Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Oct 2013, at 00:49, LizR wrote:

By the way, my son (14) asked me the other day what's the oddest  
prime number?


Fortunately, I got the right answer!


I would say 2. LOL

Was it 2 that you found?  To be odd is very subjective here :)

Bruno





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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/15/2013 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized  
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is  
not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare  
and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by  
the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the  
computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show  
that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is  
not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.



Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by  
the sum


What does sum mean?  And how does is constitute a piece of matter?

of the infinity of computations going through your state as it  
is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not  
computed.


But that's not a definition.  It's saying the piece of matter is  
*constituted* by an infinity of computations.



That is a misleading phrasing. The matter is not constituted of  
anything. It is an appearance coming from the FPI on all computations.



But what associates the computations to a piece of matter that we  
*define* ostensively?


The FPI.

Bruno


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:39, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/15/2013 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or  
generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all  
the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the  
computable is rare and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by  
the or a machine?


We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all  
closed formula written in the language of arithmetic (and thus  
using logical symbol + the symbol 0, s (+1), + and *) are all  
either true or false, independently of us.


From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can  
prove that the average universal numbers will (correctly) believe  
in matter (but it will not know that it is correct).


That's not at all clear to me.  A universal number encodes proofs -  
is that what you mean by it believes something?


Yes. (I am thinking about the Löbian universal numbers).




But how is this something identified at 'matter'?


It should follow from the step seven.








So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like there is  
no biggest prime number are true independently of me and you, and  
the universe, then you can understand that the proposition  
asserting the existence of (infinitely many) computations in which  
you believe reading my current post, is also true independently of  
us.


The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines  
cannot avoid in the arithmetical truth.


Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical  
truth (by Gödel).





And I thought the generalized brain did the computations,


Only the computations associated to your mind.


not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the  
rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed.  
Bruno is constantly confusing me.


I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not  
aware that arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than  
what any computer can generate or compute.


Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going  
through your actual state of mind,


That sounds like an uncomputable totality.



No, by virtue of the closure of the set of partial (includes the total  
functions) computable functions for diagonalization, or equivalently,  
by the existence of universal machines/numbers, that totality is  
computable/enumerable, and that is why we do have a UD.
What happens is that most interesting subset will be uncomputable, so  
that the FPI entails a priori the non computability of *some* physical  
things (which can be only the apparent collapse of the wave, but it  
could be more than that too: open problem).


Bruno








Brent

and below your substitution level there are infinitely many such  
computations. They all exist in arithmetic, and the FPI glues them,  
in a non computable way, in possible long and deep physical  
histories.


Bruno





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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Oct 2013, at 23:04, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable  
arithmetical truth

(by Gödel).


Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that  
uncomputible

arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this  
universe
if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which  
is very
far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other  
words, I
believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than  
10^120. So I

will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.



Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which
deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have  
sufficient

resources to run the universal dovetailer.


Good point.

Bruno






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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread Richard Ruquist
Bruno Marchal 
viahttp://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=enanswer=1311182ctx=mail
 googlegroups.com
2:47 AM (8 hours ago)
to everything-list
On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:02, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth
(by Gödel).


Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
arithmetical truth can produce the physical.


Nobody is perfect :)
(You are not alone, physicalism is believed by almost everybody those days)


Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe
if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very
far from infinity.


Of course, I do not assume such a universe. I assume only that I am
Turing emulable.



I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest
prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of
these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.


OK. And then the reasoning (UDA), if you do assume some physicalism, is
that we are not Turing emulable. You are working in a non comp theory. Not
sure this solves anything, as now you can't justify matter (you assume it),
and are back to the usual mind-body problem, with an non satisfying
identity between mind and matter.

Bruno

Richard: I guess you did not read my paper afterall. The Metaverse machine
is what computes matter and its energy from the get-go. I grant you that I
assume such a Metaverse. But the universe with its limited computations are
given by known physics.

Regarding MWI vs Wave Collapse , here is some interesting data:


Measurement-induced collapse of quantum wavefunction captured in slow
motion.
http://www.nature.com/news/physicists-snatch-a-peep-into-quantum-paradox-1.13899?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20131015


On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 15 Oct 2013, at 23:04, Russell Standish wrote:

  On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical
 truth
 (by Gödel).


 Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
 arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
 Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this
 universe
 if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very
 far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I

 believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120.
 So I
 will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.


 Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which
 deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have sufficient
 resources to run the universal dovetailer.


 Good point.

 Bruno





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 Principal, High Performance Coders
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 11:41:46AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
 
 
 Measurement-induced collapse of quantum wavefunction captured in slow
 motion.
 http://www.nature.com/news/physicists-snatch-a-peep-into-quantum-paradox-1.13899?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20131015
 

The headline is sensationlist and misleading. What is being done is a
series of weak measurements that capturing the change from a
superposition to a non superposed state. An MWIer would say this is
capturing the process of decoherence. It is most certainly not
demonstrating wave function collapse is occurring, interesting though
the experiment is for technical reasons.

Cheers

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Oct 2013, at 17:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:



Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com
2:47 AM (8 hours ago)



to everything-list

On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:02, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable  
arithmetical truth (by Gödel).



Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that  
uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical.


Nobody is perfect :)
(You are not alone, physicalism is believed by almost everybody  
those days)



Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this  
universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd  
limit) which is very far from infinity.


Of course, I do not assume such a universe. I assume only that I  
am Turing emulable.




I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the  
largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I  
will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.


OK. And then the reasoning (UDA), if you do assume some physicalism,  
is that we are not Turing emulable. You are working in a non comp  
theory. Not sure this solves anything, as now you can't justify  
matter (you assume it), and are back to the usual mind-body problem,  
with an non satisfying identity between mind and matter.


Bruno

Richard: I guess you did not read my paper afterall.


I read it, but as you said, we start from very different assumption,  
and many things you say about PA seems a bit weird for a logician.




The Metaverse machine is what computes matter and its energy from  
the get-go. I grant you that I assume such a Metaverse. But the  
universe with its limited computations are given by known physics.


But that universe, if it exists, must be justified by using + and *  
and the numbers only, if comp is assumed.





Regarding MWI vs Wave Collapse , here is some interesting data:


Measurement-induced collapse of quantum wavefunction captured in  
slow motion.

http://www.nature.com/news/physicists-snatch-a-peep-into-quantum-paradox-1.13899?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20131015



A slow motion movie of the wave collapse is a slow motion movie of a  
differentiating multiverse. Everett theory predicts such motions.


Bruno





On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 15 Oct 2013, at 23:04, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable  
arithmetical truth

(by Gödel).


Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that  
uncomputible

arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this  
universe
if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is  
very
far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other  
words, I


believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than  
10^120. So I

will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.


Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which
deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have  
sufficient

resources to run the universal dovetailer.

Good point.

Bruno





--


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread LizR
On 16 October 2013 06:02, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:


 Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
 arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
 Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this
 universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which
 is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other
 words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than
 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from
 yours.

 So what happens if someone proves that, say, 2^200 - 1 is a prime number?

Personally I find a statements about prime numbers in this universe to be
rather odd. Would 17 remain prime in an empty universe?

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread LizR
By the way, my son (14) asked me the other day what's the oddest prime
number?

Fortunately, I got the right answer!

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread meekerdb

On 10/16/2013 3:49 PM, LizR wrote:

By the way, my son (14) asked me the other day what's the oddest prime number?

Fortunately, I got the right answer!


2, because it's the only one that's even.

Brent
There are 10 kinds of people.  Those who think in binary and those who don't.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-16 Thread LizR
Or the largest prime number less than 10^120, because it's the biggest
prime number...?!?!? :)

There are two secrets to success.
The first is not to give away everything you know...

