize the idea of a local theory more precisely.
>
The assumption of locality implies that we should
>   be able to identify a set of past factors, described by
>   some variables λ, having a joint causal influence on both
>   outcomes, and which fully account for the dependence
>   between a and b. Once all such factors have been taken
>   into account, the residual indeterminacies about the outcomes
>
must now be decoupled, that is, the probabilities
>   for a and b should factorize:"
>
> So, basically the standard local hidden variables framework.
>

Read a little more carefully. "Once all such factors have been taken into
account 
the probabilities for a and b should factorize."
If it were a hidden variable theory, then the probabilities for a and b
would depend on those hidden variables, and that is what is explicitly
ruled out. So Brunner is not using a hidden variable theory. The main point
is that, even taking unknown joint causal factors into account, the
probabilities at the remote ends factorize. In other words, what happens at
A does not affect what happens at B, and vice versa. This is the notion of
locality that they use to derive the CHSH inequality -- nothing to do with
hidden variables.

Bruce

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-26 Thread smitra


On 26-11-2024 23:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 4:42 AM smitra  wrote:


On 25-11-2024 23:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 12:16 AM smitra 

wrote:



On 24-11-2024 05:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


If QM were intrinsically local, then you would be able to give

this

local account of the correlations.
You are manifestly unable to do this.


It's obvious from the time evolution specified by the local

Hamiltonian.


You have tried this approach before. You seem unable to realize

that

that is just a restatement of your position. And it is that

position

that is in question. Restating your conclusion is not an argument

or

an account of anything.



You are disputing a triviality, namely that we have a unitary time
evolution specified by a local Hamiltonian:

U(t) = exp(-i H t/hbar)

At least that's what you are claiming. What you are really doing is
that
you play hide and seek in the complexity of this. Your real bone is,
of
course, with the idea that time evolution is unitary and that there
is
no collapse. Obviously, the only plausible reason QM could be
non-local
is if there is a real collapse. If everything always stays unitary
with
the unitary transform specified by a local Hamiltonian then there is
no
collapse, and everything always stays local. That doesn't mean that
you
can't have states with non-local properties, what it means is that
whatever happens always follows from applying local laws. Sol,
non-local
features can be explained using common cause effects propagated by
local
unitary dynamics.


You appear to be veering towards the position exemplified by Wallace
in his book "The Emergent Multiverse", where he says that in
Everettian quantum mechanics interactions are local, but states are
nonlocal (p. 310).  If you do take such a position, you have to
acknowledge the importance of the nonlocality of the entangled state.
Going on about unitary dynamics is of no help to you in understanding
this.


You made the extraordinary claim that Bell proved that QM
is non-local, which is plain nonsense.


No, it is not nonsense. Bell's theorem, which depends only on the
assumption of locality, shows that the correlations from entangled
particles must satisfy certain inequalities. These inequalities are
violated by standard quantum mechanics, and also by experiment.

The challenge is to explain these violations. And that is possible
only by invoking nonlocality. If you think you can explain the
experiments without invoking nonlocality, go ahead. But no one has
ever done this.


Yes, it invokes unitary QM with the unitary time evolution specified
by
a local Hamiltonian. This implies a MWI scenario, but not per se
with
all the baggage of splitting worlds that are supposed to split in
independent ways. You end up with different sectors that are
entangled.


So, you are invoking the nonlocality of states that Wallce refers to.
That is all very well, but that is not a detailed explanation of how
this works. Wallace can't give a detailed explanation either, because
that would involve nonlocal dynamics, but he thinks many-worlds allows
you to avoid this. He is mistaken, of course.


Bell's theorem doesn't prove that QM is non-local. If that were the
case, then this would be just another of QM that would be proven in
any
QM textbook, and it would make unitary QM specified by a local
Hamiltonian inconsistent. The whole debate about e.g. black hole
information loss wouldn't happen in that case. The fact that this is
a
hot topic in theoretical physics proves that you
don't really understand the subject matter you are debating here.
It's
true that QM could be non-local but that's not implied by Bell's
theorem. If you were right on this point, then that would imply that
all
theoretical physicists get this wrong and you are one of the few
people
who knows better. So, clearly not a matter of "Not everyone gets it
right", rather that everyone else but you is getting it wrong, and
that
makes it appropriate to invoke an argument from authority pointing
that
out.


You are talking a lot of nonsense. I refer you to a paper by Brunner
_et al._, Rev Mod. Phys. 86 (2014) pp.419-478.
This is also available at arxiv.org/abs/1303.2849 [1]
The abstract states "Bell's 1964 theorem, which states that the
predictions of quantum theory cannot be accounted for by any local
theory, represents one of the most profound developments in the
foundations of physics."
Brunner _et al._ go on to derive the CHSH (Clauer-Horne-Shimony-Holt)
inequality using only local dynamics, and prove that this inequality
is violated in conventional QM, as well as in many experiments. This
proves that quantum mechanics is intrinsically nonlocal. (If you like,
it demonstrates that nonlocal states are intrinsic to the theory.)


And b.t.w. if there is a Bell's theorem purely about unitary QM that

doesn't invoke hidden variables, you could just state it right here.


I don't prove Bell's theorem here, but I have referred you to Bel

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-26 Thread Brent Meeker

On 11/26/2024 6:08 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 10:58 PM Brent Meeker
wrote:

> /as you have noted every predictive theory require SOME initial
condition. /

*There is a vast difference between being able to predictthe outcome
of ANY initial conditionand only being able to predict the outcome of
ONE initial condition! *

Given determinism there is only one outcome for ANY ONE initial condition.
*It may require more calculating power than you have available**but
Newtonian physics can give you an answer for an infinite number of
initial conditions, and if things are not too fast or too small and
gravity is not too strong the answer will even be correct; but
superdeterminism can only give you an answer if things started out in
one very specific starting condition. *
Who told you that? It's not t'Hooft's theory. He just says suppose
there is no free will and no randomness, all evolution is deterministic.
Then whatever state we find ourselves it is the one and only state that
follows from the initial state.

*It wouldn't even make sense to ask what Superdeterminism would
predict if the universe started out in some other initial condition;
and if that fact doesn't scream "bad theory" I don't know what does. *

I agree with that last, you don't know what does.

*
*

*>> ridiculously bad theories, like superdeterminism, will
only work if the universe started out in _ONE_ very particular
configuration.*

/> Which as you said, it must have done./

*All the other rival quantum interpretationswill work regardless of
which particular initial condition the universe started out at, they
have no need of specifying one particular one; by contrast what
superdeterminism says is let's assume the universe did NOT start out
in that state, or that state, or that state, or that state and it must
continue making those assumptions an_infinite_ number of times before
it finally gets to one and at last says yeah it started out in that one. *

A simple consequence of deterministic evolution, which is time reversible.

*A greater violation of Occam's razor is impossible to imagine. *

*> Christian fundamentalist say God is lying to me,
Superdeterminism fans say nature is lying to me.*

*
*

/> Not at all. The simplest hypothesis is that Superdeterminism
has determined what the laws of physicare and that they be
obeyedin every instance. /

*The laws of physics are not the problem,and determinism is not the
problem. The problem is the initial conditions, out of the infinite
number of initial conditions the universe could've started out in only
one of them will guarantee that experimenters everywhere will always
make the wrong choice when performing their quantum experiments, even
when they use dice or quantum "randomness" on how to set their
polarizers or Stern Gerlach magnet**s because nothing is really random. *
In what sense is the choice wrong if it is determined by laws?**It's
certainly possible that deterministic processes can appear random, c.f.
psuedo-random number generators.*

*Brent*

*
*There is a grand conspiracy to mislead us; just like God misled us
when he made dinosaur bones in 4004 BC but made them look like they
were hundreds of millions of years old.*

/> What you don't believe is that your choices of what to do,
specially what to measure, are determined because you really,
really like free will...even though you don't believe in it./

*I don't believe that free will is true and I don't believe that free
will is untrue either. I believe that free will is gibberish. It's so
bad it's not even wrong. *

*John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis
*

feg
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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-26 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 4:42 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 25-11-2024 23:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 12:16 AM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> On 24-11-2024 05:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>
> >>> If QM were intrinsically local, then you would be able to give this
> >>> local account of the correlations.
> >>> You are manifestly unable to do this.
> >>
> >> It's obvious from the time evolution specified by the local
> Hamiltonian.
> >
> > You have tried this approach before. You seem unable to realize that
> > that is just a restatement of your position. And it is that position
> > that is in question. Restating your conclusion is not an argument or
> > an account of anything.
> >
>
> You are disputing a triviality, namely that we have a unitary time
> evolution specified by a local Hamiltonian:
>
> U(t) = exp(-i H t/hbar)
>
> At least that's what you are claiming. What you are really doing is that
> you play hide and seek in the complexity of this. Your real bone is, of
> course, with the idea that time evolution is unitary and that there is
> no collapse. Obviously, the only plausible reason QM could be non-local
> is if there is a real collapse. If everything always stays unitary with
> the unitary transform specified by a local Hamiltonian then there is no
> collapse, and everything always stays local. That doesn't mean that you
> can't have states with non-local properties, what it means is that
> whatever happens always follows from applying local laws. Sol, non-local
> features can be explained using common cause effects propagated by local
> unitary dynamics.
>

You appear to be veering towards the position exemplified by Wallace in his
book "The Emergent Multiverse", where he says that in Everettian quantum
mechanics interactions are local, but states are nonlocal (p. 310).  If you
do take such a position, you have to acknowledge the importance of the
nonlocality of the entangled state. Going on about unitary dynamics is of
no help to you in understanding this.

> >> You made the extraordinary claim that Bell proved that QM
> >> is non-local, which is plain nonsense.
>

No, it is not nonsense. Bell's theorem, which depends only on the
assumption of locality, shows that the correlations from entangled
particles must satisfy certain inequalities. These inequalities are
violated by standard quantum mechanics, and also by experiment.

The challenge is to explain these violations. And that is possible only by
invoking nonlocality. If you think you can explain the experiments without
invoking nonlocality, go ahead. But no one has ever done this.

