Re: The free will function

2012-02-29 Thread 1Z


On Feb 27, 10:11 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 25, 10:50 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 25, 6:32 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

   On Feb 24, 8:22 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

   You are
   thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
   observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

  I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
  be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all.

 Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the
 simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the
 simulation.

But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense
to the claim that they are sims ITFP

   They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer
   somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can
   never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out
   there.

  That certain things don'tn matter to you doesn't
  change any facts.

 That would be true if I were aware of the fact but didn't care, but in
 this case there is no possibility of my ever being aware of it. Facts
 outside of our own universe can't be considered as facts to us unless
 they impact us in some way.

But you are already doing that. You are putting forward it's
all a simulation as a fact that is just true and not necessarily
knowable to us possible sims.

That may be intended as some sort of reductio ad absurdum
of the simulation hypothesis. I don't know if it is. That is
one of the many things that aren't clear.

If all of humanity died off and you are an
 ant crawling on a microwave oven, the 'fact' that it 'is' a microwave
 oven is not relevant.

That doens't mean it isn't a fact. You are
supposing it is in order to set up the scenario.

It is consistent to say it is an objective, absolute facts
that there are objective, absolute facts.

It is not consistent to say there are no objective
facts, everything is just true to of for a subject
and offfer in support of that just such an objective fact.


The world has lost the capacity to define that
 object in that way, and it now is a hard flat surface for ants to
 crawl on.



   I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause
   the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to
   them, I am a simulation.

  But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
  transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
  to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic.

 You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the
 delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make
 their consciousness completely solipsistic.

So?

   To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth.

  Luncacy might be believed. Not the same thing.

 Not if you take comp and simulation seriously. I don't, so I agree,
 truth is more than local simulation, but comp does not agree. Any
 fantasy which can be rendered arithmetically could be a valid universe
 to live in under comp.

But Comp/SH doesn't have the implication that
the nature of truth itself keeps changing.
You can state Comp/SH by saying it is an
objective fact that most subjective perceptions
are of simulated worlds, and most subjects hold
fasle beliefs. You are importing your
own subjectivist epistemology into Comp/SH.
It is not native to it. If you want to critique Comp,
you need to show there is something wrong
with *it's* claim, not yours!

  I recommend using publically accessble language
  to enhance communication, not to discover new
  facts.

 I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form.

If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point?

   Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.

  That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the 
  meaning
  of
  a word *always* changes in different contexts.

 It does

Says who?

   Why do you think it doesn't?

  Don't shift the burden. You are making the extraordinary claim.

 I'm not making an extraordinary claim, I'm pointing out that
 perception cannot be reproduced

What has pecerption to do with it? We were discussing meaning.

precisely since is is context
 dependent. If it were not the case, it would be possible to say the
 same word over and over forever and never grow tired of doing that.

Boredom does not indicate shifts of meaning.

 Every moment of our lives has unique semantic content exclusive to us.

That does not mean that individual words are always changing meaning.
You
can have constantly changing  compounds of stable elements.

 No man ever steps in the same river twice. - Heraclitus



   Do you mean the same 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-29 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 29, 4:56 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 27, 10:11 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


You are
thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that 
the
observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

   I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
   be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at 
   all.

  Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the
  simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the
  simulation.

 But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense
 to the claim that they are sims ITFP

They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer
somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can
never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out
there.

   That certain things don'tn matter to you doesn't
   change any facts.

  That would be true if I were aware of the fact but didn't care, but in
  this case there is no possibility of my ever being aware of it. Facts
  outside of our own universe can't be considered as facts to us unless
  they impact us in some way.

 But you are already doing that. You are putting forward it's
 all a simulation as a fact that is just true and not necessarily
 knowable to us possible sims.

Yes, the fact of it being a simulation is not true for the observers
being simulated under comp. The reality that you simulate is their
actual reality.


 That may be intended as some sort of reductio ad absurdum
 of the simulation hypothesis. I don't know if it is. That is
 one of the many things that aren't clear.

Yes, it is. My point is that MWI is no less wishful thinking than
Creationism.


 If all of humanity died off and you are an
  ant crawling on a microwave oven, the 'fact' that it 'is' a microwave
  oven is not relevant.

 That doens't mean it isn't a fact.

It's not a fact to anyone who is alive. If you add the idea that only
insects and plants will ever live anywhere, then it has no meaning to
say it is a fact.

 You are
 supposing it is in order to set up the scenario.

 It is consistent to say it is an objective, absolute facts
 that there are objective, absolute facts.

 It is not consistent to say there are no objective
 facts, everything is just true to of for a subject
 and offfer in support of that just such an objective fact.

I don't offer an objective fact, I offer a naturalistic scenario to
point out that 'facts' are experiential invariance and nothing more.


 The world has lost the capacity to define that
  object in that way, and it now is a hard flat surface for ants to
  crawl on.

I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause
the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to
them, I am a simulation.

   But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
   transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
   to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every 
   lunatic.

  You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the
  delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and 
  make
  their consciousness completely solipsistic.

 So?

To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth.

   Luncacy might be believed. Not the same thing.

  Not if you take comp and simulation seriously. I don't, so I agree,
  truth is more than local simulation, but comp does not agree. Any
  fantasy which can be rendered arithmetically could be a valid universe
  to live in under comp.

 But Comp/SH doesn't have the implication that
 the nature of truth itself keeps changing.

What is a simulation if not a matrix of internally consistent
propositions that can be changed?

 You can state Comp/SH by saying it is an
 objective fact that most subjective perceptions
 are of simulated worlds, and most subjects hold
 fasle beliefs. You are importing your
 own subjectivist epistemology into Comp/SH.
 It is not native to it. If you want to critique Comp,
 you need to show there is something wrong
 with *it's* claim, not yours!

No, because Comp has no capacity to understand what is wrong with its
claim. Comp is inherently circular and can only prove itself
regardless of any absurdities that arise from it in the real world.
Comp exists in its own theoretical bubble which realism cannot
penetrate. It is up to us living human beings to seize the reigns of
sentience directly and not be seduced by this one narrow tradition of
logical puzzle solving into forsaking the myriad of other channels of
sense we have access to. Comp is like a black and white TV demanding
that color be proved on its terms.


   I recommend using publically accessble language
   to enhance communication, not to discover new
   facts.

  I would rather enhance the content of the 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-28 Thread 1Z


On Feb 27, 6:40 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
 On 27.02.2012 17:47 John Clark said the following:

  On Sat, Feb 25, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Craig
  Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

  There is no simulation of red. Red is only red.

  But red itself is a simulation. Electromagnetic waves a length of
  700 nanometers can produce the quale red in the minds of most (but
  not all) human beings if it enters their eye, so the red quale
  simulates (represents) the location and intensity of 700 nanometer
  electromagnetic radiation. But red can stand for other things that
  have nothing to do with light; go into a pitch dark room and close
  your eyes and apply gentle pressure to your closed eyelid, you often
  see splotches of red. So in this case the red quale simulates
  (represents) the location and intensity of pressure.

 You may want look at synaesthetes for whom red could appears for example
 when they hear a word blue. You can certainly claim that in this case
 sound waves simulate red but then the question is what the intensity of
 700 nanometer electromagnetic radiation has to do with this.

 Also I believe that one feels red not only with 700 nanometer wavelength
 but with other combinations of wavelengths as well. This is not one to one.

Even more so if your depart from vision and consider other senses,
such as taste and smell. There is no simple chemical property
that corresponds to sweet, bitter, etc.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-27 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Feb 25, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 There is no simulation of red. Red is only red.


But red itself is a simulation. Electromagnetic waves a length of 700
nanometers can produce the quale red in the minds of most (but not all)
human beings if it enters their eye, so the red quale simulates
(represents) the location and intensity of 700 nanometer electromagnetic
radiation. But red can stand for other things that have nothing to do with
light; go into a pitch dark room and close your eyes and apply gentle
pressure to your closed eyelid, you often see splotches of red. So in this
case the red quale simulates (represents) the location and intensity of
pressure.

 Who we are is like that. Us-ness.


I see, ...  Us-ness. Well I'm glad you cleared that up.

  John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-27 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 27.02.2012 17:47 John Clark said the following:

On Sat, Feb 25, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Craig
Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.comwrote:


There is no simulation of red. Red is only red.



But red itself is a simulation. Electromagnetic waves a length of
700 nanometers can produce the quale red in the minds of most (but
not all) human beings if it enters their eye, so the red quale
simulates (represents) the location and intensity of 700 nanometer
electromagnetic radiation. But red can stand for other things that
have nothing to do with light; go into a pitch dark room and close
your eyes and apply gentle pressure to your closed eyelid, you often
see splotches of red. So in this case the red quale simulates
(represents) the location and intensity of pressure.


You may want look at synaesthetes for whom red could appears for example 
when they hear a word blue. You can certainly claim that in this case 
sound waves simulate red but then the question is what the intensity of 
700 nanometer electromagnetic radiation has to do with this.


Also I believe that one feels red not only with 700 nanometer wavelength 
but with other combinations of wavelengths as well. This is not one to one.


Evgenii





Who we are is like that. Us-ness.



I see, ...  Us-ness. Well I'm glad you cleared that up.

John K Clark



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-27 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 25, 10:50 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 25, 6:32 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:









  On Feb 24, 8:22 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  You are
  thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
  observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

 I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
 be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all.

Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the
simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the
simulation.

   But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense
   to the claim that they are sims ITFP

  They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer
  somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can
  never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out
  there.

 That certain things don'tn matter to you doesn't
 change any facts.

That would be true if I were aware of the fact but didn't care, but in
this case there is no possibility of my ever being aware of it. Facts
outside of our own universe can't be considered as facts to us unless
they impact us in some way. If all of humanity died off and you are an
ant crawling on a microwave oven, the 'fact' that it 'is' a microwave
oven is not relevant. The world has lost the capacity to define that
object in that way, and it now is a hard flat surface for ants to
crawl on.










  I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause
  the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to
  them, I am a simulation.

 But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
 transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
 to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic.

You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the
delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make
their consciousness completely solipsistic.

   So?

  To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth.

 Luncacy might be believed. Not the same thing.

Not if you take comp and simulation seriously. I don't, so I agree,
truth is more than local simulation, but comp does not agree. Any
fantasy which can be rendered arithmetically could be a valid universe
to live in under comp.










 I recommend using publically accessble language
 to enhance communication, not to discover new
 facts.

I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form.

   If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point?

  Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.

 That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning
 of
 a word *always* changes in different contexts.

It does

   Says who?

  Why do you think it doesn't?

 Don't shift the burden. You are making the extraordinary claim.

I'm not making an extraordinary claim, I'm pointing out that
perception cannot be reproduced precisely since is is context
dependent. If it were not the case, it would be possible to say the
same word over and over forever and never grow tired of doing that.
Every moment of our lives has unique semantic content exclusive to us.

No man ever steps in the same river twice. - Heraclitus


  Do you mean the same thing today when you
  talk about having 'fun' as you did when you were in third grade?

 I am  not disputing that some meanings change in some contexts.

Why would any meanings be immune from that?












 It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying
 to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are
 really the top hat in Monopoly, or Throngar the Invincible in
 DD

Those make the same point as well. Is it true that you are the top hat
in Monopoly? If not then Monopoly is not a very strong simulation -
which it isn't. A full immersion virtual DD campaign? That would be a
stronger simulation and you could not so easily say that you aren't
Throngar. Especially if you played him for a living...and changed your
name legally...and got plastic surgery. At what point do you become
Throngar?

   If there is any meaning to the word simulation, then it is never
   actual.

  That's simplistic. The whole point of a simulation is that is is as if
  it were actual in some sense. A flight simulator provides an actual
  experience that can seem like flying an actual plane. If you are on a
  plane where the pilot dies, do you ask the guy who has logged 1
  hours on flight simulators to fly the plane or do you say they have no
  actual experience?

 That's irrelevant.

Why? You said simulation is never actual, and I give you an example of
how simulation can have consequences as if it were 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-27 Thread Craig Weinberg
Couple of Free Will studies:

Laypersons' belief in free will may foster a sense of thoughtful
reflection and willingness to exert energy, thereby promoting
helpfulness and reducing aggression, and so disbelief in free will may
make behavior more reliant on selfish, automatic impulses and
therefore less socially desirable. Three studies tested the hypothesis
that disbelief in free will would be linked with decreased helping and
increased aggression. In Experiment 1, induced disbelief in free will
reduced willingness to help others. Experiment 2 showed that chronic
disbelief in free will was associated with reduced helping behavior.
In Experiment 3, participants induced disbelief in free will caused
participants to act more aggressively than others. Although the
findings do not speak to the existence of free will, the current
results suggest that disbelief in free will reduces helping and
increases aggression.

http://psp.sagepub.com/content/35/2/260.short

also:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18684016/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/study-hints-fruit-flies-have-free-will/#.T0wpVHlUF8E

A spark of free will may exist in even the tiny brain of the
humble fruit fly, based on new findings that could shed light on the
nature and evolution of free will in humans.

Future research delving further into free will could lead to more
advanced robots, scientists added. The result, joked neurobiologist
Björn Brembs from the Free University Berlin, could be world robot
domination.

Seriously though, Brembs said that programming robots with
aspects of free will may lead to more realistic and probably even
more efficient behavior, which could be decisive in truly autonomous
robots needed for planetary exploration.

Better understanding aspects of free will in humans also could aid
in the treatment of mental disorders where people face problems
controlling how they feel, think or act, such as depression, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, anorexia nervosa, schizophrenia or attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder, Brembs told LiveScience.

For centuries, the question of whether or not humans possess free
will — and thus control their own actions — has been a source of hot
debate.

Free will is essentially an oxymoron — we would not consider it
'will' if it were completely random and we would not consider it
'free' if it were entirely determined, Brembs said. In other words,
nobody would ascribe responsibility to one's actions if they were
entirely the result of random coincidence. On the other hand, if one's
actions were completely determined by outside factors such that no
alternative existed, no one would hold that person responsible for
them.

We speculate that if free will exists, it is in this middle
ground between randomness and determinism that is currently not well
understood or characterized, said mathematical biologist George
Sugihara at the University of California at San Diego.

Insects and other animals are often seen just as very complex
robots, Brembs said, for which behavior is determined solely by
reactions to the outside world. When scientists observe animals
responding in different ways to the same outside cues, such variations
are typically attributed to random errors in a complex brain, he
said.

Not just random
Brembs and his colleagues reasoned that if fruit flies (Drosophila
melanogaster) were simply reactive robots entirely determined by their
environment, in completely featureless rooms they should move
completely randomly. To investigate this idea, the international team
of researchers glued the insects to small copper hooks in completely
uniform white surroundings, a kind of visual sensory deprivation tank.
These flies could still beat their wings and attempt to turn.

A plethora of increasingly sophisticated computer analyses
revealed that the way the flies turned back and forth over time was
far from random. Instead, there appeared to be a function in the fly
brain which evolved to generate spontaneous variations in the
behavior, Sugihara said.

Specifically, their behavior seemed to match up with a
mathematical algorithm called Levy's distribution, commonly found in
nature. Flies use this procedure to find meals, as do albatrosses,
monkeys and deer. Scientists have found similar patterns in the flow
of e-mails, letters and money, and in the paintings of Jackson
Pollock, Brembs said.

These strategies in flies appear to arise spontaneously and do not
result from outside cues, according to findings detailed in
Wednesday's issue of the journal PLoS ONE. This makes their behavior
seem to lie somewhere between completely random and purely determined,
and could form the biological foundation for what we experience as
free will, Sugihara added. This function appears to be common to
many other animals.

Brembs said that even a fly brain possesses a function which
makes it easier to imagine a brain that creates the impression of free
will.


Re: The free will function

2012-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Feb 2012, at 20:01, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote:


On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2012 11:52, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness,  
experience),

(Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.
Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all  
3, mind is
the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing  
possible, even
if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from  
our experience
(but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism  
which means

our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build
mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really  
avoid any of
the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other  
can be

directly inferred.
However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that  
these
notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never  
all 3.
Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying  
the existence
of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence.  
(This tends
to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to  
stomach because
all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's  
a bit

self-defeating.
Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic  
versions
where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some  
piece of
abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those  
that wish
matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies  
into

reality (even if low-measure).
Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter  
which cannot

obey any rules - not even all possible rules


Nice summary.  You say Mind becomes how some piece of abstract  
math

feels from the inside, which is essentially how Bruno puts it.
However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it
seems obvious that mind is no more identical to math or  
computation

than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as
categorically different.  Math and mind are still distinct,  
though
correlated.  Do you think that such a duality can still be  
subsumed in

some sort of neutral monism?
Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated  
with them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm  
not sure there's much to gain by adding extra indirection layers  
-  it's not that consciousness is associated with some scribbles  
on a piece of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and  
we could say that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific  
structure we can talk about (using pen and paper or computers),  
but at the same time, that that abstract structure does have some  
sensory experience associated with it. Other structure might  
represent some machines implementing some partial local physics.  
In that way it's neutral monist. We could try to keep experience  
separate and supervening on arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure  
if there's anything to gain by introducing such a dualism - it  
might make epistemological sense, but I'm not sure it makes sense  
ontologically. I'm rather unsure of such a move myself, I wonder  
what Bruno's opinion is on this.


I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism,  
because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view,  
if you agree to


1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially  
correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason  
to do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting  
things is that it leads to an already very complex machine's  
theology. We might take it as a toy theology, but then all  
theories are sort of toys.


2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp - BBp) provides the  
best axiomatic theories for knowledge.


Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp  p) gives a notion of  
knowledge, i.e. (Bp  p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory.


The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent  
with Bp  p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point  
where the divine intellect (G*), the believer (G) and the kower  
(soul) Bp  p, will completely differ, and this will account for a  
variety of dualism, unavoidable for the machine.


So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the  
definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will  
behaves as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp  
and understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of  
taking that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe,  
nor even explictly express that she is correct).


Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*,  
S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to  
solve problems, like in analytical philosophy, but 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-26 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/26/2012 12:27 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Feb 2012, at 20:01, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote:


On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2012 11:52, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, 
experience),

(Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.
Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 
3, mind is
the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing 
possible, even
if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our 
experience
(but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism 
which means

our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build
mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really 
avoid any of
the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other 
can be

directly inferred.
However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that 
these
notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never 
all 3.
Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the 
existence
of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence. 
(This tends
to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach 
because
all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a 
bit

self-defeating.
Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic 
versions
where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some 
piece of
abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those 
that wish
matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies 
into

reality (even if low-measure).
Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which 
cannot

obey any rules - not even all possible rules


Nice summary.  You say Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math
feels from the inside, which is essentially how Bruno puts it.
However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it
seems obvious that mind is no more identical to math or computation
than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as
categorically different.  Math and mind are still distinct, though
correlated.  Do you think that such a duality can still be 
subsumed in

some sort of neutral monism?
Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated with 
them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not sure 
there's much to gain by adding extra indirection layers -  it's 
not that consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece 
of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could 
say that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we 
can talk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same 
time, that that abstract structure does have some sensory 
experience associated with it. Other structure might represent some 
machines implementing some partial local physics. In that way it's 
neutral monist. We could try to keep experience separate and 
supervening on arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's 
anything to gain by introducing such a dualism - it might make 
epistemological sense, but I'm not sure it makes sense 
ontologically. I'm rather unsure of such a move myself, I wonder 
what Bruno's opinion is on this.


I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism, 
because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, 
if you agree to


1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially 
correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason 
to do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting 
things is that it leads to an already very complex machine's 
theology. We might take it as a toy theology, but then all theories 
are sort of toys.


2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp - BBp) provides the 
best axiomatic theories for knowledge.


Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp  p) gives a notion of 
knowledge, i.e. (Bp  p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory.


The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent 
with Bp  p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point 
where the divine intellect (G*), the believer (G) and the kower 
(soul) Bp  p, will completely differ, and this will account for a 
variety of dualism, unavoidable for the machine.


So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the 
definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will 
behaves as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp and 
understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of 
taking that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, 
nor even explictly express that she is correct).


Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*, 
S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solve 
problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Feb 2012, at 20:37, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/26/2012 12:27 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 25 Feb 2012, at 20:01, Stephen P. King wrote:


snip

Likewize Bp  Dt, and Bp  Dt  p, are other important variants. I  
will say more when I get more time, but by searching 'S4Grz' or  
'hypostase' in the archive you might find the many explanations I  
already give. See my papers and the reference therein. Ask precise  
question when you don't understand, so I can help.





Thank you for this brief set of remarks. I would like to see an  
elaboration of the Löbian entity such that we can see the means by  
which the 1p content is encoded.


The first person content are not encoded, they are just true belief,  
or correct inference with respect to plausible local universal numbers.
A brain does not create a person, it helps a person to manifest  
herself with respect to other universal numbers (some being person  
themselves, and others might be less clear).




Can, for example, we include a free or atomic boolean algebra in a  
Löbian entity?


Algebraically Löbian machines can be handled by diagonalizable algebra  
(that is boolean algebra endowed with a transformation operator  
verifying the Löbian axioms, the fixed point property.


But what the machine can observe is non boolean, and cannot, I presume  
be extended in a Boolean reality. It is an open problem if all  
coherent dreams could define a unique physical reality. I doubt it.











I would also appreciate your comments on this paper by Barry  
Cooper: http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/preprints/rome.paper.pdf


Here is its Abstract:

Amongst the huge literature concerning emergence, reductionism  
and mech-
anism, there is a role for analysis of the underlying mathematical  
constraints.
Much of the speculation, confusion, controversy and descriptive  
verbiage might
be clarified via suitable modelling and theory. The key  
ingredients we bring
to this project are the mathematical notions of definability and  
invariance, a
computability theoretic framework in a real-world context, and  
within that,
the modelling of basic causal environments via Turing's 1939  
notion of interac-
tive computation over a structure described in terms of reals.  
Useful outcomes
are: a refinement of what one understands to be a causal  
relationship, includ-
ing non-mechanistic, irreversible causal relationships; an  
appreciation of how
the mathematically simple origins of incomputability in definable  
hierarchies
are materialized in the real world; and an understanding of the  
powerful ex-

planatory role of current computability theoretic developments.


Interesting, but still not taking into account the comp mind-body  
problem, or the comp first person indeterminacy.
Might say more on this later. It would have been nice I  
(re)discovered that paper soon, but many thanks :)




Please also see http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/jrl/Research/laplace1.pdf 
 which contains many of the same questions that I have been asking  
but expressed in a more formal and erudite manner.


You cannot ask to read 50 pages long technical pages at each  
paragraph, and guess what are your non understing of the UDA is from  
that.
It looks like not too bad material though, but does not really address  
the question we are discussing here.











