Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-27 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, December 27, 2018 at 6:55:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 


 Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
 (non-digital) brain?






 are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
 brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
 with symbols. 


 I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could 
 work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to 
 now, I see only a magical use of word.

 For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
 words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
 symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
 there is a theory, or just idea-associations.

 Bruno 





>>>
>>>
>>> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, 
>>> that's one thing scientists are studying:
>>>
>>> 
>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>
>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>>
>>> 
>>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as 
>>> I've given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, 
>>> we cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>>> matter being quite magical.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*.
>> Matter is *Experientialistic*.
>>
>> That's the whole thing!
>>
>>
>> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
>> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, 
>> and so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic 
>> phenomenological matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would 
>> need to run the entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails 
>> a “non-cloning” theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
>> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non 
>> computable things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. 
>> Most arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy 
>> inherit it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.
>
>
>
> But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or 
> fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no 
> problem there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who 
> forbid to doubt physicalism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


What if conventional mathematics itself is in error by assuming its primary 
elements are numbers?

(There is arguably something to category/type theory that maybe gets away 
from this.)


What if primary elements include/are non-numbers - (qualitative) 
experiences?

HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies
Vol 9 No 31 (2016) : 
The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology: In Search of New Categories

Introduction :
– the enactive approach opposes the Cartesian bifurcation of reality into 
psychological and physical
– complements quantitative categories, offering a mathematical treatment of 
qualitative aspects of reality

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/


- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>>> 
>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>>> (non-digital) brain?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
 brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
 with symbols. 
>>> 
>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
>>> see only a magical use of word.
>>> 
>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>> 
>>> Bruno 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's 
>>> one thing scientists are studying:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
>>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>> 
>> 
>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
>> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>> matter being quite magical.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
>> Matter is Experientialistic.
>> 
>> That's the whole thing!
> 
> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and 
> so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological 
> matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the 
> entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning” 
> theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable 
> things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most 
> arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit 
> it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.


But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or 
fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no problem 
there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who forbid to 
doubt physicalism.

Bruno



> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 
>>>
>>>
>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>>> (non-digital) brain?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
>>> with symbols. 
>>>
>>>
>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could 
>>> work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to 
>>> now, I see only a magical use of word.
>>>
>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, 
>> that's one thing scientists are studying:
>>
>> 
>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>
>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>> thing (the next chapter):
>>
>> 
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>
>>  
>>
>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as 
>> I've given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>>
>>
>>
>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, 
>> we cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>> matter being quite magical.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*.
> Matter is *Experientialistic*.
>
> That's the whole thing!
>
>
> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, 
> and so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic 
> phenomenological matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would 
> need to run the entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails 
> a “non-cloning” theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non 
> computable things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. 
> Most arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy 
> inherit it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.


- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>> 
>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>> (non-digital) brain?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
>>> with symbols. 
>> 
>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see 
>> only a magical use of word.
>> 
>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>> 
>> Bruno 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's one 
>> thing scientists are studying:
>> 
>> 
>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>> thing (the next chapter):
>> 
>> 
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of operating 
>> with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have actual 
>> (material!) realization as experience.
> 
> 
> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
> matter being quite magical.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
> Matter is Experientialistic.
> 
> That's the whole thing!

But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first person, 
phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and so 
Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological matter. 
For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the entire 
universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning” theorem 
for matter, confirmed by QM.
In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable 
things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most arithmetical 
truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit it by the First 
Person Indeterminacy on all computations.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
>  
> 
> -- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-23 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 
>>
>>
>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>> (non-digital) brain?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
>> with symbols. 
>>
>>
>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
>> see only a magical use of word.
>>
>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, 
> that's one thing scientists are studying:
>
> 
> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>
> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
> thing (the next chapter):
>
> 
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>
>  
>
> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>
>
>
> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
> matter being quite magical.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*.
Matter is *Experientialistic*.

That's the whole thing!

- pt

 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
> 
> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
> (non-digital) brain?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with 
>> symbols. 
> 
> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see 
> only a magical use of word.
> 
> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if there 
> is a theory, or just idea-associations.
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's one 
> thing scientists are studying:
> 
> 
> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
> 
> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
> thing (the next chapter):
> 
> 
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
> 
>  
> 
> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of operating 
> with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have actual 
> (material!) realization as experience.


You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary matter 
being quite magical.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 
>
>
> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
> (non-digital) brain?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
> with symbols. 
>
>
> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
> see only a magical use of word.
>
> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
>


Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, that's 
one thing scientists are studying:


https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/

Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
thing (the next chapter):

  
  https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html

 

On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
actual (material!) realization as experience.

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 5:41:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> snip
> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling?
>>> 
>>> When you get down to the bottom of it, numbers are spiritual entities.
>> 
>> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, 
>> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then 
>> consciousness mind, etc. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities.
>> 
>> 
>> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and 
>> math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems to 
>> me.
>> 
>> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I 
>> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual 
>> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively 
>> material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through 
>> this.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that 
>> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist).
>> 
>> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language 
>> group) created by material entities.
> 
> But the arithmetical reality is not a language.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A   
>> (A→M),  is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is 
>> enough? 
> 
> Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of view 
> of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That difference 
> of perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical reality..
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., 
>> who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever 
>> materialists are misguided).
> 
> 
> Which psychical states of matter? 
> 
> Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee?
> 
> To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a 
> brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a 
> brain if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you think 
> a brain is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing 
> emulated but that this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it was 
> conscious, but isn’t?).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That arithmetic is a language (or technically, a language group) leads to it 
> (from a language theory perspective) includes both syntax & semantics.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
> Formal semantics
> 
> Main article: Formal semantics of programming languages 
> 
> Formal semantics is the formal specification of the behavior of computer 
> programs and programming languages. Three common approaches to describe the 
> semantics or "meaning" of a computer program are denotational semantics 
> , operational semantics 
>  and axiomatic semantics 
> .
> 
> 

Wiki is not quite accurate on those matters. Better to separate the language, 
the semantics, and the theories.  I use the notion of theory, to avoid the 
“semantics” used in programming language (to avoid possible confusion). 





> (From a fictionalist view, the objects of arithmetic are fictional objects: a 
> fictional semantics.)


The point is that with Mechanism, primary physics is inconsistent. So we are 
out of my working hypothesis.


> 
> 
> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)

Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the (non-digital) 
brain?






> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with 
> symbols. 

I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see 
only a magical use of word.

For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any words. 
Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional symbols, and 
R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if there is a theory, 
or just idea-associations.

Bruno 




> 
> 
> - pt 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 5:41:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> snip
>>
>>
>
>>
>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling?
>>
>> When you get down to the bottom of it, *numbers are spiritual entities*.
>>
>>
>> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, 
>> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then 
>> consciousness mind, etc. 
>>
>>
>>
>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities.
>>
>>
>>
>> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and 
>> math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems 
>> to me.
>>
>> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I 
>> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual 
>> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively 
>> material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through 
>> this.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that 
> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist).
>
> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language 
> group) created by material entities.
>
>
> But the arithmetical reality is not a language.
>
>
>
>
> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A  
>  (A→M),  is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is 
> enough? 
>
>
> Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of 
> view of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That 
> difference of perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical 
> reality..
>
>
>
>
> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., 
> who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever 
> materialists are misguided).
>
>
>
> Which psychical states of matter? 
>
> Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee?
>
> To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a 
> brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a 
> brain if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you 
> think a brain is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing 
> emulated but that this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it 
> was conscious, but isn’t?).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
That arithmetic is a language (or technically, a language group) leads to 
it (from a language theory perspective) includes both syntax & semantics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
Formal semantics
Main article: Formal semantics of programming languages 


Formal semantics is the formal specification of the behavior of computer 
programs and programming languages. Three common approaches to describe the 
semantics or "meaning" of a computer program are denotational semantics 
, operational 
semantics  and axiomatic 
semantics .

(From a fictionalist view, the objects of arithmetic are fictional objects: 
a fictional semantics.)


The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) are the real 
constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The brain-as-computer operates 
with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with symbols. 


- pt 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> snip

>> 
>> 
>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling?
>> 
>> When you get down to the bottom of it, numbers are spiritual entities.
> 
> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, 
> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then 
> consciousness mind, etc. 
> 
> 
> 
>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities.
> 
> 
> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and math 
> in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems to me.
> 
> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I 
> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual 
> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively material 
> world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through this.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that 
> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist).
> 
> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language 
> group) created by material entities.

But the arithmetical reality is not a language.



> 
> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A   
> (A→M),  is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is 
> enough? 

Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of view 
of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That difference of 
perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical reality..



> 
> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., who 
> say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever materialists 
> are misguided).


Which psychical states of matter? 

Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee?

To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a 
brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a brain 
if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you think a brain 
is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing emulated but that 
this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it was conscious, but 
isn’t?).

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
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> .
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> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> .

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 9:24:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  
> wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p 
> is proved. 
> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p 
> -> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = 
> Gödel’s 
> beweisbar. 
> >> 
> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will 
> belong to G* \ G. 
>  
>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
> inconsistency. 
> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting 
> them for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though 
> "true" 
> is undefinable)? 
> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any 
> obvious truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition 
> for which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
> (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too 
> which 
> this provability and consistency referred to. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
>  
> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> > 
> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building 
> doesn't mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>
> ? 
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories 
> are false. 
> > 
> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>
> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not 
> mean anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* 
> arithmetic. 
>
> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, 
> then it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than 
> arithmetic, but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test 
> Mechanism. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of 
> arithmetic, as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s 
> consistency 
> in arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic 
> is 
> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
> > 
> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>
> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need 
> to assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure 
> more 
> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
> even in the infinity axioms. 
>
> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the 
> use of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their 
> descriptions and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot 
> even 
> secure the finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one 
> the system is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson 
> Arithmetic is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. 
> We 
> know now 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 9:24:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>>>  proved. 
>>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true) 
>>> >>>  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
>>> >> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>>> >> beweisbar. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> 
>>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
>>>  G* \ G. 
>>>  
>>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
>>>  In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
>>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
>>> >>> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" 
>>> >>> is undefinable)? 
>>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>>> >> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>>> >>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
>>> >> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
>>> >> provability and consistency referred to. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>>  
>>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
>>> >>> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>>> > 
>>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
>>> > mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>>> 
>>> ? 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>>> >> false. 
>>> > 
>>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>>> 
>>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
>>> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>>> 
>>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it 
>>> is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but 
>>> the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
>>> >> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>>> >> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>>> >> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>>> > 
>>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>>> 
>>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
>>> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
>>> even in the infinity axioms. 
>>> 
>>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
>>> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
>>> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
>>> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
>>> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you 
>>> get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
>>> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> > 
>>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
>>> >> quite the contrary. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>>> >> (easily) its consistency. 
>>> > 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 9:24:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
 > 
 > 
 > 
 > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  
 wrote: 
 >>> 
 >>> 
 >>> 
 >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p 
 is proved. 
 >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
 true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
 >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p 
 -> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
 beweisbar. 
 >> 
 >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >>> 
  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong 
 to G* \ G. 
  
  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
 true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
 inconsistency. 
 >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting 
 them for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" 
 is undefinable)? 
 >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
 truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition 
 for which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
 >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
 (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too 
 which 
 this provability and consistency referred to. 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
  
 > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
 >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
 arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
 >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
 > 
 > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building 
 doesn't mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 

 ? 



 > 
 >> 
 >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories 
 are false. 
 > 
 > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 

 In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not 
 mean anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* 
 arithmetic. 

 If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then 
 it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, 
 but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 






 > 
 >> 
 >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, 
 as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
 arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
 consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
 > 
 > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 

 Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
 assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
 system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
 on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
 get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
 even in the infinity axioms. 

 Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use 
 of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions 
 and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the 
 finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system 
 is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic 
 is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now 
 that we understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 