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one  
another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a  
binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence  
in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right  
proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning a  
measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even  
numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born  
rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued  
by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel  
experiences, (then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do  
you refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so  
superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.


But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one  
photon interference in the two slits experiment.


?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a  
single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no  
superposition of observer required.



But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely  
mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.



















When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise:  
yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but  
they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities,  
including the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the  
real, which is a bit weird to me.


The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible  
futures.  Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to  
understand or get a bigger picture.











I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological,  
which is not a problem for me. there are still many.



Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with  
yours.  I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S.  
Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution of Reason  
- a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view  
he defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv: 
1207.2141v1


OK.













It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique  
(multiversal) physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in  
comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define  
what is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a  
cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong  
don't ask imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I  
think you do the same).



What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs,  
itself define by a relative universal numbers.


Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of  
his actions.


Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its  
octalist points of view, and an whole theology including his  
physics, etc.








Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally  
comfortable with not explaining everything.


Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.


What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what  
I've heard is that it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I  
don't find very enlightening.


What do you miss in the UDA?


As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's  
only your inference that observers (and the rest of the multiverse)  
*must be in there somewhere* because you've assumed that everything  
is computable.



On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is  
computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In  
everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and  
exceptional.









Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Richard Ruquist
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain)
is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.

Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a
machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which
presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
confusing me.


On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

  So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
 divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
 many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
 produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
 a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
 square numbers?).

 And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives
 from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences,
 (then), disappearing, please do.


 I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
 to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


  The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious
 on the observer


 I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
 superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.


  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
 interference in the two slits experiment.


 ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
 photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
 observer required.



 But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
 mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.












  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
 quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still
 a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
 self-multiplication.


 There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
 subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


  I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


 Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real,
 which is a bit weird to me.


 The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
 Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


 That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand
 or get a bigger picture.







  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
 superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
 a problem for me. there are still many.



 Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
 think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
 the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension
 of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview
 with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1


  OK.









  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
 physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.

  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is
 the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of
 solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative.


 You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


  I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



 I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you
 do the same).



  What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself
 define by a relative universal numbers.


 Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his
 actions.

  Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist
 points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc.






  Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally
 comfortable with not explaining everything.


  Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.


 What's your explanation for the existence of 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
 brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
 everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.

 Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
 claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a
 machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
 it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which
 presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
 confusing me.


Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum
of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is
defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed.

A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity
of computations.

Quentin



 On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
 divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
 many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
 produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
 a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
 square numbers?).

 And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
 derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
 Chris Fuchs?


  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences,
 (then), disappearing, please do.


 I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
 to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


  The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
 contagious on the observer


 I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
 superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.


  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
 interference in the two slits experiment.


 ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
 photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
 observer required.



 But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
 mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.












  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
 quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still
 a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
 self-multiplication.


 There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
 subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


  I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


 Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real,
 which is a bit weird to me.


 The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
 Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


 That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to
 understand or get a bigger picture.







  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
 superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
 a problem for me. there are still many.



 Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
 think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
 the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension
 of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview
 with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1


  OK.









  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
 physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.

  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is
 the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of
 solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative.


 You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


  I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



 I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you
 do the same).



  What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself
 define by a relative universal numbers.


 Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his
 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com



 -- Forwarded message --
 From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
 Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
 brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
 everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.

 Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
 claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a
 machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
 it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which
 presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
 confusing me.


 Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the
 sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is
 defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed.

 A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an
 infinity of computations.

 Quentin



No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite set
of computations going through your current state (at every state, an
infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going
through that state and it's for every state).

Quentin



 You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed.
 That does not make sense.
 Richard


 On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
 divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
 many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
 produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
 a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
 square numbers?).

 And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
 derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
 Chris Fuchs?


  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences,
 (then), disappearing, please do.


 I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
 to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


  The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
 contagious on the observer


 I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
 superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.


  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
 interference in the two slits experiment.


 ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
 photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
 observer required.



 But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
 mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.












  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
 quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still
 a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
 self-multiplication.


 There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
 subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


  I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


 Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the
 real, which is a bit weird to me.


 The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
 Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


 That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to
 understand or get a bigger picture.







  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
 superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
 a problem for me. there are still many.



 Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
 think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
 the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension
 of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview
 with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1


  OK.









  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
 physical

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized  
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is  
not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare  
and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the  
or a machine?


We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all  
closed formula written in the language of arithmetic (and thus using  
logical symbol + the symbol 0, s (+1), + and *) are all either true or  
false, independently of us.


From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can  
prove that the average universal numbers will (correctly) believe in  
matter (but it will not know that it is correct).


So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like there is no  
biggest prime number are true independently of me and you, and the  
universe, then you can understand that the proposition asserting the  
existence of (infinitely many) computations in which you believe  
reading my current post, is also true independently of us.


The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines cannot  
avoid in the arithmetical truth.


Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth  
(by Gödel).







And I thought the generalized brain did the computations,


Only the computations associated to your mind.


not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the  
rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed.  
Bruno is constantly confusing me.


I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not  
aware that arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than  
what any computer can generate or compute.


Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going  
through your actual state of mind, and below your substitution level  
there are infinitely many such computations. They all exist in  
arithmetic, and the FPI glues them, in a non computable way, in  
possible long and deep physical histories.


Bruno






On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one  
another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a  
binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence  
in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right  
proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning a  
measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even  
numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born  
rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued  
by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel  
experiences, (then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do  
you refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function -  
so superpositions are just something that happens in the  
mathematics.


But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one  
photon interference in the two slits experiment.


?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a  
single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no  
superposition of observer required.



But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely  
mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.



















When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise:  
yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states,  
but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical- 
realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the  
real, which is a bit weird to me.


The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible  
futures.  Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to  
understand or get a bigger picture.











I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes   

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com


-- Forwarded message --
From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized  
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is  
not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare  
and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the  
or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the  
computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show  
that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is  
not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.



Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by  
the sum of the infinity of computations going through your state  
as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is  
not computed.


A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an  
infinity of computations.


Quentin


No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the  
infinite set of computations going through your current state (at  
every state, an infinity of computations diverge, but there is still  
an infinity going through that state and it's for every state).


Yes. It generalizes what Everett did on the universal quantum wave, on  
the whole arithmetical truth (which contains the whole computer  
science theoretical truth). If QM is correct, the SWE is redundant,  
and a consequence of comp. Physics is one aspect of arithmetic seen by  
its internal creatures (the universal or not numbers). We can  
concretely extract physics from the interview of the chatty rich one  
(the Löbian numbers).


Bruno





Quentin


You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not  
computed. That does not make sense.

Richard

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one  
another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a  
binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence  
in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right  
proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning a  
measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even  
numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born  
rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued  
by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel  
experiences, (then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do  
you refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function -  
so superpositions are just something that happens in the  
mathematics.


But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one  
photon interference in the two slits experiment.


?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a  
single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no  
superposition of observer required.



But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely  
mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.



















When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise:  
yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states,  
but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical- 
realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the  
real, which is a bit weird to me.


The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible  
futures.  Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to  
understand or get a bigger picture.











I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological,  
which

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Richard Ruquist
Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth
(by Gödel).


Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe
if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very
far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I
believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I
will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.


On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com



 -- Forwarded message --
 From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
 Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
 brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
 everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.

 Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
 claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a
 machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
 it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which
 presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
 confusing me.


 Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the
 sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is
 defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed.

 A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an
 infinity of computations.

 Quentin



 No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite
 set of computations going through your current state (at every state, an
 infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going
 through that state and it's for every state).