   I am still not seeing how you define the philosophical terms  
that you are using, as the way that you are using words, such as  
dualism and monism are inconsistent with their usage by others  
in philosophy.


I use them in the sense of the wiki you did provide to me.

Neutral monism, in the philosophy of mind consists in explaining  
mind and matter, and the relation between, in term of something   
else.


Yes, but I see numbers as belonging to the category of mental  
content and thus not capable of forming a neutral something else.


But this is basically, with all my respect, a mistake. You confuse the  
theory of numbers, with the meta and psychological theory (which  
assumes much more things) of how humans mentally handle the numbers.
Unless you make clear your ontology, and what is your theory, or  
initial theory, you might just beg the question.


It is not a question of true or false, but understanding a reasoning.  
You have to go through the thought experiment until you have the aha!







OTOH, if we stick to your consideration that minds are only the 1p


associated with true beliefs.



then your argument that COMP is a neutral monism is consistent  
modulo finite considerations. I think that considerations of 3p  
spoils this neutrality (the Laplace draft paper above touches on  
this), but let us see what happens in our discussions.


OK.






If your theory is scientific, the something else must be clearly  
specifiable, that is itself described by a reasonable theory, so  
that the explanation of mind and body from it makes (sharable) sense.


With comp, in short, a TOE is 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote:


On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2012 11:52, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness,  
experience),

(Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.
Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3,  
mind is
the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing  
possible, even
if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our  
experience
(but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism  
which means

our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build
mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoid  
any of
the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other  
can be

directly inferred.
However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that  
these
notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never  
all 3.
Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the  
existence
of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence.  
(This tends
to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach  
because
all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a  
bit

self-defeating.
Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic  
versions
where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece  
of
abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those  
that wish
matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies  
into

reality (even if low-measure).
Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which  
cannot

obey any rules - not even all possible rules


Nice summary.  You say Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math
feels from the inside, which is essentially how Bruno puts it.
However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it
seems obvious that mind is no more identical to math or computation
than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as
categorically different.  Math and mind are still distinct, though
correlated.  Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed  
in

some sort of neutral monism?
Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated with  
them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not sure  
there's much to gain by adding extra indirection layers -  it's  
not that consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece  
of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could say  
that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we can  
talk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same time,  
that that abstract structure does have some sensory experience  
associated with it. Other structure might represent some machines  
implementing some partial local physics. In that way it's neutral  
monist. We could try to keep experience separate and supervening on  
arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's anything to gain by  
introducing such a dualism - it might make epistemological sense,  
but I'm not sure it makes sense ontologically. I'm rather unsure of  
such a move myself, I wonder what Bruno's opinion is on this.


I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism,  
because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, if  
you agree to


1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially  
correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason to  
do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting things  
is that it leads to an already very complex machine's theology. We  
might take it as a toy theology, but then all theories are sort of toys.


2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp - BBp) provides the best  
axiomatic theories for knowledge.


Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp  p) gives a notion of  
knowledge, i.e. (Bp  p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory.


The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent  
with Bp  p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point where  
the divine intellect (G*), the believer (G) and the kower (soul) Bp  
 p, will completely differ, and this will account for a variety of  
dualism, unavoidable for the machine.


So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the  
definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will behaves  
as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp and  
understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of taking  
that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, nor even  
explictly express that she is correct).


Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*,  
S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solve  
problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable nuances  
brought by the provably correct self-reference logic of machines in  
theoretical 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Marty,


On 25 Feb 2012, at 01:51, marty684 wrote:


Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot  
know' ? On what is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are  
defining probability by that which is relative to our 'actual  
states'. Why can't we inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an  
infinite, determined universe ?


But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of  
arithmetic (equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic  
structure, which from our points of view will look indeterministic.


The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the  
experience. Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will  
happen to you you have to look at all the computation accessing the  
computational state you have when throwing the coin, and infer what  
will happen from a measure on the continuations.



  I'm delighted to learn that I understood you after all. Thanks  
for this further clarification.




You are welcome.





  Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in  
case of problem, so we might single out the precise point where you  
don't succeed to grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities,  
uncertainties,  in front of everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get  
this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more subtle immateriality point  
implied by computationalism.




My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.

May be you have a problem with my english. Please, begin by the  
step one, on page 4 of sane04, read it, and tell me precisely what  
you don't understand in the step 1.  I might need to re-explain  
comp to you, or you can glance its definition on page 2.


When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step,  
and so one.


Bruno

   I don't have a problem with your english. I have a  
problem with the logical complexity of your work.


It is not simple, but not *that* difficult either (I mean UDA, AUDA  
needs a background in logic which is not so well taught).





Also I no longer remember where to find the text you're referring  
to. Warmest wishes,   marty


You can find the paper, and the unique slide to easily remember the  
different steps here:


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-25 Thread marty684
Thanks, I'll give it another shot. All the best,   marty a.





From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sat, February 25, 2012 5:05:35 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function

Hi Marty, 



On 25 Feb 2012, at 01:51, marty684 wrote:


Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On 
what 
is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by 
that 
which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we 
inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ?

But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of arithmetic 
(equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic structure, which from our 
points of view will look indeterministic.

The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the 
experience. 
Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will happen to you you have 
to look at all the computation accessing the computational state you have when 
throwing the coin, and infer what will happen from a measure on the 
continuations.

  
  I'm delighted to learn that I understood you after all. Thanks for this 
further clarification.


You are welcome.






  Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of 
problem, so we might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to 
grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in front 
of 
everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more 
subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism.




My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.

May be you have a problem with my english. Please, begin by the step one, on 
page 4 of sane04, read it, and tell me precisely what you don't understand in 
the step 1.  I might need to re-explain comp to you, or you can glance its 
definition on page 2. 

When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and so one. 

Bruno
  
   I don't have a problem with your english. I have a problem with 
the logical complexity of your work. 


It is not simple, but not *that* difficult either (I mean UDA, AUDA needs a 
background in logic which is not so well taught).




Also I no longer remember where to find the text you're referring to. Warmest 
wishes,   marty

You can find the paper, and the unique slide to easily remember the different 
steps here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The free will function

2012-02-25 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 24, 8:22 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:



You are
thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

   I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
   be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all.

  Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the
  simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the
  simulation.

 But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense
 to the claim that they are sims ITFP

They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer
somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can
never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out
there. I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause
the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to
them, I am a simulation.


   But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
   transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
   to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic.

  You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the
  delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make
  their consciousness completely solipsistic.

 So?

To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth.


   I recommend using publically accessble language
   to enhance communication, not to discover new
   facts.

  I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form.

 If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point?

Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.

   That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning
   of
   a word *always* changes in different contexts.

  It does

 Says who?

Why do you think it doesn't? Do you mean the same thing today when you
talk about having 'fun' as you did when you were in third grade? Did
that meaning change specifically at some point? Are meanings hovering
around somewhere unchanging until some dictionary is updated?


Not a bad thing, just not my thing. I don't do word definitions. I
don't believe in them.

   Have you never seen a dictionary?

  I believe in dictionaries, but not definitions. I believe in movie
  critics but I don't believe that their opinions about movies are
  objectively true. I might agree with them, but that doesn't mean that
  it is possible for an opinion to be authoritatively definitive.

 Again, that is disbelief in a certain kind of definition.

That's your opinion of the definition of definition.


   It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying
   to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are
   really the top hat in Monopoly, or Throngar the Invincible in
   DD

  Those make the same point as well. Is it true that you are the top hat
  in Monopoly? If not then Monopoly is not a very strong simulation -
  which it isn't. A full immersion virtual DD campaign? That would be a
  stronger simulation and you could not so easily say that you aren't
  Throngar. Especially if you played him for a living...and changed your
  name legally...and got plastic surgery. At what point do you become
  Throngar?

 If there is any meaning to the word simulation, then it is never
 actual.

That's simplistic. The whole point of a simulation is that is is as if
it were actual in some sense. A flight simulator provides an actual
experience that can seem like flying an actual plane. If you are on a
plane where the pilot dies, do you ask the guy who has logged 1
hours on flight simulators to fly the plane or do you say they have no
actual experience?

 The problem we keep running into is that you assume something...
 simulations exist...and then refuse to follow throught the
 consequences.

No, you just aren't getting the overall concept of relativism. Comp
claims that computation is all that is required for consciousness.
This is what opens up a nonsense thesis about simulations having
relative reality. I understand that is not the way it works.
Consciousness is not emulable, only extendible. There is no simulation
of red. Red is only red. Who we are is like that. Us-ness.


  Are you 1Z? Figurative is the word to focus on. Subjectivity
  is figurative. Meaning, perception, sensation...all figurative.
  Literal is the antithesis that is objectivity.
   But not actually supernatural at all, if he is a geek with BO and
   dandruff.
   That is the point you are missing.

  But the simulated beings can never access that information about their
  creator, so how can it be true for them?

 It can be true because it is true.

Without some way to sense it or it's truth, that means nothing to us.

 You have already assumed
 soemthing like that when you made the initial assumption
 that the simulation is a 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-25 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote:


On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2012 11:52, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, 
experience),

(Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.
Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3, 
mind is
the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing 
possible, even
if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our 
experience
(but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism 
which means

our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build
mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoid 
any of
the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other 
can be

directly inferred.
However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that these
notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never 
all 3.
Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the 
existence
of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence. 
(This tends
to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach 
because

all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a bit
self-defeating.
Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic 
versions

where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece of
abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those that 
wish

matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies into
reality (even if low-measure).
Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which 
cannot

obey any rules - not even all possible rules


Nice summary.  You say Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math
feels from the inside, which is essentially how Bruno puts it.
However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it
seems obvious that mind is no more identical to math or computation
than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as
categorically different.  Math and mind are still distinct, though
correlated.  Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed in
some sort of neutral monism?
Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated with 
them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not sure 
there's much to gain by adding extra indirection layers -  it's not 
that consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece of 
paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could say 
that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we can 
talk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same time, 
that that abstract structure does have some sensory experience 
associated with it. Other structure might represent some machines 
implementing some partial local physics. In that way it's neutral 
monist. We could try to keep experience separate and supervening on 
arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's anything to gain by 
introducing such a dualism - it might make epistemological sense, but 
I'm not sure it makes sense ontologically. I'm rather unsure of such 
a move myself, I wonder what Bruno's opinion is on this.


I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism, 
because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, if 
you agree to


1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially 
correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason to 
do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting things 
is that it leads to an already very complex machine's theology. We 
might take it as a toy theology, but then all theories are sort of toys.


2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp - BBp) provides the best 
axiomatic theories for knowledge.


Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp  p) gives a notion of 
knowledge, i.e. (Bp  p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory.


The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent 
with Bp  p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point where 
the divine intellect (G*), the believer (G) and the kower (soul) Bp 
 p, will completely differ, and this will account for a variety of 
dualism, unavoidable for the machine.


So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the 
definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will behaves 
as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp and 
understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of taking 
that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, nor even 
explictly express that she is correct).


Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*, 
S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solve 
problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable nuances 
brought by the provably correct self-reference logic of machines in 
theoretical computer science.


Re: The free will function (errata)

2012-02-25 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/25/2012 2:01 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote:


On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2012 11:52, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, 
experience),

(Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.
Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3, 
mind is
the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing 
possible, even
if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our 
experience
(but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism 
which means

our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build
mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoid 
any of
the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other 
can be

directly inferred.
However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that 
these
notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never 
all 3.
Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the 
existence
of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence. 
(This tends
to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach 
because

all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a bit
self-defeating.
Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic 
versions

where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece of
abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those 
that wish

matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies into
reality (even if low-measure).
Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which 
cannot

obey any rules - not even all possible rules


Nice summary.  You say Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math
feels from the inside, which is essentially how Bruno puts it.
However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it
seems obvious that mind is no more identical to math or computation
than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as
categorically different.  Math and mind are still distinct, though
correlated.  Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed in
some sort of neutral monism?
Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated with 
them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not sure 
there's much to gain by adding extra indirection layers -  it's 
not that consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece 
of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could say 
that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we can 
talk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same time, 
that that abstract structure does have some sensory experience 
associated with it. Other structure might represent some machines 
implementing some partial local physics. In that way it's neutral 
monist. We could try to keep experience separate and supervening on 
arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's anything to gain by 
introducing such a dualism - it might make epistemological sense, 
but I'm not sure it makes sense ontologically. I'm rather unsure of 
such a move myself, I wonder what Bruno's opinion is on this.


I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism, 
because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, 
if you agree to


1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially 
correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason to 
do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting 
things is that it leads to an already very complex machine's 
theology. We might take it as a toy theology, but then all theories 
are sort of toys.


2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp - BBp) provides the best 
axiomatic theories for knowledge.


Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp  p) gives a notion of 
knowledge, i.e. (Bp  p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory.


The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent 
with Bp  p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point where 
the divine intellect (G*), the believer (G) and the kower (soul) Bp 
 p, will completely differ, and this will account for a variety of 
dualism, unavoidable for the machine.


So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the 
definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will behaves 
as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp and 
understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of taking 
that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, nor even 
explictly express that she is correct).


Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*, 
S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solve 
problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable nuances 
brought by the provably correct self-reference 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-25 Thread 1Z


On Feb 25, 6:32 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 24, 8:22 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:









  On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 You are
 thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
 observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all.

   Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the
   simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the
   simulation.

  But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense
  to the claim that they are sims ITFP

 They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer
 somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can
 never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out
 there.

That certain things don'tn matter to you doesn't
change any facts.

 I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause
 the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to
 them, I am a simulation.



But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic.

   You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the
   delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make
   their consciousness completely solipsistic.

  So?

 To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth.

Luncacy might be believed. Not the same thing.

I recommend using publically accessble language
to enhance communication, not to discover new
facts.

   I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form.

  If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point?

 Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.

That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning
of
a word *always* changes in different contexts.

   It does

  Says who?

 Why do you think it doesn't?

Don't shift the burden. You are making the extraordinary claim.

 Do you mean the same thing today when you
 talk about having 'fun' as you did when you were in third grade?

I am  not disputing that some meanings change in some contexts.



It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying
to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are
really the top hat in Monopoly, or Throngar the Invincible in
DD

   Those make the same point as well. Is it true that you are the top hat
   in Monopoly? If not then Monopoly is not a very strong simulation -
   which it isn't. A full immersion virtual DD campaign? That would be a
   stronger simulation and you could not so easily say that you aren't
   Throngar. Especially if you played him for a living...and changed your
   name legally...and got plastic surgery. At what point do you become
   Throngar?

  If there is any meaning to the word simulation, then it is never
  actual.

 That's simplistic. The whole point of a simulation is that is is as if
 it were actual in some sense. A flight simulator provides an actual
 experience that can seem like flying an actual plane. If you are on a
 plane where the pilot dies, do you ask the guy who has logged 1
 hours on flight simulators to fly the plane or do you say they have no
 actual experience?

That's irrelevant.

  The problem we keep running into is that you assume something...
  simulations exist...and then refuse to follow throught the
  consequences.

 No, you just aren't getting the overall concept of relativism.

I understand it, but don;t agree with it.

 Comp
 claims that computation is all that is required for consciousness.
 This is what opens up a nonsense thesis about simulations having
 relative reality. I understand that is not the way it works.
 Consciousness is not emulable, only extendible. There is no simulation
 of red. Red is only red. Who we are is like that. Us-ness.



   Are you 1Z? Figurative is the word to focus on. Subjectivity
   is figurative. Meaning, perception, sensation...all figurative.
   Literal is the antithesis that is objectivity.
But not actually supernatural at all, if he is a geek with BO and
dandruff.
That is the point you are missing.

   But the simulated beings can never access that information about their
   creator, so how can it be true for them?

  It can be true because it is true.

 Without some way to sense it or it's true that means nothing to us.

It means something to non-relativists

  You have already assumed
  soemthing like that when you made the initial assumption
  that the simulation is a simulation. It may not be *knowable*
  to them, but that doesn't change the *meaning* of truth.

 The meaning of truth anticipate MWI. The two concepts may 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-24 Thread acw

On 2/21/2012 02:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 20, 2:53 pm, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:  On Feb 20, 10:32 am, 
acwa...@lavabit.com   wrote:

On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:   On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

..

Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality



It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.



If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.



Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
That would be the truth of that simulation.


They might end up with a simulation hypothesis being more plausible
than pure chance if there was evidence for it, such as non-reducible
high-level behavior indicating intelligence and not following any
obvious lower-level physical laws. However, 'omnipotent' is not the
right word here. I already explained why before - in COMP, you can
always escape the simulation, even if this is not always obvious from
the 3p of the one doing the simulation.


Escape it maybe to a universal arithmetic level, but I still can't get
out of the software and into the world of the hardware.

There is only apparent hardware in an arithmetical ontology. Which means 
that it can indeed escape to a world of apparent hardware outside of 
*your* control.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +

Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.



That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of
a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
the cases (which are infinite).



As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
simulation within one such universe.


I was just assuming COMP, which is a bit wider than MWI, but should
contain a variant compatible with it. In COMP, it's highly likely you're
living in a simulation, but you're also living in more primitive forms
(such as directly in the UD) - your 1p is contained in an infinity of
machines. You would only care if some of those happen to be a simulation
if the one doing the simulation modifies the program/data or entangles
it with his history, or merely provides a continuation for you in his
world, however any such continuations in digital physics interventionist
simulations would be low-measure.


Whether you care or not is a different issue from whether or not you
can tell the difference if you did want to.

I don't see how one could tell the difference. However, what I was 
talking about is that if experiencing your modifications has a 1/n 
probability and the probability of continuing to experience for a next 
moment would be 1/n^m, and the next moment 1/n^m^m and so on, for very 
large n and m, it might not really matter from the perspective of most 
your SIMs.

If such a programmer decides to

intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines
implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in
arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere),



That depends entirely on what kind of intervention the programmer
chooses. If she wants to make half of the population turn blue, she
can, and then when the sim is turned back on, everyone gasps and
proclaims a miracle of Biblical proportions.


I wasn't talking about the multiple observers in the simulation, but
merely that an observer, with which we identify with his 1p is
implemented by an infinity of machines (!), only some part of that
correspond to someone simulating them. If someone decides to modify the
simulation at some point, then only a small fraction of those 1p's would
diverge from the usual local laws-of-physics and becme entangled with
the laws of those doing the simulation - such continuations would be
low-measure.


How does that apply to my example though? Are you saying I can't turn
everyone 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-24 Thread David Nyman
On 24 February 2012 11:52, acw a...@lavabit.com wrote:

 I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, experience),
 (Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.
 Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3, mind is
 the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing possible, even
 if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our experience
 (but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism which means
 our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build
 mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoid any of
 the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other can be
 directly inferred.
 However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that these
 notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never all 3.
 Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the existence
 of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence. (This tends
 to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach because
 all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a bit
 self-defeating.
 Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic versions
 where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece of
 abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those that wish
 matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies into
 reality (even if low-measure).
 Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which cannot
 obey any rules - not even all possible rules

Nice summary.  You say Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math
feels from the inside, which is essentially how Bruno puts it.
However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it
seems obvious that mind is no more identical to math or computation
than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as
categorically different.  Math and mind are still distinct, though
correlated.  Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed in
some sort of neutral monism?

David

 On 2/21/2012 02:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 On Feb 20, 2:53 pm, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

 On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:  On Feb 20, 10:32 am,
 acwa...@lavabit.com   wrote:

 On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:   On Feb 19, 11:57 pm,
 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com     wrote:

 On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com     wrote:

 ..

 Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
 still aren't reality


 It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
 itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
 the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
 reality than the simulation.


 If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
 Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
 true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're
 right.


 Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
 simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
 changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
 that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
 That would be the truth of that simulation.


 They might end up with a simulation hypothesis being more plausible
 than pure chance if there was evidence for it, such as non-reducible
 high-level behavior indicating intelligence and not following any
 obvious lower-level physical laws. However, 'omnipotent' is not the
 right word here. I already explained why before - in COMP, you can
 always escape the simulation, even if this is not always obvious from
 the 3p of the one doing the simulation.


 Escape it maybe to a universal arithmetic level, but I still can't get
 out of the software and into the world of the hardware.

 There is only apparent hardware in an arithmetical ontology. Which means
 that it can indeed escape to a world of apparent hardware outside of *your*
 control.

 Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +

 Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
 which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
 *their* Gods.


 That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
 physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
 happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
 structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation
 of
 a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
 maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
 the cases (which are infinite).


 As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
 infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
 anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-24 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


   You are
   thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
   observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

  I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
  be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all.

 Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the
 simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the
 simulation.


But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense
to the claim that they are sims ITFP

  But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
  transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
  to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic.

 You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the
 delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make
 their consciousness completely solipsistic.

So?


  I recommend using publically accessble language
  to enhance communication, not to discover new
  facts.

 I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form.

If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point?

   Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.

  That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning
  of
  a word *always* changes in different contexts.

 It does

Says who?

   Not a bad thing, just not my thing. I don't do word definitions. I
   don't believe in them.

  Have you never seen a dictionary?

 I believe in dictionaries, but not definitions. I believe in movie
 critics but I don't believe that their opinions about movies are
 objectively true. I might agree with them, but that doesn't mean that
 it is possible for an opinion to be authoritatively definitive.

Again, that is disbelief in a certain kind of definition.


  It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying
  to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are
  really the top hat in Monopoly, or Throngar the Invincible in
  DD

 Those make the same point as well. Is it true that you are the top hat
 in Monopoly? If not then Monopoly is not a very strong simulation -
 which it isn't. A full immersion virtual DD campaign? That would be a
 stronger simulation and you could not so easily say that you aren't
 Throngar. Especially if you played him for a living...and changed your
 name legally...and got plastic surgery. At what point do you become
 Throngar?

If there is any meaning to the word simulation, then it is never
actual.
The problem we keep running into is that you assume something...
simulations exist...and then refuse to follow throught the
consequences.

 Are you 1Z? Figurative is the word to focus on. Subjectivity
 is figurative. Meaning, perception, sensation...all figurative.
 Literal is the antithesis that is objectivity.

  But not actually supernatural at all, if he is a geek with BO and
  dandruff.
  That is the point you are missing.

 But the simulated beings can never access that information about their
 creator, so how can it be true for them?

It can be true because it is true. You have already assumed
soemthing like that when you made the initial assumption
that the simulation is a simulation. It may not be *knowable*
to them, but that doesn't change the *meaning* of truth.

  There's all the difference in the world
  between independent of specific hardware
  and independent of any hardware

 Yes. Neither of them indicate materialism within simulation though.

 So what?
 If you assume the need for physical hardware at the
  bottom of the stack, then consc. is not non-physical.