 > 
 >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s 
 consistency, quite the contrary. 
 >> 
 >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
 (easily) its consistency. 
 > 
 > 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p 
>>> is proved. 
>>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
>>> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p 
>>> -> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>>> beweisbar. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> 
>>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong 
>>> to G* \ G. 
>>>  
>>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
>>> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
>>> inconsistency. 
>>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting 
>>> them for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" 
>>> is undefinable)? 
>>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>>> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
>>> (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which 
>>> this provability and consistency referred to. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>>  
>>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
>>> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>>> > 
>>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building 
>>> doesn't mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>>>
>>> ? 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>>> false. 
>>> > 
>>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>>>
>>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not 
>>> mean anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>>>
>>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then 
>>> it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, 
>>> but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, 
>>> as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>>> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>>> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>>> > 
>>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>>>
>>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
>>> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
>>> even in the infinity axioms. 
>>>
>>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use 
>>> of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions 
>>> and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the 
>>> finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system 
>>> is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic 
>>> is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now 
>>> that we understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s 
>>> consistency, quite the contrary. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>>> (easily) its consistency. 
>>> > 
>>> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a 
>>> contradiction. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. 
>>> The proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>>  proved. 
>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
>> >>> So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) 
>> >> -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>> >> beweisbar. 
>> >> 
>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
>>  G* \ G. 
>>  
>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
>>  In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
>> >>> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
>> >>> undefinable)? 
>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>> >> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>> >>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
>> >> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
>> >> provability and consistency referred to. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>>  
>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic. 
>> >>>  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>> > 
>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
>> > mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>> 
>> ? 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>> >> false. 
>> > 
>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>> 
>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
>> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>> 
>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it 
>> is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but 
>> the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
>> >> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>> >> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>> >> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>> 
>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, get 
>> soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and even in 
>> the infinity axioms. 
>> 
>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
>> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
>> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
>> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
>> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you 
>> get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
>> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> > 
>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
>> >> quite the contrary. 
>> >> 
>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>> >> (easily) its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
>> 
>> 
>> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. The 
>> proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
>> 
>> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
>> standard number describing a 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>> proved. 
>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
>> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
>> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>> beweisbar. 
>> >> 
>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong 
>> to G* \ G. 
>>  
>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
>> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
>> inconsistency. 
>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
>> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
>> undefinable)? 
>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
>> (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which 
>> this provability and consistency referred to. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>>  
>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
>> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>> > 
>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
>> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>>
>> ? 
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>> false. 
>> > 
>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>>
>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
>> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>>
>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then 
>> it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, 
>> but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, 
>> as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>>
>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
>> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
>> even in the infinity axioms. 
>>
>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use 
>> of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions 
>> and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the 
>> finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system 
>> is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic 
>> is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now 
>> that we understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s 
>> consistency, quite the contrary. 
>> >> 
>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>> (easily) its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
>>
>>
>> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. 
>> The proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
>>
>> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
>> standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
>> prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
>> equivalent with proving (A & 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-17 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker > 
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  >>> > wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>  proved. 
> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
> >>> So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) 
> >> -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> >> beweisbar. 
> >> 
> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* 
>  \ G. 
>  
>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
>  In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
> >>> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> >>> undefinable)? 
> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth 
> >> you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
> >>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
> >> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> >> provability and consistency referred to. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
>  
> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  
> >>> But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> > 
> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> > mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
> 
> ? 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >> 
> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> >> false. 
> > 
> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
> 
> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
> 
> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it is 
> absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but the 
> observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no 
> >> one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> >> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> >> cannot prove its consistency. 
> > 
> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
> 
> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich system 
> of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more on 
> themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, get 
> soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and even in 
> the infinity axioms. 
> 
> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you get 
> an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> >> quite the contrary. 
> >> 
> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> >> (easily) its consistency. 
> > 
> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
> 
> 
> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. The 
> proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
> 
> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
> standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
> prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
> equivalent with proving (A & ~A), which []f, interpreted at the meta-level. 
> Now, for the machine, []f is consistent, as the machine 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 5:00:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker > 
> >> wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>  But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
> >>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
> >>> proved. 
> >> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
> >> So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> > But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) 
> > -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> > beweisbar. 
> > 
> > The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* 
> >>> \ G. 
> >>> 
> >>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In 
> >>> fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
> >>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
> >> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
> >> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> >> undefinable)? 
> > No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth 
> > you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which 
> >> []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> > You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
> > indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> > provability and consistency referred to. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> 
>  Nothing which is proven can be false, 
> >>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  
> >> But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> > Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> 
> I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
> 
> > 
> > If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> > false. 
> 
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
> 
> > 
> > Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no 
> > one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> > which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> > cannot prove its consistency. 
> 
> But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
> 
> > Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> > quite the contrary. 
> > 
> > Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> > (easily) its consistency. 
> 
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I have read in various texts that at some point matter (all there is in the 
> universe) may reach a point of inconsistency: All matter itself would just 
> disintegrate.  That's all, folks!

That is what Black-Holes are in Newton physics, and they appear if any two 
masses are at distance 0 of each other. The *quantum* black hole are attempts 
by nature to survive God’s dividing number by zero!

With Mechanism we have partial control. It is up to us to try not dividing by 
zero and multiplying by the infinite. But we can’t control all bugs (security) 
without losing Turing universality (liberty).

Matter will remain apparent, but its semantic will differ, as it is a mix of 
contingent with what is observable for all universal 
number/machine/combinator/… 

With (indexical, digital) Mechanism, that is mainly the classical 
Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis, the physical reality is phi_i independent. It 
should imply the structure on which a measure one exist, may be like Turing 
universal groups (like the unitary groups). With mechanism, the origin of the 
physical laws is ia problem in mathematics, and partial solution already 
obtained compare well with the general data of contemporary physics. Major 
advantage: the Gödel-Löb-Solovay split of G and G* (the truth on “me” and what 
I can justify on “me”) allows to distinguish, in the observable, the 
justifiable and the non justifiable, but also the knowable and non knowable, 
the observable and the non observable, and this is used to distinguish the 
quanta and the qualia in the sensible realm. 

For the universal machine there is a rich corona in between the rational 
(justifiable) and the surrational (true but non provable) and the Lobian 
machine (those knowing that they are universal) are aware of that corona in the 
first person (non justifiable nor even describable) way. 


Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-16 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
> proved. 
> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> beweisbar. 
> >> 
> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
> G* \ G. 
>  
>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
> inconsistency. 
> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 
> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> provability and consistency referred to. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
>  
> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> > 
> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>
> ? 
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> false. 
> > 
> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>
> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>
> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it 
> is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but 
> the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> cannot prove its consistency. 
> > 
> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>
> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
> even in the infinity axioms. 
>
> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you 
> get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>
>
>
> > 
> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> quite the contrary. 
> >> 
> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> (easily) its consistency. 
> > 
> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
>
>
> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. 
> The proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
>
> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
> standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
> prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
> equivalent with proving (A & ~A), which []f, interpreted at the meta-level. 
> Now, for the machine, []f is consistent, as the machine cannot prove that 
> []f -> f, which would be her consistency. G* proves <>[]f. 
>
> It is because the domain here is full of ambiguities, that the logic 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.
 I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
 proved.
>>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So 
>>> in this case proof entails truth??
>> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> 
>> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.
>> 
>> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
 For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ 
 G.
 
 Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In 
 fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.
 Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.
>>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
>>> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
>>> undefinable)?
>> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth 
>> you want, like “1 = 1”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which 
>>> []<>t -> <>t is false?
>> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
>> indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
>> provability and consistency referred to.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
 
> Nothing which is proven can be false,
 Assuming consistency, which is not provable.
>>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  
>>> But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.
>> Explain this to your tax inspector!
> 
> I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't mean 
> it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater.

?



> 
>> 
>> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.
> 
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises.

In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 

If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it is 
absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but the 
observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism.






> 
>> 
>> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no 
>> one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
>> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
>> cannot prove its consistency.
> 
> But it can be proven in bigger systems.

Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to assume 
more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich system of 
belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more on themselves. 
Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, get soon or later the 
tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and even in the infinity axioms.

Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of the 
infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and names, 
but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite and the 
numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich enough to 
implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you get an 
explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we understand 
about nothing on numbers and machine.



> 
>> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
>> quite the contrary.
>> 
>> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>> (easily) its consistency.
> 
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 


That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. The 
proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers.

So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
equivalent with proving (A & ~A), which []f, interpreted at the meta-level. 
Now, for the machine, []f is consistent, as the machine cannot prove that []f 
-> f, which would be her consistency. G* proves <>[]f.

It is because the domain here is full of ambiguities, that the logic of G and 
G*, which capture the consequence of incompleteness are so useful.

Bruno




> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference.
> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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> To 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 14 Dec 2018, at 12:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 4:49:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
 Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers
 http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf 
 
>>> 
>>> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
>>> available for the machines.
>> 
>> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?
> 
> 
> There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.
> 
> The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be defined 
> by S4 + “5”)
> 
> “5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but also 
> incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How does this relate to the "higher-order theorem provers" that deals with 
> modal systems like S5?
> 
> 
> https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/16/Papers/137.pdf 


Rather interesting. The machine makes the right critics! Not quite serious 
about theology though. The definition of God by St-Anselme is a bit too much 
post-529 for the universal machine’s view. But some paragraph, notably the 
requirement of symmetry, gives me the feeling that the machine’s sensibility 
mode ([]p & <>t & p) defined in G1* (with 1 being what they called the collapse 
formula: p -> []p, which does not entail any collapse in arithmetic) might make 
the first person sensibility “believing” in the God of St-Anselme. It would be 
interesting to see what aspect of the ONE would correspond to this.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 5:00:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>  But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
> >>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
> proved. 
> >> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true) 
>  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> > But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> beweisbar. 
> > 
> > The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
> G* \ G. 
> >>> 
> >>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
> In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
> >>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
> >> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 
> > No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> > You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> provability and consistency referred to. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> 
>  Nothing which is proven can be false, 
> >>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> > Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>
> I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>
> > 
> > If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> false. 
>
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>
> > 
> > Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> cannot prove its consistency. 
>
> But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>
> > Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> quite the contrary. 
> > 
> > Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> (easily) its consistency. 
>
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference. 
>
> Brent 
>




I have read in various texts that at some point matter (all there is in the 
universe) may reach a point of inconsistency: All matter itself would just 
disintegrate.  That's all, folks!

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker




On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.

I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved.

So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So in 
this case proof entails truth??

But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> p” 
is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.

The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.






For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.

Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In fact <>t -> 
~[]<>t.
Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.

I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for every 
substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is undefinable)?

No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth you 
want, like “1 = 1”.





Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which []<>t -> 
<>t is false?

You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this provability 
and consistency referred to.







Nothing which is proven can be false,

Assuming consistency, which is not provable.

So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  But 
finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.

Explain this to your tax inspector!


I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater.




If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.


Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises.



Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no one 
has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, which 
confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it cannot 
prove its consistency.


But it can be proven in bigger systems.


Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, quite 
the contrary.

Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove (easily) 
its consistency.


Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference.


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 4:49:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> *Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
> Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers*
> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf
>
>
> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
> available for the machines.
>
>
> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?
>
>
>
> There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.
>
> The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be 
> defined by S4 + “5”)
>
> “5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but 
> also incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

How does this relate to the "higher-order theorem provers" that deals with 
modal systems like S5?


https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/16/Papers/137.pdf 

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.
>> 
>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved.
> 
> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So 
> in this case proof entails truth??

But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> p” 
is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.

The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.



> 
> 
>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.
>> 
>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In 
>> fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.
>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.
> 
> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 

No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth you 
want, like “1 = 1”.




> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which 
> []<>t -> <>t is false?

You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this provability 
and consistency referred to.




> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Nothing which is proven can be false,
>> 
>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable.
> 
> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  But 
> finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.

Explain this to your tax inspector!

If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.

Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no one 
has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, which 
confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it cannot 
prove its consistency. Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about 
arithmetic’s consistency, quite the contrary.

Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove (easily) 
its consistency.



> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.
>> 
>> Which is of course easily refuted.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very different 
>>> from the common one.
>> 
>> “BBB” is true just in case it is the case that BBB.
> 
> But you can't know whether it is the case that 10^1 + 1 is the successor 
> of 10^1000 independent of the axioms, i.e. you assume it.

That is the best we can do in science.

Bruno






> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> I am not sure, but the point is that no machine can prove []p -> p in 
>> general. And the machine can know that, making her “modest” (Löbian).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
>>> Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers
>>> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf 
>>> 
>> 
>> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
>> available for the machines.
> 
> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?


There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.

The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be defined by 
S4 + “5”)

“5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but also 
incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-13 Thread Brent Meeker




On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.


I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
proved.


So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
So in this case proof entails truth??



For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
G* \ G.


Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.

Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.


I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
undefinable)?  Or are you asserting that there is at least one true 
proposition for which []<>t -> <>t is false?






Nothing which is proven can be false,


Assuming consistency, which is not provable.


So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.







which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.


Which is of course easily refuted.



Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very 
different from the common one.


“BBB” is true just in case it is the case that BBB.


But you can't know whether it is the case that 10^1 + 1 is the 
successor of 10^1000 independent of the axioms, i.e. you assume it.


Brent



I am not sure, but the point is that no machine can prove []p -> p in 
general. And the machine can know that, making her “modest” (Löbian).


Bruno



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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-13 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers*

http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf


Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic 
NOT available for the machines.


What about S5 makes it not available for machines?

Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 9:30:10 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>  the mathematical idea of "true" is very different from the common one.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
This reminds me of the "truth" the guys on *The Big Bang Theory* refer to a 
lot: They have arguments of what would be the case (be "true") of 
characters in their favorite comic, SF, fantasy universes (Game of Thrones, 
Star Trek, Marvel, DC, ...).

Math truth is pretty much like that.

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/12/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
 wrote:
 
 
 
 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
> 
> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
 
 That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
 make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
 reality.
 
 Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
 “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
 philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
 to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
 idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
 lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
 
 I've been following him like forever.
 
 * e.g.
 Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have 
 the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
 professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
 in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
 that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
 infinity.
>>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
>>> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
>>> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is 
>>> not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction 
>>> is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
>> 
>> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
>> correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The 
>> machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything 
>> describable in any 3p terms.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
>>> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
>>> consciousness primary.
>> 
>> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital 
>> body.
>> 
>> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body 
>> in his childhood, to survive some disease?
>> 
>> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will 
>> be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown 
>> that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without 
>> observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of 
>> approximations of that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine 
>> grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many 
>> such approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial 
>> equation, and the invariance of the first person for “delays of 
>> reconstitution” (definable by the number of steps done by the universal 
>> dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted 
>> with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p 
>> & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
>> provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: 
>> Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It 
>> represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA is close for the Löb 
>> rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the existence of Santa 
>> Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will soon or later 
>> prove the existence of Santa Klauss.
> 
> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 

I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved. 
For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.

Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In fact 
<>t -> ~[]<>t. 
Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.


> Nothing which is proven can be false,

Assuming consistency, which is not provable.



> which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false. 

Which is of course easily refuted.



> Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very different 
> from the common one.

