Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-22 Thread Alberto G. Corona
2013/2/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a
 infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being
 eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid.



 That's correct.



 So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;)


 That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence the
 relative proportion of its consistent extensions.

  It may be under QM


 You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all case
 you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high probability
 to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground floor. If you jump out
 of the window, you might have a high probability to find yourself in a very
 painful situation, in some hospital. This can be argued in both QM, or
 directly in comp.


 If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical laws
 from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be just false,
 by leading to too much white rabbits.


But the observed   lawful behaviour of the (local) universe according with
QM, for example,  does not coerce the null hypothesis  to such consistency.
It may be possible a consistent universe at time T  and after that a rogue
universe where I suffer painful tortures, white rabbits appear by breaking
some causality laws but not challenging the continuation of life and
intelligence, at least for some time, so that anyone can observe it. Then a
mormal universe at T2 can proceed normally.

I guess it would be perfectly computable and mathematical (although with a
higher Kolmogorov complexity). What avoid that explosion of possibilities?.
That is the unreasonable dogmatic, but effective, assumption that puzzled
Einstein, that any reality is simple because it is what it is observed
locally.

And, if they exist, Do we should care for these other realities? It is all
this unobserved realities a scientific endavour or it is simply
extrapolations as a result of an aestethical or ideological drive?   I
suppose that questions like these appear here from time to time.


Bruno







 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will
 tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These
 aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to
 scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they
 call
 you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed
 back
 to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain
 experiments? and
 they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read
 the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens
 with
 the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to
 them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting
 test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture
 and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished,
 you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began.
 The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to
 your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and
 they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case
 of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Feb 2013, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:





2013/2/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted,  
then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild  
horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid.



That's correct.



So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing  
whatever ;)


That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence  
the relative proportion of its consistent extensions.


 It may be under QM


Plausibly. That makes my statement even more solid.





You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all  
case you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high  
probability to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground  
floor. If you jump out of the window, you might have a high  
probability to find yourself in a very painful situation, in some  
hospital. This can be argued in both QM, or directly in comp.


If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical  
laws from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be  
just false, by leading to too much white rabbits.


But the observed   lawful behaviour of the (local) universe  
according with QM, for example,  does not coerce the null  
hypothesis  to such consistency.


 It is comp that coerce for the null or everything hypothesis.  
And with comp the everything given by the additive and multiplicative  
number structure is already enough and not completeable for the  
ontology (and the epistemology is richer, and QM belongs or should  
belong to it).


Keep in mind I do not assume QM, nor non-QM.
In some context, I can talk like if QM was indeed the correct  
consequence of comp, but that remains to be seen.


I tend to think that QM is very plausible, because you can derive it  
from very small set of experience (like rotational two slits  
experience, four slits experience (Deutch), five Stern Gerlach  
experience (Swinger). But with comp, we have to derive the whole SWE,  
including the linearity, the real and complex numbers, the dimensional  
geometries, which are assumed to interpret those experiences.




It may be possible a consistent universe at time T  and after that  
a rogue universe where I suffer painful tortures, white rabbits  
appear by breaking some causality laws but not challenging the  
continuation of life and intelligence, at least for some time, so  
that anyone can observe it. Then a mormal universe at T2 can proceed  
normally.


We have to compute the comp-probability, or the QM-probability of  
this happening. If the comp-probability of white rabbits is big, then  
comp can be considered as empirically refuted. The QM-probability of  
white rabbit is shown rare, by the Born rule or Gleason's theorem, or  
by Feynman phase randomization.






I guess it would be perfectly computable and mathematical (although  
with a higher Kolmogorov complexity).


Computable is not enough. It has to be computable *and* having the  
right relative measure. Computable makes it exists, but it can still  
be relatively rare with respect to all computations going through your  
actual brain states (at the substitution levels).


By the invariance of the first person experience for the computation  
delay,  we cannot use Kolmogorov complexity to solve the measure  
problem, at least not directly (that would beg the measure problem).





What avoid that explosion of possibilities?.


Nothing.


On the contrary: it is the explosion of possibilities which makes us  
hope that some normal histories can emerge statistically.






That is the unreasonable dogmatic, but effective, assumption that  
puzzled Einstein, that any reality is simple because it is what it  
is observed locally.


And, if they exist, Do we should care for these other realities?



We should not care too much for the non-normal realities, except when  
we die, or take drugs, or sleep. When we die, a priori with comp, we  
survive in the most normal consistent extension, with respect to our  
actual state. It makes violent death a bit more frightening, at first  
sight.
We should definitely care about our local normal realities, as they  
define our most probable futures, for us and our children.




It is all this unobserved realities a scientific endavour or it is  
simply extrapolations as a result of an aestethical or ideological  
drive?


It is a consequence of the assumption that we can survive with   
digital brain. The existence of the many computations is a theorem of  
elementary arithmetic, with comp (and thus Church's thesis) assumed or  
understood at the meta-level.






I suppose that questions like these appear here from time to time.



No problem with questions.
Only problem with answers :)

Bruno





2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Feb 2013, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/20/2013 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Feb 2013, at 00:27, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and  
consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous  
person.  Let's say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3.  
2. 1.  The swap is complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body,  
with access to your memories and living as you were just before  
you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a  
billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course, while  
you are in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not  
only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even  
notice it.  You only have access to Bill's memories now so you  
do not realize anything is awry.  Don't worry, everything will  
be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of  
course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to  
read the last few sentences for you and now they have been  
placed into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I  
wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.   
For all you know, you already are, have, and will.


This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist  
apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to  
talk of exchanging bodies and memories.


We agree it is nonsense.

  For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a  
Bill Gates soul that switched.


Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you  
at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of  
memories and material?


There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two  
individuals at two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to  
some arbitrary measure of similarity.  There are two  
alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you  
are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which  
identifies you with every conscious entity.


You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest  
theory - physical continuity.


Physical continuity entails, very plausibly, computability.


Yes that is very plausible.  But I also suspect that comp plus  
intelligence entails physics.


But comp implies that intelligence exists, in arithmetic, in many  
exemplars. OK?

If you are OK, then comp implies physics, and that's my point.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then  
a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse  
while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid.



That's correct.



So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing  
whatever ;)


That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence  
the relative proportion of its consistent extensions.


You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all  
case you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high  
probability to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground floor.  
If you jump out of the window, you might have a high probability to  
find yourself in a very painful situation, in some hospital. This can  
be argued in both QM, or directly in comp.


If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical laws  
from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be just  
false, by leading to too much white rabbits.


Bruno








2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:

Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will  
tell
you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct  
some
experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These  
aliens
possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability  
to scan

and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which  
they call
you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you  
unharmed back
to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain  
experiments? and
they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You  
read the

pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You  
consider

this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
rather than you.

Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
Restorers:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the  
aliens with

the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all  
other
physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The  
aliens

will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to  
them.
They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours,  
conducting test
after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the  
torture and
all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are  
finished, you
are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture  
began. The
aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to  
your
home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and  
they

hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You  
consider

this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
rather than you.

My questions for the list:

1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the  
case of
the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why  
not.


2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture  
in the
case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please  
explain.


3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one  
you would

prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.

The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
pain but then forget it.

OK, same answer (assuming comp).

If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the  
theory of mind that we might propose.


Bruno





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Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-21 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, February 20, 2013 8:24:23 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

 If there is an infinity of copies of you now being kicked by a wild horse, 
 when is there ever a single copy of yourself doing something?


And if there are an infinity of copies which we can't experience, why 
should we care? How does explaining one universe in terms of infinite 
universes explain anything at all, other than that we have no idea how the 
obvious unity of experience can physically exist. (hint: sense = 'the 
decider' which unifies public narrative from private possibility.)

Craig
 


 Jason

 On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Alberto G. Corona 
 agoc...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:

 if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a 
 infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being 
 eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. So it does not matter what just a single 
 copy of you is doing whatever ;)


 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript:


 On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch 
 jason...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will 
 tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct 
 some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These 
 aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to 
 scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which 
 they call
 you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed 
 back
 to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain 
 experiments? and
 they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read 
 the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what 
 humans call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You 
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens 
 with
 the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The 
 aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to 
 them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting 
 test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture 
 and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are 
 finished, you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. 
 The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to 
 your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and 
 they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what 
 humans call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You 
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the 
 case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in 
 the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please 
 explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you 
 would
 prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


 The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
 preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
 pain but then forget it.


 OK, same answer (assuming comp).

 If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory 
 of mind that we might propose.

 Bruno




  
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and 
consciousness
will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's say Bill 
Gates.  I
hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is complete.  Bill Gates 
is now
in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just 
before
you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire 
and
enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course, while you are in his body you 
only
have access to his memories.  Not only does his wife not notice the 
switch,
but you don't even notice it.  You only have access to Bill's memories 
now so
you do not realize anything is awry.  Don't worry, everything will be 
set back
how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't
remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few 
sentences for
you and now they have been placed into your memory.  This shows it is
meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in 
Y's
shoes.  For all you know, you already are, have, and will.


This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart 
from
your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging 
bodies
and memories.


We agree it is nonsense.

  For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill 
Gates
soul that switched.


Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and 
you at
T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?

There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals 
at two
different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. 
There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are

nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies 
you with
every conscious entity.


You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - 
physical
continuity.


I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory (while perfectly 
fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others.  Particularly those involving 
duplicates, material replacement, teleporters, amnesia, split brains, etc.


What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions:
Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery?
Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the Everett 
multi-verse?

Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter?
Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories?
Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person without losing 
consciousness?

If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I 
survive as?

Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate physical 
continuity theories are:


I imagined two brains lying at
either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive
me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain
from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain
is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including all
its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate
himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of
you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe.

Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any
pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them
where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the
rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the
same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it
had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why
it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is still
before you.