 It is relative to the inside of the simulation. Pac-Man's universe is
 non-physical (though it has physical themes).

So what? That's still all illusion and delusion. if the
sim is running on silicon, what does it matter that
it seems not to be from the inside?

  If you meant there is no such thing as finally authoritative
  definition,
  you should have said so. If you meant there are too many
  definitions, not zero definitions, you should have said so.

 What I said is that I don't believe in definitions at all.

But when asked to defend that claim, you switch
to a different claim--that you don't believe in final,
authoritative definitions.

  A legal
   dictionary? A theological dictionary? Language doesn't come from
   dictionaries.

  No. dictionaries reflect the shared meaning that communication
  depends on.

 They reflect the meaning, they don't provide the meaning.

So?

  You offer idiosyncratic meaning sinstead of using the
  accepted
  ones, woth the consequence that ohther people don;t unnderstand you.

 You seem to understand me. Are you not people?

I actually don't understand a lot  of what you say at all.


   It's not that simple. We can communicate very successfully in all
   kinds of non-verbal ways.

  How do we use non verbal communication on Usenet?

Re: The free will function

2012-02-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 23 Feb 2012, at 15:12, marty684 wrote:




From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, February 23, 2012 4:48:10 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function


On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:


Bruno,

 If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP)



Nothing is made of. Everything appears in the mind of Universal  
numbers relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable  
relative statistics.


Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can  
understand that such a coffee is not made of anything. The  
experience of coffee is due to some computation in your brain. With  
the big picture apparently implied by comp, even the brain is like  
that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only locally  
made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating  
your actual state.


The matrix metaphore, or the Galouye simulacron metaphore is not  
so bad.
And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and  
multiplication to get an initial dreaming immaterial machinery.


Thanks for this vivid clarification. But...


Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers  
relative to other numbers), then we cannot knowwhich machine we  
are, nor which computations supports us, among an infinity of them.  
Everything observablebecomes probabilistic. The probability bears  
on the infinitely many computations going through your actual state  
(that's why they are relative).


Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot  
know' ? On what is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are  
defining probability by that which is relative to our 'actual  
states'. Why can't we inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an  
infinite, determined universe ?


But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of  
arithmetic (equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic  
structure, which from our points of view will look indeterministic.


The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the  
experience. Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will  
happen to you you have to look at all the computation accessing the  
computational state you have when throwing the coin, and infer what  
will happen from a measure on the continuations.













   (If you've been over this before, please refer me to the  
relevant posts, thanks.)  marty a.


Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we  
might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp  
why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in  
front of everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed  
only for the more subtle immateriality point implied by  
computationalism.


My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.


May be you have a problem with my english. Please, begin by the step  
one, on page 4 of sane04, read it, and tell me precisely what you  
don't understand in the step 1.  I might need to re-explain comp to  
you, or you can glance its definition on page 2.


When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and  
so one.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-24 Thread marty684






From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Fri, February 24, 2012 11:58:51 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function



On 23 Feb 2012, at 15:12, marty684 wrote:






From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, February 23, 2012 4:48:10 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function



On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:

Bruno,
 If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP)

Nothing is made of. Everything appears in the mind of Universal numbers 
relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable relative statistics.

Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can understand 
that 
such a coffee is not made of anything. The experience of coffee is due to 
some 
computation in your brain. With the big picture apparently implied by comp, 
even 
the brain is like that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only 
locally made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating your 
actual state.

The matrix metaphore, or the Galouye simulacron metaphore is not so bad. 
And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and multiplication to get an 
initial dreaming immaterial machinery.

Thanks for this vivid clarification. But...


Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers relative to 
other 
numbers), then we cannot knowwhich machine we are, nor which computations 
supports us, among an infinity of them. Everything observablebecomes 
probabilistic. The probability bears on the infinitely many computations going 
through your actual state (that's why they are relative).

Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what 
is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that 
which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we 
inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ?

But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of arithmetic 
(equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic structure, which from our 
points of view will look indeterministic.

The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the 
experience. 
Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will happen to you you have 
to look at all the computation accessing the computational state you have when 
throwing the coin, and infer what will happen from a measure on the 
continuations.

  
 I'm delighted to learn that I understood you after all. Thanks for this 
further clarification.



  Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of 
problem, so we might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to 
grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in front of 
everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more 
subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism.May be you have a 
problem 
with my english. Please, begin by the step one, on page 4 of sane04, read it, 
and tell me precisely what you don't understand in the step 1.  I might need to 
re-explain comp to you, or you can glance its definition on page 2. 




My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry.


When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and so one. 

Bruno
  
   I don't have a problem with your english. I have a problem with 
the logical complexity of your work. Also I no longer remember where to find 
the 
text you're referring to. Warmest wishes,   marty

   


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:


Bruno,

 If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP)



Nothing is made of. Everything appears in the mind of Universal  
numbers relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable  
relative statistics.


Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can  
understand that such a coffee is not made of anything. The  
experience of coffee is due to some computation in your brain. With  
the big picture apparently implied by comp, even the brain is like  
that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only locally  
made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating your  
actual state.


The matrix metaphore, or the Galouye simulacron metaphore is not  
so bad.
And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and multiplication  
to get an initial dreaming immaterial machinery.




which can express states to an arbitrary degree of precision, is  
there any room for chance or probability?


There is ONLY room for probability. The whole physics is made into a  
probability calculus.






And if so, how do they arise?

Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers  
relative to other numbers), then we cannot know which machine we are,  
nor which computations supports us, among an infinity of them.  
Everything observable becomes probabilistic. The probability bears on  
the infinitely many computations going through your 'actual' state  
(that's why they are relative).





   (If you've been over this before, please refer me to the relevant  
posts, thanks.)  marty a.


Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we  
might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp  
why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in front  
of everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for  
the more subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread marty684






From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, February 23, 2012 4:48:10 AM
Subject: Re: The free will function



On 22 Feb 2012, at 18:17, marty684 wrote:

Bruno,
 If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) 

Nothing is made of. Everything appears in the mind of Universal numbers 
relatively to universal numbers, with hopefully reasonable relative statistics.

Think about a dream. If you dream that you drink coffee, you can understand 
that 
such a coffee is not made of anything. The experience of coffee is due to 
some 
computation in your brain. With the big picture apparently implied by comp, 
even 
the brain is like that dreamed coffee: it is not made of anything. It is only 
locally made of things due to the infinitely many computations generating your 
actual state.

The matrix metaphore, or the Galouye simulacron metaphore is not so bad. 
And we don't need more than the numbers + addition and multiplication to get an 
initial dreaming immaterial machinery.

Thanks for this vivid clarification. But...


Read UDA. You might understand that if we are machine (numbers relative to 
other 
numbers), then we cannot know which machine we are, nor which computations 
supports us, among an infinity of them.Everything observable becomes 
probabilistic. The probability bears on the infinitely many computations going 
throughyour actual state (that's why they are relative).

Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what 
is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that 
which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we inhabit a seemingly 
probablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ? 







   (If you've been over this before, please refer me to the relevant posts, 
thanks.)  marty a.
Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we might 
single 
out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp why comp put 
probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties,  in front of everything. UDA1-7 
is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more subtle immateriality 
point implied by computationalism.

My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry. 

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 21, 10:41 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   You are conflating the levels (as Bruno always tells me). The
   simulation has no access to extra-simulatory information, it is a
   complete sub-universe. It's logic is the whole truth which the
   inhabitants can only believe in or disbelieve to the extent which the
   simulation allows them that capacity. If the programmer wants all of
   his avatars to believe with all their hearts that there is a cosmic
   muffin controlling their universe, she has only to set the cosmic
   muffin belief subroutine = true for all her subjects.

  Read again. I didn't say no sim could have such-and-such
  an opinion, I said it would not be true.

 Your standard of truth appears to exclude any simulated content.

No, my definition of truth just doens't change to something
else when considering simulated contexts.

   Opinions can be right or wrong but the reality is that a programmer
   has omnipotent power over the conditions within the program. She may
   be a programmer, but she can make her simulation subjects think or
   experience whatever she wants them to. She may think of herself as
   their goddess, but she can appear to them as anything or nothing. Her
   power over them remains true and factually real.

  Same problem.

 Same linguistic literalism.

You say that like its a bad thing.


 , it may
  make false but plausible beliefs in gods likely, but
  it cannot make supernatural gods inevitable because
  all the ingredients in it are natural or artificial.

 That has almost nothing to do with my argument. You are off in
 dictionary land. The fact remains that comp, rather than disallowing
 gods, makes it impossible to know if a Matrix Lord/Administrator has
 control over aspects of your life.

That is a fact, when expressed properly.

No, that is not at all an equivlaent claim. There may
be no extension of magnetic monopole, but it is a meaningful
concept.

   Supernatural can be meaningful if you want it to be, but in comp all
   it means is meta-programmatic or meta-simulation.

  Says who? I don't have to accept that the meaning of supernatural
  has
  to exchange to ensure that there are N0 supernatural entities. I can
  stick to the traditional meaning, and regard it as unpopulated and
  extensionless.

 What traditional meaning does 'supernatural' have in Comp?

Why assume it has a non tradtional one.

Why do I
 have to accept your linguistic preferences but you deny me the same
 right?

Because we can communicate if we stick to accepted meanings,
and communiction breaks down if you have a free hand to use
invented meanings.

   It has no mystical
   charge. It is not what is impossible by the logic of the MWI universe,
   only what is impossible by the programmed logic of the UM-Sub
   Universes. Your argument is based on confusing the levels. If I force
   you to stay within the logic of comp, you have no argument.

  Apart from ...my argument. As given.

 Your argument now seems to be a word definition argument.

You say that like its a bad thing.


 That why I said it
 from the start. Computational simulations can define anything as being
 natural or supernatural.

And they may or may not be right. Opionion does not
trump truth.

   The opinion of the programmer *is* truth to the programmed.

  It still isn't truth. As soon as you add a to or for clause,
  you are actually talking about opinion, even if you are using the
  *word* truth.

 If I score a point in a game is that the truth that I scored a point?
 Is anything in a game 'true' in your definition?

Yes It is true that a game is being played, not just true-for-the-
layers.
Likewise, the simulation hypothesis requires simulation
to be actually true and not just true-for.

   That's
   what makes them God.

  Being supernatural makes an entity god. And not just
  supernatural to or for someone.

 You are aware that there are many definitions for the word god.

You are aware they broadly support what I amsaying, eg
God is most often conceived of as the supernatural creator and
overseer of the universe. --WP

 It
 seems like you have one particular one in mind which reads - whatever
 is the opposite of what Craig says it is.

No.


   Huh? You could run it on vacuum tubes if you want. Or a stadium full
   of people holding up colored cards.

  The matter doesn't matter. What matters is that there is always
  some matter. I have never seen a simulation run on arithmetic.

 I absolutely agree. I'm talking about how comp sees it.

Bruno;s comp.

 This is what
 comp is - functionalism.

Functionalism isn't usually immaterialitic.

A universe run on formula rather than stuff.
 I disagree with comp. I see stuff and formula as one half of a
 dialectic with self and experience.



  A cartoon is a simulation. A
   puppet show is a simulation.
 See? I say MWI could have all kinds of Gods (in 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 23, 11:18 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 21, 10:41 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
You are conflating the levels (as Bruno always tells me). The
simulation has no access to extra-simulatory information, it is a
complete sub-universe. It's logic is the whole truth which the
inhabitants can only believe in or disbelieve to the extent which the
simulation allows them that capacity. If the programmer wants all of
his avatars to believe with all their hearts that there is a cosmic
muffin controlling their universe, she has only to set the cosmic
muffin belief subroutine = true for all her subjects.

   Read again. I didn't say no sim could have such-and-such
   an opinion, I said it would not be true.

  Your standard of truth appears to exclude any simulated content.

 No, my definition of truth just doens't change to something
 else when considering simulated contexts.

That's because you aren't taking the simulation seriously. You are
thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation. In
comp though, it's all simulation. The only truly universal truths are
arithmetic ones. Arithmetic doesn't care if it makes Gods or
Administrators.


Opinions can be right or wrong but the reality is that a programmer
has omnipotent power over the conditions within the program. She may
be a programmer, but she can make her simulation subjects think or
experience whatever she wants them to. She may think of herself as
their goddess, but she can appear to them as anything or nothing. Her
power over them remains true and factually real.

   Same problem.

  Same linguistic literalism.

 You say that like its a bad thing.

Not a bad thing, just an inappropriate thing for talking about fantasy
simulations. Pipe fittings maybe, or legal analysis, but you are not
going to find the secrets of consciousness by pointing at a
dictionary.


  , it may
   make false but plausible beliefs in gods likely, but
   it cannot make supernatural gods inevitable because
   all the ingredients in it are natural or artificial.

  That has almost nothing to do with my argument. You are off in
  dictionary land. The fact remains that comp, rather than disallowing
  gods, makes it impossible to know if a Matrix Lord/Administrator has
  control over aspects of your life.

 That is a fact, when expressed properly.

How would you express it?


 No, that is not at all an equivlaent claim. There may
 be no extension of magnetic monopole, but it is a meaningful
 concept.

Supernatural can be meaningful if you want it to be, but in comp all
it means is meta-programmatic or meta-simulation.

   Says who? I don't have to accept that the meaning of supernatural
   has
   to exchange to ensure that there are N0 supernatural entities. I can
   stick to the traditional meaning, and regard it as unpopulated and
   extensionless.

  What traditional meaning does 'supernatural' have in Comp?

 Why assume it has a non tradtional one.

Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.


 Why do I
  have to accept your linguistic preferences but you deny me the same
  right?

 Because we can communicate if we stick to accepted meanings,
 and communiction breaks down if you have a free hand to use
 invented meanings.

Just the opposite. Communication breaks down if you tie my hands to
express new ideas in their native terms. Should discussions about
early automotive horsepower been limited to literal horses?


It has no mystical
charge. It is not what is impossible by the logic of the MWI universe,
only what is impossible by the programmed logic of the UM-Sub
Universes. Your argument is based on confusing the levels. If I force
you to stay within the logic of comp, you have no argument.

   Apart from ...my argument. As given.

  Your argument now seems to be a word definition argument.

 You say that like its a bad thing.

Not a bad thing, just not my thing. I don't do word definitions. I
don't believe in them.


  That why I said it
  from the start. Computational simulations can define anything as 
  being
  natural or supernatural.

 And they may or may not be right. Opionion does not
 trump truth.

The opinion of the programmer *is* truth to the programmed.

   It still isn't truth. As soon as you add a to or for clause,
   you are actually talking about opinion, even if you are using the
   *word* truth.

  If I score a point in a game is that the truth that I scored a point?
  Is anything in a game 'true' in your definition?

 Yes It is true that a game is being played, not just true-for-the-
 layers.
 Likewise, the simulation hypothesis requires simulation
 to be actually true and not just true-for.

That was not my question. I asked if I score a point in a 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 7:43 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 23, 11:18 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 You are conflating the levels (as Bruno always tells me). The
 simulation has no access to extra-simulatory information, it is a
 complete sub-universe. It's logic is the whole truth which the
 inhabitants can only believe in or disbelieve to the extent which the
 simulation allows them that capacity. If the programmer wants all of
 his avatars to believe with all their hearts that there is a cosmic
 muffin controlling their universe, she has only to set the cosmic
 muffin belief subroutine = true for all her subjects.

Read again. I didn't say no sim could have such-and-such
an opinion, I said it would not be true.

   Your standard of truth appears to exclude any simulated content.

  No, my definition of truth just doens't change to something
  else when considering simulated contexts.

 That's because you aren't taking the simulation seriously.

Or because I am taking truth seriously.

 You are
 thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
 observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all.
But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic.

. In
 comp though, it's all simulation. The only truly universal truths are
 arithmetic ones.

That only arithmetic truth is truly true is not an arithmetic truth.
But
is is, as you put it, unviersal.


Same problem.

   Same linguistic literalism.

  You say that like its a bad thing.

 Not a bad thing, just an inappropriate thing for talking about fantasy
 simulations.


No. Fantasy can be expressed in literal language. In fact,
it is better to do so, since the reader does not have to
deal with the communicative double whammy of of
weird ideas expressed in a weird way.

 Pipe fittings maybe, or legal analysis, but you are not
 going to find the secrets of consciousness by pointing at a
 dictionary.

I recommend using publically accessble language
to enhance communication, not to discover new
facts.


   That has almost nothing to do with my argument. You are off in
   dictionary land. The fact remains that comp, rather than disallowing
   gods, makes it impossible to know if a Matrix Lord/Administrator has
   control over aspects of your life.

  That is a fact, when expressed properly.

 How would you express it?

Not using the word god


   What traditional meaning does 'supernatural' have in Comp?

  Why assume it has a non tradtional one.

 Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.


That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning
of
a word *always* changes in different contexts.

  Because we can communicate if we stick to accepted meanings,
  and communiction breaks down if you have a free hand to use
  invented meanings.

 Just the opposite. Communication breaks down if you tie my hands to
 express new ideas in their native terms. Should discussions about
 early automotive horsepower been limited to literal horses?

That;s a poor example. Horsepower is literallty the power of one
horse.


   Your argument now seems to be a word definition argument.

  You say that like its a bad thing.

 Not a bad thing, just not my thing. I don't do word definitions. I
 don't believe in them.

Have you never seen a dictionary?


  Yes It is true that a game is being played, not just true-for-the-
  layers.
  Likewise, the simulation hypothesis requires simulation
  to be actually true and not just true-for.

 That was not my question. I asked if I score a point in a game, is
 that the truth that I scored a point.

It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying
to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are
really the top hat in Monopoly, or Throngar the Invincible in
DD

  You are aware they broadly support what I amsaying, eg
  God is most often conceived of as the supernatural creator and
  overseer of the universe. --WP

 Since we are talking about simulations within a universe, the creator
 of that simulation is the overseer of the simulated universe and
 therefore 'supernatural' relative to the simulated beings in that
 universe. This is the crucial point you are overlooking.
#
But not actually supernatural at all, if he is a geek with BO and
dandruff.
That is the point you are missing.



   I absolutely agree. I'm talking about how comp sees it.

  Bruno;s comp.

 I think that all forms of comp consider the simulation independent
 from the specific hardware it runs on (

There's all the difference in the world
between independent of specific hardware
and independent of any 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 7:43 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 23, 11:18 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:


     Why would Gods be supernatural?

    Why would bachelors be married?

 This is your argument, not mine. My whole point is that God becomes
 natural, and inevitable under MWI + Comp.

My point is that that argument requires the meaning of god to
change, and, since language us public, you don't get to change it
unilaterally.

   It changes a little every time you use it.

  There's an important difference between it changes and I am going
  to change it.

 Not for me.

Then you are wrong.

  That's how words work.

  That is one side of the picture. Shared meaning is the other.

 That's what I'm saying, meaning is shared in between the lines. It
 doesn't rely on adhering to linguistic conventions strictly.

between the lines is a vague, meaningless metaphor.

Common meaning. OTOH, literallu is adhering to linguistic convention.

I don't know how to get accross to you that it is about WHAT THE
WORD GOD MEANS.

   I don't argue about what words mean.

  No: you don;t pay attention to the issue and so
  end up miscommunicating and talking past people.

 That happens with some people and not with others.

Who have you succeeded in explaining yourself to?

 Different ways of
 thinking use words differently. I'm never trying to talk past people,

I didn't suggest it was literal.


 We can invent as many words for it as we want, but none will be any
 more or less appropriate than God.

Says who?

   Who doesn't say?

  Me.

 Why though?

Because God has implications about who created the whole Shebang, and
not
just about which fallibel entity is able to lord it over even more
fallible
ones in the next layer down. Matrix Lord is fine though.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 23, 3:51 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  That's because you aren't taking the simulation seriously.

 Or because I am taking truth seriously.

Seriously and literally are two different things.

  You are
  thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the
  observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation

 I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not
 be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all.

Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the
simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the
simulation.

 But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a
 transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems
 to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic.

You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the
delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make
their consciousness completely solipsistic.


 . In

  comp though, it's all simulation. The only truly universal truths are
  arithmetic ones.

 That only arithmetic truth is truly true is not an arithmetic truth.
 But
 is is, as you put it, unviersal.

Universal only means that it is maximally common, not that it absolute
or cannot be changed. In some MWI universe I might be able to make a
simulation in which linguistic truth is fundamental instead and
arithmetic truth is not universal. It could be populated by parrots
who can't do math for shit but talk up a storm.


 Same problem.

Same linguistic literalism.

   You say that like its a bad thing.

  Not a bad thing, just an inappropriate thing for talking about fantasy
  simulations.

 No. Fantasy can be expressed in literal language. In fact,
 it is better to do so, since the reader does not have to
 deal with the communicative double whammy of of
 weird ideas expressed in a weird way.

Or it could lead to this  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HiMD12xKOig


  Pipe fittings maybe, or legal analysis, but you are not
  going to find the secrets of consciousness by pointing at a
  dictionary.

 I recommend using publically accessble language
 to enhance communication, not to discover new
 facts.

I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form.


That has almost nothing to do with my argument. You are off in
dictionary land. The fact remains that comp, rather than disallowing
gods, makes it impossible to know if a Matrix Lord/Administrator has
control over aspects of your life.

   That is a fact, when expressed properly.

  How would you express it?

 Not using the word god

Ohh, ok. My point in that though is to show how god is really no
different from an administrator of a simulation that you are part of,
and that such a simulation is inevitable under comp.


What traditional meaning does 'supernatural' have in Comp?

   Why assume it has a non tradtional one.

  Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions.

 That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning
 of
 a word *always* changes in different contexts.

It does. It even changes within the same same context contextsince
no two contexts are really completely the same. Meaning isn't an
object. It has no fixed structure, it is figurative.


   Because we can communicate if we stick to accepted meanings,
   and communiction breaks down if you have a free hand to use
   invented meanings.

  Just the opposite. Communication breaks down if you tie my hands to
  express new ideas in their native terms. Should discussions about
  early automotive horsepower been limited to literal horses?

 That;s a poor example. Horsepower is literallty the power of one
 horse.

When you get done shoving 200 of them into a Honda, let me know so I
can see what literal horses look like. There is no such thing as the
literal power of a horse. It is an second order logic - a figure which
we use to represent a non-literal constellation of physical measures.


Your argument now seems to be a word definition argument.

   You say that like its a bad thing.

  Not a bad thing, just not my thing. I don't do word definitions. I
  don't believe in them.

 Have you never seen a dictionary?

I believe in dictionaries, but not definitions. I believe in movie
critics but I don't believe that their opinions about movies are
objectively true. I might agree with them, but that doesn't mean that
it is possible for an opinion to be authoritatively definitive.