> Yes, it invokes unitary QM with the unitary time evolution specified by
> a local Hamiltonian. This implies a MWI scenario, but not per se with
> all the baggage of splitting worlds that are supposed to split in
> independent ways. You end up with different sectors that are entangled.
>

So, you are invoking the nonlocality of states that Wallce refers to. That
is all very well, but that is not a detailed explanation of how this works.
Wallace can't give a detailed explanation either, because that would
involve nonlocal dynamics, but he thinks many-worlds allows you to avoid
this. He is mistaken, of course.

Bell's theorem doesn't prove that QM is non-local. If that were the
> case, then this would be just another of QM that would be proven in any
> QM textbook, and it would make unitary QM specified by a local
> Hamiltonian inconsistent. The whole debate about e.g. black hole
> information loss wouldn't happen in that case. The fact that this is a
> hot topic in theoretical physics proves that you
> don't really understand the subject matter you are debating here. It's
> true that QM could be non-local but that's not implied by Bell's
> theorem. If you were right on this point, then that would imply that all
> theoretical physicists get this wrong and you are one of the few people
> who knows better. So, clearly not a matter of "Not everyone gets it
> right", rather that everyone else but you is getting it wrong, and that
> makes it appropriate to invoke an argument from authority pointing that
> out.
>

You are talking a lot of nonsense. I refer you to a paper by Brunner *et
al.*, Rev Mod. Phys. 86 (2014) pp.419-478.
This is also available at arxiv.org/abs/1303.2849
The abstract states "Bell's 1964 theorem, which states that the predictions
of quantum theory cannot be accounted for by any local theory, represents
one of the most profound developments in the foundations of physics."
Brunner *et al.* go on to derive the CHSH (Clauer-Horne-Shimony-Holt)
inequality using only local dynamics, and prove that this inequality is
violated in conventional QM, as well as in many experiments. This proves
that quantum mechanics is intrinsically nonlocal. (If you like, it
demonstrates that nonlocal states are intrinsic to the theory.)

And b.t.w. if there is a Bell's theorem purely about unitary QM that
> doesn't invoke hidden variables, you could just state

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-26 Thread smitra


On 25-11-2024 23:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 12:16 AM smitra  wrote:


On 24-11-2024 05:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


If QM were intrinsically local, then you would be able to give

this

local account of the correlations.
You are manifestly unable to do this.


It's obvious from the time evolution specified by the local
Hamiltonian.


You have tried this approach before. You seem unable to realize that
that is just a restatement of your position. And it is that position
that is in question. Restating your conclusion is not an argument or
an account of anything.



You are disputing a triviality, namely that we have a unitary time 
evolution specified by a local Hamiltonian:


U(t) = exp(-i H t/hbar)

At least that's what you are claiming. What you are really doing is that 
you play hide and seek in the complexity of this. Your real bone is, of 
course, with the idea that time evolution is unitary and that there is 
no collapse. Obviously, the only plausible reason QM could be non-local 
is if there is a real collapse. If everything always stays unitary with 
the unitary transform specified by a local Hamiltonian then there is no 
collapse, and everything always stays local. That doesn't mean that you 
can't have states with non-local properties, what it means is that 
whatever happens always follows from applying local laws. Sol, non-local 
features can be explained using common cause effects propagated by local 
unitary dynamics.





Invoking authorities to get a simple fact about Bell's inequalities
cleared up, i.e. that it does not imply that QM is non-local, is
quite
appropriate.


You have to make sure that you quote authorities that actually know
something.



https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2007/11/sidney-coleman-dies-at-70/

"Nobel Prize winner and former Harvard colleague Steven Weinberg, now 
professor of physics and astronomy at the University of Texas, said, “I 
always thought that Sidney Coleman understood modern theoretical physics 
better than anyone else. "





You made the extraordinary claim that Bell proved that QM
is non-local, which is plain nonsense.


If it were nonsense, you would be able to give a clear demonstration
of a local account of the Bell correlations. This you have repeatedly
failed to do, so I call out your nonsense.


It's trivial as I explained above.



If it were true, then you
wouldn't have professors with deep knowledge of QM claiming that QM
is local.


Not everyone gets it right. People who believe in MWI tend to claim
that QM is local, but then, usually only in the context of the theory
of many worlds. They, too, have never been able to establish this. If
they had, you could give this argument. But even then, Bell's theorem
proves beyond any doubt that there are inequalities that any local
theory must satisfy. Experiment, as well as QM, shows that these
inequalities are violated. Indeed, Clauser, Aspect, and Zeiling were
recently awarded the Nobel prize for establishing this fact. QM has
been shown to be necessarily non-local.


Yes, it invokes unitary QM with the unitary time evolution specified by 
a local Hamiltonian. This implies a MWI scenario, but not per se with 
all the baggage of splitting worlds that are supposed to split in 
independent ways. You end up with different sectors that are entangled.


Bell's theorem doesn't prove that QM is non-local. If that were the 
case, then this would be just another of QM that would be proven in any 
QM textbook, and it would make unitary QM specified by a local 
Hamiltonian inconsistent. The whole debate about e.g. black hole 
information loss wouldn't happen in that case. The fact that this is a 
hot topic in theoretical physics proves that you
don't really understand the subject matter you are debating here. It's 
true that QM could be non-local but that's not implied by Bell's 
theorem. If you were right on this point, then that would imply that all 
theoretical physicists get this wrong and you are one of the few people 
who knows better. So, clearly not a matter of "Not everyone gets it 
right", rather that everyone else but you is getting it wrong, and that 
makes it appropriate to invoke an argument from authority pointing that 
out.


And b.t.w. if there is a Bell's theorem purely about unitary QM that 
doesn't invoke hidden variables, you could just state it right here. You 
didn't do that and made the counterclaim against me when I pointed out 
that Bell's theorem is about inequalities for certain correlations 
satisfied by local hidden variable theories, which is common knowledge. 
And I made the remark that it's then a theorem about local hidden 
variable theories, not QM, so it's relevance to QM is limited to the 
ideas that QM might have an underlying hidden variable theory. You are 
disputing this only on your say so, so basically an argument from 
authority where the authority is you, not even references to the works 
other experts in the field.


Saibal



Bruce

 --

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-26 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 10:58 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> *as you have noted every predictive theory require SOME initial
> condition. *

*There is a vast difference between being able to predict the outcome
of ANY initial condition and only being able to predict the outcome of ONE
initial condition! **It may require more calculating power than you have
available** but Newtonian physics can give you an answer for an infinite
number of initial conditions, and if things are not too fast or too small
and gravity is not too strong the answer will even be correct; but
superdeterminism can only give you an answer if things started out in one
very specific starting condition.  It wouldn't even make sense to ask what
Superdeterminism would predict if the universe started out in some other
initial condition; and if that fact doesn't scream "bad theory" I don't
know what does.  *

*>> ridiculously bad theories, like superdeterminism, will only work if the
>> universe started out in ONE very particular configuration.*
>
>
> *> Which as you said, it must have done.*

*All the other rival quantum interpretations will work regardless of which
particular initial condition the universe started out at, they have no need
of specifying one particular one; by contrast what superdeterminism says is
let's assume the universe did NOT start out in that state, or that state,
or that state, or that state and it must continue making those assumptions
an infinite number of times before it finally gets to one and at last says
yeah it started out in that one. A greater violation of Occam's razor is
impossible to imagine.*

> *> Christian fundamentalist say God is lying to me,  Superdeterminism fans
>> say nature is lying to me.*
>
>
> *> Not at all. The simplest hypothesis is that Superdeterminism has
> determined what the laws of physic are and that they be obeyed in every
> instance. *

*The laws of physics are not the problem, and determinism is not the
problem. The problem is the initial conditions, out of the infinite number
of initial conditions the universe could've started out in only one of them
will guarantee that experimenters everywhere will always make the wrong
choice when performing their quantum experiments, even when they use dice
or quantum "randomness" on how to set their polarizers or Stern Gerlach
magnet**s because nothing is really random. There is a grand conspiracy to
mislead us; just like God misled us when he made dinosaur bones in 4004 BC
but made them look like they were hundreds of millions of years old.*

> *> What you don't believe is that your choices of what to do, specially
> what to measure, are determined because you really, really like free
> will...even though you don't believe in it.*

*I don't believe that free will is true and I don't believe that free will
is untrue either. I believe that free will is gibberish. It's so bad it's
not even wrong. *

* John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
feg

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 15, 2024 at 7:38:06 PM UTC-7 Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Nov 15, 2024 at 12:02:14AM -0800, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> As I see it, JC's core claim about the MWI is that it follows from S's 
> equation 

It comes about by not making any further assumptions, like the 
wavefunction collapse of CI, or pilot waves of Bohmian mechanics which 
privilege one branch over the others.

*Do you have any concept what a WHOLE universe is? (I didn't think so.) 
And *
*you're assuming they're metastasizing but you can never detect any of 
them! *
*And this, presumably, is what you call rigorous thinking? Which 
university *
*awarded you a Ph'D? AG* 

> ; namely, that anything the can happen (has a non-zero probability), 
> must happen (in some world). I fail to see anything in S's equation to 
support 
> this claim. And, I fail to see JC argue for this claim. Thus, IMO, I've 
put the 
> nail in the coffin to the MWI. AG 
> 

You think!

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-25 Thread Brent Meeker





On 11/25/2024 6:20 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 11:01 PM Brent Meeker  
wrote:

*
*

*>> the only way the universe could be deterministic, local
and realistic is with Superdeterminism, but that theory is
idiotic because it requires you to make quite literally
an_INFINITE_ number of assumptions.*

/> It only requires that there be *some* initial condition and
deterministic evolution thereafter.  Sounds just like Newtonian
cosmology./


*Every problem, not just in physics but in science in general,requires 
that there be SOME initial condition, but good theories will give you 
the right answer starting with lots of different initial conditions,*
Not if they are deterministic.  In that case there's one-to-one mapping 
from initial condition to observed condition.  And as you have noted 
every predictive theory require SOME initial condition.  So 
Superdeterminism is as economical as possible.