As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu-
lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their experience?
Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each
brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that,
despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and
their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one another?
You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and
 consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's
 say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is
 complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and
 living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you
 are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course,
 while you are in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not only
 does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You
 only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is
 awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1.
 Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill
 was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have
 been placed into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish
 I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know,
 you already are, have, and will.


  This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist
 apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of
 exchanging bodies and memories.


 We agree it is nonsense.


For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill
 Gates soul that switched.


 Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1
 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?

 There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals
 at two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure
 of similarity.  There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal
 identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and
 universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity.


  You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory -
 physical continuity.


 I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory
 (while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others.
 Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters,
 amnesia, split brains, etc.

 What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions:
 Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery?
 Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the
 Everett multi-verse?
 Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter?
 Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories?
 Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person
 without losing consciousness?
 If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do
 I survive as?

 Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how
 inadequate physical continuity theories are:

  I imagined two brains lying at
 either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please
 forgive
 me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain
 from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other
 brain
 is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including
 all
 its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate
 himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of
 you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe.

 Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any
 pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them
 where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the
 rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the
 same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it
 had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why
 it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is
 still
 before you.

 As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu-
 lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their experience?
 Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each
 brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that,
 despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and
 their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one another?
 You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the other end of the
 operating table is another subject, lost in his or hers. It is as though
 we are
 thinking about two ashtrays of the same 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Feb 2013, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/19/2013 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Feb 2013, at 17:29, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote:

Thanks to everyone who replied to this post.  So far Stathis and  
Bruno both

answered that both cases are equivalent.

Is there anyone willing to argue against either:
1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or
2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is  
tortured?




Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought  
experiences with
amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you  
suspicious that
personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when  
people begin to

grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy.

A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to  
sleep in
my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you  
in advance
that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I  
have the

means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that
nightmare.
Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in  
that way?

Can this be legal?

Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy  
for one

hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)?
Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you  
OK that

your daughter makes money in that way?

Bruno


There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would  
allow
the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by  
her
behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have  
no

memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there
was no lasting trauma.

My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be  
consciously

re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience
childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic??



Not really, as here we were touching on the question of personal  
identity, in relation with memory.
Now, your question is very difficult, and my thought on it is that  
woman should have the choice, and that nobody can coerce on her  
decision. Comp + Theaetetus would lead to the idea that nobody can  
solve that problem, and that only individual woman can take the  
decision.  The very basic idea is that no one can think at the  
place of other one, especially about possible pain.


And can you now make a decision for you in the future - since those  
are in some degree two different people.


Why?

Not with comp where we agree that the one restored in Moscow and the  
one restore in Washington are the same person, despite being different  
with each other.






A forgotten pain has still been a lived pain, and this has to be  
avoided if possible.


Right.  Many things happen that we forget - but that doesn't make  
them unhappen.  In the Restorer story there is the assumption that  
everything can be put back as it was; but that is nomologically  
impossible.


With comp it is possible in principle, if only through a backup, given  
the equivalence explained above.


Bruno





Brent




Bruno


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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Feb 2013, at 00:27, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and  
consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person.   
Let's say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The  
swap is complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to  
your memories and living as you were just before you got to  
reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and  
enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course, while you are in his  
body you only have access to his memories.  Not only does his wife  
not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You only  
have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything  
is awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in  
3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember.  
Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences  
for you and now they have been placed into your memory.  This  
shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or  
experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know, you already  
are, have, and will.


This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist  
apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk  
of exchanging bodies and memories.


We agree it is nonsense.

  For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a  
Bill Gates soul that switched.


Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at  
T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories  
and material?


There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two  
individuals at two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to  
some arbitrary measure of similarity.  There are two alternatives,  
no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but  
a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you  
with every conscious entity.


You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory  
- physical continuity.


Physical continuity entails, very plausibly, computability.

If that is not the case, your point would still be only an argument  
against comp, but I think that Jason was assuming comp.


Bruno





Brent

Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can  
answer why you are experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none  
at all or some other observer moment.  No-self theories, taken  
seriously, seem incompatible with the scientific method, as if you  
are trapped in a single OM forever, you cannot perform any  
experiments, or test predictions.


Jason
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02/18/13





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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread meekerdb

On 2/20/2013 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and
consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  
Let's
say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is
complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your 
memories
and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence,
while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank 
account.
  Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his
memories.  Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you 
don't
even notice it.  You only have access to Bill's memories now so you 
do
not realize anything is awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set 
back
how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you 
don't
remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few
sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory.  
This
shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or 
experience
a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know, you already are, have, and 
will.


This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist 
apart
from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of
exchanging bodies and memories.


We agree it is nonsense.

For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill
Gates soul that switched.


Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 
and you
at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?

There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two 
individuals at
two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary 
measure of
similarity.  There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal
identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and
universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity.


You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - 
physical
continuity.


I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory 
(while
perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others. 
Particularly
those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters, amnesia, 
split
brains, etc.

What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions:
Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery?
Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the 
Everett
multi-verse?
Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter?
Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories?
Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person 
without
losing consciousness?
If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I 
survive as?

Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate
physical continuity theories are:

I imagined two brains lying at
either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive
me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain
from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain
is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including 
all
its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate
himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of
you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe.

Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any
pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them
where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the
rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the
same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it
had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why
it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is 
still
before you.

As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu-

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread meekerdb

On 2/20/2013 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Feb 2013, at 00:27, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness 
will
swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's say Bill Gates.  I 
hope you
are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is complete.  Bill Gates is now in your
body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you 
got to
reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying 
Bills
bank account.   Of course, while you are in his body you only have access 
to his
memories.  Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even
notice it.  You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not 
realize
anything is awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 
3. 2.
1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, 
Bill was
nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been 
placed
into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live 
as
X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know, you already are, 
have,
and will.


This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart 
from your
bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies 
and memories.


We agree it is nonsense.

  For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill 
Gates soul
that switched.


Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, 
when the two are different in terms of memories and material?


There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two 
different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity.  
There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are 
nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with 
every conscious entity.


You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical 
continuity.


Physical continuity entails, very plausibly, computability.


Yes that is very plausible.  But I also suspect that comp plus intelligence 
entails physics.

Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread Alberto G. Corona
if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a
infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being
eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. So it does not matter what just a single
copy of you is doing whatever ;)


2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These
 aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to
 scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they
 call
 you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed
 back
 to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments?
 and
 they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens
 with
 the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to
 them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting
 test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished,
 you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case
 of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in
 the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you
 would
 prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


 The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
 preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
 pain but then forget it.


 OK, same answer (assuming comp).

 If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of
 mind that we might propose.

 Bruno





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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 1:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/20/2013 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and
 consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's
 say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is
 complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and
 living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you
 are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course,
 while you are in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not only
 does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You
 only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is
 awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1.
 Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill
 was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have
 been placed into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish
 I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know,
 you already are, have, and will.


  This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist
 apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of
 exchanging bodies and memories.


 We agree it is nonsense.


For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill
 Gates soul that switched.


 Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1
 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?

 There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two
 individuals at two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to some
 arbitrary measure of similarity.  There are two alternatives, no-self
 theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single
 observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every
 conscious entity.


  You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory -
 physical continuity.


 I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory
 (while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others.
 Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters,
 amnesia, split brains, etc.

 What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions:
 Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain
 surgery?
 Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the
 Everett multi-verse?
 Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter?
 Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories?
 Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person
 without losing consciousness?
 If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do
 I survive as?

 Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how
 inadequate physical continuity theories are:

  I imagined two brains lying at
 either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please
 forgive
 me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain
 from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other
 brain
 is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including
 all
 its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this
 duplicate
 himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates
 of
 you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe.

 Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any
 pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them
 where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the
 rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the
 same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if
 it
 had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why
 it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is
 still
 before you.

 As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu-
 lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their
 experience?
 Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each
 brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that,
 despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and
 their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one
 another?
 You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the other end of the
 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-20 Thread Jason Resch
If there is an infinity of copies of you now being kicked by a wild horse,
when is there ever a single copy of yourself doing something?

Jason

On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.comwrote:

 if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a
 infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being
 eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. So it does not matter what just a single
 copy of you is doing whatever ;)


 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will
 tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These
 aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to
 scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they
 call
 you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed
 back
 to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain
 experiments? and
 they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read
 the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens
 with
 the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to
 them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting
 test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture
 and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished,
 you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began.
 The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to
 your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and
 they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case
 of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in
 the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please
 explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you
 would
 prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


 The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
 preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
 pain but then forget it.


 OK, same answer (assuming comp).

 If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of
 mind that we might propose.

 Bruno





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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 Feb 2013, at 17:29, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote:

Thanks to everyone who replied to this post.  So far Stathis and  
Bruno both

answered that both cases are equivalent.

Is there anyone willing to argue against either:
1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or
2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is  
tortured?




Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought  
experiences with
amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious  
that
personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people  
begin to

grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy.

A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to  
sleep in
my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in  
advance
that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I  
have the

means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that
nightmare.
Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in  
that way?

Can this be legal?

Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy  
for one

hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)?
Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you  
OK that

your daughter makes money in that way?

Bruno


There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow
the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her
behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no
memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there
was no lasting trauma.

My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously
re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience
childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic??



Not really, as here we were touching on the question of personal  
identity, in relation with memory.
Now, your question is very difficult, and my thought on it is that  
woman should have the choice, and that nobody can coerce on her  
decision. Comp + Theaetetus would lead to the idea that nobody can  
solve that problem, and that only individual woman can take the  
decision.  The very basic idea is that no one can think at the place  
of other one, especially about possible pain. A forgotten pain has  
still been a lived pain, and this has to be avoided if possible.


Bruno











Jason

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:


Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens  
will tell
you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to  
conduct some
experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them.  
These aliens
possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the  
ability to scan
and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use  
this
technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which  
they call
you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you  
unharmed back
to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain  
experiments? and
they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You  
read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created  
and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You  
consider
this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your  
duplicate

rather than you.

Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
Restorers:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the  
aliens
with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens  
possess a
restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all  
other
physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The  
aliens
will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish  
to
conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown  
to them.
They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours,  
conducting test
after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the  
torture and
all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are  
finished, you
are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture  
began. The
aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back  
to your
home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments?  
and they

hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created  
and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You  
consider
this awful, but are nonetheless glad 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 19 Feb 2013, at 07:49, Jason Resch wrote:



 Are you OK that your daughter makes money in that way?


 No.


 OK. But if she is adult, and if you have the assurance that she knows
 what she is doing, i.e. that she has some fair account of what is involved,
 then you can't obliged her to not do it. This follows from what you said
 above, as I am sure you see. It is not different from alpinism. I would be
 anxious my daughter make alpinism, as she might get stuck of fall, perhaps
 die, but then, if she is not a minor, it is her choice.



It might be that we just had different connotations of OK.  I would be
uneasy with and disagree (hence not be OK with) her making a living by
causing or suffering.  I think there might be better ways to make money but
still the decision is hers.  Your scenario reminded me of this writing by
Lee Corbin:

Next suppose that you have a duplicate in an adjacent room that you are
monitoring on closed circuit television. You are told that you and he are
the same person. Probably, you disagree. You are then asked you whether it
is preferable that your duplicate receive two minutes' electrical shock or
you receive one minute's. You reply that you would prefer that your
duplicate receive the two minutes' worth. (Better him than me.) It is
done, but that night a merging process copies 'your' memories of the day
into 'his' brain and 'his' memories into 'yours'. (I must use funny quotes
around his and yours because my central claim is that ultimately such a
distinction is meaningless.)

Now the next day the scenario is repeated. I ask 'you' whether it is better
that 'your' duplicate get the two minute treatment or that 'you' get the
one minute treatment. Now you're not so sure. For you now *remember* that
yesterday you were sitting minding your own business being monitored on
closed circuit television when suddenly out of the blue there came two
minutes' of electrical shock. You remember this as being *very painful*.
Nature has constructed you to avoid repetition of unpleasant incidents. So
you now begin to suspect that 'you' and 'your duplicate' are the same
person.

You decide (maybe after several more days of two minute punishments) that
perhaps it is better to call down upon 'yourself' the mere one minute
punishment. After that night, when the memories are merged, you conclude
that you made a wise move. Today's punishment seemed to be less severe than
yesterday's.


If the person making the decision to take the money in exchange for the
torture would make the same decision whether or not the memory was erased,
then they are making the right decision for themself.  If they change their
mind depending on the memory erasure, then I think they are using a faulty
theory of personal identity to make their decision, and are prone to making
a bad decision.

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2013 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Feb 2013, at 17:29, Richard Ruquist wrote:


On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote:

Thanks to everyone who replied to this post.  So far Stathis and Bruno both
answered that both cases are equivalent.

Is there anyone willing to argue against either:
1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or
2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured?



Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought experiences with
amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious that
personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people begin to
grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy.

A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to sleep in
my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in advance
that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I have the
means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that
nightmare.
Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in that way?
Can this be legal?

Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy for one
hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)?
Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you OK that
your daughter makes money in that way?

Bruno


There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow
the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her
behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no
memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there
was no lasting trauma.

My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously
re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience
childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic??



Not really, as here we were touching on the question of personal identity, in relation 
with memory.
Now, your question is very difficult, and my thought on it is that woman should have the 
choice, and that nobody can coerce on her decision. Comp + Theaetetus would lead to the 
idea that nobody can solve that problem, and that only individual woman can take the 
decision.  The very basic idea is that no one can think at the place of other one, 
especially about possible pain. 


And can you now make a decision for you in the future - since those are in some degree two 
different people.



A forgotten pain has still been a lived pain, and this has to be avoided if 
possible.


Right.  Many things happen that we forget - but that doesn't make them unhappen.  In the 
Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put back as it was; but that 
is nomologically impossible.


Brent




Bruno


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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


3. We need not our memories to be ourselves.  Imagine concentrating heavily on some 
task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous conditions.  You become so focused 
on your task that you use almost none of your personal long term memories.  In 
principal, large portions of your brain could be disconnected without impacting your 
performance or experience.


I think that is very doubtful.  You seem to equate memory entirely with conscious 
narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small part of our thinking.  In 
fact it might be a quite small part that could be disconnected.  When I think of the 
solution to a problem it often just 'pops into my head'.  It obviously depended on my 
memory, because, for example, I didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it.


Brent


How much of you really goes into any given moment of your experience?  Could we cut out 
20%, 50%, 75%, 90% of your memories while you are busy at this task?  It is still you 
experiencing that test, or that drive, but what about that experience makes it yours?


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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
4. In the course of normal life, we gain memories (through experience) and lose memories 
(by forgetting).  Yet most feel they are still the same person.  This allows for some 
interesting experiments with a faulty teleporter.  You step into the teleporter and it 
transports you, but it is not 100% and your resulting copy has lost some small fraction 
of his long term memories.  It has also given you new memories for things you never 
actually experienced.  You comfort yourself with the idea that this is no different than 
living life and assert you are still the same person.  Two very similar twins, Alice and 
Alicia each use this teleporter at the same time.  Alice and Alicia both steps into it 
and on the recieving end of the teleporter, Alice and Alicia step out.  But what really 
happened is Alice gained and lost some memories and is now identical to the Alicia who 
stepped into the teleporter, and the Alicia gained and lost some memories and is now 
identicial to the Alice who stepped into the teleporter.  Is this any different from the 
two of them entering a closet and the two of them coming out?  If not, couldn't they be 
switching places all the time, each always in the other?


No, because they occupy different locations and will within milliseconds develop different 
experiences, e.g. Alice looks at Alicia, but Alicia isn't looking at Alice.


Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap 
with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready. 
 5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to 
your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while 
you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course, while you 
are in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not only does his wife not notice 
the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You only have access to Bill's memories now 
so you do not realize anything is awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it 
was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, 
Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been 
placed into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as 
X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know, you already are, have, and will.


This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies 
and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories.  For it to 
make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched.


Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put
 back as it was; but that is nomologically impossible.


Not everything in the sense of the entire universe, just everything about
your physical body/brain.  I don't see why this should be nomologically
impossible.

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


 3. We need not our memories to be ourselves.  Imagine concentrating
 heavily on some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous
 conditions.  You become so focused on your task that you use almost none of
 your personal long term memories.  In principal, large portions of your
 brain could be disconnected without impacting your performance or
 experience.


 I think that is very doubtful.  You seem to equate memory entirely with
 conscious narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small
 part of our thinking.  In fact it might be a quite small part that could be
 disconnected.  When I think of the solution to a problem it often just
 'pops into my head'.  It obviously depended on my memory, because, for
 example, I didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it.


Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely
unrelated to taking the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball,
tasting food, swimming, and so on.  Certianly, our experiences shape us in
ways we aren't always aware, and unconscious thought plays a big part of
solutions we come up with, but when you are for instance, meditating and
thinking of almost nothing, but how much of what you consider uniquely
defines you as an individual, really goes into that experience? (of
meditating, concentrating on an SAT question)?

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 4. In the course of normal life, we gain memories (through experience) and
 lose memories (by forgetting).  Yet most feel they are still the same
 person.  This allows for some interesting experiments with a faulty
 teleporter.  You step into the teleporter and it transports you, but it is
 not 100% and your resulting copy has lost some small fraction of his long
 term memories.  It has also given you new memories for things you never
 actually experienced.  You comfort yourself with the idea that this is no
 different than living life and assert you are still the same person.  Two
 very similar twins, Alice and Alicia each use this teleporter at the same
 time.  Alice and Alicia both steps into it and on the recieving end of the
 teleporter, Alice and Alicia step out.  But what really happened is Alice
 gained and lost some memories and is now identical to the Alicia who
 stepped into the teleporter, and the Alicia gained and lost some memories
 and is now identicial to the Alice who stepped into the teleporter.  Is
 this any different from the two of them entering a closet and the two of
 them coming out?  If not, couldn't they be switching places all the time,
 each always in the other?


 No, because they occupy different locations and will within milliseconds
 develop different experiences, e.g. Alice looks at Alicia, but Alicia isn't
 looking at Alice.


Consider the case in the absence of alicia.  Alice steps into the
teleporter, and comes out a little different, but nonetheless she considers
herself to have survived.

Consider the case in the absence of alice.  Alicia steps into the
teleporter, and comes out a little different, but nonetheless she considers
herself to have survived.

Now if they both step into two different teleporters, where Alice steps
into the  A1 - A2 teleporter, and Alicia steps into the B1-B2
teleporter.  When Alice comes out of B2, and Alicia comes out of A2, who is
who?  What is the first person experience like?

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness
 will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's say Bill Gates.
  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is complete.  Bill Gates
 is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were
 just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as
 a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course, while you are
 in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not only does his wife
 not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You only have access
 to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry.  Don't
 worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back.
 How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice
 enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed
 into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live
 as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know, you already
 are, have, and will.


 This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart
 from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging
 bodies and memories.


We agree it is nonsense.


   For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill
 Gates soul that switched.


Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and
you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?

There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals
at two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure
of similarity.  There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal
identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and
universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity.
Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can answer
why you are experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none at all or some
other observer moment.  No-self theories, taken seriously, seem
incompatible with the scientific method, as if you are trapped in a single
OM forever, you cannot perform any experiments, or test predictions.

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/2/19 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and
 consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's
 say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is
 complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and
 living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you
 are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course,
 while you are in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not only
 does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You
 only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is
 awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1.
 Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill
 was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have
 been placed into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish
 I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know,
 you already are, have, and will.


 This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart
 from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging
 bodies and memories.


 We agree it is nonsense.


For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill
 Gates soul that switched.


 Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and
 you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?


Causality ? The you at T1 and the you at T2 are causally linked.

