Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-16 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never
 predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the W-man, or I
 feel being the M-man.


That's because neither will happen, however I the Helsinki Man can predict
that I the Helsinki Man will see only Helsinki. I the Helsinki Man can also
predict that I the Helsinki Man will turn into the Moscow Man or the
Washington Man,  but is unable to know which because I the Helsinki Man
don't know if the next photon that will enter the eye of I the Helsinki Man
will come from Moscow or Washington. I the Helsinki Man can make a third
prediction, even if the predictions made by I the Helsinki Man turn out to
be wrong (actually they won't be wrong in this instance but it wouldn't
matter if they were) I the Helsinki Man would still feel like I the
Helsinki Man.


   If you are OK with this, please proceed.


I'm not OK with this and will not proceed.


the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither
 Pascal or Boltzman were:
  1) Some events have no cause.


  Only those believing in the collapse


You can say that what the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying was
wrong if you like, but they were talking about wave collapse.  And the
founders of Quantum Mechanics would also say that arguing over the
difference between a event with no cause and a event with a cause that can
never be detected even in theory is a waste of time.


   that Feynman called a collective hallucination.


Hmm, I've heard lots of people say that reality is a collective
hallucination and I know a few Feynman sayings but I never heard him say
that about wave collapse.  When did he say it? What is the entire
quotation? Google can't seem to find anything like that.


  I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone capable
 of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized as X.


The problem has never been X calling himself X, that's fine; the problem
comes when you a third party who never remembers being X starts talking
about X  to yet another third party in a world that has 2 things in it
that have a equal right to call themselves X because duplication chambers
exist. If somebody hides behind pronouns in such a world anything can be
proven.


  So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory of
 pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.


Yes, just as John Clark thought. It is theoretically impossible to explain
Bruno Marchal's ideas without using ill defined pronouns to hide behind and
without assuming the very things that Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove.
The only explanation given is I is I and you is you and he is he, but
before Euclid even started his first proof he made crystal clear what all
his terms meant, and Euclid never said a line is a line.


  Without using pronouns please explain who the hell Mr. 1 is and then
 maybe I can answer your questions.


  Without using pronouns, I lost my job.


John Clark does not think Bruno Marchal knows what a pronoun is.


  You confuse [blah blah]


There is one thing John Clark is most certainly not confused about, unless
used very very carefully pronouns will cause endless confusion in a world
where duplicating chambers exist.

 John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Oct 2013, at 16:46, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can  
never predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the  
W-man, or I feel being the M-man.


That's because neither will happen, however I the Helsinki Man can  
predict that I the Helsinki Man will see only Helsinki. I the  
Helsinki Man can also predict that I the Helsinki Man will turn into  
the Moscow Man or the Washington Man,  but is unable to know which  
because I the Helsinki Man don't know if the next photon that will  
enter the eye of I the Helsinki Man will come from Moscow or  
Washington.


OK. We agree. You do grasp enough of the FPI to proceed to step 4.



I the Helsinki Man can make a third prediction, even if the  
predictions made by I the Helsinki Man turn out to be wrong  
(actually they won't be wrong in this instance but it wouldn't  
matter if they were) I the Helsinki Man would still feel like I the  
Helsinki Man.


We completely agree on this.
With your theory of identity, both the M-man and the W-man are the H- 
man.






  If you are OK with this, please proceed.

I'm not OK with this


???



and will not proceed.


???






   the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that  
neither Pascal or Boltzman were:

 1) Some events have no cause.

 Only those believing in the collapse

You can say that what the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying  
was wrong if you like, but they were talking about wave collapse.   
And the founders of Quantum Mechanics would also say that arguing  
over the difference between a event with no cause and a event with a  
cause that can never be detected even in theory is a waste of time.


They were under the spell of Vienna positivism. Einstein said about  
this that he would have preferred to be plumber than to hear things  
like that.


Anywy, with comp and/or Everett, we have no more any reason to believe  
in event without cause.







  that Feynman called a collective hallucination.

Hmm, I've heard lots of people say that reality is a collective  
hallucination and I know a few Feynman sayings but I never heard him  
say that about wave collapse.


It is in a footnote in his little book on light. I don't have it under  
my hand for now.




