Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Dec 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/11/2011 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in  
the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI  
does nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe  
that we do.


Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot  
understand that you are the one ending in Washington instead as  
the one ending in Moscow. It explains contingencies by consistent  
extensions.


But then starting from Philadelphia instead of Brussels you  
should end up in Washington - since it is much more similar to  
Philadelphia.


That might indeed be the case if my consciousness supervene on a  
generalized brain including a city, which get an internal role in  
the computation leading to your state. But in that case you have to  
ask the doctor to do the awkward substitution at *that* level.


Yes, that goes back to my concern that the right level may include  
a large part of the universe.


OK.




Which is also related to the 323 argument.


I am not sure of this.



Quantum mechanics would say that we (our brains) are extensively  
entangled with the rest of the universe and, as Russell puts it, the  
323 register may be active in the other Everett branches.


There are no reason for that. The 323 register is, or can be,  
classical. If the brain is a quantum computer, I will emulate it on a  
classical machine, and do the 323 reasoning again on that classical  
computer.
Also, QM is not part of the comp assumption. So the reversal physics/ 
arithmetic does not rely on the truth of falsity of QM. QM can be used  
to test the consequence of comp, but not of the reversal reasoning.





The idea of substituting a mechanism for part (or all) of ones brain  
is only plausible because we live in an quasi-classical world


But comp concerns a classical machine, even in the case we have a  
quantum brain. Quantum computing does not violate Church thesis, so we  
can always find a classical level, so that we have to take into  
account all computations going through our state in the UD*.








In the W and M duplication experience, we assume that the brain is  
the usual biological one in the skull.  All what will matter in the  
probabilities is the distinguishibility of the self-localization  
outcome after the duplication. IN QM terms, seeing Brussels,  
Washington, and Philadelphia are orthogonal state, and not part of  
the brain, or of the computation leading to the state before the  
multiplication.


I don't know what you mean by seeing is not part of the brain.   
Seeing different things presumably correspond to orthogonal states  
of the brain.


Exactly, and seeing will connect an external input (W, M, spin up,  
etc.) with a brain state.





Of course Philadelphia is just an example.  I could choose even  
closer continuations.


The point of the step 5 in the UD Argument consists in showing that  
comp refutes the notion (by Nozick) of closer continuer. The  
probabilities (or credibilities, ...) will bear on all numerical  
*identical* reconstitutions of the brain capable of differentiating  
when getting new inputs (like W or M). The thought experiments are  
just more awkward when using a very low level, and that's why I use  
the neuro classical comp for the first six steps. Then the seventh  
step, introducing the UD in the universe, shows that the level does  
not matter. If the level just exists, it will be accessed by the UD,  
or the (sigma_1) arithmetical truth.





Suppose you are just reconstituted in Brussels, where you started,  
as well as Moscow.


That's step 5. Except that in step 5 you are even not annihilated in  
Brussels. And even in that case you will have to say 1/2 (in case you  
agree with the 1/2 for the usual duplication WM.




Does this mean your consciousness remains in Brussels while in  
Moscow there is not-Bruno?


Only with a chance of 1/2. There will be also a chance 1/2 I feel  
ending up in Moscow. But this is correct only in the theoretical  
protocol which assume no other reconstitutions other than those in  
Brussels and Moscow.








In front of the (concrete or not) UD, your consciousness will do  
the selection at the right level. (Again like in the Quantum MW).


There is no selection in MWI - everything happens.


 There is no selection either in the WM duplication experience, from  
a third person point of view. But there is a selection from a first  
person perspective. All reconstituted persons does live like there has  
been a selection from their first person perspectives. Likewise with a  
quantum superposition of an observer state. That's how Everett  
justifies the use of probability in the context of the deterministic  
universal wave.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in  
the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does  
nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we  
do.


Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot  
understand that you are the one ending in Washington instead as the  
one ending in Moscow. It explains contingencies by consistent  
extensions.


But then starting from Philadelphia instead of Brussels you should  
end up in Washington - since it is much more similar to Philadelphia.


That might indeed be the case if my consciousness supervene on a  
generalized brain including a city, which get an internal role in the  
computation leading to your state. But in that case you have to ask  
the doctor to do the awkward substitution at *that* level.


In the W and M duplication experience, we assume that the brain is the  
usual biological one in the skull.  All what will matter in the  
probabilities is the distinguishibility of the self-localization  
outcome after the duplication. IN QM terms, seeing Brussels,  
Washington, and Philadelphia are orthogonal state, and not part of the  
brain, or of the computation leading to the state before the  
multiplication.


In front of the (concrete or not) UD, your consciousness will do the  
selection at the right level. (Again like in the Quantum MW).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-11 Thread meekerdb

On 12/11/2011 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in the two-slit 
experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we 
observe the particular universe that we do.


Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot understand that you are 
the one ending in Washington instead as the one ending in Moscow. It explains 
contingencies by consistent extensions.


But then starting from Philadelphia instead of Brussels you should end up in 
Washington - since it is much more similar to Philadelphia.


That might indeed be the case if my consciousness supervene on a generalized brain 
including a city, which get an internal role in the computation leading to your state. 
But in that case you have to ask the doctor to do the awkward substitution at *that* level.


Yes, that goes back to my concern that the right level may include a large part of the 
universe.  Which is also related to the 323 argument.  Quantum mechanics would say that we 
(our brains) are extensively entangled with the rest of the universe and, as Russell puts 
it, the 323 register may be active in the other Everett branches.  The idea of 
substituting a mechanism for part (or all) of ones brain is only plausible because we live 
in an quasi-classical world




In the W and M duplication experience, we assume that the brain is the usual biological 
one in the skull.  All what will matter in the probabilities is the distinguishibility 
of the self-localization outcome after the duplication. IN QM terms, seeing Brussels, 
Washington, and Philadelphia are orthogonal state, and not part of the brain, or of the 
computation leading to the state before the multiplication.


I don't know what you mean by seeing is not part of the brain.  Seeing different things 
presumably correspond to orthogonal states of the brain.


Of course Philadelphia is just an example.  I could choose even closer continuations.  
Suppose you are just reconstituted in Brussels, where you started, as well as Moscow.  
Does this mean your consciousness remains in Brussels while in Moscow there is not-Bruno?




In front of the (concrete or not) UD, your consciousness will do the selection at the 
right level. (Again like in the Quantum MW).


There is no selection in MWI - everything happens.

Brent



Bruno



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 23:50, benjayk wrote:



Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it.

I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism,


OK.



but I
still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you  
didn't

eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism.


In a classical (or intuitionist) proof, if you derived B from A,  
automatically you have derived B from A + any supplementary  
assumption.


Also, I don't know what you mean by non-platonic-immaterialism. Comp  
needs arithmetical realism (the belief that the third excluded middle  
principle is valid in first order arithmetic). It does not exclude  
wider form of realism, but it recovers them in the machine  
epistemologies.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net   
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form  
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would  
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational  
universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of  
problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but  
I wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a  
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It  
basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some  
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't,  
or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you  
suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the latter  
case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function  
is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

  Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,  
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some  
stuff as existing and the rest not and everything happens  
and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The  
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem  
in that is has no way of sorting the Tom sees this and not  
that from the  from Dick sees this and not that and Jane  
sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only  
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not  
can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and  
Jane see and do not see.
  The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers  
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying  
medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I  
am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl  
had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4  
6-die and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6- 
die. ...
  The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes  
when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that  
just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one  
set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish  
this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that  
computations exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of  
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the  
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

  I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg  
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories  
deal with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as  
I understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to  
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that  
everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem  
to be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything  
that is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e.  
everything that is computable.  Within this plenuum there are  
various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will  
pick out what part we experience.  Computation includes an  
uncountable infinity of states and relations between states - so  
whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in  
the relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

   Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be  
cut to shreds by the razor itself. Postulating that everything  
exists without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate  
an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct  
contradiction to Occam's razor.


I think you have a mistaken conception of Occam's razor.  Although  
Occam may have had physical objects in mind when he enunciated his  
principle, no one uses that razor any more.  Occam's razor advises  
to make one's *theory* as simple as possible.  For example the  
atomic theory of matter entails an enormous number of objects - but  
it is a simple way to explain the existent of different materials,  
thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, bio-energetics,...


Even when we reduce this to a 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote:


On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:



On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just  
there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take  
them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A  
creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it  
would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that  
natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and  
very plausibly,

there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).
You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.   
Physical laws are models we
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they  
change when we get new
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the  
mathematics.  Nobody supposes they are

in the world.
Brent

Brent
You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and  
predict

the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?
Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are  
related by rules of
inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all  
kinds of things, both
real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where  
possible because then we
have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.   
Where our models are
not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear  
exactly what the model

predicts.

I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See  
William S. Coopers book

The Evolution of Reason.




In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?
The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite  
energy density and
curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a  
black hole and the Big
Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the  
model doesn't apply at
these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone,  
since it was already known
that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics  
and is expected to

breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

Brent


 Brent

I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract
mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
descriptions and predictions of the universe.


I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with  
truth.  Truth is an attribute of a proposition that expresses a  
fact.  Mathematics consists of relations of inference between  
propositions - which may or may not express anything at all beyond  
the relations.


Mathematics concerned usually mathematical truth. You confuse  
mathematics and the inner working of mathematical theories or  
machines. Logic, that is metamathematics, studies both aspect  
(syntactical proof, and the mathematical models of the theories).  
Everything interesting in logic depends on the relation between those  
two aspects. for example you have the notion of semantical entialment:  
A - B if all models satisfying A satisfy B, and syntactical  
entailment: you can derive B from A. logicians are happy when they  
have soundness and completeness theorems linking the two notions.  
Likewise, and simpler, you have the notion of tautology (true in all  
models of a theory) and proved proposition (syntactical notion).


Bruno






Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as  
well

as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.


Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used  
to describe them.




Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
*potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.


I don't think laws/rules are fundamental.  They are compact models  
we make up to explain and predict facts.


Brent


The
role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is
established by this fact.

Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language
could also be an 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 17:55, Stephen P. King wrote:





[SPK]
I take Occam to say in any explanation do not multiply entities  
beyond necessity.


See Brent's answer.







Postulating that everything exists without a means to even  
demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown  
cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor.


Occam razor asks for the minimal number of assumption in a theory.  
It does not care about the cardinal of the models of the theory.  
That is why the many worlds is a product of occam principle.


Sure, but the necessity of the plurality of actual worlds  
given that we can only observe one


Nobody can observe one universe. Physicists measure numbers and  
relates those numbers by inductive inference on quantitative relations  
among them.






requires additional evidence.


one physical universe requires as much evidences and explanations  
than 0, 2, 3, infinity, ... The everything idea is that all possible  
universes is conceptually simpler than one real universe among all  
the possible one.




Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in the  
two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does  
nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we do.


Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot understand  
that you are the one ending in Washington instead as the one ending in  
Moscow. It explains contingencies by consistent extensions.





It has its basis problem as your result has its measure problem.


I don't think there is any basis problem in the quantum MW, nor is  
there any initial theory problem in comp. And the mind-body problem  
is transformed into a body problem, itself becoming a measure problem,  
but that is what makes those theories interesting.






I suspect that these two problems are in the same family.






Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities,


Which is indeed the case for the comp ontology, but the  
epistemology can and will be bigger. It is a sort of Skolem  
phenomenon, that I have often described.




the need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist?


Nobody can answer that. We cannot prove the existence of the  
numbers in a theory which do not assume them at the start,  
implicitly or explicitly.


So it is OK to postulate that numbers exists


We need only to postulate that zero (or one if you prefer) is a  
number, and that the successor of a number is a number. This is less  
than postulating sets or categories, as you need for talking about  
Stone duality.




and from such argue that the physical world is unnecessary  
epiphenomena


It is a phenomenon. Why would it be an epiphenomenon? I have argue  
that this does not make sense.





and yet is required for your result to run.


The phenomenon is required. Not its primitivity.



All I ask is that you consider the world of numbers to not have an  
existence independent of the possibility of knowledge of it.


In which sense. With comp, the numbers (N, +, *) entails the existence  
of the knowledge of the numbers by some universal numbers. The Bp   
p concerns numbers relatively to universal numbers.





I separate existence from properties.


Me too. Existence is handled by the quantifier E, and properties are  
handled by arithmetical predicate.




The mere existence of an object does not necessitate any propeties  
whatsoever. Numbers have properties, they have relative value...  
Where do those properties derive?


From the (non trivial) additive and multiplicative properties, which  
are among the postulates (recursive laws of addition and  
multiplication).











Why numbers and not Nothing?


Because with Nothing in the ontology, you can't prove the existence  
of anything, not even illusion which needs some illusionned  
subject. That is why all fundamental theories assumes the numbers,  
(or equivalent) and with comp this can be shown to be enough.




I merely start with the assumption that existence exists and  
go from there.


We have discussed this. existence exists does not make sense for me.  
Existence of what? You are the one transforming existence into a  
property here.




To postulate one particular type of entity and not any other  
requires special explanations.


We assume simple principles and no more than what we need, and with  
comp we need only combinators, of lambda-terms, or natural numbers.





What makes numbers special over spaces?


They are conceptually far simpler.









At least with the Stone-type dualism we have a way to show the  
necessity of numbers via bisimulations between different instances  
of Boolean algebras and, dually, via causality between Stone  
spaces and thus do not violate Occam blindly.


Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more  
than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).


Are two Boolean 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:57, Stephen P. King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more  
than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).


Are two Boolean algebras that have different propositional  
content one and the same? If this is true then there is no  
variation is algorithms, it is to say that all algorithms are  
identical in every way.


Let me answer this differently. Does not the postulation of the  
primitive existence of numbers not equivalent to postulating an  
infinite set.


Not at all. As I said we need to postulate 0 and the successor rules  
(and the + and * laws). Every existing object (that is the object  
that you can prove to exist) are finite. The set N is not part of  
arithmetic.





Are not the Integers an (countable) infinite set?


Yes, but that is not part of the theory. But you can prove in the  
theory that there is no biggest numbers, or that for all numbers n you  
can find a bigger one. You can also prove the existence of numbers who  
believes in infinite sets, but you cannot prove the existence of an  
infinite set in arithmetic.


Arithmetic is the simplest (universal with respect to computations)  
theory. The one that Hillbert was hoping we could reduce all math to  
it, but since Gödel we know that we cannot even reduce arithmetical  
truth, or computer theoretical truth, to it.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread Pzomby


  Brent
  You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
  the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
  representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
  functions?
  Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by 
  rules of
  inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of 
  things, both
  real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible 
  because then we
  have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where 
  our models are
  not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly 
  what the model
  predicts.

  I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. 
  Coopers book
  The Evolution of Reason.

  In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
  further divided?
  The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy 
  density and
  curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole 
  and the Big
  Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model 
  doesn't apply at
  these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was 
  already known
  that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is 
  expected to
  breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

  Brent

    Brent

  I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
  it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

  Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
  instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth abstract
  mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
  and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
  are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
  descriptions and predictions of the universe.

 I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with truth.  
 Truth is an
 attribute of a proposition that expresses a fact.  Mathematics consists of 
 relations of
 inference between propositions - which may or may not express anything at all 
 beyond the
 relations.



  Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
  representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well
  as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
  computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.

 Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used to 
 describe them.


 Exactly, that is what I was attempting to state. You, and most other
contributors to this list are very knowledgeable but I believe that
some of the properties of numbers and mathematics may be overlooked as
to their relevance, but I may be wrong as I have only been observing
the “Everything” list for a short time.

Ordinal numbers are “descriptive adjectives” as to relational
position.  The relative position of an event in order being 1st, 2nd,
3rd etc. has describable meaning. The representational description of
mental events and external existent conditions are related as to their
position in the sequence of time. Time and place both exude conditions
that are describable and somewhat predictable. The representational
and descriptive conditional position of the earth to the sun, moon and
stars gives rise to conditions at a relational position in time.

The point is that numbers represent computation (counting and
arithmetic) and the ordinal attribute of numbers represent words that
communicate descriptive relational meaning. This appears to give dual
meaning to numbers that human brain/consciousness can distinguish,
represent, organize and compute.

An example: The mathematical “golden ratio” as observed in art and
nature appears to be pleasant in a geometrically way to the human
vision and brain/consciousness.



  Your statement: I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
  brains , This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
  languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
  *potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
  fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.

 I don't think laws/rules are fundamental.  They are compact models we make up 
 to explain
 and predict facts.

 Brent



  The
  role of human embodied consciousness in any theory of everything is
  established by this fact.

  Mathematics may be a subset of language as you state or language
  could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal
  idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws).
  In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant
  mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics
  represents or enumerates.

  It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which
  roughly could be stated as both a state of being (quanta) and the
 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread meekerdb

On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in the two-slit 
experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we observe 
the particular universe that we do.


Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot understand that you are the 
one ending in Washington instead as the one ending in Moscow. It explains contingencies 
by consistent extensions.


But then starting from Philadelphia instead of Brussels you should end up in Washington 
- since it is much more similar to Philadelphia.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 00:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?



Hi Craig,

 Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of  
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not  
specify

which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.



True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism. To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?


Mechanism is usually used by materialist or dualist to put the mind- 
body problem under the rug, with the idea that we are just (material)  
machine, so that mind emerge from material activity. Then the whole  
point of UDA is that such an idea does not work. Weak materialism (and  
thus both monistic and dualist materialism) is incompatible with  
computationalism (in the sense of yes doctor). That is not yet very  
well appreciated. With one exception scientist usually see the point,  
but most seems not to be interested in the mind-body issues. They see  
this kind of stuff as religious and condemn it without realizing that  
the mind-body problem, even with mechanism is not yet solved, which is  
the main point of UDA.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net   
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

 Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form  
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would  
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality  
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I  
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a  
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically  
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are  
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff  
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that  
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's  
really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some  
stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

   Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,  
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff  
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists  
do not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens  
and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way  
of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick  
sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where  
as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as  
existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union  
of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
   The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers  
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium  
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am  
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had  
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die  
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
   The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when  
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as  
it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of  
numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from  
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist  
independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of  
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the  
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

   I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg  
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal  
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I  
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to  
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything  
exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically  
coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well  
defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is  
computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers  
in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we  
experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states  
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in  
there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the  
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.






I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics  
implies that different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that  
it's true.


I agree, it is total non sense. Not only it would contradict Church  
thesis and the immunity of computability for diagonalization, but  
thanks to David Deutsch quantum computer, it does not even make sense  
with what we know currently believed in physics, and such a position  
is a sort of revisionist definition of what is a computation. That's  
is why I prefer to call Deutsch's Church Turing principle the  
Deutsch's thesis. And it is an open problem if such a thesis is  
compatible with Church's thesis.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

 Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not 
specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality 
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I 
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically 
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are 
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff 
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that 
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really 
no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

   Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists do 
not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and 
exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of 
sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick 
sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where 
as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union 
of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
   The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am 
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three 
sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the 
third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
   The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when 
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as 
it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of 
numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from that 
itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist 
independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

   I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my 
question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal with 
this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse 
to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything 
exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically 
coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined 
and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is 
computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers in 
arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we 
experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states 
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in 
there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the 
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be 
cut to shreds by the razor itself. Postulating that everything exists 
without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite 
(of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to 
Occam's razor. Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of 
entities, the need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers 
exist? Why numbers and not Nothing? At least with the Stone-type dualism 
we have a way to show the necessity of numbers via bisimulations between 
different instances of Boolean algebras and, dually, via causality 
between Stone spaces and thus do not violate Occam blindly.
Comprehensability requires the co-existence of that which is 
comprehended with that which is doing the comprehension, that numbers 
can comprehend themselves without additional structure seem to me to be 
ruled out even by your 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not 
specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality 
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I 
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically 
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are 
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists 
and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything 
happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for 
ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and 
the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists do 
not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and 
exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of 
sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees 
this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and 
the rest not can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, 
Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am reminded 
of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed 
jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third 
contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when 
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as it 
vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of numbers 
from another. If the ability to distinguish this from that itself 
vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent 
of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my 
question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal with 
this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse 
to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything exists.  
But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically coherent.  
So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and still 
possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable.  Within 
this plenuum there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some 
principle will pick out what part we experience.  Computation includes 
an uncountable infinity of states and relations between states - so 
whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics 
implies that different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that 
it's true.


Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for 
instance, the work of Tipler 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology 
that discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations 
that can occur? The notion of Hypercomputation 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good place to 
start. My agreement with Deutsch's assertion does not follow from just 
taking his words as authority. Consider a physical would in which the 
Plank constant was zero, Newton's universe for example; in such a world 
computations would be radically different if only because there do not 
exists any stable atoms. All computers would be sporadic and stochastic 
Boltzmann type computers. Would the same kind of universality that we 
have with our Turing thesis exist in such? The paper tape and read head 
would not have any physical support in the sense that its continuous 
existence over an arbitrary 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net   
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form  
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would  
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational  
universality without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I  
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a  
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It  
basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some  
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't,  
or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you  
suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the latter  
case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function  
is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

  Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,  
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff  
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and  
exists do not sleep together very well at all. The everything  
happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is  
has no way of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  
 from Dick sees this and not that and Jane sees this and  
not that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark  
some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently  
defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not  
see.
  The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers  
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying  
medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I  
am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had  
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die  
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
  The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes  
when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that  
just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one  
set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this  
from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that  
computations exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of  
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the  
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

  I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg  
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal  
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I  
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to  
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that  
everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to  
be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that  
is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything  
that is computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states  
(numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part  
we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of  
states and relations between states - so whatever we experience  
must be in there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the  
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

   Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be  
cut to shreds by the razor itself.


?


Postulating that everything exists without a means to even  
demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown  
cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor.


Occam razor asks for the minimal number of assumption in a theory. It  
does not care about the cardinal of the models of the theory. That is  
why the many worlds is a product of occam principle.





Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities,


Which is indeed the case for the comp ontology, but the epistemology  
can and will be bigger. It is a sort of Skolem phenomenon, that I have  
often described.




the need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist?