“BBB” is true just in case it 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
 
 (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>> 
>>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
>>> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
>>> reality.
>>> 
>>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
>>> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
>>> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to 
>>> relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, 
>>> but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>>> 
>>> I've been following him like forever.
>>> 
>>> * e.g.
>>> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
>>> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
>>> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
>>> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
>>> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
>> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
>> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
>> less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
>> needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
> 
> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) correctly. 
> It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The machine’s 
> soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in 
> any 3p terms.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
>> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
>> consciousness primary.
> 
> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital body.
> 
> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body 
> in his childhood, to survive some disease?
> 
> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will be 
> that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown that no 
> universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without observable clue, a 
> physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of approximations of 
> that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine grained, with 
> 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many such 
> approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, 
> and the invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution” 
> (definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to get the 
> relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a continuum. The math 
> shows that it has to be a special (models of []p & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] 
> is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of provability of Gödel 1931. It is 
> my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula 
> of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of 
> PA saying that PA is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the 
> provability of the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa 
> Klauss, then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put 
> in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove that the 
> provability of something entails that something. PA is maximally modest on 
> her own provability ability. 
> 
> In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the ~[]f, 
> equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general not 
> provable and is not a theorem of PA.
> 
> Incompleteness enforces the nuances between
> 
> Truth p
> Provable  []p
> Knowable  []p & p
> Observable[]p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ 
> = consistent)
> Sensible  []p & <>t
> 
> And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable and 
> the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-12 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/12/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:




On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift
 wrote:


Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise".

(Derrida, Rorty, …)


That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism.
Confirmation does not make an idea true, but it is better
than nothing, once we postulate some reality.

Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like
some “religions” do, although only when they are used for
that purpose.  Some philosophies vindicate  their lack of
rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, and
obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea,
but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.

Bruno



Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the
(youtube) lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?

I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

  * *Mathematics is /so/ useful because physical scientists and
engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the
"religious" fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and
their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases is
misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms"
that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the
so-called infinity.*


Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even
without the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”.
Induction axioms, infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the
phenomenology. The phenomenology is not less real, but its is not
primary, it is second order, and that fiction is needed to
survive, even if fictionally.

Bruno



To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.


That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non 
provable. The machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor 
even anything describable in any 3p terms.








To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
consciousness primary.


Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a 
digital body.


But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital 
body in his childhood, to survive some disease?


You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point 
will be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can 
be shown that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, 
without observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely 
many emulation of approximations of that physical reality at some 
level of substitution (fine grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for 
example). Then, infinitely many such approximation exists in 
arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, and the 
invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution” 
(definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to 
get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a 
continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p & 
p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, 
shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p 
-> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA 
is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of 
the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, 
then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss.


But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.  Nothing which is proven 
can be false, which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.  
Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very 
different from the common one.


Brent

Put in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove 
that the provability of something entails that something. PA is 
maximally modest on her own provability ability.


In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the 
~[]f, equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in 
general not provable and is not a theorem of PA.


Incompleteness enforces the nuances between

Truthp
Provable[]p
Knowable[]p & p
Observable[]p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ = 
consistent)

Sensible[]p & <>t

And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the 
observable and the sensible along the provable/true parts, G 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>>
>>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>>
>>>
>>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does 
>>> not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate 
>>> some reality.
>>>
>>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
>>> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
>>> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
>>> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
>>> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>>
>> I've been following him like forever.
>>
>> * e.g.
>>
>>- *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
>>have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
>>professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, 
>> that 
>>in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on 
>> "axioms" 
>>that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
>>infinity.*
>>
>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without 
>> the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, 
>> infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The 
>> phenomenology is not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, 
>> and that fiction is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
>
>
> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
> correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. 
> The machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything 
> describable in any 3p terms.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
> consciousness primary.
>
>
> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital 
> body.
>
> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital 
> body in his childhood, to survive some disease?
>
> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will 
> be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown 
> that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without 
> observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation 
> of approximations of that physical reality at some level of substitution 
> (fine grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely 
> many such approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine 
> polynomial equation, and the invariance of the first person for “delays of 
> reconstitution” (definable by the number of steps done by the universal 
> dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted 
> with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p 
> & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
> provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: 
> Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. 
> It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA is close for the 
> Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the existence of Santa 
> Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will soon or later 
> prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put in another way, unless PA proves 
> something, she will never prove that the provability of something entails 
> that something. PA is maximally modest on her own provability ability. 
>
> In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the 
> ~[]f, equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general 
> not provable and is not a theorem of PA.
>
> Incompleteness enforces the nuances between
>
> Truth p
> Provable []p
> Knowable []p & p
> Observable []p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ = 
> consistent)
> Sensible []p & <>t
>
> And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable 
> and the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*.
> That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5 
> “terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes on 
> 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>> 
>>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>> 
>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
>> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
>> reality.
>> 
>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
>> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
>> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, 
>> and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, but 
>> eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>> 
>> I've been following him like forever.
>> 
>> * e.g.
>> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
>> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
>> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
>> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
>> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
> less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
> needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.

That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) correctly. 
It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The machine’s 
soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in any 
3p terms.





> 
> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is intrinsic 
> to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make consciousness 
> primary.

Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital body.

But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body in 
his childhood, to survive some disease?

You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will be 
that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown that no 
universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without observable clue, a 
physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of approximations of 
that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine grained, with 10^100 
decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many such approximation exists 
in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, and the invariance of 
the first person for “delays of reconstitution” (definable by the number of 
steps done by the universal dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that 
the 1p is confronted with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a 
special (models of []p & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical 
“beweisbar” predicate of provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic 
Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of 
Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that 
PA is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the 
existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will 
soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put in another way, unless 
PA proves something, she will never prove that the provability of something 
entails that something. PA is maximally modest on her own provability ability. 

In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the ~[]f, 
equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general not 
provable and is not a theorem of PA.

Incompleteness enforces the nuances between

Truth   p
Provable[]p
Knowable[]p & p
Observable  []p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ 
= consistent)
Sensible[]p & <>t

And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable and 
the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*.
That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5 
“terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes on the 
Self, with two of them (Truth and Knowable) at the intersection of Earth 
(effective, provable) and Heaven (truth).

The beauty is that G* 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>
>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>
>>
>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does 
>> not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate 
>> some reality.
>>
>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
>> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
>> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
>> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
>> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>
> I've been following him like forever.
>
> * e.g.
>
>- *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
>have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
>professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
>in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
>that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
>infinity.*
>
> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without 
> the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, 
> infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The 
> phenomenology is not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, 
> and that fiction is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.

To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
consciousness primary.


https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>> 
>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
> 
> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
> reality.
> 
> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, 
> and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, but eventually 
> it hurts in front of the truth.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) lectures 
> of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
> 
> I've been following him like forever.
> 
> * e.g.
> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
needed to survive, even if fictionally. 

Bruno




> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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> .
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> .

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 3:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:


Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise".

(Derrida, Rorty, …)


That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation
does not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we
postulate some reality.

Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some
“religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.
 Some philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a
principle. That leads to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks
nice as anyone can defend any idea, but eventually it hurts in
front of the truth.

Bruno



Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?


I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

  * *Mathematics is /so/ useful because physical scientists and
engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious"
fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and their insistence on
so-called rigor, that in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical,
since it is based on "axioms" that are completely fictional, i.e.
those that involve the so-called infinity.*



Physics is to mathematics as sex is to masturbation.
   --- Richard Feynman

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>
> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>
>
> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
> reality.
>
> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?

I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

   - *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
   have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
   professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
   in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
   that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
   infinity.*
   - 
   

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:21:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
 computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
 call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
 Galen Strawson):
>>> 
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
 
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
  ]
 
  -pt
 
 
>>> 
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>  
>>> 
>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>> ] — where 
>>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>> fiction.)
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>> 
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>> 
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. 
>> I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not 
>> have solutions.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>> (like us).
>> 
>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
> 
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
> the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Example: The Turing 
>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>  
>> 
>>  ].
> 
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, 
> and their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid 
> get a 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
>> a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>> "boring”.)
> 
> 
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
> 
> 
>> 
>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
> 
> 
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
> 
> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/ 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:21:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically 
>>> that *computationalism is indeed false*, and it should be replaced 
>>> by what I call *real computationalism* (where I am adopting the 
>>> "real" label from Galen Strawson):
>>>
>>>
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>> ]
>>>
>>>  -pt
>>>
>>>
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>>
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — 
>> where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
>> computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
>> computationalism is fiction.)
>>
>>
>>
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>>
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z 
>> such x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon 
>> exists”. I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t 
>> conceive waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have 
>> and 
>> not have solutions.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist 
> are ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of 
> nature (like us).
>
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>
>
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot 
> use the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>
>
>
>
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> ].
>
>
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, 
> and 
> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>
>
>
>
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" 
> since a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that 
> idea "boring”.)
>
>
>
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
>
>
>
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in

 http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
 Computing
 http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and 
 Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
 etc.


 Does 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
>>> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
>>> Galen Strawson):
>> 
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>> 
>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>>  ]
>>> 
>>>  -pt
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>> 
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — where 
>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>> fiction.)
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
> 
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
> 
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
> solutions.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
> (like us).
> 
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
 
 That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
 than in the moon.
 Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
 the computationalist theory of mind.
 I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
 are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
 the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
 
 
 
 
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> 
>  ].
 
 Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
 immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
 But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
 their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
 
 
 
> 
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
> "boring”.)
 
 
 I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
 machine) in Turing sense.
 
 
> 
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
 
 
 Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
 non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
 
 http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International 
 Center of Unconventional Computing
 http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
 Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 
 2019
 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-09 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> *computationalism 
>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>> Strawson):
>>
>>
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>> ]
>>
>>  -pt
>>
>>
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
>
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — 
> where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
> computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
> computationalism is fiction.)
>
>
>
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
>
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
>
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z 
> such x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon 
> exists”. I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t 
> conceive waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and 
> not have solutions.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
 Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
 ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
 (like us).

 "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 


 That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
 than in the moon.
 Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot 
 use the computationalist theory of mind.
 I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
 objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
 aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.




 Example: The Turing 
 machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
 https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
  
 ].


 Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
 immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
 But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
 their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...




 (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
 a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
 "boring”.)



 I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
 machine) in Turing sense.



 So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 



 Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
 some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.

 Bruno



>>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>>
>>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
>>> Computing
>>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
>>> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
>>> etc.
>>>
>>>
>>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
>>> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
>>> non-standard non-assumptions.
>>>
>>>
>>> Widely used does not mean that the notion is 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
>> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
>> Galen Strawson):
> 
> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
> opinion private, if I have one.
> 
> Bruno
>> 
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>  ]
>> 
>>  -pt
>> 
>> 
> 
> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
> 
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — where 
> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
> fiction.)
> 
> 
 
 
 You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
 physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
 math-fictionanlist.
 
 But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
 arithmetic.
 
 I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
 x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
 can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
 waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
 solutions.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
 ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
 (like us).
 
 "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
>>> 
>>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than 
>>> in the moon.
>>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
>>> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
>>> the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Example: The Turing 
 machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
 https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
  
 
  ].
>>> 
>>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
 computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
 "boring”.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>> 
>>> 
 
 So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
>>> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>> 
>>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International Center 
>>> of Unconventional Computing
>>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
>>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 
>>> 2019
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing 
>>> 
>>> etc.
>> 
>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
>>> computing - a widely 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-07 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
> *computationalism 
> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
> Strawson):
>
>
> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
> opinion private, if I have one.
>
> Bruno
>

> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>
>  -pt
>
>
> The background idea of real computationalism is:
  

 (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
 ] — 
 where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
 computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
 computationalism is fiction.)



 You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
 physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
 math-fictionanlist.

 But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
 arithmetic.

 I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
 x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
 can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
 waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
 solutions.

 Bruno




>>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>>> (like us).
>>>
>>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
>>> than in the moon.
>>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
>>> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
>>> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Example: The Turing 
>>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>>  
>>> ].
>>>
>>>
>>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
>>> a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>>> "boring”.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
>>> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>
>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
>> Computing
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
>> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
>> etc.
>>
>>
>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
>> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
>> non-standard non-assumptions.
>>
>>
>> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
>> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
>> since, but I don’t find the reference now).
>> Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s 
>> notion of computation.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Of course UC 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
> Galen Strawson):
 
 I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
 computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
 computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
 opinion private, if I have one.
 
 Bruno
> 
> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>  ]
> 
>  -pt
> 
> 
 
 The background idea of real computationalism is:
  
 
 (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
 ] — where 
 there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
 considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
 fiction.)
 
 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>>> math-fictionanlist.
>>> 
>>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>>> arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such x^3 
>>> + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I can 
>>> conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive waking 
>>> up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>>> solutions.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>>> (like us).
>>> 
>>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
>> 
>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than 
>> in the moon.
>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use the 
>> computationalist theory of mind.
>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
>> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of the 
>> pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Example: The Turing 
>>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  ].
>> 
>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. But 
>> the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and their 
>> existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 0/10, it 
>> will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
>>> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>>> "boring”.)
>> 
>> 
>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>> machine) in Turing sense.
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>> 
>> 
>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
>> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>> 
>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International Center 
>> of Unconventional Computing
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing 
>> 
>> etc.
> 
> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
>> computing - a widely used term - and people will understand the non-standard 
>> non-assumptions.
> 
> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
> since, but I don’t find the reference 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-07 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
 *computationalism 
 is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
 computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
 Strawson):


 I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
 computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
 computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
 opinion private, if I have one.

 Bruno

>>>
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]

  -pt


 The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>  
>>>
>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>> ] — where 
>>> *there 
>>> are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is 
>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>> fiction.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>>> math-fictionanlist.
>>>
>>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>>> arithmetic.
>>>
>>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
>>> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>>> solutions.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>> (like us).
>>
>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>>
>>
>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
>> than in the moon.
>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
>> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
>> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Example: The Turing 
>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>  
>> ].
>>
>>
>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
>> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>> "boring”.)
>>
>>
>>
>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>
>>
>>
>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
>> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>
> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
> Computing
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
> etc.
>
>
> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>
>
>
>
> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
> non-standard non-assumptions.
>
>
> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
> since, but I don’t find the reference now).
> Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s 
> notion of computation.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Of course UC says CTT is false. 

(Pragmatists don't get "hung up" with truth, as you know.) 