*Great theories will give you the right answer starting 
withANY initial condition, *

You must not have applied many differential equations.*

*
*and ridiculously bad theories, like superdeterminism, will only work 
if the universe started out in _ONE_ very particular configuration.*

Which as you said, it must have done.*

*

*That sounds NOTHING like Newtonian cosmology! *

*Every problem in Newtonian physics starts with some initial 
condition, but Newton can tell you how fast a ball will be after it 
rolls down an incline plank no matter how high it is at the top, what 
the angle of the plank is, or how fast the ball is already rolling at 
before it started going down the ramp. Superdeterminism would be like 
a rival theory that could correctly predict how fast the ball will be 
going at the bottom _BUT_ only if the ball started out at 3.109 MPH, 
and the ramp was exactly 5.096 feet high, and it was set at an angle 
of 28.062 degrees, if the initial conditions were anything other than 
that it would make an incorrect prediction. *
But ex hypothesi the initial conditions *were that *and therefore the 
prediction is correct.

*
*
**

*>> It's not even a scientific theory because if it's true
then the scientific method itself would be of no help
whatsoever in increasing your ontologicalor even
epistemological knowledge. *


/> There would still be deterministic law-like evolution. /


*Maybe, maybe not, if superdeterminism is true there would be no way 
to ever knowbecause the scientific method wouldn't work. The initial 
conditions of the universe could've been set up so that in 4004 BC 
non-biological purely geological processes created dinosaur bones, and 
living breathing dinosaurs never existed. And monkey and even human 
fossils could be common in Cambrian rock layers, but they have never 
been found and never will be found because the initial conditions of 
the universe were such that no paleontologist will ever decide to dig 
in the particular spots where those fossils are. *


*And the initial conditions of the universe could haveconspired to 
make us believe there were such a thing as "particle entanglement" 
because the angle 2 distant experimenters always choose to set their 
polarizer or Stern-Gerlach magnet at is _NEVER_ random, they always 
picked angles that gave them a consistent but totally incorrect view 
of reality. *

*
*
*Christian fundamentalist say God is lying to me,  Superdeterminism 
fans say nature is lying to me. *
Not at all.  The simplest hypothesis is that Superdeterminism has 
determined what the laws of physic are and that they be obeyed in every 
instance.  Which it the thing you already believe. What you don't 
believe is that your choices of what to do, specially what to measure, 
are determined because you really, really like free will...even though 
you don't believe in it.


Brent

*But I see no reason that my default assumption should be that 
somebody or something is lying to me. *


*John K Clark    See what's on my new list at Extropolis 
*

*
*
7bw
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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-25 Thread Brent Meeker





On 11/24/2024 8:34 PM, PGC wrote:


Barandes' work on non-Markovian quantum dynamics is undeniably 
sophisticated and offers potential applications (I appreciate the 
post, thanks), but it exemplifies a recurring issue in alleged 
foundational inquiry. In /"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory,"/ for 
instance, his "kinematical axiom", that he states as a physical axiom 
on the slide, assumes natural numbers and sets—*abstract or 
metaphysical concepts, /not physical concepts/*—while presenting them 
as part of a physical ontology (see minute 11 of the video). This 
conflation risks undermining the rigor and clarity required in 
foundational inquiry.


His axiom only assumes that configurations of a physical system can be 
labeled by the natural numbers.  Your complaint could have included that 
he's writing about it in English, which is not a part of physical ontology.


Quantum mechanics, in any interpretation (digital mechanism aside), 
cannot fully explain why it appears as it does to specific subjects 
without a precise account of what a subject is and how their 
interaction with the system is modeled. Questions like "Why collapse?"


Copenhagen gave a clear answer to that by just referring to classical 
physics.  The subject reads the value on the instrument which assumed a 
state corresponding to a projection of the object state.


or "Why Many Worlds?" demand assumptions about the subject, their 
properties, and their relationship to both the physical and 
mathematical structures they interpret. Without this clarity, 
foundational reasoning risks either circularity or ambiguity.



Clarity which MWI very much lacks.


Foundational work should strive for clarity and honesty

Are you implying that Barandes is dishonest in his presentation?  or 
it's unclear?


in its assumptions before reaching for elegance. It’s not enough to 
say "this works, it's sophisticated"—we have to address and state why 
it works for a subject with specific properties xyz in relation to the 
precise quantum or classical frameworks in play. Without this, we risk 
getting lost in the weeds of sophistication, leaving foundational gaps 
open and unexamined.


I'd say it's the opposite.  We get lost in sophistications precisely 
when we go beyond "This works"  Which is not to say it's not worthwhile 
to go beyond instrumentalism.  Going beyond, finding a different way of 
looking at things or filling in some gap, can lead to a better, wider 
theory, e.g. the long sought theory of quantum gravity.


Barandes is right: examine the obvious things we take for granted; too 
bad he didn't apply that to his axiom mentioned above. 

To bad you didn't read it as intended.


If Bruno's digital mechanism strikes you as an implausible foundation,
Bruno didn't "address and state why it works for a subject with specific 
properties xyz in relation to the precise quantum or classical 
frameworks in play." and he failed to make any new or surprising 
testable conclusions.


Brent
/*then what exactly are the assumptions underlying your stance*/ 
regarding existence of a subject, with which properties, experiencing 
which kind of physics and why; how QM, randomness, classicality, 
consciousness or lack thereof, qualia or not etc. manifest and emerge 
or don't?

On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 5:01:13 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/24/2024 4:27 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Nov 23, 2024 at 11:04 PM Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

>> He [Bell] assumes a deterministic local hidden variable
theory.


/> //Which theory is that, then?/


*Ironically that was Erwin Schrödinger's quantum interpretation,
and Albert Einstein's, but it turned out they were both wrong.
They thought the universe was local, deterministic and realistic,
but if it was then it would be impossible to violate Bell's
Inequality, and if it was then quantum mechanics would make
incorrect predictions in experiments set up the way that Bell
described. But the experimental results are clear, Bell's
Inequality _IS_ violated and the predictions of quantum mechanics
are _correct_.*

*So the only way the universe could be deterministic, local and
realistic is with Superdeterminism, but that theory is idiotic
because it requires you to make quite literally an_INFINITE_
number of assumptions. *

It only requires that there be /*some*/ initial condition and
deterministic evolution thereafter.  Sounds just like Newtonian
cosmology.



*It's not even a scientific theory because if it's true then the
scientific method itself would be of no help whatsoever in
increasing your ontologicalor even epistemological knowledge. *

There would still be deterministic law-like evolution.  Does the
existence of randomness help increase your ontological or
epistemological knowledge?  According your favorite
interpretation, observing a binary event like ..., consistent

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-25 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 12:16 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 24-11-2024 05:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > If QM were intrinsically local, then you would be able to give this
> > local account of the correlations.
> > You are manifestly unable to do this.
>
> It's obvious from the time evolution specified by the local Hamiltonian.
>

You have tried this approach before. You seem unable to realize that
that is just a restatement of your position. And it is that position that
is in question. Restating your conclusion is not an argument or an account
of anything.

Invoking authorities to get a simple fact about Bell's inequalities
> cleared up, i.e. that it does not imply that QM is non-local, is quite
> appropriate.

You have to make sure that you quote authorities that actually know
something.

You made the extraordinary claim that Bell proved that QM
> is non-local, which is plain nonsense.

If it were nonsense, you would be able to give a clear demonstration of a
local account of the Bell correlations. This you have repeatedly failed to
do, so I call out your nonsense.

If it were true, then you
> wouldn't have professors with deep knowledge of QM claiming that QM is
> local.
>

Not everyone gets it right. People who believe in MWI tend to claim that QM
is local, but then, usually only in the context of the theory of
many worlds. They, too, have never been able to establish this. If they
had, you could give this argument. But even then, Bell's theorem proves
beyond any doubt that there are inequalities that any local theory must
satisfy. Experiment, as well as QM, shows that these inequalities are
violated. Indeed, Clauser, Aspect, and Zeiling were recently awarded the
Nobel prize for establishing this fact. QM has been shown to be necessarily
non-local.

Bruce

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 1:46:40 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 1:34:31 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 11:58:08 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 12:25 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*>What observable results are you referring to? *


Mr.Grayson, it's not always easy to treat your ideas about physics with 
respect, but if you want me to at least try to do so it might be wise for 
you NOT TO COMPARE ME WITH DONALD FUCKING TRUMP!

*John K Clark*


How about answering a simple question, instead of BS'ing? FYI, MW has no 
observable effects! AG


Face it. For you, imaginary BS is what you mean by "observable". Strange 
use of words. AG 


While, according to you, the MW's metastasize, no one can observe any of 
them. Amazing, isn't it? AG 

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 1:34:31 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 11:58:08 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 12:25 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*>What observable results are you referring to? *


Mr.Grayson, it's not always easy to treat your ideas about physics with 
respect, but if you want me to at least try to do so it might be wise for 
you NOT TO COMPARE ME WITH DONALD FUCKING TRUMP!

*John K Clark*


How about answering a simple question, instead of BS'ing? FYI, MW has no 
observable effects! AG


Face it. For you, imaginary BS is what you mean by "observable". Strange 
use of words. AG 

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 11:58:08 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 12:25 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*>What observable results are you referring to? *


Mr.Grayson, it's not always easy to treat your ideas about physics with 
respect, but if you want me to at least try to do so it might be wise for 
you NOT TO COMPARE ME WITH DONALD FUCKING TRUMP!

*John K Clark*


How about answering a simple question, instead of BS'ing? FYI, MW has no 
observable effects! AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 12:25 PM Alan Grayson 
wrote:

*>What observable results are you referring to? *


Mr.Grayson, it's not always easy to treat your ideas about physics with
respect, but if you want me to at least try to do so it might be wise for
you NOT TO COMPARE ME WITH DONALD FUCKING TRUMP!