Quentin


 There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals
 at two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure
 of similarity.  There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal
 identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and
 universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity.
 Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can answer
 why you are experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none at all or some
 other observer moment.  No-self theories, taken seriously, seem
 incompatible with the scientific method, as if you are trapped in a single
 OM forever, you cannot perform any experiments, or test predictions.

 Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 4:02 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:



 2013/2/19 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and
 consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's
 say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is
 complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and
 living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you
 are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course,
 while you are in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not only
 does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You
 only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is
 awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1.
 Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill
 was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have
 been placed into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish
 I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know,
 you already are, have, and will.


 This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart
 from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging
 bodies and memories.


 We agree it is nonsense.


For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill
 Gates soul that switched.


 Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1
 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?


 Causality ? The you at T1 and the you at T2 are causally linked.


Causality links many things to you, and you to many things, which you
wouldn't normally associate with yourself.  I don't think causality alone
can serve as a theory of personal identity.  A theory of personal identity
needs to define the boundaries of a person, and answer questions such as
which experiences can be ascribed to a given person.  You could trace
causality backwards and find that the big bang caused you, but that doesn't
mean you are the big bang.  Likewise, you could make a fancy dinner (which
you caused) but the fancy dinner is not you.  I think causally linked might
be a requirement but by itself it is too general to delineate an individual.

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2013 1:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put 
back as it
was; but that is nomologically impossible.


Not everything in the sense of the entire universe, just everything about your physical 
body/brain.  I don't see why this should be nomologically impossible.


It probably is, but even if not, do you *only* care about your body/brain?  Suppose there 
is a video of you being tortured - wouldn't it make a difference to you whether it was erased?


Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


3. We need not our memories to be ourselves.  Imagine concentrating 
heavily on
some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous conditions.  
You
become so focused on your task that you use almost none of your 
personal long
term memories.  In principal, large portions of your brain could be 
disconnected
without impacting your performance or experience.


I think that is very doubtful.  You seem to equate memory entirely with 
conscious
narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small part of our
thinking.  In fact it might be a quite small part that could be 
disconnected.  When
I think of the solution to a problem it often just 'pops into my head'.  It
obviously depended on my memory, because, for example, I didn't just 
unconsciously
invent calculus to solve it.


Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely unrelated to taking 
the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball, tasting food, swimming, and so on. 


How do you know that catching a baseball is *completely* unrelated? I very much doubt that 
there is a one-to-one mapping between functions and neurons.



Certianly, our experiences shape us in ways we aren't always aware, and unconscious 
thought plays a big part of solutions we come up with, but when you are for instance, 
meditating and thinking of almost nothing, but how much of what you consider uniquely 
defines you as an individual, really goes into that experience? (of meditating, 
concentrating on an SAT question)?


What uniquely defines me as an individual (if I am unique) is my moment-to-moment position 
and viewpoint as well as my stream of consciousness over time intervals.  I may have the 
same thought as you momentarily, but I'm seeing a different room and typing on a different 
keyboard and my next thought is different than yours.


Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2013 1:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

4. In the course of normal life, we gain memories (through experience) and 
lose
memories (by forgetting).  Yet most feel they are still the same person.  
This
allows for some interesting experiments with a faulty teleporter.  You 
step into
the teleporter and it transports you, but it is not 100% and your resulting 
copy
has lost some small fraction of his long term memories.  It has also given 
you new
memories for things you never actually experienced.  You comfort yourself 
with the
idea that this is no different than living life and assert you are still 
the same
person.  Two very similar twins, Alice and Alicia each use this teleporter 
at the
same time.  Alice and Alicia both steps into it and on the recieving end of 
the
teleporter, Alice and Alicia step out.  But what really happened is Alice 
gained
and lost some memories and is now identical to the Alicia who stepped into 
the
teleporter, and the Alicia gained and lost some memories and is now 
identicial to
the Alice who stepped into the teleporter.  Is this any different from the 
two of
them entering a closet and the two of them coming out?  If not, couldn't 
they be
switching places all the time, each always in the other?


No, because they occupy different locations and will within milliseconds 
develop
different experiences, e.g. Alice looks at Alicia, but Alicia isn't looking 
at Alice.


Consider the case in the absence of alicia.  Alice steps into the teleporter, and comes 
out a little different, but nonetheless she considers herself to have survived.


Consider the case in the absence of alice.  Alicia steps into the teleporter, and comes 
out a little different, but nonetheless she considers herself to have survived.


Now if they both step into two different teleporters, where Alice steps into the  A1 - 
A2 teleporter, and Alicia steps into the B1-B2 teleporter.  When Alice comes out of B2, 
and Alicia comes out of A2, who is who?  What is the first person experience like?


?? Alice is Alice and Alicia is Alicia.  I don't know what it's like to be teleported, but 
I'm not exactly the same as I was yesterday (another day older and deeper in debt).


Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness 
will
swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's say Bill Gates.  I 
hope you
are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is complete.  Bill Gates is now in 
your body,
with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to 
reading
this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank
account.   Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his
memories.  Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even 
notice
it.  You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize 
anything is
awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. 
Welcome
back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice 
enough
to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into 
your
memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or
experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know, you already are, have, 
and will.


This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart 
from your
bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies 
and memories.


We agree it is nonsense.

  For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill 
Gates soul
that switched.


Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, 
when the two are different in terms of memories and material?


There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two 
different times.  Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity.  
There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are 
nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every 
conscious entity.


You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical 
continuity.

Brent

Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can answer why you are 
experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none at all or some other observer moment.  
No-self theories, taken seriously, seem incompatible with the scientific method, as if 
you are trapped in a single OM forever, you cannot perform any experiments, or test 
predictions.


Jason
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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:14 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/19/2013 1:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put
 back as it was; but that is nomologically impossible.


 Not everything in the sense of the entire universe, just everything about
 your physical body/brain.  I don't see why this should be nomologically
 impossible.


 It probably is, but even if not, do you *only* care about your
 body/brain?  Suppose there is a video of you being tortured - wouldn't it
 make a difference to you whether it was erased?

 Brent


In experiment, the aliens fly away and you never see them again.  If they
did take a video recording of it, it shouldn't make any difference from my
first person perspective.

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:21 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/19/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


 3. We need not our memories to be ourselves.  Imagine concentrating
 heavily on some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous
 conditions.  You become so focused on your task that you use almost none of
 your personal long term memories.  In principal, large portions of your
 brain could be disconnected without impacting your performance or
 experience.


  I think that is very doubtful.  You seem to equate memory entirely with
 conscious narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small
 part of our thinking.  In fact it might be a quite small part that could be
 disconnected.  When I think of the solution to a problem it often just
 'pops into my head'.  It obviously depended on my memory, because, for
 example, I didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it.


 Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely
 unrelated to taking the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball,
 tasting food, swimming, and so on.


 How do you know that catching a baseball is *completely* unrelated?  I
 very much doubt that there is a one-to-one mapping between functions and
 neurons.


What is the information content of your current experience compared to the
information content of your entire brain?  Do you think they are
approximately 1:1, 1:10, 1:100?

I would guess it is somewhere less than 1:10, and thus the majority of the
me in my brain is of no consequence to my current observer moment, though
there is little existing data regarding the information content of our
conscious experience, if you look at the bandwidth of the optic nerve, or
auditory nerves, they are very low compared to the total estimated storage
capacity of the brain.  What makes this calculation more complex is that
memories are integral to experience; about half the traffic that goes into
the visual cortex is from memory, and the other half from the eyes.





 Certianly, our experiences shape us in ways we aren't always aware, and
 unconscious thought plays a big part of solutions we come up with, but when
 you are for instance, meditating and thinking of almost nothing, but how
 much of what you consider uniquely defines you as an individual, really
 goes into that experience? (of meditating, concentrating on an SAT
 question)?


 What uniquely defines me as an individual (if I am unique) is my
 moment-to-moment position and viewpoint as well as my stream of
 consciousness over time intervals.  I may have the same thought as you
 momentarily, but I'm seeing a different room and typing on a different
 keyboard and my next thought is different than yours.


If two people are in the same virtual reality so they see the same room and
type on the same keyboard, and they happen to have the same thought, what
principal do you use to say one thought is Brent's and another thought is
that person's?  Is it some intrinsic property of the thought, and if so
what is that property?

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and
 consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person.  Let's
 say Bill Gates.  I hope you are ready.  5. 4. 3. 2. 1.  The swap is
 complete.  Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and
 living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you
 are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account.   Of course,
 while you are in his body you only have access to his memories.  Not only
 does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it.  You
 only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is
 awry.  Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1.
 Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill
 was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have
 been placed into your memory.  This shows it is meaningless to say I wish
 I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes.  For all you know,
 you already are, have, and will.


  This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart
 from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging
 bodies and memories.


 We agree it is nonsense.


For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill
 Gates soul that switched.


 Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and
 you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material?

 There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals
 at two different times.  Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure
 of similarity.  There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal
 identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and
 universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity.


 You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory -
 physical continuity.


I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory
(while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others.
Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters,
amnesia, split brains, etc.

What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions:
Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery?
Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the
Everett multi-verse?
Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter?
Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories?
Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person
without losing consciousness?
If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I
survive as?

Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate
physical continuity theories are:

I imagined two brains lying at
either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive
me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain
from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain
is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including
all
its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate
himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of
you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe.

Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any
pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them
where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the
rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the
same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it
had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why
it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is
still
before you.

As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu-
lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their experience?
Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each
brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that,
despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and
their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one another?
You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the other end of the
operating table is another subject, lost in his or hers. It is as though we
are
thinking about two ashtrays of the same design sitting at either end of a
coffee table.

But now for the experiment itself. Our mad researcher begins by trading
one quarter of your brain for the corresponding 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2013 3:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:21 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 2/19/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


3. We need not our memories to be ourselves.  Imagine concentrating 
heavily
on some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous 
conditions.
 You become so focused on your task that you use almost none of your
personal long term memories.  In principal, large portions of your 
brain
could be disconnected without impacting your performance or 
experience.