 Yes. It generalizes what Everett did on the universal quantum wave, on the
 whole arithmetical truth (which contains the whole computer science
 theoretical truth). If QM is correct, the SWE is redundant, and a
 consequence of comp. Physics is one aspect of arithmetic seen by its
 internal creatures (the universal or not numbers). We can concretely
 extract physics from the interview of the chatty rich one (the Löbian
 numbers).

 Bruno




 Quentin



 You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed.
 That does not make sense.
 Richard


 On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


 On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
 divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
 many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
 produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
 a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
 square numbers?).

 And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
 derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
 Chris Fuchs?


  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences,
 (then), disappearing, please do.


 I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you
 refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


  The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
 contagious on the observer


 I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
 superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.


  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
 interference in the two slits experiment.


 ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
 photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
 observer required.



 But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
 mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.












  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
 quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still
 a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
 self-multiplication.


 There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
 subjective

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread meekerdb

On 10/15/2013 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) 
is
computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, 
or just
in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.

Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was 
claiming. How
does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I 
thought the
generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How 
does
Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter 
is not
computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.


Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum


What does sum mean?  And how does is constitute a piece of matter?

of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an 
infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed.


But that's not a definition.  It's saying the piece of matter is *constituted* by an 
infinity of computations.  But what associates the computations to a piece of matter that 
we *define* ostensively?


Brent



A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of 
computations.

Quentin


--
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread meekerdb

On 10/15/2013 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is 
computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in 
arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How 
does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine?


We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all closed formula 
written in the language of arithmetic (and thus using logical symbol + the symbol 0, s 
(+1), + and *) are all either true or false, independently of us.


From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can prove that the average 
universal numbers will (correctly) believe in matter (but it will not know that it is 
correct).


That's not at all clear to me.  A universal number encodes proofs - is that what you mean 
by it believes something?  But how is this something identified at 'matter'?




So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like there is no biggest prime 
number are true independently of me and you, and the universe, then you can understand 
that the proposition asserting the existence of (infinitely many) computations in which 
you believe reading my current post, is also true independently of us.


The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines cannot avoid in the 
arithmetical truth.


Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel).






And I thought the generalized brain did the computations,


Only the computations associated to your mind.


not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably 
includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.


I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not aware that 
arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than what any computer can generate 
or compute.


Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going through your actual 
state of mind,


That sounds like an uncomputable totality.

Brent

and below your substitution level there are infinitely many such computations. They all 
exist in arithmetic, and the FPI glues them, in a non computable way, in possible long 
and deep physical histories.


Bruno




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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
 Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth
 (by Gödel).
 
 
 Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
 arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
 Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe
 if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very
 far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I
 believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I
 will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.
 

Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which
deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have sufficient
resources to run the universal dovetailer.


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one  
another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary  
measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order  
that some branch-counting measure produces the right  
proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning a  
measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even  
numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born  
rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by,  
for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel  
experiences, (then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you  
refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so  
superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.


But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon  
interference in the two slits experiment.














When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes  
the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they  
concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities,  
including the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the  
real, which is a bit weird to me.






I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which  
is not a problem for me. there are still many.



Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with  
yours.  I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S.  
Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution of Reason -  
a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he  
defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv: 
1207.2141v1


OK.













It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)  
physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define  
what is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a  
cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't  
ask imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I  
think you do the same).



What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs,  
itself define by a relative universal numbers. Comp has a pretty well  
defined notion of observer, with its octalist points of view, and an  
whole theology including his physics, etc.








Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally  
comfortable with not explaining everything.


Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.


What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what  
I've heard is that it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't  
find very enlightening.


What do you miss in the UDA?



Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the  
story that goes along with the mathematics, is important insofar as  
it gives you insight into how to apply the mathematics and to extend  
your theories.  He is critical of Everett's MWI for not doing that,  
or at least not doing it well.


Well, perhaps Fuchs is a bit out of topic, once you agree that it is  
only Everett in a psychological version. That is close to comp. But  
comp leads, by UDA, that the theory of everuthing is just elementary  
arithmetic (or Turing equivalent, like colmbinatirs, ...). Then  
everything is defined in a very precise way in that theory.
And this explains both 100% matter and 99,999... % of consciousness.  
The explanation might be false, of course, but is testable.


Bruno





Brent



Bruno





Brent
I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system  
is a lack of integrity.

--- Fredrick Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-14 Thread meekerdb

On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement.  How are 
these universes distinct from one another?   Do they divide into two infinite 
subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order 
that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see 
any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more 
even numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a 
Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), 
disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer to?  And 
you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the 
observer


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are 
just something that happens in the mathematics.


But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in 
the two slits experiment.


?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in 
a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required.
















When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave 
describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* 
dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective 
probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit 
weird to me.


The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.  Or even the 
result of considering all possible paths.








I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition 
disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there 
are still many.



Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I think Fuchs 
view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book The 
Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view 
he defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1


OK.













It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. 
Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, 
the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can 
generate some strong don't ask imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you do 
the same).



What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself define by a 
relative universal numbers.


Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his actions.

Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist points of view, and 
an whole theology including his physics, etc.








Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally comfortable with not 
explaining everything.


Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.


What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what I've heard is that 
it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very enlightening.


What do you miss in the UDA?


As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's only your inference that 
observers (and the rest of the multiverse) *must be in there somewhere* because you've 
assumed that everything is computable.






Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the story that goes 
along with the mathematics, is important insofar as it gives you insight into how to 
apply the mathematics and to extend your theories.  He is critical of Everett's MWI for 
not doing that, or at least not doing it well.


Well, perhaps Fuchs is a bit out of topic, once you agree that it is only Everett in a 
psychological version.


It's kinda funny to see only...psychological from a guy who wants to show that 
everything is a shared dream.


That is close to comp. But comp leads, by UDA, that the theory of 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-14 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 2:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

  So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
 divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
 many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
 produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
 a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
 square numbers?).

 And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives
 from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences,
 (then), disappearing, please do.


 I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
 to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


  The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious
 on the observer


 I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
 superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.


  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
 interference in the two slits experiment.


 ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
 photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
 observer required.











  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
 quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still
 a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
 self-multiplication.


 There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
 subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


  I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


 Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real,
 which is a bit weird to me.


 The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
 Or even the result of considering all possible paths.




According to Fuchs, who does the consideration have to be made by?
 Obviously no person (nor any practical classical computer) could
contemplate all possible paths of a large quantum computation.  So whose
contemplation reifies or interferes with the product of that computation?

Jason






  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
 superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
 a problem for me. there are still many.



 Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
 think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
 the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension
 of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview
 with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1


  OK.









  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
 physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.

  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is
 the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of
 solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative.


 You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


  I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



 I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you
 do the same).



  What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself
 define by a relative universal numbers.


 Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his
 actions.


  Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist
 points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc.






  Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally
 comfortable with not explaining everything.


  Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.


 What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what I've
 heard is that it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very
 enlightening.


  What do you miss in the UDA?


 As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's only
 your inference that observers (and the rest of the multiverse) *must be in
 there somewhere* because you've assumed that everything is computable.




  Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the
 story that goes along with the mathematics, is important insofar as it
 gives you insight into how to apply the mathematics 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement,  
or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some  
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not  
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable  
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule  
derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for  
example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences,  
(then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you  
refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer








When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes  
the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they  
concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including  
the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?
I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is  
not a problem for me. there are still many.








It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)  
physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what  
is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic  
form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask  
imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally  
comfortable with not explaining everything.


Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.

Bruno





Brent
I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system  
is a lack of integrity.