*John K Clark*

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, November 18, 2024 at 6:54:29 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 17, 2024 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote
 

*> One of the frequently stated arguments for many worlds is that it avoids 
the problem of the wave function collapse. The collapse of the wave 
function is only a problem if the wave function is a physical object,*


*Even if you assume, as Copenhagen does, that the quantum wave function is 
just a prediction device and not a "real physical object" you still have a 
grave problem; at exactly what point are you supposed to stop trusting what 
that prediction device is telling you? Copenhagen would answer that you 
should stop trusting it at the exact point you make a measurement. Physics 
is the most precise of all the sciences so it would be reasonable to then 
ask for the exact meaning of this word "measurement", but when you do Niels 
Bohr and his friends will respond with bafflegab, which I can only 
interpret as "shut up and calculate". *

*By the way, the integers are not physical objects and neither is the 
concept of "fast", does that mean that both are unreal? If so, how would 
things be different if both of those things WERE real? I believe that if 
the wave function didn't lead to conclusions that make some people, perhaps 
most people, uncomfortable, like there being many other versions of 
themselves in a multiverse, nobody would be insisting that the wave 
function is not real. Physicists whose primary focus is physics at its most 
fundamental level sure seem to behave as if they thought it's real because 
they spend about 95% of their time studying quantum field theory.  *
 

*> because then you run into problems with instantaneous action at a 
distance or FTL physical action.*


*That's no problem in Many Worlds because you can say the split happens 
instantaneously or you can say the split propagates at the speed of light, 
it makes no difference because they both produce identical observable 
results.  *


*What observable results are you referring to? There are NONE. You are 
completely deluded and have no one to blame but yourself. AG *

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 7:33:10 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 4:21 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> your reasoning on the MWI resembles the way Trump thinks. *


Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen *+**3* *times I've heard it from you. *

*> How about dealing with the substance of my reply?*


*Your reply had substance? I hadn't noticed.  *


I quoted your comment about measurement. When you're in the MW cult, it's 
no surprise that your reading comprehension went way down. AG 

* John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
*
4v4


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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 4:21 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> your reasoning on the MWI resembles the way Trump thinks. *


Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen *+**3* *times I've heard it from you. *

*> How about dealing with the substance of my reply?*


*Your reply had substance? I hadn't noticed.  *
* John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
4v4


>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 11:01 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*>> the only way the universe could be deterministic, local and realistic
>> is with Superdeterminism, but that theory is idiotic because it requires
>> you to make quite literally an INFINITE number of assumptions.*
>
>

*> It only requires that there be some initial condition and deterministic
> evolution thereafter.  Sounds just like Newtonian cosmology.*
>

*Every problem, not just in physics but in science in general, requires
that there be SOME initial condition, but good theories will give you the
right answer starting with lots of different initial conditions, Great
theories will give you the right answer starting with ANY initial
condition, and ridiculously bad theories, like superdeterminism, will only
work if the universe started out in ONE very particular configuration.
That sounds NOTHING like Newtonian cosmology! *

*Every problem in Newtonian physics starts with some initial condition, but
Newton can tell you how fast a ball will be after it rolls down an incline
plank no matter how high it is at the top, what the angle of the plank is,
or how fast the ball is already rolling at before it started going down the
ramp. Superdeterminism would be like a rival theory that could correctly
predict how fast the ball will be going at the bottom BUT only if the ball
started out at 3.109 MPH, and the ramp was exactly 5.096 feet high, and it
was set at an angle of 28.062 degrees, if the initial conditions were
anything other than that it would make an incorrect prediction.  *

> *>> It's not even a scientific theory because if it's true then the
>> scientific method itself would be of no help whatsoever in increasing
>> your ontological or even epistemological knowledge. *
>
>
> *> There would still be deterministic law-like evolution. *
>

*Maybe, maybe not, if superdeterminism is true there would be no way to
ever know because the scientific method wouldn't work. The initial
conditions of the universe could've been set up so that in 4004 BC
non-biological purely geological processes created dinosaur bones, and
living breathing dinosaurs never existed. And monkey and even human fossils
could be common in Cambrian rock layers, but they have never been found and
never will be found because the initial conditions of the universe were
such that no paleontologist will ever decide to dig in the particular spots
where those fossils are. *

*And the initial conditions of the universe could have conspired to make us
believe there were such a thing as "particle entanglement" because the
angle 2 distant experimenters always choose to set their polarizer or
Stern-Gerlach magnet at is NEVER random, they always picked angles that
gave them a consistent but totally incorrect view of reality. *

*Christian fundamentalist say God is lying to me,  Superdeterminism fans
say nature is lying to me. But I see no reason that my default assumption
should be that somebody or something is lying to me.  *

* John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*

7bw

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-25 Thread PGC



On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 7:44:36 AM UTC+1 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, November 24, 2024 at 9:34:01 PM UTC-7 PGC wrote:

Barandes' work on non-Markovian quantum dynamics is undeniably 
sophisticated and offers potential applications (I appreciate the post, 
thanks), but it exemplifies a recurring issue in alleged foundational 
inquiry. In *"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory,"* for instance, his 
"kinematical axiom", that he states as a physical axiom on the slide, 
assumes natural numbers and sets—*abstract or metaphysical concepts, not 
physical concepts*—while presenting them as part of a physical ontology 
(see minute 11 of the video). This conflation risks undermining the rigor 
and clarity required in foundational inquiry.

Quantum mechanics, in any interpretation (digital mechanism aside), cannot 
fully explain why it appears as it does to specific subjects without a 
precise account of what a subject is and how their interaction with the 
system is modeled. Questions like "Why collapse?" or "Why Many Worlds?" 
demand assumptions about the subject, their properties, and their 
relationship to both the physical and mathematical structures they 
interpret. Without this clarity, foundational reasoning risks either 
circularity or ambiguity.

Foundational work should strive for clarity and honesty in its assumptions 
before reaching for elegance. It’s not enough to say "this works, it's 
sophisticated"—we have to address and state why it works for a subject with 
specific properties xyz in relation to the precise quantum or classical 
frameworks in play. Without this, we risk getting lost in the weeds of 
sophistication, leaving foundational gaps open and unexamined.
Barandes is right: examine the obvious things we take for granted; too bad 
he didn't apply that to his axiom mentioned above. If Bruno's digital 
mechanism strikes you as an implausible foundation, *then what exactly are 
the assumptions underlying your stance*  regarding existence of a subject, 
with which properties, experiencing which kind of physics and why; how QM, 
randomness, classicality, consciousness or lack thereof, qualia or not etc. 
manifest and emerge or don't? 


*Your philosophy, or shall we say point of view, is an example of the 
perfect as the enemy of the good. If Euclid had waited to satisfy your 
criteria, we wouldn't have plane geometry, and we'd still be waiting for 
the theorem of Pythagoras. Based on a voluminous catalog of passed 
experience, every successful theory begins with some undefined concepts. AG*


Alan, I see where you're coming from, and I agree that every theory begins 
with undefined concepts. However, the issue isn’t with starting 
somewhere—it’s with failing to interrogate and refine those starting 
assumptions. Even Euclid, whose axiomatic system remains a cornerstone of 
mathematics, didn't engage with the metaphysical status of his constructs. 
He left unanswered whether points, lines, and planes exist independently or 
are purely abstractions. That omission has echoed through history, leaving 
significant gaps in how we understand the relationship between mathematics, 
reality, and observation.

This lack of metaphysical clarity persists in modern science. The 
compartmentalization you defend has undoubtedly led to extraordinary 
achievements: life-saving technologies, powerful medicines, and yes, 
nuclear weapons. But it has also left us with a world where those weapons 
are pointed at each other, without any framework for addressing the deeper 
questions about the people wielding them: *Who are they? Why do they exist? 
What drives their actions? What physics supports their experiences and 
behaviors?*

Physics, as it is often practiced today, avoids these questions, declaring 
them "philosophical" or "outside its domain." But that refusal reinforces a 
point made by digital mechanists: If physics refuses to confront the 
fundamental "why" questions—questions of consciousness, existence, and 
reality itself—it becomes epistemic rather than ontological. It describes 
appearances without engaging their deeper causes.

Saying "PGC is drinking coffee at that table" is a satisfactory observation 
only if we stop there. But if we pursue foundational inquiry, we must ask: *Why 
does PGC appear to drink coffee? Why does he exist? What physics governs 
this observation? Does he experience the coffee as conscious, and if so, 
how does that consciousness emerge?*

Dismissing such questions as irrelevant, philosophical, meaningless etc. 
suggests a discomfort with clarity and foundational honesty. Yet without 
such honesty, physics becomes not an inquiry into reality but a tool for 
predictions divorced from purpose or meaning. That tool can work—it can 
build bridges, launch rockets, and construct bombs—but at the cost of 
losing the deeper truths about the universe and ourselves.

If your view is that physics need not address these questions, then perhaps 
the role of foundational inquir

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-25 Thread smitra

On 24-11-2024 05:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 2:25 PM smitra wrote:

On 22-11-2024 09:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 7:05 PM smitra wrote:

On 22-11-2024 06:40, Brent Meeker wrote:

That's what is ruled out by violation of Bell's inequality.

Bells' theorem doesn't apply to QM,

I think it is about time that you read Bell's papers. His theorem

not about hidden variable theories, or non-local theories. He

assumes,

for the purposes of argument, a local theory.

He assumes a deterministic local hidden variable theory.

Which theory is that, then?

He assumes local hidden variables which specify what the outcome of any
particular measurement will be.

He then derives a series
of inequalities that such a local theory must satisfy.

Experimentally,

these inequalities are violated. Inspection of standard QM gives
results that agree with experiment, but these results also require
non-locality.

No, non-locality is not required.

The conclusion drawn from these experiments is that
quantum mechanics, itself, is non-local.

No, that's not the conclusion.

If QM were intrinsically local, then you would be able to give this
local account of the correlations.
You are manifestly unable to do this.

It's obvious from the time evolution specified by the local Hamiltonian.