It's the UCNC conferences, which is a bit odd, but they put UC and NC 
together. I don't really like NC. Just UC, since I think that's clearer. 

The International Conference on Unconventional 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
 computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I call 
 real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
 Strawson):
>>> 
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
 
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
  ]
 
  -pt
 
 
>>> 
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>  
>>> 
>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>> ] — where 
>>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>> fiction.)
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, physics 
>> is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by math-fictionanlist.
>> 
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>> 
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such x^3 
>> + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I can 
>> conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive waking up 
>> in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have solutions.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are ones 
>> that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature (like 
>> us).
>> 
>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
> 
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than 
> in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use the 
> computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of the 
> pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Example: The Turing 
>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>  
>> 
>>  ].
> 
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. But 
> the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and their 
> existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 0/10, it 
> will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
>> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>> "boring”.)
> 
> 
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
> 
> 
>> 
>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
> 
> 
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
> 
> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional Computing
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
> etc.

Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?



> 
> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
> computing - a widely used term - and people will understand the non-standard 
> non-assumptions.

Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
since, but I don’t find the reference now).
Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s notion of 
computation.

Bruno


> 
> - pt
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-06 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>> *computationalism 
>>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>>> Strawson):
>>>
>>>
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>>>
>>>  -pt
>>>
>>>
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>>
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — where 
>> *there 
>> are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is 
>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>> fiction.)
>>
>>
>>
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>>
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
>> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>> solutions.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
> (like us).
>
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>
>
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
> the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
> the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>
>
>
>
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> ].
>
>
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>
>
>
>
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
> "boring”.)
>
>
>
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
>
>
>
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in

http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional Computing
http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
etc.

One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
non-standard non-assumptions.

- pt
 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I call 
>>> real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>>> Strawson):
>> 
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>> 
>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>>  ]
>>> 
>>>  -pt
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>> 
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — where 
>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>> fiction.)
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, physics 
> is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by math-fictionanlist.
> 
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
> 
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such x^3 + 
> y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I can 
> conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive waking up 
> in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have solutions.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are ones 
> that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature (like us).
> 
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.

That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than in 
the moon.
Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use the 
computationalist theory of mind.
I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects are 
much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of the 
pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.




> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  ].

Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. But 
the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and their 
existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 0/10, it 
will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...



> 
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
> "boring”.)


I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal machine) 
in Turing sense.


> 
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 


Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some non 
standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> *computationalism 
>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>> Strawson):
>>
>>
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>>
>>  -pt
>>
>>
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
>
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — where 
> *there 
> are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is 
> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
> fiction.)
>
>
>
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
>
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
>
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
> solutions.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
(like us).

"Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. Example: The 
Turing 
machine as defined in the standard textbook manner 
[ 
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html 
].

(Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
"boring".)

So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 6:37:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>> 
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
>> behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, 
>> and it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of 
>> matter is “magical”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>> then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter 
>> behaves intelligently.  
> 
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
> 
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
> 
> 
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a 
> random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which 
> computations run us, if I may say.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
> 
> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
> 
> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
> sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely 
> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant 
> to computation. [ 
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>  
> 
>  ]).
> 
> 
> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
> non-Turing.
> 
> This new article may be of interest:
> 
> 
> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
> them, too"
> ] 
> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>  
> 
>  ]
 
 I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
 provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
 “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
 mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
 true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
 subject of
 
 Galileo's Error
 Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
 
 by Philip Goff
 (coming from Penguin Random House)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
>>> present the idea and use it.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 
 What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
 no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
 matter (the subject of science).
>>> 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-04 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 6:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>* It is very simple. Never claim to have the truth, and always present a
> theory having verifiable consequences.*
>

Your theory is a working Turing Machine can be made without using matter or
physics, so don't show me more squiggles, show me a verifiable consequence
of that theory, show me  your mystical machine actually making a
calculation so I can verify  it is correct. Of course we both know you will
never EVER be able to do that, but that won't stop you from continuing to
sell your snake oil.

>>show me a WORKING Turing Machine that doesn't make use of the laws of
>> physics so that I can observe it making a calculation.You insist such a
>> thing exists so put up or shut up.
>
>
> *> The existence is provable in Peano arithmet*ic.
>

If an observable Turing Machine that makes no use of matter or physics has
been proven to exist why is it that nobody has ever seen one and nobody
ever will? Because what Peano actually proved is that some squiggles that
humans (who are made of matter and obey the laws of physics) have assigned
meaning to is the same as other squiggles that humans have assigned
different meanings to. None of those squiggles are Turing Machines and none
of them are powerful enough to calculate 2+2.


> *>Read Gödel 1931.*
>

In 1931 Godel knew nothing about Turing Machines.

>> Prove me wrong by producing a working machine that doesn't use matter or
>> physics.
>
>
> *>This is ambiguous.*
>

*Like hell it is!* My request is about as unambiguous as things get.

> *Either you ask me something contradictory at the start,*
>

Like explaining why your observable Turing Machine, the one that works
without using using matter or physics, is totally unobservable


> > *or you ask me an example of a working machine, relatively to a
> universal machine, in arithmetic. *
>

I'm not picky, it can be relative to anything you want, all I ask is that
it be observable and able to make a calculation without using matter or
physics; and it need not be complicated, 2+2 would be good enough.


> >>And by "working" I mean one that changes in time or space or both.
>
>
> >OK. Then your laptop is an excellent example.
>

Correct, and unless Apple just came out with something new all laptops are
made of matter and they all obey the laws of physics.

*> People who says that theology or metaphysics cannot be done with the
> scientific method are those who want impose their personal conviction to
> others.*
>

Metaphysics with the scientific method is just physics, and theology with
the scientific method causes the entire area of study to evaporate.


> > *Religion has been separated from science for one reason only: to make
> it into an instrument of control of the others.*
>

Yes let's go back to the good old days of the inquisition when authorities
knew how to deal with blasphemers like Galileo.


> You can produce it anyway you like provided its observable.
>
>

> *We have to agree by what mean by observable.*
>

But before we can do that we must first agree on what we mean by "mean",
then we have to agree on what we mean by "mean by "mean"" then we have to
agree on what we mean by "mean by "mean by "mean""", then 

I've noticed this phenomena before in debates when somebody is losing, they
start demanding definitions of words, and then demanding definitions of the
words in the definition, and then definitions of the words in the definitions
of the words in the definition, and then ...


> > *I have no clue what you mean by observable,*
>

Oh I think you do, I think you have a clue, you just can't produce what I
ask.


> > *you invoke your god-primary matter*  [...]  *Repeating a statement
> again and again does not make it valid.*
>

Very good, for once you say something I agree with completely.

  >> I want to observe a working Turing Machine that is not made of matter
> and does not make use of the laws of physics.


> >  *{(q1 B 1 q1)}*
>

I tried that but it doesn't work, I've been shouting at {(q1 B 1 q1)} at
the top of my lungs "*HOW MUCH IS 2+2 ?*" but nothing changes,
the squiggles  just sit there.

>>You just said that pure arithmetic can do exactly that, so stop talking
>> about it and SHOW ME.
>
>
> > See my paper for the proof.
>

To hell with your idiotic "proof", don't tell me SHOW ME a Turing Machine
that is not made of matter that can calculate 2+2!


> >>I already told you that matter, or anything else, is real if you can
>> make a working Turing Machine out of it.
>
>
> > *“Working” is ambiguous.*
>

I guess "ambiguous" is you're new favorite word. I already said "working"
is something that changes in time or space or both, what the hell is
ambiguous about that?


> > *How could a universal machine distinguish a physically working
> environment, and an arithmetically environment?*
>

Easy, if the environment changes in time or space then its physical, if it
doesn't then its arithmetical, and if the environment can't change then a

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 6:37:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>>
>>
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
>> behave 
>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter 
>> is 
>> “magical”.
>>
>>
>>
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
> behaves intelligently*.  
>
>
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
>
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>
>
>
>
>
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years 
> thought that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in 
> nature.
>
>
>
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful 
> processing ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature 
> use a random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which 
> computations run us, if I may say.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

 Going by something Barry Cooper wrote

 *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly 
 entails higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect 
 for embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
 content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*

 "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
 that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
 sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is 
 precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is 
 relevant to computation.* [ 
 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
  
 ]).


 I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
 non-Turing.

 This new article may be of interest:


 "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
 not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
 them, too"
 ] 
 https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
  
 ]


 I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
 provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
 “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
 mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
 true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 

 Bruno



>>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
>>> subject of
>>>
>>> Galileo's Error
>>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>>>
>>> by Philip Goff
>>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, 
>>> but present the idea and use it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there 
>>> is no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
>>> matter (the subject of science).
>>>
>>>
>>> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, 
>>> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you 
>>> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
> 
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
> behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and 
> it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of 
> matter is “magical”.
> 
> 
> 
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
> then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter 
> behaves intelligently.  
 
 Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
 (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
 complete. 
 
 It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
 means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
 
 
 
 
> 
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
 
 
 If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
 ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a 
 random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which 
 computations run us, if I may say.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 
 Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
 
 The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
 higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
 embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
 content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
 
 "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
 that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
 sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely 
 about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
 computation. [ 
 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
  
 
  ]).
 
 
 I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
 non-Turing.
 
 This new article may be of interest:
 
 
 "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
 not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
 them, too"
 ] 
 https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
  
 
  ]
>>> 
>>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
>>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
>>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
>>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
>>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject 
>>> of
>>> 
>>> Galileo's Error
>>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>>> 
>>> by Philip Goff
>>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
>> present the idea and use it.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
>>> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
>>> matter (the subject of science).
>> 
>> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and 
>> then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>> 
>> 
>> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume 
>> matter, you need indeed a non 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>
>
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
> behave 
> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter 
> is 
> “magical”.
>
>
>
 If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
 then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
 behaves intelligently*.  


 Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
 (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
 complete. 

 It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
 this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).





 It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
 that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.



 If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
 ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a 
 random 
 oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
 run us, if I may say.

 Bruno




>>>
>>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>>
>>> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
>>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*
>>>
>>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
>>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
>>> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is 
>>> precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is 
>>> relevant to computation.* [ 
>>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>>  
>>> ]).
>>>
>>>
>>> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
>>> non-Turing.
>>>
>>> This new article may be of interest:
>>>
>>>
>>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
>>> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
>>> them, too"
>>> ] 
>>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>>  
>>> ]
>>>
>>>
>>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
>>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
>>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
>>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
>>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
>> subject of
>>
>> Galileo's Error
>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>>
>> by Philip Goff
>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, 
>> but present the idea and use it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
>> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
>> matter (the subject of science).
>>
>>
>> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, 
>> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>>
>>
>> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you 
>> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and 
>> of mind, which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it 
>> experimentally, which is not a good sign. 
>>
>> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid 
>> assuming it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 
> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
 
 No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
 physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
 computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
 behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and 
 it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter 
 is “magical”.
 
 
 
 If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
 then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
 intelligently.  
>>> 
>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>>> complete. 
>>> 
>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
>>> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
 that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>>> run us, if I may say.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>> 
>>> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
>>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
>>> 
>>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
>>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
>>> sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely 
>>> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
>>> computation. [ 
>>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  ]).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
>>> non-Turing.
>>> 
>>> This new article may be of interest:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
>>> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, 
>>> too"
>>> ] 
>>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  ]
>> 
>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably 
>> inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a 
>> product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without 
>> adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t 
>> see any evidence for such a move. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject 
>> of
>> 
>> Galileo's Error
>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>> 
>> by Philip Goff
>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
> 
> 
> 
> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
> present the idea and use it.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is no 
>> evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of matter 
>> (the subject of science).
> 
> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and 
> then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
> 
> 
> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume 
> matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and of mind, 
> which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it experimentally, 
> which is not a good sign. 
> 
> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid assuming 
> it when doping physics, so there is no need of 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:




 Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 


 No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
 that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
 computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
 behave 
 intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
 behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
 “magical”.



>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>>> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
>>> behaves intelligently*.  
>>>
>>>
>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>>> complete. 
>>>
>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
>>> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>>> run us, if I may say.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>
>> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*
>>
>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
>> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is 
>> precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is 
>> relevant to computation.* [ 
>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>  
>> ]).
>>
>>
>> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
>> non-Turing.
>>
>> This new article may be of interest:
>>
>>
>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
>> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
>> them, too"
>> ] 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>  
>> ]
>>
>>
>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
> subject of
>
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>
> by Philip Goff
> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>
>
>
>
> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, 
> but present the idea and use it.
>
>
>
>
>
> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
> matter (the subject of science).
>
>
> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, 
> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>
>
> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you 
> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and 
> of mind, which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it 
> experimentally, which is not a good sign. 
>
> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid 
> assuming it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside 
> some primary matter. (I am the skeptical here).
>
> When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without 
> empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving 
> problems (that can prevent science).
>
> I claim no truth, I just show that we can test 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2018, at 12:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 5:05:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show 
> that this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Since Matter (a material computer) can compute Mechanism, I don't see how 
> Mechanism contradicts Materialism.


A material computer can emulate a computation supporting a person relatively to 
us, but with mechanism, a person cannot distinguish (without observing details) 
any computations leading to its local state, and so physics, and the appearance 
of matter can only be given by a statistics of all computation leading to that 
state, and structured by the ability of a machine to refer to itself.

Read my papers, I explain all this, or tell me at which step of the 8th step 
you have problem with. 





> 
> One could of course "eliminate" Matter in an Idealist metaphysics, but one 
> can (more plausibly to many) eliminate Numbers.

If you can understand the arithmetical definition of computation (Gödel, 
Church, Kleene), and if you are open to the digital mechanist thesis, then you 
can understand it will be easier to explain the appearances of the physical 
from the numbers, than to explain consciousness in term of material relation, 
and what those could be?