When did he say it? What is the entire quotation? Google can't seem  
to find anything like that.


Ah! You force me to do research in my (new) apartment. Let me pray  
that it is not in some box ...


... I found it, and the quote. It is page 108 of my french edition  
Lumière et Matière, une étrange histoire, which is a translation of  
his book QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter.


The exact quote in french is: Il est bon de garder à présent à  
l'esprit ce principe général si l'on ne veut pas tomber dans toutes  
sortes de confusions telles que la 'réduction du paquet d'ondes' et  
autres effets magiques.
I translate:  It is good to keep that general idea in mind if we want  
to avoid all sorts of confusions like 'the reduction of the wave  
packet' or other magical effect.
(the general idea is that the wave represents an amplitude of  
probability, whose squared gives the probability).





 I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone  
capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized  
as X.


The problem has never been X calling himself X, that's fine; the  
problem comes when you a third party who never remembers being X  
starts talking about X  to yet another third party in a world that  
has 2 things in it that have a equal right to call themselves X  
because duplication chambers exist. If somebody hides behind  
pronouns in such a world anything can be proven.



Only see a problem here, when there is just an indetermination on a  
subjective outcome.





 So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a  
theory of pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.


Yes, just as John Clark thought. It is theoretically impossible to  
explain Bruno Marchal's ideas without using ill defined pronouns to  
hide behind and without assuming the very things that Bruno Marchal  
is attempting to prove.


No made ill use of pronouns, and you mock when I added the necessary  
nuances: notably the distinction between first person pov and third  
person pov, completely defined in sharable 3p terms.



The only explanation given is I is I and you is you and he is he,  
but before Euclid even started his first proof he made crystal clear  
what all his terms meant, and Euclid never said a line is a line.


Nor did I.





 You confuse [blah blah]


And when I provide precise and of course more lengthy explanations,  
you just skip them. This can't help you.





There is one thing John Clark is most certainly not confused about,  
unless used very very carefully pronouns will cause endless  
confusion in a world where 

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-16 Thread LizR
Here's an etext! Happy hunting :)

http://ia700700.us.archive.org/18/items/QuantumElectrodynamics/Feynman-QuantumElectrodynamics.pdf




On 17 October 2013 10:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 16 Oct 2013, at 16:46, John Clark wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never
 predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the W-man, or I
 feel being the M-man.


 That's because neither will happen, however I the Helsinki Man can predict
 that I the Helsinki Man will see only Helsinki. I the Helsinki Man can also
 predict that I the Helsinki Man will turn into the Moscow Man or the
 Washington Man,  but is unable to know which because I the Helsinki Man
 don't know if the next photon that will enter the eye of I the Helsinki Man
 will come from Moscow or Washington.


 OK. We agree. You do grasp enough of the FPI to proceed to step 4.



 I the Helsinki Man can make a third prediction, even if the predictions
 made by I the Helsinki Man turn out to be wrong (actually they won't be
 wrong in this instance but it wouldn't matter if they were) I the Helsinki
 Man would still feel like I the Helsinki Man.


 We completely agree on this.
 With your theory of identity, both the M-man and the W-man are the
 H-man.





   If you are OK with this, please proceed.


 I'm not OK with this


 ???


 and will not proceed.


 ???






the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither
 Pascal or Boltzman were:
  1) Some events have no cause.


  Only those believing in the collapse


 You can say that what the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying was
 wrong if you like, but they were talking about wave collapse.  And the
 founders of Quantum Mechanics would also say that arguing over the
 difference between a event with no cause and a event with a cause that can
 never be detected even in theory is a waste of time.


 They were under the spell of Vienna positivism. Einstein said about this
 that he would have preferred to be plumber than to hear things like that.

 Anywy, with comp and/or Everett, we have no more any reason to believe in
 event without cause.






   that Feynman called a collective hallucination.


 Hmm, I've heard lots of people say that reality is a collective
 hallucination and I know a few Feynman sayings but I never heard him say
 that about wave collapse.


 It is in a footnote in his little book on light. I don't have it under my
 hand for now.



 When did he say it? What is the entire quotation? Google can't seem to
 find anything like that.


