On 07 Feb 2011, at 21:22, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 19:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of an
algorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea,
but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not,
then, related to the fact that physical machines appears as
relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too,
and that this is already not just described in arithmetic, but
emulated in arithmetical truth.
This is the starting point I am trying to agree between the two of us.
PROPOSITION 1
The mind is related to the execution of an algorithm -- for
instance, on some physical machine.
Then, we propose, we go beyond the concept of the physical machine,
and simply suppose that:
PROPOSITION 2
The mind is the execution of an algorithm, an algorithm which simply
exists, without the requirement for any physical instantiation, or
any physical universe / multiverse in actuality.
In other words, the algorithm simply exists, and simply runs, and
the subjective experience of this algorithm:
Looks exactly like
Feels exactly like
Sounds exactly like
Smells and tastes exactly like
a real physical, relativistic, quantum mechanical reality.
The first proposition, that the mind is / is related to the
execution of an algorithm, I have no problem with whatsoever. This
is what I see emphasised in your steps 1-7, with examples of
displacement of the observer in space, and then time, and then
replacement, and then duplication in space and time.
This all makes perfect sense.
I think of this as tautological.
?
Comp is everything but tautological. It asks for an act of faith. It
is a big jump. Even actual machine can prove that they cannot be sound
and prove that they are machine. Also, I don't like using the notion
of algorithm because it is a very complex notion which does not admit
precise definition. I prefer to talk on more concrete "programs",
which can be see as numbers relative to a universal number. I fix the
universal universal system to arithmetic (addition and
multiplication), which I assume, and from that I prove the existence
of universal numbers and many machines, and they discourses.
The consequence of comp are usually judge even more less obvious.
Equally, there is no problem, of course, that in the context of the
execution of the algorithm, "physical machines appears as relatively
stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too".
But
The *obvious* implication is that the physical machines *are*
relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm,
specifically, the algorithm instantiated in the physical quantum
mechanical universe.
And that
"physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some
unknown number of algorithm too", in the virtual reality each
observer generates between the ears, as Deutsch describes.
Now
Going on from that starting point
We are philosophically interested in showing that this execution of
the algorithm may be taking place in such a way as to give the
appearance of the physical quantum mechanical universe, without
there having to be an actual physical quantum mechanical universe.
I am delighted to entertain this possibility. However, I have not to
date understood the basis on which you are claiming you have found
support for it. I'm sure I'll get there!
You still miss the point. It is not a question of having any support
of that idea. It is a question of understanding that it is a
consequence of the comp assumption. It is a theorem, if you want. may
be there is still a flaw, but people fails to find it, despite a
reasonable number of people have tried. Some can sometimes show that
the reasoning might be improved and more pedagogical, but I think it
is just a theorem. You can obvioulsy still believe in a primitive
physical universe by either abandoning comp, or by adding an invisible
physical universe as an epiphenomenon (which is pretty ridiculous
'course).
Anyway, I give the tools to extract the physics, so we can already
compare. Eventually this can lead to a measuring of our degree of
computationalism with respect to nature.
Bruno
It is hard for me to believe in any of this, but I just follow a
theory toward its logical consequences.
I know exactly what you mean about this. For years, after I had I
deduced the extraordinary implications of Everett's formulation, I
acknowledged that very peculiar properties of the transtemporal
experiential reality were implied, but I could not really take them
as real and actual, let alone make them part of my personal
epistemology. (Eventually, however, quite recently, these
implications began to become real for me. This, I can report, is a
wildly exciting, terrifying, and totally all consuming transition!)
I have titled the reply to your email as The propositions of comp?
In this thread I would like to be crystal clear simply about what
the propositions are, then I know exactly what we are discussing in
subsequent / parallel threads.
Andrew
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