I think that is very doubtful.  You seem to equate memory entirely with
conscious narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a 
small part
of our thinking.  In fact it might be a quite small part that could be
disconnected.  When I think of the solution to a problem it often just 
'pops
into my head'.  It obviously depended on my memory, because, for 
example, I
didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it.


Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely 
unrelated to
taking the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball, tasting food, 
swimming,
and so on. 


How do you know that catching a baseball is *completely* unrelated?  I very 
much
doubt that there is a one-to-one mapping between functions and neurons.


What is the information content of your current experience compared to the information 
content of your entire brain?  Do you think they are approximately 1:1, 1:10, 1:100?


I would guess it is somewhere less than 1:10, and thus the majority of the me in my 
brain is of no consequence to my current observer moment,


How long is an observer moment?  How about 1/100th of an observer moment?  Taking a test 
usually takes an hour.  How are moments strung together to make you?


though there is little existing data regarding the information content of our conscious 
experience, if you look at the bandwidth of the optic nerve, or auditory nerves, they 
are very low compared to the total estimated storage capacity of the brain.  What makes 
this calculation more complex is that memories are integral to experience; about half 
the traffic that goes into the visual cortex is from memory, and the other half from the 
eyes.





Certianly, our experiences shape us in ways we aren't always aware, and 
unconscious
thought plays a big part of solutions we come up with, but when you are for
instance, meditating and thinking of almost nothing, but how much of what 
you
consider uniquely defines you as an individual, really goes into that 
experience?
(of meditating, concentrating on an SAT question)?


What uniquely defines me as an individual (if I am unique) is my 
moment-to-moment
position and viewpoint as well as my stream of consciousness over time 
intervals.  I
may have the same thought as you momentarily, but I'm seeing a different 
room and
typing on a different keyboard and my next thought is different than yours.


If two people are in the same virtual reality so they see the same room and type on the 
same keyboard, and they happen to have the same thought,


Then they are the same person in the virtual reality.

what principal do you use to say one thought is Brent's and another thought is that 
person's?


If this is a virtual reality and there's another instance of exactly the same virtual 
reality - then I'm Brent in both of them. Otherwise, I'm the one on the left.


Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-18 Thread Richard Ruquist
On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote:

 Thanks to everyone who replied to this post.  So far Stathis and Bruno both
 answered that both cases are equivalent.

 Is there anyone willing to argue against either:
 1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or
 2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured?



 Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought experiences with
 amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious that
 personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people begin to
 grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy.

 A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to sleep in
 my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in advance
 that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I have the
 means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that
 nightmare.
 Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in that way?
 Can this be legal?

 Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy for one
 hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)?
 Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you OK that
 your daughter makes money in that way?

 Bruno

There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow
the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her
behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no
memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there
was no lasting trauma.

My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously
re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience
childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic??






 Jason

 On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call
 you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back
 to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and
 they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens
 with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you
 would prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


 Thank you.

 Jason




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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-17 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, February 16, 2013 10:12:34 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote:



 On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com 
 wrote: 

  That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there 
 must 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even 
  with advanced scientific methods. 
  
  
  Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that 
 experience not 
  be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be 
  limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is 
  automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would 
 have to 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular 
 event 
  from eternity. 

 If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed 
 physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is 
 something other than a physical basis to the experience. This 
 something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. 


 No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something 
 repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was 
 writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on 
 in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back 
 yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been 
 repeated 100%. 


 Do you have any theory that explains sensation?


 Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make 
 cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual 
 sensations (thoughts).


 In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation?


Yes, but because sense is already 'planation' itself. You are trying to 
weigh weight itself, so I am saying there can be no weight of weight 
itself, just as there is no value of value or size of size. 
 




  

   Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious 
 experience over some finite period of time?


 Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which 
 inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is 
 presented.


 Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that 
 presentation?


There may be loosely finite ranges of experiences someone can have as that 
person, as a person in general, as an animal, organism, part of Earth, 
body, etc but it is self-diagonalizing so probably infinite overall. Until 
people invented rockets, seeing the Earth from space wasn't within the 
range of possible experiences. Now the possible experiences of everyone on 
Earth include seeing pictures from the surface of Mars, or Hubble pictures 
of a fantastic number of places.

Craig



 Jason



  

   If not, then it seems plausible that whatever information needs to go 
 into creating some sensory experience can be duplicated.  If it is non 
 infinite then the pigeon hole principle applies ( 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle ).


 Sensory experience is not created by information, information is a 
 consequence of sensory experience and conceptual-level motives. Sensory 
 experience is private physics. Information is a conceptual abstraction of 
 sensory experience, so that while our thoughts about information are 
 physical events, the bits and bytes to which they refer are not physically 
 real.

 Craig
  


 Jason

  

 The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences 
 and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical.
  


  This is equivalent to saying it is 
  magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a 
  pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something 
  else does not change the facts. 
  
  
  I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, 
 so you 
  strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer 
 to is 
  either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or 
 Significance 
  - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing 
 else, 
  and I claim nothing else. 

 Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, 


 No, they are physical, but they are private.
  

 but the conventional 
 view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with 
 this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. 
 This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. 


 Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief 
 in a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience 
 takes place. Once you realize that the 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-17 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Feb 17, 2013 at 8:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Saturday, February 16, 2013 10:12:34 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
 wrote:

  That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there
 must
  be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even
  with advanced scientific methods.
 
 
  Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that
 experience not
  be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately
 be
  limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is
  automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would
 have to
  be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular
 event
  from eternity.

 If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed
 physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is
 something other than a physical basis to the experience. This
 something else is the mysterious non-physical entity.


 No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something
 repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was
 writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on
 in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back
 yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been
 repeated 100%.


 Do you have any theory that explains sensation?


 Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make
 cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual
 sensations (thoughts).


 In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation?


 Yes, but because sense is already 'planation' itself. You are trying to
 weigh weight itself, so I am saying there can be no weight of weight
 itself, just as there is no value of value or size of size.







   Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your
 conscious experience over some finite period of time?


 Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which
 inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is
 presented.


 Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that
 presentation?


 There may be loosely finite ranges of experiences someone can have as that
 person, as a person in general, as an animal, organism, part of Earth,
 body, etc but it is self-diagonalizing so probably infinite overall. Until
 people invented rockets, seeing the Earth from space wasn't within the
 range of possible experiences. Now the possible experiences of everyone on
 Earth include seeing pictures from the surface of Mars, or Hubble pictures
 of a fantastic number of places.



Would you agree that there is a digital audio quality high enough that no
human can distinguish it from the original analog one, and that there is a
visual resolution and number of colors per pixel high enough that no human
could distinguish the display from an actual scene?  If so, there is a
large but finite number of 1 minute songs that can be experienced by a
human, and there is large but finite number of images a person can see.
Therefore, in a universe that is infinite there is bound to be replication
of the same experiences.  This may not duplicate an experience, which
some have argued is a but it does mean there can be multiple instances of
the same experience.

Arnold Zuboff writes:

Let us compare the logic of experience to the logic of something like a
novel. A novel might be called a 'detailed type', of which there are
'tokens',
which are its copies. For example, on a shelf in a bookshop there might be
two copies of but a single novel, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Just
as this would be only one novel, this would also constitute no
multiplication
of the character called Huckleberry Finn, despite there being two copies
of his adventures on the shelf. The logic of a copy is different from that
of
a novel. If one of these copies was destroyed, the novel would continue to
exist in the shop so long as there was at least one copy there. The novel
has the logic of an Aristotelian universal. There must be at least one
instance for it to exist, but repeated instances cannot multiply the number
of universals.

Jason

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-17 Thread Jason Resch
Thanks to everyone who replied to this post.  So far Stathis and Bruno both
answered that both cases are equivalent.

Is there anyone willing to argue against either:
1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or
2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured?

Jason

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they
 call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you
 unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain
 experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly
 off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2)
 was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to
 what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2was euthanized. 
 You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they
 tortured your duplicate rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens
 with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You
 consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your
 duplicate rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you
 would prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


 Thank you.

 Jason




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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-17 Thread meekerdb

On 2/17/2013 9:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Thanks to everyone who replied to this post.  So far Stathis and Bruno both answered 
that both cases are equivalent.


Is there anyone willing to argue against either:
1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or
2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured?


The two cases can be equivalent and 'you' experience torture in both of them.

Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-17 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Sunday, February 17, 2013 11:51:38 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Sun, Feb 17, 2013 at 8:07 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Saturday, February 16, 2013 10:12:34 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com 
 wrote: 

  That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there 
 must 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, 
 even 
  with advanced scientific methods. 
  
  
  Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that 
 experience not 
  be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately 
 be 
  limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is 
  automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there 
 would have to 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular 
 event 
  from eternity. 

 If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed 
 physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is 
 something other than a physical basis to the experience. This 
 something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. 


 No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something 
 repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was 
 writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show 
 on 
 in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back 
 yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been 
 repeated 100%. 


 Do you have any theory that explains sensation?


 Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make 
 cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual 
 sensations (thoughts).


 In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation?


 Yes, but because sense is already 'planation' itself. You are trying to 
 weigh weight itself, so I am saying there can be no weight of weight 
 itself, just as there is no value of value or size of size. 
  




  

   Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your 
 conscious experience over some finite period of time?


 Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which 
 inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is 
 presented.


 Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that 
 presentation?


 There may be loosely finite ranges of experiences someone can have as 
 that person, as a person in general, as an animal, organism, part of Earth, 
 body, etc but it is self-diagonalizing so probably infinite overall. Until 
 people invented rockets, seeing the Earth from space wasn't within the 
 range of possible experiences. Now the possible experiences of everyone on 
 Earth include seeing pictures from the surface of Mars, or Hubble pictures 
 of a fantastic number of places.