 Ah! You force me to do research in my (new) apartment. Let me pray that it
 is not in some box ...

 ... I found it, and the quote. It is page 108 of my french edition
 Lumière et Matière, une étrange histoire, which is a translation of his
 book QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter.

 The exact quote in french is: Il est bon de garder à présent à l'esprit
 ce principe général si l'on ne veut pas tomber dans toutes sortes de
 confusions telles que la 'réduction du paquet d'ondes' et autres effets
 magiques.
 I translate:  It is good to keep that general idea in mind if we want to
 avoid all sorts of confusions like 'the reduction of the wave packet' or
 other magical effect.
 (the general idea is that the wave represents an amplitude of probability,
 whose squared gives the probability).




  I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone
 capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized as X.


 The problem has never been X calling himself X, that's fine; the problem
 comes when you a third party who never remembers being X starts talking
 about X  to yet another third party in a world that has 2 things in it
 that have a equal right to call themselves X because duplication chambers
 exist. If somebody hides behind pronouns in such a world anything can be
 proven.



 Only see a problem here, when there is just an indetermination on a
 subjective outcome.




  So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory of
 pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.


 Yes, just as John Clark thought. It is theoretically impossible to explain
 Bruno Marchal's ideas without using ill defined pronouns to hide behind and
 without assuming the very things that Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove.


 No made ill use of pronouns, and you mock when I added the necessary
 nuances: notably the distinction between first person pov and third person
 pov, completely defined in sharable 3p terms.


 The only explanation given is I is I and you is you and he is he, but
 before Euclid even started his first proof he made crystal clear what all
 his terms meant, and Euclid never said a line is a line.


 Nor did I.





  You confuse [blah blah]


 And when I provide precise and of course more lengthy explanations, you
 just skip them. This can't help 

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 6:39 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 wrote:

   I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
 identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
 justified to give them different names.


  Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
  identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago


 Yes.

  But things would get a bit confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue
  now.


 Yes.


  Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.


 Yes.

  Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from time
  passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't.


 Yes.

  Which one is it?


 I do.

  I suspect you think they are the same


 No, your prediction failed.

There goes my daily dose of dopamine. Will have to find some other way
to get it...

 I think the 2 things are fundamentally different
 because the John Clark of one second ago and the John Clark of right now
 will never meet,

Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad:

1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible, so this
type of thought experiment is based on an absurd premise;

2) You believe that teleportation is possible, in which case you
accept the thought experiment and are confronted with the question of
what you would perceive if you went through such an experience.

I don't feel I am sufficiently knowledge in physics to have and
educated opinion on teleportation. I'm pretty sure you have a much
more sophisticated knowledge of physics than I do, so I'm more than
happy to listen to your arguments. Not going to make any more
prediction on what you might think because my dopamine is already low.

On the next point you will see why I wasn't paying attention in physics class.

 so there is no confusion and separate names are not needed
 to avoid confusion and pronouns cause no trouble. But with duplicating
 chambers the 2 John Clarks could meet and stand right next to each other,
 and if you were to say I like John Clark but I don't like John Clark your
 meaning might be clear in your mind but you would need to change your
 language if you wanted to communicate the idea to others.

I had a very unpleasant physics teacher (coincidently... :) ) who
appeared to wear the same trousers throughout the entire semester. A
scientifically-minded colleague of mind decided to throw some ink at
her ass. It turns out that she, indeed, wore the same trousers for the
entire semester. How do you feel about tattoos?

 And the place to
 start would be to be careful with pronouns and give one of the John Clarks,
 it doesn't matter which one, the nickname Mary Sue.

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_OW6wa7cAFBY/TPACSytH_kI/AvQ/BmLVAQA/s1600/mary_sue.jpg

 True, John Clark might
 not like it, but a lot of people don't like their nickname.


  I also predict an attempt to avoid answering the question directly


 That prediction has also failed but you still feel like Telmo Menezes
 because predictions, right or wrong, have nothing to do with identity;

I don't think I claimed predictions had anything to do with identity.

 you
 feel like Telmo Menezes because you remember being Telmo Menezes yesterday
 and for no other reason.

Yes.