If there were any truth in what you are
saying, then you wouldn't have Sidney Coleman saying things like
this:

https://youtu.be/EtyNMlXN-sw?t=2023

And Prof. Marletto wouldn't have put point nr. 2 on her slide:

https://youtu.be/DT61eSiOs50?t=299

I think it is better to rely on the mathematics rather than on
so-called authorities.

Invoking authorities to get a simple fact about Bell's inequalities
cleared up, i.e. that it does not imply that QM is non-local, is quite
appropriate. You made the extraordinary claim that Bell proved that QM
is non-local, which is plain nonsense. If it were true, then you
wouldn't have professors with deep knowledge of QM claiming that QM is
local.

Saibal

Bruce

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 5:33:40 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 4:21 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> like Trump, you lie *



*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen +2 times I've heard it from you. *


I quoted your lie, but you deleted it. If not a lie, then a quasi conscious 
distortion. Something awry when someone falls in love with a theory. *And 
now you lie again.* *I didn't write you're a Trump supporter. *This is what 
happens when you become a cultist, in this case a MW cultist. AG 

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 4:21 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> like Trump, you lie *



*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen +2 times I've heard it from you. *

* John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
ltl





>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-24 Thread Alan Grayson

On Sunday, November 24, 2024 at 9:34:01 PM UTC-7 PGC wrote:

Barandes' work on non-Markovian quantum dynamics is undeniably
sophisticated and offers potential applications (I appreciate the post,
thanks), but it exemplifies a recurring issue in alleged foundational
inquiry. In *"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory,"* for instance, his
"kinematical axiom", that he states as a physical axiom on the slide,
assumes natural numbers and sets—*abstract or metaphysical concepts, not
physical concepts*—while presenting them as part of a physical ontology
(see minute 11 of the video). This conflation risks undermining the rigor
and clarity required in foundational inquiry.

Quantum mechanics, in any interpretation (digital mechanism aside), cannot
fully explain why it appears as it does to specific subjects without a
precise account of what a subject is and how their interaction with the
system is modeled. Questions like "Why collapse?" or "Why Many Worlds?"
demand assumptions about the subject, their properties, and their
relationship to both the physical and mathematical structures they
interpret. Without this clarity, foundational reasoning risks either
circularity or ambiguity.

Foundational work should strive for clarity and honesty in its assumptions
before reaching for elegance. It’s not enough to say "this works, it's
sophisticated"—we have to address and state why it works for a subject with
specific properties xyz in relation to the precise quantum or classical
frameworks in play. Without this, we risk getting lost in the weeds of
sophistication, leaving foundational gaps open and unexamined.
Barandes is right: examine the obvious things we take for granted; too bad
he didn't apply that to his axiom mentioned above. If Bruno's digital
mechanism strikes you as an implausible foundation, *then what exactly are
the assumptions underlying your stance* regarding existence of a subject,
with which properties, experiencing which kind of physics and why; how QM,
randomness, classicality, consciousness or lack thereof, qualia or not etc.
manifest and emerge or don't?

*Your philosophy, or shall we say point of view, is an example of the
perfect as the enemy of the good. If Euclid had waited to satisfy your
criteria, we wouldn't have plane geometry, and we'd still be waiting for
the theorem of Pythagoras. Based on a voluminous catalog of passed
experience, every successful theory begins with some undefined concepts. AG*

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-24 Thread PGC

Barandes' work on non-Markovian quantum dynamics is undeniably 
sophisticated and offers potential applications (I appreciate the post, 
thanks), but it exemplifies a recurring issue in alleged foundational 
inquiry. In *"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory,"* for instance, his 
"kinematical axiom", that he states as a physical axiom on the slide, 
assumes natural numbers and sets—*abstract or metaphysical concepts, not 
physical concepts*—while presenting them as part of a physical ontology 
(see minute 11 of the video). This conflation risks undermining the rigor 
and clarity required in foundational inquiry.

Quantum mechanics, in any interpretation (digital mechanism aside), cannot 
fully explain why it appears as it does to specific subjects without a 
precise account of what a subject is and how their interaction with the 
system is modeled. Questions like "Why collapse?" or "Why Many Worlds?" 
demand assumptions about the subject, their properties, and their 
relationship to both the physical and mathematical structures they 
interpret. Without this clarity, foundational reasoning risks either 
circularity or ambiguity.

Foundational work should strive for clarity and honesty in its assumptions 
before reaching for elegance. It’s not enough to say "this works, it's 
sophisticated"—we have to address and state why it works for a subject with 
specific properties xyz in relation to the precise quantum or classical 
frameworks in play. Without this, we risk getting lost in the weeds of 
sophistication, leaving foundational gaps open and unexamined.
Barandes is right: examine the obvious things we take for granted; too bad 
he didn't apply that to his axiom mentioned above. If Bruno's digital 
mechanism strikes you as an implausible foundation, *then what exactly are 
the assumptions underlying your stance*  regarding existence of a subject, 
with which properties, experiencing which kind of physics and why; how QM, 
randomness, classicality, consciousness or lack thereof, qualia or not etc. 
manifest and emerge or don't? 
On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 5:01:13 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:

>
>
>
> On 11/24/2024 4:27 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 23, 2024 at 11:04 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>  
>
>> >> He [Bell] assumes a deterministic local hidden variable theory.
>>>
>>
>> *> **Which theory is that, then?*
>>
>
> *Ironically that was Erwin Schrödinger's quantum interpretation, and 
> Albert Einstein's, but it turned out they were both wrong. They thought the 
> universe was local, deterministic and realistic, but if it was then it 
> would be impossible to violate Bell's Inequality, and if it was then 
> quantum mechanics would make incorrect predictions in experiments set up 
> the way that Bell described. But the experimental results are clear, Bell's 
> Inequality IS violated and the predictions of quantum mechanics are 
> correct. *
>
> *So the only way the universe could be deterministic, local and realistic 
> is with Superdeterminism, but that theory is idiotic because it requires 
> you to make quite literally an INFINITE number of assumptions. *
>
> It only requires that there be *some* initial condition and deterministic 
> evolution thereafter.  Sounds just like Newtonian cosmology.
>
>
> *It's not even a scientific theory because if it's true then the 
> scientific method itself would be of no help whatsoever in increasing 
> your ontological or even epistemological knowledge. *
>
> There would still be deterministic law-like evolution.  Does the existence 
> of randomness help increase your ontological or epistemological knowledge?  
> According your favorite interpretation, observing a binary event like 
> ..., consistent with a Born probability of 0.01, will leave almost all 
> physicists with the wrong conclusion because they will see something like 
> ++-+--+---+-++... with roughly equal numbers of + and -.
>
> Brent
>
> *It sort of reminds me of Christian fundamentalists who say that the 
> universe was created in 4004 BC  and God made dinosaur bones, buried them, 
> and made them look like they were hundreds of millions of years old in 
> order to test our faith. It's impossible to disprove that idea because God 
> is omnipotent so He certainly has the power to fool us if He wants to. But 
> a God like that would be a real prick! *
>
> * John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
> *
> 3sq 
>
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> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
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>  
>

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-24 Thread Brent Meeker

On 11/24/2024 4:27 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Nov 23, 2024 at 11:04 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

>> He [Bell] assumes a deterministic local hidden variable theory.

/> //Which theory is that, then?/

*Ironically that was Erwin Schrödinger's quantum interpretation, and
Albert Einstein's, but it turned out they were both wrong. They
thought the universe was local, deterministic and realistic, but if it
was then it would be impossible to violate Bell's Inequality, and if
it was then quantum mechanics would make incorrect predictions in
experiments set up the way that Bell described. But the experimental
results are clear, Bell's Inequality _IS_ violated and the predictions
of quantum mechanics are _correct_.*

*So the only way the universe could be deterministic, local and
realistic is with Superdeterminism, but that theory is idiotic because
it requires you to make quite literally an_INFINITE_ number of
assumptions. *
It only requires that there be /*some*/ initial condition and
deterministic evolution thereafter. Sounds just like Newtonian cosmology.

*It's not even a scientific theory because if it's true then the
scientific method itself would be of no help whatsoever in increasing
your ontologicalor even epistemological knowledge. *
There would still be deterministic law-like evolution. Does the
existence of randomness help increase your ontological or
epistemological knowledge? According your favorite interpretation,
observing a binary event like ..., consistent with a Born
probability of 0.01, will leave almost all physicists with the wrong
conclusion because they will see something like ++-+--+---+-++... with
roughly equal numbers of + and -.

Brent

*It sort of reminds me of Christian fundamentalists who say that the
universe was created in 4004 BC and God made dinosaur bones, buried
them, and made them look like they were hundreds of millions of years
old in order to test our faith. It's impossible to disprove that idea
because God is omnipotent so He certainly has the power to fool us if
He wants to. But a God like that would be a real prick! *

*
*
*John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis
*

3sq

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-24 Thread Alan Grayson

On Saturday, November 23, 2024 at 2:56:12 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Saturday, November 23, 2024 at 11:36:02 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Nov 23, 2024 at 1:30 PM Alan Grayson wrote:

*> Only true in the context of Trump physics,*

*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult! I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen +1 times I've heard it from you. *

*John K Clark *

91t
I didn't write you were a Trump supporter; rather that your reasoning on
the MWI resembles the way Trump thinks. How about dealing with the
substance of my reply? AG

Recently you, JC, wrote, referring to those who adopt the Copenhagen
Interpretation of collapse: *It's even worse than that because they can't
tell you exactly, or even approximately, what a "measurement" is. *

Really? This, of course, is false, the SG experiment being an obvious
counter-example, and like Trump, you lie to defend the theory you're in
love with. And in the same context, you seem to rely on, and believe the
results of Bell experiments. Do you know what you're doing? AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-24 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Nov 23, 2024 at 11:04 PM Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> >> He [Bell] assumes a deterministic local hidden variable theory.
>>
>
> *> **Which theory is that, then?*
>

*Ironically that was Erwin Schrödinger's quantum interpretation, and Albert
Einstein's, but it turned out they were both wrong. They thought the
universe was local, deterministic and realistic, but if it was then it
would be impossible to violate Bell's Inequality, and if it was then
quantum mechanics would make incorrect predictions in experiments set up
the way that Bell described. But the experimental results are clear, Bell's
Inequality IS violated and the predictions of quantum mechanics are
correct. *

*So the only way the universe could be deterministic, local and realistic
is with Superdeterminism, but that theory is idiotic because it requires
you to make quite literally an INFINITE number of assumptions. It's not
even a scientific theory because if it's true then the scientific method
itself would be of no help whatsoever in increasing your ontological or
even epistemological knowledge. It sort of reminds me of Christian
fundamentalists who say that the universe was created in 4004 BC  and God
made dinosaur bones, buried them, and made them look like they were
hundreds of millions of years old in order to test our faith. It's
impossible to disprove that idea because God is omnipotent so He certainly
has the power to fool us if He wants to. But a God like that would be a
real prick! *

* John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
3sq

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-24 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-everett/



Was Everett right?

