### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even just the

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Le 11-oct.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit : David Nyman wrote: But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Le 10-oct.-06, à 22:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Bruno: you wrote: ...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ... Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1? Because it is equal to six. you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person

### RE: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

snip unless you can eyeball it you're not being scientific). The subtlety with 'objective scientific evidence' is that ultimately it is delivered into the private experiences of indiividual scientists. Only agreement as to what is evidenced makes it 'objective'. So the privacy of

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 5:56 PM Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:06 AM Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:06 AM Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 10, 8:31 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata,That's a feature, not a bug. and has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your sticking point, I

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Ah yes - I was confusing my 'isms. Eliminative materialism is an extreme type of physicalism, but physicalism is broader. What I meant was what you just stated - COMP is incompatible with physicalism, but not with materialism. As I understand it, physicalism denies any form of downward

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 9, 6:35 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? Bruno covers what he means by 'comp' pretty comprehensively in his various posts and papers. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. Not sure what you're getting

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-) For

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

1Z wrote: Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Yes, of course. But how are these properties supposed to simultaneously produce a state of consciousness stably linked to the 'computation' when this self-same computation could have been

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Yes, of course. But how are these properties supposed to simultaneously produce a state of consciousness stably linked to the 'computation' when this self-same

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes known as

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no need to reify the numbers. [...] I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be explained quite precisely why numbers (in a third person view-view) are

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going round in circles

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Johnathan, Nice one! :-) As far as I can see there is nothing a-priori which would make these two hypotheses mutually exclusive; one 'cause' is predator related, the other is resource related. I await with interest, but not bated breath, for an ecologist to tell us of any empirical evidence

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Hi Mark, Le 05-oct.-06, à 20:49, markpeaty a écrit : Bruno, I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons and Persons' by

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Bruno, I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons and Persons' by Derek Parfitt. His book is very dry in places but mostly very

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

On Thu, October 5, 2006 11:49, markpeaty wrote: That said, I read with interest a year or two ago about certain kinds of insects [I think they are in North America somewhere] which lie dormant in the earth in some pre-adult stage for a PRIME number of years, 11, 13, were chosen by different

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Le 02-oct.-06, à 18:03, markpeaty a écrit : I hope you will excuse my butting in here, but I was passing through on a different mission and became disturbed by reading some earlier posts of this thread. You are welcome. My 2 cents worth: I tend to think that David Nyman has the more

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

I hope you will excuse my butting in here, but I was passing through on a different mission and became disturbed by reading some earlier posts of this thread. My 2 cents worth: I tend to think that David Nyman has the more sceptically acceptable slant on this. Mathematics and logic are

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented procedures and actual occurrences of their application? David I did point out in my last

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented procedures and actual occurrences of their application?

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math concepts such as infinite sets

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

Peter; I try to keep out from the ongoing discussions lately (no succes to report) but sometimes I get carried away. I will barge in with 2 remarks into your text below John M --- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David Nyman wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I did point out in my last

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

David Nyman wrote: I fail to see any 'knock-down' character in this argument. Peter says that mathematical concepts don't refer to anything 'external', and on one level I agree with him. But they are surely derived from the contingent characteristics of experience, and AFAICS experience in

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (1) A general mathematical category is not the same as any specific physical thing But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this description to 'exist' apart from its

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair exists; as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular chair. Brent Meeker What follows is actually a very important and profound metaphysical point,

### Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Mathematical concepts are quite different. The key difference is that we *cannot* in fact dispense with mathematical descriptions and replace them with something else. We cannot *eliminate* mathematical concepts from our theories like we can with say 'chair'