Marry Sue (aka John K Clark)

Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*)

* bonus points if you get the reference



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 5:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad:

1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible


No.

 2) You believe that teleportation is possible


Yes.

 in which case you accept the thought experiment


Yes, both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark see nothing
fundamentally wrong with the thought experiment, so the pronoun in the
above causes no problems.

 and are confronted with the question of what you would perceive if you
 went through such an experience.


 ^^^  ^^^


What both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark perceive is that
Telmo Menezes has caught the pronoun disease from Bruno Marchal.

 Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*)

 * bonus points if you get the reference


Well I hear that a restaurant in Ecuador called San Telmo serves a
excellent T-bone steak.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com


 On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 5:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

  Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad:

 1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible


 No.

  2) You believe that teleportation is possible


 Yes.

  in which case you accept the thought experiment


 Yes, both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark see nothing
 fundamentally wrong with the thought experiment, so the pronoun in the
 above causes no problems.

  and are confronted with the question of what you would perceive if you
 went through such an experience.


 ^^^  ^^^


 What both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark perceive is that
 Telmo Menezes has caught the pronoun disease from Bruno Marchal.


Are you saying that John Clark after going through a (duplicating
teleporter cannot use anymore the indexical 'I' when talking about himself,
and both copy will talk about themselve like Alain Delon and never use 'I'
again because 'I' is an ill concept when a duplicating teleporter exist ?

Quentin



  Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*)

 * bonus points if you get the reference


 Well I hear that a restaurant in Ecuador called San Telmo serves a
 excellent T-bone steak.

   John K Clark


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will assess that
 they were unable to predict the result of opening the door


Bruno I really didn't need your help on that, I already knew that I can't
always successfully predict what I will see after I open a door.

 I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what
 you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.


  That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the founders
 of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or Boltzman.


No, the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither
Pascal or Boltzman were:

1) Some events have no cause.
2) Probability is a property of the thing itself and not just a measure of
our lack of information.

The sort of indeterminacy you're talking about was first discovered by
Professor Og of Caveman University who didn't write in the journal
Paleolithic Times because Professor Og didn't know how to write.

 What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is
 deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view,


The trouble is that Bruno Marchal is unable to say who exactly is that is
experiencing this 1-view.  Without using pronouns please explain who the
hell Mr. 1 is and then maybe I can answer your questions.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 10:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

 Are you saying that John Clark after going through a (duplicating
 teleporter cannot use anymore the indexical 'I' when talking about himself


No.

  me myself and I John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Oct 2013, at 17:18, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will  
assess that they were unable to predict the result of opening the door


Bruno I really didn't need your help on that, I already knew that I  
can't always successfully predict what I will see after I open a door.


The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never  
predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the W-man,  
or I feel being the M-man.


If you are OK with this, please proceed.





 I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know  
what you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a  
long time ago.


 That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the  
founders of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or  
Boltzman.


No, the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that  
neither Pascal or Boltzman were:


1) Some events have no cause.


Only those believing in the collapse (that Feynman called a collective  
hallucination). You confuse QM and one of his most nonsensical  
interpretation.





2) Probability is a property of the thing itself and not just a  
measure of our lack of information.


In QM-withoit collapse, the probability comes, like in comp, from the  
ignorance about which computation we belong too.







The sort of indeterminacy you're talking about was first discovered  
by Professor Og of Caveman University who didn't write in the  
journal Paleolithic Times because Professor Og didn't know how to  
write.


Lol




 What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is  
deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view,


The trouble is that Bruno Marchal is unable to say who exactly is  
that is experiencing this 1-view.


I don't need this. This should be made utterly clear in the iterated  
self-duplication, where I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during  
1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies that can be sent in front of one  
of the 2^(16180 * 1) possible images on a screen with 16180 *  
1 pixels, which can be black or white each.


All you need to understand is that almost all among the  2^(16180 *  
1) * (60 * 90) * 24 see white noise, independently of who they  
are. The predictions bears on the relative experiences.


I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone  
capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized  
as X.




Without using pronouns please explain who the hell Mr. 1 is and then  
maybe I can answer your questions.



Without using pronouns, I lost my job.