Nobody can answer that. We cannot 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form 
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would 
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality 
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I 
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It 
basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some 
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, 
or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you 
suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the latter case 
there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to 
mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

  Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff 
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and 
exists do not sleep together very well at all. The everything 
happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has 
no way of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  
from Dick sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not 
that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark some 
stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as 
the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
  The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am 
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had 
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die 
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
  The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when 
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as 
it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of 
numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from 
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

  I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg 
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal 
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to 
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that 
everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to 
be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that 
is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything 
that is computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states 
(numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part 
we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of 
states and relations between states - so whatever we experience 
must be in there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the 
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

   Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be 
cut to shreds by the razor itself.


?


[SPK]
I take Occam http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor to say 
in any explanation do not multiply entities beyond necessity.





Postulating that everything exists without a means to even demostrate 
necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of 
entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor.


Occam razor asks for the minimal number of assumption in a theory. It 
does not care about the cardinal of the models of the theory. That is 
why the many worlds is a product of occam principle.


Sure, but the necessity of the plurality of actual worlds given 
that we can only observe one requires additional evidence. Some say that 
the interference of particles with themselves in the 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Stephen P. King

Dear Bruno,

On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more than 
the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).


Are two Boolean algebras that have different propositional content 
one and the same? If this is true then there is no variation is 
algorithms, it is to say that all algorithms are identical in every way.


Let me answer this differently. Does not the postulation of the 
primitive existence of numbers not equivalent to postulating an infinite 
set. Are not the Integers an (countable) infinite set?


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

 Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to 
some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose 
there are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or 
some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything 
happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose 
only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

   Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and 
everything happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The 
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way 
of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not 
that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only function is 
to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the 
union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
   The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations 
there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel 
numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a 
girl had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the 
third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
   The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it 
closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the 
ability to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to 
distinguish this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of everything 
theories; you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

   I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How 
does immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I understand it, the 
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that 
we theorize that everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be 
logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and 
still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable.  Within this plenuum 
there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what 
part we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states and 
relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the relative way, by 
the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be cut to shreds by 
the razor itself. Postulating that everything exists without a means to even demostrate 
necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct 
contradiction to Occam's razor. 


I think you have a mistaken conception of Occam's razor.  Although Occam may have had 
physical objects in mind when he enunciated his principle, no one uses that razor any 
more.  Occam's razor advises to make one's *theory* as simple as possible.  For example 
the atomic theory of matter entails an enormous number of objects - but it is a simple way 
to explain the existent of different materials, thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, 
bio-energetics,...


Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities, the need for necessitation 
remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist? Why numbers and not 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to 
some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose there 
are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some 
stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything 
happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose 
only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and 
everything happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The 
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way 
of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not 
that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only function is 
to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the 
union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations 
there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel 
numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a 
girl had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the 
third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it 
closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the 
ability to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to 
distinguish this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of everything 
theories; you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How 
does immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I understand it, the 
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that we 
theorize that everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be 
logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and 
still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable.  Within this plenuum 
there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what 
part we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states and 
relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics implies that 
different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that it's true.


Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for instance, the work of 
Tipler http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology that 
discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations that can occur? The 
notion of Hypercomputation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good 
place to start. 


Yes I can understand that there are mathematical models in which computations different 
from Turing's are possible.  But I'm doubtful whether they are coherent.  If you tried to 
build a physics on them that model conscious beings would you run into contradictions?  
That's one role the physical universe plays, it (supposedly) is free of contradictions.  
So if we have a mathematical model of something physical and the model is found to have a 
contradiction we generally say that it cannot be a correct model of the physical something.


My agreement with 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Pzomby


On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:


  On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:
  On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

  Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
  any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
  granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is 
  just
  there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
  totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
  are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very 
  plausibly,
  there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).
  You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical 
  laws are models we
  make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we 
  get new
  information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
  supposes they are
  in the world.

  Brent
  Brent

  You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
  the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
  representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
  functions?

 Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by 
 rules of
 inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of 
 things, both
 real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible 
 because then we
 have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where our 
 models are
 not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly 
 what the model
 predicts.

 I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. 
 Coopers book
 The Evolution of Reason.



  In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
  further divided?

 The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy 
 density and
 curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and 
 the Big
 Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model 
 doesn't apply at
 these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was 
 already known
 that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is 
 expected to
 breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

 Brent


 Brent

I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract
mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
descriptions and predictions of the universe.

Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well
as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.

Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
*potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.  The
role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is
established by this fact.

Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language
could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal
idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws).
In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant…
mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics
represents or enumerates.

It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which
roughly could be stated as both “a state of being” (quanta) and the
“reason of being” (qualia) (access to abstract primitive laws/rules or
as you state “newer information”).

Perhaps monistic materialism and monistic idealism are semantically
created notions that lack “newer information”.

Thanks for your comments.




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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote:


On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:



On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws 
are models we
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get 
new
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
supposes they are
in the world.
Brent

Brent
You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?

Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by rules 
of
inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of 
things, both
real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible 
because then we
have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where our 
models are
not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly what 
the model
predicts.

I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. 
Coopers book
The Evolution of Reason.




In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?

The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy 
density and
curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and 
the Big
Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model 
doesn't apply at
these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was 
already known
that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is expected 
to
breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

Brent


  Brent

I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract
mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
descriptions and predictions of the universe.


I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with truth.  Truth is an 
attribute of a proposition that expresses a fact.  Mathematics consists of relations of 
inference between propositions - which may or may not express anything at all beyond the 
relations.




Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well
as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.


Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used to 
describe them.



Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
*potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.


I don't think laws/rules are fundamental.  They are compact models we make up to explain 
and predict facts.


Brent


The
role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is
established by this fact.

Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language
could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal
idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws).
In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant…
mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics
represents or enumerates.

It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which
roughly could be stated as both “a state of being” (quanta) and the
“reason of being” (qualia) (access to abstract primitive laws/rules or

as you state “newer information”).

Perhaps monistic materialism and monistic idealism are semantically
created notions that lack “newer information”.

Thanks for your comments.




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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically 
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are 
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff 
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that 
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's 
really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some 
stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff 
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists 
do not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens 
and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way 
of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick 
sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where 
as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union 
of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am 
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had 
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die 
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes 
when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that 
just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one 
set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this 
from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg 
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal 
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to 
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything 
exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically 
coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well 
defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is 
computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers 
in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we 
experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states 
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in 
there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics 
implies that different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that 
it's true.


Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for 
instance, the work of Tipler 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology 
that discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations 
that can occur? The notion of Hypercomputation 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good place to 
start. 


Yes I can understand that there are mathematical models in which 
computations different from Turing's are possible.  But I'm doubtful 
whether they are coherent.  If you tried to build a physics on them 
that model conscious beings would you run into contradictions?  That's 
one role the physical universe plays, it (supposedly) is free of 
contradictions.  So if we have a mathematical model of something 
physical and the model is found to have a contradiction we generally 
say that it cannot be a correct model of the physical something.


[SPK]

  Hi Brent,

Again, what is the basis of your doubt and how would you confirm 
the truthfulness of that basis?




My agreement with Deutsch's assertion does not follow from just 
taking his words as authority. Consider a physical would in which the 
Plank constant was zero, Newton's universe for example; in such a 
world computations would be radically different if only because there 
do not exists any stable atoms. 


In Newton's universe there weren't any atoms to be unstable.  But 
Newton's universe was not Turing computable.

[SPK]
  OK, but that is illustrating Deutsch's point that proofs require a 
physical universe. See pages 190-191 in BoI. Without the 'thisness of 
the physical one does not 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread benjayk

Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it.

I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism, but I
still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you didn't
eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism. 

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2011 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast 
to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose 
there are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or 
some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that 
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for ur 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and 
everything happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The 
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no 
way of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this 
and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only 
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently 
defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations 
there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel 
numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a 
girl had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the 
third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it 
closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the 
ability to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to 
distinguish this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of everything 
theories; you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How 
does immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just 
outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I understand it, the 
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that 
we theorize that everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to 
be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined 
and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable.  Within this 
plenuum there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick 
out what part we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states 
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics implies that 
different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that it's true.


Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for instance, the work of 
Tipler http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology that 
discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations that can occur? The 
notion of Hypercomputation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good 
place to start. 


Yes I can understand that there are mathematical models in which computations different 
from Turing's are possible.  But I'm doubtful whether they are coherent.  If you tried 
to build a physics on them that model conscious beings would you run into 
contradictions?  That's one role the physical universe plays, it (supposedly) is free 
of contradictions.  So if we have a mathematical model of something physical and the 
model is found to have a contradiction we generally say that it cannot be a correct 
model of the physical something.


[SPK]

  Hi Brent,

Again, what is the basis of your doubt and how would you confirm the truthfulness of 
that basis?


The latter is part of the problem.   How could one test the idea that the universe 
instantiates a hypercomputer.  It seems to me that our model of the universe must be 
Turing computable because that's the kind of computation we can do to make predictions.  
To say that there are other physics that allow a hypercomputer or some other kind of 
computation, is sort of like saying there are aspects of the universe that we cannot 
model.  It might be true, but it's almost irrelevant.






My agreement with Deutsch's assertion does not follow from just taking his 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 I can relate with many things you say.
 Indeed I can argue that the universal (Löbian) machine already relate  
 on this, too.
 
 But science get rid only on subjective judgement in publication  
 (ideally), making them universally communicable.
 
 But considering the subjective influence themselves, science prohibit  
 them only by bad habits, ignorance, since about theology has been  
 abandoned to or stolen by the politics (523 after C.). it is just a  
 form of (sad) prohibition. It is above all unscientific.
But that's necessary, in some way. If we try to make the very subjective
communicable, we run into the problem of making the uncommunicable
communicable. Either science fails there, or it isn't very good science
(reproducible and clearly presented) anymore. If we start to include
subjective influence, suddenly our research won't be very reproducible and
can't be very clearly presented in an objective way, which are standards for
good science.
I don't think that the scientific community excluded subjective influence
purely because of dogma, but because it is so hard to research that it is
virtually impossible to obtain good results, and so it quite justfiable to
exclude (as a first approximation of what consistutes valid science) such
research from science. It is at most fringe science, like parapsychology.
I think the mistake of many scientist is to act like fringe science (or not
quite science anymore) is not also a valid tool for gaining insight, just
like mysticism. That's just dogma, scientism.

You are right that we can publicate subjective things without subjective
judgement, but that's not science as commonly understood, as this requires
much more than that (also well designed experiments,
reproducibility,etc...), it is just a part of science.

In a way fringe science and non-suprestitious mysticism is the continuation
of science; it continues its tradition of skepticism and open-mindedness,
but transcends scientific limitation. It is just a more difficult realm, in
the sense that we have to be more clear and honest and non-dogmatic and
careful and skeptic than in science to really gain useful insights.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 And here, according to the machine's comp theory (AUDA) you might be  
 rather true, but cross what can be communicated without making some  
 non provable assumption clear. Or you should add something like I  
 hope that 
I have no clear assumption, and what I say are just thoughts, I am not
saying there are the truth. I think there are very interesting and possibly
useful thoughts, though.
I am not even hoping that, it is just what I think, and it happens to
include hopeful thoughts - but it is not rooted in hope. I am just not a
person rooted in hope (quite the opposite actually, I tend to be afraid and
depressed).
I don't really feel like what I say is what would come out of what one could
hope. It is much more promising than anything one could hope for (like
heaven), and is so big that it naturally comes to us to find it very
frightening.

You are right that unfortunately in our times it seems better to make clear
at the start that you are not dogmatic about what you say, since it is so
common to assume that you think what you write is true. I often don't do
that because I don't even believe in what I say myself. I really can't find
any thought that I don't doubt almost immediatly.

Ultimately every thought and every theory and every assumption is worthy to
be doubted, we just have to learn to not be dependent on our beliefs to
really do that. I don't even think a belief can be true, it can be useful,
that's all, and beliefs that you hold very firmly tend to be of little use.
I treat all these ideas of the conscious singularity as ideas, not as dearly
held beliefs. If it happens it is going to be infinitely unbelievable
anyway.

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 I am just not arguing at all for what
 your argument(s) seeks to refute.

 I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent  
 reason to
 *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable
 that
 those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you  
 feel
 like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say  
 so.
 The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
 I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from
 comp,
 they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and
 over
 again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you
 don't
 make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can
 matter) and
 then saying it is equivalent to COMP.

 Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
 Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain,  
 and
 skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a
 priori.
 I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only  
 after
 the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that
 idea.
 The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.
 
 Explain this in detail. Please.
It just doesn't deal with non-platonic-immaterialism, that's all.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 The only work for
 a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical  
 materialism or
 non-platonic-immaterialism.
 
 It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will  
 survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a  
 machine do the right corresponding computation.
But if your reaoning doesn't work for everything then the conlusion doesn't
follow. I might doubt that I survive a substitution, but I don't have to if
I don't believe in what you refuted in your argument.
So, you conclusion just follows if you believe only the alternatives you
find relevant can be true. But it's quite unreasonable to assume that.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes
 nothing
 magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
 supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically
 related).

 I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical
 materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp
 + sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why
 after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away  
 with
 Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are
 pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is  
 rarely
 scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
 Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to  
 eliminate
 too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
 magical or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
 It is not at all artificial. A car pushed by invisible discrete  
 kangaroos
 is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by  
 some
 mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been  
 believed
 for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.
 
 I agree.
 This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown  
 that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can  
 realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate  
 ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of  
 theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give  
 references).
So we agree. But then you conlusion doesn't follow, since you failed to
eliminate the mystery beyond computations. We are not only related to
infinity of computations, we are related to an infinite mystery (which
*also* includes an infinity of computation).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
 computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious  
 things
 at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the  
 very basis
 of your theory.

 It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply  
 eliminate all
 possbilities that you don't like.
 
 Proving eliminate possibilities by definition. In the frame of some  
 assumption.
That's not the problem, you are just avoiding my point. The problem is that
your principle it totally ad-hoc. Oh, that's not good, let's just eliminate
that.
As said, you let your favorite mystery surivive and eliminate the one you
don't like. You keep the inherent primitive infinite mystery of numbers, but
deny the *inherent/primitive* infinite mystery of matter or the *inherent*
primitive infinite mystery of consciousness, even though you have no
justification for that. You can say you 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/12/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  I am just not arguing at all for what
  your argument(s) seeks to refute.
 
  I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent
  reason to
  *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable
  that
  those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you
  feel
  like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say
  so.
  The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
  I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from
  comp,
  they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and
  over
  again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you
  don't
  make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can
  matter) and
  then saying it is equivalent to COMP.
 
  Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
  Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain,
  and
  skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a
  priori.
  I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only
  after
  the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that
  idea.
  The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.
 
  Explain this in detail. Please.
 It just doesn't deal with non-platonic-immaterialism, that's all.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  The only work for
  a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical
  materialism or
  non-platonic-immaterialism.
 
  It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will
  survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a
  machine do the right corresponding computation.
 But if your reaoning doesn't work for everything then the conlusion doesn't
 follow.


You just don't get that the only thing the reasoning shows is that
computationalism is not compatible with materialism... that's all, nothing
is said about computationlism being true or materialism being true or santa
clausism being true. What is said is that computationalism within
materialistic framework is false.



 I might doubt that I survive a substitution, but I don't have to if
 I don't believe in what you refuted in your argument.
 So, you conclusion just follows if you believe only the alternatives you
 find relevant can be true. But it's quite unreasonable to assume that.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes
  nothing
  magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
  supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically
  related).
 
  I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical
  materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp
  + sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why
  after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away
  with
  Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are
  pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is
  rarely
  scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
  Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to
  eliminate
  too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
  magical or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
  It is not at all artificial. A car pushed by invisible discrete
  kangaroos
  is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by
  some
  mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been
  believed
  for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.
 
  I agree.
  This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown
  that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can
  realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate
  ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of
  theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give
  references).
 So we agree. But then you conlusion doesn't follow, since you failed to
 eliminate the mystery beyond computations. We are not only related to
 infinity of computations, we are related to an infinite mystery (which
 *also* includes an infinity of computation).


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
  computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious
  things
  at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the
  very basis
  of your theory.
 
  It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply
  eliminate all
  possbilities that you don't like.
 
  Proving eliminate possibilities by definition. In the frame of some
  assumption.
 That's not the problem, you are just avoiding my 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread benjayk


meekerdb wrote:
 
 On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
 Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if
 we
 assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our
 artificial
 experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to
 remain
 coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So
 it
 seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.
 
 Photosynthesis doesn't require much coherence.
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-12-evidence-quantum-photosynthesis.html

And wikipedia says Studies in the last few years have demonstrated the
existence of functional quantum coherence in photosynthetic protein. [...]
These systems use times to decoherence that are within the timescales
calculated for brain protein..


meekerdb wrote:
 
   Even aside from Tegmark's analysis, it's 
 easy to see that brains should be mostly classical.  There would be great
 evolutionary 
 disadvantage to have a brain that was in a coherent superposition when it
 needed to inform 
 actions in a mostly classical world using a mostly classical body.
What if the classical world is just an simplificated world as an
epistemological model that's helps us to survive well in the world of
infinite quantum possibility (which is extremely hard to survive in without
it)? It may be that quantum processes are of great importance everywhere in
nature, and it is precisely our capability of consciousness to make simple
models that makes it appear classical.
We have more and more evidence of that, as we discover quantum coherence in
plants and many phenomena that are virtually impossible to explain in terms
of classical physics (paranormal phenomena).

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:

 You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my  
 favorite
 mystery is acceptable).
 
 This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your  
 enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.
 
I am not insulting you, I am just stating what you did. You invoke an
occams razor, which actually has nothing to do with eliminating
complicated theories (since it is just mysterious is not complicated at
all), and is really your opinion of what alternatives are acceptable.
You elimimate the primary mystery of matter and/or consciousness, but
abitrarily keep the mystery of computations.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have patiently debunked your  
 refutation. You might just ask for explanation if you still miss the  
 point.
Sorry, you are patiently avoiding my point and claim to have debunked it.
That's a bit unfair.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 .
 With Occam, we can't eliminate the mystery.
 
 Occam eliminates only the ad hoc hypothesis used for making a theory  
 wrong. Occam eliminates the collapse of the wave packet,  for example,  
 because the collapse is made only to make QM false when applied to the  
 observers. (To avoid many realities).
 
 Likewise Occam eliminates primitive matter if the appearance of matter  
 can be (or has to be) explained in a conceptual simpler theory. And my  
 point is double:
 
 1) if we assume comp then it has to be the case that arithmetic (or  
 combinator, ...) is the simpler theory. (UDA)
 
 2) This can be verified (making comp testable) by deriving physics  
 from a translation of UDA in the language of a universal number.  
 (AUDA). Then you can compare that physics with the observation  
 inferred physics.
You miss the most simple possibility that primitive matter/consciousness
don't work according to any theory, but to some more fundamental
untheoretical principle.
You can't eliminate that, and your theory can't derive that principle,
either. And no, that is not unreasonable, since the very axioms of math
don't work according to any theory, either.

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/12/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
 
  You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
  favorite
  mystery is acceptable).
 
  This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
  enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.
 
 I am not insulting you, I am just stating what you did. You invoke an
 occams razor, which actually has nothing to do with eliminating
 complicated theories (since it is just mysterious is not complicated at
 all), and is really your opinion of what alternatives are acceptable.
 You elimimate the primary mystery of matter and/or consciousness, but
 abitrarily keep the mystery of computations.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have patiently debunked your
  refutation. You might just ask for explanation if you still miss the
  point.
 Sorry, you are patiently avoiding my point and claim to have debunked it.
 That's a bit unfair.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
  .
  With Occam, we can't eliminate the mystery.
 
  Occam eliminates only the ad hoc hypothesis used for making a theory
  wrong. Occam eliminates the collapse of the wave packet,  for example,
  because the collapse is made only to make QM false when applied to the
  observers. (To avoid many realities).
 
  Likewise Occam eliminates primitive matter if the appearance of matter
  can be (or has to be) explained in a conceptual simpler theory. And my
  point is double:
 
  1) if we assume comp then it has to be the case that arithmetic (or
  combinator, ...) is the simpler theory. (UDA)
 
  2) This can be verified (making comp testable) by deriving physics
  from a translation of UDA in the language of a universal number.
  (AUDA). Then you can compare that physics with the observation
  inferred physics.
 You miss the most simple possibility that primitive matter/consciousness
 don't work according to any theory, but to some more fundamental
 untheoretical principle.


The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).

Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.


 You can't eliminate that, and your theory can't derive that principle,
 either. And no, that is not unreasonable, since the very axioms of math
 don't work according to any theory, either.

 benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
 argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
 is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
 your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
 world is of no use (if there is one).

 Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
 it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Dec 7, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 I said to Stephen that, concerning the epiphenomena, consciousness and
 matter do not play a symmetrical role, but this does not mean that one
 of them is primitive.

 With comp, the basic ontology needed is just anything given by the
 logical specification of any universal system. I have chosen the
 natural numbers, structured by the laws of addition and multuplication
 (that's already universal for computability). Both consciousness and
 matter appearance are explained in the comp frame.

Couldn't anything be 'explained' in the comp frame though? Is there
something specific about arithmetic which lends itself to the
production of material appearances rather than disembodied numbers
flying around or universes of variations on the theme of odor? On what
basis do you choose the natural numbers as a basic ontology? As you
know, to my mind, enumeration is obviously a high order
anthropological logic rooted in a sensorimotive primitive which is
gestural and rhythmic, not a formal ontological system.


  Just as matter is a phenomenon but not
  primitive, consciousness too is a phenomenon but not *the* primitive
  phenomenon.

 Yes. comp leads to a neutral monism. The theory of everything can be
 just arithmetic. It will be up to *you* to listen or not to what the
 numbers can tell.

