On 11 Dec 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/11/2011 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in
the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these,
On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in
the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does
nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we
do.
On 12/11/2011 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in the two-slit
experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we
On 09 Dec 2011, at 23:50, benjayk wrote:
Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it.
I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism,
OK.
but I
still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you
didn't
eliminate
On 09 Dec 2011, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P.
On 09 Dec 2011, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote:
On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:
On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist
On 09 Dec 2011, at 17:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
I take Occam to say in any explanation do not multiply entities
beyond necessity.
See Brent's answer.
Postulating that everything exists without a means to even
demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of
On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:57, Stephen P. King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more
than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).
Brent
You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
the world. Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?
Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are
On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in the two-slit
experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we observe
the particular universe that we do.
Comp explains this completely, by explaining why
On 09 Dec 2011, at 00:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Hi Craig,
Not quite, a dualist model
On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P.
On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg
On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P.
On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM,
On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM,
Dear Bruno,
On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more than
the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).
Are two Boolean algebras that have different
On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb
On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg
On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:
On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason
On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote:
On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:
On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just
On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
You
Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it.
I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism, but I
still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you didn't
eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism.
benjayk
--
View this message in context:
On 12/9/2011 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can relate with many things you say.
Indeed I can argue that the universal (Löbian) machine already relate
on this, too.
But science get rid only on subjective judgement in publication
(ideally), making them universally communicable.
But considering the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.
I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent
2011/12/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to
meekerdb wrote:
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if
we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our
artificial
experiments. But it seems natural systems have a better ability to
remain
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite
mystery is acceptable).
This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.
I am not
2011/12/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite
mystery is acceptable).
This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment
On Dec 7, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I said to Stephen that, concerning the epiphenomena, consciousness and
matter do not play a symmetrical role, but this does not mean that one
of them is primitive.
With comp, the basic ontology needed is just anything given by the
On 12/8/2011 5:46 AM, benjayk wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if
we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our
artificial
experiments. But it seems natural systems have a
On 08 Dec 2011, at 14:25, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.
Explain this in detail. Please.
It just doesn't deal
On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows
computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) is not compatible with
materialism. It shows that to be able to predict your next moment (if
On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows
On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as
On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:
On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this
On 12/8/2011 8:58 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument
that shows computationalism (I can
On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a
2011/12/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/8/2011 8:58 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.comwrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Hi Craig,
Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process
On 12/8/2011 1:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.comwrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Hi Craig,
Not quite, a dualist model would
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Hi Craig,
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22
On 06 Dec 2011, at 21:04, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote:
Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
run/simulated
on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno,
because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can
On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact
On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
but so does ideal monism.
Why?
The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem
of epiphenomena.
I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before.
meekerdb wrote:
And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are
done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.
I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems
On 07 Dec 2011, at 17:14, benjayk wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the
computations are
done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer
On 07 Dec 2011, at 16:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
but so does ideal monism.
Why?
The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem
of epiphenomena.
I don't
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our artificial
experiments. But it seems natural systems have a better ability to remain
coherent, when it would be
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.
I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent
reason to
*believe* in
On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite
mystery is acceptable).
This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.
Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict the
2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being
Sorry for the spelling mistakes, please read:
That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* it exists a
*perfect* level of substitution *or* we are not turing emulable. The fact
that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that
*if* we are turing emulable *then*
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
interact with the environment
This is
2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
interact
On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
It does matter. If you run
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.
I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable
that
those
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely
On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact that
On 12/6/2011 2:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.
I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You
On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote:
Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
run/simulated
on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that our body
can
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not
perfect.
Once the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict the digital and correct level
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not perfect.
Digital means based on discrete values, not only
On 02 Dec 2011, at 19:08, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can
On 01 Dec 2011, at 20:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
If you can add and multiply, or if you can play
On Dec 2, 6:58 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
operational way by the yes doctor thought experiment. Most people
understand that they can
On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the
universe, can it?
I can change my experience
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for
On 12/2/2011 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
brain and
On Dec 2, 3:22 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/2/2011 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of
Hello John,
I agree with you (almost) completely that we (bio-beings) are
computers, except for the diminishing factor we HAVE to include into
a computer as a machine of knowable components and capabilities,
observed WITHIN our perspectives as of yesterday.
We don't need to know the
John Mikes wrote:
Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree,
please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit).
I agree wholheartedly!
That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and pretends to be
a proof (or at least a valid reasoning)
On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
So, then I am computer or
On 01 Dec 2011, at 13:22, benjayk wrote:
John Mikes wrote:
Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to
agree,
please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit).
I agree wholheartedly!
That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and
pretends
On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand
On 12/1/2011 4:22 AM, benjayk wrote:
John Mikes wrote:
Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree,
please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit).
I agree wholheartedly!
That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and pretends to be
a proof
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I
Dear Bruno,
I agree with you (almost) completely that we (bio-beings) are computers,
except for the *diminishing factor* we HAVE to include into a computer as
a machine of knowable components and capabilities, observed WITHIN our
perspectives as of yesterday.
Your term universal computer may fit
On 27 Nov 2011, at 16:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
since an uploaded digital mind could also
be part of a lot of dreamy realities
It is a part of a lot of dreamy realities, without any uploading.
By
definition of the body and of the digital level of substitution, if
we
On 25 Nov 2011, at 15:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the
abstract goal is immortality, but full of sense if the goal
consists
in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it
'naturally'.
But as
Bruno Marchal wrote:
since an uploaded digital mind could also
be part of a lot of dreamy realities
It is a part of a lot of dreamy realities, without any uploading. By
definition of the body and of the digital level of substitution, if we
upload ourself in a computer, we conserve
On 24 Nov 2011, at 23:00, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
wrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
The simulation
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
The simulation argument:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the
abstract goal is immortality, but full of sense if the goal consists
in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it
'naturally'.
But as soon as we upload ourselves, we can't
On 23 Nov 2011, at 17:59, John Mikes wrote:
To the posts below:
where is this 'immortality' come from at all? in the 'existence' in
change it is implied that what comes around goes around, the rest is
our imagination afraid of dying. Our (living???) complexity
changes int other
, that cosmology and consciousness, do not,
by necessity, dovetail (UDA?). Thanks for your patience, everyone.
Mitch
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tue, Nov 15, 2011 9:21 am
Subject: Re: The consciousness
Thanks Jason,
Yes, I am not sure if QTI is really Immortality, as in post-mortality, if
memory, and personality, are destroyed? To a hammer, the entire world looks
like a nail; as the Japanese expression goes, so I personally wonder, if
the old 'move' function of data processing, can somehow
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