But all what I have done is providing the way to test all this, and what we 
observe till now rather confirm mechanism, and not materialism.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:26:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>> 
>> 
>> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
>> enough equivalent).
>> 
>> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume 
>> a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike 
>> the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
>> before it meets form, hence hylomorphism [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism 
>>  ]. 
>> 
>> Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which gives 
>> forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
>> people, etc.
>> 
> 
> That is the usual Aristotelian explanation. It is inconsistent with the 
> assumption of digital mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> molecules?
>> 
>> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
>> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>> 
>> 
>> Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?
> 
> Read them, and if one convince you, you can explain it here. Note that the 
> background of those paper are Aristotelian, where Mechanism enforces the 
> platonic view (if only to define properly what is a computation or machine).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The papers in scientific publications (in recent science news, etc.) mainly 
> involve positing downward causation: There are chemical laws that cannot be 
> reduced to physical laws, and these (higher-level chemical) laws are needed 
> to explain currently "unsolved" problems in chemistry and biochemistry.

Above the threshold of universality, all reductionist theory broke. You can 
predict perfectly well the transistors, and still have no clue if a program 
will stop or not.

All my interest in arithmetic/meta-arithmetic is that we can see and understand 
how very simple rule, once Turing universal, leads to transfinite hierarchies 
of non controllability. 

Arithmetic is full of downward causation, and circular or spiral causation, at 
different levels.

That should be easy to understand from their self-referential logics and their 
variants. 

Bruno





> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>>> 
>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
>>> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>>> “magical”.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
>>> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
>>> intelligently.  
>> 
>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>> complete. 
>> 
>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
>> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>> 
>> 
>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>> run us, if I may say.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>> 
>> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic content 
>> of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
>> 
>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense that 
>> doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing sense 
>> (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely about the 
>> relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
>> computation. [ 
>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>  
>> 
>>  ]).
>> 
>> 
>> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
>> non-Turing.
>> 
>> This new article may be of interest:
>> 
>> 
>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
>> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, too"
>> ] 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>  
>> 
>>  ]
> 
> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably 
> inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a 
> product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without 
> adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t see 
> any evidence for such a move. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject of
> 
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
> 
> by Philip Goff
> (coming from Penguin Random House)



Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
present the idea and use it.



> 
> 
> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is no 
> evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of matter 
> (the subject of science).

There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and 
then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 


Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume 
matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and of mind, 
which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it experimentally, 
which is not a good sign. 

All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid assuming it 
when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside some primary 
matter. (I am the skeptical here).

When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without 
empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving 
problems (that can prevent science).

I claim no truth, I just show that we can 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 5:05:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show 
> that this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.
>
>
>

Since Matter (a material computer) can compute Mechanism, I don't see how 
Mechanism *contradicts *Materialism.

One could of course "eliminate" Matter in an Idealist metaphysics, but one 
can (more plausibly to many) eliminate Numbers.

- pt


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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 30 Nov 2018, at 20:52, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 1:53 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method. 
> 
> > I do, which is not so frequent in theology
> 
> The scientific method in theology? You must be kidding.

It is very simple. Never claim to have the truth, and always present a theory 
having verifiable consequences.




> 
> > You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real by 
> > “physically real”
> 
> I'm not defining anything in fact I'm asking you to stop defining stuff for 
> one second and instead show me a example, show me a WORKING Turing Machine 
> that doesn't make use of the laws of physics so that I can observe it making 
> a calculation.


Well, assuming mechanism, you, and your laptop, are good examples, as there is 
no physical reality which is primary at all in that case.

You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show that 
this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.





> You insist such a thing exists so put up or shut up.


The existence is provable in Peano arithmetic. Read Gödel 1931.





>  
> > and then asking me the impossible task to transform a computation realised 
> > in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical reality.
> 
> If it's impossible for arithmetic to do that, and I agree with you it is, 
> then physical reality can do something arithmetic can’t.

Arithmetic makes you believe in a physical reality. The physical becomes 
phenomenological.

You are the one doing an ontological commitment. 






>  
> >> the multiverse as a collection of all real universes and a real universe 
> >> is one capable of producing a working Turing Machine.
> 
> All terms are used in too fuzzy way here.
> 
> So says the man that can't use personal pronouns without tying himself into 
> logical knots and contradictions.

Repeating a statement again and again does not make it valid. Just wait I 
explain this to some other.




>  
> > The arithmetical reality produces all working machines
> 
> I don't believe you. Prove me wrong by producing a working machine that 
> doesn't use matter or physics.

This is ambiguous. Either you ask me something contradictory at the start, like 
creating primary matter from the numbers, or you ask me an example of a working 
machine, relatively to a universal machine, in arithmetic. That is long to 
show. See the proof by Gödel in 25 steps (in his 1931 paper).





> And by "working" I mean one that changes in time or space or both.

OK. Then your laptop is an excellent example.





> You can claim all you want  you've proven there are a thousand angels dancing 
> on the head of a pin by redefining the words "angles" and "dancing" and "pin" 
> but I won't be interested until you show me many very small spiritual beings 
> moving to the rhythm of music on a dance floor of less than one square 
> millimeter in area.
>  
> > You can’t use work like "real” when doing metaphysics with the scientific 
> > method.
> 
> There is no such thing as metaphysics with the scientific method


People who says that theology or metaphysics cannot be done with the scientific 
method are those who want impose their personal conviction to others.
Religion has been separated from science for one reason only: to make it into 
an instrument of control of the others.





> 
>  >> there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce it.
> 
> > I guess you mean to produce it physically,
> 
> You can produce it anyway you like provided its observable.

We have to agree by what mean by observable. I gave a precise definition for 
“observable with measure one”, and illustrated it in step 3 with the cup of 
coffee offered to both reconstituted person. Eventually observable is defined 
by being sigma_1, provable and consistent. That is enough to extract quantum 
logic, and to begin an explanation of why observation can be persistent and 
locally sharable between different universal machine. 
I have no clue what you mean by observable, as you invoke your god-primary 
matter, which makes no sense.




>   I want to observe a working Turing Machine that is not made of matter and 
> does not make use of the laws of physics.


 {(q1 B 1 q1)}





> You just said that pure arithmetic can do exactly that, so stop talking about 
> it and SHOW ME.  

See my paper for the proof. But what you ask me to so is enough ambiguous, so 
whatever I will show you, I know how you will criticized it, and it will be 
invalid as you will invoke your god.

It is hard to convince believer.






>   
> >  the criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle [...]
> 
> Don't you ever get tired of dead Greeks?


The big difference between two quite different conceptions of reality start 
there: Aristotle (matter exists ontologically) and Plato (matter is a symptom 
of a deeper non physical reality). Since 1500 years, we have 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-02 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:26:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>>
>>
>>
>> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something 
>> judged enough equivalent).
>>
>> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to 
>> assume a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who 
>> dislike the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything 
>> physical. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
> My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
> before it meets form, hence *hylomorphism *[ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism ]. 
>
> Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which 
> gives forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
> people, etc.
>
>
> That is the usual Aristotelian explanation. It is inconsistent with the 
> assumption of digital mechanism.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> molecules? 
>>
>>
>> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
>> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>>
>
>
> Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?
>
>
> Read them, and if one convince you, you can explain it here. Note that the 
> background of those paper are Aristotelian, where Mechanism enforces the 
> platonic view (if only to define properly what is a computation or machine).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
The papers in scientific publications (in recent science news, etc.) mainly 
involve positing *downward causation*: There are chemical laws that cannot 
be reduced to physical laws, and these (higher-level chemical) laws are 
needed to explain currently "unsolved" problems in chemistry and 
biochemistry.


- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-02 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>>>
>>>
>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>>> “magical”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
>> behaves intelligently*.  
>>
>>
>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>> complete. 
>>
>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
>> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>
>>
>>
>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>> run us, if I may say.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>
> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*
>
> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is precisely 
> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
> computation.* [ 
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>  
> ]).
>
>
> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
> non-Turing.
>
> This new article may be of interest:
>
>
> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
> them, too"
> ] 
> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity 
> ]
>
>
> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject 
of

Galileo's Error
Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness

by Philip Goff
(coming from Penguin Random House)


What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
matter (the subject of science).

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
> 
> 
> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
> enough equivalent).
> 
> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume a 
> bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike the 
> idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
> before it meets form, hence hylomorphism [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism ]. 
> 
> Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which gives 
> forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or people, 
> etc.
> 

That is the usual Aristotelian explanation. It is inconsistent with the 
assumption of digital mechanism.



> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> molecules?
> 
> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
> 
> 
> Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?

Read them, and if one convince you, you can explain it here. Note that the 
background of those paper are Aristotelian, where Mechanism enforces the 
platonic view (if only to define properly what is a computation or machine).

Bruno



> 
> [ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3262307/ ]
> [ 
> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/historical-contingency-and-the-futility-of-reductionism-why-chemistry-and-biology-is-not-physics/
>  ]
> 
>  - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>> 
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
>> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>> “magical”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
>> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
>> intelligently.  
> 
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
> 
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought that 
>> the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
> 
> 
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations run 
> us, if I may say.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
> 
> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for embodied 
> information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic content of 
> descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
> 
> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense that 
> doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing sense (but 
> could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely about the 
> relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to computation. 
> [ 
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>  ]).
> 
> 
> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
> non-Turing.
> 
> This new article may be of interest:
> 
> 
> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, too"
> ] 
> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity 
> ]

I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably 
inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a 
product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without adding 
light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t see any 
evidence for such a move. 

Bruno



> 
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-30 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 1:53 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method.
>
>
> *> I do, which is not so frequent in theology*
>

The scientific method in theology? You must be kidding.

> *You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real
> by “physically real”*
>

I'm not defining anything in fact I'm asking you to stop defining stuff for
one second and instead show me a example, show me a WORKING Turing Machine
that doesn't make use of the laws of physics so that I can observe it
making a calculation. You insist such a thing exists so put up or shut up.


> > *and then asking me the impossible task to transform a computation
> realised in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical reality.*
>

If it's impossible for arithmetic to do that, and I agree with you it is,
then physical reality can do something arithmetic can't.


> >> the multiverse as a collection of all real universes and a real
>> universe is one capable of producing a working Turing Machine.
>
>
> *All terms are used in too fuzzy way here.*
>

So says the man that can't use personal pronouns without tying himself into
logical knots and contradictions.


> > *The arithmetical reality produces all working machines*
>

I don't believe you. Prove me wrong by producing a working machine that
doesn't use matter or physics. And by "working" I mean one that changes in
time or space or both. You can claim all you want  you've proven there are
a thousand angels dancing on the head of a pin by redefining the words
"angles" and "dancing" and "pin" but I won't be interested until you show
me many very small spiritual beings moving to the rhythm of music on a
dance floor of less than one square millimeter in area.


> > *You can’t use work like "real” when doing metaphysics with the
> scientific method.*
>

There is no such thing as metaphysics with the scientific method

 >> there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce
>> it.
>
>
> > *I guess you mean to produce it physically,*
>

You can produce it anyway you like provided its observable.  I want to
observe a working Turing Machine that is not made of matter and does not
make use of the laws of physics. You just said that pure arithmetic can do
exactly that, so stop talking about it and SHOW ME.


> >  *the criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle* [...]
>

Don't you ever get tired of dead Greeks?


> > *No problem, but then you need to abandon mechanism, or to explain us
> what in “real matter”  *
>

I already told you that matter, or anything else, is real if you can make a
working Turing Machine out of it.


> > *is both Turing emulable (as it should with mechanism), yet not
> emulated in arithmetic, which would violate Turing completeness of
> arithmetic,*
>

You've got it exactly backwards yet again. Turing proved matter can
calculate anything that can be calculated but he did not prove that
arithmetic can. That's why it's easy for me to show you matter doing
arithmetic but you have to rack your brains dreaming up excuses why you
can't show me arithmetic doing matter, in fact you can't even show me
arithmetic doing arithmetic.

> *It is a standard theorem in all mathematical textbook that Robison
> arithmetic is Turing complete.*
>

And when you tell that mathematical textbook to calculate 2+2 what happens?


> >> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard
>> that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.
>
>
> >
> *You repeat this again, *
>

And I'd need scientific notation to count how many times you've called me
religious or dug up some Greek who's been dead for 2500 years as your
ultimate authority. You stop your repetition and I'll stop mine.

>>> *The number (2^4)*(3^5) typically encodes the list (4, 5),*
>>
>>
>> >>Do you know of a way that large Godel number can be un-encoded to get
>> back the 4 and 5 without doing any calculations?
>
>
> > *No of course.*
>

Then you can't use Godel numbering to encode information without matter and
the laws of physics.


> > *The point is that infinitely many of those calculations are realised
> in virtue of true relations of the type 2+2=4.*
>
> *You are the one saying that computationalism is true, but that only a
> special universal number counts.*
>

There is no special relationship between that Godel number and 4 and 5,
there are a infinite number of ways 4 and 5 can be manipulated to get
another larger number, Godel just picked one of them


> *>>>The FPI is that you are maximally ignorant of the future experience
>>> that you (the you here and now in Helsinki, say) will *live* after pus-hing
>>> on the button.*
>>
>>

>>If that is how the personal pronoun "you" is defined then "you" will not
>> live in the future regardless of if the button is pushed or not because the
>> here and now will not exist in the there and then,
>
>
> >*If the here and now will not exist in the here and then, *
>

There is 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 29 Nov 2018, at 16:36, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson  > wrote:
> 
> > How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as 
> > before? Thanks for the response. m.a.
> 
> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many 
> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double helix 
> unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix molecules, but 
> each helix still contains as much information as the original double helix 
> because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the information and Adenine 
> only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds with Guanine. So each single 
> helix can grab free bases floating around and start to grow, and pretty soon 
> you have 2 identical double helix molecules where there was only one before.