I don't think that the theory of everything can be just arithmetic,
because not everything makes sense arithmetically. Everything does
however make sense in some sense, that's why I think that a sense
based theory of everything is the only plausible option.


  Regardless of it's possibly 'illusory' status, matter
  still has to ultimately be made of the same primitive as consciousness
  (what else is there to make it out of?)

 Observable matter might be an illusion. The numbers do play infinite
 video games.

But what do they use to play games with? It can only be themselves or
some meta-arithmetic phenomenon. It doesn't mean anything to say it's
an 'illusion', illusions still have to be produced through some means.

 Numbers dreams still obeys to the consequence of the
 additive+multiplicative non trivial (even non axiomatizable) number
 structure(s).

 Matter, as it appears in dreams and games, does not have to be made of
 something. All what is needed are relatively persistent relations
 between some numbers, notably those having relatively (to some
 universal number(s)) self-referentially correct features.

I understand what you mean, you're saying that matter can be virtual,
like the Matrix. This would be supported by the success of simulation
logic in modeling matter as well as the philosophical idea that we
cannot tell the difference between a realistic dream and reality. As
long as the arithmetic that we are computes other arithmetic processes
as being a material body, then there is no way we would be able to
tell the difference. I think that is not exactly the case.

Given the example of learning not to wet the bed as we grow up, I am
inclined to think that just because some aspects of ourselves can be
convinced of an immaterial realism does not mean that all parts of
ourselves can be fooled indefinitely. We are vast and complex. One or
a group of senses can be fooled at a time but it is not clear that the
self can be virtualized entirely. It may not work that way. We are
rooted in a historical flow of causality which is anchored to specific
events in this universe. We are therefore unrepeatable and unique on
some level - not subject to simulation or digitization as a generic
pattern. Matter may not have to be made of something, but there must
be something that at least pretends to be made of matter, and that
thing, and it's capacity to pretend in that way can only be primitive.


  There is no getting around the
  tight connection that the matter of our brain has with our conscious
  experience.

 Of course, I stop to follow you here. With comp the tight connection
 is made with the organization of that matter, not an elusive primitive
 matter no one can observe.

How can you say that the organization of matter is causally
efficacious if you say matter is an illusion? How can matter be any
less of an illusion than consciousness? I can inject a general
anesthetic into the bloodstream of someone with the most robust mind
in history and they will go down instantly, helpless in the face of a
few milligrams of dissolved material 'illusion'. Bullets versus Ghost
Dance. Zyklon B vs Torah. What does it mean to disbelieve an illusion
that kills?


  On some level, it all has to be the same thing. To me that
  means that it is neither matter nor consciousness which is illusion,
  but the separation of the two.

 This seems to me identifying different things.

?


  The primitive is not empty
  consciousness in a vacuum - that has zero degrees of realism. Thought
  alone cannot conjure material outside of the body. The primitive is
  the relation between subject and 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 5:46 AM, benjayk wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if
we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our
artificial
experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to
remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So
it
seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.

Photosynthesis doesn't require much coherence.

http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-12-evidence-quantum-photosynthesis.html

And wikipedia says Studies in the last few years have demonstrated the
existence of functional quantum coherence in photosynthetic protein. [...]
These systems use times to decoherence that are within the timescales
calculated for brain protein..


But they only involve passing electrons through some molecules; nothing like a neuronal 
signal.





meekerdb wrote:

   Even aside from Tegmark's analysis, it's
easy to see that brains should be mostly classical.  There would be great
evolutionary
disadvantage to have a brain that was in a coherent superposition when it
needed to inform
actions in a mostly classical world using a mostly classical body.

What if the classical world is just an simplificated world as an
epistemological model that's helps us to survive well in the world of
infinite quantum possibility (which is extremely hard to survive in without
it)? It may be that quantum processes are of great importance everywhere in
nature, and it is precisely our capability of consciousness to make simple
models that makes it appear classical.


That's my point.  We see the world as classical because that's the important way to see it 
for survival.  So our brains evolved to be (mostly) classical.  Of course quantum 
processes are important everywhere: without them atoms and molecules couldn't even exist.



We have more and more evidence of that, as we discover quantum coherence in
plants and many phenomena that are virtually impossible to explain in terms
of classical physics (paranormal phenomena).


If the phenomena are explicable by quantum mechanics, they're normal.  Sounds like you 
been reading too much Depak Chopra.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 08 Dec 2011, at 14:25, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:




The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.


Explain this in detail. Please.

It just doesn't deal with non-platonic-immaterialism, that's all.


Why should it?





Bruno Marchal wrote:



The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical
materialism or
non-platonic-immaterialism.


It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will
survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a
machine do the right corresponding computation.

But if your reaoning doesn't work for everything


The reasoning works from the assumption (comp) only.




then the conlusion doesn't
follow. I might doubt that I survive a substitution, but I don't  
have to if

I don't believe in what you refuted in your argument.


The points are that if you survive a material digital functional  
substitution, you get

- first person indeterminacy (OK?)
- the invariance of that indeterminacy for delays, real/virtual shift  
(OK?)
- an explanation where the physical laws come from, no more relying on  
the assumption of a physical primary universe, and a partial  
explanation of what consciousness is and why it has to seem  
mysterious. (OK?)
(and with occam razor we get a simple ontology, and a simple theory of  
everything (OK?))

And the proof is enough constructive to make already comp testable. OK?



So, you conclusion just follows if you believe only the alternatives  
you

find relevant can be true.


I don't think so. The conclusion follows from the mechanist  
assumption, and nothing else. I think you just miss the point, as you  
have only criticized step zero (the definition of comp) until now. You  
say it includes the conclusion, which it does not (the assumption  
makes sense a priori for materialists, not the conclusion). Of course  
the assumption includes the conclusion in the logical sense (if not  
the reasoning would not be a deductive reasoning, but a speculation).


I comment the other post here. I might repeat myself a little bit.


You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite
mystery is acceptable).


This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.


I am not insulting you, I am just stating what you did. You invoke an
occams razor,


After step 8.




which actually has nothing to do with eliminating
complicated theories


?




(since it is just mysterious is not complicated at
all),


This is not eliminated. I would say it is even justify, at different  
levels.





and is really your opinion of what alternatives are acceptable.


No alternatives to comp are eliminated. What is eliminated  
(epistemologically, and ontologically with Occam) is the aristotelian  
idea that there is a primary physical universe TOGETHER with the comp  
supposition. If someone comes up with a serious evidence that some  
*primary* matter exist, that would automatically be a serious evidence  
that comp is false.





You elimimate the primary mystery of matter and/or consciousness, but
abitrarily keep the mystery of computations.


Well, the mystery of computation *is* the mystery of numbers (by  
Church, Turing, Post, Gödel, ...). This one can be shown non  
eliminable in *any* theory, and is used in virtually all existing  
theories. Anyway, it is part of the assumption. By definition  
assumptions are not provable.







Bruno Marchal wrote:




A car pushed by invisible discrete
kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by
some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been
believed
for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.


I agree.
This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown
that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can
realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate
ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of
theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give
references).
So we agree. But then you conlusion doesn't follow, since you failed  
to

eliminate the mystery beyond computations.


How is that relevant for the conclusion (that physics, actually both  
quanta and qualia, is, in the comp theory, a branch of number theory/ 
computer science)?





We are not only related to
infinity of computations, we are related to an infinite mystery (which
*also* includes an infinity of computation).


That might be. Even in the comp frame. But that is not relevant for  
the proof of the reversal point.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious
things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows 
computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) is not compatible with 
materialism. It shows that to be able to predict your next moment (if computationlism is 
true) then the primitive material world is of no use (if there is one).


I don't think so.  It is patently untrue that the material world model is of no use in 
predicting your next experience.  In fact it is essentially the only useful model for 
prediction.


Brent
I wonder if practitioners of alternative medicine would fly in airliners designed by 
alternative aerodynamics?

--- TG, Holistic Lawyer

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:


The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).

Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?


No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material processes: 
there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Pzomby
On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

  Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
  any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
  granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
  there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
  totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
  are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
  there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

 You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws 
 are models we
 make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get 
 new
 information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
 supposes they are
 in the world.

 Brent

Brent

You state: “Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
the world.”  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?

In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?

Thanks

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:

On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:


Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws 
are models we
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get 
new
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
supposes they are
in the world.

Brent

Brent

You state: “Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
the world.”  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?


Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by rules of 
inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of things, both 
real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible because then we 
have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where our models are 
not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly what the model 
predicts.


I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. Coopers book 
The Evolution of Reason.




In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?


The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy density and 
curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and the Big 
Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model doesn't apply at 
these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was already known 
that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is expected to 
breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.


Brent



Thanks



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 8:58 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/12/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an 
argument
that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) is not
compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict your 
next
moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material world 
is of no
use (if there is one).


I don't think so.  It is patently untrue that the material world model is 
of no use
in predicting your next experience.  In fact it is essentially the only 
useful model
for prediction.


That's not what I said. I said that the primitive world if any is of no use if we are 
computation, because our next moment is part of the infinity of computations that goes 
through our current state and only that. So in that case you use the appearance world 
not a *primitive* world.


You seem to be making an argument that we are not computations.  If we were then 
materialism would be a useless model.  It's not a useless model, therefore 
computationalism is false.  I'd disagree with that because is might be that materialism 
provides a useful model of compuattions.


Or are you arguing that the notion of a primitive world is useless because we always use 
the world of appearance.  That I might agree with.


Brent



Quentin


Brent
I wonder if practitioners of alternative medicine would fly in airliners 
designed
by alternative aerodynamics?
   --- TG, Holistic Lawyer


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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:

  The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
  argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
  is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
  your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
  world is of no use (if there is one).

  Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
  it is about considering it true and see the implications.
  Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
  by definition?

 No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material 
 processes:
 there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.

 Brent

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/12/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 12/8/2011 8:58 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2011/12/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

 On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
 argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
 is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
 your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
 world is of no use (if there is one).


  I don't think so.  It is patently untrue that the material world model
 is of no use in predicting your next experience.  In fact it is essentially
 the only useful model for prediction.


 That's not what I said. I said that the primitive world if any is of no
 use if we are computation, because our next moment is part of the infinity
 of computations that goes through our current state and only that. So in
 that case you use the appearance world not a *primitive* world.


 You seem to be making an argument that we are not computations.  If we
 were then materialism would be a useless model.  It's not a useless model,
 therefore computationalism is false.  I'd disagree with that because is
 might be that materialism provides a useful model of compuattions.

 Or are you arguing that the notion of a primitive world is useless because
 we always use the world of appearance.  That I might agree with.


That's what I'm arguing.

Regards,
Quentin


  Brent


 Quentin


 Brent
 I wonder if practitioners of alternative medicine would fly in airliners
 designed by alternative aerodynamics?
--- TG, Holistic Lawyer


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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.comwrote:

The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).
Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?

No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material 
processes:
there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.

Brent

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Craig


Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material 
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting 
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify 
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without 
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
 On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  To suppose computation requires a material process would be
  materialism, wouldn't it?

 Hi Craig,

      Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
 process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
 computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
 which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
 having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism. To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 1:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.comwrote:

The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).
Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?

No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material 
processes:
there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.

Brent

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?


Sure, but you could still suppose that consciousness is the result of certain computations 
and so say yes to the doctor.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to some 
supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some 
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and 
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the 
latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff 
as existing and the rest not.


Brent


To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material

process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in 
contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to 
whether you suppose there are some things that are real (e.g. some 
things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and some doesn't) 
and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists.  In 
the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only 
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but 
ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing 
and the rest not and everything happens and exists do not sleep 
together very well at all. The everything happens and exists 
hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the Tom 
sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not that 
and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only 
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can be 
coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do 
not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their 
operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts 
one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I 
watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed jars. One contained 
nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 
immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we 
look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as it 
vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of numbers from 
another. If the ability to distinguish this from that itself vanishes, 
how are we to claim that computations exist independent of physics? 
Seriously!?!


Onward!

Stephen



To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig





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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to some 
supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some 
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and 
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists.  In 
the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some 
stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically stuff 
whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and everything 
happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and 
exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the Tom sees 
this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not that and Jane sees this and 
not that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and 
the rest not can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and 
do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations there 
exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from 
another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed 
jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 
1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it closely 
enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the ability to 
distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from 
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent of 
physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of everything theories; you 
did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?


Brent



Onward!

Stephen



To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig







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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not 
specify

which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, 
in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils 
down to whether you suppose there are some things that are real 
(e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and 
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens 
and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff 
whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but 
ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists do not 
sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and exists 
hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the 
Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not 
that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose 
only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can 
be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and 
do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their 
operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts 
one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I 
watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed jars. One 
contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 
1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we 
look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as it 
vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of numbers 
from another. If the ability to distinguish this from that itself 
vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent of 
physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my 
question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal with this 
problem that I just outlined?


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to 
some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose there 
are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff 
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and 
exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function 
is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically stuff 
whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and 
everything happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The 
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of 
sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not that 
and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark 
some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union of 
what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations there 
exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from 
another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three 
sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 
1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it 
closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the ability 
to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this 
from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent of 
physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of everything theories; 
you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How does 
immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I understand it, the 
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that we 
theorize that everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be 
logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and still 
possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable.  Within this plenuum there are 
various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we 
experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states and relations between 
states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics implies that different 
things are computable, but I'm doubtful that it's true.


Brent



Onward!

Stephen



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Dec 2011, at 21:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote:

Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
  run/simulated
  on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno,  
because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that  
our body
can be substituted): A digital computer consists not only of the  
turing
emulable states it works with. It does way more than that, since it  
is a
physical object and has to have some parts that transfrom the  
states (which
work with analog means like voltage), and receive (analog) input  
and output.


It is essentially consciousness that is being reproduced.  If  
consciousness arises from the brain performing certain computations,  
then those computations could be performed to any desired degree of  
precision by a digital computer; and saying Yes to the doctor is  
betting that the instantiating those computations will necessarily  
instantiate consciousness (the naturalist hypothesis - there is no  
magic).


OK. And saying yes to a doctor asks only for Turing emulability at  
some level. It does not presuppose that such an emulation can be only  
arithmetical or immaterial. That necessity is handled by the Movie  
Graph Argument (MGA, step 8(*) of UDA).


Yes doctor is basically the naturalist hypothesis, at least for an a  
priori materialist, but then step 8 shows that nature and Matter are  
themselves necessarily machine's mental construct, so, to be neutral,  
I would probably prefer to call that the rationalist hypothesis.


(*) http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html




And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations  
are done

and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and  
output, but in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and  
output a

brain or body can't work.


Yes, that's why I think the level of substitution might be a whole  
universe.   Tegmark's argument that the brain is essentially  
classical only shows that you could replace a brain with a digital  
computer IF you still have the rest of the universe to interact with.


Hmm... In that case, the brain (the generalized brain) *is* the  
universe. If you can replace the brain (the biological one in the  
skull) and if I survive by the fact that such an artificial brain run  
(physically, say) the right computation, then the rest of the  
physical universe (whatever that is) is an average of some sort on  
all computations (physical or not by step 8) going through my actual  
brain state.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
 fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't  
matter.


It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer  
that

interact with the environment

This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with  
the simulated brain, you *must* run at the same level. That  
does not preclude that the simulated brain can be run on any  
level, only interaction with you require a specific level... your  
level.


A human being is not a closed system.  So the substitution level  
for Bruno's argument to go thru could include digital simulation  
of a large part of the universe - or maybe all of it.


Brent

Yes.

But if all the universe is needed, then computationalism is  
certainly false and that would prevent any conscious AI and even  
if the argument could still go through with the whole universe...  
it seems really like plain old solipsism in that case.


Also, the argument is not about feasibility of capturing the  
consciousness of a living person and puting it in a computer but  
about the concept and the compatibility with materialism.


Yes, an environment is needed for consciousness, but I doubt that  
to capture an existing consciousness (mind uploading) the level  
would be more than neuronal or maybe atomic and hence the  
environment needed could be feeded via input/output system without  
it being explicitely included (weither the real one or a virtual  
one) in the captured consciousness.




If we assume comp, and if the whole physical universe is needed for  
the 'generalized brain', then, by comp, all the universe's states  
have to be digitally accessible, and the UD will still access to  
those states infinitely often. So the whole reasoning still go  
through, even in the case of a concrete physical UD (step seven).


Empirically this is doubtful, though. If the quantum indeterminacy  
relies on the first person indeterminacies, then we can bet that we  
share the computational states of our matter constitution at, or  
above, the quantum state of our bodies. Our level is probably above  
the quantum level. This makes QM saving comp from solipsism, and is  
coherent with Tegmark's argument that the brain does not exploit  
quantum superpositions when handling our relevant mechanist  
computational states (Sorry, Stephen). We most plausibly do share  
deep dynamical histories. Beware the collision with Andromeda!


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Hi Bruno,

Yes, I am still reading this LIst. :-) Tegmark is not even wrong  
but I do concede the point as it is not relevant to digital  
substitution but I, like Craig, caution against thinking that using  
classical theory to reason about consciousness is doomed from the  
start. Your result, for me, proves that material monism fails  
miserably as a T.O.E.


OK.




but so does ideal monism.


Why?




The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem  
of epiphenomena.



I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before. Matter  
(primitive matter) simply does not exist. It can be an ideal  
(immaterial) appearance (by the reasoning). Matter can not be an  
epiphenomenon. It is just a phenomenon, and not a primitive one.
But with material monism, matter has to exist primitively (by  
definition) and consciousness has to be an epiphenomenon indeed.
The role of matter and consciousness is not symmetrical. Matter can be  
an illusion, but consciousness cannot. In all case consciousness has  
to be real, or eliminated (which makes no sense). And it t makes  
logical sense to eliminate primitive matter, not consciousness. Only  
material monism needs to use the notion of epiphenomenon, not  
immaterial (number like) monism.



The main difference is that matter (or physics) single out (or try  
to single out) one universal system, where comp explains that such  
a universal physical system has to be justified from a measure, on  
all computations, invariant for all universal machine points of  
view, which includes the working of an infinity of universal systems.
The other difference is that by extracting physics from a  
computational measure constrained by the logic of self-reference,  
we get a natural distinction between qualia and quanta (even if  
quanta appears as special case of qualia by the first person plural  
nature of physical histories).


[SPK]
But this measure simply does not exist! The set of all  
computable functions is of measure zero in the set of all functions.

What are you going to do about this fact?


The measure is on the computations (going through my actual state),  
not on all functions. The set of all functions plays some role,  
including an 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:


  but so does ideal monism.

 Why?

  The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem
  of epiphenomena.

 I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before. Matter
 (primitive matter) simply does not exist. It can be an ideal
 (immaterial) appearance (by the reasoning). Matter can not be an
 epiphenomenon. It is just a phenomenon, and not a primitive one.
 But with material monism, matter has to exist primitively (by
 definition) and consciousness has to be an epiphenomenon indeed.
 The role of matter and consciousness is not symmetrical. Matter can be
 an illusion, but consciousness cannot. In all case consciousness has
 to be real, or eliminated (which makes no sense). And it t makes
 logical sense to eliminate primitive matter, not consciousness. Only
 material monism needs to use the notion of epiphenomenon, not
 immaterial (number like) monism.

Making consciousness 'real' does not mean that it has to be any more
primitive than matter though. Just as matter is a phenomenon but not
primitive, consciousness too is a phenomenon but not *the* primitive
phenomenon. Regardless of it's possibly 'illusory' status, matter
still has to ultimately be made of the same primitive as consciousness
(what else is there to make it out of?) There is no getting around the
tight connection that the matter of our brain has with our conscious
experience. On some level, it all has to be the same thing. To me that
means that it is neither matter nor consciousness which is illusion,
but the separation of the two. The primitive is not empty
consciousness in a vacuum - that has zero degrees of realism. Thought
alone cannot conjure material outside of the body. The primitive is
the relation between subject and object: Sense. How I think it works
is that objectness is just the rear end of subjectness. Everything is
a subject to itself and and object to everything else. The closer
things are to the subject, literally and figuratively, the more sense
can be made out of them and their familiarity acquires subjective
qualities. When they are extremely close/similar, they are identified
with the subject directly.

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread benjayk


meekerdb wrote:
 
 And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
 computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are
 done
 and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
 One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but
 in
 this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and output
 a
 brain or body can't work.
 
 Yes, that's why I think the level of substitution might be a whole
 universe.
And there is no other to this universe, or something transcendent to it?
This seems to be incoherent with Brunos conclusion, because the conclusion
entails that not all of the universe can be digital. But if there is not
other (or something trascendent to it) that provides input or that output is
given to, the substituted universe could only consists of the computations.

[The following is not on this sub-discussion, but is more an extension of my
first post about the consciousness singularity:]

meekerdb wrote:
 
Tegmark's argument that the brain is essentially classical only shows
 that you could replace a brain with a digital computer IF you still have
 the rest of the universe to interact with.
Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our artificial
experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So it
seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.
For me, it seems pretty evident now that there is something special to life
after all in the way it relates to physical laws and in importance of the
universe. It is just not plausible at all why the universe would be capable
of self-accelerating evolution if there is no inherent drive in nature
towards intelligence (not human intelligence, universal intelligence,
capability of self-learning). Why would carbon be able to form all these
complex bounds, and DNA be able to encode information in such a way that it
is so extremely versatile and universal in its expression, and even more
amazingly, why would it be working in such a way that at some point very
small changes can have extremely large effects in terms of
learning-capability (look at humans vs other animals).
It is utterly and totally implausible that this is chance, or is a necessity
that just happens to be good for intellignent life (why would it?).
Granted, we can invoke the anthrophic principle, but then we are really
granting that ultimately subjectivity shapes the apparent cosmos, which most
scientist want to avoid desperately.

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

I think it is much much much more convincing (not to mention wonderful),
that the universe is based on an inherent self-organizing, self-learning
consciousness, the I/Self.
It is the ultimate singularity (including the Big Bang singularity).