--- Fredrick Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-13 Thread meekerdb

On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are 
these universes distinct from one another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets 
on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some 
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems 
with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers 
that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a 
Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), 
disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer to?  And 
you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the 
observer


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just 
something that happens in the mathematics.










When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave 
describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* 
dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective 
probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.

I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition 
disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there are 
still many.



Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I think Fuchs view 
of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution 
of Reason - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he defends 
at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1










It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. 
Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, the 
observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate 
some strong don't ask imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you do 
the same).




Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally comfortable with not 
explaining everything.


Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.


What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what I've heard is that it's 
an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very enlightening.  Fuchs, correctly I 
think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the story that goes along with the 
mathematics, is important insofar as it gives you insight into how to apply the 
mathematics and to extend your theories.  He is critical of Everett's MWI for not doing 
that, or at least not doing it well.


Brent



Bruno





Brent
I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of 
integrity.
--- Fredrick Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Oct 2013, at 17:00, Jason Resch wrote:




On Oct 11, 2013, at 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 11 Oct 2013, at 13:16, Pierz wrote:

And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number  
of irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an  
infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.


It is the same cardinal (2^aleph_zero). But cardinality is not what  
count when searching a measure.



So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white  
rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that  
does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave  
as we would classically expect.


That is what remain to be seen. But if comp is true, we know the  
measure has to exist, and the math gives some clues that it is  
indeed the case, from machines' (consistent and/or true) points of  
view.




Bruno,

Could the matter of the countably infinite number of programs be  
irrelevant from the first person perspective because any given mind  
contains/is aware of only a finite amount of information?


Say some mind contains a million bits of information. Then there is  
a finite number (2^100) of distinct combinations of content for  
that mind. These differations are all that matter from the first  
person view, and some may be more probable than others.


(But deciding the measures for each of those finite number of  
possibilities depends on infinite computations, and so would they be  
real numbers?)


Even if the 3-mind (my current 3-state) is finite, the FPI will bear  
on non enumerable continuations. I will be able to distinguish only  
finite numbers of cluster of histories in that infinity of  
continuations, but the measure will bear (like in QM) on the  
distinguishable in-principle continuation, so the relative  
indeterminacy might depends on them all, and so it is consistent that  
real numbers will be at play. Now, the real measure takes the fusion- 
amnesia-backtracking into account, and the real picture is beyond our  
intuition, and has to be extracted from the semantics of the (q)Hm. (q  
for quantification in the logician sense, and Hm is for the relevant  
material hypostases (Bp  Dt, Bp  Dt  p, but also on Bp  p, as it  
gives a quantization (in the physicist sense) when p is in the UD (p  
is sigma_1).


Bruno



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Oct 2013, at 19:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).
But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number  
of

elements.


I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form  
a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying  
continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.


There is necessarily a continuum in comp, because the UD is so dumb as  
making interacting all programs (rich enough) with a dovetailing on  
the real, complex, quanternions, octonions, etc.


Very plausibly, the winning universal numbers exploit this, with the  
algbraic measure structure (imposed by self-reference constraints)  to  
multiply enough the first person views.


I would not have believe myself in this without the QM empirical  
evidences. Without QM, I would probably not find comp plausible at all.


Bruno






Brent


That is why I'm not sure that problems with assigning
measures to countably infinite sets (such as your example above re
even and square numbers) are really such a problem.




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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Oct 2013, at 23:46, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement,  
or

do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).
But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable  
number of

elements.


I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.



UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT.


From the first person views statistics.



It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n},  
where n is

the number of leading bits in common between x and y).


That would  be a sort of measure on infinite programs, not so much on  
the computations, which will need a sort of measure on experiences,  
which needs the definition of experiences and thus of the knower  
logic and semantics, and for this I use the (counter-intuitive)  
arithmetic of self-reference.


Bruno




ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

Cheers

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 00:12, LizR wrote:

On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au  
wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
 a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
 continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.


UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n},  
where n is

the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a  
countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?


The first/third person distinction. I might add explanation later. It  
looks like even those who grasp the FPI forget to apply it. The  
invariance of UD-steps-delay plays a crucial role here. It entails  
that the consciousness differentiation on the UD* takes zero second,  
and that is why we are confronted with continua.


Bruno





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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 00:14, LizR wrote:


On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au  
wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
 a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
 continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.


UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n},  
where n is

the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a  
countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?


Am I missing diagonalisation? i.e. Can the UD output be diagonalised?


It cannot. For the same reason that the partial computabe functions is  
immune to diagonlaization. That is why it is universal.
But as I said, you forget to take into account the 1p/3p distinction.  
You are forgetting step 7.


Bruno


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 01:04, LizR wrote:

On 12 October 2013 11:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au  
wrote:

The UD doesn't output anything. If it did, then certainly, the output
could not be an uncountable set due to the diagonalisation argument.

Yes, I wasn't speaking very precisely. Obviously there is no output,  
because where would it go? I meant the trace, which I assume is a  
record of its operation, which itself exists in arithmetic (I think?)


Yes. In different ways, but that would be technical to describe.  
Shortly: arithmetic contains only finite pieces of computations, but  
the first person indeterminacy (and thus the consciousness  
differentiation) will glue them all.


Bruno




Rather UD* is like the internal view of the operation of the
dovetailer, like the sum of all possible experiences of the Helsinki
man being duplicated to Washington and Moscow that is being discussed
rather a lot lately.

Ah! Should read to the end :)
Thanks.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 01:05, Pierz wrote:




On Saturday, October 12, 2013 5:42:06 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
On 10/11/2013 4:16 AM, Pierz wrote:
And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number  
of irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an  
infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.


No, the two are exactly the same uncountable infinity, because there  
is a 1-to-1 mapping between them.


My mathematical terminology may not be up to scratch. The measure is  
different.



So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white  
rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that  
does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave  
as we would classically expect.


But computationalism only produces rational numbers.

We were talking MWI, where a measure is permitted because of the  
underlying physical continuum. It does seem that the measure problem  
is an open one for comp, as far as I can tell from Bruno's  
responses, but he seems confident it's not insurmountable. I'm not  
competent to judge.


The comp measure problem *is* the same problem as deriving physics  
from comp. It is *the* problem.
The apparition of a quantum-like quantization in the material  
hypostases gives much hopes indeed.


Bruno






Brent



On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that  
gives the required probabilities. For example if the part of the  
multiverse that is involved in performing a quantum measurement  
with a 50-50 chance of either outcome is represented by the numbers  
0 to 1, you can divide those into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David  
do something like this in FOR? (Or is this too plistic?)


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 01:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT.  
It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{- 
n}, where n is

the number of leading bits in common between x and y).
Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the  
measure on this space?



1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
arbitrary sets of binary strings.



Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given  
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit  
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has  
started.  Right?


Imagine a universal (and thus finite) game of life pattern. Then you  
can look at UD* as the infinite cone obtained by adding all the planes  
describing its evolution. That gives a static view of UD* as a  
discrete infinite 3D conic object.


It is, as Russell and Liz said, the trace of the programs which runs  
all computations in that parallel -dovetailing manner.


But physics and theology are emerging from the internal relative  
machines points of views, and that gives a richer structure, relying  
on the continuum. The 1/3 distinction has a key role here.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/11/2013 4:05 PM, Pierz wrote:
It does seem that the measure problem is an open one for comp, as  
far as I can tell from Bruno's responses, but he  seems  
confident it's not insurmountable.


Bruno's so confident that he argues that there must be a measure  
(because he's assumed comp is true and his argument from comp is  
valid).  :-)


Haha! Yes, that's a good point. IF COMP is true that measure must  
exist, even if it took a billions years for humans to extract it. But  
the apparently universal machine get quickly a quantized structure  
(thanks to the p - []p appearing at the right places). So hope can  
exist that such problem is not that insurmountable.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 01:36, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:


Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
started.  Right?



Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.



To do that needs the phi_i, or the W_i. It is the sequence

phi_0(0)^0, phi_0(0)^1, etc.

With the three numbers (i, j, k) going through all element of NxNxN, and
phi_i(j)^k = the kth state /step of the computation of machine/number  
i, on input j.


Bruno


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 04:52, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
started.  Right?


Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz  
did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a  
clear,

crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.


Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up
to some point I don't see how we can define the kind of measure we
need over that, because the measure has to be over all threads of
computation corresponding to a particular classical state.



And these correspond to a countable union of sets of strings sharing
the same prefix, which is just the Solomonoff-Levin measure.


I think this might play some role in the thermodynamic, but the  
quantum and the very existence of physics needs the measure on the  
points of view (which I handle with the self-reference logics).


Bruno





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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Oct 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/11/2013 7:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a  
given

state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
started.  Right?


Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and  
Liz did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a  
clear,

crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.

Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up
to some point I don't see how we can define the kind of measure we
need over that, because the measure has to be over all threads of
computation corresponding to a particular classical state.


And these correspond to a countable union of sets of strings sharing
the same prefix, which is just the Solomonoff-Levin measure.



But there are infinitely more threads going thru (near) this state  
which have not yet been computed.  So the threads counted up to some  
point are of zero measure. ?


But the arithmetical truth is time independent, and all computations  
are computed, like in a block universe. The FPI do the rest.
Then you are right, all finite portion of UD* have no role, and the  
thread counted up to some point have zero measure. The 1-p exploits  
the neighborhood of omega, not zero.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or  
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch- 
counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any  
problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are  
there more even numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule  
derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for  
example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences,  
(then), disappearing, please do.


When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the  
quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern  
still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many  
self-multiplication.


It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)  
physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is  
the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of  
solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative.


Bruno





Brent

On 10/10/2013 6:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given  
that I'm not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular  
renditions of MWI by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing  
the point. But in my understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI,  
the reason for Born probabilities lies in the fact that there is no  
such thing as a single branch. Every branch of the multiverse  
contains an infinity of identical, fungible universes. When a  
quantum event occurs, that set of infinite universes divides  
proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The appearance  
of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication of  
the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?


On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian  
quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science
IN PRESS.


ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,  
emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]).  
The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum  
mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics,  
Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense  
of probabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the  
probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has  
derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s  
solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows.  
First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive  
the theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is  
not successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is  
correct to put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an  
axiom of rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so  
that BI is not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an  
alternative strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of  
branching which is rational, and which violates BI. This is Branch  
Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, and has proffered various  
arguments against it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s  
arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the  
probability problem in EQM persists.


http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf
Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics,  
May 2012)
‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics  
Persists’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science,  
2011 78(5): 976-988
‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73:  
393-412, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese,  
2011 179(2): 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)


His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also  
available in:
‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas  
(eds): Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and  
Foundational Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of  
Science Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer


I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI  
probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere  
by members of this list. Previous discussions have not been  
personally convincing.


Richard
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-12 Thread meekerdb

On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement.  How are 
these universes distinct from one another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets 
on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some 
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems 
with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers 
that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a 
Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), 
disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer to?  And you're 
asking why they disappeared?




When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave 
describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* 
dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective 
probabilities of contemplated futures.




It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. 
Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, the 
observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate 
some strong don't ask imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected. Physicists, like Fuchs, 
and unlike philosophers, are generally comfortable with not explaining everything.


Brent
I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of 
integrity.
--- Fredrick Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
 Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
 do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
 branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
 see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
 subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
elements. That is why I'm not sure that problems with assigning
measures to countably infinite sets (such as your example above re
even and square numbers) are really such a problem.


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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread LizR
If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives
the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that
is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of
either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those
into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or
is this too simplistic?)

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Pierz


On Friday, October 11, 2013 12:25:45 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:

  So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a 
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?  

 
They aren't 'distinct'. The hypothesis is that every universe branch 
contains an *uncountable* infinity of fungible (identical and 
interchangeable) universes. While this seems extravagant, it actually kind 
of makes more sense than the idea of a universe splitting into two (where 
did the second universe come from?). Instead, uncountable infinities of 
universes are differentiated from one another. Quantum interference 
patterns arise because of the possibility of universes merging back into 
one another again.
 

 Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do 
 infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting 
 measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with 
 assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even 
 numbers that square numbers?). 

 The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets in 
great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable 
infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a problem for 
Bruno's computations - a point I've tried to argue with Bruno, but he 
bamboozles my sophomoric maths with his replies. To me it seems you can't 
count computations that go through a state, because for every function f 
that computes a certain function, there is also some function f1 that also 
computes f such that f1 = f + 1 - 1. But maybe that can be solved by 
counting only the functions with the least number of steps (?).
 

 And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives 
 from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?

 I don't know about Chris Fuchs, although isn't that just Copenhagen? It's 
clear that one would need strong reasons to favour MWI with its crazy 
proliferation of entities, which at first blush seems to run against 
Occam's razor. However Deutsch makes a damn good fist of explaining why we 
in fact have those reasons. For instance, when a quantum computer 
calculates a function based on a superposition of states, MWI can explain 
where these calculations are occurring - in other universes. The computer 
is exploiting the possibility of massive parallelism inherent in that 
infinity of universes. It is entirely unclear how these calculations occur 
in the standard interpretation. MWI also solves the problem of what happens 
to non-realized measurement states once a system decoheres. And of course 
it gets around the intractable difficulties of non-computable wave 
collapse. So it's a case of choose your poison: infinite universes or 
conceptual incoherence. I'll take the former, even though in some ways I'd 
like the universe (or the multiverse) better if it wasn't that way.

Max Born was my great grandfather. I wonder what he would have made of 
Everett if he'd been a bit younger. When he died in 1970, it was still 
probably too out there for him to have seriously considered. 
 

 Brent

 On 10/10/2013 6:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
  
 I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm 
 not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI 
 by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my 
 understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the reason for Born 
 probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a single 
 branch. Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, 
 fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite 
 universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The 
 appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication 
 of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?

 On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote: 

 Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum 
 mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN PRESS. 

  ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, 
 emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The 
 possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, 
 in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the 
 ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the 
 Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch 
 ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that 
 Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. 
 First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the 
 theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not 
 successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to 
 put the burden of proof on Wallace to 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Pierz
That is pretty much exactly my understanding. It does puzzle me that this 
argument about the supposed probability problem with MWI is still live, 
when that explanation seems perfectly coherent.

On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:

 If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
 the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
 is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
 either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
 into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
 is this too simplistic?)



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Pierz
And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of 
irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an infinity as 
those between 0.1 and 1. So extrapolating to universes, the very low 
probability, white rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, 
but that does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave 
as we would classically expect. 

On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:

 If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
 the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
 is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
 either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
 into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
 is this too simplistic?)



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Oct 2013, at 13:09, Pierz wrote:




On Friday, October 11, 2013 12:25:45 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?


They aren't 'distinct'. The hypothesis is that every universe branch  
contains an *uncountable* infinity of fungible (identical and  
interchangeable) universes. While this seems extravagant, it  
actually kind of makes more sense than the idea of a universe  
splitting into two (where did the second universe come from?).  
Instead, uncountable infinities of universes are differentiated from  
one another. Quantum interference patterns arise because of the  
possibility of universes merging back into one another again.


With comp too, it is best to see one consciousness differentiating  
than actual splitting of universes.






Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or  
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch- 
counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any  
problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are  
there more even numbers that square numbers?).


The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets  
in great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these  
uncountable infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a  
problem for Bruno's computations - a point I've tried to argue with  
Bruno, but he bamboozles my sophomoric maths with his replies. To me  
it seems you can't count computations that go through a state,  
because for every function f that computes a certain function, there  
is also some function f1 that also computes f such that f1 = f + 1 -  
1. But maybe that can be solved by counting only the functions with  
the least number of steps (?).



You have to take all the programs, and all computations. Your relative  
1-indeterminacy bears on all computations going through your state.

Using little programs would beg the 1-p/3-p problem.
There is an uncountable set of such computations, as they dovetail on  
the reals. Just keep in mind that the UD is enough dumb to implement  
the infinite iterated self-duplication, which leads to uncountably  
many histories.


(Having said that, there are many ways to put probability and measure  
on any set, finite, enumerable, non enumerable, etc. Sometimes people  
just relinquish the sigma-additivity condition, and still get  
something very close to a measure).






And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule  
derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for  
example, Chris Fuchs?


I don't know about Chris Fuchs, although isn't that just Copenhagen?  
It's clear that one would need strong reasons to favour MWI with its  
crazy proliferation of entities, which at first blush seems to run  
against Occam's razor. However Deutsch makes a damn good fist of  
explaining why we in fact have those reasons. For instance, when a  
quantum computer calculates a function based on a superposition of  
states, MWI can explain where these calculations are occurring - in  
other universes. The computer is exploiting the possibility of  
massive parallelism inherent in that infinity of universes. It is  
entirely unclear how these calculations occur in the standard  
interpretation. MWI also solves the problem of what happens to non- 
realized measurement states once a system decoheres. And of course  
it gets around the intractable difficulties of non-computable wave  
collapse. So it's a case of choose your poison: infinite universes  
or conceptual incoherence. I'll take the former, even though in some  
ways I'd like the universe (or the multiverse) better if it wasn't  
that way.


Max Born was my great grandfather. I wonder what he would have made  
of Everett if he'd been a bit younger. When he died in 1970, it was  
still probably too out there for him to have seriously considered.


That would have been nice to know. I really love the correspondence  
between Max Born and Albert Einstein. I think both would have accepted  
Everett, even if with some grimaces, like François Englert and many  
quantum cosmologists.


I disagree with the idea that Everett propose a new interpretation of  
QM. Everett proposes a new theory, which is just Copenhagen without  
the collapse.  Everett himself talk about a new formulation of QM, not  
a new interpretation. that is not so important, except when we begin  
to use logic, which forces to be precise on what is a theory, and what  
is an interpretation of a theory.


And Everett QM obeys Occam in the sense that he used less hypotheses.

Bruno




Brent

On 10/10/2013 6:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given  
that I'm not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular  
renditions of MWI by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing  
the point. But in my 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Richard Ruquist
Pierz: Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
fungible universes.
Richard: How do you know this? Who said so?
 Besides the branches must contain a finite number of identical universes
for probabilities to be realized.
 Dividing infinity by any number results in an infinity.


On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:11 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

 I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm
 not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI
 by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my
 understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the reason for Born
 probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a single
 branch. Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
 fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite
 universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The
 appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
 of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?

 On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:

 Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum
 mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN PRESS.

 ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,
 emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The
 possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are,
 in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the
 ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the
 Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch
 ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that
 Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows.
 First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the
 theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not
 successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to
 put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of
 rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not
 rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for
 setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and
 which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC,
 and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue
 that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the
 probability problem in EQM persists.

 http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.**pdf http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf
 Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012)
 ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’,
 British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
  ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011
 78(5): 976-988
 ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412,
 (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
 ‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2):
 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)

 His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in:
 ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): Recent
 Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems,
 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings),
 Dordrecht: Springer

 I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI
 probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by
 members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally
 convincing.

 Richard

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Richard Ruquist
Opps. I replied before reading the entire discussion


On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 9:08 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 Pierz: Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
 fungible universes.
 Richard: How do you know this? Who said so?
  Besides the branches must contain a finite number of identical universes
 for probabilities to be realized.
  Dividing infinity by any number results in an infinity.


 On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:11 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

 I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm
 not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI
 by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my
 understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the reason for Born
 probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a single
 branch. Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
 fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite
 universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The
 appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
 of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?

 On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:

 Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian
 quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN
 PRESS.

 ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,
 emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The
 possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are,
 in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the
 ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the
 Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch
 ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that
 Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows.
 First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the
 theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not
 successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to
 put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of
 rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not
 rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for
 setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and
 which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC,
 and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue
 that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the
 probability problem in EQM persists.

 http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.**pdf http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf
 Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May
 2012)
 ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’,
 British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
  ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011
 78(5): 976-988
 ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412,
 (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
 ‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2):
 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)

 His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available
 in:
 ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds):
 Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational
 Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association
 Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer

 I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI
 probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by
 members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally
 convincing.

 Richard

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Jason Resch



On Oct 11, 2013, at 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 11 Oct 2013, at 13:16, Pierz wrote:

And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number  
of irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an  
infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.


It is the same cardinal (2^aleph_zero). But cardinality is not what  
count when searching a measure.



So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white  
rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that  
does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave  
as we would classically expect.


That is what remain to be seen. But if comp is true, we know the  
measure has to exist, and the math gives some clues that it is  
indeed the case, from machines' (consistent and/or true) points of  
view.




Bruno,

Could the matter of the countably infinite number of programs be  
irrelevant from the first person perspective because any given mind  
contains/is aware of only a finite amount of information?


Say some mind contains a million bits of information. Then there is a  
finite number (2^100) of distinct combinations of content for that  
mind. These differations are all that matter from the first person  
view, and some may be more probable than others.


(But deciding the measures for each of those finite number of  
possibilities depends on infinite computations, and so would they be  
real numbers?)


Jason



Bruno




On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that  
gives the required probabilities. For example if the part of the  
multiverse that is involved in performing a quantum measurement  
with a 50-50 chance of either outcome is represented by the numbers  
0 to 1, you can divide those into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David  
do something like this in FOR? (Or is this too simplistic?)



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
elements.


I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form a continuum, which I 
don't think they do.  I QM an underlying continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in 
Bruno's theory.


Brent


That is why I'm not sure that problems with assigning
measures to countably infinite sets (such as your example above re
even and square numbers) are really such a problem.




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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 4:09 AM, Pierz wrote:



On Friday, October 11, 2013 12:25:45 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement.  
How are
these universes distinct from one another?

They aren't 'distinct'. The hypothesis is that every universe branch contains an 
*uncountable* infinity of fungible (identical and interchangeable) universes. While this 
seems extravagant, it actually kind of makes more sense than the idea of a universe 
splitting into two (where did the second universe come from?). Instead, uncountable 
infinities of universes are differentiated from one another. Quantum interference 
patterns arise because of the possibility of universes merging back into one another again.


Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do 
infinitely
many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure 
produces the
right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to 
infinite
countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets in great detail and 
shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable infinities (as Russell points 
out)), whereas it may be a problem for Bruno's computations - a point I've tried to 
argue with Bruno, but he bamboozles my sophomoric maths with his replies. To me it seems 
you can't count computations that go through a state, because for every function f that 
computes a certain function, there is also some function f1 that also computes f such 
that f1 = f + 1 - 1. But maybe that can be solved by counting only the functions with 
the least number of steps (?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives 
from a
Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?

I don't know about Chris Fuchs, although isn't that just Copenhagen?