This is what can be made utterly precise with the second recursion theorem, or 
some of its generalisation. You can look at my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and 
Dreaming Machine” where I explain self-reproduction, self-transformation, 
set-regeneration, and dreams, by using Kleene’s second recursion theorem, or 
John Case’s generalisation of it. A planaria, here, is a program that you can 
cut in many pieces, and each pieces can build the entire program back 
(self-regeneration). Nature used it, somehow, arguably.

Bruno



> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread Philip Thrift



What does this mean in terms of (the possibility of) making a Star Trek 
transporter?  :)

[ https://www.thoughtco.com/star-trek-instantaneous-matter-transport-3072118 
]

- pt

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 8:34:23 PM UTC-6, Monterey wrote:
>
> My original question was about copying memories between identical carbon 
> atoms. How does that work with DNA molecules? Are they composed of carbon 
> atoms?
>
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 10:37 AM John Clark  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson > > wrote:
>>
>> > *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams 
>>> as before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>>>
>>
>> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many 
>> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double 
>> helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix 
>> molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the 
>> original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the 
>> information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds 
>> with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and 
>> start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules 
>> where there was only one before.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread Martin Abramson
My original question was about copying memories between identical carbon
atoms. How does that work with DNA molecules? Are they composed of carbon
atoms?

On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 10:37 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson 
> wrote:
>
> > *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as
>> before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>>
>
> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many
> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double
> helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix
> molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the
> original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the
> information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds
> with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and
> start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules
> where there was only one before.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>
>
>
> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
> enough equivalent).
>
> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to 
> assume a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who 
> dislike the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything 
> physical. 
>
>
>
>
My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
before it meets form, hence *hylomorphism *[ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism 
]. 

Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which 
gives forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
people, etc.





>
>
>
> molecules? 
>
>
> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>


Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?

[ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3262307/ ]
[ 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/historical-contingency-and-the-futility-of-reductionism-why-chemistry-and-biology-is-not-physics/
 
]

 - pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>>
>>
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>> “magical”.
>>
>>
>>
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
> behaves intelligently*.  
>
>
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
>
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>
>
>
>
>
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>
>
>
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
> run us, if I may say.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

Going by something Barry Cooper wrote

*The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*

"natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is precisely 
about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
computation.* [ 
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
 
]).


I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
non-Turing.

This new article may be of interest:


"there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, 
too"
] https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity 
]



- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 28 Nov 2018, at 00:44, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish 
> >>claims (matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic alone 
> >>can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information) I ask you 
> >>to actually do so.
>  
> > You ask me to implement those computation in the physical reality.
> 
> All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method. 


I do, which is not so frequent in theology and metaphysics those days.

You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real by 
“physically real”, and then asking me the impossible task to transform a 
computation realised in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical 
reality. The only way to do that is to implement a universal machine (a 
mathematical being) into the physical reality.

The whole point is that this physical reality is not necessarily primary, and 
that it is an appearance emerging from the first person indeterminacy of any 
universal machine respectively to the set of all computations.

You just mock the argument at the start by invoking your personal metaphysical 
belief. That is not valid.




>  
> > That has nothing to do with the fact that all computations are implemented 
> > in the “block-univers”, or better “block-mindscape” associate to arithmetic.
> 
> All that is just a fancy way of saying you don't need no stinking scientific 
> method. You like definitions so I will give you two, the multiverse as a 
> collection of all real universes and a real universe is one capable of 
> producing a working Turing Machine.

All terms are used in too fuzzy way here. The arithmetical reality produces all 
working machines, and indeed all of their works. You can’t use work like "real” 
when doing metaphysics with the scientific method.





>   And there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce 
> it.

I guess you mean to produce it physically, which means that you are using the 
criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle. No problem, but then you 
need to abandon mechanism, or to explain us what in “real matter”  is both 
Turing emulable (as it should with mechanism), yet not emulated in arithmetic, 
which would violate Turing completeness of arithmetic, indeed of its tiny 
initial sigma_1 segment.
That makes no sense.



> Neither you or Mr.Kleene or Mr.Robinson or anybody else has ever shown that a 
> working Turing Machine can be produced without using matter that obeys the 
> laws of physics and they haven't even come close to doing so.


They start from that. They are not doing metaphysics, nor physics. It is a 
standard theorem in all mathematical textbook that Robison arithmetic is Turing 
complete. If a sigma_1 relation is true, RA proves it, and that proofs can be 
translated in arithmetic and is associated to a computation done in arithmetic. 
You just show that you have no clue what computability theory is. 



> 
> > That is the usual interest form of pseudo-regions behaviour.
>  
> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that 
> one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

You repeat this again, which might show that you are not aware of your 
prejudices. But your older post does not confirm this. 

Do you commit yourself or not in a primary physical universe? That is what I 
called the Aristotelian Theology. The first “God” of Aristotle is the “first 
mover”, the one who gave the initial “impulsion”, and plays no other role. The 
second God of Aristotle is Matter. An irreducible substance which essence 
implies its existence, which is a way to say that it does not come from 
something else, which departs a lot from Plato’s types of conception of reality.


>  
> > my “outlandish” statements are just part of any course in computer science.
> 
> BULLSHIT!  Try peddling your ideas in Silicon Valley, talk to a venture 
> capitalist about funding it, You'd be laughed out if town!  


You have not yet begun to criticise my ideas (actually, the Löbian machine’s 
idea). You criticise (without realising) the mathematical work of Turing and 
others on which the Silicon Valley already relies.




> 
> > I have been asked both in Brussels and Lille to withdraw those explanations 
> > as it was judged to be well known.
> 
> The stuff you're correct about is not original and the stuff that's original 
> is not correct.

You seem to repeat a common slogan. Good. Usually this is not done publicly. 
Do you get money for this?





>  
> > You are not criticising me, you are criticising the whole of computer 
> > science.
> 
> Tell that to the Billionaires in Silicon Valley, they'll cry all the way to 
> the bank.
> 
> >> I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the 
> >> English language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/27/2018 2:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>>  Dennett's said:
>>> 
>>> “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the 
>>> painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.”
>>> 
>>> The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, the 
>>> trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a 
>>> misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that needs 
>>> no interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things would be 
>>> different if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer that, and I don't 
>>> think he could, then the statement "pain is a illusion" contains no 
>>> information.
>>> 
>>> And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness is an 
>>> illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, although 
>>> true, is not very illuminating. When discussing any philosophical issue the 
>>> word "illusion" should be used very cautiously. And if the topic involves 
>>> consciousness or quala and silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" 
>>> should never be used at all because it explains nothing.  
>> 
>> That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc. 
>> 
>> For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an illusion, but 
>> the primary matter that we infer
> 
> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 


X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
enough equivalent).

The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume a 
bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike the 
idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 







> molecules?

Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
electrons, and quantum mechanics.




> atoms? quarks? strings? 

Strings might be close to a notion of primary matter, except it is nt clear if 
they are conceived of being made by something, and it is also open, for most 
physicists, if they are primitive of not.

The notion of primary matter is typically not a physical notion, but a 
metaphysical one. To solve the problem which came first, mind or matter, it is 
obvious we cannot decide in advance the solution.




>   Who is it who every claims any one of these is "primary”? 

The (weak) materialist metaphysician. Like those who says that a computation 
needs to be implemented in some primitive physical reality to exist. They adopt 
Aristotle assumption about some ontological physical reality.

Most physicists, as any good scientists, are neutral on this. Some proposes 
their own opinion, after pension, or at some dinner when drunk. But physics and 
metaphysics are not the same branche of inquiry, even if related of course.




> What theory depends on one of them being primary? 


Many people says that there is no after-life. They use the mind-brain identity 
principle, usually in some materialist context, so that when the brain perish, 
they believe that their first person stop to exist in some absolute way. With 
mechanism, like with Everett QM, that conclusion does not follow.




> I think you are beating a straw man to imply that others theories are wrong 
> therefore yours must be right.


I never claim that a theory is right or wrong. I show only that the Mechanist 
theory implies immaterialism, and I explain how to recover physics 
phenomenologically, and how we can test that, and why the current empirical 
evidences favours more mechanism than materialism. 


Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a delusion. It is just a 
>> wrong inference, as most illusion are. 
>> 
>> Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of 
>> consciousness, minus being conscious, can be wrong.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > 
>> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
> 
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it behaves 
> as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is “magical”.
> 
> 
> 
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
> intelligently.  

Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a (universal) 
computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing complete. 

It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).




> 
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought that 
> the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.


If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing ability 
than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random oracle, 
which would come only from our ignorance about which computations run us, if I 
may say.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-29 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson 
wrote:

> *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as
> before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>

The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many
different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double
helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix
molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the
original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the
information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds
with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and
start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules
where there was only one before.

 John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-28 Thread Martin Abramson
How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as
before? Thanks for the response. m.a.

On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 11:28 AM John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:39 AM Martin Abramson 
> wrote:
>
> >"Anything with the capacity to change will do and that's why one carbon
>> atom is a good as another."  Please explain.   m.a.
>>
>
> Science can not tell the difference between one carbon atom and another
> (if they are of the same isotope), good thing too because the carbon atoms
> that make up your brain now are not the same ones that were in it last
> year. So carbon atoms don't have your name scratched on them, the thing
> that makes you be you is the way those carbon atoms are arranged.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>>
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-28 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 7:52:46 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 3:05 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> > *What in matter is not simulatable in arithmetic is experience.*
>>
>
> That's just a specific example of a more general concept, change. If you 
> have an experience you have changed, you're different than if you did not 
> have the experience.  Matter can change, arithmetic can't.
>
> > *Matter has experientiality, not mere informationality. *
>>
>
> I don't see the distinction, information describes a change in matter, an 
> experience needs a change and matter is the only known thing that can 
> change.
>
> *> This runs counter to most current consciousness science,*
>>
>
> There is intelligence science but there is no such thing as consciousness 
> science, at least none that I've heard of.
>  
>
>> *> There are 3 or 4 consciousness science conferences in 2019.*
>>
>
> And I would bet money not one of them will produced anything new about 
> consciousness, 
> although no doubt there will be 6.02*10^23 consciousness theories 
> presented, each one as good (or bad) as the other and all of them 
> untestable and impossible to falsify.   
>  
>
>> > *A purely informational world could be emulated in arithmetic.*
>>
>
> Arithmetic never changes in time or space so it can't emulate anything 
> without the help of something that can change, and that can only mean 
> matter. Anything with the capacity to change will do and that's why one 
> carbon atom is a good as another.
>
> John K Clark
>
>


When I wrote "What in matter is not *simulatable* in arithmetic is 
experience"

I meant instead: What in matter is not *synthesizable* (or realizable) in 
arithmetic is experience.

One can simulate a tornado in a supercomputer - at least partially -  but 
the simulation doesn't rear apart the supercomputer it's running in.
- https://news.wisc.edu/a-scientist-and-a-supercomputer-re-create-a-tornado/

(I translate "arithmetic" just to be the [fictional] Platonic computer of 
mathematics.)



"Consciousness Science" is becoming more common. We'll see what happens.


21st International Conference on Machine Consciousness and Consciousness 
Science
Paris, France
May 16 - 17, 2019

26th international Conference on The Science of Consciousness 
2019 Interlaken
June 25-28, 2019
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwGRHbdjhH4

Center for Consciousness Science
- https://consciousness.med.umich.edu


- pt
 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-28 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:39 AM Martin Abramson 
wrote:

>"Anything with the capacity to change will do and that's why one carbon
> atom is a good as another."  Please explain.   m.a.
>

Science can not tell the difference between one carbon atom and another (if
they are of the same isotope), good thing too because the carbon atoms that
make up your brain now are not the same ones that were in it last year. So
carbon atoms don't have your name scratched on them, the thing that makes
you be you is the way those carbon atoms are arranged.

John K Clark





>
>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-28 Thread Martin Abramson
"Anything with the capacity to change will do and that's why one carbon
atom is a good as another."  Please explain.   m.a.

On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 8:52 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 3:05 AM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
> > *What in matter is not simulatable in arithmetic is experience.*
>>
>
> That's just a specific example of a more general concept, change. If you
> have an experience you have changed, you're different than if you did not
> have the experience.  Matter can change, arithmetic can't.
>
> > *Matter has experientiality, not mere informationality. *
>>
>
> I don't see the distinction, information describes a change in matter, an
> experience needs a change and matter is the only known thing that can
> change.
>
> *> This runs counter to most current consciousness science,*
>>
>
> There is intelligence science but there is no such thing as consciousness
> science, at least none that I've heard of.
>
>
>> *> There are 3 or 4 consciousness science conferences in 2019.*
>>
>
> And I would bet money not one of them will produced anything new about 
> consciousness,
> although no doubt there will be 6.02*10^23 consciousness theories
> presented, each one as good (or bad) as the other and all of them
> untestable and impossible to falsify.
>
>
>> > *A purely informational world could be emulated in arithmetic.*
>>
>
> Arithmetic never changes in time or space so it can't emulate anything
> without the help of something that can change, and that can only mean
> matter. Anything with the capacity to change will do and that's why one
> carbon atom is a good as another.
>
> John K Clark
>
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-28 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 3:05 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> *What in matter is not simulatable in arithmetic is experience.*
>

That's just a specific example of a more general concept, change. If you
have an experience you have changed, you're different than if you did not
have the experience.  Matter can change, arithmetic can't.

> *Matter has experientiality, not mere informationality. *
>

I don't see the distinction, information describes a change in matter, an
experience needs a change and matter is the only known thing that can
change.

*> This runs counter to most current consciousness science,*
>

There is intelligence science but there is no such thing as consciousness
science, at least none that I've heard of.


> *> There are 3 or 4 consciousness science conferences in 2019.*
>

And I would bet money not one of them will produced anything new about
consciousness,
although no doubt there will be 6.02*10^23 consciousness theories
presented, each one as good (or bad) as the other and all of them
untestable and impossible to falsify.