It is self-evident, and self-explaining (through the evolution of the
cosmos), and extremely simple (it is just Self) so it naturally needs no
further external explanation.
The only reason that this is not accepted is because the scientific
community is predominatly dogmatically materialistic and based on
scienticsm. It doesn't want something transcendent trans-scientifc,
trans-rational, trans-objective as its base.
But that it is just self-denial, because science always needs something
beyond science to justify even its most fundamental premises (the universe
is basically lawful for example) and to interpret results (eg QM).

Once we take this possibility seriously many many difficult questions become
much more answerable (even though of course there is always infinite
ignorance about fundamental questions).
Why is the universe so orderly? Because consciousness is, as everybody can
observe for themselves, self-ordering through self-seeing.
Why does its behaviour approximate laws, but is still not entirely
predictable? Because natural laws are useful for consciousness to navigate
the world and use it.
Why is there life and why is the universe suited for life? Because the
universe (multiverse) is already intelligent and uses life for further
development towards even more intelligence.
If the universe is intelligent, why does it appear so stupid and uncaring
and unconscious oftentimes? It is not humanly intelligent, consciousness is
not rational or moral or planning, it only sees its own order, which may be
stupid from the persepective of humans, but still has its own 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 I am just not arguing at all for what
 your argument(s) seeks to refute.

 I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
 *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable  
 that
 those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel
 like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.
 The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
 I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from  
 comp,
 they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and  
 over
 again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you  
 don't
 make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can  
 matter) and
 then saying it is equivalent to COMP.
 
 Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
 Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain, and  
 skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a  
 priori.
 I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only after  
 the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that  
 idea.
The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying. The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical materialism or
non-platonic-immaterialism.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes  
 nothing
 magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
 supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically  
 related).
 
 I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical  
 materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp  
 + sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why  
 after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away with  
 Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are  
 pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is rarely  
 scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to eliminate
too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
magical or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
It is not at all artificial. A car pushed by invisible discrete kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been believed
for many centuries, and also is our actual experience. 
Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the very basis
of your theory.

It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply eliminate all
possbilities that you don't like.
You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my favorite
mystery is acceptable).

benjayk

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Dec 2011, at 17:14, benjayk wrote:




meekerdb wrote:



And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the  
computations are

done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and  
output, but

in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and  
output

a
brain or body can't work.


Yes, that's why I think the level of substitution might be a whole
universe.
And there is no other to this universe, or something transcendent to  
it?
This seems to be incoherent with Brunos conclusion, because the  
conclusion
entails that not all of the universe can be digital. But if there is  
not
other (or something trascendent to it) that provides input or that  
output is
given to, the substituted universe could only consists of the  
computations.


[The following is not on this sub-discussion, but is more an  
extension of my

first post about the consciousness singularity:]

meekerdb wrote:


  Tegmark's argument that the brain is essentially classical only  
shows
that you could replace a brain with a digital computer IF you still  
have

the rest of the universe to interact with.
Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially  
classical if we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our  
artificial
experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to  
remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see  
photosynthesis). So it

seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.
For me, it seems pretty evident now that there is something special  
to life
after all in the way it relates to physical laws and in importance  
of the
universe. It is just not plausible at all why the universe would be  
capable

of self-accelerating evolution if there is no inherent drive in nature
towards intelligence (not human intelligence, universal intelligence,
capability of self-learning). Why would carbon be able to form all  
these
complex bounds, and DNA be able to encode information in such a way  
that it
is so extremely versatile and universal in its expression, and even  
more
amazingly, why would it be working in such a way that at some point  
very

small changes can have extremely large effects in terms of
learning-capability (look at humans vs other animals).
It is utterly and totally implausible that this is chance, or is a  
necessity

that just happens to be good for intellignent life (why would it?).
Granted, we can invoke the anthrophic principle, but then we are  
really
granting that ultimately subjectivity shapes the apparent cosmos,  
which most

scientist want to avoid desperately.

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there,  
without

any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God  
is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would  
be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural  
laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very  
plausibly,

there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

I think it is much much much more convincing (not to mention  
wonderful),
that the universe is based on an inherent self-organizing, self- 
learning

consciousness, the I/Self.
It is the ultimate singularity (including the Big Bang singularity).

It is self-evident, and self-explaining (through the evolution of the
cosmos), and extremely simple (it is just Self) so it naturally  
needs no

further external explanation.
The only reason that this is not accepted is because the scientific
community is predominatly dogmatically materialistic and based on
scienticsm. It doesn't want something transcendent trans-scientifc,
trans-rational, trans-objective as its base.
But that it is just self-denial, because science always needs  
something
beyond science to justify even its most fundamental premises (the  
universe

is basically lawful for example) and to interpret results (eg QM).

Once we take this possibility seriously many many difficult  
questions become

much more answerable (even though of course there is always infinite
ignorance about fundamental questions).
Why is the universe so orderly? Because consciousness is, as  
everybody can

observe for themselves, self-ordering through self-seeing.
Why does its behaviour approximate laws, but is still not entirely
predictable? Because natural laws are useful for consciousness to  
navigate

the world and use it.
Why is there life and why is the universe suited for life? Because the
universe (multiverse) is already intelligent and uses life for further
development towards even more intelligence.
If the universe is intelligent, why does it appear so stupid and  
uncaring
and unconscious oftentimes? It is not humanly intelligent,  
consciousness is
not rational 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Dec 2011, at 16:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:





but so does ideal monism.


Why?


The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem
of epiphenomena.


I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before. Matter
(primitive matter) simply does not exist. It can be an ideal
(immaterial) appearance (by the reasoning). Matter can not be an
epiphenomenon. It is just a phenomenon, and not a primitive one.
But with material monism, matter has to exist primitively (by
definition) and consciousness has to be an epiphenomenon indeed.
The role of matter and consciousness is not symmetrical. Matter can  
be

an illusion, but consciousness cannot. In all case consciousness has
to be real, or eliminated (which makes no sense). And it t makes
logical sense to eliminate primitive matter, not consciousness. Only
material monism needs to use the notion of epiphenomenon, not
immaterial (number like) monism.


Making consciousness 'real' does not mean that it has to be any more
primitive than matter though.


That is a point where I agree with you, but Benjayk would disagree.

I said to Stephen that, concerning the epiphenomena, consciousness and  
matter do not play a symmetrical role, but this does not mean that one  
of them is primitive.


With comp, the basic ontology needed is just anything given by the  
logical specification of any universal system. I have chosen the  
natural numbers, structured by the laws of addition and multuplication  
(that's already universal for computability). Both consciousness and  
matter appearance are explained in the comp frame.





Just as matter is a phenomenon but not
primitive, consciousness too is a phenomenon but not *the* primitive
phenomenon.


Yes. comp leads to a neutral monism. The theory of everything can be  
just arithmetic. It will be up to *you* to listen or not to what the  
numbers can tell.




Regardless of it's possibly 'illusory' status, matter
still has to ultimately be made of the same primitive as consciousness
(what else is there to make it out of?)


Observable matter might be an illusion. The numbers do play infinite  
video games. Numbers dreams still obeys to the consequence of the  
additive+multiplicative non trivial (even non axiomatizable) number  
structure(s).


Matter, as it appears in dreams and games, does not have to be made of  
something. All what is needed are relatively persistent relations  
between some numbers, notably those having relatively (to some  
universal number(s)) self-referentially correct features.






There is no getting around the
tight connection that the matter of our brain has with our conscious
experience.


Of course, I stop to follow you here. With comp the tight connection  
is made with the organization of that matter, not an elusive primitive  
matter no one can observe.





On some level, it all has to be the same thing. To me that
means that it is neither matter nor consciousness which is illusion,
but the separation of the two.


This seems to me identifying different things.




The primitive is not empty
consciousness in a vacuum - that has zero degrees of realism. Thought
alone cannot conjure material outside of the body. The primitive is
the relation between subject and object: Sense. How I think it works
is that objectness is just the rear end of subjectness.


Yes, that's a good intuition. Matter is the border of the universal  
mind (with comp, the mind of the universal machine, this includes its  
many possible dreams). But so you don't identify them. Good.





Everything is
a subject to itself and and object to everything else.


But not everything can be said to refer to itself. Universal numbers  
can because they have the cognitive ability to do that.


Bruno




The closer
things are to the subject, literally and figuratively, the more sense
can be made out of them and their familiarity acquires subjective
qualities. When they are extremely close/similar, they are identified
with the subject directly.

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread meekerdb

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our artificial
experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So it
seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.


Photosynthesis doesn't require much coherence.  Even aside from Tegmark's analysis, it's 
easy to see that brains should be mostly classical.  There would be great evolutionary 
disadvantage to have a brain that was in a coherent superposition when it needed to inform 
actions in a mostly classical world using a mostly classical body.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.


I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent  
reason to

*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable
that
those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you  
feel
like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say  
so.

The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from
comp,
they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and
over
again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you
don't
make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can
matter) and
then saying it is equivalent to COMP.


Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain,  
and

skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a
priori.
I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only  
after

the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that
idea.

The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.


Explain this in detail. Please.




The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical  
materialism or

non-platonic-immaterialism.






It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will  
survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a  
machine do the right corresponding computation.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes
nothing
magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically
related).


I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical
materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp
+ sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why
after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away  
with

Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are
pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is  
rarely

scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to  
eliminate

too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
magical or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
It is not at all artificial. A car pushed by invisible discrete  
kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by  
some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been  
believed

for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.


I agree.
This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown  
that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can  
realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate  
ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of  
theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give  
references).



Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious  
things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the  
very basis

of your theory.

It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply  
eliminate all

possbilities that you don't like.


Proving eliminate possibilities by definition. In the frame of some  
assumption.


Bruno


You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my  
favorite

mystery is acceptable).

benjayk

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread meekerdb

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).


You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws are models we 
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get new 
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody supposes they are 
in the world.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:


You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my  
favorite

mystery is acceptable).


This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your  
enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.


Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have patiently debunked your  
refutation. You might just ask for explanation if you still miss the  
point.


It is a modest (yet radical) point, and it has been indeed criticized  
as being trivial, tautological a long time ago. That's why I have done  
AUDA, which is UDA for the dummies (with the dummies played by the  
Löbian machine). This illustrates at the least how non trivial the  
problem is.


With Occam, we can't eliminate the mystery.

Occam eliminates only the ad hoc hypothesis used for making a theory  
wrong. Occam eliminates the collapse of the wave packet,  for example,  
because the collapse is made only to make QM false when applied to the  
observers. (To avoid many realities).


Likewise Occam eliminates primitive matter if the appearance of matter  
can be (or has to be) explained in a conceptual simpler theory. And my  
point is double:


1) if we assume comp then it has to be the case that arithmetic (or  
combinator, ...) is the simpler theory. (UDA)


2) This can be verified (making comp testable) by deriving physics  
from a translation of UDA in the language of a universal number.  
(AUDA). Then you can compare that physics with the observation  
inferred physics.


1) needs a passive understanding of how a computer work (if only to  
grasp the universal dovetailer)


2) needs some amount of mathematical logic.

Bruno

(*) I don't pretend Brent is entirely glad with this, and for those  
who really want kill the proof, at step 8, they might think about the  
question: does comp really implies the 323 principle? So I am  
willing to admit that in step 8, some improvement could be done, but I  
am not sure. Even Brent seems to accept that comp implies 323, if I  
remember well. Jacques Mallah seemed to kill the argument exactly  
there (323). He believes that matter might be so strange that even  
when unemployed in a computation it has some physical activity  
relevant in the computation. I think that this a key for making more  
precise the qua computio notion.


I recall that the 323-principle asserts that if consciousness  
supervenes on the physical activity of a computer not using the  
register n° 323, then the same consciousness will supervene on the  
physical activity of the same computer when its register n° 323 is  
removed.


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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread benjayk


Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
 2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
  never
  be.
 
  That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
 
  No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not
  perfect.
 
  Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
  Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
 No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit
 your
 conlusion.
 Wikipedia says A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses
 discrete
 (discontinuous) values.. That does not mean that digital system has no
 other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
 matter in the substitution.
 COMP does not say they can't matter.

 
 It does by definition.
 
Definition of what? Correct substitution level? It just says that there is a
working substitution level. It does not say it has to work perfectly, or
that only the right choice of the substitution level matters (indeed,
obviously it matter whether it is instantiated correctly).


Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
  The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
 fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
 
It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
interact with the environment, it will be useless (because the computations
are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body of
us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is.
Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999%
percent of the time, it is also of no use. 
Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly
transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound
Woooshhh... that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by the
computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your
screen, it will be useless.
We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its
environment, making it useless.

COMP does not say only the digitalness matters. It says digital
substitution, but it does not say that only the digitalness of the
substitution matters. As said, digital means using discrete values, not
something were everything else but its discrete values does not matter (what
ever that would even mean, since we can't even absolutely differentiate
between discrete values and their physical anolog instantiation).
Also, we assume that doctor correctly implements the computations, and in
that implementation it may matter if his implementations takes care of the
non-computational aspect of the implementation.

If we take COMP to mean only the discrete values and their computations can
matter, then we already state the conlusion, since discrete values and their
computations are not physical, but abstract notions, so materialism (and
non-platonic-immaterialism) are excluded at the beginning.
But in this case the doctor can not possibly make a mistake (since the
physical instantiation can't matter, and so can't be wrong), but this means
that it doesn't matter at all what is being substituted and how.
That is a reductio ad absurdum of this interpretation of COMP, since it
obviously does matter whether we substitute our brain with a peanut or a
working device.

I don't get why it is not valid to show that the assumption is absurd to
refute the reasoning. You can't say assuming [the latter form of] COMP if
that assumption is absurd (well, you can but then your reasoning is as
absurd).


Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  A digital
  computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct
  substitution is
  one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
 
  You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to
  me.
 I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in
 the
 argument?
 I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means
 working
 substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly.
 
 If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of
 substitution level. If it is not perfect, either it is not the correct
 substitution level or there are none.
Nowhere in COMP is substitution level defined as a level that works
perfectly. It works good enough for us to subjectively stay the same person.

If you insist COMP means there is a perfect substitution level, we get the
same problem as above (perfect substitution is not possible physically -
just according to the COMP conclusion -, so we can't substitute correctly,
or any abitrary substitution has no effect, which is absurd) and even if a
perfect substitution level existed, it would have to be correctly
implemented, which may include a non-computational aspect.


Quentin 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com



 Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
  2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
  
   On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
  
  
  
   Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
   The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
   never
   be.
  
   That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
  
   No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not
   perfect.
  
   Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
   Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
  No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit
  your
  conlusion.
  Wikipedia says A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses
  discrete
  (discontinuous) values.. That does not mean that digital system has no
  other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
  matter in the substitution.
  COMP does not say they can't matter.
 
 
  It does by definition.
 
 Definition of what? Correct substitution level?


If you are turing emulable *then* there exists a *perfect* substitution
level *or* the premice you are turing emulable is false.


 It just says that there is a
 working substitution level. It does not say it has to work perfectly, or
 that only the right choice of the substitution level matters (indeed,
 obviously it matter whether it is instantiated correctly).


 Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
   The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
  fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
 
 It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
 interact with the environment


This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the
simulated brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude
that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only interaction with you
require a specific level... your level.


 , it will be useless (because the computations
 are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body
 of
 us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is.
 Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999%
 percent of the time, it is also of no use.
 Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly
 transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound
 Woooshhh... that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by
 the
 computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your
 screen, it will be useless.
 We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its
 environment, making it useless.

 COMP does not say only the digitalness matters.


Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be run/simulated
on a digital computer.



 It says digital
 substitution, but it does not say that only the digitalness of the
 substitution matters. As said, digital means using discrete values, not
 something were everything else but its discrete values does not matter
 (what
 ever that would even mean, since we can't even absolutely differentiate
 between discrete values and their physical anolog instantiation).
 Also, we assume that doctor correctly implements the computations, and in
 that implementation it may matter if his implementations takes care of the
 non-computational aspect of the implementation.

 If we take COMP to mean only the discrete values and their computations can
 matter, then we already state the conlusion, since discrete values and
 their
 computations are not physical, but abstract notions, so materialism (and
 non-platonic-immaterialism) are excluded at the beginning.
 But in this case the doctor can not possibly make a mistake (since the
 physical instantiation can't matter, and so can't be wrong), but this means
 that it doesn't matter at all what is being substituted and how.
 That is a reductio ad absurdum of this interpretation of COMP, since it
 obviously does matter whether we substitute our brain with a peanut or a
 working device.

 I don't get why it is not valid to show that the assumption is absurd to
 refute the reasoning. You can't say assuming [the latter form of] COMP if
 that assumption is absurd (well, you can but then your reasoning is as
 absurd).


 Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
   A digital
   computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct
   substitution is
   one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
  
   You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to
   me.
  I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in
  the
  argument?
  I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means
  working
  substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly.
 
  If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of
  substitution level. If it is not 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Sorry for the spelling mistakes, please read:


That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* it exists a
*perfect* level of substitution *or* we are not turing emulable. The fact
that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that
*if*  we are turing emulable *then* there is a *perfect* level of
substitution.

2011/12/6 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com



 2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com



 Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
  2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
  
   On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
  
  
  
   Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
   The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they
 will
   never
   be.
  
   That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
  
   No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not
   perfect.
  
   Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
   Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
  No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit
  your
  conlusion.
  Wikipedia says A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses
  discrete
  (discontinuous) values.. That does not mean that digital system has no
  other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
  matter in the substitution.
  COMP does not say they can't matter.
 
 
  It does by definition.
 
 Definition of what? Correct substitution level?


 If you are turing emulable *then* there exists a *perfect* substitution
 level *or* the premice you are turing emulable is false.


 It just says that there is a
 working substitution level. It does not say it has to work perfectly, or
 that only the right choice of the substitution level matters (indeed,
 obviously it matter whether it is instantiated correctly).


 Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
   The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
  fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
 
 It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
 interact with the environment


 This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the
 simulated brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude
 that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only interaction with you
 require a specific level... your level.


 , it will be useless (because the computations
 are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body
 of
 us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is.
 Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999%
 percent of the time, it is also of no use.
 Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly
 transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound
 Woooshhh... that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by
 the
 computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your
 screen, it will be useless.
 We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its
 environment, making it useless.

 COMP does not say only the digitalness matters.


 Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
 run/simulated on a digital computer.



 It says digital
 substitution, but it does not say that only the digitalness of the
 substitution matters. As said, digital means using discrete values, not
 something were everything else but its discrete values does not matter
 (what
 ever that would even mean, since we can't even absolutely differentiate
 between discrete values and their physical anolog instantiation).
 Also, we assume that doctor correctly implements the computations, and in
 that implementation it may matter if his implementations takes care of the
 non-computational aspect of the implementation.

 If we take COMP to mean only the discrete values and their computations
 can
 matter, then we already state the conlusion, since discrete values and
 their
 computations are not physical, but abstract notions, so materialism (and
 non-platonic-immaterialism) are excluded at the beginning.
 But in this case the doctor can not possibly make a mistake (since the
 physical instantiation can't matter, and so can't be wrong), but this
 means
 that it doesn't matter at all what is being substituted and how.
 That is a reductio ad absurdum of this interpretation of COMP, since it
 obviously does matter whether we substitute our brain with a peanut or a
 working device.

 I don't get why it is not valid to show that the assumption is absurd to
 refute the reasoning. You can't say assuming [the latter form of] COMP
 if
 that assumption is absurd (well, you can but then your reasoning is as
 absurd).


 Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
   A digital
   computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct
   substitution is
   one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
  
   You miss the 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread meekerdb

On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
 fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.

It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
interact with the environment


This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the simulated brain, 
you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude that the simulated brain can be 
run on any level, only interaction with you require a specific level... your level.


A human being is not a closed system.  So the substitution level for Bruno's argument to 
go thru could include digital simulation of a large part of the universe - or maybe all of 
it.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

   The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
  fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
 
  It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
 interact with the environment


 This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the
 simulated brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude
 that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only interaction with you
 require a specific level... your level.


 A human being is not a closed system.  So the substitution level for
 Bruno's argument to go thru could include digital simulation of a large
 part of the universe - or maybe all of it.

 Brent


Yes.

But if all the universe is needed, then computationalism is certainly false
and that would prevent any conscious AI and even if the argument could
still go through with the whole universe... it seems really like plain old
solipsism in that case.

Also, the argument is not about feasibility of capturing the consciousness
of a living person and puting it in a computer but about the concept and
the compatibility with materialism.

Yes, an environment is needed for consciousness, but I doubt that to
capture an existing consciousness (mind uploading) the level would be more
than neuronal or maybe atomic and hence the environment needed could be
feeded via input/output system without it being explicitely included
(weither the real one or a virtual one) in the captured consciousness.

Regards,
Quentin

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
 fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.

It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer  
that

interact with the environment

This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with  
the simulated brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does  
not preclude that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only  
interaction with you require a specific level... your level.


A human being is not a closed system.  So the substitution level  
for Bruno's argument to go thru could include digital simulation of  
a large part of the universe - or maybe all of it.


Brent

Yes.

But if all the universe is needed, then computationalism is  
certainly false and that would prevent any conscious AI and even if  
the argument could still go through with the whole universe... it  
seems really like plain old solipsism in that case.


Also, the argument is not about feasibility of capturing the  
consciousness of a living person and puting it in a computer but  
about the concept and the compatibility with materialism.


Yes, an environment is needed for consciousness, but I doubt that to  
capture an existing consciousness (mind uploading) the level would  
be more than neuronal or maybe atomic and hence the environment  
needed could be feeded via input/output system without it being  
explicitely included (weither the real one or a virtual one) in  
the captured consciousness.




If we assume comp, and if the whole physical universe is needed for  
the 'generalized brain', then, by comp, all the universe's states have  
to be digitally accessible, and the UD will still access to those  
states infinitely often. So the whole reasoning still go through, even  
in the case of a concrete physical UD (step seven).


Empirically this is doubtful, though. If the quantum indeterminacy  
relies on the first person indeterminacies, then we can bet that we  
share the computational states of our matter constitution at, or  
above, the quantum state of our bodies. Our level is probably above  
the quantum level. This makes QM saving comp from solipsism, and is  
coherent with Tegmark's argument that the brain does not exploit  
quantum superpositions when handling our relevant mechanist  
computational states (Sorry, Stephen). We most plausibly do share deep  
dynamical histories. Beware the collision with Andromeda!