 Would you agree that there is a digital audio quality high enough that no 
 human can distinguish it from the original analog one, 


Yes, but that doesn't mean that there is any recording of high enough 
quality that no human can distinguish if from a live performance in person. 
When we can use all of our senses, and can walk up to the guitar player and 
shake his hand, then we can tell that it isn't a recording.
 

 and that there is a visual resolution and number of colors per pixel high 
 enough that no human could distinguish the display from an actual scene? 


Same thing. We don't just see with our eyes. What do you make of this guy? 
http://www.odditycentral.com/pics/the-paintings-of-a-congenitally-blind-man.html
 

 If so, there is a large but finite number of 1 minute songs that can be 
 experienced by a human, and there is large but finite number of images a 
 person can see.  Therefore, in a universe that is infinite there is bound 
 to be replication of the same experiences.  This may not duplicate an 
 experience, which some have argued is a but it does mean there can be 
 multiple instances of the same experience.


If we look at an ambiguous image, we can see two different images through 
the same matrix of pixels. If you stare at photos you can see simulacrum 
there. The matrix of pixels is only a conduit for us to receive and project 
image. The image is more than what we assume.
 


 Arnold Zuboff writes:

 Let us compare the logic of experience to the logic of something like a
 novel. A novel might be called a 'detailed type', of which there are 
 'tokens',
 which are its copies. For example, on a shelf in a bookshop there might be
 two copies of but a single novel, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Just
 as this would be only one novel, this would 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-16 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 

  That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even 
  with advanced scientific methods. 
  
  
  Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience 
 not 
  be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be 
  limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is 
  automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would 
 have to 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event 
  from eternity. 

 If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed 
 physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is 
 something other than a physical basis to the experience. This 
 something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. 


No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something 
repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was 
writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on 
in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back 
yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been 
repeated 100%. The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered 
experiences and string them together as similar enough to be considered 
identical.
 


  This is equivalent to saying it is 
  magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a 
  pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something 
  else does not change the facts. 
  
  
  I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so 
 you 
  strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to 
 is 
  either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or 
 Significance 
  - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing 
 else, 
  and I claim nothing else. 

 Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, 


No, they are physical, but they are private.
 

 but the conventional 
 view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with 
 this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. 
 This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. 


Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in a 
magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience takes 
place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, then you 
can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the concrete 
reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on measuring 
interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is physical. 
Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. The 
relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public space, 
not real vs illusion. 
 


   Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond 
 from 
   1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the 
 universe 
   as 
   bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations 
 of 
   a 
   single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, 
   contingent 
   upon the experiential capacity of the participant. 
  
  There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be 
  replicated. 
  
  
  Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like 
  every experience. 

 If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced 
 exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly. 


Experience isn't caused by the brain, any more than the internet is caused 
by your computer. Reproducing your computer from 2000 won't resurrect 
Napster of 2000. Nothing, and I mean nothing at all has ever been 
reproduced exactly.
 


  In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is* 
  duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in 
  extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy 
  of anything you care to name. 
  
  
  You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I 
 say, 
  you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally 
  experiences rather than objects. 
  
  The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on sensitivity. 
 If 
  you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the Jack 
 of 
  Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you factor 
 out 
  sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is 
 misconception. 

 Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is 
 consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will 
 behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original 
 have a basic physical existence. 


Behave like 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-16 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com 
 wrote: 

  That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there 
 must 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even 
  with advanced scientific methods. 
  
  
  Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that 
 experience not 
  be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be 
  limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is 
  automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would 
 have to 
  be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular 
 event 
  from eternity. 

 If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed 
 physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is 
 something other than a physical basis to the experience. This 
 something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. 


 No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something 
 repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was 
 writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on 
 in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back 
 yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been 
 repeated 100%. 


 Do you have any theory that explains sensation?


Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make 
cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual 
sensations (thoughts). 
 

   Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious 
 experience over some finite period of time?


Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which 
inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is 
presented.
 

   If not, then it seems plausible that whatever information needs to go 
 into creating some sensory experience can be duplicated.  If it is non 
 infinite then the pigeon hole principle applies ( 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle ).


Sensory experience is not created by information, information is a 
consequence of sensory experience and conceptual-level motives. Sensory 
experience is private physics. Information is a conceptual abstraction of 
sensory experience, so that while our thoughts about information are 
physical events, the bits and bytes to which they refer are not physically 
real.

Craig
 


 Jason

  

 The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences 
 and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical.
  


  This is equivalent to saying it is 
  magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a 
  pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something 
  else does not change the facts. 
  
  
  I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, 
 so you 
  strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to 
 is 
  either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or 
 Significance 
  - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing 
 else, 
  and I claim nothing else. 

 Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, 


 No, they are physical, but they are private.
  

 but the conventional 
 view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with 
 this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. 
 This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. 


 Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in 
 a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience 
 takes place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, 
 then you can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the 
 concrete reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on 
 measuring interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is 
 physical. Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. 
 The relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public 
 space, not real vs illusion. 
  


   Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond 
 from 
   1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the 
 universe 
   as 
   bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique 
 variations of 
   a 
   single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, 
   contingent 
   upon the experiential capacity of the participant. 
  
  There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be 
  replicated. 
  
  
  Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just 
 like 
  every experience. 

 If experience is caused by the brain and the brain 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-16 Thread Jason Resch



On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com  
wrote:





On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:


On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there  
must

 be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even
 with advanced scientific methods.


 Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that  
experience not
 be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately  
be

 limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is
 automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there  
would have to
 be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular  
event

 from eternity.

If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed
physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is
something other than a physical basis to the experience. This
something else is the mysterious non-physical entity.

No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of  
something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be  
repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago.  
In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a  
quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No  
moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%.


Do you have any theory that explains sensation?

Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to  
make cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other  
conceptual sensations (thoughts).


In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation?





  Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your  
conscious experience over some finite period of time?


Information is not physically real. Formations are representations  
which inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not  
produced, it is presented.


Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that  
presentation?


Jason





  If not, then it seems plausible that whatever information needs to  
go into creating some sensory experience can be duplicated.  If it  
is non infinite then the pigeon hole principle applies ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle 
 ).


Sensory experience is not created by information, information is a  
consequence of sensory experience and conceptual-level motives.  
Sensory experience is private physics. Information is a conceptual  
abstraction of sensory experience, so that while our thoughts about  
information are physical events, the bits and bytes to which they  
refer are not physically real.


Craig


Jason


The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered  
experiences and string them together as similar enough to be  
considered identical.



 This is equivalent to saying it is
 magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a
 pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something
 else does not change the facts.


 I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking  
about, so you
 strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I  
refer to is
 either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or  
Significance
 - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is  
nothing else,

 and I claim nothing else.

Sense, motive and significance are non-physical,

No, they are physical, but they are private.

but the conventional
view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with
this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed.
This would by definition be something magical, like a soul.

Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a  
belief in a magical non-physical never-never land in which our  
private experience takes place. Once you realize that the  
conventional view is impossible, then you can begin to look for more  
realistic alternatives based on the concrete reality of experience  
rather than the abstract theory based on measuring interactions of  
public bodies. I say that every presence is physical. Thoughts,  
feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. The relevant  
distinction within physics should be private time vs public space,  
not real vs illusion.



  Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one  
millisecond from
  1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the  
universe

  as
  bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique  
variations of

  a
  single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between,
  contingent
  upon the experiential capacity of the participant.

 There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be
 replicated.


 Except that it 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Sun, Feb 17, 2013 at 6:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed
 physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is
 something other than a physical basis to the experience. This
 something else is the mysterious non-physical entity.


 No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something
 repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was
 writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on
 in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back
 yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been
 repeated 100%. The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered
 experiences and string them together as similar enough to be considered
 identical.

If I tell you to make a copy of my copper bar which is 100mm x 100mm
x10mm with a tolerance of 0.5mm at 25 degrees Celsius would you
complain that you can't do it because the idea of repeating something
is subjective?

  I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so
  you
  strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to
  is
  either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or
  Significance
  - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing
  else,
  and I claim nothing else.

 Sense, motive and significance are non-physical,


 No, they are physical, but they are private.


 but the conventional
 view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with
 this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed.
 This would by definition be something magical, like a soul.


 Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in a
 magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience takes
 place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, then you
 can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the concrete
 reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on measuring
 interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is physical.
 Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. The
 relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public space,
 not real vs illusion.

You can't make an immaterial soul part of physics simply by defining
it as such. You say that it is impossible to duplicate a mind by
duplicating the body, so the mind must not be supervenient on physical
properties.

 If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced
 exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly.


 Experience isn't caused by the brain, any more than the internet is caused
 by your computer. Reproducing your computer from 2000 won't resurrect
 Napster of 2000. Nothing, and I mean nothing at all has ever been reproduced
 exactly.

Perhaps you could explain what you mean by reproduce exactly.
Obviously reproducing your computer from 2000 would not reproduce
Napster, but reproducing the entire system of computers and users
would. And in any case, we don't want to reproduce the Internet of
2000, just the computer from 2000 that will behave the same as the
original computer given the same inputs, which is not very difficult
to do at all.

 Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is
 consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will
 behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original
 have a basic physical existence.


 Behave like the original to whom? There is no way to copy water without it
 being water. If I pour sulfuric acid from a pitcher into a water glass, I
 might be able to fool someone into thinking that this clear liquid is a
 perfect copy, but the smell and the severe chemical burns will reveal that
 the copy is actually very different in many other ways. Plants know it, even
 inorganic matter will not be fooled. It's only in the visual sense that the
 two liquids seem equivalent.

You've never acknowledged that you understand the concept a good
enough copy. All biological components have a certain engineering
tolerance, for if *exact* replacements were required when parts wore
out no living thing could survive more than a few moments.

 Of course they will know where they live and how to communicate with
 each other. The reason you know where you live and how to communicate
 is that your brain today is a close copy of your brain yesterday.


 No, that's the same pre-affirmation you are smuggling in. If you can't let
 go of the certainty that the public shapes of the brain define experience,
 then you won't ever locate experience at all. Our brain is necessary but not
 sufficient to explain human quality of consciousness, just as a TV set is
 necessary but not sufficient to explain Spongebob Squarepants. We aren't
 inside our brain, we are inside our lifetime.