   Yes It is true that a game is being played, not just true-for-the-
   layers.
   Likewise, the simulation hypothesis requires simulation
   to be actually true and not just true-for.

  That was not my question. I asked if I score a point in a game, is
  that the truth that I scored a point.

 It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying
 to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are
 really the top hat in 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 23, 3:57 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 23, 7:43 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:









  On Feb 23, 11:18 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

      Why would Gods be supernatural?

     Why would bachelors be married?

  This is your argument, not mine. My whole point is that God becomes
  natural, and inevitable under MWI + Comp.

 My point is that that argument requires the meaning of god to
 change, and, since language us public, you don't get to change it
 unilaterally.

It changes a little every time you use it.

   There's an important difference between it changes and I am going
   to change it.

  Not for me.

 Then you are wrong.

No, I'm just in control of my own expression. I don't need permission
alter it.


   That's how words work.

   That is one side of the picture. Shared meaning is the other.

  That's what I'm saying, meaning is shared in between the lines. It
  doesn't rely on adhering to linguistic conventions strictly.

 between the lines is a vague, meaningless metaphor.

not at all. it is a tremendously successful and ubiquitous metaphor.
It's in no way vague. It specifies precisely that communication is
carried by the figurative gaps between words, not merely by the lines
on the page. You have to connect the dots, figure it out, get to the
point, see what they mean, etc.


 Common meaning. OTOH, literallu is adhering to linguistic convention.

 I don't know how to get accross to you that it is about WHAT THE
 WORD GOD MEANS.

I don't argue about what words mean.

   No: you don;t pay attention to the issue and so
   end up miscommunicating and talking past people.

  That happens with some people and not with others.

 Who have you succeeded in explaining yourself to?

I get almost entirely positive feedback from my blogs. It's only here
and places like this where people complain.


  Different ways of
  thinking use words differently. I'm never trying to talk past people,

 I didn't suggest it was literal.

You mean intentional? See - I was able to read in between the lines
and see what you meant. Without a dictionary.


  We can invent as many words for it as we want, but none will be any
  more or less appropriate than God.

 Says who?

Who doesn't say?

   Me.

  Why though?

 Because God has implications about who created the whole Shebang, and
 not

Maybe to you. I didn't grow up in a religious family. 'God' has always
been a creepy pyramid scheme to me. Besides, the Matrix Lord is the
creator of simworld.

 just about which fallibel entity is able to lord it over even more
 fallible
 ones in the next layer down. Matrix Lord is fine though.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Feb 2012, at 17:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/21/2012 7:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Negative amplitude of probability comes from the formula p-[]p  
satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD).


How does that work?


By using a theorem of Goldblatt which shows that:

MQL proves A iff B proves t(A),

MQL being a Minimal form of Quantum Logic and B being the Brouwersche  
modal logic, with axioms
[ ](A-B) - ([ ]A - [ ]B), [ ]A - A, A-[ ]A, and the Modus  
Ponens rule + the necessitation rule.


and the translation t(A) given by

t(p) = [ ] p   p atomic
t(A  B) = t(A)  t(B)
t(~A) = [ ] ~t(A)

So B models an quantum orthologic, a bit like S4, or S4Grz, are known  
to model Intuitionist Logic.


Now, the UD is modeled by the restriction of the arithmetical  
realisation of modal logic to the Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences, for  
which it can be shown that [ ](p-q) - ([ ]p - [ ]q), [ ]p - p, p- 
[ ]p, that is the axioms of B, when [ ]p is the result of the  
material hypostases translation, which I sum up often by Bp  Dt (but  
which is really given by a translation like above).


The MP rule is sound, but we lose the necessitation rule. Nevertheless  
we obtain still a quantum logic by using the reverse-Goldblatt  
translation, leading to an arithmetical interpretation of a sort of  
quantum logic, and this where the UDA shows we need to find the  
elementary logic of the yes/no observable in the comp physical reality.


That was the first step in the verification that the comp physics fit  
empirical physics. Others have followed (orthomodularity, a violation  
of a Bell type of inequality). Unfortunately the translation of those  
nested modal operators (with many [ ]) makes the algorith  
intractable for more interesting physical formula.


Hard to explain this without being technical, but more is said in  
sane04 and some other papers in my url.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Feb 2012, at 19:26, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/21/2012 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:





Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.



That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM,


?
That's exactly what I am saying above.



No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler  
ontology

than multiple solipsistic physicses.


I show that the CTM theory entais that physics is the same for all  
Löbian entity (machine or not), so that we canb derive physics from  
machine's introspection. The general shape is given by a relative  
sum on all computations. It depends for each machine to the  
competition between infinities of machines. Negative amplitude of  
probability comes from the formula p-[]p satisfied by the  
sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD). Without this I  
would have already conclude that comp and/or the classical theory  
of knowledge is refuted.




Does this introspection manifest all possible means of  
generating the appearance of other minds?


The introspection is needed only to recognize and assess other minds,  
not for their generation. All the possible minds are already alive  
from arithmetic (even just sigma_1 arithmetic).









It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to  
define

matter, I think.


1)  a little does not equal none


I don't use this. In MGA I use the fact that Physical Supervenience  
Thesis (PST) entails that consciousness need to be attributed to  
*arbitrary physical activity, including none, and that is absurd  
for comp+PS.
If you don't see this, quote the passage, and let us discuss it  
really in detail.


Could it be that the no physical activity mode of  
computational implementation is some kind of at infinity  
extrapolation, i.e. it is in principle achievable but only in some  
infinite limit? If this is true that we might have a chance of  
capturing a Gaussian measure in the finite approximation of this  
limit, otherwise the measure would vanish as one would have to  
included the non-constructable cases of computation.


To much unclear for me. Sorry.
Maudlin, and me, does not reduce the physical activity to show it  
unnecessary, we show it non relevant with respect to the computations.
The Gaussian measure on the distinguishable 1-person states, comes  
from the iterated self-duplication, which shows that the resulting  
people can recognize at each step of the iteration the Pascal triangle  
partitioning, and the Gaussian measure is the limit of all such  
partitioning for the infinite iteration. It is the same reasoning, in  
Everett QM, to explain how a beam splitters is working.








2) redefine computation so that comptuational states must be  
causally

connected.


define causally, and tell me in which theory you work. Usually,  
when we implement a computation physically, or in any UMs, we just  
manage to implement the arithmetical causality in terms of the  
UMs capacity to link the computational states. Without this, the  
concept of implementation would not make sense.


This is very weak reasoning as the notion of causation that you  
are using, based of the truth of Sigma_1 sentences, is contingent on  
the mathematical axioms that are chosen.


On the contrary, Church thesis makes it independent of the choice of  
any formal system.











3) Given a choice between materalism and CTM, keep materialism, a la
Maudlin.


[CTM implies ~MAT] is equivalent with [MAT implies ~CTM]. You are  
not giving a refutation, but a rephrasing of a (partial) result.


---

I comment some other posts by you:


Shouldn't we open up our mind?

John Mikes


Maybe all multiversal theories are wrong and there is one univese.  
Is

your mind
open to that?



Sure. But then QM and CTM are both false. The point is a point of  
reasoning, validity, not of conviction or truth.


We know that QM is true modulo the experiments done so far.  
Testing CTM is difficult as we would have to show a non-computable  
physical process to falsify it.



It is enough to compare empirical physics with the comp-physics. If it  
differs, we have a string evidence that we, whatever we are, are the  
non computational element. Up to now, QM fits with the comp-physics,  
which already make quasi obvious most of the quantum weirdness.




Consideration of computational intractability, e.g. the NP-Complete  
problem is a hint but you do not seem to be interested in looking  
there. :-(


NP concerns tractability issue, not the insolubility used in the  
derivation of physics.










On Feb 20, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:




How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.


I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread marty684
Bruno,
 If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) which can express 
states to an arbitrary degree of precision, is there any room for chance or 
probability? And if so, how do they arise?   (If you've been over this before, 
please refer me to the relevant posts, thanks.)  marty a.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread acw

On 2/22/2012 17:17, marty684 wrote:

Bruno,
  If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) which can express
states to an arbitrary degree of precision, is there any room for chance or
probability? And if so, how do they arise?   (If you've been over this before,
please refer me to the relevant posts, thanks.)  marty a.

There's an immense amount of chance (indeterminacy) from the 1st 
person perspective of the machine. Read the UDA (in Bruno's SANE2004 
paper). The simplest example is the third step of the UDA. If someone 
makes 2 duplicate instances/copies of their selves (possible if brain 
admits a digital substitution level), we can expect to be either one or 
the other copy, with 1/2 probability. It's fairer than a classical coin 
toss, and likely the origin of the quantum nature of reality (see rest 
of UDA).


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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:


  How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
  simulation or not.

 I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that
 we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
 point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
 verifiable (empirically) constraints.

 With comp we are in a complex matrix whose existence is deducible
 from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible
 from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.

Of course, Platonism/AR cannot be deduced mathematically: it is
ontology.


  Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
  without the notion of computational realism?

 Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
 incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
 physicalism.

There is no such incompatibility. It is mutual redundancy, not  mutual
contradiction. What BM calls incompatibility actually
hinges on Occams Razor, and O's R cuts both ways: AR/Platonism is
redundant
given materialism.


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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread 1Z



On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acw a...@lavabit.com wrote:

  On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
  1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com  wrote:
   On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:
  ..
   Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
   still aren't reality

   It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
   itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
   the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
   reality than the simulation.

  If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
  Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
  true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.

 Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation.

No. True = true of unsimulated reality.

 If I make a
 simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
 changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
 that there is an omnipotent entity

They can only wrongly conclude that since you are not omnipotent.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 5:38 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:52 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

  There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all kinds of Gods.

 But then why did you say There is something that prevents infinite
 nonsense universes? How did you find this out, did you somehow check on
 every one of those infinite number of Many Worlds to see?

  John K Clark

Good question. CW doesn't seem to be subject to the same epistemic
contraints
as the rest of us. Maybe he IS God!

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 1:45 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
control means god or supernaural

   You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to
   admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes
   to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe
   and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?

  You are natural.

 How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
 simulation or not.

That doens't make you supernatural.

 You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
  catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.

 No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
 Pegasus

The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications.

and that is all that is required.


 But we are natural so they would be wrong.

 They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

So? Is appearance reality?

   That is what comp says.

  Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

 Both.

Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory.

What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
 without the notion of computational realism?

What do you mean by computational realism?

  The simulation is reality as far as the
   simulatees are concerned.

  And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
  real reality.

 It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
 their reality.

their reality=appearance=/= reality.

 Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
 possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
 Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
 what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
 is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.

But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated,
and our reality is delusional.

  You seem to be arguing
  appearance=reality on the premise that
  opinion=truth.

 Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
 be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
 the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
 is in fact a logical program.

That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are
saying elsewhere.

   Appearances may not reflect the truest level
   of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
   representation of the simulation's function.

  Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
  still aren't reality

 It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
 itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
 the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
 reality than the simulation.


Can't a red pill be programmed in?


  If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
  your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
  might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.

 Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
 Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
 which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
 *their* Gods.

ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all
sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods
are supernatural by definition, no belief in a god arising in such
circumsntances is *correct*, be it every so persuasive.

Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
poisonous.

   Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
   place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you
   would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
   view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
   agents than living organisms.

  What we are arguing about is the supernatural.

 No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing
 about are gods

Gods are supernatural by definition.

 (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over
 the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and
 their inevitability in MWI.

That's superbeings, not gods.



  You
  do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
  meaningless.

 Why not?

Because, if the one is meaningless, so is the other.

 Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the
 supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all,
 it is an accurate description of the relationship between the
 programmer and the programmed.

Gods are superntarual by definition. You can  no more
provide evidecne of a natural god than of a married bachelor.


I don't know. Who?

   You.

  No, you have 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2012/2/20 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com

 He said and I quote and emphasis:  Now comp makes **almost all** (not any)
 UMs' physics identical. 



Note that there will still be an infinite variety of HP/WR physics
even
if it is a small subset of the whole.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/2/21 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com



 On Feb 20, 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  2012/2/20 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com

  He said and I quote and emphasis:  Now comp makes **almost all** (not
 any)
  UMs' physics identical. 
 


 Note that there will still be an infinite variety of HP/WR physics
 even
 if it is a small subset of the whole.


Sure but it must be of low measure... and this is compatible with QM.

Quentin


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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/21/2012 5:41 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 20, 1:45 pm, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:

On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com  wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:

I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
control means god or supernaural

You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to
admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes
to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe
and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?

You are natural.

How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.

That doens't make you supernatural.


  Hi Craig,

I think that you are missing a point here. COMP is showing us how 
there is no inherent bias on what we can believe ourselves to be, thus 
it is throwing open the options. This is a good with with regards to 
Free Will for without the multiplicity of options or alternatives there 
is no choice. We just would be one thing and there would be no debate on 
free will.





You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.

No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
Pegasus

The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications.


False, Semantics is said to only be possible because we can lie, 
i.e. if we cannot lie then we cannot tell truths either. See Umberto 
Echo's Semiotics Theory 
http://books.google.com/books?id=RaFrIAAJq=lie#search_anchor pg. 7.





and that is all that is required.



But we are natural so they would be wrong.
They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

So? Is appearance reality?

That is what comp says.

Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

Both.

Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory.


It is scientific if it is falsifiable. Is it?




What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?

What do you mean by computational realism?


The belief that what is real is what is computable or expressible 
with enumerable recursive functions.





The simulation is reality as far as the
simulatees are concerned.

And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
real reality.

It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
their reality.

their reality=appearance=/= reality.


This is really a debate about Realism, no?





Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.

But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated,
and our reality is delusional.


It is delusion only if there are alternative realities against 
which we can judge the validity of such statements as what I am 
experiencing at this moment is not real.





You seem to be arguing
appearance=reality on the premise that
opinion=truth.

Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
is in fact a logical program.

That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are
saying elsewhere.


Appearances may not reflect the truest level
of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
representation of the simulation's function.

Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality

It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.


Can't a red pill be programmed in?


No, as that would render the entire edifice of alternatives 
impossible and thus not even conceivable.






If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.

ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all
sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods
are supernatural by definition, no belief in a god arising in such
circumsntances is *correct*, be it every so persuasive.


Would A.C. Clarck's dictum have an answer to this all sufficiently 
advanced technology appears to be magic?





Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
poisonous.

Poisonous is a term with a more literal 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:












On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?



Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?



We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
hypothesis than most forms of CTM,






?




given that comp allows the
substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the  
notion

of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are
automatically
lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst.  
level.



Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.



That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM,


?
That's exactly what I am saying above.



No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology
than multiple solipsistic physicses.


I show that the CTM theory entais that physics is the same for all  
Löbian entity (machine or not), so that we canb derive physics from  
machine's introspection. The general shape is given by a relative sum  
on all computations. It depends for each machine to the competition  
between infinities of machines. Negative amplitude of probability  
comes from the formula p-[]p satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical  
sentences (that is the UD). Without this I would have already conclude  
that comp and/or the classical theory of knowledge is refuted.









and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.


A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in
physics.


Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0.


Occam razor says that we must not assume ontologicaly what we can  
explain phenomenologically.

That why QM + Occam = MWI = QM without collapse.
With CTM, we have that the theory of everything is arithmetic, for it  
explains why and how numbers, relatively to other numbers develop  
stable and persistent beliefs and knowledge about quanta and qualia.







And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in
fundamental cognitive science.





Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
materialism (weak materialism).



According to a string of controversial arguments.


You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7,


I never said anything of the kind.


I asked you, after a summing up of the argument, and we got into a  
long conversation on step 8 only. I debunked earlier critics of the  
step 0 (the definition of comp) because you asserted it was platonist,  
when I insist that it is only realist on arithmetic, and this means  
that we just agree with the validity of (A V ~A) for arithmetical  
sentences.







and
when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,
but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I
asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making  
sense.



Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned  
computers

and brains are
made of matter.


Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of
the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate
for marrying GR and QM.


Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two
very different issues.


I am OK with this. For example consciousness, reality, truth, etc. are  
all concept which are intuitively not definable, and have been proved  
to be not definable in the comp (meta) theory, and in the machines'  
discourse (that is formally).
But primitive matter is different. Not only we cannot define it, but  
we cannot experiment with it, we cannot experience it, nor find any  
use of the notion in physics, nor even mention of it. It is only a  
vague everyday-like extrapolation from our animal experience. In  
occident, science is born from taking some distance from such kind of  
idea.
Given more than 2000 years of not being able to solve the mind body  
problem, we should not take it for granted, at the least.







It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in
matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA
reasoning.


Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism.


Oh no! You are coming back with this?
I already answer this by asking you to prove this. To show me where in  
the paper I assume Platonism. The Platonism comes from the conclusion.
I use only the minimal amount of arithmetical realism to give sense to  
Church thesis. Nothing else.





Non Patonists
are fully entitled to disregard it. Others might wish to treat it
as a reductio of Platonism.


This is philosophical nonsense.
COMP + the usual occam used in 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Feb 2012, at 14:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2012/2/21 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com


On Feb 20, 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2012/2/20 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com

 He said and I quote and emphasis:  Now comp makes **almost all**  
(not any)

 UMs' physics identical. 



Note that there will still be an infinite variety of HP/WR physics
even
if it is a small subset of the whole.


Sure but it must be of low measure... and this is compatible with QM.


Yes. With QM without collapse, there are also infinite varieties of HP/ 
WR first person (even plural) realities. But they are relatively rare,  
and when plural, they are very unstable. The probability to get there  
is something like 1/big number, and the probability to stay there is  
(1/bib number)^big number.


--Why do you build each week a lottery ticket, given that you have  
never won?
--Oh, I continue to play *every week* because my goal is to win ten  
times in a row ...

:)

Bruno





Quentin

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread meekerdb

On 2/21/2012 5:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:


I think that you are missing a point here. COMP is showing us how there is no 
inherent bias on what we can believe ourselves to be, thus it is throwing open the 
options. This is a good with with regards to Free Will for without the multiplicity of 
options or alternatives there is no choice.


Options implies one-or-the-other.  All the theories based on COMP and MWI assume there is 
no choice and everything happens.


Brent

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread meekerdb

On 2/21/2012 7:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Negative amplitude of probability comes from the formula p-[]p satisfied by the 
sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD).


How does that work?

Brent

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/21/2012 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:












On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?



Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?



We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
hypothesis than most forms of CTM,






?




given that comp allows the
substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are
automatically
lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.



Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.



That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM,


?
That's exactly what I am saying above.



No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology
than multiple solipsistic physicses.


I show that the CTM theory entais that physics is the same for all 
Löbian entity (machine or not), so that we canb derive physics from 
machine's introspection. The general shape is given by a relative sum 
on all computations. It depends for each machine to the competition 
between infinities of machines. Negative amplitude of probability 
comes from the formula p-[]p satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical 
sentences (that is the UD). Without this I would have already conclude 
that comp and/or the classical theory of knowledge is refuted.




Does this introspection manifest all possible means of generating 
the appearance of other minds?







and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.


A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in
physics.


Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0.


Occam razor says that we must not assume ontologicaly what we can 
explain phenomenologically.

That why QM + Occam = MWI = QM without collapse.
With CTM, we have that the theory of everything is arithmetic, for it 
explains why and how numbers, relatively to other numbers develop 
stable and persistent beliefs and knowledge about quanta and qualia.







And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in
fundamental cognitive science.





Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
materialism (weak materialism).



According to a string of controversial arguments.


You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7,


I never said anything of the kind.


I asked you, after a summing up of the argument, and we got into a 
long conversation on step 8 only. I debunked earlier critics of the 
step 0 (the definition of comp) because you asserted it was platonist, 
when I insist that it is only realist on arithmetic, and this means 
that we just agree with the validity of (A V ~A) for arithmetical 
sentences.







and
when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,
but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I
asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making 
sense.



Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
and brains are
made of matter.


Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of
the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate
for marrying GR and QM.


Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two
very different issues.


I am OK with this. For example consciousness, reality, truth, etc. are 
all concept which are intuitively not definable, and have been proved 
to be not definable in the comp (meta) theory, and in the machines' 
discourse (that is formally).
But primitive matter is different. Not only we cannot define it, but 
we cannot experiment with it, we cannot experience it, nor find any 
use of the notion in physics, nor even mention of it. It is only a 
vague everyday-like extrapolation from our animal experience. In 
occident, science is born from taking some distance from such kind of 
idea.
Given more than 2000 years of not being able to solve the mind body 
problem, we should not take it for granted, at the least.







It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in
matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA
reasoning.


Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism.


Oh no! You are coming back with this?
I already answer this by asking you to prove this. To show me where in 
the paper I assume Platonism. The Platonism comes from the conclusion.
I use only the minimal amount of arithmetical realism to give sense to 
Church thesis. Nothing else.





Non Patonists
are fully entitled to disregard it. Others 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/21/2012 11:45 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/21/2012 5:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:


I think that you are missing a point here. COMP is showing us how 
there is no inherent bias on what we can believe ourselves to be, 
thus it is throwing open the options. This is a good with with 
regards to Free Will for without the multiplicity of options or 
alternatives there is no choice.


Options implies one-or-the-other.  All the theories based on COMP and 
MWI assume there is no choice and everything happens.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Your assertion is true but irrelevant because the agency aspect of 
choice does not span all of the happenings simultaneously. We have a 
notion of free will because we cannot be conscious of all the superposed 
possibilities. The point is that we can conveive multiple possibility 
from which we can imagine making a choice. Ben Goertzel's paper, found 
here 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=trct=jq=%22hyperset+models+of+self%2C+Will+and+Reflective+consciousness%22source=webcd=1ved=0CCEQFjAAurl=http%3A%2F%2Fgoertzel.org%2Fconsciousness%2Fconsciousness_paper.pdfei=t-NDT4m_O5CUtwft1tyaBQusg=AFQjCNGPbt16jLOtezl_8Cg0vfBxcOYdhwcad=rja, 
explains this quite well IMHO.


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 21, 5:21 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


  Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation.

 No. True = true of unsimulated reality.

Where is there unsimulated reality in comp?


  If I make a
  simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
  changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
  that there is an omnipotent entity

 They can only wrongly conclude that since you are not omnipotent.

Those who I find doubting my omnipotence will find that there are more
important things than not being wrong.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   You are natural.

  How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
  simulation or not.

 That doens't make you supernatural.

Why would I be? I'm not the administrator of a virtual universe.



  You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
   catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.

  No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
  Pegasus

 The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications.

Why not? Fiction is arguably the basis for all culture. I'm not
talking about that though, I'm referring to comp's view of
epistemology. That's the whole question is whether the truths of our
universe are as true as any to us.


 and that is all that is required.
  But we are natural so they would be wrong.

  They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

 So? Is appearance reality?