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.


I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable  
that

those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel
like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.

The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from  
comp,
they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and  
over
again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you  
don't
make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can  
matter) and

then saying it is equivalent to COMP.


Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain, and  
skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a  
priori.
I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only after  
the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that  
idea.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



(things are made of spatially defined and non-fuzzy
stuff, like bricks or something).


Weak materialism is the statement that primitive matter exists
ontologically. It might be fuzzy, non local, even magical, etc.

If it is like that, what is the difference to immaterialism?


The main difference is that matter (or physics) single out (or try to  
single out) one universal system, where comp explains that such a  
universal physical system has to be justified from a measure, on all  
computations, invariant for all universal machine points of view,  
which includes the working of an infinity of universal systems.
The other difference is that by extracting physics from a  
computational measure constrained by the logic of self-reference, we  
get a natural distinction between qualia and quanta (even if quanta  
appears as special case of qualia by the first person plural nature of  
physical histories).




You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes  
nothing

magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically  
related).


I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical  
materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp  
+ sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why  
after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away with  
Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are  
pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is rarely  
scientifically refutable, nor interesting.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread benjayk


Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
 2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
 


 Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
  2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
  
   On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
  
  
  
   Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
   The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they
 will
   never
   be.
  
   That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
  
   No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not
   perfect.
  
   Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
   Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
  No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they
 fit
  your
  conlusion.
  Wikipedia says A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses
  discrete
  (discontinuous) values.. That does not mean that digital system has
 no
  other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that
 may
  matter in the substitution.
  COMP does not say they can't matter.
 
 
  It does by definition.
 
 Definition of what? Correct substitution level?
 
 
 If you are turing emulable *then* there exists a *perfect* substitution
 level *or* the premice you are turing emulable is false.
There exists no premise you are turing emulable.
COMP as defined by Bruno in his UDA says that we can be substituted by a
correct digital substitution (let's call that COMP1). That doesn't mean that
we have to be perfectly turing emulable. You can substitute a heart with an
artificial heart, that doesn't mean that the artificial heart works exactly
like the biological heart.
As Bruno, you assume the conlusion additionally to COMP1.

If we assume at the start that we are in a turing emulable state (let's call
it COMP2), we don't have to derive that this means that we can't be material
(and thus the world we are in can't be fully material also), since a turing
emulable state is per definition a state of an abstract machine, not of a
physical system.

But then the reasoning is not deriving anything. At most, it explains the
hypothesis. I am not saying it is not good in this, Brunos steps explain
well what it would mean if we are in a emulable state, but then Brunos
argument is just not what Bruno claims it is (if we say yes to an digital
substitution his conclusion follows).


Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
 
 , it will be useless (because the computations
 are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body
 of
 us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is.
 Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999%
 percent of the time, it is also of no use.
 Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly
 transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound
 Woooshhh... that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by
 the
 computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your
 screen, it will be useless.
 We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its
 environment, making it useless.

 COMP does not say only the digitalness matters.
 
 
 Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
 run/simulated
 on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that our body
can be substituted): A digital computer consists not only of the turing
emulable states it works with. It does way more than that, since it is a
physical object and has to have some parts that transfrom the states (which
work with analog means like voltage), and receive (analog) input and output.
And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and output a
brain or body can't work.
Only digital input and output doesn't work, because (even according to
Brunos conlusion) the physical world is not purely digital, so a digital
input and output is of no use.
And if we even grant that the external world can mysteriously give the right
digital input and do something with the output, then we create an additional
mysterious non-computational force that matters to what happens (because it
determines whether the digital brain receives the right input and output).
But according to Brunos conlusion this can't be, as we are supposedly *only*
related to computations.
One could argue that this outside could be infinite sheafs of computations,
but they don't give a output to the brain, so this doesn't seem to work,
either. The only way the could give an output if they have something else to
determine what output to give, for example a distribution on the sheat of

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
 fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer
doesn't matter.

It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball
computer that
interact with the environment


This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact
with the simulated brain, you *must* run at the same level.
That does not preclude that the simulated brain can be run on
any level, only interaction with you require a specific level...
your level.


A human being is not a closed system.  So the substitution
level for Bruno's argument to go thru could include digital
simulation of a large part of the universe - or maybe all of it.

Brent


Yes.

But if all the universe is needed, then computationalism is certainly 
false and that would prevent any conscious AI and even if the 
argument could still go through with the whole universe... it seems 
really like plain old solipsism in that case.


Also, the argument is not about feasibility of capturing the 
consciousness of a living person and puting it in a computer but 
about the concept and the compatibility with materialism.


Yes, an environment is needed for consciousness, but I doubt that to 
capture an existing consciousness (mind uploading) the level would be 
more than neuronal or maybe atomic and hence the environment needed 
could be feeded via input/output system without it being explicitely 
included (weither the real one or a virtual one) in the captured 
consciousness.




If we assume comp, and if the whole physical universe is needed for 
the 'generalized brain', then, by comp, all the universe's states have 
to be digitally accessible, and the UD will still access to those 
states infinitely often. So the whole reasoning still go through, even 
in the case of a concrete physical UD (step seven).


Empirically this is doubtful, though. If the quantum indeterminacy 
relies on the first person indeterminacies, then we can bet that we 
share the computational states of our matter constitution at, or 
above, the quantum state of our bodies. Our level is probably above 
the quantum level. This makes QM saving comp from solipsism, and is 
coherent with Tegmark's argument that the brain does not exploit 
quantum superpositions when handling our relevant mechanist 
computational states (Sorry, Stephen). We most plausibly do share deep 
dynamical histories. Beware the collision with Andromeda!


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



Hi Bruno,

Yes, I am still reading this LIst. :-) Tegmark is not even wrong 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=enq=macroscopic+quantum+phenomena+biologybtnG=Searchas_sdt=0%2C41as_ylo=as_vis=1 
but I do concede the point as it is not relevant to digital substitution 
but I, like Craig, caution against thinking that using classical theory 
to reason about consciousness is doomed from the start. Your result, for 
me, proves that material monism fails miserably as a T.O.E. but so does 
ideal monism. The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the 
problem of epiphenomena.


Onward!

Stephen

PS. I would like to see your argument against D. Deutsch's criticism of 
abstract proof theory in his new book.


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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/6/2011 2:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.


I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable that
those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel
like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.

The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from comp,
they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and over
again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you 
don't
make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can 
matter) and

then saying it is equivalent to COMP.


Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain, and 
skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a 
priori.
I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only after 
the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that idea.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



(things are made of spatially defined and non-fuzzy
stuff, like bricks or something).


Weak materialism is the statement that primitive matter exists
ontologically. It might be fuzzy, non local, even magical, etc.

If it is like that, what is the difference to immaterialism?


The main difference is that matter (or physics) single out (or try to 
single out) one universal system, where comp explains that such a 
universal physical system has to be justified from a measure, on all 
computations, invariant for all universal machine points of view, 
which includes the working of an infinity of universal systems.
The other difference is that by extracting physics from a 
computational measure constrained by the logic of self-reference, we 
get a natural distinction between qualia and quanta (even if quanta 
appears as special case of qualia by the first person plural nature of 
physical histories).


[SPK]
But this measure simply does not exist! The set of all computable 
functions is of measure zero in the set of all functions. What are you 
going to do about this fact? We cannot simply postulate a measure that 
is not contained by the requirements of our physical world. The solution 
is to understand that our physical world is what determines a local 
measure on the computations. A search for a global or universal 
measure is quixotic at best.






You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes nothing
magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically related).


I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical 
materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp 
+ sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why 
after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away with 
Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are 
pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is rarely 
scientifically refutable, nor interesting.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



[SPK]
You do seem to vastly underestimate the powerful constraint induced 
by our physical world. You tuck the physical world into the Yes Doctor 
and never give it another thought, but such things are not so easily 
dismissed by nitpicking curmugeons like me. ;-)


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-06 Thread meekerdb

On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote:

Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
  run/simulated
  on a digital computer.

Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that our body
can be substituted): A digital computer consists not only of the turing
emulable states it works with. It does way more than that, since it is a
physical object and has to have some parts that transfrom the states (which
work with analog means like voltage), and receive (analog) input and output.


It is essentially consciousness that is being reproduced.  If consciousness arises from 
the brain performing certain computations, then those computations could be performed to 
any desired degree of precision by a digital computer; and saying Yes to the doctor is 
betting that the instantiating those computations will necessarily instantiate 
consciousness (the naturalist hypothesis - there is no magic).



And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and output a
brain or body can't work.


Yes, that's why I think the level of substitution might be a whole universe.   Tegmark's 
argument that the brain is essentially classical only shows that you could replace a brain 
with a digital computer IF you still have the rest of the universe to interact with.


Brent



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.


That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.

No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not  
perfect.


Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
Either you miss something or you are playing with words.



Digital means based on discrete values, not only consisting of  
discrete
values (otherwise there could be no digital computers, since they  
rely on

non-discrete functioning of their parts).


In which theory. The assumptions are neutral on physics. Here, you are  
not, so i suspect you work in some non defined theory.







Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:



When I look
at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological
being,
not a
computer.


Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a
computer, then tell me what.
Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological  
being it

is not
a computer in the sense of physical computer.


I don't understand this. A bacteria is a physical being (in the  
sense
that it has a physical body) and is a computer in the sense that  
its

genetic regulatory system can emulate a universal machine.

Usually computer means programmable machine, not something that can
emulate
a universal machine.


That can be proved to be equivalent.

No, because that would rely on an abstract notion of progammability.
Programmable machine means programmable (to any practical extent)  
by us

(this cannot even be formalized).
That's why we call a computer computer and biological beings usually  
not.

Othwise you are using an abstraction of a computer.


Not at all. When I say can emulate a universal machine, it is  
programmable.
You are assuming a primitive physical reality. We have to be neutral  
at that stage.




Also something that can emulate a universal machine may be more  
capable

than a computer, like a hypercomputer.


Yes. That does not contradict the statement I made. I said only that  
anything capable of emulating a universal machine, is a universal  
machine. I did not say is only a universal machine. This follows  
from the comp assumption, though.






Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:



It is quite strange to say over and over again that I haven't
studied your
arguments (I have, though obviously I can't understand all the
details,
given how complicated they are),


UDA is rather simple to understand. I have never met people who  
does

not understand UDA1-7 among the scientific academical.
Some academics pretends it is wrong, but they have never accepted a
public or even private discussion. And then they are literary
continental philosophers with a tradition of disliking science.  
Above

all, they do not present any arguments.

It is indeed not hard to understand.
Again, there is no specific flaw in the argument, because all steps
rely on
an abstraction of how a computer works,


They relies on the definition of digital computer. The digitalness
allows exact simulation (emulation).

No. It allows simulation to the extent that the computer works.


Sure, but that is a default assumption.




A digital
computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct  
substitution is

one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.


You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to  
me.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



Consciousness supposedly emerges from self-reference of numbers, but
the
very concept of self-reference needs the existence of self
(=consciousness).
Without self, no self-reference.


The discovery of Löbian machine and of arithmetical self-reference
contradicts this.
Again, you can't even begin to talk of arithmetical *self*-reference  
if you
don't assume SELF. Otherwise we could be talking about HT)D)F$w99- 
reference

as well.
Just like you can't talk of apple-juice without apples.


I can defined the self without assuming it. I have often explained  
this on this list. Search for diagonalization, or ask me to explain.  
It is the main triumph of logic and theoretical computer science. See  
Smorinsky paper Fifty years of arithmetical self-reference, or study  
Solovay theorem. not only is the (third person) self well defined  
(without assuming it), but its propositional logic have been  
completely axiomatized. But this plays no role in UDA, only in the  
arithmetical translation of UDA (and so is not relevant here).







Bruno Marchal wrote:


To equate self and consciousness is not warranted

Why?
We can't equate *local self* or self-identity with consciousness,  
but why

not self itself?
That's what all great mystics are saying, consciousness is self.


It is the first person self, and not all mystics makes that  
identification. Some consider the universal consciousness to be  
without any notion of self. I am 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-05 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
 never
 be.

 That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.

 No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not  
 perfect.
 
 Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
 Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit your
conlusion.
Wikipedia says A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses discrete
(discontinuous) values.. That does not mean that digital system has no
other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
matter in the substitution.
COMP does not say they can't matter.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Digital means based on discrete values, not only consisting of  
 discrete
 values (otherwise there could be no digital computers, since they  
 rely on
 non-discrete functioning of their parts).
 
 In which theory. The assumptions are neutral on physics. Here, you are  
 not, so i suspect you work in some non defined theory.
What? We have to rely on some basic agreement of what the words used in the
argument mean, and this happens to be the agreement we use in our language
(digital means based on discrete values). This has little to do with a
specific theory.
If we don't presuppose any physics (even not in a practical sense), we can't
substitute a physical object (our brain), since physical object is
undefined, so COMP is meaningless, and in this case this is not a question
of lack of faith in the possbility of a correct substitution.
So if you want to eliminate any practical notion of physics in the
argumentation, you invalidate the COMP assumption, because it would state a
totally undefined thing (substituting a physical object).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 A digital
 computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct  
 substitution is
 one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
 
 You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to  
 me.
I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in the
argument?
I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means working
substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly. Indeed it can't
work perfectly, as we all plainly observe in the physical world, no device
works perfectly.
You misrepresent the notion of level that is defined in the argument with
your imagination of what a level is supposed to be (the right level is the
perfect instantiation of the right turing emulable states).

It seems you just get defensive because you realize your argument doesn't
work. I see that it is important for you, but if you want to be honest, that
is no good reason to ignore criticism.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 And if you do
 remain relatively invariant, it is only because you choose to define
 yourself in a way that you are still yourself after a certain change  
 in
 experience, but that is just a matter of opinion, and it means that  
 is just
 a matter of opinion whether you survive a substitution - but then we  
 can
 only conclude that we may survive no substitution (if we don't  
 believe YES
 doctor) or we survive every substitution (!) or something inbetween  
 - a
 pretty weak conclusion.
 
 You are playing with words. Sorry, but I get that feeling. Comp would  
 have no sense if you were true here, and that contradict other  
 statement you made. you still are unclear if you criticize comp, or  
 the validity of the reasoning. You seem a bit wanting to be negative.
I am just being honest. My criticism can be conceived of a criticism of comp
or your reasoning, because I argue that either comp is false or the
reasoning.
So it might be that your reasoning cannot directly be shown false, if you
insist that COMP is meaningless.
You seem to do that above, as you want to eliminate all notions of
physicality, but then we can't substitute a physical brain anymore, so COMP
becomes meaningless.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 

 Also: How does your reasoning show that we can't survive every  
 substitution?
 
 Nowhere the reasoning shows that. On the contrary, I have very often  
 presented the conclusion partially by saying: if you can survive (in  
 the usual clinical sense) with a concrete digital brain, then you will  
 survive no matter what.
OK. Then your argument refutes COMP. If I survive every substitution, there
can be no correct substitution level, and no non-abitrary description of my
parts. All levels would be correct and all descriptions correct, but that is
not only absurd, but also makes it impossible to choose the correct one.
But if COMP is false, your conclusion does not follow, obviously.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 but only *if done in the correct non-computational way*,
 
 And that would just contradict directly the comp *assumption*. You are  
 (again) 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
  never
  be.
 
  That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
 
  No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not
  perfect.
 
  Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
  Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
 No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit
 your
 conlusion.
 Wikipedia says A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses discrete
 (discontinuous) values.. That does not mean that digital system has no
 other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
 matter in the substitution.
 COMP does not say they can't matter.


It does by definition. The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Digital means based on discrete values, not only consisting of
  discrete
  values (otherwise there could be no digital computers, since they
  rely on
  non-discrete functioning of their parts).
 
  In which theory. The assumptions are neutral on physics. Here, you are
  not, so i suspect you work in some non defined theory.
 What? We have to rely on some basic agreement of what the words used in the
 argument mean, and this happens to be the agreement we use in our language
 (digital means based on discrete values). This has little to do with a
 specific theory.
 If we don't presuppose any physics (even not in a practical sense), we
 can't
 substitute a physical object (our brain), since physical object is
 undefined, so COMP is meaningless, and in this case this is not a question
 of lack of faith in the possbility of a correct substitution.
 So if you want to eliminate any practical notion of physics in the
 argumentation, you invalidate the COMP assumption, because it would state a
 totally undefined thing (substituting a physical object).


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  A digital
  computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct
  substitution is
  one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
 
  You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to
  me.
 I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in the
 argument?
 I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means working
 substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly.


If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of
substitution level. If it is not perfect, either it is not the correct
substitution level or there are none.


 Indeed it can't
 work perfectly, as we all plainly observe in the physical world, no device
 works perfectly.
 You misrepresent the notion of level that is defined in the argument with
 your imagination of what a level is supposed to be (the right level is the
 perfect instantiation of the right turing emulable states).

 It seems you just get defensive because you realize your argument doesn't
 work. I see that it is important for you, but if you want to be honest,
 that
 is no good reason to ignore criticism.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  And if you do
  remain relatively invariant, it is only because you choose to define
  yourself in a way that you are still yourself after a certain change
  in
  experience, but that is just a matter of opinion, and it means that
  is just
  a matter of opinion whether you survive a substitution - but then we
  can
  only conclude that we may survive no substitution (if we don't
  believe YES
  doctor) or we survive every substitution (!) or something inbetween
  - a
  pretty weak conclusion.
 
  You are playing with words. Sorry, but I get that feeling. Comp would
  have no sense if you were true here, and that contradict other
  statement you made. you still are unclear if you criticize comp, or
  the validity of the reasoning. You seem a bit wanting to be negative.
 I am just being honest. My criticism can be conceived of a criticism of
 comp
 or your reasoning, because I argue that either comp is false or the
 reasoning.


His argument is not about comp validity but about the fact that you can't
have computationalism true *and* materialism true. Both notion are
incompatible. He does not says comp is true.


 So it might be that your reasoning cannot directly be shown false, if you
 insist that COMP is meaningless.
 You seem to do that above, as you want to eliminate all notions of
 physicality, but then we can't substitute a physical brain anymore, so COMP
 becomes meaningless.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  Also: How does your reasoning show that we can't survive every
  substitution?
 
  Nowhere the reasoning shows that. On the contrary, I have very often
  presented the conclusion partially by saying: if you can survive (in
  the 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-04 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will  
 never
 be.
 
 That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
 
No. Correctly functioning means good enough to be working, not perfect.
Digital means based on discrete values, not only consisting of discrete
values (otherwise there could be no digital computers, since they rely on
non-discrete functioning of their parts).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:



 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 When I look
 at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological  
 being,
 not a
 computer.

 Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a
 computer, then tell me what.
 Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it
 is not
 a computer in the sense of physical computer.

 I don't understand this. A bacteria is a physical being (in the sense
 that it has a physical body) and is a computer in the sense that its
 genetic regulatory system can emulate a universal machine.
 Usually computer means programmable machine, not something that can  
 emulate
 a universal machine.
 
 That can be proved to be equivalent.
No, because that would rely on an abstract notion of progammability.
Programmable machine means programmable (to any practical extent) by us
(this cannot even be formalized).
That's why we call a computer computer and biological beings usually not.
Othwise you are using an abstraction of a computer.
Also something that can emulate a universal machine may be more capable
than a computer, like a hypercomputer.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 It is quite strange to say over and over again that I haven't
 studied your
 arguments (I have, though obviously I can't understand all the
 details,
 given how complicated they are),

 UDA is rather simple to understand. I have never met people who does
 not understand UDA1-7 among the scientific academical.
 Some academics pretends it is wrong, but they have never accepted a
 public or even private discussion. And then they are literary
 continental philosophers with a tradition of disliking science. Above
 all, they do not present any arguments.
 It is indeed not hard to understand.
 Again, there is no specific flaw in the argument, because all steps  
 rely on
 an abstraction of how a computer works,
 
 They relies on the definition of digital computer. The digitalness  
 allows exact simulation (emulation).
No. It allows simulation to the extent that the computer works. A digital
computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct substitution is
one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Consciousness supposedly emerges from self-reference of numbers, but  
 the
 very concept of self-reference needs the existence of self  
 (=consciousness).
 Without self, no self-reference.
 
 The discovery of Löbian machine and of arithmetical self-reference  
 contradicts this.
Again, you can't even begin to talk of arithmetical *self*-reference if you
don't assume SELF. Otherwise we could be talking about HT)D)F$w99-reference
as well.
Just like you can't talk of apple-juice without apples.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 To equate self and consciousness is not warranted
Why?
We can't equate *local self* or self-identity with consciousness, but why
not self itself?
That's what all great mystics are saying, consciousness is self.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 If we have that faith,
 we believe in abitrary mysterious occurences.

 We believe just that the brain is a sort of machine, and that we can
 substitute for a functionnally equivalent machine. This cannot be
 proved and so it asks for some faith. But it might not need to be
 blind faith. You can read books on brain, neuro-histology, and make
 your own opinion, including about the subst level. The reasoning uses
 only the possibility of this in theory. It is theoretical reasoning  
 in
 a theoretical frame.
 But functionally equivalent does not mean *totally* equivalent, but  
 this is
 required for the steps to work.
 
 There is no notion of total equivalence used. Only of subjective  
 equivalence (first person invariance), modulo the changing conditions  
 of reawakening, reconstitution in different environment, etc.
What is that supposed to mean? The only thing that ever remains absolute
subjectively invariant is (arguably) the fact of anything being conscious at
all, and this does not depend on a specific correct substitution (in case
you don't survive other people are still conscious). You seem to assume a
absolute personal self, but the personal self is itself just a collection of
memories and personality traits, that itself is ever changing. So you can't
remain absolutely subjectively equivalent, since you never do. And if you do
remain relatively invariant, it is only because you choose to define
yourself in a way that you are still yourself after a certain change in
experience, 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Dec 2011, at 19:08, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.


If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.

So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I
have no
doubt that this is true.


OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
operational way by the yes doctor thought experiment. Most people
understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for
example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with
respect to such a possible substitution.
If YES doctor means we are just an immaterial abstract computer than  
there

is nothing to deduce (our experience already is only related to
computations, since we defined as by them).


The YES doctor assumption does not refer to abstract computer. Those  
are handled at the step 8 of the UD Argument.



But if YES doctor just means our bodies work *like* a computer (and  
thus the

substitution works, and we already know that this is the case to some
extent) then none of the step works because they assume we work  
exactly 100%

like a abstract computer.


By the assumption on the level of digital substitution, we are 100%  
preserved, in the relative local way, through a physical computer,  
running a digital encoding suppose to be done at the right level.





In actuality we can eg never be sure that
teleportation, duplication etc... work as intended, because actual  
computers

are not totally reliable,


Yes, but that is not relevant for the reasoning, which use ideal  
default hypotheses (skilful doctor, level adequacy, ...)




and actually quantum objects,


This is not part of the assumption.




and not purely
digital in an abstract sense (I argue in a more detailed way below).


OK. See below.




In other words, you are assuming an abstraction of a computer in the
argument, which is already the conlusion.


Not at all. The assumption does not refer to abstract or immaterial  
machine.



The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will  
never

be.


That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.




I'm probably making it to complicated, because I can't seem to point  
out the
simple fallacy. That's why I'm continuing to give examples of why  
either YES
doctor does not mean what you need it to mean (we are exactly, and  
only, and

always an abstract digital computer) or why you can't assume that the
reasoning work.


Abstract computer enters at step 8. Up to step seven all computing  
machinery are supposed to be as concrete/physical as the computer you  
are looking at right now.






Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:



When I look
at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological  
being,

not a
computer.


Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a
computer, then tell me what.

Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it
is not
a computer in the sense of physical computer.


I don't understand this. A bacteria is a physical being (in the sense
that it has a physical body) and is a computer in the sense that its
genetic regulatory system can emulate a universal machine.
Usually computer means programmable machine, not something that can  
emulate

a universal machine.


That can be proved to be equivalent.




It seems you are so hooked on the abstract perspective
of a computer scientist, that you don't even see the possibility of  
the

distinction abstract computer / actual computer.




UDA 1-7 use actual computer. Step 8 treats the immateriality/ 
abstraction point.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



It is also not an abstract
digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a
biological being
is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
experience beyond physicality and computability).


But all universal machine have a link with something beyond
physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond  
the

computable. So your point is not valid.

Yes, but then the whole argument does not work, because it deals with
something that even according to your conclusion can't be purely
computational (actual computers),


The stuff the computer is made of is shown to be not entirely  
computational. That is why we never use exact copy of the physical  
machine, but only a digital description made at some level.





so you can't assume it works as they
should do.


And, so I can do that. You seems to have missed the key notion of  
substitution level.




COMP does just mean we work enough like computers to make a
substitution possible (we say YES to a *functionally* correct  
substitution),

it does not mean that there is any substitution that works 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Dec 2011, at 20:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.



If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.

So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I
have no
doubt that this is true.


OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
operational way by the yes doctor thought experiment. Most people
understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for
example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with
respect to such a possible substitution.


This is the first problem. It's not that the brain has to be
privileged to make it impossible to simulate, no organ can be
simulated, it's just that it is possible to simulate some of the
functions of an organ to the extent that the person as a whole, i.e.
the inhabitant(s) of the brain, can't tell the difference.


That is your hypothesis. OK.





The brain is a totally. different. story. First of all, you could have
a crowbar poking through your skull and not know it if the parts of
your brain that related to that awareness (and the pain thereof) were
damaged, so subjective accounts of success are not reliable.


OK. (I insist often on this. It is provable assuming comp, but if you  
want assume this in your non-comp theory, it is OK).





Secondly,
objective accounts are also unreliable owing to the privacy of
subjectivity.


I agree.





Finally, the brain being our only source of experience
at all, cannot be compared to anything else in the cosmos.


That is the neuro hypohesis. I don't need it, or trivialize it with  
the notion of 'generalized' brain (the portion of the physical reality  
which need to be simulated for keeping may consciousness unchanged  
locally).






No person
has ever existed outside of a brain as far as we know, so we cannot
presume that the brain itself or a person can be simulated.


I never presume. I assume. It is my working hypothesis.





It simply
may not work that way at all.


Sure. But this can be said for any hypothesis (hypothesis = theory).




A person may be a continuity of
unreproducible material + semantic happenstance which builds upon
itself cumulatively and idiopathically.


That is a speculation. That is possible, even in the comp theory.





We might be our brain


You contradict an old statement you made to me, according to which we  
own a brain (and are not a brain).






and our brain may be much more than it appears
to us from the outside or the inside, but there is nothing to suggest
that there is a such thing as an arithmetic essence which is
independent of physics and is deterministic.


What is an arithmetic essence? I avoid essence.






It is only through our
brain-grounded subjectivity that we believe there is any such thing as
pattern or arithmetic. It's just one way that we make sense of our
world.


OK.
With comp, the contrary is true. It is our arithmetic-grounded  
subjectivity which makes us believe there is such thing as space,  
matter, brain, etc.










It is also not an abstract
digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a
biological being
is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
experience beyond physicality and computability).


But all universal machine have a link with something beyond
physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond  
the

computable. So your point is not valid.


Just because computational truth is rooted in non-comp doesn't mean
that it is the same non-comp as organic subjectivity.


What is organic subjectivity, and why would that be non-comp?
Here it seems to me that Statis has convincingly explains that adding  
a non-comp element in matter does not help. I gave other reason (comp  
makes matter itself non-comp).










Neither
can they be derived from it.


Physicality can be derived. And has to be derived (by UDA). Both
quanta and qualia.


I don't think qualia can be derived. I don't think a digital machine
can know the difference between visual qualia and aural qualia if they
yield the same functionality.


You assert and reassert your non-comp hypothesis.
Are you believing that comp is false?
I don't care. I am not interested in debate on what is true or false.  
It is not my job.







Only the geography cannot be derived, but the
physical laws can. You might elaborate why you think they can't.


Physical laws are a posteriori analytical abstractions based on our
shared experiences of concrete physical events.


With comp, the notion of concrete physical event is vague, and relative.
With non-comp, I don't know, given that you have not given a  
sufficiently precise theory in which I 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Dec 2, 6:58 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
  our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
  operational way by the yes doctor thought experiment. Most people
  understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for
  example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with
  respect to such a possible substitution.

  This is the first problem. It's not that the brain has to be
  privileged to make it impossible to simulate, no organ can be
  simulated, it's just that it is possible to simulate some of the
  functions of an organ to the extent that the person as a whole, i.e.
  the inhabitant(s) of the brain, can't tell the difference.

 That is your hypothesis. OK.

But do you have any ideas about why it might be valid or not?


  Finally, the brain being our only source of experience
  at all, cannot be compared to anything else in the cosmos.

 That is the neuro hypohesis. I don't need it, or trivialize it with
 the notion of 'generalized' brain (the portion of the physical reality
 which need to be simulated for keeping may consciousness unchanged
 locally).

I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the
universe, can it? Not saying for sure that our experience could not
some day be exported to another medium (although of course I think
that medium would need to be isomorphic in substance to a high degree)
just that as far as we know now, the brain is incomparable as far as
we are concerned.


  No person
  has ever existed outside of a brain as far as we know, so we cannot
  presume that the brain itself or a person can be simulated.

 I never presume. I assume. It is my working hypothesis.

  It simply
  may not work that way at all.

 Sure. But this can be said for any hypothesis (hypothesis = theory).

  A person may be a continuity of
  unreproducible material + semantic happenstance which builds upon
  itself cumulatively and idiopathically.

 That is a speculation. That is possible, even in the comp theory.

Comp is speculation too. The question is whether it makes sense or
whether there are any specific objections from the start.




  We might be our brain

 You contradict an old statement you made to me, according to which we
 own a brain (and are not a brain).

You're right. I am of two minds about it, hah. No, I do still think
that we own a brain just as we own our lives and both our lives (and
maybe our brain and our lives own us too), I'm just opening it up so
that if we want to say that we are our brain, we have no objective
reason why it isn't so.

The interior is the ontological opposite of the exterior so it isn't
appropriate to say that we literally are the brain as the brain looks
to us from the outside, but figuratively we are the interior of our
brain, body, you could even say home or family. We are our capacity to
influence and be influenced by our world, and the brain is the gateway
to that world. I say figuratively in the sense of multisense realism
though - as a concrete realism equal to that of the exterior, just
expressed as semantic entanglement through time rather than object
relations across space.


  and our brain may be much more than it appears
  to us from the outside or the inside, but there is nothing to suggest
  that there is a such thing as an arithmetic essence which is
  independent of physics and is deterministic.

 What is an arithmetic essence? I avoid essence.

Ok, what do you want to call it? Computation? What is the identity of
a UM made of?


  It is only through our
  brain-grounded subjectivity that we believe there is any such thing as
  pattern or arithmetic. It's just one way that we make sense of our
  world.

 OK.
 With comp, the contrary is true. It is our arithmetic-grounded
 subjectivity which makes us believe there is such thing as space,
 matter, brain, etc.

Right, but we know for a fact that changes to our brain can impact our
pattern recognition capacity. We don't know of anything that is for
sure grounded in arithmetic alone as a disembodied entity. Does comp
explain why all arithmetic subjects would always appear to be
associated with physical systems to other arithmetic subjects? To
suggest that arithmetic can simulate physics is one thing, but why
does it *have to* generate physics?




  It is also not an abstract
  digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a
  biological being
  is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
  experience beyond physicality and computability).

  But all universal machine have a link with something beyond
  physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond
  the
  computable. So your point is not valid.

  Just because computational truth is rooted in non-comp doesn't 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-02 Thread meekerdb

On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the
universe, can it?


I can change my experience by moving to Canada, getting a new wife, or putting brandy in 
my coffee.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-02 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.

 If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
 life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
 So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I  
 have no
 doubt that this is true.
 
 OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning  
 our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi  
 operational way by the yes doctor thought experiment. Most people  
 understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for  
 example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with  
 respect to such a possible substitution.
If YES doctor means we are just an immaterial abstract computer than there
is nothing to deduce (our experience already is only related to
computations, since we defined as by them).
But if YES doctor just means our bodies work *like* a computer (and thus the
substitution works, and we already know that this is the case to some
extent) then none of the step works because they assume we work exactly 100%
like a abstract computer. In actuality we can eg never be sure that
teleportation, duplication etc... work as intended, because actual computers
are not totally reliable, and actually quantum objects, and not purely
digital in an abstract sense (I argue in a more detailed way below).
In other words, you are assuming an abstraction of a computer in the
argument, which is already the conlusion.
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will never
be.

I'm probably making it to complicated, because I can't seem to point out the
simple fallacy. That's why I'm continuing to give examples of why either YES
doctor does not mean what you need it to mean (we are exactly, and only, and
always an abstract digital computer) or why you can't assume that the
reasoning work.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 When I look
 at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological being,
 not a
 computer.

 Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a
 computer, then tell me what.
 Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it  
 is not
 a computer in the sense of physical computer.
 
 I don't understand this. A bacteria is a physical being (in the sense  
 that it has a physical body) and is a computer in the sense that its  
 genetic regulatory system can emulate a universal machine.
Usually computer means programmable machine, not something that can emulate
a universal machine. It seems you are so hooked on the abstract perspective
of a computer scientist, that you don't even see the possibility of the
distinction abstract computer / actual computer.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 It is also not an abstract
 digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a  
 biological being
 is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
 experience beyond physicality and computability).
 
 But all universal machine have a link with something beyond  
 physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond the  
 computable. So your point is not valid.
Yes, but then the whole argument does not work, because it deals with
something that even according to your conclusion can't be purely
computational (actual computers), so you can't assume it works as they
should do. COMP does just mean we work enough like computers to make a
substitution possible (we say YES to a *functionally* correct substitution),
it does not mean that there is any substitution that works perfectly.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Neither
 can they be derived from it.
 
 Physicality can be derived. And has to be derived (by UDA). Both  
 quanta and qualia. Only the geography cannot be derived, but the  
 physical laws can. You might elaborate why you think they can't.
Frankly I don't believe in absolute physical laws, so we can't derive them.
They are just locally valid approximate rules, like swans are white.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 

 And no, there is no need for any evidence for some non-turing emulable
 infinity in the brain. We just need non-turing emulable finite stuff  
 in the
 brain, and that's already there.
 
 I thought you were immaterialist. What is that finite stuff which is  
 non Turing emulable?
Matter. It is a form of consciousness that is finite in terms of apparent
size and apparent information content but still not computable, because the
qualia of matter itself cannot be substituted.
I don't believe in primitive matter, but I believe in stuff as a sensation
of stuffiness.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 I really try to understand. Sometimes it seems you argue against comp,  
 and sometimes it seems you argue against the proof that comp entails  
 the Platonist reversal (to be short).
Well, actually I am arguing agains both, but relevant to your argument is
just that 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
  source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
  brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the
  universe, can it?

 I can change my experience by moving to Canada, getting a new wife, or 
 putting brandy in
 my coffee.


You can't experience any of those changes without a brain. If I could
change your experience by putting brandy in my coffee then you would
have a point. I can't though. I can't change anyones experience unless
I do something that changes their brain.

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-02 Thread meekerdb

On 12/2/2011 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the
universe, can it?

I can change my experience by moving to Canada, getting a new wife, or putting 
brandy in
my coffee.


You can't experience any of those changes without a brain. If I could
change your experience by putting brandy in my coffee then you would
have a point. I can't though. I can't change anyones experience unless
I do something that changes their brain.

Craig



The point is that any change in our experience does change our brain, otherwise we 
wouldn't experience it.  I don't know why that should make it the source of our 
experience.  Actually I could change your experience by putting brandy in your coffee; in 
fact I'm changing your experience right now as you read these words.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Dec 2, 3:22 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/2/2011 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:






  On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:
  On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
  source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
  brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the
  universe, can it?
  I can change my experience by moving to Canada, getting a new wife, or 
  putting brandy in
  my coffee.

  You can't experience any of those changes without a brain. If I could
  change your experience by putting brandy in my coffee then you would
  have a point. I can't though. I can't change anyones experience unless
  I do something that changes their brain.

 The point is that any change in our experience does change our brain, 
 otherwise we
 wouldn't experience it.

That's my point exactly. This is not the case with any other object in
the cosmos. A change in our experience does not change a shoe and
changing a shoe does not change our experience - it's the brain and
only the brain which fits this description, making it the only known
source of our experience.

I don't know why that should make it the source of our
 experience.

If grape juice comes from a grape and all grapes produce grape juice,
is it not fair to say that grapes are the only known source of grape
juice? I can't apply the same logic to juice in general because lots
of things could be said to be a source of juice, but we don't have a
single thing that we can say is having a human experience without a
human brain being involved.

 Actually I could change your experience by putting brandy in your coffee; in
 fact I'm changing your experience right now as you read these words.

Right but you can't change my experience by putting brandy in *your*
coffee. Of course your words are changing my experience and my brain
because I am able to read them, but I couldn't read them if my brain
had no access to them.

Craig


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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hello John,


I agree with you (almost) completely that we (bio-beings) are  
computers, except for the diminishing factor we HAVE to include into  
a computer as a machine of knowable components and capabilities,  
observed WITHIN our perspectives as of yesterday.


We don't need to know the detail of the constitution of the entity,  
once we can show that they can simulate a universal Turing machine (or  
any universal system).


There is a diminushing factor if we presuppose that whatever they do  
can be Turing emulated.


Bio being are universal is basically a fact.

Comp is that bio being are no more than universal. This follows from  
their finiteness and the inference of a level described by computable  
laws.





Your term universal computer may fit better: an infinite 'machine'  
with infinite capabilities/domain of which we (may) select aspects  
we DO know of... (That may be MY version as I understand (or don't)  
it.



The universal machine, computer or number are FINITE entities. To  
exploit fully their abilities, they need as much memory and time as  
possible, but they use their hopefully probable environment for doing  
that.


The universal machine of Turing is really the finite instruction table  
of a finite machine, which is capable to emulate any other machine by  
using their coded finite instruction tables. All machines, including  
the universal one, are finite by definition, I would say. Certainly  
the digital machines that I am studying.






The humanized size reduced description.
Computer BTW is called in other languages something like  
'calculational machine' which separates it sharply from the more  
subtle sense of 'computing in English (I think even more in French)  
as closer to mentally put together straight from the Latin origin.  
The calculational aspect - I think - dates back to Babbage way  
before Turing.


I have an original thesis on that. Not only Babbage discovered the  
universal machine, but he discovered the equivalent of Church thesis,  
which is the key notion to understand that the universal machine is  
truly universal.
Universality = universality with respect to computing, or any digital  
processes. Computing does not need to be restricted on numbers, but it  
happens that the natural numbers together with addition and  
multiplication is Turing universal, so that the numbers' restriction  
is an apparent restriction.
Computability is the only notion immune to Cantor's diagonalization,  
and that gives a conceptual very deep argument for Church thesis.






GAI applies series of thoughts to 'compute' instead of numbers  
(sorry!) and 'meanings' are the result.


You mean genetic algorithm. I am not sure what you mean by 'compute'  
and by 'meaning'.





(Nevertheless I consider AI still a humanly limited art, since it  
starts from what we can
observe and deduce and arrives at - similarly - what we can observe  
and deduce (even if surprised).)


We observe and introspect, then believe, and then deduce from those  
beliefs, until they are shown wrong. It is not a limitation of human,  
it is a limitation of any finite entities. That is how we can, with  
some luck, progress.
In science it is better to assume that we are always wrong. But if we  
are cautious and reason validly then we can hope to be shown wrong,  
and to learn something, and to be a little bit less wrong tomorrow.







The bio - indeed one of the two science-domains we know the least  
of (the other is neurology/psych)


We know about nothing in physics (indeed, assuming comp, we are even  
putting it upside down).
We know nothing in arithmetic (indeed, assuming comp, we will forever  
only scratch the surface)
We know nothing in theology (indeed we have unwillingly abandoned it  
to the politics since 1500 years ago, and this has still the bizare  
approvment of a large part of the academy including the free-thinkers).


Let us be clear, the humans have not yet begun the game of science. We  
are still a long way from that.





includes infinite networks of influences, applies infinite inputs  
and we observe only part of them: the perceived reality part.


What is you theory? Why infinite inputs? What makes you believe there  
are infinite inputs? I can understand infinitely many inputs, but I  
am not sure I follow the idea of one infinite input, except if you  
just mean some stream of inputs.





E.g. a cell does not end at its outer membrane and those  
characteristics WE apply. It reacts to wider physical domains and  
not-so-physical procedures as well.


I agree.



In my agnostic view I do not presume what kind of 'items' populate  
the infinite (beyond our models) complexity of everything (call it:  
existence) what kind of relations they may have what we translate in  
our ignorance as our world (call it: physical).


It is not a question of presuming, but of assuming and being as clear  
as possible, so that we can be shown wrong. An ideal honest scientist  

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-01 Thread benjayk


John Mikes wrote:
 
 Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree,
 please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit).
 
I agree wholheartedly!
That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and pretends to be
a proof (or at least a valid reasoning) for something that can't be
concluded through reason. It is very immodest to just disregard all
criticism of the argument (and to defend that with you don't know what
you're talking about), and then claim to be modest by virtue of not taken
the assumption for granted.
Taken the validity of reasoning for granted is not much more modest than
taking assumptions for granted, since really the reasoning itself depends on
many unstated assumption.
In this case, for example, only materialism or computational immaterialism
can be true, it is meaningful to say YES to something that is subjectively
not happening, etc...
I don't *know* the reasoning is false, but I can see plainly that is not
quite as objectively valid as Bruno wants to present it as.

Being able to say I DUNNO! is, in my opinion, one of the most important
steps in really being able to experience reality and ourselves in an
unbiased and clear manner.
As long as we cling to knowledge, we are looking at our ideas of reality and
ourselves, not at reality as it actually is.

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.


If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I  
have no

doubt that this is true.


OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning  
our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi  
operational way by the yes doctor thought experiment. Most people  
understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for  
example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with  
respect to such a possible substitution.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



When I look
at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological being,
not a
computer.


Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a
computer, then tell me what.
Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it  
is not

a computer in the sense of physical computer.


I don't understand this. A bacteria is a physical being (in the sense  
that it has a physical body) and is a computer in the sense that its  
genetic regulatory system can emulate a universal machine.





It is also not an abstract
digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a  
biological being

is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
experience beyond physicality and computability).


But all universal machine have a link with something beyond  
physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond the  
computable. So your point is not valid.






Neither physicality nor spirituality can be reduced to computations.


Indeed. But that is a theorem in the comp theory. So any argument in  
favor of this, and not being based on comp, is a confirmation of comp,  
not a critics. I give a complete axiomatisation of all what appears,  
from the machine's pov,  beyond computations and proof. So I agree a  
lot with your point here.
Well, I don't know the truth, and I am just saying that what you say  
here is a consequence of comp, often not well understood by people  
having a reductionist conception of machine and numbers.






Neither
can they be derived from it.


Physicality can be derived. And has to be derived (by UDA). Both  
quanta and qualia. Only the geography cannot be derived, but the  
physical laws can. You might elaborate why you think they can't.
Spirituality is a very large world, so it might depend on what you put  
in there. Arithmetical truth cannot be derived from comp nor from  
*any* effective theory, and in that or similar sense, I agree with you.






Your reasoning doesn't work (due to the reasons
I already gave and clarify below).


I have not yet seen those reasons. Please, I present an argument in 8  
steps, surely you can say which step you disagree on. Up to now I see  
only a critic of step zero (the definition of comp).





And no, there is no need for any evidence for some non-turing emulable
infinity in the brain. We just need non-turing emulable finite stuff  
in the

brain, and that's already there.


I thought you were immaterialist. What is that finite stuff which is  
non Turing emulable?
I really try to understand. Sometimes it seems you argue against comp,  
and sometimes it seems you argue against the proof that comp entails  
the Platonist reversal (to be short).