The whole approach is indexical, and the third person I is  
eventually defined in the Gödel-Kleene manner (the Dx = xx trick,  
that I promised to Liz to redo in the terms of the phi_i and the w_i).


Then the first person I is defined, in UDA, as being only the content  
of the memory (= your definition).


The only difference between first person and third person, used here,  
is that the first person memories (the content of the diaries), are  
annihilated and reconstituted together with the person's body.


In the arithmetical version, the first person is proved to be not  
directly amenable to the use of the dx = xx algorithm (an obvious  
cousin of the famous Mocking Bird combinators, btw), but, by a sort of  
miracle, thanks to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, (using the  
Dx = xx algorithm at another level!), we can recover it with the  
Theaetetus definition of the knower, which recovers in the only way  
possible (a result proved by Artemov) a knower from the Gödel's notion  
of self-reference.


So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory  
of pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.
The eight arithmetical hypostases are eight precise mathematics of  
eight simple and deep machine's self-referential points of view, that  
is pronouns, like 1-I, 3-I, singular, plural, etc.


But in UDA, you don't need Gödel-Kleene, as the first person histories  
are defined in simple third person terms (sequences of W and M written  
in the personal diaries), and it is rather obvious that, with the  
protocols, all are 1-self non predictable, although some statistical  
distribution can be predicted.


Step 4 asks if those statistical distribution [of those first person  
experiences (diary content of the one who actually do the self  
multiplications)]  have to change if we introduce reconstitution  
delays in some branches of the self-multiplication changes ).


That's just step 2 + step 3. So it should be easy.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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To post to this 

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Oct 2013, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:





On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit  
of information,


I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is  
not identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it  
becomes justified to give them different names.


But you agreed that both are the H-man, and what you say confirms that  
both the W-man and the M-man will assess that they were unable to  
predict the result of opening the door (the city they see) after  
having pushed on the button.






 then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.

I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what  
you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long  
time ago.


That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the  
founders of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or  
Boltzman.
What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is  
deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view, and not  
based on any physical assumptions (unlike QM).
But the originlaity is not the point. If you agree with that  
particular form of FPI (First person indeterminacy), then you can move  
to the step 4.







 As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous  
feeling of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that  
prediction, or any other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or  
refuted, nor does it matter if the prediction was probabilistic or  
absolute.


 ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it  
makes my point)


I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?


The existence of the FPI. (and then its consequences).

Bruno





  John K Clark



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Oct 2013, at 20:14, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com  
wrote:




On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit  
of

information,



I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it  
becomes

justified to give them different names.


Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.

Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.

Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
it?

I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
dementia.


Lol.

Bruno








then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.



I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what  
you're

going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.


As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous  
feeling
of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that  
prediction, or any
other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor  
does it

matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.



? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it  
makes

my point)



I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?

 John K Clark


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Oct 2013, at 00:10, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:





On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 8:14 PM, Telmo Menezes  
te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com  
wrote:




 On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one  
bit of

 information,


 I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is  
not
 identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it  
becomes

 justified to give them different names.

Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.

Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.

Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
it?

I'll give it a shot, but I could well be confusing things/levels:

Does that question make sense given complete arithmetization of self- 
reference by Gödel (and whoever else did this or contributed) when  
we assume comp? Because new and old John Clarks cannot be  
distinguished as we can't distinguish between particular machines  
and copies.


This is related to the confusion recently on first person and third  
person.The reasoning concerns 3p formalizable discourse of self- 
reference of sufficiently rich machines. So the third person I.


However, a particular copy (?) machine making self-referential  
statements from 3rd person point of view, will communicate an  
account of some version of its states, and so talking histories of  
Moscow etc. at this level, when one copy of a machine is concerned  
in the thought experiment, is valid.


But as Moscow etc. is not part of formal self-reference provability,  
Gödel does not arithmetize this knowledge of 1st person bit and I  
think incompleteness refutes that we can because []p - p would  
hold. That's how I make sense or nonsense out of it anyway. PGC


Yes, and Gödel was well aware that his [] cannot formalize  
knowledge. Then others realized, apparently unaware of Theaetetus!,   
that []p  p does meta-formalize an non nameable knower associated  
to the 3p-machine ([]). It is meta and non nameable because, unlike  
[], you can't define it in the machine language, you can emulate it  
only for each particular proposition p.
I know that 1+1=2 = [] 1+1=2 (1+1=2). To define this in the  
language of the machine, you would need something like [] 1+1=2   
TRUE(1+1=2), but TRUE cannot be defined.