That is what comp says.

   Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

  Both.

 Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory.

What does that have to do with it's conception of in-simulation
epistemology?


 What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
  without the notion of computational realism?

 What do you mean by computational realism?

That the reality within any simulation derives from computation rather
than material substance.


   The simulation is reality as far as the
simulatees are concerned.

   And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
   real reality.

  It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
  their reality.

 their reality=appearance=/= reality.

What is reality without an appearance? If the only world I know is not
my reality, then what is it?


  Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
  possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
  Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
  what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
  is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.

 But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated,
 and our reality is delusional.

It's simulated from our perspective, but from inside the simulation
it's the only reality there is - according to comp. Of course I
disagree with comp.


   You seem to be arguing
   appearance=reality on the premise that
   opinion=truth.

  Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
  be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
  the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
  is in fact a logical program.

 That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are
 saying elsewhere.

I'm giving you the comp version.  I don't subscribe to it personally,
so I have no reason to talk about it elsewhere.


Appearances may not reflect the truest level
of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
representation of the simulation's function.

   Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
   still aren't reality

  It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
  itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
  the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
  reality than the simulation.

 Can't a red pill be programmed in?

Not unless you are already a being outside the simulation who is
participating vicariously. Different than being a native entity born
within a simulation.


   If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
   your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
   might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.

  Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
  Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
  which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
  *their* Gods.

 ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all
 sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods
 are supernatural by definition

This is just begging the question and arguing from authority. Your
claim is that the word 'scientific' wards off the supernatural and
that alone makes anything that anyone decides is supernatural
impossible. I'm telling you that because

1. comp makes godlike influence over a simulation possible
2. MWI makes such influence and simulations inevitable
3. AP makes the relative numbers of MWI universes with godlike
simulation influence irrelevant.
4. comp makes it impossible to tell whether such influence is physics
or extra-simulation intervention from inside the sim.

Therefore, whatever your reality, if you believe Comp and AP, then you
could be in a simulation subject to godlike intervention.

, no belief in a god arising in such
 circumsntances is *correct*, be it every so persuasive.

Are you saying that a belief can only be true if it 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread 1Z


On Feb 21, 8:03 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 21, 5:21 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

   Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation.

  No. True = true of unsimulated reality.

 Where is there unsimulated reality in comp?

As ever, that depends what you mean by comp.
CTM doens't require anything to be simulated at all.
in Bruno;s Platonic COMP, the unsimulated reailty
is a Plato's heaven full of numbers.

   If I make a
   simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
   changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
   that there is an omnipotent entity

  They can only wrongly conclude that since you are not omnipotent.

 Those who I find doubting my omnipotence will find that there are more
 important things than not being wrong.

Well, you're not simulating me, so i remain unpersuaded.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-21 Thread 1Z


On Feb 21, 10:41 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
   simulation or not.

  That doens't make you supernatural.

 Why would I be? I'm not the administrator of a virtual universe.

You would not be supernatural if you were.

  The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications.

 Why not? Fiction is arguably the basis for all culture.

Only it arguably isn't, because without the fiction/fact distinction,
science would not be science.

 I'm not
 talking about that though, I'm referring to comp's view of
 epistemology.

Comp has to justify itself in the face of epistemology
not vice versa.

That's the whole question is whether the truths of our
 universe are as true as any to us.



   Both.

  Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory.

 What does that have to do with it's conception of in-simulation
 epistemology?


The issue is whether Bruno's Comp = science's CTM.
Since CTM requires nothing to be simulated, and has
no epistemoloogical implications, the two are not the same.

  What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
   without the notion of computational realism?

  What do you mean by computational realism?

 That the reality within any simulation derives from computation rather
 than material substance.


OK. Then the answer to What would be the meaning of any form of
computationalism
 without the notion of computational realism? would be
something like There is a real reality, containing humans and their
brains,
and human the human mind is like software running on the hardware
of the real physical brain, and that is the Computational
Theory of Mind.

The simulation is reality as far as the
 simulatees are concerned.

   It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
   their reality.

  their reality=appearance=/= reality.

 What is reality without an appearance?

If the only world I know is not
 my reality, then what is it?

The answer is supplied by the Simulation Hypothesis,
the Deception Hypothesis, etc. if you world is simulated,
then reality is the place where and means wheresby
it is being simulatd. The Simulation Hypothesis--which
you call comp-- is a claim about reality. To claim that
what you know is not reality because it is simulated
is to claim something else is reality.


  But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated,
  and our reality is delusional.

 It's simulated from our perspective, but from inside the simulation
 it's the only reality there is - according to comp.r

False. It is not the Only Reality There Is Accoding to Comp,
because there hypothses state that there is  a ground level...
the lab where the sim is running (or Platonia in Bruno's case).


   Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
   be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
   the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
   is in fact a logical program.

  That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are
  saying elsewhere.

 I'm giving you the comp version.  I don't subscribe to it personally,
 so I have no reason to talk about it elsewhere.


You have given me two versions of comp.


   It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
   itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
   the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
   reality than the simulation.

  Can't a red pill be programmed in?

 Not unless you are already a being outside the simulation who is
 participating vicariously.

Prove that.

   Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
   Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
   which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
   *their* Gods.

  ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all
  sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods
  are supernatural by definition

 This is just begging the question and arguing from authority.

No, it is valid analytical apriori argument.

 Your
 claim is that the word 'scientific' wards off the supernatural and
 that alone makes anything that anyone decides is supernatural
 impossible. I'm telling you that because

 1. comp makes godlike influence over a simulation possible

Godlike only in a delusional sense.

 2. MWI makes such influence and simulations inevitable

not necessarily. Depends on the flavour.

 3. AP makes the relative numbers of MWI universes with godlike
 simulation influence irrelevant.
 4. comp makes it impossible to tell whether such influence is physics
 or extra-simulation intervention from inside the sim.

Yep. and impossible to tell--epistemic inaccessibility--
still doens't mean there is no fact of the matter. You
assume absolute, transcendent facts when you 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:



  On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
  Comp says that any UM's
  experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?

  Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?

 We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
 hypothesis than most forms of CTM,



 given that comp allows the
 substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
 of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically
 lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.

 Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.

That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM, and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.

 Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
 materialism (weak materialism).

According to a string of controversial arguments. Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
and brains are
made of matter.

We could say that comp makes the
 notion of primitive matter supernatural.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  Why would Gods be supernatural?

 Why would bachelors be married?

That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim that
the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines from
being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk terminology.
It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
MWI.

   I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
   control means god or supernaural

  You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to
  admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes
  to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe
  and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?

 You are natural.

How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.

You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
 catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.

No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
Pegasus, and that is all that is required.


  If comp is true, then when we create
  AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and 
  reprogram
  their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
  them other than Gods?

 But we are natural so they would be wrong.

They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

   So? Is appearance reality?

  That is what comp says.

 Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?


 The simulation is reality as far as the
  simulatees are concerned.

 And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
 real reality.

It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
their reality. Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.

 You seem to be arguing
 appearance=reality on the premise that
 opinion=truth.

Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
is in fact a logical program.


  Appearances may not reflect the truest level
  of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
  representation of the simulation's function.

 Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
 still aren't reality

It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.


It doesn't
matter who you call 'natural'.

   It matters a great deal what you call anything.

  It would if the word natural had some relevant meaning, but even in
  food labeling, that term is notoriously vague. Natural means anything
  that exists. Natural plastic comes from natural petrochemicals.

 If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
 your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
 might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.


   Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
   poisonous.

  Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
  place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you
  would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
  view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
  agents than living organisms.

 What we are arguing about is the supernatural.

No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing
about are gods (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over
the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and
their inevitability in MWI.

 You
 do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
 meaningless.

Why not? Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the
supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all,
it is an accurate description of the relationship between the
programmer and the programmed.


Now who is arguing a special case for
natively evolved consciousness?

   I don't know. Who?

  You.

 No, you have misunderstood.

If you could prove that statement, you would have tried.


 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread acw

On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com  wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:

..

Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality


It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.

If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of 
Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things, 
true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.

That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local 
physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which 
happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the 
structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of 
a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or 
maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all* 
the cases (which are infinite). If such a programmer decides to 
intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines 
implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in 
arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere), however a small part of the 
simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the 
physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with 
them), possibly meaning a reduction in measure, however the probability 
of ending up in such a simulation is very low and as time passes it 
becomes less and less likely that said observers would keep on remaining 
in that simulation - if they die or malfunction (that's just one 
example), there will be continuations for them which are no longer 
supported by the upper programmer's physics. There can never be correct 
worship of some Matrix Lord/Administrator/... as they are not what 
is responsible for such observers being conscious, at best such 
programmers are only responsible for finding some particular program and 
increasing its measure with respect to the programmer's universe. Of 
course, if such a programmer wants to lift some beings from his 
simulation to run in his universe, he could do that and those would be 
valid continuations for the being living in that simulation. Running a 
physics simulation is akin to looking into a window, not to an act of 
universe creation, even if it may look like that from the simulator's 
perspective.



Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
poisonous.



Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you
would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
agents than living organisms.


What we are arguing about is the supernatural.


No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing
about are gods (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over
the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and
their inevitability in MWI.

Except there is no omnipotence. The default meaning of the word is 
inconsistent, thus it's an impossible property. You can't change the 
truth of mathematical sentences. Physical omnipotence? Possible, but as 
I said before, it's very low probability to find yourself in an universe 
ruled by an interventionist god, at least in COMP, due to 
1p-indeterminacy. For such a god to have complete control over you, he'd 
have toto handle all counterfactuals, which is not possible due to 
Rice's theorem. The only thing such a being can do is feel like he is in 
control when he modifies a simulation, he can't control all possible 
continuations observers in his simulation can take. If he wants to more 
directly affect them, he'd have to be on an even footing them with - in 
the same universe or in a simulation in which he has more direct 
participation, and then he'd no longer be omnipotent.

You
do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
meaningless.


Why not? Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the
supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all,
it is an accurate description of the relationship between the
programmer and the programmed.

Yes, but for a 'programmed' to have an 1p, it has to be an ensemble of 
computations, yours being just a few finite ones in an infinite 
ensemble. Even if one can be confused/tricked for a finite amount of 
time about this, you can never be confused forever.




Why do you think the programmer's reality 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?



Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?


We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
hypothesis than most forms of CTM,





?





given that comp allows the
substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are  
automatically

lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.

Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.


That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM,


?
That's exactly what I am saying above.



and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.


A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in  
physics. And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in  
fundamental cognitive science.







Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
materialism (weak materialism).


According to a string of controversial arguments.


You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7, and  
when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,  
but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I  
asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense.





Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
and brains are
made of matter.


Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of  
the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate  
for marrying GR and QM.


It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in  
matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA  
reasoning. They are just following Aristotle metaphysics, which is  
itself a regression to the pre-platonist time, which extrapolated  
naturally from our animal sensations and survival programs or engrams.  
Anyway, argument of majority have zero value in science.


It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to define  
matter, I think.
I thought you did eventually grasp the point. Please make yours  
clearer. If you have a precise physicalist theory compatible with comp  
you should be able to find an invalid step in UDA.


Bruno






We could say that comp makes the
notion of primitive matter supernatural.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:











  On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
  Comp says that any UM's
  experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?

  Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?

  We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
  hypothesis than most forms of CTM,

  

 ?



  given that comp allows the
  substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
  of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are
  automatically
  lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.

  Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.

  That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
  one physics for each UTM,

 ?
 That's exactly what I am saying above.


No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology
than multiple solipsistic physicses.

  and
  there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.

 A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in
 physics.

Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0.

 And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in
 fundamental cognitive science.



  Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
  materialism (weak materialism).

  According to a string of controversial arguments.

 You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7,

I never said anything of the kind.

 and
 when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,
 but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I
 asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense.

  Not according
  to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
  and brains are
  made of matter.

 Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of
 the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate
 for marrying GR and QM.

Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two
very different issues.

 It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in
 matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA
 reasoning.

Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism. Non Patonists
are fully entitled to disregard it. Others might wish to treat it
as a reductio of Platonism.

 They are just following Aristotle metaphysics, which is
 itself a regression to the pre-platonist time, which extrapolated
 naturally from our animal sensations and survival programs or engrams.

Whatever.

 Anyway, argument of majority have zero value in science.

The majority get to define meanings. What they mean by
computationalism
is 180 degrees aways from what your mean. You should choose another
word.

 It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to define
 matter, I think.

1)  a little does not equal none
2) redefine computation so that comptuational states must be causally
connected.
3) Given a choice between materalism and CTM, keep materialism, a la
Maudlin.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  If the physicists at CERN announced that all life including human life
 was created by the Klogknee Field but didn't even attempt to explain how it
 had done this miraculous thing would you be satisfied? I wouldn't be.

  They will name it the Higgs instead, and then you will be satisfied.

That is a foolish remark. The Higgs, if it exists, can't even explain
gravity much less life or mathematics or why God exists or why there is
something rather than nothing.

  Species = life. Nothing in the Origin of Species pertains to anything
 outside of biology.

I don't see your point. And by the way, Lee Smolin has a very interesting
cosmological theory involving many worlds, Darwin's ideas, and black holes.

  God isn't a theory, it is a character in a story.

Yes, and the Hebrew god Yahweh in the old testament is the most unpleasant
character in all of fiction.

  It does not address explanation, it specifically makes explanation
 irrelevant in favor of identification with the miraculous.

Yes, and that is the reason religion is so evil, or at least the most
important reason.

  Like it or not

Not.

  religion is the universal dynamo which generates civilization.

Religion certainly played a important part in the history of civilization,
so have intestinal parasites.

  if we literally believe that all we are is molecular processes,

Shakespeare's life work is a finite sequence of ASCII characters and there
is no doubt about that, but that's not the only way to describe what his
life's work is. One way to describe what we are is that we are what a
finite amalgamation of molecular processes do, but that's not the only way
to describe what we are. And if you literally believe that all you are is a
immaterial soul why would that make you feel better and get you out of this
sad existential funk of yours?

  then there could be no reason to prefer any one set of processes or
 outcomes over another.

I don't follow, those very molecular processes cause you to prefer one
outcome over another.

  There would be no difference between one opinion and another or one
 person and another.

There would be if there were differences in those molecular processes
between one individual and another, and of course in the real world there
always are differences.

  I don't see that it would be a problem for God to make physics

  Great, so how did He do it? I'm all ears!

 Let there be Physics!



Don't be obtuse, bullshit explanations like that allowed religion to get a
foothold in unthinking people. I want a real explanation. I want to know
how God made physics. I also want to know why God always existed rather
than always not existed.

  You misunderstand the purpose of religion. It isn't supposed to explain
 anything

I see, religion isn't supposed to make sense, In that it is successful. And
they try to peddle the idea that the more ridiculous your beliefs are the
more virtuous you are because that means the more faith you must have. And
faith, they want you to accept as being obvious without even thinking about
it, is a good thing.

  it is supposed to unify human beings

More people have been murdered for religious reasons that any other single
cause,

  to a common sense and motive for political purposes.

So you think religion is a useful lie. I disagree, I find nothing useful in
it. Religion is a parasite, its a virus of the mind.

randomness becomes another name for God.

   Yet another example of someone willing to abandon the idea of God but
 not the 3 letter word G-O-D.

  Huh? We can call it R-A-N-D-O-M-N-E-S-S if you prefer.

Thank you, I do much prefer that because otherwise when I say I don't
believe in God people will think I don't believe in randomness. If God,
or any other word, can mean anything at all then the word is of no use to
anyone at all.

  There is something that prevents infinite nonsense universes

I have no way of knowing if infinite nonsense universes exist or not.

  It is symmetry and relation. Sensitivity. Being. Experience.

This is a very good example of a very bad explanation. It would be far
better and certainly more honest to simply say I don't understand why the
world is the way it is nor does anybody else. And the worst part is if you
keep repeating bullshit explanations like this eventually you might
actually start to believe it when you really don't, and that is a recipe
for stagnation.

John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:52 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all kinds of Gods.


But then why did you say There is something that prevents infinite
nonsense universes? How did you find this out, did you somehow check on
every one of those infinite number of Many Worlds to see?

 John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 4:48 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
 Peter,
 why do you think - if there are indeed many universes - that they are
 identical and like ours?

It isn't a question of what I think.
There are different multiversal theories. Some say all
the universes are bound by a set of physical laws,
some say otherwise.

 As a matter of fact: what would you call a universe? the image of the
 2012 cosmology (or 1879?)
 I believe there is more to the cosmos than so far experienced. I try to
 give room for additional info.
 And: universes (whatever they may be) are not restricted to that ONE
 pattern we - sort of - pretend
 to know about.

 Shouldn't we open up our mind?

 John Mikes

Maybe all multiversal theories are wrong and there is one univese. Is
your mind
open to that?

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acw a...@lavabit.com wrote:
 On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com  wrote:
  On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:
 ..
  Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
  still aren't reality

  It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
  itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
  the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
  reality than the simulation.

 If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
 Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
 true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.

Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
That would be the truth of that simulation.

 Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
  Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
  which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
  *their* Gods.

 That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
 physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
 happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
 structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of
 a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
 maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
 the cases (which are infinite).

As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
simulation within one such universe.

 If such a programmer decides to
 intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines
 implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in
 arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere),

That depends entirely on what kind of intervention the programmer
chooses. If she wants to make half of the population turn blue, she
can, and then when the sim is turned back on, everyone gasps and
proclaims a miracle of Biblical proportions.

 however a small part of the
 simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the
 physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with
 them),

Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting that the programmer of Pac
Man can't reprogram it for zero gravity? Or for a Non-Euclidean
Salvador Dali melting clock wormhole version? What effect would a
physical universe have on a simulated universe if comp were true,
beyond impacting the ability of the simulation to function as
intended?

 possibly meaning a reduction in measure, however the probability
 of ending up in such a simulation is very low and as time passes it
 becomes less and less likely that said observers would keep on remaining
 in that simulation - if they die or malfunction (that's just one
 example), there will be continuations for them which are no longer
 supported by the upper programmer's physics.

The observers would have no capacity to detect continuity errors
unless they were given that functionality. Pac Man doesn't know if I
hack in there and turn the cherries to a turnip.

 There can never be correct
 worship of some Matrix Lord/Administrator/... as they are not what
 is responsible for such observers being conscious, at best such
 programmers are only responsible for finding some particular program and
 increasing its measure with respect to the programmer's universe. Of
 course, if such a programmer wants to lift some beings from his
 simulation to run in his universe, he could do that and those would be
 valid continuations for the being living in that simulation. Running a
 physics simulation is akin to looking into a window, not to an act of
 universe creation, even if it may look like that from the simulator's
 perspective.

With the right tools and drugs, your brain will prove to you that you
are a shoe, and you will believe it. If had the capacity to stop,
start, and edit your experience, I could make that belief last the
rest of your life and make the universe you experience validate that
belief. It would therefore be as true for you as anything has ever
been true for anyone.This is the unavoidable implication of comp. I of
course think it's false because experience cannot be simulated.
Computation supervenes on experience, not the other way around. We use
computation, our brains use computation, but it is experiences they
are computing, not numbers.


  Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
  poisonous.

  Poisonous is a term with a more literal 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


Why would Gods be supernatural?



Why would bachelors be married?


That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim  
that
the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines  
from
being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk  
terminology.

It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
MWI.



I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
control means god or supernaural


You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would  
have to
admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make  
changes
to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your  
universe

and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?


You are natural.


How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.


I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that  
we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person  
point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to  
verifiable (empirically) constraints.


With comp we are in a complex matrix whose existence is deducible  
from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible  
from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.


Bruno







You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.


No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
Pegasus, and that is all that is required.




If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and  
reprogram
their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we  
be to

them other than Gods?



But we are natural so they would be wrong.



They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.



So? Is appearance reality?



That is what comp says.


Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.


Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?


Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the  
incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including  
physicalism. This shows just the gap between computer scientist,  
philosopher of mind, and physicists, together with the usual  
authoritative dogma in the field.









The simulation is reality as far as the
simulatees are concerned.


And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
real reality.


It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
their reality.


Not really. Peter is right, here. The physical reality is not a  
simulation, unless we discover that it violate the material modal  
logical (arithmetically based) hypostases.






Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.



You miss the first person indeterminacy. From the first person  
perspective, viewed in the theory from some third person point of  
view, the subject 'belongs' to an infinite set of computations, which  
ask for compromise between the little numbers and the big numbers.







You seem to be arguing
appearance=reality on the premise that
opinion=truth.


Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
is in fact a logical program.


Hmm... reality will be the result of the indeterminacy. We can bet,  
thanks to QM, and quasi-already comp, on a first person sharable  
winning computation sheaf.










Appearances may not reflect the truest level
of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
representation of the simulation's function.


Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality


It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.


Comp confront each machine with reality, all the time. But then  
there is the reality of lies, and this has to be taken into account,  
but with comp, there is a sense to say that the reality cannot lie to  
you. Just extract comp from arithmetic, and compare it with your local  
reality. Roughly speaking, if it differ, it means that you are not at  
stage 0 of the comp reality, you are relatively failed, but this you  
can be aware of. Comp makes the physically real more real, and more  

Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread acw

On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:

On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:  On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.comwrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

..

Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality



It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.


If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.


Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
That would be the truth of that simulation.

They might end up with a simulation hypothesis being more plausible 
than pure chance if there was evidence for it, such as non-reducible 
high-level behavior indicating intelligence and not following any 
obvious lower-level physical laws. However, 'omnipotent' is not the 
right word here. I already explained why before - in COMP, you can 
always escape the simulation, even if this is not always obvious from 
the 3p of the one doing the simulation.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +

Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.


That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of
a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
the cases (which are infinite).


As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
simulation within one such universe.

I was just assuming COMP, which is a bit wider than MWI, but should 
contain a variant compatible with it. In COMP, it's highly likely you're 
living in a simulation, but you're also living in more primitive forms 
(such as directly in the UD) - your 1p is contained in an infinity of 
machines. You would only care if some of those happen to be a simulation 
if the one doing the simulation modifies the program/data or entangles 
it with his history, or merely provides a continuation for you in his 
world, however any such continuations in digital physics interventionist 
simulations would be low-measure.

If such a programmer decides to
intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines
implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in
arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere),


That depends entirely on what kind of intervention the programmer
chooses. If she wants to make half of the population turn blue, she
can, and then when the sim is turned back on, everyone gasps and
proclaims a miracle of Biblical proportions.