Every part of the 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2013, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect  
that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from  
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique  
experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated  
relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the  
experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making  
astonishing why you are using those points against the  
possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated  
by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication  
(as Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed  
by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the  
1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel  
the split in any way.


That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of  
experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is  
no 'person'.


Not at all. Both the Bp  p, and the UDA-personal-diary  
definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of  
having those experiences, locally.
Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally  
by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to  
others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons.
There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal  
bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their  
self-referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations.


Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of  
bodies, etc.  So are you agreeing with my idea that a physical world  
in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN.


Yes, indeed. At least in the form of long/deep  computations, having  
the correct first person sharable indeterminacy measure. That's why  
physics is necessary indeed, so much that it has to be extracted from  
arithmetic when we assume comp. That's why also we can accept the  
postulation of a physical world, or of a God, as an explanation.


You might disagree as necessary in natural language can be  
ambiguous. In logic, if P is necessary in some context, it means that  
it is derivable from the context, but sometimes it can mean that we  
have to postulate it (which is the opposite). But with necessary in  
the logical sense, it makes sense with computationalism and its  
consequences.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must
 be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even
 with advanced scientific methods.


 Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not
 be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be
 limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is
 automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to
 be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event
 from eternity.

If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed
physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is
something other than a physical basis to the experience. This
something else is the mysterious non-physical entity.

 This is equivalent to saying it is
 magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a
 pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something
 else does not change the facts.


 I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you
 strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is
 either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance
 - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else,
 and I claim nothing else.

Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, but the conventional
view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with
this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed.
This would by definition be something magical, like a soul.

  Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from
  1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe
  as
  bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of
  a
  single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between,
  contingent
  upon the experiential capacity of the participant.

 There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be
 replicated.


 Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like
 every experience.

If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced
exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly.

 In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is*
 duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in
 extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy
 of anything you care to name.


 You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I say,
 you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally
 experiences rather than objects.

 The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on sensitivity. If
 you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the Jack of
 Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you factor out
 sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is misconception.

Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is
consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will
behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original
have a basic physical existence.

  So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
  you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,
 
 
  If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical
  twin -
  my guess is probably a dead one.

 If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the duplication.


 No, your assumption of duplication is not necessarily possible. If you clone
 everyone in New York City, and drop them into a model you have built of New
 York, they aren't suddenly going to know where they live and how to
 communicate with each other. You are assuming that particles are
 disconnected generic entities which have no past of future. I am saying that
 precisely the opposite is also true.

Of course they will know where they live and how to communicate with
each other. The reason you know where you live and how to communicate
is that your brain today is a close copy of your brain yesterday. If
something goes wrong in the copying process, like a head injury, you
might forget how to do these things.

 Cells and cell components are constantly being replaced yet you
 survive. Therefore, it is possible to make a copy of you using
 inanimate matter; for that is in fact what you are.


 Because you aren't cells, you are the experiences of cells, molecules,
 organs, people, civilizations. The cells are like the fuel which experience
 burns. Copying is an intersubjective relation. It just means that in our
 particular state of mind two things seem identical.

But if you copy the cells you reproduce the experience, and if you
don't then something is missing.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that  
unique is the only thing that experiences can  literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from  
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience  
of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some  
observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what  
you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using  
those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so  
much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body  
change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed  
by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p  
view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the  
split in any way.


That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of  
experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no  
'person'.


Not at all. Both the Bp  p, and the UDA-personal-diary definitions  
relates the first person to a machine in a position of having those  
experiences, locally.
Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by  
our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to  
others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons.
There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal  
bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their self- 
referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-14 Thread meekerdb

On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only 
thing that experiences can literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 
3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. 
It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the 
experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you 
are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much 
well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as 
Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is 
relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in 
Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way.


That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart 
from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'.


Not at all. Both the Bp  p, and the UDA-personal-diary definitions relates the first 
person to a machine in a position of having those experiences, locally.
Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by our local 
experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to others locally, and so there are 
locally genuine different persons.
There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal bodies and context 
which relates those experiences, through their self-referential logical and arithmetical 
(computational) relations.


Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of bodies, etc.  So are 
you agreeing with my idea that a physical world in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN.


Brent




Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
 being made up of only a few atoms?


 Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms
 exist in the experience of beings. Experiences cannot be duplicated
 literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences
 can literally be.

That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must
be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even
with advanced scientific methods. This is equivalent to saying it is
magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a
pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something
else does not change the facts.

 Sometimes the objection is raised
 that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be
 duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the
 original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the
 quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then
 it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from
 moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body
 changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you.


 Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from
 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as
 bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a
 single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent
 upon the experiential capacity of the participant.

There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be
replicated. In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is*
duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in
extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy
of anything you care to name.

 So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
 you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,


 If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin -
 my guess is probably a dead one.

If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the duplication.
If you haven't made a mistake and it's still dead then there is magic
involved, which science will not be able to fathom no matter how
advanced.

 and why
 you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to
 day,


 Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other way
 around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes.

 having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the
 course of months with the matter in the food he eats.


 It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is no
 longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation of drivers who
 employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding the phenomenon as just a
 statistical pattern of positions and frequencies, or of objects in a spatial
 relation are both interesting and useful, but without the underlying
 sensory-motive grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big picture.

Cells and cell components are constantly being replaced yet you
survive. Therefore, it is possible to make a copy of you using
inanimate matter; for that is in fact what you are.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:

Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens  
will tell
you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct  
some
experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These  
aliens
possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability  
to scan
and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use  
this
technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which  
they call
you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you  
unharmed back
to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain  
experiments? and
they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You  
read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created  
and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You  
consider
this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your  
duplicate

rather than you.

Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
Restorers:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the  
aliens with

the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all  
other
physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The  
aliens

will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown  
to them.
They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours,  
conducting test
after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the  
torture and
all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are  
finished, you
are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture  
began. The
aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back  
to your
home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments?  
and they

hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created  
and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You  
consider
this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your  
duplicate

rather than you.

My questions for the list:

1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the  
case of
the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why  
not.


2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture  
in the
case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please  
explain.


3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one  
you would

prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
pain but then forget it.


OK, same answer (assuming comp).

If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory  
of mind that we might propose.


Bruno





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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg  
whats...@gmail.com wrote:
 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in  
the case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why  
not.


 Yes


 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the  
torture in the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please  
explain.


 The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only  
look at
 the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that,  
it would
 not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms  
to be
 experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be  
shaped like

 you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.

 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in  
the
 universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased  
absolutely,
 because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that  
extend out to
 eternity.  I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our  
naive
 realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to  
consciousness.
 Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is  
mandated by

 physics to be universal and uniform.

What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
being made up of only a few atoms?

Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms,  
rather atoms exist in the experience of beings.


But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable.





Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that  
unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from  
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of  
a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some  
observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what  
you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those  
points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much  
well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and  
duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a  
3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is  
not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any  
way.


Bruno











Sometimes the objection is raised
that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be
duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the
original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the
quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then
it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from
moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body
changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you.

Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond  
from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the  
universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is  
unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of  
'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity  
of the participant.



So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,

If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical  
twin - my guess is probably a dead one.


and why
you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to
day,

Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the  
other way around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes.


having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the
course of months with the matter in the food he eats.

It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it  
is no longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation  
of drivers who employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding  
the phenomenon as just a statistical pattern of positions and  
frequencies, or of objects in a spatial relation are both  
interesting and useful, but without the underlying sensory-motive  
grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big picture.


Craig



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/13/2013 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in
the case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not,
why not.

 Yes


 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the
torture in the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not,
please explain.

 The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we
only look at
 the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate
that, it would
 not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of
atoms to be
 experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be
shaped like
 you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.

 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing
in the
 universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased
absolutely,
 because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that
extend out to
 eternity.  I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt
our naive
 realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to
consciousness.
 Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is
mandated by
 physics to be universal and uniform.

What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
being made up of only a few atoms? 



Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather 
atoms exist in the experience of beings.



Dear Bruno,

I have some questions but they are not well-formed, my apologies. I 
hope you can make some sense of them. I agree generally that atoms 
exist in the experience of beings only. We (the in the plural sense) 
happen to be able to agree on the locations and other properties of 
objects within our individual 1p.



But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable.


 If we are 3p-duplicatable then how do we obtain the 
non-clonability of quantum states?




Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that 
unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from 
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.


Could it be that the 3p-duplicatability is possible but global 1p 
correlations of these is not possible, thus obtaining the no cloning of QM?


An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of 
a unique being.


Does this follow from the uniqueness of a fixed point (for a given group 
of transformations on a closed (or semi-closed) collection?


It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not 
relatively to the experiencer himself.


So would relate them to each other?

Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are 
using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is 
so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body 
change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 
3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is 
not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any 
way.


It seems to me that you are assuming a special observer that can 
distinguish all 3p-persons from each other. In my thinking this is cheating.




Bruno




Sometimes the objection is raised
that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be
duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the
original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the
quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness
then
it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from
moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body
changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you.


Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond 
from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the 
universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique 
variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' 
in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant.



So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,


If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical 
twin - my guess is probably a dead one.


and why
you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from
day to
day, 



Because the cells of the body exist within 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Feb 2013, at 16:25, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:

Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will  
tell
you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct  
some
experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These  
aliens
possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability  
to scan

and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which  
they call
you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you  
unharmed back
to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain  
experiments? and
they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You  
read the

pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You  
consider

this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
rather than you.

Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
Restorers:

At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the  
aliens with

the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all  
other
physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The  
aliens

will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to  
them.
They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours,  
conducting test
after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the  
torture and
all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are  
finished, you
are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture  
began. The
aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to  
your
home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and  
they

hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what  
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You  
consider

this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
rather than you.