> .
> 

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread Alan Grayson

On Saturday, November 23, 2024 at 9:04:19 PM UTC-7 Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 2:25 PM smitra  wrote:

On 22-11-2024 09:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 7:05 PM smitra  wrote:
> 
>> On 22-11-2024 06:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 
>>> That's what is ruled out by violation of Bell's inequality.
>> 
>> Bells' theorem doesn't apply to QM,
> 
> I think it is about time that you read Bell's papers.  His theorem is
> not about hidden variable theories, or non-local theories. He assumes,
> for the purposes of argument, a local theory.

He assumes a deterministic local hidden variable theory.

Which theory is that, then?

> He then derives a series
> of inequalities that such a local theory must satisfy. Experimentally,
> these inequalities are violated. Inspection of standard QM gives
> results that agree with experiment, but these results also require
> non-locality.

No, non-locality is not required.

> The conclusion drawn from these experiments is that
> quantum mechanics, itself, is non-local.

No, that's not the conclusion.

If QM were intrinsically local, then you would be able to give this local 
account of the correlations.
You are manifestly unable to do this.

*What exactly do you mean by "local account of the correlations"? Would you*
*agree that the fact the wf extends infinitely in all directions and 
changes in*
*time infinitely in all directions sufficiently establishes that QM is 
non-local? AG * 

If there were any truth in what you are 
saying, then you wouldn't have Sidney Coleman saying things like this:

https://youtu.be/EtyNMlXN-sw?t=2023

And Prof. Marletto wouldn't have put point nr. 2 on her slide:

https://youtu.be/DT61eSiOs50?t=299

I think it is better to rely on the mathematics rather than on so-called 
authorities.

Bruce

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 2:25 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 22-11-2024 09:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 7:05 PM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> On 22-11-2024 06:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>
> >>> That's what is ruled out by violation of Bell's inequality.
> >>
> >> Bells' theorem doesn't apply to QM,
> >
> > I think it is about time that you read Bell's papers.  His theorem is
> > not about hidden variable theories, or non-local theories. He assumes,
> > for the purposes of argument, a local theory.
>
> He assumes a deterministic local hidden variable theory.
>

Which theory is that, then?

> He then derives a series
> > of inequalities that such a local theory must satisfy. Experimentally,
> > these inequalities are violated. Inspection of standard QM gives
> > results that agree with experiment, but these results also require
> > non-locality.
>
> No, non-locality is not required.
>
> > The conclusion drawn from these experiments is that
> > quantum mechanics, itself, is non-local.
>
> No, that's not the conclusion.


If QM were intrinsically local, then you would be able to give this local
account of the correlations.
You are manifestly unable to do this.



> If there were any truth in what you are
> saying, then you wouldn't have Sidney Coleman saying things like this:
>
> https://youtu.be/EtyNMlXN-sw?t=2023
>
> And Prof. Marletto wouldn't have put point nr. 2 on her slide:
>
> https://youtu.be/DT61eSiOs50?t=299


I think it is better to rely on the mathematics rather than on so-called
authorities.

Bruce

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread smitra

On 22-11-2024 09:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 7:05 PM smitra wrote:

On 22-11-2024 06:40, Brent Meeker wrote:

That's what is ruled out by violation of Bell's inequality.

Bells' theorem doesn't apply to QM,

I think it is about time that you read Bell's papers. His theorem is
not about hidden variable theories, or non-local theories. He assumes,
for the purposes of argument, a local theory.

He assumes a deterministic local hidden variable theory.

He then derives a series
of inequalities that such a local theory must satisfy. Experimentally,
these inequalities are violated. Inspection of standard QM gives
results that agree with experiment, but these results also require
non-locality.

No, non-locality is not required.

The conclusion drawn from these experiments is that
quantum mechanics, itself, is non-local.

No, that's not the conclusion. If there were any truth in what you are
saying, then you wouldn't have Sidney Coleman saying things like this:

https://youtu.be/EtyNMlXN-sw?t=2023

And Prof. Marletto wouldn't have put point nr. 2 on her slide:

https://youtu.be/DT61eSiOs50?t=299

Saibal

Bruce

it's a theorem about deterministic
hidden variable theories that says that certain correlations like
some
of those of QM cannot be reproduced by any local hidden variable
theory.
The relevance of Bell's theorem to QM is only that it rules out that
if
QM is not fundamental and has an underlying hidden variable theory,
then
that hidden variable theory cannot be local.

So, if we then assume that QM is fundamental, then there is no
objection
against QM being local. Getting to non-local states via local
dynamics
isn't a problem as this is routinely done in experiments where
entangled
spin pairs are created. Nothing non-local goes on as far as the
dynamics
is concerned in such experiments.

Saibal

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread Brent Meeker





On 11/23/2024 5:47 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 9:19 AM PGC  wrote:

> [the Gödelian critique]///Applied to quantum mechanics and
ontology//indicates that any framework aiming for ontological
finality will inevitably encounter unprovable truths if it
includes arithmetic or its use in its formulations. /


*ButPhysics is not mathematics. In physicsyou don't need to prove 
experimental results, you need to demonstrate them. Theory is used to 
predict and explain those experimental results, which Objective 
Collapseand Pilot Waveand Many Worldsall can do. *

So do the more instrumentalist interpretations

*The best theory is the one that can do so with the fewest 
assumptions; and in that regard Many Worlds is the clear winner. *


You only think so because you close your eyes to it's shortcomings.  Try 
this lecture by Jacob Barandes.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9RhoQVxuwQ

And Barandes is not only a critic; he has a one-world formulation that 
is still conventional, non-instrumentalist QM.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg&t=49s

Brent

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread Alan Grayson



On Saturday, November 23, 2024 at 11:36:02 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Nov 23, 2024 at 1:30 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> Only true in the context of Trump physics,*


*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a 
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for 
the 19 dozen +1 times I've heard it from you. *

*John K Clark  *
91t
I didn't write you were a Trump supporter; rather that your reasoning on 
the MWI resembles the way Trump thinks. How about dealing with the 
substance of my reply? AG


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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Nov 23, 2024 at 1:30 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> Only true in the context of Trump physics,*


*Wow, calling a guy known for disliking Trump a Trump supporter, what a
witty and original insult!  I've never heard that one before, except for
the 19 dozen +1 times I've heard it from you. *

*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*
91t


>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread Alan Grayson

On Saturday, November 23, 2024 at 6:47:52 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 9:19 AM PGC  wrote:

> [the Gödelian critique] *Applied to quantum mechanics and ontology* 
> *indicates 
that any framework aiming for ontological finality will inevitably 
encounter unprovable truths if it includes arithmetic or its use in its 
formulations. *

*But Physics is not mathematics. In physics you don't need to prove 
experimental results, you need to demonstrate them. Theory is used to 
predict and explain those experimental results, which Objective Collapse 
and Pilot Wave and Many Worlds all can do. The best theory is the one that 
can do so with the fewest assumptions; and in that regard Many Worlds is 
the clear winner. But even if you knew for a fact that Objective Collapse, 
or Pilot Wave, or Many Worlds was 100% correct, you still couldn't claim to 
have reached ontological finality. *

*You may have noticed I didn't include Copenhagen or Quantum Bayesianism, 
that's because they don't even claim to have anything to do with ontology, 
final or otherwise, and they don't even pretend to explain anything, 
they're for people who only care about predicting what value they're going 
to get on their voltmeter.*

* > Collapse postulates introduce "magic" by assuming the wavefunction's 
reality only to dismiss it post-measurement, *

*It's even worse than that because they can't tell you exactly, or even 
approximately, what a "measurement" is.  *

*Only true in the context of Trump physics, whereas, for example, in normal 
physics we can measure spin using an SG apparutus, and we know we're 
measuring spin. AG *

*> while MWI faces the unresolved challenge of deriving probabilities 
without external axioms.*

*Well, MWI can clearly explain why you need probabilities even though 
Schrodinger's Equation is 100% deterministic. And mathematically we know 
that taking the square of absolute value of an equation that contains 
complex numbers, like Schrodinger's does, is the only way to get a set of 
real numbers between zero and one that add up to exactly one, which is 
exactly what we need for probability. And we know that if your eyes are 
closed and you bet on which world you're in and you want to win then you 
should bet you're in the world that has the largest quantum magnitude, if 
you keep repeating that you will make more money with that strategy than 
with any other.  And MWI can do all that without introducing any 
assumptions except that Schrodinger's Equation means what it says.*

*In fact you've added immensely to the assumptions of S's equation, such as 
the departure from the frequency interpretation of probability, and the 
creation of many worlds without knowing the frequency and boundaries of 
these worlds. When will you admit this fact and stop with the misleading 
BS? AG*  

*> **While frameworks like MWI or collapse postulates have epistemic value, 
they are better seen as tools for exploring the boundaries of what can be 
explained or inspiration for developing new problems and possible 
application, rather than as definitive ontological inquiry.*

*If one is interested in exploring the fundamental boundaries of what we 
can know, I can't think of a better way than trying to figure out what 
quantum mechanics means; we will never reach the goal of ontological 
certainty but I think we can go further than we are right now.2*

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-23 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 9:19 AM PGC  wrote:

> [the Gödelian critique] *Applied to quantum mechanics and ontology* *indicates
> that any framework aiming for ontological finality will inevitably
> encounter unprovable truths if it includes arithmetic or its use in its
> formulations. *

*But Physics is not mathematics. In physics you don't need to prove
experimental results, you need to demonstrate them. Theory is used to
predict and explain those experimental results, which Objective Collapse
and Pilot Wave and Many Worlds all can do. The best theory is the one that
can do so with the fewest assumptions; and in that regard Many Worlds is
the clear winner. But even if you knew for a fact that Objective Collapse,
or Pilot Wave, or Many Worlds was 100% correct, you still couldn't claim to
have reached ontological finality. *

*You may have noticed I didn't include Copenhagen or Quantum Bayesianism,
that's because they don't even claim to have anything to do with ontology,
final or otherwise, and they don't even pretend to explain anything,
they're for people who only care about predicting what value they're going
to get on their voltmeter.*

* > Collapse postulates introduce "magic" by assuming the wavefunction's
> reality only to dismiss it post-measurement, *

*It's even worse than that because they can't tell you exactly, or even
approximately, what a "measurement" is.  *

*> while MWI faces the unresolved challenge of deriving probabilities
> without external axioms.*

*Well, MWI can clearly explain why you need probabilities even though
Schrodinger's Equation is 100% deterministic. And mathematically we know
that taking the square of absolute value of an equation that contains
complex numbers, like Schrodinger's does, is the only way to get a set of
real numbers between zero and one that add up to exactly one, which is
exactly what we need for probability. And we know that if your eyes are
closed and you bet on which world you're in and you want to win then you
should bet you're in the world that has the largest quantum magnitude, if
you keep repeating that you will make more money with that strategy than
with any other.  And MWI can do all that without introducing any
assumptions except that Schrodinger's Equation means what it says.*

*> **While frameworks like MWI or collapse postulates have epistemic value,
> they are better seen as tools for exploring the boundaries of what can be
> explained or inspiration for developing new problems and possible
> application, rather than as definitive ontological inquiry.*

*If one is interested in exploring the fundamental boundaries of what we
can know, I can't think of a better way than trying to figure out what
quantum mechanics means; we will never reach the goal of ontological
certainty but I think we can go further than we are right now. *
*John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
*

='/

>

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 10:08:36 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/22/2024 8:24 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:01:23 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/22/2024 6:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

I recommend the lectures of Jacob Barandes. He has developed an
interpretation of QM which shows how QM is related to classical stochastic
processes and which avoids the problems I see in other interpretations. He
makes a distinction between ontic and epistemic layers in the
interpretations which I think clarifies things a lot.

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

Where did I say an equation was ontic? Check your eye sight.

Brent

I meant to write equation or theory. What's your favorite ontic theory if
you have one? AG

The phrase was "ontic *layer*" which is just the things you take to exist,
e.g. charged particles and photons in QED. It's prior to equations and
theories.

Brent

You'd have to include things which might exist, such as gravitons or
tachyons, which is why, IMO, the concept is vacuous and therefore
meaningless, and just adds to our confusion. But that's just my opinion and
we know what that's worth. AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:01:23 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/22/2024 6:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

Where did I say an equation was ontic? Check your eye sight.

Brent

*Don't worry. I forgive you for you snide remark. After all, you might not
be the real Brent, but a copy of some original, more polite Brent, resident
on some other branch who conducted some experiment, or was accidentally
included in a branch induced by an ant who turned left of a dung hill. lol.
AG *

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On 11/22/2024 8:24 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:01:23 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/22/2024 6:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

I recommend the lectures of Jacob Barandes. He has developed
an interpretation of QM which shows how QM is related to
classical stochastic processes and which avoids the problems
I see in other interpretations. He makes a distinction
between ontic and epistemic layers in the interpretations
which I think clarifies things a lot.

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory
arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

Where did I say an equation was ontic? Check your eye sight.

Brent

I meant to write equation or theory. What's your favorite ontic theory
if you have one? AG
The phrase was "ontic *layer*" which is just the things you take to
exist, e.g. charged particles and photons in QED. It's prior to
equations and theories.

Brent

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:30:15 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:24:16 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:01:23 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/22/2024 6:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

Where did I say an equation was ontic? Check your eye sight.

Brent

I meant to write equation or theory. What's your favorite ontic theory if
you have one? AG

More interesting to me is the question about stochastics. Why do you choose
to answer my relatively trivial question? AG

I suppose Faraday's Law or Coulumb's Law could be considered ontic since
they describe real things. But this criterion could be applied to all the
Laws of Physics (and their interpretations), so, AFAICT, "ontic" doesn't
have much, if any, meaning. AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:24:16 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:01:23 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/22/2024 6:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

Where did I say an equation was ontic? Check your eye sight.

Brent

I meant to write equation or theory. What's your favorite ontic theory if
you have one? AG

More interesting to me is the question about stochastics. Why do you choose
to answer my relatively trivial question? AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 9:01:23 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/22/2024 6:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

Where did I say an equation was ontic? Check your eye sight.

Brent

I meant to write equation or theory. What's your favorite ontic theory if
you have one? AG

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI






On 11/22/2024 6:19 AM, PGC wrote:


These discussions around Bell's theorem, the Many-Worlds 
Interpretation (MWI), and the challenges of deriving the Born rule 
continue invoking the interplay between epistemic frameworks and 
ontological commitments. A significant point of contention is whether 
MWI can account for the correlations observed in entangled systems 
without additional postulates, such as collapse, and how these 
correlations map onto the observer accounts and global description 
perspectives. There are interpretational gaps that persist.


John’s description of branching in the Many-Worlds Interpretation 
(MWI) assumes that decoherence ensures each branch corresponds to a 
distinct outcome of a quantum measurement. This can be expressed using 
the density matrix ρ in a composite system-environment state:


ρ=∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣,where ∣ψ⟩=i∑ci∣si⟩∣ei⟩.

Decoherence suppresses off-diagonal terms in ρ, effectively yielding a 
mixed state:


ρ′=i∑∣ci∣2∣si⟩⟨si∣.

Consider the correlations in entangled systems that violate Bell's 
inequality. These correlations are quantitatively expressed as 
deviations from the CHSH inequality:


S=∣E(a,b)+E(a′,b)+E(a,b′)−E(a′,b′)∣≤2,

where E(a,b) represents the expectation value of measurements along 
directions a and b. Experimental results consistently show that S>2, 
as predicted by quantum mechanics but inconsistent with local hidden 
variable theories (Bell, 1964, p.195). In MWI, these results follow 
from the unitary evolution of the wavefunction. The wavefunction for 
an entangled pair,


∣ψ⟩=21(∣↑⟩A∣↓⟩B−∣↓⟩A∣↑⟩B),

evolves unitarily under the Schrödinger equation. Decoherence ensures 
that interference terms vanish in the density matrix describing 
macroscopic observers, giving the appearance of distinct "branches."


However, Bruce keeps raising the critical challenge: how do these 
branches remain correlated across spacelike separations? In MWI, the 
correlations are not post-measurement artifacts but inherent to the 
global wavefunction. The key is the consistency enforced by the 
universal wf's structure, which ensures that for any measurement 
basis, the resulting "branches" respect the original entanglement. The 
reduced density matrix formalism explicitly demonstrates this:


ρA=TrB(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣),

yielding probabilities consistent with the Born rule. Yet, the Born 
rule itself remains elusive within MWI's framework and demands further 
clarification, as acknowledged by Carroll (2014, p.18).


Critics like Brent and Bruce argue that without an explicit derivation 
of the Born rule, MWI fails to fully account for observed 
probabilities. This is valid but reflects a broader epistemological 
gap. Probabilities, as noted, have different interpretations: 
frequentist, Bayesian, and, uniquely in computational contexts, 
"objective" probabilities derived from "subjective probabilities" 
(Everett used "subjective probabilities" iirc, and Bruno's refinement 
was terming them "objective" in this sense). In this framework, 
probabilities emerge not as axioms but as limits of frequency 
operators over the ensemble of computations or histories:


Something akin to:

n→∞limn1i=1∑nPi≈PBorn,

where PBorn=∣⟨ψ∣ϕ⟩∣2. This connects subjective perspectives (what the 
observer experiences) to 3p descriptions (what the formalism 
predicts), which is insufficiently addressed/incomplete in MWI or 
collapse approaches and open with Bruno's approach iirc (correct me, 
if otherwise). The merit of this kind of approach is that observer 
experience is no longer outside the scope of the clearest ontology.


Now, consider the Gödelian critique. All frameworks—whether MWI, 
collapse postulates, or alternatives like Invariant Set Theory 
(Palmer, 2009)—assume arithmetical or stronger foundations. Gödel's 
incompleteness theorems (Gödel, 1931) demonstrate that within any 
sufficiently rich formal system F, there exist true statements T that 
are unprovable within F. Explicitly:


∃T(T∈True∧T∈/Provable in F).

Applied to quantum mechanics and ontology, this indicates that any 
framework aiming for ontological finality will inevitably encounter 
unprovable truths if it includes arithmetic


First, that's only relative to a fix set of axioms.  Physics isn't an 
axiomatic game.  Second, the Goedel proposition that is true but 
unprovable may be no more that "This is not provable." expressed within 
the theory...not necessarily some deep truth.


or its use in its formulations. For example, the observer's role 
versus the formalism's predictions remains a gap that cannot be fully 
bridged within any single system.


"Observer" is a carryover from Bohr.  A measurement can be performed by 
a system that is diagonalized by decoherence.  Decoherence isn't magic.  
See the formulation of QM by Barandes that I posted.


Brent

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI





On 11/22/2024 6:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

I recommend the lectures of Jacob Barandes.  He has developed an
interpretation of QM which shows how QM is related to classical
stochastic processes and which avoids the problems I see in other
interpretations.  He makes a distinction between ontic and
epistemic layers in the interpretations which I think clarifies
things a lot.

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem  arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence  arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

Where did I say an equation was ontic?  Check your eye sight.