I wasn't talking about the multiple observers in the simulation, but 
merely that an observer, with which we identify with his 1p is 
implemented by an infinity of machines (!), only some part of that 
correspond to someone simulating them. If someone decides to modify the 
simulation at some point, then only a small fraction of those 1p's would 
diverge from the usual local laws-of-physics and becme entangled with 
the laws of those doing the simulation - such continuations would be 
low-measure.

however a small part of the
simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the
physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with
them),


Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting that the programmer of Pac
Man can't reprogram it for zero gravity? Or for a Non-Euclidean
Salvador Dali melting clock wormhole version? What effect would a
physical universe have on a simulated universe if comp were true,
beyond impacting the ability of the simulation to function as
intended?

What I'm saying is that if those observers within the simulation have 
1p's (if COMP is true), then they are implemented by infinitely many 
simulations, only a few corresponding to your particular Matrix Lord, 
thus the probability that the ML would affect them is very low, however 
not null. In the sense that if you were in such a world, and someone 
happened to be simulating your physics and then suddenly decided 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 20, 2:48 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Sorry, I resend this because there was a little mistake:

 On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
  On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  Why would Gods be supernatural?

  Why would bachelors be married?

  That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim
  that
  the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines
  from
  being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk
  terminology.
  It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
  MWI.

  I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
  control means god or supernaural

  You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would
  have to
  admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make
  changes
  to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your
  universe
  and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?

  You are natural.

  How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
  simulation or not.

 I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that
 we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
 point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
 verifiable (empirically) constraints.

How does that relate to the issue of simulation though? Any internally
consistent simulation is verifiable within the simulation. Are you
saying there is a way to see through all simulations and know the
ultimate host universe?



 With comp we are in a complex matrix whose existence is deducible
 from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible
 from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.

Ok, but if I am running on an Apple 6000 computer in a furniture store
in Teaneck, NJ, how are + and * going to help me know where that is?
Even if I could, how would I know that New Jersey wasn't just part of
the simulation?




  You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
  catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.

  No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
  Pegasus, and that is all that is required.

  If comp is true, then when we create
  AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and
  reprogram
  their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we
  be to
  them other than Gods?

  But we are natural so they would be wrong.

  They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

  So? Is appearance reality?

  That is what comp says.

  Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

  Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
  without the notion of computational realism?

 Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
 incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
 physicalism. This shows just the gap between computer scientist,
 philosopher of mind, and physicists, together with the usual
 authoritative dogma in the field.

That's all beside the point though. My argument is simple. If comp is
true, then programmers are, in a sense, gods.




  The simulation is reality as far as the
  simulatees are concerned.

  And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
  real reality.

  It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
  their reality.

 Not really. Peter is right, here. The physical reality is not a
 simulation, unless we discover that it violate the material modal
 logical (arithmetically based) hypostases.

What does that mean for the universe which I live in that runs on the
Apple computer in New Jersey? I'm saying that my reality is whatever
Skyrim Matrix program that is the world I interact with but now you
seem to be saying that my physical reality is the physical inside of
the computer? Or is it New Jersey?


  Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
  possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
  Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
  what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
  is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.

 You miss the first person indeterminacy. From the first person
 perspective, viewed in the theory from some third person point of
 view, the subject 'belongs' to an infinite set of computations, which
 ask for compromise between the little numbers and the big numbers.

Sorry, I don't understand how that relates to my point, nor do I
understand how infinite computations collectively decide to become a
set, ask for compromises, or take ownership of a subject.




  You seem to be arguing
  appearance=reality on the premise that
  opinion=truth.

  Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
  be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
  the possibility of an 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-20 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 20, 2:53 pm, acw a...@lavabit.com wrote:
 On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 20, 10:32 am, 
 acwa...@lavabit.com  wrote:
  On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:  On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
  1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.comwrote:
  On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
  ..
  Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
  still aren't reality

  It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
  itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
  the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
  reality than the simulation.

  If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
  Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
  true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.

  Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
  simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
  changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
  that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
  That would be the truth of that simulation.

 They might end up with a simulation hypothesis being more plausible
 than pure chance if there was evidence for it, such as non-reducible
 high-level behavior indicating intelligence and not following any
 obvious lower-level physical laws. However, 'omnipotent' is not the
 right word here. I already explained why before - in COMP, you can
 always escape the simulation, even if this is not always obvious from
 the 3p of the one doing the simulation.

Escape it maybe to a universal arithmetic level, but I still can't get
out of the software and into the world of the hardware.

 Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
  Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
  which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
  *their* Gods.

  That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
  physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
  happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
  structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of
  a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
  maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
  the cases (which are infinite).

  As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
  infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
  anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
  simulation within one such universe.

 I was just assuming COMP, which is a bit wider than MWI, but should
 contain a variant compatible with it. In COMP, it's highly likely you're
 living in a simulation, but you're also living in more primitive forms
 (such as directly in the UD) - your 1p is contained in an infinity of
 machines. You would only care if some of those happen to be a simulation
 if the one doing the simulation modifies the program/data or entangles
 it with his history, or merely provides a continuation for you in his
 world, however any such continuations in digital physics interventionist
 simulations would be low-measure.

Whether you care or not is a different issue from whether or not you
can tell the difference if you did want to.

 If such a programmer decides to
  intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines
  implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in
  arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere),

  That depends entirely on what kind of intervention the programmer
  chooses. If she wants to make half of the population turn blue, she
  can, and then when the sim is turned back on, everyone gasps and
  proclaims a miracle of Biblical proportions.

 I wasn't talking about the multiple observers in the simulation, but
 merely that an observer, with which we identify with his 1p is
 implemented by an infinity of machines (!), only some part of that
 correspond to someone simulating them. If someone decides to modify the
 simulation at some point, then only a small fraction of those 1p's would
 diverge from the usual local laws-of-physics and becme entangled with
 the laws of those doing the simulation - such continuations would be
 low-measure.

How does that apply to my example though? Are you saying I can't turn
everyone blue in my sim? That they wouldn't be impressed? I don't get
it.

 however a small part of the
  simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the
  physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with
  them),

  Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting that the programmer of Pac
  Man can't reprogram it for zero gravity? Or for a Non-Euclidean
  Salvador Dali melting clock wormhole version? What effect would a
  physical universe have on a simulated 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

John,

On 18 Feb 2012, at 22:54, John Mikes wrote:


A bit from 'outside the box':
the 'religious' ideas emerged from the 'awe' how very ancient apes  
looked at the world. It went through innumerable changes to reach a  
tribe with writing skills and the Bible was established saving  
positive attitudes of the Super Naturals (whatever THEY were) as  
'Good Lord' FOR ME. (Some polytheistics also included vile  
characteristics, but never mind that). In Mono (or almost mono) it  
is MY GOD who I ask to destroy MY enemies - and HeSheIt does it.
My enemy, however asks (the same?) God to destroy ME and HIS GOOD  
LORD does just that.
Over the past 5000+ years the 5000+th version of such Scriptures  
still attracts faithful.
Surprisingly well educated and reasonably smart people still take  
such hearsay for basic knowledge.



YES. The reason is probably that we are still under 1500 years of  
making the field taboo.
(it is normal, for making it taboo permits easily the control of  
majorities by minorities. It makes social sense).




As we got smarter,


That's what *we* think. I'm not sure of that. (But that's another  
topic). We do accumulate discoveries and tools, though.




the main questions concentrated on Creation and Teleology. With all  
the mental training we underwent  we still have no better image than  
the bearded old man in a white nightgown?


Fairy tales for adults.




I propose a different image:
The World (Everything) is an Infinite Complexity.


I would prefer, with Plotinus, Utter Simplicity.

I can argue that comp just gives that. God is arithmetical truth, and  
that is really the Pythagorean Simplicity. It is almost magically  
simple, for the concept can be understood by everyone (except perhaps  
philosophers).


Yet, it rejoins your idea of Infinite Complexity, because this is how  
the simple arithmetical truth can only appear from the point of view  
of the number or machine living inside it.




Never mind how it occurred, it is WAY beyond our mental capabilities  
even to imagine it.


Right. (Well I can't know that, but it is meta-right, which I will  
define by implied by comp).


I will use the prefix meta- to mean implied by the comp hypothesis.



Some features transpired into human minds (=mental functions we  
apply by our tool - the brain) and Homo rounded it up continually  
into a MODEL of the TOTAL, explaining ALL questionable features from  
WITHIN it.


And then you have the bombs. The universal numbers, which makes  
arithmetical truth beyond the grasp of our (machine) theories. We meta- 
discover that we, the machines, can only scratch the surface of even  
just arithmetical truth. Creative bombs, not destructive bombs, but  
they put mess by adding complexity by their attempts to understand.
It will still take time before the humans stop trying to name the ONE.  
Indeed.





The 'Infinite Complexity' includes more and we have no access to the  
'beyond our model' features, nor how they (their relations?) may be  
'organized', - BUT there is an easy way: we imagine it in OUR ways,  
i.e. anthropocentrically as 'processing topics'. (They may be  
completely different, relations of aspects, or even descriptions  
beyond our present vocabulary.)


The irrationalists do this, or anyone pretending to know the truth.




Such 'imaging' (?) makes the debate about 'name' or 'idea' of 'G-O- 
D' baseless and superfluous.


The comp GOD, that is arithmetical truth, is not nameable by the  
machine, and it is a key feature of their theology.


The comp theology is consistent by remaining scientific. It does not  
assert any truth, but consequences of a very strong hypothesis: comp.






There are some idioms in the discussion I don't care about:
'Random' - if such exists, we have no physical (or other observed)  
order to establish.


Comp implies first person randomness, by the many embedding of the  
iterated self-duplications in arithmetic, more easily seen in the UD  
(The tiny Sigma_1 part of arithmetic).



'Evolution': every change occurs within the feasibility of the  
'givens' - some survive, some don't.


This is relative, it might be that some survive here, some survive  
else where. We don't know, but comp, like QM, are everything-type of  
theories, with the indexical actualisation of all possibilities  
(relative arithmetical consistencies), so it favors the idea that not  
surviving  might not be a realist first person option. Despite the  
third person appearances, which makes indeed making believe to some  
machine that they evolve.




Occasional snapshots of our science don't even detect the completely  
unsuccessful.
'Free Will': cousin of 'random', we, as products of the Infinite  
Complexity have circumstances to live within and cannot even  
'decide' outside the givens. Some such decisions are conscious, some  
are not.

Etc.
I really enjoyed the dicussion


Me to :)

Best,

Bruno




John Mikes
On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 1:35 PM, John Clark 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 18, 1:35 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Fri, Feb 17, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

   It's not trying to explain how God did it though, it gets around that by
  collapsing all whats and hows into a single overarching Who and Why.

 Exactly, religion takes everything we don't understand and puts it into a
 box, it then writes God on a label and sticks it on the box and decrees
 that the problem is now solved. This is progress?

I didn't say it was progress. I'm explaining the symmetry of
anthropomorphism and mechanemorphism as incomplete cosmologies rooted
in natural cognitive bias, not arguing for one over the other.
Progress is transcending the bias, or understanding how its modulation
is a tool.

 If the physicists at CERN
 announced that all life including human life was created by the Klogknee
 Field but didn't even attempt to explain how it had done this miraculous
 thing would you be satisfied? I wouldn't be.

They will name it the Higgs instead, and then you will be satisfied. I
would be too, because I assume they know what they are doing, not
because it has been proved to me in some kind of logically satisfying
way.


 When Charles Darwin wrote his book in 1859 he didn't just say Evolution is
 the key to understanding life he explained how, he explained how it could
 lead to the origin of species; and that's why he was the greatest scientist
 who ever lived and that is the difference between science and religion.

Species = life. Nothing in the Origin of Species pertains to anything
outside of biology. I don't know what your opinion of the greatness of
Darwin is supposed to add. Darwin was great, as was Newton, Descartes,
Bacon, Einstein, etc. All of them stood on the shoulders of earlier
giants of natural philosophy, theology, and religion. Science is the
flowering of religion, not the antidote.


  The mechanemorphic model is certainly a tremendous improvement over the
  anthropmorphic but it is still half wrong. [...] The biggest problem for me
  with the God idea is that it is arbitrarily humanoid.

 I don't dislike the God theory because of anthropomorphism, although I'm
 not a big fan of long white beards myself I feel than any being should have
 a right to facial hair if He fancies that sort of thing. The reason I
 dislike the God theory is that it explains absolutely nothing.

God isn't a theory, it is a character in a story. It does not address
explanation, it specifically makes explanation irrelevant in favor of
identification with the miraculous. It make be the case that this
particular story winds up freeing up resources in the wandering,
wondering primitive mind, allowing focus on political organization and
unleashing crusading energies into the culture. Religion is a
political technology. It is a weapon as powerful and useful as early
flint knapped knives. We have better knives now, and more advanced
tools and weapons, but they all share the original DNA of religion;
applied storytelling - sensemaking.

Like it or not, religion is the universal dynamo which generates
civilization. Science is a product of civilization. No paleolithic
Charles Darwin would have stood a chance to convince a bunch of
illiterates to build a laboratory or a school. Popular support
requires passionate subjective identification. Sex, horror, torture,
supernatural characters, etc. This is who we are. Not logical
machines.


   If we were to take the worldview of mechanism literally, we would have
  no idea who we were, nor would we care.

 I don't know what this means.

It means that if we literally believe that all we are is molecular
processes, then there could be no reason to prefer any one set of
processes or outcomes over another. There would be no difference
between one opinion and another or one person and another. We would be
empty puppets of circumstance, completely alienated from ourselves,
other people, and nature.


  I don't see that it would be a problem for God to make physics

 Great, so how did He do it? I'm all ears!

Let there be Physics!


  I can make a castle out of sand, so God can make a universe out of physics

 I don't know about you but I can explain how I made a castle out of sand,
 so why can't God do what I can.

I don't think that you can explain how 'you' can do anything in the
first place. How do you fire your neurons to move your hand to scoop
the sand?

 If' you're puzzled how something as
 marvelous and complex as X came to be and someone tells you that Y made it
 but cannot even begin to explain how it did so and also cannot explain how
 Y came to be in the first place then that explanation has not really
 rendered you any the wiser. It's often said that science can't explain
 everything and that's true, but religion can't explain ANYTHING.

You misunderstand the purpose of religion. It isn't supposed to
explain anything, it is supposed to unify human beings to a common
sense and motive for political purposes. You are assuming 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 18, 5:36 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
 It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would
 like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
 Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
 every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
 another, then there is no need for a god.

Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
kinds of Gods.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread 1Z


On Feb 19, 4:52 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 18, 5:36 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

  It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would
  like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
  Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
  every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
  another, then there is no need for a god.

 Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
 kinds of Gods.

 Craig

QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
universe. Are you

familiar with Tegmark's classification?

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 19, 4:52 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  On Feb 18, 5:36 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

   It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would
   like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
   Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
   every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
   another, then there is no need for a god.

  Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
  kinds of Gods.

  Craig

 QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
 universe. Are you

 familiar with Tegmark's classification?

Why would Gods be supernatural? If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings which we have power over to stop, start, and reprogram them
as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to them other
than Gods? Comp says that we have no way of knowing that has not
happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3 classification) demands
that this is inevitable.

In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
to be supernatural. Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would
   like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
   Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
   every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
   another, then there is no need for a god.


  Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
  kinds of Gods.



 QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
 universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

Why would Gods be supernatural? If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
them other than Gods? Computationalism says that we have no way of
knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
to be supernatural? Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2012 5:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com  wrote:


It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would
like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
another, then there is no need for a god.

Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
kinds of Gods.


QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

Why would Gods be supernatural? If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
them other than Gods? Computationalism says that we have no way of
knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
to be supernatural?


In MWI the infinite universes all still the same physics and so the same statistics.  No 
event can be *known* to be supernatural; but a very improbable event is still very improbable.



Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.


And you could be a simulation of a brain in a vat that has just fluctuated into existence 
as a Boltzmann brain.  This is different from a universe in a  multiverse.  It is also 
cognitively unstable; i.e. there is no way to act as if it's true.


Brent



Craig



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 1:08 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I 
would
like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state 
in
every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
another, then there is no need for a god.

   Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
   kinds of Gods.

  QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
  universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

 Why would Gods be supernatural?

Why would bachelors be married?

 If comp is true, then when we create
 AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
 their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
 them other than Gods?

But we are natural so they would be wrong.

The Goa'uld are false gods! -- Stargate, passim.

Computationalism says that we have no way of
 knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
 classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

 In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
 to be supernatural?

There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based multiverses.

 Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
 quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
 appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.

 Craig

Appearance =/= reality.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 19, 8:29 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 2/19/2012 5:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:









  On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com  wrote:

  It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I 
  would
  like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
  Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state 
  in
  every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
  another, then there is no need for a god.
  Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
  kinds of Gods.

  QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
  universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?
  Why would Gods be supernatural? If comp is true, then when we create
  AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
  their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
  them other than Gods? Computationalism says that we have no way of
  knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
  classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

  In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
  to be supernatural?

 In MWI the infinite universes all still the same physics and so the same 
 statistics.  No
 event can be *known* to be supernatural; but a very improbable event is still 
 very improbable.

Improbable is meaningless with the anthropic principle. The set of MWI
universes with Gods would have the same physics and statistics as the
rest of the MWI universes, but within these MWIGs the UMs which the
Gods have learned to build and program would have the physics of the
Gods' choosing since the UMs are actually living in a nested virtual
universe.

What you suggest in saying that no event can be known to be
supernatural is the same as saying that all video games would have to
have the same basic rules. It's an arbitrary deus ex machina to plug
the hole in the two theories, which, if both were true, clearly make
the certain epistemology of primitive physics in any universe by it's
inhabitants inaccessible.

The only way out of it that I can see is to acknowledge that it is
possible for 'sense' to transcend logic and therefore at least
indirectly access a level of primitive truth through physics, which is
exactly what multisense realism predicts. This corresponds to our
ordinary experience of implicit 'seems like' epistemology which makes
our perceptions specular participation in a real human world rather
than a solipsistic simulation.


  Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
  quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
  appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.

 And you could be a simulation of a brain in a vat that has just fluctuated 
 into existence
 as a Boltzmann brain.  This is different from a universe in a  multiverse.

Yes, but I'm saying that through comp, we cannot know that we are in a
universe at all. We could be programs in someone else's universe, and
our arithmetic and logic the meaningless hallucinations of a brain
simulation that makes us feel our logic makes sense by stimulating the
corresponding regions of our brains with the appropriate virtual
chemistry.

 It is also
 cognitively unstable; i.e. there is no way to act as if it's true.

In a comp simulation, there is no truth, only internal consistency,
which could be easily simulated by disabling the ability to detect
continuity errors.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 19, 8:36 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 20, 1:08 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

 It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I 
 would
 like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
 Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum 
 state in
 every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe 
 or
 another, then there is no need for a god.

Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
kinds of Gods.

   QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
   universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

  Why would Gods be supernatural?

 Why would bachelors be married?

That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim that
the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines from
being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk terminology.
It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
MWI.


  If comp is true, then when we create
  AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
  their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
  them other than Gods?

 But we are natural so they would be wrong.

They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though. It doesn't
matter who you call 'natural'. Now who is arguing a special case for
natively evolved consciousness?


 The Goa'uld are false gods! -- Stargate, passim.

If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can intervene
and change my program and the program of my universe at will, then to
me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to them.


 Computationalism says that we have no way of
  knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
  classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

  In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
  to be supernatural?

 There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based multiverses.

If it is not supernatural for us to build a Turing machine and control
the content of it's 'tape', then it cannot, cannot, can-not be
supernatural for that UM to have its world be controlled by us. As
long as the top level programmer is natural and resides in a top level
MWI universe, there can be no limit to their omnipotence over their
programs in comp. To claim supernatural distinctions within an
emulation is to turn the programs into zombies, is it not? They become
the second class citizens that I am criticized for suggesting.


  Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
  quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
  appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.

 Appearance =/= reality.

I agree, but comp does not. In comp, reality is only deep appearance.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread meekerdb

On 2/19/2012 7:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 19, 8:29 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 2/19/2012 5:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:










On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.comwrote:

It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would
like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
another, then there is no need for a god.

Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
kinds of Gods.

QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

Why would Gods be supernatural? If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
them other than Gods? Computationalism says that we have no way of
knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.
In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
to be supernatural?

In MWI the infinite universes all still the same physics and so the same 
statistics.  No
event can be *known* to be supernatural; but a very improbable event is still 
very improbable.

Improbable is meaningless with the anthropic principle. The set of MWI
universes with Gods would have the same physics and statistics as the
rest of the MWI universes, but within these MWIGs the UMs which the
Gods have learned to build and program would have the physics of the
Gods' choosing since the UMs are actually living in a nested virtual
universe.

What you suggest in saying that no event can be known to be
supernatural is the same as saying that all video games would have to
have the same basic rules.


No all MWI have the same basic rules.  MWI is an interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
which supplies the basic rules.



It's an arbitrary deus ex machina to plug
the hole in the two theories, which, if both were true, clearly make
the certain epistemology of primitive physics in any universe by it's
inhabitants inaccessible.

The only way out of it that I can see is to acknowledge that it is
possible for 'sense' to transcend logic


Transcend logic means what?  Logic is just the consistency of a set of propositions 
under an inference rule.  Perception is some else entirely.



and therefore at least
indirectly access a level of primitive truth through physics, which is
exactly what multisense realism predicts. This corresponds to our
ordinary experience of implicit 'seems like' epistemology which makes
our perceptions specular participation in a real human world rather
than a solipsistic simulation.


Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.

And you could be a simulation of a brain in a vat that has just fluctuated into 
existence
as a Boltzmann brain.  This is different from a universe in a  multiverse.

Yes, but I'm saying that through comp, we cannot know that we are in a
universe at all. We could be programs in someone else's universe, and
our arithmetic and logic the meaningless hallucinations of a brain
simulation that makes us feel our logic makes sense by stimulating the
corresponding regions of our brains with the appropriate virtual
chemistry.


  It is also
cognitively unstable; i.e. there is no way to act as if it's true.

In a comp simulation, there is no truth, only internal consistency,
which could be easily simulated by disabling the ability to detect
continuity errors.


In a simulation there's no need for internal consistency either.  Which is why there's no 
way to act as if it's true...so it's epistemologically and practically irrelevant.


Brent



Craig



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 3:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 19, 8:36 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:









  On Feb 20, 1:08 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

   On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but 
  I would
  like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
  Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum 
  state in
  every particle interaction is realized in one parallel 
  world/universe or
  another, then there is no need for a god.

 Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
 kinds of Gods.

QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

   Why would Gods be supernatural?

  Why would bachelors be married?

 That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim that
 the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines from
 being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk terminology.
 It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
 MWI.

I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
control means god or supernaural

   If comp is true, then when we create
   AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
   their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
   them other than Gods?

  But we are natural so they would be wrong.

 They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

So? Is appearance reality?

 It doesn't
 matter who you call 'natural'.

It matters a great deal what you call anything.

Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
poisonous.

 Now who is arguing a special case for
 natively evolved consciousness?