No one yet succeeded to emulate the brain,


This is not relevant for the reasoning (or show me where and why), in  
case you argue against the reasoning.




and we can just assume something can be substituted by an emulation  
if we

show that it can be.


This is not true. We might doubt it to be true and make a Pascal like  
sort of bet. Many proposition can be true without us being able to  
prove them. That's why we have constructive or intuitionist logic,  
when we want to avoid the classical ignorance, and the non  
constructive proofs, which are hardly avoidable in fundamental studies.




That seems quite unlikely, since already very simple objects like a  
stone

can't be emulated.


The notion of stone is no more well defined in the comp theory. Either  
you mean the stuff of the stone. Then comp makes it non Turing  
emulable, because that apparent stuff is emerging from an infinity  
of computations. So you are right. Or you mean by stone what we can do  
with a stone (a functional stone), and this will depend on the  
functionality that you ascribe to the stone.






If we simulate a stone, we just simulate our description
of it, we can't actually touch it and use it.


So you were talking about the functional stone. In this case we can  
simulate the couple you + the stone in a way such that you will not  
see the difference (assuming comp).





BTW, I am not saying this non-turing emulable stuff is some mysterious
primitive matter that actually 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Dec 2011, at 13:22, benjayk wrote:




John Mikes wrote:


Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to  
agree,

please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit).


I agree wholheartedly!
That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and  
pretends to be

a proof (or at least a valid reasoning) for something that can't be
concluded through reason.


But it can still be concluded through reason starting from an  
hypothesis.





It is very immodest to just disregard all
criticism of the argument (and to defend that with you don't know  
what
you're talking about), and then claim to be modest by virtue of not  
taken

the assumption for granted.
Taken the validity of reasoning for granted is not much more modest  
than

taking assumptions for granted,


Absolutely not. The validity of a reasoning can be peer reviewed. The  
truth of an assumption cannot.





since really the reasoning itself depends on
many unstated assumption.


Which one?



In this case, for example, only materialism or computational  
immaterialism

can be true,


This statement if false, and has never been made in any of my post.  
All what is *concluded* is that (weak) materialism is incompatible  
with computationalism. That's quite different. In one case you say  
that there is only two options, and in the second case you say that  
two options (among perhaps an infinity of others) cannot be taken  
together. It is a bit like a confusion between ((not A) OR (not B))  
and (A OR B). This is non valid, even with the excluded third principle.





it is meaningful to say YES to something that is subjectively
not happening, etc...


If someone asks me do you want to be NOT tortured, I will say yes,  
and I hope nothing will happen.



I don't *know* the reasoning is false, but I can see plainly that is  
not

quite as objectively valid as Bruno wants to present it as.


It is up to you to tell us what is the step you consider non valid,  
and why.
Up to now, I might have missed your point, but it seems to me that it  
concerns only the possibility of comp, which is not a relevant point  
concerning the reasoning.





Being able to say I DUNNO! is, in my opinion, one of the most  
important

steps in really being able to experience reality and ourselves in an
unbiased and clear manner.


It helps to approach that, probably. And certainly for machine. I agree.




As long as we cling to knowledge, we are looking at our ideas of  
reality and

ourselves, not at reality as it actually is.


That's indeed the key to understand the difference between belief and  
knowledge, dream and reality,  Bp and Bp  p, etc.
But nobody can talk in any third person way of what reality actually  
is, because the only reality we can undoubtably know *as such* is our  
private and non rationally-communicable consciousness.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-01 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:



  Bruno Marchal wrote:

  I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.

  If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
  life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
  So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I
  have no
  doubt that this is true.

 OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
 our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
 operational way by the yes doctor thought experiment. Most people
 understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for
 example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with
 respect to such a possible substitution.

This is the first problem. It's not that the brain has to be
privileged to make it impossible to simulate, no organ can be
simulated, it's just that it is possible to simulate some of the
functions of an organ to the extent that the person as a whole, i.e.
the inhabitant(s) of the brain, can't tell the difference.

The brain is a totally. different. story. First of all, you could have
a crowbar poking through your skull and not know it if the parts of
your brain that related to that awareness (and the pain thereof) were
damaged, so subjective accounts of success are not reliable. Secondly,
objective accounts are also unreliable owing to the privacy of
subjectivity. Finally, the brain being our only source of experience
at all, cannot be compared to anything else in the cosmos. No person
has ever existed outside of a brain as far as we know, so we cannot
presume that the brain itself or a person can be simulated. It simply
may not work that way at all. A person may be a continuity of
unreproducible material + semantic happenstance which builds upon
itself cumulatively and idiopathically.

We might be our brain and our brain may be much more than it appears
to us from the outside or the inside, but there is nothing to suggest
that there is a such thing as an arithmetic essence which is
independent of physics and is deterministic. It is only through our
brain-grounded subjectivity that we believe there is any such thing as
pattern or arithmetic. It's just one way that we make sense of our
world.


  It is also not an abstract
  digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a
  biological being
  is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
  experience beyond physicality and computability).

 But all universal machine have a link with something beyond
 physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond the
 computable. So your point is not valid.

Just because computational truth is rooted in non-comp doesn't mean
that it is the same non-comp as organic subjectivity.



  Neither
  can they be derived from it.

 Physicality can be derived. And has to be derived (by UDA). Both
 quanta and qualia.

I don't think qualia can be derived. I don't think a digital machine
can know the difference between visual qualia and aural qualia if they
yield the same functionality.

 Only the geography cannot be derived, but the
 physical laws can. You might elaborate why you think they can't.

Physical laws are a posteriori analytical abstractions based on our
shared experiences of concrete physical events. The laws in themselves
have no existence or power to physically bring anything into
existence. If I understand how gold is different from lead, that does
not give me the power to turn one into the other just be thinking
about it. You have to physically make the change.


  In the reasoning we use the fact that you are told in advance. That
  you cannot see the difference is the comp assumption.
  Ah, OK. If you can't notice you are being substituted the very
  statement
  that you are being substituted is meaningless.

 Why? I can say yes to the doctor, and tell him that it seems that the
 artificial brain is 100% OK, because I don't notice the difference,
 and then he can show me a scan of my skull, and I can see the
 evidences for the artificial brain. So I can believe that I have
 perfectly survived with that digital brain.

If you have no memory, then you can't notice the difference. It
doesn't mean you have survived perfectly.


  Unfortunately then we could as well base
  the argument on 1+1=3 or there are pink unicorn in my room even
  though I
  don't notice them, so it's worthless.

 This does not follow. We do have biological evidence that the brain is
 a Turing emulable entity. It is deducible from other independent
 hypothesis (like the idea that QM is (even just approximately)
 correct, for example).
 You don't seem to realize, a bit like Craig, that to define a non-comp
 object, you need to do some hard work.

No, it's only hard work because you are thinking about it the wrong
way. It's actually very easy, as hinted at by the simplicity of how it
is defined in 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-01 Thread meekerdb

On 12/1/2011 4:22 AM, benjayk wrote:


John Mikes wrote:

Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree,
please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit).


I agree wholheartedly!
That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and pretends to be
a proof (or at least a valid reasoning) for something that can't be
concluded through reason. It is very immodest to just disregard all
criticism of the argument (and to defend that with you don't know what
you're talking about), and then claim to be modest by virtue of not taken
the assumption for granted.
Taken the validity of reasoning for granted is not much more modest than
taking assumptions for granted, since really the reasoning itself depends on
many unstated assumption.


I think you are confusing reasoning and logical deduction.  Logical deduction is narrow 
and it never arrives at anything not implicit in its assumptions (although they may be 
surprising).  Reasoning is the general term for finding reasons to believe or act on one 
proposition or another, and can be as broad as you want.


Brent


In this case, for example, only materialism or computational immaterialism
can be true, it is meaningful to say YES to something that is subjectively
not happening, etc...
I don't *know* the reasoning is false, but I can see plainly that is not
quite as objectively valid as Bruno wants to present it as.

Being able to say I DUNNO! is, in my opinion, one of the most important
steps in really being able to experience reality and ourselves in an
unbiased and clear manner.
As long as we cling to knowledge, we are looking at our ideas of reality and
ourselves, not at reality as it actually is.

benjayk


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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-29 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
 
 If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of  
 life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I have no
doubt that this is true.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 When I look
 at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological being,  
 not a
 computer.
 
 Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a  
 computer, then tell me what.
Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it is not
a computer in the sense of physical computer. It is also not an abstract
digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a biological being
is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
experience beyond physicality and computability).
Neither physicality nor spirituality can be reduced to computations. Neither
can they be derived from it. Your reasoning doesn't work (due to the reasons
I already gave and clarify below).

And no, there is no need for any evidence for some non-turing emulable
infinity in the brain. We just need non-turing emulable finite stuff in the
brain, and that's already there. No one yet succeeded to emulate the brain,
and we can just assume something can be substituted by an emulation if we
show that it can be.
That seems quite unlikely, since already very simple objects like a stone
can't be emulated. If we simulate a stone, we just simulate our description
of it, we can't actually touch it and use it. 

BTW, I am not saying this non-turing emulable stuff is some mysterious
primitive matter that actually no one can show the existence of. It is
consciousness, and you can see for yourself that it exists.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 It's harder to dinstinguish
 yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological
 selves,
 because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that
 computers
 lack.

 Ah?
 I can see that I am physically/biologically seperate from you,
 
 You cannot see that.
???
Of course I can see that. We don't share the same brain and body, relatively
speaking. Of course we can't be seperate in any ultimate way (even just
according to QM), but I don't say that.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 while we
 could be both simulated on one computer, without any clear physical  
 dividing
 barrier.
 
 All my point is that once we assume comp, the word physical can no  
 more be taken as granted.
No, that's not your only point as presented by you. You say that assuming
COMP experience is related only to a measure on the computations.
You can't just assume there is only computational immaterialism and
materialsm.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 You seem to *presuppose* a primary physical universe (Aristotle). I do  
 not.
I don't either. Frankly I wonder why you think that, given that I have taken
a very obvious non-material standpoint in our discussions thus far.
It somehow seems like you pretend that all opinions except your own and the
ones of your favorite opponents (the ones you can easily refute) do not
exist.
Honestly I am quite stupid to discuss with someone that just chooses to
plainly ignore everything that doesn't fit into his own preconceived notions
of what someone that's criticizing is saying.
It is quite strange to say over and over again that I haven't studied your
arguments (I have, though obviously I can't understand all the details,
given how complicated they are), while you don't even bother to remember the
most fundamental premise of my argumentation (non-materialism). It is like I
was saying to you: Oh it seems to me you just presuppose that we are
material computers, that's why your argument works.
Your argument may work against materialism (I am not sure, I don't take
materialism seriously anyway - frankly materialism is a joke, since
materialist are not even capable to say what matter is supposed to be), but
you don't take into account any of the alternatives that can be taken more
seriously (any sort of non-materialism).

It seems very much you presuppose a purely material or computational
ontology.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 We can only say YES if we assume there is no self-referential loop
 between
 my instantiation and my environment (my instantiation influences
 what world
 I am in, the world I am in influences my instantiation, etc...).

 Why? Such loops obviously exist (statistically), and the relative
 proportion statistics remains unchanged, when doing the substitution
 at the right level. If such loop plays a role in consciousness, you
 have to enlarge the digital generalized brain. Or comp is wrong,
 'course.
 I think it is self-refuting if we not already take the conclusion for
 granted (saying YES only based on the faith we are already purely  
 digital).
 Imagine substituting our whole generalized brain (let's say the  
 milky way).
 Then 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-29 Thread John Mikes
Dear Bruno,

I agree with you (almost) completely that we (bio-beings) are computers,
except for the *diminishing factor* we HAVE to include into a computer as
a machine of knowable components and capabilities, observed WITHIN our
perspectives as of yesterday.
Your term universal computer may fit better: an infinite 'machine' with
infinite capabilities/domain of which we (may) select aspects we DO know
of... (That may be MY version as I understand (or don't) it. The
humanized size reduced description.
Computer BTW is called in other languages something like 'calculational
machine' which separates it sharply from the more subtle sense of
'computing in English (I think even more in French) as closer to mentally
put together straight from the Latin origin. The calculational aspect - I
think - dates back to Babbage way before Turing. GAI applies series of
thoughts to 'compute' instead of numbers (sorry!) and 'meanings' are the
result. (Nevertheless I consider AI still a humanly limited art, since it
starts from what we can
observe and deduce and arrives at - similarly - what we can observe and
deduce (even if surprised).)

The bio - indeed one of the two science-domains we know the least of (the
other is neurology/psych) includes infinite networks of influences, applies
infinite inputs and we observe only part of them: the perceived reality
part. E.g. a cell does not end at its outer membrane and those
characteristics WE apply. It reacts to wider physical domains and
not-so-physical procedures as well.
In my agnostic view I do not presume what kind of 'items' populate the
infinite (beyond our models) complexity of everything (call it: existence)
what kind of relations they may have what we translate in our ignorance as
our world (call it:* physical*).
We cannot even look beyond our limited models of known items/aspects of
yesterday. We (conventional science) explain them all in the framework of
our knowledge base (of yesterday) and improve on THAT whenever we 'get'
something more to it.

Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree,
please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit).

John Mikes

On Tue, Nov 29, 2011 at 12:44 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
 
  If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
  life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
 So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I have no
 doubt that this is true.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  When I look
  at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological being,
  not a
  computer.
 
  Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a
  computer, then tell me what.
 Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it is not
 a computer in the sense of physical computer. It is also not an abstract
 digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a biological being
 is physical and spiritual (meaning related to subjective conscious
 experience beyond physicality and computability).
 Neither physicality nor spirituality can be reduced to computations.
 Neither
 can they be derived from it. Your reasoning doesn't work (due to the
 reasons
 I already gave and clarify below).

 And no, there is no need for any evidence for some non-turing emulable
 infinity in the brain. We just need non-turing emulable finite stuff in the
 brain, and that's already there. No one yet succeeded to emulate the brain,
 and we can just assume something can be substituted by an emulation if we
 show that it can be.
 That seems quite unlikely, since already very simple objects like a stone
 can't be emulated. If we simulate a stone, we just simulate our description
 of it, we can't actually touch it and use it.

 BTW, I am not saying this non-turing emulable stuff is some mysterious
 primitive matter that actually no one can show the existence of. It is
 consciousness, and you can see for yourself that it exists.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  It's harder to dinstinguish
  yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological
  selves,
  because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that
  computers
  lack.
 
  Ah?
  I can see that I am physically/biologically seperate from you,
 
  You cannot see that.
 ???
 Of course I can see that. We don't share the same brain and body,
 relatively
 speaking. Of course we can't be seperate in any ultimate way (even just
 according to QM), but I don't say that.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  while we
  could be both simulated on one computer, without any clear physical
  dividing
  barrier.
 
  All my point is that once we assume comp, the word physical can no
  more be taken as granted.
 No, that's not your only point as presented by you. You say that assuming
 COMP experience is related only to a measure on the computations.
 You can't 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Nov 2011, at 16:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




since an uploaded digital mind could also
be part of a lot of dreamy realities


It is a part of a lot of dreamy realities, without any uploading.  
By
definition of the body and of the digital level of substitution, if  
we
upload ourself in a computer, we conserve the same relative  
proportion

of the dreamy realities.
Yes, if a correct substitution level exists. My point is that it in  
the

general case no digital substitution level can exists, because of a
self-referential loop between the substitution and the environment /  
between
the computation and the instantiation of the computation (see below  
for a

more detailed argument).


Just put the environment needed in the 'generalized brain'. Steps 1-6  
becomes a bit awkward but is still valid, and step seven remains  
unchanged.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



Our brain avoids that by being a structure with a quite unique
instantiation,


Current physics makes this very doubtful. Assuming QM, there is only
quantum clouds of brains. Unless you presuppose the old copenhagen  
QM,

which does not make sense to me.

I don't mean unique in a physical way, but in a subjective way. It is
subjectively easier to see the difference between brains, but harder  
to see
the difference between computers (that may be physically equal, but  
running
different code). The uniqueness of the brain is its uniqueness of  
subjective

instantiation.


Both with comp and QM the brain is hardly unique. Then the  
dissemblance between brain is a contingent fact, unless you abandon  
mechanism right now. This means that you are just stating that you  
believe in non-comp. I am agnostic on comp and on non-comp.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



and a quite clear subjective dividing barrier to virtual
realities (I am not a/ in a computer).


How do you know that?
I can't know that, indeed I suspect that even just my local personal  
self is

to some extent distributed among all computations.


Good intuition, and a necessity assuming comp.




I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.


If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of  
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.





When I look
at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological being,  
not a

computer.


Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a  
computer, then tell me what.
I discovered the notion of computer by studying the molecular genetics  
of bacteria. (Turing) universality is cheap.


Don't confuse a computer (the concept) with a keyboard in front of a  
TV (one possible incarnation of a computer).








Bruno Marchal wrote:



It's harder to dinstinguish
yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological
selves,
because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that
computers
lack.


Ah?

I can see that I am physically/biologically seperate from you,


You cannot see that.




while we
could be both simulated on one computer, without any clear physical  
dividing

barrier.


All my point is that once we assume comp, the word physical can no  
more be taken as granted.
You seem to *presuppose* a primary physical universe (Aristotle). I do  
not.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



We can only say YES if we assume there is no self-referential loop
between
my instantiation and my environment (my instantiation influences
what world
I am in, the world I am in influences my instantiation, etc...).


Why? Such loops obviously exist (statistically), and the relative
proportion statistics remains unchanged, when doing the substitution
at the right level. If such loop plays a role in consciousness, you
have to enlarge the digital generalized brain. Or comp is wrong,
'course.

I think it is self-refuting if we not already take the conclusion for
granted (saying YES only based on the faith we are already purely  
digital).
Imagine substituting our whole generalized brain (let's say the  
milky way).

Then you cannot have access to the fact that the whole milky way was
substituted,


In the reasoning we use the fact that you are told in advance. That  
you cannot see the difference is the comp assumption.






because otherwise the whole milky way would have to appear to
be a computer running a simulation of the milky way, making our  
experience
drastically different (which is not possible, given that our  
experience
should remain invariant). But if we don't have access to the fact/ 
the way
that we are being substituted, it makes no sense to say YES, because  
we

can't even say whether are being substituted. If a substitution is not
taking place subjectively, the question of saying YES becomes  
meaningless

(making COMP meaningless).


Of course not. You talk like a doctor who would provides artificial  
brain without asking the permission of the patient. Then comp entails  
that, if the doctor is choosing the right subst 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Nov 2011, at 15:14, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:


So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the
abstract goal is immortality, but full of sense if the goal  
consists

in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it
'naturally'.
But as soon as we upload ourselves, we can't make sure we uniquely  
interact

with our usual physical reality,


Indeed. But that is an explainable facts in the comp theory. We cannot  
know our substitution level, we cannot know if comp is true. It is a  
bit banal: we cannot know if we will survive any next experiment or  
experience, even of sleeping or drinking a cup of tea.







since an uploaded digital mind could also
be part of a lot of dreamy realities


It is a part of a lot of dreamy realities, without any uploading. By  
definition of the body and of the digital level of substitution, if we  
upload ourself in a computer, we conserve the same relative proportion  
of the dreamy realities.





(/simulations/virtual words) - except
if we assume materialism, which postulates there is an objective  
physical
wold (in which case we have no computational reason to suspect  
substitutions

will work, we would have to rely on blind faith).


Not at all. If there is an objective primary physical world, we must  
expect any digital substitution to be equivalent with (absolute)  
death. In the worst case, we become zombie. No worry: there is no  
evidence at all for an objective primary physical world.
But with comp, there is an objective, first person plural, physical  
reality. Indeed, comp makes it very stable and solid, because it  
relies on objective non physical relations between the numbers.






Our brain avoids that by being a structure with a quite unique
instantiation,


Current physics makes this very doubtful. Assuming QM, there is only  
quantum clouds of brains. Unless you presuppose the old copenhagen QM,  
which does not make sense to me.





and a quite clear subjective dividing barrier to virtual
realities (I am not a/ in a computer).


How do you know that?





That's why I don't buy COMP: As soon as we substitute ourselves, we  
will

inevitably change our subjective relative environment, making the
substitution fail.


Only if we are wrong on the choice of the substitution level (by  
definition).





If we are a computer, we can subjectively interface much
more strongly with all the computers that our computational  
instantiation is
(could be) a part of and interfere with all the simulations that are  
hard to

dinstinguish from what goes on your computer.


Yes. Even up to the point that  your computer is not well defined.  
You (1-you) have an infinity of computers/brain.






It's harder to dinstinguish
yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological  
selves,
because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that  
computers

lack.


Ah?




And we can't assume we are able to find the right world we would like
to be in, without subjectively developing a brain (which will make the
substitution seem to never have happened).


If it is done at the right level, you will know. Just by seeing the  
doctor's bill, or by feeling dizzy when going through some strong  
magnetic field, like in airport (even with an artificial heart that  
can can happen).





We can only say YES if we assume there is no self-referential loop  
between
my instantiation and my environment (my instantiation influences  
what world

I am in, the world I am in influences my instantiation, etc...).


Why? Such loops obviously exist (statistically), and the relative  
proportion statistics remains unchanged, when doing the substitution  
at the right level. If such loop plays a role in consciousness, you  
have to enlarge the digital generalized brain. Or comp is wrong,  
'course.





But we
really have to assume such a loop exists if we are already part of the
matrix (since everything in the matrix is connected).


Such connection are just made of the sharing of the computations.



It matters how our computations are instantiated because of  
subjective

self-reference.


Sure. That is why we have to choose the right level. And this needs  
always some act of faith. To be sure, evidences are that the level is  
rather high (chemistry of the biological brain).




OK, we could say YES based on the faith that subjective self- 
reference will

develop a world for the digital brain that is similar to the old world
(though that seems very unlikely to me), but this is not YES qua  
computatio.


That is exactly the YES qua computatio. You let the artificial machine  
handling the 3-person self-reference (at the hopefully right level),  
and you bet you are still confronted with the local persistant true  
illusion.