Brent

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

2024-11-22 Thread Russell Standish

On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 05:21:14PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
> The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem  arXiv:2309.03085
> 
> The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence  arxiv:2302.10778
>  
> The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory  arXiv:1405.6755
> 

Thanks - these look interesting! I've downloaded them for later study.


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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI

On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

*This seems promising. AG *

Of course there are also papers on the same topic:

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem arXiv:2309.03085

*Doesn't "stochastic" imply the classical theory where ignorance is assumed
of individual members of an ensemble, so when applied to quantum theory
wouldn't it imply the Ignorance Interpretation of the superposed wf? AG*

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence arxiv:2302.10778

The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

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Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 6:21:18 PM UTC-7 Brent Meeker wrote:

I recommend the lectures of Jacob Barandes.  He has developed an 
interpretation of QM which shows how QM is related to classical stochastic 
processes and which avoids the problems I see in other interpretations.  He 
makes a distinction between ontic and epistemic layers in the 
interpretations which I think clarifies things a lot.

"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory" 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sshJyD0aWXg

"New Foundations for Quantum Theory"  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dB16TzHFvj0

"Why We Shouldn't Believe in Hilbert Spaces Anymore" 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmaSAG4J6nw

Of course there are also papers on the same topic: 

The Stochastic-Quantum Theorem  arXiv:2309.03085

The Stochastic-Quantum Correspondence  arxiv:2302.10778
  
The Minimal Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory  arXiv:1405.6755

Brent

 
*Ontic? Is any equation ontic? Have you tried to kick one? AG*


On 11/22/2024 6:19 AM, PGC wrote:

These discussions around Bell's theorem, the Many-Worlds Interpretation 
(MWI), and the challenges of deriving the Born rule continue invoking the 
interplay between epistemic frameworks and ontological commitments. A 
significant point of contention is whether MWI can account for the 
correlations observed in entangled systems without additional postulates, 
such as collapse, and how these correlations map onto the observer accounts 
and global description perspectives. There are interpretational gaps that 
persist.

John’s description of branching in the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) 
assumes that decoherence ensures each branch corresponds to a distinct 
outcome of a quantum measurement. This can be expressed using the density 
matrix ρ in a composite system-environment state:

ρ=∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣,where ∣ψ⟩=i∑ci∣si⟩∣ei⟩.

Decoherence suppresses off-diagonal terms in ρ, effectively yielding a 
mixed state:

ρ′=i∑∣ci∣2∣si⟩⟨si∣.

Consider the correlations in entangled systems that violate Bell's 
inequality. These correlations are quantitatively expressed as deviations 
from the CHSH inequality:
S=∣E(a,b)+E(a′,b)+E(a,b′)−E(a′,b′)∣≤2, 

where E(a,b) represents the expectation value of measurements along 
directions a and b. Experimental results consistently show that S>2, as 
predicted by quantum mechanics but inconsistent with local hidden variable 
theories (Bell, 1964, p.195). In MWI, these results follow from the unitary 
evolution of the wavefunction. The wavefunction for an entangled pair,
∣ψ⟩=21(∣↑⟩A∣↓⟩B−∣↓⟩A∣↑⟩B), 

evolves unitarily under the Schrödinger equation. Decoherence ensures that 
interference terms vanish in the density matrix describing macroscopic 
observers, giving the appearance of distinct "branches."

However, Bruce keeps raising the critical challenge: how do these branches 
remain correlated across spacelike separations? In MWI, the correlations 
are not post-measurement artifacts but inherent to the global wavefunction. 
The key is the consistency enforced by the universal wf's structure, which 
ensures that for any measurement basis, the resulting "branches" respect 
the original entanglement. The reduced density matrix formalism explicitly 
demonstrates this:
ρA=TrB(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣), 

yielding probabilities consistent with the Born rule. Yet, the Born rule 
itself remains elusive within MWI's framework and demands further 
clarification, as acknowledged by Carroll (2014, p.18).

Critics like Brent and Bruce argue that without an explicit derivation of 
the Born rule, MWI fails to fully account for observed probabilities. This 
is valid but reflects a broader epistemological gap. Probabilities, as 
noted, have different interpretations: frequentist, Bayesian, and, uniquely 
in computational contexts, "objective" probabilities derived from 
"subjective probabilities" (Everett used "subjective probabilities" iirc, 
and Bruno's refinement was terming them "objective" in this sense). In this 
framework, probabilities emerge not as axioms but as limits of frequency 
operators over the ensemble of computations or histories:

Something akin to:
n→∞limn1i=1∑nPi≈PBorn, 

where PBorn=∣⟨ψ∣ϕ⟩∣2. This connects subjective perspectives (what the 
observer experiences) to 3p descriptions (what the formalism predicts), 
which is insufficiently addressed/incomplete in MWI or collapse approaches 
and open with Bruno's approach iirc (correct me, if otherwise). The merit 
of this kind of approach is that observer experience is no longer outside 
the scope of the clearest ontology.

Now, consider the Gödelian critique. All frameworks—whether MWI, collapse 
postulates, or alternatives like Invariant Set Theory (Palmer, 2009)—assume 
arithmetical or stronger foundations. Gödel's incompleteness theorems 
(Gödel, 1931) demonstrate that within any sufficiently rich formal system F, 
there exist true statements T that are unprovable within F. Explicitly:
∃T(T∈True∧T∈/Provable in F). 

Applied to quantum

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI



On Friday, November 22, 2024 at 7:19:10 AM UTC-7 PGC wrote:

These discussions around Bell's theorem, the Many-Worlds Interpretation 
(MWI), and the challenges of deriving the Born rule continue invoking the 
interplay between epistemic frameworks and ontological commitments. A 
significant point of contention is whether MWI can account for the 
correlations observed in entangled systems without additional postulates, 
such as collapse, and how these correlations map onto the observer accounts 
and global description perspectives. There are interpretational gaps that 
persist.

John’s description of branching in the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) 
assumes that decoherence ensures each branch corresponds to a distinct 
outcome of a quantum measurement. This can be expressed using the density 
matrix ρ in a composite system-environment state:

ρ=∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣,where ∣ψ⟩=i∑ci∣si⟩∣ei⟩.

Decoherence suppresses off-diagonal terms in ρ, effectively yielding a 
mixed state:

ρ′=i∑∣ci∣2∣si⟩⟨si∣.

Consider the correlations in entangled systems that violate Bell's 
inequality. These correlations are quantitatively expressed as deviations 
from the CHSH inequality:
S=∣E(a,b)+E(a′,b)+E(a,b′)−E(a′,b′)∣≤2,

where E(a,b) represents the expectation value of measurements along 
directions a and b. Experimental results consistently show that S>2, as 
predicted by quantum mechanics but inconsistent with local hidden variable 
theories (Bell, 1964, p.195). In MWI, these results follow from the unitary 
evolution of the wavefunction. The wavefunction for an entangled pair,
∣ψ⟩=21(∣↑⟩A∣↓⟩B−∣↓⟩A∣↑⟩B),

evolves unitarily under the Schrödinger equation. Decoherence ensures that 
interference terms vanish in the density matrix describing macroscopic 
observers, giving the appearance of distinct "branches."

However, Bruce keeps raising the critical challenge: how do these branches 
remain correlated across spacelike separations? In MWI, the correlations 
are not post-measurement artifacts but inherent to the global wavefunction. 
The key is the consistency enforced by the universal wf's structure, which 
ensures that for any measurement basis, the resulting "branches" respect 
the original entanglement. The reduced density matrix formalism explicitly 
demonstrates this:
ρA=TrB(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣),

yielding probabilities consistent with the Born rule. Yet, the Born rule 
itself remains elusive within MWI's framework and demands further 
clarification, as acknowledged by Carroll (2014, p.18).

Critics like Brent and Bruce argue that without an explicit derivation of 
the Born rule, MWI fails to fully account for observed probabilities. This 
is valid but reflects a broader epistemological gap. Probabilities, as 
noted, have different interpretations: frequentist, Bayesian, and, uniquely 
in computational contexts, "objective" probabilities derived from 
"subjective probabilities" (Everett used "subjective probabilities" iirc, 
and Bruno's refinement was terming them "objective" in this sense). In this 
framework, probabilities emerge not as axioms but as limits of frequency 
operators over the ensemble of computations or histories:

Something akin to:
n→∞limn1i=1∑nPi≈PBorn,

where PBorn=∣⟨ψ∣ϕ⟩∣2. This connects subjective perspectives (what the 
observer experiences) to 3p descriptions (what the formalism predicts), 
which is insufficiently addressed/incomplete in MWI or collapse approaches 
and open with Bruno's approach iirc (correct me, if otherwise). The merit 
of this kind of approach is that observer experience is no longer outside 
the scope of the clearest ontology.

Now, consider the Gödelian critique. All frameworks—whether MWI, collapse 
postulates, or alternatives like Invariant Set Theory (Palmer, 2009)—assume 
arithmetical or stronger foundations. Gödel's incompleteness theorems 
(Gödel, 1931) demonstrate that within any sufficiently rich formal system F, 
there exist true statements T that are unprovable within F. Explicitly:
∃T(T∈True∧T∈/Provable in F).

Applied to quantum mechanics and ontology, this indicates that any 
framework aiming for ontological finality will inevitably encounter 
unprovable truths if it includes arithmetic or its use in its formulations. 
For example, the observer's role versus the formalism's predictions remains 
a gap that cannot be fully bridged within any single system. Collapse 
postulates introduce "magic" by assuming the wavefunction's reality only to 
dismiss it post-measurement, while MWI faces the unresolved challenge of 
deriving probabilities without external axioms.

The whack-a-mole nature of these discussions therefore may find an 
explanation in this incompleteness. Every attempt to resolve one gap (e.g., 
deriving Born within MWI) introduces others (e.g., defining the observer). 
As Saibal notes, local hidden variables fail due to Bell's theorem, but 
Bruce counters that this implies non-locality within standard QM. Both 
points reflect the limits of purely formal reason

Re: The Incessant Arguments about MWI