I don't know. Who?

  The Goa'uld are false gods! -- Stargate, passim.

 If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can intervene
 and change my program and the program of my universe at will, then to
 me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to them.

To me= appearance =/= reality

  Computationalism says that we have no way of
   knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
   classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

   In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
   to be supernatural?

  There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based multiverses.

 If it is not supernatural for us to build a Turing machine and control
 the content of it's 'tape', then it cannot, cannot, can-not be
 supernatural for that UM to have its world be controlled by us.

So? I never said that could no be apparently omnopotent
control of a VM. I said it doesn't fit the defintition
of supernatural.

 As
 long as the top level programmer is natural and resides in a top level
 MWI universe, there can be no limit to their omnipotence over their
 programs in comp. To claim supernatural distinctions within an
 emulation is to turn the programs into zombies, is it not?

There is a conceptual distinction between the natural and the
supernatural in MWI and computaitonl multiverses, and
such that the extension of the concept superntatural
could likely be empty.

They become
 the second class citizens that I am criticized for suggesting.



   Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
   quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
   appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.
  Appearance =/= reality.

 I agree, but comp does not. In comp, reality is only deep appearance.

Oh good grief. In comp, reality is the lab where the simulation  is
running.

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  What you suggest in saying that no event can be known to be
  supernatural is the same as saying that all video games would have to
  have the same basic rules.

 No all MWI have the same basic rules.  MWI is an interpretation of quantum 
 mechanics,
 which supplies the basic rules.

But who says that we live in a primitive MWI universe and not a UM-WMI
simulation with simulated quantum mechanics? Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?


  It's an arbitrary deus ex machina to plug
  the hole in the two theories, which, if both were true, clearly make
  the certain epistemology of primitive physics in any universe by it's
  inhabitants inaccessible.

  The only way out of it that I can see is to acknowledge that it is
  possible for 'sense' to transcend logic

 Transcend logic means what?  Logic is just the consistency of a set of 
 propositions
 under an inference rule.  Perception is some else entirely.

Consistency, sets, propositions, inference, and rules all supervene
upon sense. Sense includes logic, conscious perception, implicit
presumptions, etc. It means that sense must, on some level see through
comp to a primitive universal realism or else Gods can exist.










  and therefore at least
  indirectly access a level of primitive truth through physics, which is
  exactly what multisense realism predicts. This corresponds to our
  ordinary experience of implicit 'seems like' epistemology which makes
  our perceptions specular participation in a real human world rather
  than a solipsistic simulation.

  Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
  quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our programmers...who
  appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.
  And you could be a simulation of a brain in a vat that has just fluctuated 
  into existence
  as a Boltzmann brain.  This is different from a universe in a  multiverse.
  Yes, but I'm saying that through comp, we cannot know that we are in a
  universe at all. We could be programs in someone else's universe, and
  our arithmetic and logic the meaningless hallucinations of a brain
  simulation that makes us feel our logic makes sense by stimulating the
  corresponding regions of our brains with the appropriate virtual
  chemistry.

    It is also
  cognitively unstable; i.e. there is no way to act as if it's true.
  In a comp simulation, there is no truth, only internal consistency,
  which could be easily simulated by disabling the ability to detect
  continuity errors.

 In a simulation there's no need for internal consistency either.  Which is 
 why there's no
 way to act as if it's true...so it's epistemologically and practically 
 irrelevant.

I didn't say there was a need for internal consistency. I said that
internal consistency is the closest epistemology possible to truth
within a comp simulation.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
  Comp says that any UM's
 experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?

Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread acw

On 2/20/2012 03:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can intervene
 and change my program and the program of my universe at will, then to
 me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to them.

I think you might be misunderstanding COMP. In COMP, your 1p is mostly 
identified with some true arithmetical sentences, some such sentences 
may talk about some particular physics being implemented by some UMs. If 
someone else runs an UM which partially computes your local physics 
(it's provably impossible to do so for the entire history tree of some 
observer), then they are merely observing some computation, sort of like 
looking into a window to your universe. If they chose to intervene, 
they would be entangling the computations of a copy-of-you with their 
own, however the chance of being in such a computation becomes 
astronomically lower. COMP makes being in an universe/simulation 
controlled by interventionist gods a very low probability event. Also, 
the longer the simulation + arbitrary changes keep going on, the lower 
the chance that you won't just end up in a version where nobody is 
changing your computations (what's simpler? program A ran by UM or 
program A ran by UM ran by UM2 ran by ...). There is however one way 
for such a god (a better term I heard used for such a being would be a 
Matrix Lord) to make his actions more likely to be experienced by you: 
simulate 'you'(as copied from his earlier digital physics simulation) in 
his own world. Also, COMP makes pure digital physics less likely 
locally, and false globally.
Also, if said Matrix Lord decided to kill himself in his level of 
reality, he might have some unusual continuations over which he has no 
control over, same would be for the observer within his simulation. COMP 
makes any interventionist god's interventions very less likely to be 
experienced and in the limit, an observer will always escape such control.


The main idea is to look at all possible consistent continuations within 
the UD, not just at what's possible within some local digital physics.


Also, if there is nothing supernatural that can be experienced by an 
observer with a computable body: it's all somewhere in the UD, which 
itself is in arithmetic. However, if the observer's body is not 
computable, things are weirder, but that's non-COMP.


 Computationalism says that we have no way of
 knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
 classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

 In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
 to be supernatural?

 There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based multiverses.

 If it is not supernatural for us to build a Turing machine and control
 the content of it's 'tape', then it cannot, cannot, can-not be
 supernatural for that UM to have its world be controlled by us. As
 long as the top level programmer is natural and resides in a top level
 MWI universe, there can be no limit to their omnipotence over their
 programs in comp. To claim supernatural distinctions within an
 emulation is to turn the programs into zombies, is it not? They become
 the second class citizens that I am criticized for suggesting.

Controlling the content of the tape means that the UM no longer runs 
that one particular program that it was running, but something else 
entangled with your own computations (so UM0 becomes UM1 running 
modified UM0). Omnipotence is non-sense if it claims to change the 
consequences of the Church-Turing Thesis. CTT is either false or true, 
it can't be changed on a whim.


Also, consciousness isn't associated with the physical state of the 
tape: MGA shows that it's not the case. It's associated with abstract 
computations which may also be contained in a physical body, although 
the notion of the physical itself becomes rather abstract.


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Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 19, 10:59 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 20, 3:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:









  On Feb 19, 8:36 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   On Feb 20, 1:08 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, 
   but I would
   like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
   Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum 
   state in
   every particle interaction is realized in one parallel 
   world/universe or
   another, then there is no need for a god.

  Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
  kinds of Gods.

 QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
 universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

Why would Gods be supernatural?

   Why would bachelors be married?

  That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim that
  the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines from
  being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk terminology.
  It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
  MWI.

 I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
 control means god or supernaural

You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to
admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes
to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe
and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?


If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
them other than Gods?

   But we are natural so they would be wrong.

  They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

 So? Is appearance reality?

That is what comp says. The simulation is reality as far as the
simulatees are concerned. Appearances may not reflect the truest level
of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
representation of the simulation's function.


  It doesn't
  matter who you call 'natural'.

 It matters a great deal what you call anything.

It would if the word natural had some relevant meaning, but even in
food labeling, that term is notoriously vague. Natural means anything
that exists. Natural plastic comes from natural petrochemicals.


 Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
 poisonous.

Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you
would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
agents than living organisms.


  Now who is arguing a special case for
  natively evolved consciousness?

 I don't know. Who?

You.


   The Goa'uld are false gods! -- Stargate, passim.

  If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can intervene
  and change my program and the program of my universe at will, then to
  me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to them.

 To me= appearance =/= reality

No. To me = my reality. The causes and conditions upon which my
existence supervenes. If my programmer can make a Bengal tiger appear
or disappear in my living room, then he is God in reality. This is
what comp says.


   Computationalism says that we have no way of
knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
to be supernatural?

   There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based multiverses.

  If it is not supernatural for us to build a Turing machine and control
  the content of it's 'tape', then it cannot, cannot, can-not be
  supernatural for that UM to have its world be controlled by us.

 So? I never said that could no be apparently omnopotent
 control of a VM. I said it doesn't fit the defintition
 of supernatural.

That's why I say in MWI + Comp + Anthropic principle, there would
inevitably be an infinite number of universes in which simulations
exist with citizens to whom God is real and natural. There would also
be infinite MWI UM sub-universes where God is supernatural, sub-
universes where Gods are aliens, pirates, beercans, Pokemon, etc.


  As
  long as the top level programmer is natural and resides in a top level
  MWI universe, there can be no limit to their omnipotence over their
  programs in comp. To claim supernatural distinctions within an
  emulation is to turn the programs into zombies, is it not?

 There is a conceptual distinction between the natural and the
 supernatural in MWI and computaitonl multiverses, and
 such that the 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread 1Z


On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 19, 10:59 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:









  On Feb 20, 3:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

   On Feb 19, 8:36 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 20, 1:08 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Feb 19, 2:19 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, 
but I would
like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many 
Worlds
Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every 
quantum state in
every particle interaction is realized in one parallel 
world/universe or
another, then there is no need for a god.

   Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with 
   all
   kinds of Gods.

  QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
  universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification?

 Why would Gods be supernatural?

Why would bachelors be married?

   That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim that
   the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines from
   being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk terminology.
   It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
   MWI.

  I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
  control means god or supernaural

 You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to
 admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes
 to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe
 and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?

You are natural. You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.

 If comp is true, then when we create
 AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and reprogram
 their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
 them other than Gods?

But we are natural so they would be wrong.

   They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.

  So? Is appearance reality?

 That is what comp says.

Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

The simulation is reality as far as the
 simulatees are concerned.

And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
real reality. You seem to be arguing
appearance=reality on the premise that
opinion=truth.

 Appearances may not reflect the truest level
 of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
 representation of the simulation's function.

Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality


   It doesn't
   matter who you call 'natural'.

  It matters a great deal what you call anything.

 It would if the word natural had some relevant meaning, but even in
 food labeling, that term is notoriously vague. Natural means anything
 that exists. Natural plastic comes from natural petrochemicals.

If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.


  Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
  poisonous.

 Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
 place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you
 would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
 view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
 agents than living organisms.

What we are arguing about is the supernatural. You
do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
meaningless.

   Now who is arguing a special case for
   natively evolved consciousness?

  I don't know. Who?

 You.

No, you have misunderstood.

The Goa'uld are false gods! -- Stargate, passim.

   If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can intervene
   and change my program and the program of my universe at will, then to
   me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to them.

  To me= appearance =/= reality

 No. To me = my reality.
 The causes and conditions upon which my
 existence supervenes. If my programmer can make a Bengal tiger appear
 or disappear in my living room, then he is God in reality.

No he isn;t, because reality is where the sim is running and there
he is just a programmer.

This is
 what comp says.

What do you mean by comp.


Computationalism says that we have no way of
 knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
 classification) demands that this is inevitable in some universes.

 In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility be said
 to be supernatural?

There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based multiverses.

   If it is not supernatural for us to build a Turing machine and control
   the content of it's 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?


Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?



We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker  
hypothesis than most forms of CTM, given that comp allows the  
substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion  
of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically  
lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.


Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.

Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with  
materialism (weak materialism). We could say that comp makes the  
notion of primitive matter supernatural.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-18 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


  It's not trying to explain how God did it though, it gets around that by
 collapsing all whats and hows into a single overarching Who and Why.


Exactly, religion takes everything we don't understand and puts it into a
box, it then writes God on a label and sticks it on the box and decrees
that the problem is now solved. This is progress? If the physicists at CERN
announced that all life including human life was created by the Klogknee
Field but didn't even attempt to explain how it had done this miraculous
thing would you be satisfied? I wouldn't be.

When Charles Darwin wrote his book in 1859 he didn't just say Evolution is
the key to understanding life he explained how, he explained how it could
lead to the origin of species; and that's why he was the greatest scientist
who ever lived and that is the difference between science and religion.


 The mechanemorphic model is certainly a tremendous improvement over the
 anthropmorphic but it is still half wrong. [...] The biggest problem for me
 with the God idea is that it is arbitrarily humanoid.


I don't dislike the God theory because of anthropomorphism, although I'm
not a big fan of long white beards myself I feel than any being should have
a right to facial hair if He fancies that sort of thing. The reason I
dislike the God theory is that it explains absolutely nothing.


  If we were to take the worldview of mechanism literally, we would have
 no idea who we were, nor would we care.


I don't know what this means.

 I don't see that it would be a problem for God to make physics


Great, so how did He do it? I'm all ears!

 I can make a castle out of sand, so God can make a universe out of physics


I don't know about you but I can explain how I made a castle out of sand,
so why can't God do what I can. If' you're puzzled how something as
marvelous and complex as X came to be and someone tells you that Y made it
but cannot even begin to explain how it did so and also cannot explain how
Y came to be in the first place then that explanation has not really
rendered you any the wiser. It's often said that science can't explain
everything and that's true, but religion can't explain ANYTHING.

 I don't see that the universe has any particular preference for
 simplicity over complexity, it seems to make good use of both.


Yes but explanations do have a preference for simplicity over complexity;
that's what a explanation is, describing something we don't understand in
terms of something we do understand.

 You must understand that spirituality is an anthropological universal: we
 have never, ever come
 in contact with any culture which does not have spiritual concepts.


And what things have all those millenniums of spirituality produced?

1) Lots and lots of fancy tombs built with backbreaking effort by people
who would have preferred to be doing something else.

2) Some good paintings.

3) Poetry that nobody reads if they're not teaching or taking a class in it.

4) Ridiculous philosophy.

5) Lots and lots of cadavers manufactured in bloody holy wars.


  This cannot be brushed aside


I think I just did.


  randomness becomes another name for God.


Yet another example of someone willing to abandon the idea of God but not
the 3 letter word G-O-D.

 Causality magically appears from randomness. Why?


I don't know, but I do know that given enough time even astronomically
unlikely things will happen, in fact they will happen a infinite number of
times if infinity is at your disposal.

  John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-18 Thread John Mikes
A bit from 'outside the box':
the 'religious' ideas emerged from the 'awe' how very ancient apes looked
at the world. It went through innumerable changes to reach a tribe with
writing skills and the Bible was established saving positive attitudes of
the Super Naturals (whatever THEY were) as 'Good Lord' FOR ME. (Some
polytheistics also included vile characteristics, but never mind that). In
Mono (or almost mono) it is MY GOD who I ask to destroy MY enemies - and
HeSheIt does it.
My enemy, however asks (the same?) God to destroy ME and HIS GOOD LORD does
just that.
Over the past 5000+ years the 5000+th version of such Scriptures still
attracts faithful.
Surprisingly well educated and reasonably smart people still take such
hearsay for basic knowledge.

As we got smarter, the main questions concentrated on Creation and
Teleology. With all the mental training we underwent  we still have no
better image than the bearded old man in a white nightgown?
I propose a different image:
The World (Everything) is an Infinite Complexity.
Never mind how it occurred, it is WAY beyond our mental capabilities even
to imagine it. Some features transpired into human minds (=mental functions
we apply by our tool - the brain) and Homo rounded it up continually into a
MODEL of the TOTAL, explaining ALL questionable features from WITHIN it.
The 'Infinite Complexity' includes more and we have no access to the
'beyond our model' features, nor how they (their relations?) may be
'organized', - BUT there is an easy way: we imagine it in OUR ways, i.e.
anthropocentrically as 'processing topics'. (They may be completely
different, relations of aspects, or even descriptions beyond our present
vocabulary.)

Such 'imaging' (?) makes the debate about 'name' or 'idea' of 'G-O-D'
baseless and superfluous.

There are some idioms in the discussion I don't care about:
'Random' - if such exists, we have no physical (or other observed) order to
establish.
'Evolution': every change occurs within the feasibility of the 'givens' -
some survive, some don't. Occasional snapshots of our science don't even
detect the completely unsuccessful.
'Free Will': cousin of 'random', we, as products of the Infinite Complexity
have circumstances to live within and cannot even 'decide' outside the
givens. Some such decisions are conscious, some are not.
Etc.
I really enjoyed the dicussion

John Mikes
On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 1:35 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Feb 17, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


  It's not trying to explain how God did it though, it gets around that
 by collapsing all whats and hows into a single overarching Who and Why.


 Exactly, religion takes everything we don't understand and puts it into a
 box, it then writes God on a label and sticks it on the box and decrees
 that the problem is now solved. This is progress? If the physicists at CERN
 announced that all life including human life was created by the Klogknee
 Field but didn't even attempt to explain how it had done this miraculous
 thing would you be satisfied? I wouldn't be.

 When Charles Darwin wrote his book in 1859 he didn't just say Evolution is
 the key to understanding life he explained how, he explained how it could
 lead to the origin of species; and that's why he was the greatest scientist
 who ever lived and that is the difference between science and religion.


  The mechanemorphic model is certainly a tremendous improvement over the
 anthropmorphic but it is still half wrong. [...] The biggest problem for me
 with the God idea is that it is arbitrarily humanoid.


 I don't dislike the God theory because of anthropomorphism, although I'm
 not a big fan of long white beards myself I feel than any being should have
 a right to facial hair if He fancies that sort of thing. The reason I
 dislike the God theory is that it explains absolutely nothing.


  If we were to take the worldview of mechanism literally, we would have
 no idea who we were, nor would we care.


 I don't know what this means.

   I don't see that it would be a problem for God to make physics


 Great, so how did He do it? I'm all ears!

  I can make a castle out of sand, so God can make a universe out of
 physics


 I don't know about you but I can explain how I made a castle out of sand,
 so why can't God do what I can. If' you're puzzled how something as
 marvelous and complex as X came to be and someone tells you that Y made it
 but cannot even begin to explain how it did so and also cannot explain how
 Y came to be in the first place then that explanation has not really
 rendered you any the wiser. It's often said that science can't explain
 everything and that's true, but religion can't explain ANYTHING.

   I don't see that the universe has any particular preference for
 simplicity over complexity, it seems to make good use of both.


 Yes but explanations do have a preference for simplicity over complexity;
 that's what a explanation is, describing something we 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-18 Thread Richard Ruquist
It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would
like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
another, then there is no need for a god. Everything is deterministic and
known ahead of time for all time.

However, if in a Single World Interpretation SWI, a single quantum state is
selected in each particle interaction to become physical (based it seems on
information), then there may be a need for some sort of consciousness to
make that selection. If so then that consciousness controls every particle
interaction and we may rightly call it god. Note that SWI allows for free
will and hence morality that MWI lacks.
Richard

On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 4:54 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

 A bit from 'outside the box':
 the 'religious' ideas emerged from the 'awe' how very ancient apes looked
 at the world. It went through innumerable changes to reach a tribe with
 writing skills and the Bible was established saving positive attitudes of
 the Super Naturals (whatever THEY were) as 'Good Lord' FOR ME. (Some
 polytheistics also included vile characteristics, but never mind that). In
 Mono (or almost mono) it is MY GOD who I ask to destroy MY enemies - and
 HeSheIt does it.
 My enemy, however asks (the same?) God to destroy ME and HIS GOOD LORD
 does just that.
 Over the past 5000+ years the 5000+th version of such Scriptures still
 attracts faithful.
 Surprisingly well educated and reasonably smart people still take such
 hearsay for basic knowledge.

 As we got smarter, the main questions concentrated on Creation and
 Teleology. With all the mental training we underwent  we still have no
 better image than the bearded old man in a white nightgown?
 I propose a different image:
 The World (Everything) is an Infinite Complexity.
 Never mind how it occurred, it is WAY beyond our mental capabilities even
 to imagine it. Some features transpired into human minds (=mental functions
 we apply by our tool - the brain) and Homo rounded it up continually into a
 MODEL of the TOTAL, explaining ALL questionable features from WITHIN it.
 The 'Infinite Complexity' includes more and we have no access to the
 'beyond our model' features, nor how they (their relations?) may be
 'organized', - BUT there is an easy way: we imagine it in OUR ways, i.e.
 anthropocentrically as 'processing topics'. (They may be completely
 different, relations of aspects, or even descriptions beyond our present
 vocabulary.)

 Such 'imaging' (?) makes the debate about 'name' or 'idea' of 'G-O-D'
 baseless and superfluous.

 There are some idioms in the discussion I don't care about:
 'Random' - if such exists, we have no physical (or other observed) order
 to establish.
 'Evolution': every change occurs within the feasibility of the 'givens' -
 some survive, some don't. Occasional snapshots of our science don't even
 detect the completely unsuccessful.
 'Free Will': cousin of 'random', we, as products of the Infinite
 Complexity have circumstances to live within and cannot even 'decide'
 outside the givens. Some such decisions are conscious, some are not.
 Etc.
 I really enjoyed the dicussion

 John Mikes
 On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 1:35 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Feb 17, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


  It's not trying to explain how God did it though, it gets around that
 by collapsing all whats and hows into a single overarching Who and Why.


 Exactly, religion takes everything we don't understand and puts it into a
 box, it then writes God on a label and sticks it on the box and decrees
 that the problem is now solved. This is progress? If the physicists at CERN
 announced that all life including human life was created by the Klogknee
 Field but didn't even attempt to explain how it had done this miraculous
 thing would you be satisfied? I wouldn't be.

 When Charles Darwin wrote his book in 1859 he didn't just say Evolution
 is the key to understanding life he explained how, he explained how it
 could lead to the origin of species; and that's why he was the greatest
 scientist who ever lived and that is the difference between science and
 religion.

  The mechanemorphic model is certainly a tremendous improvement over the
 anthropmorphic but it is still half wrong. [...] The biggest problem for me
 with the God idea is that it is arbitrarily humanoid.


 I don't dislike the God theory because of anthropomorphism, although I'm
 not a big fan of long white beards myself I feel than any being should have
 a right to facial hair if He fancies that sort of thing. The reason I
 dislike the God theory is that it explains absolutely nothing.


  If we were to take the worldview of mechanism literally, we would have
 no idea who we were, nor would we care.


 I don't know what this means.

   I don't see that it 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-18 Thread meekerdb

On 2/18/2012 2:36 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I would like to 
suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, which is where every quantum state in every particle interaction is realized 
in one parallel world/universe or another, then there is no need for a god. Everything 
is deterministic and known ahead of time for all time.


However, if in a Single World Interpretation SWI, a single quantum state is selected in 
each particle interaction to become physical (based it seems on information), then there 
may be a need for some sort of consciousness to make that selection.


Just so it's made randomly in accordance with the Born rule.

If so then that consciousness controls every particle interaction and we may rightly 
call it god.


If you're really, really attached to those three letters.  An attachment which only seems 
explicable if you want to drag in the baggage of all the despotic monomanical 
tyrants-in-the-sky that people have sacrificed to over the millenia (c.f. Graveyard of 
the Gods H.L. Mencken).