No, it's an interpretation of QM as personal probabilities, i.e. quantum Bayesianism.  It 
reifies information, not quantum states, c.f. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1207.2141.pdf or 
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.3274.pdf  It's might be compatible with Bruno's ideas where 
Copenhagen certainly isn't.


It's clear that one would need strong reasons to favour MWI with its crazy proliferation 
of entities, which at first blush seems to run against Occam's razor. However Deutsch 
makes a damn good fist of explaining why we in fact have those reasons. For instance, 
when a quantum computer calculates a function based on a superposition of states, MWI 
can explain where these calculations are occurring - in other universes. The computer is 
exploiting the possibility of massive parallelism inherent in that infinity of 
universes. It is entirely unclear how these calculations occur in the standard 
interpretation. MWI also solves the problem of what happens to non-realized measurement 
states once a system decoheres. And of course it gets around the intractable 
difficulties of non-computable wave collapse. So it's a case of choose your poison: 
infinite universes or conceptual incoherence. I'll take the former, even though in some 
ways I'd like the universe (or the multiverse) better if it wasn't that way.


If you just read this list you have the impression that MWI is the consensus true 
interpretation of QM; but it's still controversial (as are all other intepretations).  I 
highly recommend reading Scott Aaronson's arXiv:1108.1791v3  Why Philosophers Should Care 
About Computational Complexity.  Section 8 is his discussion of Deutsch's argument based 
on computation.  He gives several reasons why Deutsch's argument, if not actually wrong, 
may not mean what people think it means.  Here's the concluding part:



=

One can sharpen the point as follows: if one took the parallel-universes 
explanation of how a
quantum computer works too seriously (as many popular writers do!), then it would be 
natural to

make further inferences about quantum computing that are flat-out wrong. For 
example:

“Using only a thousand quantum bits (or qubits), a quantum computer could store 
21000
classical bits.”

This is true only for a bizarre definition of the word “store”! The fundamental problem is 
that,

when you measure a quantum computer’s state, you see only one of the possible 
outcomes; the
rest disappear. Indeed, a celebrated result called Holevo’s Theorem [74] says that, using 
n qubits,
there is no way to store more than n classical bits so that the bits can be reliably 
retrieved later.
In other words: for at least one natural definition of “information-carrying capacity,” 
qubits have

exactly the same capacity as bits.

To take another example:

“Unlike a classical computer, which can only factor numbers by trying the 
divisors one
by one, a quantum computer could try all possible divisors in parallel.”

If quantum computers can harness vast numbers of 

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 4:16 AM, Pierz wrote:
And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of irrational numbers 
between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.


No, the two are exactly the same uncountable infinity, because there is a 1-to-1 mapping 
between them.


So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white rabbit universes also 
occur an infinite number of times, but that does not make them equally as likely as the 
universes which behave as we would classically expect.


But computationalism only produces rational numbers.

Brent



On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:

If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives the
required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that is 
involved
in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of either outcome is
represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those into 0-0.5 and 0.5 
to 1.
Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or is this too plistic?)

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread LizR
I know I shouldn't be flattered to hear that Max Born's great grandson
endorses my view of quantum probability, but.

:D  :D  :D

On 12 October 2013 00:11, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

 That is pretty much exactly my understanding. It does puzzle me that this
 argument about the supposed probability problem with MWI is still live,
 when that explanation seems perfectly coherent.

 On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:

 If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives
 the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that
 is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of
 either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those
 into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or
 is this too simplistic?)



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
 Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
 do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
 branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
 see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
 subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).
 But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
 elements.
 
 I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
 a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
 continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
 

UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

Cheers

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:09:20AM -0700, Pierz wrote:
  The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets in 
 great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable 
 infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a problem for 

Interesting. I wasn't aware that Deutsch had done that. I was aware of
his critiques of measuring countable sets (such as in the infinity
hotel chapter of BoI), but not that he showed there was no such
problems with uncountable sets. Do you have a reference?

Of course, I take the position that it will be alright on the night,
and give a plausible account of it in my solution of the White Rabbit
problem in my paper Why Occams razor, but that has been criticised,
particularly by Bruno, that the measure issue is not so simple. I
don't feel confident enough in the maths of measure theory to say that
it isn't a problem, just that I can't see a problem in using
Solomonoff's measure. Hence my interest in Deutsch's take.

Cheers

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 2:46 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
elements.

I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.


UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y).


Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on this 
space?

Brent


ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

Cheers



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread LizR
On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

 On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
  I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
  a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
  continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
 

 UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
 the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n},
 where n is
 the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
 metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
 is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

 I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a
 countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?


Am I missing diagonalisation? i.e. Can the UD output be diagonalised?

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Oct 12, 2013 at 11:14:32AM +1300, LizR wrote:
 On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
 
  On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
 
  On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
   I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
   a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
   continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
  
 
  UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
  the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n},
  where n is
  the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
  metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
  is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?
 
  I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a
  countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?
 
 
 Am I missing diagonalisation? i.e. Can the UD output be diagonalised?
 

The UD doesn't output anything. If it did, then certainly, the output
could not be an uncountable set due to the diagonalisation argument.

Rather UD* is like the internal view of the operation of the
dovetailer, like the sum of all possible experiences of the Helsinki
man being duplicated to Washington and Moscow that is being discussed
rather a lot lately.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
 the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n 
 is
 the number of leading bits in common between x and y).
 
 Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on 
 this space?
 

1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
arbitrary sets of binary strings.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread LizR
On 12 October 2013 11:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

 The UD doesn't output anything. If it did, then certainly, the output
 could not be an uncountable set due to the diagonalisation argument.


Yes, I wasn't speaking very precisely. Obviously there is no output,
because where would it go? I meant the trace, which I assume is a record of
its operation, which itself exists in arithmetic (I think?)


 Rather UD* is like the internal view of the operation of the
 dovetailer, like the sum of all possible experiences of the Helsinki
 man being duplicated to Washington and Moscow that is being discussed
 rather a lot lately.

 Ah! Should read to the end :)
Thanks.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Pierz


On Saturday, October 12, 2013 5:42:06 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:

  On 10/11/2013 4:16 AM, Pierz wrote:
  
 And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of 
 irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an infinity as 
 those between 0.1 and 1. 


 No, the two are exactly the same uncountable infinity, because there is a 
 1-to-1 mapping between them.


My mathematical terminology may not be up to scratch. The measure is 
different.


  So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white rabbit 
 universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that does not make 
 them equally as likely as the universes which behave as we would 
 classically expect. 
  

 But computationalism only produces rational numbers.


We were talking MWI, where a measure is permitted because of the underlying 
physical continuum. It does seem that the measure problem is an open one 
for comp, as far as I can tell from Bruno's responses, but he seems 
confident it's not insurmountable. I'm not competent to judge.
 


 Brent

  
 On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote: 

 If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
 the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
 is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
 either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
 into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
 is this too plistic?) 

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Pierz
Haha. The flattery may be undone by learning that your view of quantum 
probability is also endorsed by Olivia Newton-John's nephew! :)

On Saturday, October 12, 2013 8:26:23 AM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:

 I know I shouldn't be flattered to hear that Max Born's great grandson 
 endorses my view of quantum probability, but. 

 :D  :D  :D

 On 12 October 2013 00:11, Pierz pie...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:

 That is pretty much exactly my understanding. It does puzzle me that this 
 argument about the supposed probability problem with MWI is still live, 
 when that explanation seems perfectly coherent.

 On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:

 If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
 the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
 is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
 either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
 into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
 is this too simplistic?)



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y).

Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on this 
space?


1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
arbitrary sets of binary strings.



Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given state of the UD, the 
last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit output by the 2nd program,...up to the last 
prog that the UD has started.  Right?


Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 4:05 PM, Pierz wrote:
It does seem that the measure problem is an open one for comp, as far as I can tell from 
Bruno's responses, but he seems confident it's not insurmountable.


Bruno's so confident that he argues that there must be a measure (because he's assumed 
comp is true and his argument from comp is valid).  :-)


Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 
 Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
 state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
 output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
 started.  Right?
 

Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.

Cheers

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Pierz


On Saturday, October 12, 2013 9:07:57 AM UTC+11, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:09:20AM -0700, Pierz wrote: 
   The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets 
 in 
  great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable 
  infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a problem for 

 Interesting. I wasn't aware that Deutsch had done that. I was aware of 
 his critiques of measuring countable sets (such as in the infinity 
 hotel chapter of BoI), but not that he showed there was no such 
 problems with uncountable sets. Do you have a reference? 

 Of course, I take the position that it will be alright on the night, 
 and give a plausible account of it in my solution of the White Rabbit 
 problem in my paper Why Occams razor, but that has been criticised, 
 particularly by Bruno, that the measure issue is not so simple. I 
 don't feel confident enough in the maths of measure theory to say that 
 it isn't a problem, just that I can't see a problem in using 
 Solomonoff's measure. Hence my interest in Deutsch's take. 

 Cheers 


Sorry to disappoint you. I was referring rather to his arguments in BoI 
that the measure problem is not an issue for MWI because of the underlying 
relationships between the universes (on page 179-180 for instance). It 
wasn't actually about uncountable infinities versus countable ones :(


 -- 

  

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 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Pierz


On Saturday, October 12, 2013 10:08:05 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:

  On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
  
 On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

  UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
 the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n 
 is
 the number of leading bits in common between x and y).

  Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on 
 this space?


  1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
 apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
 relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
 these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

 The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
 supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
 set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
 prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
 considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
 arbitrary sets of binary strings.


  
 Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given state 
 of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit output by the 
 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has started.  Right?

 Brent


But Russell just said there *is* no output. There are only machine states 
(computation X is at step Y and so on). I thought the UD* was the entire 
history of computational states the the UD passes through from the moment 
it starts up to ... well, forever. 

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread LizR
On 12 October 2013 12:06, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

 Haha. The flattery may be undone by learning that your view of quantum
 probability is also endorsed by Olivia Newton-John's nephew! :)


OMG!!!

:D :D :D

It's electrifying!

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 4:45 PM, Pierz wrote:



On Saturday, October 12, 2013 10:08:05 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where 
n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y).

Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on 
this space?


1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
arbitrary sets of binary strings.



Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given state 
of the UD,
the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit output by the 2nd 
program,...up to
the last prog that the UD has started.  Right?

Brent


But Russell just said there *is* no output.


I just meant last printed onto the tape.

Brent

There are only machine states (computation X is at step Y and so on). I thought the UD* 
was the entire history of computational states the the UD passes through from the moment 
it starts up to ... well, forever.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
started.  Right?


Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.


Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up to some point I don't 
see how we can define the kind of measure we need over that, because the measure has to be 
over all threads of computation corresponding to a particular classical state.


Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
 state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
 output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
 started.  Right?
 
 Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
 anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
 emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
 experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.
 
 Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
 also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
 crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.
 
 Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up
 to some point I don't see how we can define the kind of measure we
 need over that, because the measure has to be over all threads of
 computation corresponding to a particular classical state.
 

And these correspond to a countable union of sets of strings sharing
the same prefix, which is just the Solomonoff-Levin measure.

-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread meekerdb

On 10/11/2013 7:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
started.  Right?


Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.

Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up
to some point I don't see how we can define the kind of measure we
need over that, because the measure has to be over all threads of
computation corresponding to a particular classical state.


And these correspond to a countable union of sets of strings sharing
the same prefix, which is just the Solomonoff-Levin measure.



But there are infinitely more threads going thru (near) this state which have not yet been 
computed.  So the threads counted up to some point are of zero measure. ?


Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-10 Thread Pierz
I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm 
not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI 
by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my 
understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the reason for Born 
probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a single 
branch. Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, 
fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite 
universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The 
appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication 
of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?

On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:

 Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum 
 mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN PRESS.

 ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, 
 emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The 
 possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, 
 in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the 
 ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the 
 Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch 
 ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that 
 Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. 
 First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the 
 theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not 
 successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to 
 put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of 
 rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not 
 rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for 
 setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and 
 which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, 
 and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue 
 that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the 
 probability problem in EQM persists.

 http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf
 Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012)
   ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’, 
 British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
   ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011 
 78(5): 976-988
   ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412, 
 (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
   ‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2): 
 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)

 His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in:
   ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): 
 Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational 
 Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association 
 Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer

 I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI probability 
 problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by members of this 
 list. Previous discussions have not been personally convincing.

 Richard


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-10 Thread meekerdb
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement.  How are these 
universes distinct from one another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a 
binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some 
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with 
assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square 
numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian 
epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


Brent

On 10/10/2013 6:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm not a physicist 
and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI by Deutsch and others, it may 
be me who's missing the point. But in my understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the 
reason for Born probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a single 
branch. Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, fungible 
universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite universes divides 
proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The appearance of probability 
arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication of the observer in those infinite 
branches. Why is this problematic?


On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:

Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum 
mechanics
persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN PRESS.

ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, emergent,
branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The possible 
outcomes of
measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, in EQM, all 
instantiated. Given
this metaphysics, Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make 
sense of
probabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, 
Wallace,
following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I 
argue
that Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as 
follows.
First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the 
theorem,
Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful in 
showing that
BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put the burden of proof on 
Wallace to
motivate BI as an axiom of rationality, it does not follow from his failing 
to do so
that BI is not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative 
strategy
for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and 
which
violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, and has 
proffered
various arguments against it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s 
arguments
against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM 
persists.

http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf
Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012)
‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’, British 
Journal
for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011 78(5): 
976-988
‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412, (with 
R. Frigg
and S. Hartmann)
‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2): 
321-338,
(with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)

His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in:
‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): Recent 
Progress
in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems, 2013, 
(The Third
European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer

I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI probability 
problem
although it has been covered here and elsewhere by members of this list. 
Previous
discussions have not been personally convincing.

Richard

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Oct 2013, at 23:30, John Mikes wrote:


Richard:
I grew into denying probability in cases where not - ALL -  
circumstances are known.


I agree with this. That is why there are many other attempt to study  
ignorance and beliefs (like believability theories, which is like  
probability, except they can sum and go above 1).
Now I am not sure Dizadji-Bahmani is successful on his critics on  
branching indifference, which of ourse can be seen as part of the  
first person indeterminacy in the (more general) comp or arithmetical  
duplication situations.


Bruno



Since we know only part of the infinite complexity of the WORLD, we  
buy in for a mistake if fixing anything like 'probability'.
The same goes for statistical: push the borderlines abit further  
away and the COUNT of the studied item (= statistical value) will  
change. Also the above argument for probability is valid for results  
as 'statistical' values.

JM


On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com  
wrote:
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian  
quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN  
PRESS.


ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,  
emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]).  
The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum  
mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics,  
Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of  
probabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the probability  
problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum  
representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the  
probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine  
one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem,  
Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful  
in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put  
the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of  
rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is  
not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative  
strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which  
is rational, and which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC).  
Wallace is aware of BC, and has proffered various arguments against  
it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC are  
unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists.


http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf
Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May  
2012)
‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics  
Persists’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science,  
2011 78(5): 976-988
‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73:  
393-412, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011  
179(2): 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)


His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also  
available in:
‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas  
(eds): Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and  
Foundational Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of  
Science Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer


I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI  
probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere  
by members of this list. Previous discussions have not been  
personally convincing.


Richard

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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