Of course in science we don't search for any certainty. This should  
not add doubt on what we are already certain, but keep for ourself,  
because it is not publicly sharable. The 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 24 Nov 2011, at 23:00, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com 
 wrote:



Jason Resch-2 wrote:

 On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:


 On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

 The simulation argument:

 http://www.simulation-**argument.com/simulation.htmlhttp://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html 



 If any civilization in this universe or others has reached the  
point
 where they choose to explore consciousness (rather than or in  
addition

 to
 exploring their environment) then there are super-intelligences  
which

 may
 chooses to see what it is like to be you, or any other human, or  
any

 other
 species.  After they generate this experience, they may  
integrate its

 memories into the larger super-mind, and therefore there are
 continuations
 where you become one with god.  Alternate post-singularity
 civilizations
 may maintain individuality, in which case, any one person  
choosing to

 experience another being's life will after experiencing that life
 awaken
 to find themselves in a type of heaven or nirvana offering  
unlimited
 freedom, from which they can come back to earth or other  
physical worlds

 as
 they choose (via simulation).

 Therefore, even for those that don't survive to see the human race
 become
 a trans-humanist, omega-point civilization, and for those that  
don't

 upload
 their brain, there remain paths to these other realities.   I  
think this
 can address the eternal aging implied by many-worlds:  
eventually, the
 probability that you survive by other means, e.g., waking up as  
a being

 in
 a post-singularity existence, exceeds the probability of continued
 survival
 through certain paths in the wave function.

 Jason


 Why stop there.  Carrying the argument to it's natural conclusion  
the
 above has already happened (infinitely many) times and we are now  
all in
 the simulation of the super-intelligent beings who long ago  
discovered

 that
 nirvana is too boring.

 Brent



 Brent,

 I agree.  About 10% of all humans who have ever lived are alive  
today.
  With a silicon-based brain, we could experience things about  
1,000,000
 times the rate our biological brains do.  If the humans that  
uploaded
 themselves spend just 1 day (real time) experiencing other human  
lives

 that
 is equivalent to 40 human lifetimes worth of experience, and thus  
80% of
 all human lives experienced would be simulated ones. (After that 1  
day)
  This is after just one day, but such a civilization could thrive  
in this

 universe for trillions of years.

Isn't uploading somewhat superflous if we are already simulated?

If everyone were to think like that, then nothing would be  
simulated.  It is like deciding not to put on a seat belt when you  
go in a car because you believe in other branches you won't get in  
an accident in the first place.  The decisions we make affect the  
relative proportions and frequencies of events.


Yes, all simulations exist, no matter what. For example they exist in  
UD*, which belongs to a tiny part of arithmetical truth.
But we cannot effectively recognize ourselves in UD* (even if we knew  
our substitution level!, by the theorem of Rice in computer science),  
so it makes sense to change the probabilities of our first person  
extensions by personal decisions.
We can influence our first person future experiences, in the mundane  
life and in the many possible form of after-life. This is related with  
the existence of local, terrestrial, free will in the determinist frame.
So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the  
abstract goal is immortality, but full of sense if the goal consists  
in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it  
'naturally'.


Bruno





It seems this whole argument more plausibly means that there is no
simulation needed in the first place (it already there anyway). It  
seems
that ultimately we all will inveitably get lost in our simulations  
and all
the others that we could be a part of (how would we avoid this?), so  
no one
knows anymore what is simulated and what not, and who simulates and  
who is
simluating (and how it is simulated), what is past and what is  
future, who
is who, etc... So ultimately, there are not really concrete  
simulations
going on at all, since there are so intermingled with each other and  
with
reality that we can't distinguish different simulations and  
simulations

from reality (in an absolute way).

I mostly agree with the above.  Reality and paths through it are  
very complex, and what is simulated vs. what isn't may be impossible  
to distinguish.


Everything occurs that subjectively can occur. Subjectivity orders  
the space
of infinite possibilities, and learns to navigate it (creating a  
subjective
future). Normal, material reality is just the ordering mechanism  
to avoid
getting lost over and over again in 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-25 Thread benjayk


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk
 benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
 


 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 
  On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
  The simulation argument:
 
  http://www.simulation-**argument.com/simulation.html
 http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html
 
  If any civilization in this universe or others has reached the point
  where they choose to explore consciousness (rather than or in
 addition
  to
  exploring their environment) then there are super-intelligences which
  may
  chooses to see what it is like to be you, or any other human, or any
  other
  species.  After they generate this experience, they may integrate its
  memories into the larger super-mind, and therefore there are
  continuations
  where you become one with god.  Alternate post-singularity
  civilizations
  may maintain individuality, in which case, any one person choosing to
  experience another being's life will after experiencing that life
  awaken
  to find themselves in a type of heaven or nirvana offering unlimited
  freedom, from which they can come back to earth or other physical
 worlds
  as
  they choose (via simulation).
 
  Therefore, even for those that don't survive to see the human race
  become
  a trans-humanist, omega-point civilization, and for those that don't
  upload
  their brain, there remain paths to these other realities.   I think
 this
  can address the eternal aging implied by many-worlds: eventually, the
  probability that you survive by other means, e.g., waking up as a
 being
  in
  a post-singularity existence, exceeds the probability of continued
  survival
  through certain paths in the wave function.
 
  Jason
 
 
  Why stop there.  Carrying the argument to it's natural conclusion the
  above has already happened (infinitely many) times and we are now all
 in
  the simulation of the super-intelligent beings who long ago discovered
  that
  nirvana is too boring.
 
  Brent
 
 
 
  Brent,
 
  I agree.  About 10% of all humans who have ever lived are alive today.
   With a silicon-based brain, we could experience things about 1,000,000
  times the rate our biological brains do.  If the humans that uploaded
  themselves spend just 1 day (real time) experiencing other human lives
  that
  is equivalent to 40 human lifetimes worth of experience, and thus 80%
 of
  all human lives experienced would be simulated ones. (After that 1 day)
   This is after just one day, but such a civilization could thrive in
 this
  universe for trillions of years.
 
 Isn't uploading somewhat superflous if we are already simulated?

 
 If everyone were to think like that, then nothing would be simulated.  It
 is like deciding not to put on a seat belt when you go in a car because
 you
 believe in other branches you won't get in an accident in the first place.
  The decisions we make affect the relative proportions and frequencies of
 events.
We may already have simulated ourselves an infinite number of times. If we
decide to simulate ourselves over and over again, we will get in an infinite
cycle of getting lost in our simulations over and over again.
When we just stop, we realize there is already infinite simulations of
everything possible going on.
This is just the most natural conclusion (like Brent said).

We don't have to simulate anything, because we can't avoid that everything
is already being simulated. The only reason to simulate somehing is if the
experience of simulating something is useful (beyond the benefit of
transcending physical limitations, you can do that in dreams as well - just
learn lucid dreaming, it seems to be more rich than any virtual reality
could be and it has the benefit we seemingly don't get lost and addicted to
it, like with games), and we should only do that while making sure there is
a clear difference between simulation and reality (no universal uploading) -
otherwise we have achieved nothing whatsoever, we'll just join the usual
dreamscape. I am not sure under what circumstances very big and involving
simulations would be useful. It might very well turn out the main reason for
simulating anything is discovering the relationship of simulations and
real reality in general. Getting very involved in a simulation may be
impossible (let alone uploading) , since we inevitably will lose contact to
reality (and not just temporarily) quite quickly if we do this. We already
can get dangerously much lost in computer games (often a whole youth is
wasted this way), which are comparitively extremely uninvolving (they are
just pictures on a screen and sound, you don't physically feel anything and
there is a clear sperating barrier between you and the game).
In my youth my main activity was playing computer games, and even though now
I seldomly play games now, and in a casual way, my unconscious was very
polluted by it for a long time and still is to some extent. I 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-25 Thread benjayk


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the  
 abstract goal is immortality, but full of sense if the goal consists  
 in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it  
 'naturally'.
But as soon as we upload ourselves, we can't make sure we uniquely interact
with our usual physical reality, since an uploaded digital mind could also
be part of a lot of dreamy realities (/simulations/virtual words) - except
if we assume materialism, which postulates there is an objective physical
wold (in which case we have no computational reason to suspect substitutions
will work, we would have to rely on blind faith).
Our brain avoids that by being a structure with a quite unique
instantiation, and a quite clear subjective dividing barrier to virtual
realities (I am not a/ in a computer).

That's why I don't buy COMP: As soon as we substitute ourselves, we will
inevitably change our subjective relative environment, making the
substitution fail. If we are a computer, we can subjectively interface much
more strongly with all the computers that our computational instantiation is
(could be) a part of and interfere with all the simulations that are hard to
dinstinguish from what goes on your computer. It's harder to dinstinguish
yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological selves,
because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that computers
lack. And we can't assume we are able to find the right world we would like
to be in, without subjectively developing a brain (which will make the
substitution seem to never have happened).
We can only say YES if we assume there is no self-referential loop between
my instantiation and my environment (my instantiation influences what world
I am in, the world I am in influences my instantiation, etc...). But we
really have to assume such a loop exists if we are already part of the
matrix (since everything in the matrix is connected).
It matters how our computations are instantiated because of subjective
self-reference.
OK, we could say YES based on the faith that subjective self-reference will
develop a world for the digital brain that is similar to the old world
(though that seems very unlikely to me), but this is not YES qua computatio.

benjayk

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 23 Nov 2011, at 17:59, John Mikes wrote:


To the posts below:
where is this 'immortality' come from at all? in the 'existence' in  
change it is implied that what comes around goes around, the rest is  
our imagination afraid of dying. Our (living???) complexity  
changes int other constructs. Nothing dies, just transforms.  
Relations change. Immortality implies mortality, which is  
unreasonable. Transfer into 'bio' or 'silicon? brings me to the 2nd  
point:


On a Schmidhuber-Zuse-Lloyd-Bostrum-Fredkin hypothesis, that the  
cosmos is a quantum computer, a hypercomputer, a simulation...
reminds me of the previous times metaphors, when we (the cosmos?)  
were steam engines, etc., because THAT was the actual image of the  
level of thinking. Today it is the computer - that embryonic machine  
we so far constructed on 'silicon' basis. Not the last step in our  
development. Our 'simulations' are mirrored by the now images as  
well.


Those explanations are not incompatible, and we have to use the  
simplest and clearest explanations, if only we want to be able to be  
corrected and to progress. From the evidences we have we are steam  
engine and, at least, computer.





Smart people are wasting their time into arguments not reasonably  
thought over.


We can only propose theories and see if they fit with the observation.



I rather confess to my agnosticism: I dunno,


In science we are always agnostic, except when a theory is refuted. We  
have only beliefs, and they can be true by chance, but this we never  
know as such.





but do not present fancy theories to hide my ignorance.


But then you will be unable to be shown wrong, and you can't progress.  
Fancy theories is all we have. We should just not pretend that they  
are the truth.



I tell that we are far from the omniscient level and I expect many  
novelties to show up - we do not even fantasize about - today.


Good intuition ... which is already explainable with the theory above.  
If we are universal machine, then we are forever ignorant even just  
with respect to what numbers can do. As far as mechanism is correct we  
can correctly believe (know)  why. Arithmetic is full of surprises and  
we cannot not expect novelties to show up. Here a theory explains and  
make necessary one of you main persistent point.


Actually the Schmidhuber-Suze-LLoyd-Bostrom-Fredkin hypothesis (that  
the cosmos is a quantum computer) has been refuted a long time ago. If  
we are universal machine, reality is not. Even if the quantum  
computing machine wins the statistical game in the limit, which is  
experimentally plausible. But this has to be justified from less  
demanding hypothesis, if only to be able to distinguish the qualia  
from the quanta (but also to get an explanation where such machine  
comes from.


Those researcher rely on a conception of Soul and Matter which comes  
from Aristotle and is incompatible with mechanism. Given that they use  
mechanism, they are inconsistent. It is a case where we can't be  
agnostic, we can know that the theory is inconsistent. Neither Mind,  
nor the Cosmos (the Mind's border) can be a computer. They are not  
aware of the distinction between first and third person views, nor are  
they aware of the first person indeterminacy.
It looks like many still fail to see this clearly. This does not  
jeopardize all their conclusions, to be sure.


Bruno





Otherwise I appreciate the in part concluding results: our present  
line of technology, what I try to enjoy with thanks.

John Mikes



On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 11:40 AM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Thanks Jason,
Yes, I am not sure if QTI is really Immortality, as in post- 
mortality, if memory, and personality, are destroyed? To a hammer,  
the entire world looks like a nail; as the Japanese expression goes,  
so I personally wonder, if the old 'move' function of data  
processing, can somehow be analogous, to our minds being moved  
elsewhere-sort of a copy paste function? One has to have a program  
or a developer to execute the 'move' function, as I see it.


 Therefore, even for those that don't survive to see the human  
race become a trans-humanist, omega-point civilization, and for  
those that don't upload their brain, there remain paths to these  
other realities.   I think this can address the eternal aging  
implied by many-worlds: eventually, the probability that you survive  
by other means, e.g., waking up as a being in a post-singularity  
existence, exceeds the probability of continued survival through  
certain paths in the wave function.


On a Schmidhiber-Zuse-Lloyd-Bostrum-Fredkin hypothesis, that the  
cosmos is a quantum computer, a hypercomputer, a simulation; we must  
first ascertain, how we as subroutines in such a cosmos, can  
determine if this is fact or not?  Because this kind of pursuit  
seems so complicated,and frustrating, most scholars just give up on  
the question. Then the question has to be asked, what is the 

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-23 Thread Jason Resch
The simulation argument:

http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html

If any civilization in this universe or others has reached the point where
they choose to explore consciousness (rather than or in addition to
exploring their environment) then there are super-intelligences which may
chooses to see what it is like to be you, or any other human, or any other
species.  After they generate this experience, they may integrate its
memories into the larger super-mind, and therefore there are continuations
where you become one with god.  Alternate post-singularity civilizations
may maintain individuality, in which case, any one person choosing to
experience another being's life will after experiencing that life awaken
to find themselves in a type of heaven or nirvana offering unlimited
freedom, from which they can come back to earth or other physical worlds as
they choose (via simulation).

Therefore, even for those that don't survive to see the human race become a
trans-humanist, omega-point civilization, and for those that don't upload
their brain, there remain paths to these other realities.   I think this
can address the eternal aging implied by many-worlds: eventually, the
probability that you survive by other means, e.g., waking up as a being in
a post-singularity existence, exceeds the probability of continued survival
through certain paths in the wave function.

Jason

On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 2:36 PM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

 Outside of QTI, does anyone consider any hypothesis as 'viable' for
 immortality? I am not sure that I mean, never dying, I think I mean, some
 kind of continuation, beyond our current 'mortality ?  I am not meaning
 Uploading while still alive, or brain in a vat; but basically, an afterlife
 of some kind? I ask, realizing, that cosmology and consciousness, do not,
 by necessity, dovetail (UDA?). Thanks for your patience, everyone.

 Mitch


 -Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Tue, Nov 15, 2011 9:21 am
 Subject: Re: The consciousness singularity


 On 14 Nov 2011, at 18:39, benjayk wrote:

 
  I have a few more ideas to add, considering how this singularity
  might work
  in practice.
 
  I think that actually consciousness does not start in a linear
  fashion in
  our coherent material world, but creates an infinity of semi-coherent
  beginngs all the time (at all levels of consciousness), which might be
  termed virtual experiences, that exist right now. These are
  experiences
  are more akin to exploring the possibility space than having a
  consistent
  world (though they have to have a relative consistency, no one wants
  to
  experience random noise). This would explain the encounters with
  intelligent
  entities encountered on drug trips (sometimes dreams and
  meditation), that
  seem very conscious. It seems hard to explain where they could come
  from in
  coventional terms (future, spririt world, parallel universes,
  etc...?).

 Why not mind subroutine? Living in Platonia, and manifesting through
 brain's module?
 This is already the case if mechanism is correct.



  My
  theory is that they are virtual beings, that really experience, but
  in them
  consciousness has not yet decided by which real entitiy (like a
  human) it
  is experienced, in which way the real subjective future will be
  experienced
  (there already might exist a virtual future, though), when it is
  experienced
  in reality and how exactly the experience is reflected to outside
  observers.

 The thema of this list is that virtual or possible = real. Real =
 virtual seen from inside.

 You are reintroducing a suspect reality selection principle, similar
 to the wave collapse.

 Bruno




  They are somehow left in abeyance.
  In the future, and partially already in the present, we might
  download these
  experiences and interface them with our normal history. With
  download, I
  mean experience them, and giving them a context, so they can become
  actual
  in a manner that makes sense in our reality. This can happen in our
  imagination, in our dreams, through playing games, reading books,
  surfing
  the internet and on trips.
  As we download the experience, we may infuse it with our
  personality/humaness (this often felt as merging with entities on
  trips),
  which leads to more consistent development in the virtual realm (so
  that
  entities can exist that are stable enough to make a clear and
  consistent
  communication possible).
  On the other hand, by downloading experiences, we can infuse our
  realm with
  creative new ideas (and the possibility of paranormal events), bring
  these
  virtual realm on earth.
 
  If we learn to navigate this virtual realm more efficiently in the
  future,
  it might be immensly powerful. For example, it allows the interaction
  between physically seperated entities.
  Or it may allow us to make time jumps (of course not collectively,
  since

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-23 Thread Spudboy100
Thanks Jason,
Yes, I am not sure if QTI is really Immortality, as in post-mortality, if  
memory, and personality, are destroyed? To a hammer, the entire world looks 
like  a nail; as the Japanese expression goes, so I personally wonder, if 
the old  'move' function of data processing, can somehow be analogous, to our 
minds being  moved elsewhere-sort of a copy paste function? One has to have 
a program or a  developer to execute the 'move' function, as I see it.
 
 Therefore, even for those that don't survive to see the human  race 
become a trans-humanist, omega-point civilization, and for those that don't  
upload their brain, there remain paths to these other realities.   I  think 
this can address the eternal aging implied by many-worlds: eventually, the  
probability that you survive by other means, e.g., waking up as a being in a  
post-singularity existence, exceeds the probability of continued survival  
through certain paths in the wave function.
 
On a Schmidhiber-Zuse-Lloyd-Bostrum-Fredkin hypothesis, that the cosmos is  
a quantum computer, a hypercomputer, a simulation; we must first ascertain, 
how  we as subroutines in such a cosmos, can determine if this is fact or 
not?   Because this kind of pursuit seems so complicated,and frustrating, 
most  scholars just give up on the question. Then the question has to be asked, 
what  is the pay off? My answer would be, post-mortality, not necessarilly  
immortality, in the eternal sense. Jokingly, I would add to my answer that, 
this  is the best offer you'll have all day! If we can prove this. 
 
If we can achieve post-mortality,(biological or silicon)  as Ettinger  
longed for, as Ray Kurzweil pursues, as the people at Alcor are going for, as  
well as Vernor Vinge's uploading, then all the better for us. Living on, 
seems  less severe than biologically perishing, first. But that choice (as far 
as  we now know) is not yet available to us. So the rough road of dying and 
hoping  along the way, that we are a simulation, that will be subject to 
recurrence, is  about all we have. 
 
Mitch

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-11-23 Thread John Mikes
To the posts below:
where is this 'immortality' come from at all? in the 'existence' in change
it is implied that what comes around goes around, the rest is our
imagination afraid of dying. Our (living???) complexity changes int other
constructs. Nothing dies, just transforms. Relations change. Immortality
implies mortality, which is unreasonable. Transfer into 'bio' or 'silicon?
brings me to the 2nd point:

*On a Schmidhuber-Zuse-Lloyd-Bostrum-Fredkin hypothesis, that the cosmos
is a quantum computer, a hypercomputer, a simulation...*
reminds me of the previous times metaphors, when we (the cosmos?) were
steam engines, etc., because THAT was the actual image of the level of
thinking. Today it is the computer - that embryonic machine we so far
constructed on 'silicon' basis. Not the last step in our development. Our
'simulations' are mirrored by the now images as well.
Smart people are wasting their time into arguments not reasonably thought
over.
I rather confess to my agnosticism: I dunno, but do not present fancy
theories to hide my ignorance. I tell that we are far from the omniscient
level and I expect many novelties to show up - we do not even fantasize
about - today.

Otherwise I appreciate the in part concluding results: our present line of
technology, what I try to enjoy with thanks.
John Mikes



On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 11:40 AM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

 **
 Thanks Jason,
 Yes, I am not sure if QTI is really Immortality, as in post-mortality, if
 memory, and personality, are destroyed? To a hammer, the entire world looks
 like a nail; as the Japanese expression goes, so I personally wonder, if
 the old 'move' function of data processing, can somehow be analogous, to
 our minds being moved elsewhere-sort of a copy paste function? One has to
 have a program or a developer to execute the 'move' function, as I see it.

  *Therefore, even for those that don't survive to see the human race
 become a trans-humanist, omega-point civilization, and for those that don't
 upload their brain, there remain paths to these other realities.   I think
 this can address the eternal aging implied by many-worlds: eventually, the
 probability that you survive by other means, e.g., waking up as a being in
 a post-singularity existence, exceeds the probability of continued survival
 through certain paths in the wave function.*
 **
 On a Schmidhiber-Zuse-Lloyd-Bostrum-Fredkin hypothesis, that the cosmos is
 a quantum computer, a hypercomputer, a simulation; we must first ascertain,
 how we as subroutines in such a cosmos, can determine if this is fact or
 not?  Because this kind of pursuit seems so complicated,and
 frustrating, most scholars just give up on the question. Then the question
 has to be asked, what is the pay off? My answer would be, post-mortality,
 not necessarilly immortality, in the eternal sense. Jokingly, I would add
 to my answer that, this is the best offer you'll have all day! If we can
 prove this.

 If we can achieve post-mortality,(biological or silicon)  as Ettinger
 longed for, as Ray Kurzweil pursues, as the people at Alcor are going for,
 as well as Vernor Vinge's uploading, then all the better for us. Living on,
 seems less severe than biologically perishing, first. But that choice (as
 far as we now know) is not yet available to us. So the rough road of dying
 and hoping along the way, that we are a simulation, that will be subject to
 recurrence, is about all we have.

 Mitch

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