Note that SWI allows for free will and hence morality that MWI lacks.


Such free will should be observable as a violation of the Born rule somewhere 
in brains.

Brent

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-18 Thread Richard Ruquist
On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 5:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 2/18/2012 2:36 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I
 would like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
 Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum state in
 every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe or
 another, then there is no need for a god. Everything is deterministic and
 known ahead of time for all time.

 However, if in a Single World Interpretation SWI, a single quantum state
 is selected in each particle interaction to become physical (based it seems
 on information), then there may be a need for some sort of consciousness to
 make that selection.


 Just so it's made randomly in accordance with the Born rule.


RDR: Actually it seems not completely random. For example take the double
slit experiment. As more and more particles are detected the pattern fills
out in accordance with the theoretical wave function interference pattern.
So it seems as though there is some memory of the previous detections
rather than complete randomness. But that may just be heuristic on my part.
snip

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Feb 16, 2012 a Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  if comp is true, no God is needed. It's just an arithmetic machine.


Even if it's not true God is STILL not needed, that is to say the God
hypothesis is of no help whatsoever in understanding anything; it makes no
attempt at explaining HOW God does things nor does it explain how and why
God came to be. All it does is kick everything we don't understand upstairs
and say further investigations into these matters are off limits. No
explanation at all is preferable to a explanation that just makes things
worse and adds a pointless layer of complication. There is no disgrace in
saying in a loud clear voice I don't know, but counterproductive
pseudo-explanations are a disgrace.

 John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 17, 12:57 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Thu, Feb 16, 2012 a Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

   if comp is true, no God is needed. It's just an arithmetic machine.

 Even if it's not true God is STILL not needed, that is to say the God
 hypothesis is of no help whatsoever in understanding anything; it makes no
 attempt at explaining HOW God does things nor does it explain how and why
 God came to be.

How and why did evolution or physics or statistical laws come to be?
How is that really different from the God hypothesis?

 All it does is kick everything we don't understand upstairs
 and say further investigations into these matters are off limits.

And physics does the same by kicking everything downstairs to simple
mechanisms.

 No
 explanation at all is preferable to a explanation that just makes things
 worse and adds a pointless layer of complication. There is no disgrace in
 saying in a loud clear voice I don't know, but counterproductive
 pseudo-explanations are a disgrace.

Quantum physics and computationalism may be doing exactly that right
now. Our chasing ever more insubstantial chains of logical causality
may be entirely misguided. At some point it may be necessary to
realize that the universe cannot be understood by relying exclusively
on the knowable, but we may have no choice but to investigate choice
itself. We may know and not know it. It may seem like we don't know,
but in a sense, we already know.

Craig

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Feb 2012, at 18:57, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Feb 16, 2012 a Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  if comp is true, no God is needed. It's just an arithmetic machine.

Even if it's not true God is STILL not needed, that is to say the  
God hypothesis is of no help whatsoever in understanding anything;  
it makes no attempt at explaining HOW God does things nor does it  
explain how and why God came to be. All it does is kick everything  
we don't understand upstairs and say further investigations into  
these matters are off limits. No explanation at all is preferable to  
a explanation that just makes things worse and adds a pointless  
layer of complication. There is no disgrace in saying in a loud  
clear voice I don't know, but counterproductive pseudo- 
explanations are a disgrace.



I see you defend the conception of God given by the Christians.

I use the term God in the pre-christian sense of the Platonists. It is  
basically the truth we are searching, whatever it is.


If someone's religion is that the ultimate explanation is a physical  
primitive universe, then God = that primary physical universe. It  
remain a God, in the sense that you need an act of faith to believe in  
it. (As opposed to the physical reality, primary or not, that we  
believe in because we live it).


That God can be shown not exist if comp is true, and the one with the  
white barb is not very plausible too.


But, at least for little machine, the notion of arithmetical truth  
seems to obey many reasonable axiom for God, notably:


- It is responsible for the existence of mind and matter,
- the machine cannot describe it in its own language, yet can conceive  
approximation,
- the machine cannot avoid it in any circumstances, but without any  
means to prove it.


When atheists asserts that God does not exist, they mean the Christian  
God does not exist, and they behave as pseudo-scientist by taking for  
granted their own God, hiding the act of faith they are doing in their  
theories. Comaore to platonism, atheism is a variety of christianism.  
They share the God MATTER, and they share the notion of GOD, even if  
they disagree on their existence, on which a scientist can only be  
agnostic.


Then, even the jewish, muslims and christians are full of theologians  
having been good thinkers, and perhaps good experiencer, and having  
developed reasonable things, despite the risk to hurt the  
susceptibility of the local dangerous power who pervert the initial  
meaning of the word and questions. I am not even sure that the roman  
christianism has any relation with the christianism in between 0 and  
500.


In fact those who ridicule theology, are those who confined it in the  
hand of the charlatans. That prevents any progress.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 How and why did evolution or physics or statistical laws come to be? How
 is that really different from the God hypothesis?


Neither can explain why there is something rather than nothing, but the
Evolution theory can explain how Evolution did what it did. However the God
theory can NOT explain how God did what he did. And explaining how physics
and statistical laws came to be is very very hard, but the God theory must
do something even harder, explain how the thing that made physics and
statistical laws came to be.


  And physics does the same by kicking everything downstairs to simple
 mechanisms.


Yes, SIMPLE mechanism. Kicking things downstairs is exactly what a good
theory should do, using the simple to explain the complex. The God
hypothesis does the opposite and uses the complex to explain the simple and
that does no good at all, far better would be a truthful I don't know.


  Quantum physics and computationalism may be doing exactly that right
 now. Our chasing ever more insubstantial chains of logical causality may be
 entirely misguided.


There doesn't seem to be any may be about it, chains of causality are not
infinity long, eventually they stop and you will reach randomness.

 At some point it may be necessary to realize that the universe cannot be
 understood by relying exclusively on the knowable,


Maybe, but then the universe is not knowable period.  If it takes something
you can never know to understand the universe then obviously you will never
understand the universe; and the God hypothesis is still totally useless.

 but we may have no choice but to investigate choice itself.


But there is nothing to investigate, there is no great mystery about
choice, it's either causal or random.

  John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread meekerdb

On 2/17/2012 11:17 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 17, 12:57 pm, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com  wrote:

On Thu, Feb 16, 2012 a Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:


  if comp is true, no God is needed. It's just an arithmetic machine.

Even if it's not true God is STILL not needed, that is to say the God
hypothesis is of no help whatsoever in understanding anything; it makes no
attempt at explaining HOW God does things nor does it explain how and why
God came to be.

How and why did evolution or physics or statistical laws come to be?


See Lawrence Krause The Universe from Nothing and Vic Stenger The Comprehensible 
Cosmos


How is that really different from the God hypothesis?


It makes good predictions.  It doesn't come with a lot of medieval baggage: like God wants 
you to kill people who won't worship Him.





All it does is kick everything we don't understand upstairs
and say further investigations into these matters are off limits.

And physics does the same by kicking everything downstairs to simple
mechanisms.


The difference is we can get to the stuff downstairs and test our stories and use the ones 
that work.






No
explanation at all is preferable to a explanation that just makes things
worse and adds a pointless layer of complication. There is no disgrace in
saying in a loud clear voice I don't know, but counterproductive
pseudo-explanations are a disgrace.

Quantum physics and computationalism may be doing exactly that right
now. Our chasing ever more insubstantial chains of logical causality
may be entirely misguided. At some point it may be necessary to
realize that the universe cannot be understood by relying exclusively
on the knowable,


So we'll rely on understanding the unknowable?

Brent
Religion: the daughter of Fear and Hope, explaining to Ignorance the nature of 
the Unknowable.
 -- Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread meekerdb

On 2/17/2012 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Feb 2012, at 18:57, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Feb 16, 2012 a Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com 
mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


  if comp is true, no God is needed. It's just an arithmetic machine.


Even if it's not true God is STILL not needed, that is to say the God hypothesis is of 
no help whatsoever in understanding anything; it makes no attempt at explaining HOW God 
does things nor does it explain how and why God came to be. All it does is kick 
everything we don't understand upstairs and say further investigations into these 
matters are off limits. No explanation at all is preferable to a explanation that just 
makes things worse and adds a pointless layer of complication. There is no disgrace in 
saying in a loud clear voice I don't know, but counterproductive pseudo-explanations 
are a disgrace.



I see you defend the conception of God given by the Christians.

I use the term God in the pre-christian sense of the Platonists. It is basically the 
truth we are searching, whatever it is.


If someone's religion is that the ultimate explanation is a physical primitive universe, 
then God = that primary physical universe. It remain a God, in the sense that you need 
an act of faith to believe in it. (As opposed to the physical reality, primary or not, 
that we believe in because we live it).


That God can be shown not exist if comp is true, and the one with the white barb is not 
very plausible too.


But, at least for little machine, the notion of arithmetical truth seems to obey many 
reasonable axiom for God, notably:


- It is responsible for the existence of mind and matter,
- the machine cannot describe it in its own language, yet can conceive 
approximation,
- the machine cannot avoid it in any circumstances, but without any means to 
prove it.

When atheists asserts that God does not exist, they mean the Christian God does not 
exist, and they behave as pseudo-scientist by taking for granted their own God, hiding 
the act of faith they are doing in their theories. Comaore to platonism, atheism is a 
variety of christianism. They share the God MATTER, and they share the notion of GOD, 
even if they disagree on their existence, on which a scientist can only be agnostic.


You seem to think you know a lot about a-theists.

Brent



Then, even the jewish, muslims and christians are full of theologians having been good 
thinkers, and perhaps good experiencer, and having developed reasonable things, despite 
the risk to hurt the susceptibility of the local dangerous power who pervert the initial 
meaning of the word and questions. I am not even sure that the roman christianism has 
any relation with the christianism in between 0 and 500.


In fact those who ridicule theology, are those who confined it in the hand of the 
charlatans. That prevents any progress.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 17, 3:59 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Fri, Feb 17, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  How and why did evolution or physics or statistical laws come to be? How
  is that really different from the God hypothesis?

 Neither can explain why there is something rather than nothing, but the
 Evolution theory can explain how Evolution did what it did. However the God
 theory can NOT explain how God did what he did.

It's not trying to explain how God did it though, it gets around that
by collapsing all whats and hows into a single overarching Who and
Why. This is what the universe looks like when you completely
anthropomorphize it. Mechanism (which evolution does not universalize
to the entire universe) is the contrary thesis: All whos and whys are
collapsed into whats and hows, leaving you with a completely de-
anthropomorphized (or mechanemorphic) model of the universe. The
mechanemorphic model is certainly a tremendous improvement over the
anthropmorphic but it is still half wrong. The only reason it's better
is because empiricism takes the who and why for granted rather than
eliminates it, whereas anthropomorphism is ignorant of the the what
and how. It is only through empiricism's development as an extension
of natural philosophy/Hermetical alchemy that these principles are
incorporated to begin with. If we were to take the worldview of
mechanism literally, we would have no idea who we were, nor would we
care.

 And explaining how physics
 and statistical laws came to be is very very hard, but the God theory must
 do something even harder, explain how the thing that made physics and
 statistical laws came to be.

I don't see that it would be a problem for God to make physics (I can
make a castle out of sand, so God can make a universe out of physics),
but the question of why would be more of a problem. The biggest
problem for me with the God idea is that it is arbitrarily humanoid.
The universe is not very human friendly so it doesn't make much sense.


   And physics does the same by kicking everything downstairs to simple
  mechanisms.

 Yes, SIMPLE mechanism. Kicking things downstairs is exactly what a good
 theory should do, using the simple to explain the complex.

Unless the thing you want to explain cannot really be reduced in some
sense but can be in another. I don't see that the universe has any
particular preference for simplicity over complexity, it seems to make
good use of both.

 The God
 hypothesis does the opposite and uses the complex to explain the simple and
 that does no good at all, far better would be a truthful I don't know.

We can only say that in the luxury of hindsight. You are a product of
20th century empiricism. Your senses are atrophied and conditioned
into a stoic logical focus. This is nothing like the universe of your
ancestors, who for thousands of years existed in direct communication
(or so they assumed) with their environment. You must understand that
spirituality is an anthropological universal: we have never, ever come
in contact with any culture which does not have spiritual concepts.
This cannot be brushed aside, nor should it be assumed to validate
religion. What I think the universality of spirituality means is that
our first natural impulse to relate to the universe is to treat it
like we treat ourselves...only more so. This is why the gods are all
human superlatives: God of Strength, Beauty, Wisdom, etc. Monotheism
is that principle amplified to it's ultimate extreme. No tribe wanders
out of the desert saying 'I don't know what I am or how the universe
works, but I wonder if there is a microscopic double helix inside each
of my trillion cells of my body replicating according to abstract
symmetrical principles'. 'I don't know' is new. It's very very
important, but only because beneath the 'I don't know' is an implicit
'I know that I don't know' or 'I know that what I think I know might
be false'. Without that underlying sense, the confidence to know that
even though you don't know you might be able to figure it out, you
have nothing. Science is measured faith, faith diffracted through the
the suspension of blind faith and with it's opposite: methodical,
measured curiosity.


   Quantum physics and computationalism may be doing exactly that right
  now. Our chasing ever more insubstantial chains of logical causality may be
  entirely misguided.

 There doesn't seem to be any may be about it, chains of causality are not
 infinity long, eventually they stop and you will reach randomness.

Then randomness becomes another name for God. It is the result of the
same function run in reverse. Causality magically appears from
randomness. Why?


  At some point it may be necessary to realize that the universe cannot be
  understood by relying exclusively on the knowable,

 Maybe, but then the universe is not knowable period.  If it takes something
 you can never know to understand the universe then obviously you will never
 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-17 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 I see you defend the conception of God given by the Christians.


By God I mean an omnipotent being that created all the matter and energy
in the universe, and logic and mathematics and morality and everything
else; when I want to talk about a concept other than that I use a different
word than God.

  I use the term God in the pre-christian sense of the Platonists. It is
 basically the truth we are searching, whatever it is.


I see, so if I seek to know who was the 13'th president of the United
States then Millard Fillmore is God. You can certainly redefine the word
God to mean anything you like, you can redefine it so only a fool would
not believe in it, but I don't see the point. This proves what I have often
said, many people are willing to abandon the idea of God but not the 3
letter word God.  If I redefine the symbol 5 to mean 4 then 2+2=5 is
a true statement, but doing so would cause needless confusion.

  John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-16 Thread ronaldheld
Another comment on the paper: arXiv:1202.3395v1 [physics.hist-ph}
   Ronald

On Feb 15, 10:27 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Tue, Feb 14, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  can a virtual typhoon makes you wet?

 I don't know, it depends on whether you are in the same level of reality
 as the typhoon. I do know for certain that a real typhoon can't make the
 laws of physics wet because they exist at different levels, although I
 don't really have a way of determining if the storm is real or not, all I
 can do is tell if its at the same level as me or not. I can also say that
 some things behave much the same regardless of what level they are in,
 things like arithmetic and logic and consciousness.

   John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2012, at 23:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Feb 14, 3:41 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:










On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:


All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer  
will

run
the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do
that.


It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb  
to

do a
thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program  
mean.



That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
anything else than what you already do.



But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you
don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot
assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning?


My goal is not to be intelligent or to be interested in every  
idea, it

is to explore the implications of this particular set of ideas.


You write well, but I'm afraid that you have to develop your learning
ability, and it is only by exploring the implications of different  
set

of ideas that you will learn the difference between arguing and
advertizing an opinion.


A superficial survey of the total set of ideas is what I'm after. I
was an anthropology major. I'm not trying to understand the customs
and truths of any particular culture, I'm trying to see through all
cultures to the underlying universals.





A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to  
discuss

further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you
are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your
opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then.



I'm saying that comp does the same thing, as does every religion and
philosophy. They are all different ways of making sense of the
universe and the self. All I'm doing is looking at what they all  
have

in common - sense.


That is not what I am doing. On the contrary I wish the philosophy  
and

religion adopt the standard of science, which is modest hypothetical
communication, without *ever* claiming the truth, but trying valid
reasoning in hypothetical frames. It is the only way to progress.


But science doesn't put itself in the hypothetical frame - which is
fine for specific inquiries, but inquiries into consciousness in
general or the cosmos as a whole have to include science itself, it's
assumptions, it's origins and motives.


Yes. But it is science only as far as we present the theory in clear  
hypothetical way.

The rest is pseudo-religion or insanity.




There was progress before
science, so it is not true that it is the only way to progress.
Science itself may be just the beginning.


I like to say that science has begin, in Occident, in -500, and has  
ended in +500. Thanks to the jews and arabs, the half of science has  
come back in the enlightenment period. The so-called exact one, so  
that the political power can continue his fear business selling by  
using the inexact results of the inexact sciences. That's cool for the  
bandits.
In the East, science has begin earlier, and disappear later, but the  
situation is not much brilliant.


I don't believe in science, but only in scientific attitude, which is  
mainly modesty, brought by the understanding that any public knowledge  
is conjectural. Scientific statements are beliefs, which means that  
they are open to be refuted, indeed they ask only for that.




















Intelligence is the ability to
make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it,



I can agree, although then even human might have a limited
intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or  
you
are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in  
an

already very long and fuzzy list.



I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart
monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others.



which
is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
trivially for specific functions).


And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by  
the

diagonalization routine.


Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the  
only
way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels  
us

to accept it's evidence.


On the contrary. Comp leads to a counter-intuitive view of reality,
doubly so for Aristotelians, and it does not ask to accept its
evidence, but only for its refutation. You get it all wrong, Craig.


That's what I'm saying is that it is reverse psychology. Comp seduces
with humility. It is the ultimate anthropomorphism to see the entire
cosmos as completely real except for our own experience which is
somehow completely illusory yet has ability to precisely understand
its own illusory reasoning. Instead of the special child of God, we
become the insignificant consequence of an immense non-god.


No. It is the complete contrary. 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-16 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 16, 12:10 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Yes. But it is science only as far as we present the theory in clear
 hypothetical way.
 The rest is pseudo-religion or insanity.

Or it could expand the scope of science.


  There was progress before
  science, so it is not true that it is the only way to progress.
  Science itself may be just the beginning.

 I like to say that science has begin, in Occident, in -500, and has
 ended in +500. Thanks to the jews and arabs, the half of science has
 come back in the enlightenment period. The so-called exact one, so
 that the political power can continue his fear business selling by
 using the inexact results of the inexact sciences. That's cool for the
 bandits.
 In the East, science has begin earlier, and disappear later, but the
 situation is not much brilliant.

 I don't believe in science, but only in scientific attitude, which is
 mainly modesty, brought by the understanding that any public knowledge
 is conjectural. Scientific statements are beliefs, which means that
 they are open to be refuted, indeed they ask only for that.

In this area though, I want science to even be modest about it's
modesty. We can't be sure what attitudes are appropriate for
approaching the ultimate mysteries. I find that if we include all
attitudes, they form a high quality symmetry with a lot of obvious
correlation as well as a lot of subtlety and nuance. Through that
symmetry we can see that modesty is not a neutral statement, it is a
subject-neutralizing bias. This voyeuristic perspective is ideal for
studying objects, but only when those objects do not include
ourselves. We should understand that we may not be able to find
ourselves in a microscope, any my view explains why that is probably
the case. Who we are is rooted in idiosyncratic identity as well as
generic process. You can't get one from the other. They are opposite
sides of the same thing.












  Intelligence is the ability to
  make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it,

  I can agree, although then even human might have a limited
  intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or
  you
  are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in
  an
  already very long and fuzzy list.

  I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart
  monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others.

  which
  is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
  trivially for specific functions).

  And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by
  the
  diagonalization routine.

  Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the
  only
  way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels
  us
  to accept it's evidence.

  On the contrary. Comp leads to a counter-intuitive view of reality,
  doubly so for Aristotelians, and it does not ask to accept its
  evidence, but only for its refutation. You get it all wrong, Craig.

  That's what I'm saying is that it is reverse psychology. Comp seduces
  with humility. It is the ultimate anthropomorphism to see the entire
  cosmos as completely real except for our own experience which is
  somehow completely illusory yet has ability to precisely understand
  its own illusory reasoning. Instead of the special child of God, we
  become the insignificant consequence of an immense non-god.

 No. It is the complete contrary. Comp de-anthropomorphizes, for if the
 cosmos is a building of the mind, it is not a building of the human
 mind, but of the mind of all universal numbers.

Right, but that is what I'm saying. De-anthropomorphizing the universe
(or mechanemorphizing) is anthropomorphism by reverse psychology. It
is to assume that we are capable of escaping our own perceptual bias
entirely and see ourselves clearly as nothing very special. It is the
ultimate conceit. Our view of the cosmos is so great that we must
humble even ourselves before it. This is only possible to do if we
psychologically withdraw from our mortality and identify with pure
transparency itself. To see the universe as X, we must become non-X; a
generic voyeur position unique in all the cosmos - an all doubting,
all powerless non-entity. This becomes a problem when you add
consciousness into the cosmos. We jump to the conclusion that it is
possible for an observation to be universalized - for truths and
perceptions to exist independently of a concrete subject. We should
instead be more modest about this, deconstruct our assumptions about
universality and try it the other way - with subjectivity and
objectivity being part of the same finite experiential sense.

 The entire cosmos is seen as unreal (primitively) but our experience
 of it are not illusory, once we understand that they don't refer to
 anything primitively physical.

 Only the last point is basically correct. Yes, we are not a special
 child of God. It depends on us to get closer, but we are not well
 

Re: The free will function

2012-02-15 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Feb 14, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 can a virtual typhoon makes you wet?


I don't know, it depends on whether you are in the same level of reality
as the typhoon. I do know for certain that a real typhoon can't make the
laws of physics wet because they exist at different levels, although I
don't really have a way of determining if the storm is real or not, all I
can do is tell if its at the same level as me or not. I can also say that
some things behave much the same regardless of what level they are in,
things like arithmetic and logic and consciousness.

  John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

2012-02-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Feb 11, 8:04 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com




All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will  
run

the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that.


It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to  
do a

thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program mean.


That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
anything else than what you already do.


But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you  
don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot  
assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning?
A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss  
further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you  
are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your  
opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then.





Intelligence is the ability to
make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it,


I can agree, although then even human might have a limited  
intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you  
are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an  
already very long and fuzzy list.





which
is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
trivially for specific functions).


And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the  
diagonalization routine.





If it weren't that way we would not
be having this discussion. Machines would exhibit creativity and
versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and
human life.


You confuse the conceptually possibility that some machine can think,  
the possibility that actual machine can thing. You might have said  
that the DNA will never reach the moon by looking at bacteria or  
insects. That is not reasoning.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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