Bruno





I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
dementia.



  then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.


 I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what  
you're
 going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time  
ago.



  As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous  
feeling
  of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that  
prediction, or any
  other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted,  
nor does it

  matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.


  ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like  
it makes

  my point)


 I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?

   John K Clark


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-14 Thread Telmo Menezes
Dear John,

 in spite of my reluctance to spend time and energy on that nightmare of
 teleportation-related follies - (probably a result of too heavy dinners
 after which Q-physicists could not sleep/relax) - and with no intention to
 protect John Clark (a decent partner anyway) I may draw a thick line between
 the terms generating a new term  and  experiencing change in passing.

 In my agnosticism I visualize the 'World' in constant dynamic change, so
 nothing stays the same. What does not mean that 'instant by instant' (if
 we accept time as a reality-factor) everything becomes renewed
 Changed: yes. (=My disagreement also against 'loops' in general).

 Considering the changes: they may be 'essential' (as e.g. death, or at least
 extended to 'major' parts of our organization) - or just incidental/partial.
 The way I try to figure out changes? there is an infinite complexity
 exercising (affecting) our world (i.e. the model we constructed for our
 existence as of latest) providing the stuff to our reductionist thinking
 (That 'model' is all and we have to explain - fit everything into it). I
 arrived at this by Robert Rosen.
 So: I am not a 'different person' from what I was a second ago, YET I feel
 identical to THAT person (maybe of decades ago) which underwent lots of
 changes - keeping the SELF-feeling (whatever that may be).
 It doesn't mean that I am identical to THAT person, who could run, exercise,
 worked successfully in his conventional-reductionist science, etc. etc. I
 just FEEL as the same person (though changed, what I realize).

I understand your reluctance. My intuition is that the fact that
rational discussion around things like teleportation turn into such a
nightmare is precisely a sign that there is something very fundamental
that we are not grasping. Sci-fi duplicators are nice because they
confront us with situations where our normal model of I breaks. Of
course maybe these duplicators are impossible, but they are a nice
shortcut to other possible physical situations that result in the same
type of problems.

I suspect that trusting too much the feeling of being the same person
is problematic. Imagining another sci-fi device that could write all
of my personal memories into your brain (and that would come with my
sincere apologies): I suspect you would then feel that you are me.
Memories are just more perceptions, but what perceives?

 In a doubling from 'Helsinki' to 'Moscow' (joke) it is not likely that all
 those changes by the complexity-circumstances in Finnland would be
 duplicated by the changes in Russia, so the 'doubled' (clone???) changes
 into a different person. I leave it to the 'Everything' Friends to decide
 whether that person feels still like the other one. I wouldn't.

What if you were duplicated inside an isolation tank? You could enter
the tank in Helsinki, wait a bit, open the lid and be in Moscow. It
would certainly feel strange but do you really think you would feel
you have been transformed into someone else?

All the best,
Telmo.

 Just musing. Respectfully
 John Mikes


 On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 wrote:

 On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 
 
  On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
  wrote:
 
   if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
  information,
 
 
  I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
  identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
  justified to give them different names.

 Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
 identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
 confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.

 Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.

 Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
 time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
 it?

 I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
 to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
 comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
 dementia.


   then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
 
 
  I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what
  you're
  going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.
 
 
   As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous
   feeling
   of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction,
   or any
   other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does
   it
   matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.
 
 
   ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it
   makes
   my point)
 
 
  I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?
 