> > *A purely informational world could be emulated in arithmetic.*
>

Arithmetic never changes in time or space so it can't emulate anything
without the help of something that can change, and that can only mean
matter. Anything with the capacity to change will do and that's why one
carbon atom is a good as another.

John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-28 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 5:45:33 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
>> *>What in “matter” plays the role of not being able to be emulated in 
>> arithmetic.*
>>
>
> Intelligence needs change. Matter can change in both time and space. 
> Arithmetic can change in neither.
>  
>
>> >>To hell with consciousness! 
>>
>>
>> *> That its Dennett, or Churchland conclusion. Let us just deny 
>> consciousness.*
>>
>
> I don't deny consciousness I'm just tired of hearing about it if nobody 
> has anything interesting to say. First things first, before you have even a 
> hope of understanding consciousness you're going to have to understand how 
> intelligence works, until then you're just wasting time spinning your 
> wheels.
>  
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
Before this year (2018) I didn't pay attention to panpsychism. Today I 
agree that

   "Panpsychism is crazy. But it is also highly likely to be true." 
(Philip Goff)

   [ 
https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-crazy-but-its-also-most-probably-true ]

What in matter is not simulatable in arithmetic is *experience*.

*Matter has experientiality, not mere informationality. *

This runs counter to most current consciousness science, which is 
information-processing oriented. (Experience is not taken to be a 
first-order property.) There are 3 or 4 consciousness science conferences 
in 2019.

A purely informational world could be *emulated in arithmetic. *But the 
existence of *experience* leads one to "real" materialism (Galen Strawson).

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-27 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish
>> claims (*matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic
>> alone can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information*)
>> I ask you to actually do so.
>>
>
> *> You ask me to implement those computation in the physical reality. *
>

All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method.


> *> That has nothing to do with the fact that all computations are
> implemented in the “block-univers”, or better “block-mindscape” associate
> to arithmetic.*
>

All that is just a fancy way of saying you don't need no stinking
scientific method. You like definitions so I will give you two, the
multiverse as a collection of all real universes and a real universe is one
capable of producing a working Turing Machine.  And there is no better way
to prove that something exists than to produce it. Neither you or Mr.Kleene
or Mr.Robinson or anybody else has ever shown that a working Turing Machine
can be produced without using matter that obeys the laws of physics and
they haven't even come close to doing so.

*> That is the usual interest form of pseudo-regions behaviour.*
>

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.


> *> my “outlandish” statements are just part of any course in computer
> science. *
>

BULLSHIT!  Try peddling your ideas in Silicon Valley, talk to a venture
capitalist about funding it, You'd be laughed out if town!

*> I have been asked both in Brussels and Lille to withdraw those
> explanations as it was judged to be well known.*
>

The stuff you're correct about is not original and the stuff that's
original is not correct.


> > *You are not criticising me, you are criticising the whole of computer
> science.*
>

Tell that to the Billionaires in Silicon Valley, they'll cry all the way to
the bank.

>> I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the
>> English language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually make a
>> calculation or encode some information without using matter that obeys the
>> laws of physics.
>
>
> > *The number (2^4)*(3^5) typically encodes the list (4, 5),*
>

Do you know of a way that large Godel number can be un-encoded to get back
the 4 and 5 without doing any calculations? If not then you must know of a
way to make calculations without matter that obeys the laws of physics. You
should tell the Silicon Valley  people immediately.
Just kidding, save yourself the humiliation.


> > *In metaphysics, when done seriously with the scientific attitude,*
>

Metaphysics with the scientific attitude is a contradiction in terms, like
jumbo shrimp or brilliant stupidity.

> *How can you lack so much sense of rigour.*
>

At least I'm rigorous enough to know who the referent is when I use
personal pronouns. You should try it sometime.


> *>The FPI is that you are maximally ignorant of the future experience that
> you (the you here and now in Helsinki, say) will *live* after pus-hing on
> the button.*
>

If that is how the personal pronoun "you" is defined then "you" will not
live in the future regardless of if the button is pushed or not because the
here and now will not exist in the there and then, and so "you" won't
either. If that is what the word means then "you" has died a billion time a
second since birth. And I'm suposed to be the one lacking rigour? You
can't even
keep simple personal pronouns straight!!

> *So, how could a universal machine distinguish a reality emulated by a
> program emulated in arithmetic, and a program emulated by your god?*
>

How could God or any intelligent entity know what the hell you're talking
about?


> *>What in “matter” plays the role of not being able to be emulated in
> arithmetic.*
>

Intelligence needs change. Matter can change in both time and space.
Arithmetic can change in neither.


> >>To hell with consciousness!
>
>
> *> That its Dennett, or Churchland conclusion. Let us just deny
> consciousness.*
>

I don't deny consciousness I'm just tired of hearing about it if nobody has
anything interesting to say. First things first, before you have even a
hope of understanding consciousness you're going to have to understand how
intelligence works, until then you're just wasting time spinning your
wheels.


> >>Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>
>
> *>No. *
>

No? *NO!* Are you joking? Are you serious?

> *He showed how a person can be attached to a computation,*
>

I have no idea what you mean. Do you?


> > *and also that physics is Turing complete,*
>

If something is Turing Complete then it is capable of behaving
intelligently and matter that obeys the laws of physics is the only thing
that has been proven to be Turing Complete. People can get sloppy in their
language snd say things like "Conway's Game of Life is Turing Complete" but
what they really 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-27 Thread Brent Meeker



On 11/27/2018 2:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark > wrote:


On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:


Dennett's said:

“/The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the 
painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion/.”


The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, 
the trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a 
misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that 
needs no interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things 
would be different if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer 
that, and I don't think he could, then the statement "pain is a 
illusion" contains no information.


And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness 
is an illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, 
although true, is not very illuminating. When discussing any 
philosophical issue the word "illusion" should be used very 
cautiously. And if the topic involves consciousness or quala and 
silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" should never be used 
at all because it explains nothing.


That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc.

For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an 
illusion, but the primary matter that we infer


What is this "primary matter" of which you speak?  molecules? atoms? 
quarks? strings?   Who is it who every claims any one of these is 
"primary"?  What theory depends on one of them being primary?  I think 
you are beating a straw man to imply that others theories are wrong 
therefore yours must be right.


Brent

from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a delusion. It is just 
a wrong inference, as most illusion are.


Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of 
consciousness, minus being conscious, can be wrong.


Bruno




John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-27 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>
>
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
> “magical”.
>
>
>
If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
*humans 
behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter behaves 
intelligently*.  

It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.

- pt



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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
>  Dennett's said:
> 
> “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the 
> painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.”
> 
> The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, the 
> trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a 
> misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that needs no 
> interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things would be different 
> if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer that, and I don't think he 
> could, then the statement "pain is a illusion" contains no information.
> 
> And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness is an 
> illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, although true, 
> is not very illuminating. When discussing any philosophical issue the word 
> "illusion" should be used very cautiously. And if the topic involves 
> consciousness or quala and silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" 
> should never be used at all because it explains nothing.  

That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc. 

For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an illusion, but the 
primary matter that we infer from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a 
delusion. It is just a wrong inference, as most illusion are. 

Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of consciousness, 
minus being conscious, can be wrong.

Bruno


> 
> John K Clark
> 
>  
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 8:31 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> > in a precise context, when doing science/mathematics, it is useful to have 
> > precise mathematical definition.
> 
> Sure definitions can be useful but they never cause things to pop into 
> existence


Once a definition is given, we may, ornate, give argument in favour of some 
existence. If I define x being “even” by “it exists a number z such that x = 2 
* z”, I can prove the existence of even number in “the standard model, (in all 
models actually) of arithmetic. Similarly with a computation and 
emulation/execution. Once we accept Turing or Church’s definition, we can 
explain why they exist and are executed in arithmetic.



> or can tell you anything about the nature of science or mathematics, all they 
> tell you is what the sound some human beings make with their mouth or the 
> squiggles they draw with their hands represent, something that may or may not 
> be part of reality. 
> 
> > You define computation through an ontological commitment.
>  
> My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish 
> claims (matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic alone 
> can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information) I ask you 
> to actually do so.


You ask me to implement those computation in the physical reality. That has 
nothing to do with the fact that all computations are implemented in the 
“block-univers”, or better “block-mindscape” associate to arithmetic.

When I say that the Kleene’s predicate encode computations, I am just reminding 
the BABA of the partial recursive function theory.

You are the one making an ontological commitment, and invoking it to prevent 
the testing of a theory. That is the usual interest form of pseudo-regions 
behaviour. Here, my “outlandish” statements are just part of any course in 
computer science. I have been asked both in Brussels and Lille to withdraw 
those explanations as it was judged to be well known. You are not criticising 
me, you are criticising the whole of computer science.




> I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the English 
> language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually make a 
> calculation or encode some information without using matter that obeys the 
> laws of physics.


The number (2^4)*(3^5) typically encodes the list (4, 5), which might, for 
example, encode a computation with respect to some universal number u. But the 
computation is in the semantical relations involving those numbers, not in the 
Gödel number description of the relations. That is a subtle point, I agree, but 
a very important one.




> I don't want more squiggles made of ink I want you to perform a experiment 
> that can be repeated.  I'm not being unreasonable in my request, I'm just 
> asking you to be scientific.


I am, in the sense that I show how to refute Mechanism, and shows that 
contemporary physics does not refute it, and on the contrary, confirms it, 
notably its weirder aspect (many-worlds, etc.).




>   If you can successfully do all that I'll do a 180, my opinion of your work 
> will change radically because I have no loyalty or sentimentality, if a idea 
> doesn't work I reject it if it does work I embrace it until I find something 
> that works even better.


Then act in this way in step 3 ...




>  
> > That is not the standard way to proceed in this field,
> 
> True, that's not the way things are done in the Junk Science field, Voodoo 
> priests would not approve at all. 


In metaphysics, when done seriously with the scientific attitude, you cannot 
invoke your god (matter).
You take observation as the criteria of reality, but that is exactly what 
mechanism makes invalid, as the dream argument showed already to Plato. You 
seem unable to think out of the frame of your metaphysics.



> 
> >>Definitions do not change reality and you're never going to discover 
> >>anything new just by making definitions.
> 
> > Any formal or mathematical definition will do,
> 
> Will do what? Change reality?
> 
> >That all computations are executed in arithmetic is just a standard fact 
> >knows since 1931-1936. 
> 
> And it has also been know that arithmetic can only be performed by matter 
> that obeys the laws of physics.
>  
> > That simply cannot work, unless you are right about the non existence of 
> > the first person indeterminacy,
> 
> First person indeterminacy? Oh yes, the idea that you can't always be certain 
> what will happen next.


How can you lack so much sense of rigour. The FPI is that you are maximally 
ignorant of the future experience that you (the you here and now in Helsinki, 
say) will *live* after pus-hing on the button. It is a precise special case of 
strong indeterminacy. 





> I believe that monumental discovery was made by the great thinker and 
> philosopher Og The Caveman.

Then, if you 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-25 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

 Dennett's said:

“*The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the
painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion*.”

The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, the
trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a
misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that needs
no interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things would be
different if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer that, and I don't
think he could, then the statement "pain is a illusion" contains no
information.

And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness is an
illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, although
true, is not very illuminating. When discussing any philosophical issue the
word "illusion" should be used very cautiously. And if the topic involves
consciousness or quala and silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion"
should never be used at all because it explains nothing.

John K Clark



>
>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, November 24, 2018 at 5:10:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/24/2018 5:39 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 1:10 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> Some in AI will say if something is just informationally intelligent 
>> (or pseudo-intelligent) but not experientially intelligent then it will not 
>> ever be remarkably creative - in literature, music, painting, or even 
>> science.*
>>
>
> Apparently being remarkably creative is not required to be supremely good 
> at Chess or GO or solving equations because pseudo-intelligence will beat 
> true-intelligence at those things every time. The goal posts keep moving, 
> true intelligence is whatever computers aren't good at. Yet. 
>  
>
>> > And it will not be conscious,
>>
>
> My problem is if the AI is smarter than me it will outsmart me, but if the 
> AI isn't conscious that's the computers problem not mine. And besides, 
> I'll never know if the AI is conscious or not just as I'll never know if 
> you are.
>
>
> The question is whether the AI will ever infer it is not conscious.  I 
> think Bruno correctly points out that this would be a contradiction. If it 
> can contemplate the question, it's conscious even though it can't prove it.
>
> Brent
>




As Galen Strawson points out, there are supposedly smart people around 
today - like Daniel Dennett - who don't believe they are conscious:

[ https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ ]

*Ned Block* [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ned_Block ] *once remarked that 
Dennett’s attempt to fit consciousness or “qualia” into his theory of 
reality “has the relation to qualia that the US Air Force had to so many 
Vietnamese villages: he destroys qualia in order to save them.”*

*...*

*This is how philosophers in the twentieth century came to endorse the 
Denial, the silliest view ever held in the history of human thought. “When 
I squint just right,” Dennett writes in 2013, “it does sort of seem that 
consciousness must be something in addition to all the things it does for 
us and to us, some special private glow or here-I-am-ness that would be 
absent in any robot… But I’ve learned not to credit the hunch. I think it 
is a flat-out mistake, a failure of imagination.” His position was 
summarized in an interview in The New York Times: “The elusive subjective 
conscious experience—the redness of red, the painfulness of pain—that 
philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.” If he’s right, no one has ever 
really suffered, in spite of agonizing diseases, mental illness, murder, 
rape, famine, slavery, bereavement, torture, and genocide. And no one has 
ever caused anyone else pain.*

*This is the Great Silliness. We must hope that it doesn’t spread outside 
the academy, or convince some future information technologist or roboticist 
who has great power over our lives.*


- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 6:10 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*>The question is whether the AI will ever infer it is not conscious. *


Perhaps reverse solipsism is true, maybe what I think of as consciousness
is just a very pale reflection of the true glorious feeling of
consciousness that you and everybody else except me feels. Comparing my
consciousness to yours may be like comparing a firefly to a supernova,
maybe I'm the only human that is not conscious. Or maybe its the other way
around and regular old solipsism is true, or maybe we're equally conscious;
the only thing I know for sure is I'll never know.