My questions for the list:

1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the  
case of
the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why  
not.


2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture  
in the
case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please  
explain.


3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one  
you would

prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.

The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
pain but then forget it.

OK, same answer (assuming comp).


With comp are the probabilities the same?  For instance, would there  
be a 50% chance of experiencing the torture when duplicated vs.  
100% in the case of the memory wipe?


It is counter-intuitive, but if the memory wipe is perfect, the  
relative probabilities, evaluated before the experiment, should be the  
same. If a future memory wipe is done perfectly, it is analogous to a  
reconstitution of a past (3p) state in the future, and before that  
first state occurence, you have a probability non null to find  
yourself in the future.


It is not clear if such a perfect memory wipe is possible in practice  
though.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Jason Resch
Bruno,

Thanks for your response.  I think I understand now.

Jason

On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 13 Feb 2013, at 16:25, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will
 tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These
 aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to
 scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they
 call
 you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed
 back
 to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain
 experiments? and
 they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read
 the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens
 with
 the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to
 them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting
 test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture
 and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished,
 you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began.
 The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to
 your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and
 they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans
 call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You
 consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case
 of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in
 the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please
 explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you
 would
 prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


 The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
 preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
 pain but then forget it.


 OK, same answer (assuming comp).



 With comp are the probabilities the same?  For instance, would there be a
 50% chance of experiencing the torture when duplicated vs. 100% in the
 case of the memory wipe?


 It is counter-intuitive, but if the memory wipe is perfect, the relative
 probabilities, evaluated before the experiment, should be the same. If a
 future memory wipe is done perfectly, it is analogous to a reconstitution
 of a past (3p) state in the future, and before that first state occurence,
 you have a probability non null to find yourself in the future.

 It is not clear if such a perfect memory wipe is possible in practice
 though.

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Stephen,


On 13 Feb 2013, at 16:53, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/13/2013 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg  
whats...@gmail.com wrote:
 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in  
the case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not,  
why not.


 Yes


 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the  
torture in the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please  
explain.


 The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we  
only look at
 the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that,  
it would
 not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of  
atoms to be
 experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be  
shaped like

 you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.

 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing  
in the
 universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased  
absolutely,
 because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that  
extend out to
 eternity.  I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt  
our naive
 realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to  
consciousness.
 Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is  
mandated by

 physics to be universal and uniform.

What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
being made up of only a few atoms?

Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms,  
rather atoms exist in the experience of beings.



Dear Bruno,

I have some questions but they are not well-formed, my  
apologies. I hope you can make some sense of them. I agree generally  
that atoms exist in the experience of beings only. We (the in the  
plural sense) happen to be able to agree on the locations and other  
properties of objects within our individual 1p.


OK, as they will be shared in the plural we.






But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable.


 If we are 3p-duplicatable then how do we obtain the non- 
clonability of quantum states?


Because below our substitution level, matter is (re)-defined by all  
computations going through our state, so the matter which constitute  
our local material brain cannot be duplicated. It involves the  
infinite sum on the whole UD*.









Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that  
unique is the only thing that experiences canliterally  
be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from  
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.


Could it be that the 3p-duplicatability is possible but global 1p  
correlations of these is not possible,


Hmm... we need the 1p correlations to trust the doctor, and introduce  
them, by chance perhaps, when betting on the correct level, or below.





thus obtaining the no cloning of QM?

An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience  
of a unique being.


Does this follow from the uniqueness of a fixed point (for a given  
group of transformations on a closed (or semi-closed) collection?


You can get it intuitively. Even John Clark agrees that two absolutely  
identical computations, in case they support a mind, will support a  
unique mind. That's why in fine a mind is associated with all  
computations going through the states, and UDA makes matter redefined  
by the 1p relative measure.






It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not  
relatively to the experiencer himself.


So would relate them to each other?


The density of the sharable computations would relate them to each  
other, with some high normal probability.






Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are  
using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which  
is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self- 
body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed  
by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p  
view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the  
split in any way.


It seems to me that you are assuming a special observer that can  
distinguish all 3p-persons from each other. In my thinking this is  
cheating.


To just enunciate comp we have to agree on the (sigma_1, tiny part of)  
arithmetic, which gives the whole set of possible 3p relations from  
which the dreams emerges and cohere (or not).


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 3:58:31 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 

  What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious 
  being made up of only a few atoms? 
  
  
  Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather 
 atoms 
  exist in the experience of beings. Experiences cannot be duplicated 
  literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that 
 experiences 
  can literally be. 

 That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must 
 be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even 
 with advanced scientific methods. 


Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience 
not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be 
limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is 
automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have 
to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event 
from eternity.

This is equivalent to saying it is 
 magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a 
 pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something 
 else does not change the facts. 


I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you 
strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is 
either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance 
- all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, 
and I claim nothing else.  


  Sometimes the objection is raised 
  that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be 
  duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the 
  original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the 
  quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then 
  it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from 
  moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body 
  changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. 
  
  
  Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 
  1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe 
 as 
  bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of 
 a 
  single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, 
 contingent 
  upon the experiential capacity of the participant. 

 There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be 
 replicated. 


Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like 
every experience.
 

 In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is* 
 duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in 
 extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy 
 of anything you care to name. 


You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I say, 
you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally 
experiences rather than objects.

The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on sensitivity. If 
you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the Jack of 
Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you factor out 
sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is misconception.


  So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if 
  you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, 
  
  
  If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical 
 twin - 
  my guess is probably a dead one. 

 If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the duplication. 


No, your assumption of duplication is not necessarily possible. If you 
clone everyone in New York City, and drop them into a model you have built 
of New York, they aren't suddenly going to know where they live and how to 
communicate with each other. You are assuming that particles are 
disconnected generic entities which have no past of future. I am saying 
that precisely the opposite is also true.
 

 If you haven't made a mistake and it's still dead then there is magic 
 involved, which science will not be able to fathom no matter how 
 advanced. 


If it's not white, it must be blacker than black! There must be 
consequences for heretic thoughts! This kind of Manichean compulsion has 
generally been a hindrance to science.
 


  and why 
  you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to 
  day, 
  
  
  Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other 
 way 
  around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes. 
  
  having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the 
  course of months with the matter in the food he eats. 
  
  
  It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is 
 no 
  longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the 

Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread meekerdb

On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only 
thing that experiences can literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 
3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It 
can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the 
experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are 
using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well 
illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis 
argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is 
relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett 
QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way.


That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from 
that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'.


Brent

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-13 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/13/2013 2:36 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that 
unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from 
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of 
a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some 
observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what 
you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those 
points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much 
well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and 
duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by 
a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, 
is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in 
any way.


That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of 
experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 
'person'.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Yes, but that is true only for the computable portion of any 1p 
view. The person' itself is not computable, but it related to an 
intersection of an infinite number of computations (if I get Bruno's 
idea correctly).


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-12 Thread Craig Weinberg
1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of 
the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

Yes

2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the 
case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please explain.

The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at 
the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would 
not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be 
experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like 
you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.

3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the 
universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, 
because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to 
eternity.  I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive 
realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. 
Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by 
physics to be universal and uniform.

Craig


On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 7:58:49 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell 
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some 
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens 
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan 
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this 
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they 
 call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you 
 unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain 
 experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly 
 off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) 
 was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to 
 what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2was euthanized. 
 You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they 
 tortured your duplicate rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The 
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens 
 with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a 
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other 
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens 
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to 
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. 
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test 
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and 
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you 
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The 
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your 
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they 
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the 
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and 
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans 
 call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You 
 consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your 
 duplicate rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of 
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the 
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you 
 would prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.


 Thank you.

 Jason




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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 Yes


 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please explain.

 The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at
 the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would
 not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be
 experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like
 you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.

 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the
 universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely,
 because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to
 eternity.  I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive
 realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness.
 Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by
 physics to be universal and uniform.

What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
being made up of only a few atoms? Sometimes the objection is raised
that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be
duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the
original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the
quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then
it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from
moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body
changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you.

So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, and why
you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to
day, having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the
course of months with the matter in the food he eats.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell
 you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some
 experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens
 possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan
 and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this
 technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call
 you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back
 to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and
 they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The
 Restorers:

 At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with
 the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
 restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other
 physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens
 will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
 conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them.
 They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test
 after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and
 all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you
 are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The
 aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your
 home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they
 hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
 pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and
 subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call
 torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider
 this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate
 rather than you.

 My questions for the list:

 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of
 the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not.

 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the
 case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please explain.

 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would
 prefer?  If you have a preference, please provide some justification.

The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
pain but then forget it.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-12 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 
  1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case 
 of 
  the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not, why not. 
  
  Yes 
  
  
  2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in 
 the 
  case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not, please 
 explain. 
  
  The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look 
 at 
  the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it 
 would 
  not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be 
  experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped 
 like 
  you according to an electron microscope does not make them you. 
  
  3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the 
  universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased 
 absolutely, 
  because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out 
 to 
  eternity.  I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive 
  realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. 
  Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by 
  physics to be universal and uniform. 

 What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious 
 being made up of only a few atoms? 


Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms 
exist in the experience of beings. Experiences cannot be duplicated 
literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences 
can literally be.

Sometimes the objection is raised 
 that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be 
 duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the 
 original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the 
 quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then 
 it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from 
 moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body 
 changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. 


Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 
1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as 
bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a 
single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent 
upon the experiential capacity of the participant.
 


 So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if 
 you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,


If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - 
my guess is probably a dead one.
 

 and why 
 you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to 
 day, 


Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other way 
around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes. 

having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the 
 course of months with the matter in the food he eats. 


It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is no 
longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation of drivers 
who employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding the phenomenon as 
just a statistical pattern of positions and frequencies, or of objects in a 
spatial relation are both interesting and useful, but without the 
underlying sensory-motive grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big 
picture.

Craig
 



 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou 


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