John K Clark
 
 
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-14 Thread John Mikes
Telmo, entering sci-fi makes the discussion irrelevant.
what if... can e anything I want to show (I almost wrote: prove).
I am also against 'thought experiments' - designed to PROVE things unreal
(=not experienced in real life) - like e.g. the EPR etc., involving
'unfacts'.
By long back-and-forth people get used to the fantasy-world and THINK it is
true. Devise constants from 'real life' and 'math' (imaginary, but
formalized as real). Then someone gets a Nobel prize on it.
I rather stay a confessed gnostic.
John M


On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 7:37 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 Dear John,

  in spite of my reluctance to spend time and energy on that nightmare of
  teleportation-related follies - (probably a result of too heavy dinners
  after which Q-physicists could not sleep/relax) - and with no intention
 to
  protect John Clark (a decent partner anyway) I may draw a thick line
 between
  the terms generating a new term  and  experiencing change in passing.
 
  In my agnosticism I visualize the 'World' in constant dynamic change, so
  nothing stays the same. What does not mean that 'instant by instant'
 (if
  we accept time as a reality-factor) everything becomes renewed
  Changed: yes. (=My disagreement also against 'loops' in general).
 
  Considering the changes: they may be 'essential' (as e.g. death, or at
 least
  extended to 'major' parts of our organization) - or just
 incidental/partial.
  The way I try to figure out changes? there is an infinite complexity
  exercising (affecting) our world (i.e. the model we constructed for our
  existence as of latest) providing the stuff to our reductionist thinking
  (That 'model' is all and we have to explain - fit everything into it).
 I
  arrived at this by Robert Rosen.
  So: I am not a 'different person' from what I was a second ago, YET I
 feel
  identical to THAT person (maybe of decades ago) which underwent lots of
  changes - keeping the SELF-feeling (whatever that may be).
  It doesn't mean that I am identical to THAT person, who could run,
 exercise,
  worked successfully in his conventional-reductionist science, etc. etc. I
  just FEEL as the same person (though changed, what I realize).

 I understand your reluctance. My intuition is that the fact that
 rational discussion around things like teleportation turn into such a
 nightmare is precisely a sign that there is something very fundamental
 that we are not grasping. Sci-fi duplicators are nice because they
 confront us with situations where our normal model of I breaks. Of
 course maybe these duplicators are impossible, but they are a nice
 shortcut to other possible physical situations that result in the same
 type of problems.

 I suspect that trusting too much the feeling of being the same person
 is problematic. Imagining another sci-fi device that could write all
 of my personal memories into your brain (and that would come with my
 sincere apologies): I suspect you would then feel that you are me.
 Memories are just more perceptions, but what perceives?

  In a doubling from 'Helsinki' to 'Moscow' (joke) it is not likely that
 all
  those changes by the complexity-circumstances in Finnland would be
  duplicated by the changes in Russia, so the 'doubled' (clone???) changes
  into a different person. I leave it to the 'Everything' Friends to decide
  whether that person feels still like the other one. I wouldn't.

 What if you were duplicated inside an isolation tank? You could enter
 the tank in Helsinki, wait a bit, open the lid and be in Moscow. It
 would certainly feel strange but do you really think you would feel
 you have been transformed into someone else?

 All the best,
 Telmo.

  Just musing. Respectfully
  John Mikes
 
 
  On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
  wrote:
 
  On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 wrote:
  
  
  
   On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
   wrote:
  
if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit
 of
   information,
  
  
   I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
   identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
   justified to give them different names.
 
  Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
  identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
  confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.
 
  Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.
 
  Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
  time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
  it?
 
  I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
  to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
  comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
  dementia.
 
 
then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
  
  
   I agree that life is 

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-14 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

  I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
 identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
 justified to give them different names.


  Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
 identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago


Yes.

 But things would get a bit confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue
 now.


Yes.


  Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.


Yes.

 Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from time
 passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't.


Yes.

 Which one is it?


I do.

 I suspect you think they are the same


No, your prediction failed. I think the 2 things are fundamentally
different because the John Clark of one second ago and the John Clark of
right now will never meet, so there is no confusion and separate names are
not needed to avoid confusion and pronouns cause no trouble. But with
duplicating chambers the 2 John Clarks could meet and stand right next to
each other, and if you were to say I like John Clark but I don't like John
Clark your meaning might be clear in your mind but you would need to
change your language if you wanted to communicate the idea to others. And
the place to start would be to be careful with pronouns and give one of the
John Clarks, it doesn't matter which one, the nickname Mary Sue. True, John
Clark might not like it, but a lot of people don't like their nickname.