And that's why discussions about Artificial Intelligence are so much more
interesting than discussions about Artificial Consciousness.

 John K Clark




>
>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 3:14 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> I think one problem for us is as artificial/synthetic intelligence
> technology advances: When (if ever) do these entities get "rights"?
>

There is no point in pondering that because the question is moot. The big
unknown is not what rights we'll end up giving to machines but what rights
(if any) machines will end up giving us.

John K Clark





>
>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread Brent Meeker



On 11/24/2018 5:39 AM, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 1:10 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:


/> Some in AI will say if something is just informationally
intelligent (or pseudo-intelligent) but not experientially
intelligent then it will not ever be remarkably creative - in
literature, music, painting, or even science./


Apparently being remarkably creative is not required to be supremely 
good at Chess or GO or solving equations because pseudo-intelligence 
will beat true-intelligence at those things every time. The goal posts 
keep moving, true intelligence is whatever computers aren't good at. Yet.


> And it will not be conscious,


My problem is if the AI is smarter than me it will outsmart me, but if 
the AI isn't conscious that's the computers problem not mine. And 
besides, I'll never know if the AI is conscious or not just as I'll 
never know if you are.


The question is whether the AI will ever infer it is not conscious. I 
think Bruno correctly points out that this would be a contradiction. If 
it can contemplate the question, it's conscious even though it can't 
prove it.


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, November 24, 2018 at 7:40:26 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 1:10 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> Some in AI will say if something is just informationally intelligent 
>> (or pseudo-intelligent) but not experientially intelligent then it will not 
>> ever be remarkably creative - in literature, music, painting, or even 
>> science.*
>>
>
> Apparently being remarkably creative is not required to be supremely good 
> at Chess or GO or solving equations because pseudo-intelligence will beat 
> true-intelligence at those things every time. The goal posts keep moving, 
> true intelligence is whatever computers aren't good at. Yet. 
>  
>
>> > And it will not be conscious,
>>
>
> My problem is if the AI is smarter than me it will outsmart me, but if the 
> AI isn't conscious that's the computers problem not mine. And besides, 
> I'll never know if the AI is conscious or not just as I'll never know if 
> you are.
>  
>
>> >*as all humans are.*
>>
>
> Most humans are NOT remarkably creative in literature, music, painting or 
> science; so why do you think all humans are conscious?
>
> John K Clark
>
>  
>

I just happened to turn on COMET TV channel showing Dr. Goldfoot (Vincent 
Price) movies (Dr. Goldfoot and the Bikini Machine, Dr. Goldfoot and the 
Girl Bombs).

*Price plays the titular mad scientist who ... builds a gang of female 
robots.*

I think one problem for us is as artificial/synthetic intelligence 
technology advances: When (if ever) do these entities get "rights"?

- pt

 



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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 11:40 AM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

*> Strangely you're not as hard with yourself when you advertise
> manyworld... Just show us a parallel universe then... Until you apply to
> your own beliefs your own methods, It will just be dismissive BS.*
>

I can't show you a parallel universe and manyworlds may indeed be BS, but I
can show you weird stuff at the quantum level, manyworlds can explain it
but other things can too. I think manyworlds is slightly less weird than
the other explanations but I admit that's just my subjective opinion and I
don't really know if manyworlds, Copenhagen or pilot waves is correct,
perhaps none of them are. Right now manyworld fits the facts as well as any
other quantum interpretation, if a new one comes along that fits the facts
better I'll abandon manyworlds in a heartbeat.

 John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le sam. 24 nov. 2018 17:28, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 8:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
>> > *in a precise context, when doing science/mathematics, it is useful to
>> have precise mathematical definition.*
>>
>
> Sure definitions can be useful but they never cause things to pop into
> existence or can tell you anything about the nature of science or
> mathematics, all they tell you is what the sound some human beings make
> with their mouth or the squiggles they draw with their hands represent,
> something that may or may not be part of reality.
>
> *> You define computation through an ontological commitment.*
>>
>
> My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish
> claims (*matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic
> alone can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information*)
> I ask you to actually do so.
>

Strangely you're not as hard with yourself when you advertise manyworld...
Just show us a parallel universe then... Until you apply to your own
beliefs your own methods, It will just be dismissive BS.

I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the English
> language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually make a
> calculation or encode some information without using matter that obeys the
> laws of physics. I don't want more squiggles made of ink I want you to
> perform a experiment that can be repeated.  I'm not being unreasonable in
> my request, I'm just asking you to be scientific.  If you can successfully
> do all that I'll do a 180, my opinion of your work will change radically
> because I have no loyalty or sentimentality, if a idea doesn't work I
> reject it if it does work I embrace it until I find something that works
> even better.
>
>
>> > *That is not the standard way to proceed in this field,*
>>
>
> True, that's not the way things are done in the Junk Science field, Voodoo
> priests would not approve at all.
>
> >>Definitions do not change reality and you're never going to discover
>>> anything new just by making definitions.
>>
>>
>> > *Any formal or mathematical definition will do,*
>>
>
> Will do what? Change reality?
>
> *>That all computations are executed in arithmetic is just a standard fact
>> knows since 1931-1936. *
>>
>
> And it has also been know that arithmetic can only be performed by matter
> that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>
>> > *That simply cannot work, unless you are right about the non existence
>> of the first person indeterminacy, *
>>
>
> First person indeterminacy? Oh yes, the idea that you can't always be
> certain what will happen next. I believe that monumental discovery was made
> by the great thinker and philosopher Og The Caveman.
>
>
>> >>We've observed experimentally that a change in matter changes
>>> consciousness and a change in consciousness changes matter, I don't see how
>>> you could get better evidence than that indicating matter and consciousness
>>> are related.
>>
>>
>> *> In a video games, you can also have such relations,*
>>
>
> Yes, so what?
>
> *> them being processed in the physical reality, or in a brain in a vat,
>> or in arithmetic, the same effect can take place,*
>
>
> A brain in a vat is part of physical reality and so is a brain in a bone
> box atop your shoulders. And forget video games, arithmetic can't even
> calculate 2+2 anymore the English word "cat" can have kittens because a
> language by itself can't do anything.
>
> >>Turing showed that matter can make any computation that can be
>>> composted, what more do you need.
>>
>>
>
> *> Sure,*
>>
>
> I'm glad we agree on something.
>
> *> but we talk on primary matter, and it is this one that you have to
>> explain the role in consciousness,*
>>
>
> To hell with consciousness! Turing explained how matter can behave
> intelligently, and Darwin explained how  natural selection and random
> mutation can produce an animal that behaves intelligently, and I know that
> I am conscious, and I know I am the product of Evolution. If consciousness
> is a brute fact, if consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of
> intelligence, as I think it must be, then there is nothing more of interest
> to be said about it, certainly nobody on this list has said anything of
> more significance about consciousness since I joined the list.
>
> >> You've got it backwards. Again. Turing proved that matter can do
>>> mathematics he did NOT prove that mathematics can do matter,
>>
>>
>> *> Yes, that is my result,*
>>
>
> If you agree with Turing that matter can do mathematics but mathematics
> can NOT do matter then you must also agree that physics is more fundamental
> than mathematics.
>
>
>> > in arithmetic there are infinitely any processes that we cannot
>> predict in advance.
>>
>
> True, but how in the world does that weakness support your claim that
> mathematics tells physics what to do and thus is at the foundation of
> reality when mathematics doesn't know what matter is going to 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 8:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> > *in a precise context, when doing science/mathematics, it is useful to
> have precise mathematical definition.*
>

Sure definitions can be useful but they never cause things to pop into
existence or can tell you anything about the nature of science or
mathematics, all they tell you is what the sound some human beings make
with their mouth or the squiggles they draw with their hands represent,
something that may or may not be part of reality.

*> You define computation through an ontological commitment.*
>

My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish
claims (*matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic alone
can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information*) I ask
you to actually do so. I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can
spin a tale in the English language or the Mathematical language, I ask you
to actually make a calculation or encode some information without using
matter that obeys the laws of physics. I don't want more squiggles made of
ink I want you to perform a experiment that can be repeated.  I'm not being
unreasonable in my request, I'm just asking you to be scientific.  If you
can successfully do all that I'll do a 180, my opinion of your work will
change radically because I have no loyalty or sentimentality, if a idea
doesn't work I reject it if it does work I embrace it until I find
something that works even better.


> > *That is not the standard way to proceed in this field,*
>

True, that's not the way things are done in the Junk Science field, Voodoo
priests would not approve at all.

>>Definitions do not change reality and you're never going to discover
>> anything new just by making definitions.
>
>
> > *Any formal or mathematical definition will do,*
>

Will do what? Change reality?

*>That all computations are executed in arithmetic is just a standard fact
> knows since 1931-1936. *
>

And it has also been know that arithmetic can only be performed by matter
that obeys the laws of physics.


> > *That simply cannot work, unless you are right about the non existence
> of the first person indeterminacy, *
>

First person indeterminacy? Oh yes, the idea that you can't always be
certain what will happen next. I believe that monumental discovery was made
by the great thinker and philosopher Og The Caveman.


> >>We've observed experimentally that a change in matter changes
>> consciousness and a change in consciousness changes matter, I don't see how
>> you could get better evidence than that indicating matter and consciousness
>> are related.
>
>
> *> In a video games, you can also have such relations,*
>

Yes, so what?

*> them being processed in the physical reality, or in a brain in a vat, or
> in arithmetic, the same effect can take place,*


A brain in a vat is part of physical reality and so is a brain in a bone
box atop your shoulders. And forget video games, arithmetic can't even
calculate 2+2 anymore the English word "cat" can have kittens because a
language by itself can't do anything.

>>Turing showed that matter can make any computation that can be composted,
>> what more do you need.
>
>

*> Sure,*
>

I'm glad we agree on something.

*> but we talk on primary matter, and it is this one that you have to
> explain the role in consciousness,*
>

To hell with consciousness! Turing explained how matter can behave
intelligently, and Darwin explained how  natural selection and random
mutation can produce an animal that behaves intelligently, and I know that
I am conscious, and I know I am the product of Evolution. If consciousness
is a brute fact, if consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of
intelligence, as I think it must be, then there is nothing more of interest
to be said about it, certainly nobody on this list has said anything of
more significance about consciousness since I joined the list.

>> You've got it backwards. Again. Turing proved that matter can do
>> mathematics he did NOT prove that mathematics can do matter,
>
>
> *> Yes, that is my result,*
>

If you agree with Turing that matter can do mathematics but mathematics can
NOT do matter then you must also agree that physics is more fundamental
than mathematics.


> > in arithmetic there are infinitely any processes that we cannot predict
> in advance.
>

True, but how in the world does that weakness support your claim that
mathematics tells physics what to do and thus is at the foundation of
reality when mathematics doesn't know what matter is going to do even
though matter always ends up doing something?

>> Neither Mathematics or English or any other language will ever be Turing
>> universal, but matter is not a language and we've known since 1936 that it
>> is Turing universal.
>
>
> >*You insist confusing the language of mathematics and the object talked
> about using that language.*
>

It was you not me that insisted Robison arithmetic alone can make
calculations and "T(x, y, 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 1:10 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

*> Some in AI will say if something is just informationally intelligent (or
> pseudo-intelligent) but not experientially intelligent then it will not
> ever be remarkably creative - in literature, music, painting, or even
> science.*
>

Apparently being remarkably creative is not required to be supremely good
at Chess or GO or solving equations because pseudo-intelligence will beat
true-intelligence at those things every time. The goal posts keep moving,
true intelligence is whatever computers aren't good at. Yet.


> > And it will not be conscious,
>

My problem is if the AI is smarter than me it will outsmart me, but if the
AI isn't conscious that's the computers problem not mine. And besides, I'll
never know if the AI is conscious or not just as I'll never know if you are.


> >*as all humans are.*
>

Most humans are NOT remarkably creative in literature, music, painting or
science; so why do you think all humans are conscious?

John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-23 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, November 23, 2018 at 11:40:23 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 12:22 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
>
>> > True intelligence is *experiential intelligence*.
>>
>
> What sort of intelligence do your fellow human beings have? How does true 
> intelligence behave differently than untrue intelligence? If untrue 
> intelligence can outsmart true intelligence it sure doesn't seem very 
> untrue to me.
>
> John K Clark
>  
>

Some in AI will say if something is just informationally intelligent (or 
pseudo-intelligent) but not experientially intelligent then it will not 
ever be remarkably creative - in literature, music, painting, or even 
science.

And it will not be conscious, as all humans are.

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-23 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 12:22 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:


> > True intelligence is *experiential intelligence*.
>

What sort of intelligence do your fellow human beings have? How does true
intelligence behave differently than untrue intelligence? If untrue
intelligence can outsmart true intelligence it sure doesn't seem very
untrue to me.

John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-23 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, November 23, 2018 at 6:22:39 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 2:38 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> An alternative is that consciousness (or experientiality - in the 
>> philosophers' jargon) is intrinsic (more jargon) to matter. A change in 
>> matter would indeed change consciousness.*
>>
>
> Because a change in matter changes a computation and a change in 
> computation changes intelligence and a change in intelligence changes 
> consciousness.
>

 

>
>  John K Clark
>
>  
>
>

One can have a system that consists of only information processing: It has 
a "knowledge base" like Wikipedia, can converse on any topic, make jokes, 
can learn stuff reading online news, and so on. That system has* 
informational intelligence *- but does not have "experience". True 
intelligence is *experiential intelligence*.

- pt

 

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