  I also predict an attempt to avoid answering the question directly


That prediction has also failed but you still feel like Telmo Menezes
because predictions, right or wrong, have nothing to do with identity; you
feel like Telmo Menezes because you remember being Telmo Menezes yesterday
and for no other reason.

   Marry Sue (aka John K Clark)

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-13 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
 information,


I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
justified to give them different names.

 then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.


I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.

 As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling of
 self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any other
 prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it matter if
 the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.


  ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
 my point)


I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-13 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
 information,


 I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
 identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
 justified to give them different names.

Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.

Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.

Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
it?

I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
dementia.


  then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.


 I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
 going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.


  As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling
  of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any
  other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it
  matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.


  ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
  my point)


 I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?

   John K Clark


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-13 Thread John Mikes
Dear Telmo,
in spite of my reluctance to spend time and energy on that nightmare of
teleportation-related follies - (probably a result of too heavy dinners
after which Q-physicists could not sleep/relax) - and with no intention to
protect John Clark (a decent partner anyway) I may draw a thick line
between the terms *generating a new term * and  *experiencing
change*in passing.

In my agnosticism I visualize the 'World' in constant dynamic change,
so *nothing
stays the same*. What does not mean that 'instant by instant' (if we
accept time as a reality-factor) everything becomes renewed
Changed: yes. (=My disagreement also against 'loops' in general).

Considering the changes: they may be 'essential' (as e.g. death, or at
least extended to 'major' parts of our organization) - or just
incidental/partial. The way I try to figure out changes? there is an
infinite complexity exercising (affecting) our world (i.e. the model we
constructed for our existence as of latest) providing the stuff to our
reductionist thinking (That 'model' is *all* and we have to explain - fit
everything into it). I arrived at this by Robert Rosen.
So: I am not a *'different person'* from what I was a second ago, YET I
feel identical to *THAT* person (maybe of decades ago) which underwent lots
of changes - keeping the SELF-feeling (whatever that may be).
It doesn't mean that I am identical to THAT person, who could run,
exercise, worked successfully in his conventional-reductionist science,
etc. etc. I just FEEL as the same person (though changed, what I realize).

In a doubling from 'Helsinki' to 'Moscow' (joke) it is not likely that all
those changes by the complexity-circumstances in Finnland would be
duplicated by the changes in Russia, so the 'doubled' (clone???) changes
into a different person. I leave it to the 'Everything' Friends to decide
whether that person feels still like the other one. I wouldn't.

Just musing. Respectfully
John Mikes


On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 
 
  On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 wrote:
 
   if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
  information,
 
 
  I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
  identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
  justified to give them different names.

 Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
 identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
 confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.

 Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.

 Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
 time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
 it?

 I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
 to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
 comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
 dementia.


   then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
 
 
  I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
  going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.
 
 
   As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling
   of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction,
 or any
   other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does
 it
   matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.
 
 
   ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
   my point)
 
 
  I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?
 
John K Clark
 
 
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-13 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 8:14 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 
 
  On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 wrote:
 
   if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
  information,
 
 
  I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
  identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
  justified to give them different names.

 Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
 identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
 confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.

 Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.

 Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
 time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
 it?


I'll give it a shot, but I could well be confusing things/levels:

Does that question make sense given complete arithmetization of
self-reference by Gödel (and whoever else did this or contributed) when we
assume comp? Because new and old John Clarks cannot be distinguished as we
can't distinguish between particular machines and copies.

This is related to the confusion recently on first person and third
person.The reasoning concerns 3p formalizable discourse of self-reference
of sufficiently rich machines. So the third person I.

However, a particular copy (?) machine making self-referential statements
from 3rd person point of view, will communicate an account of some version
of its states, and so talking histories of Moscow etc. at this level, when
one copy of a machine is concerned in the thought experiment, is valid.

But as Moscow etc. is not part of formal self-reference provability, Gödel
does not arithmetize this knowledge of 1st person bit and I think
incompleteness refutes that we can because []p - p would hold. That's how
I make sense or nonsense out of it anyway. PGC


 I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
 to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
 comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
 dementia.





   then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
 
 
  I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
  going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.
 
 
   As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling
   of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction,
 or any
   other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does
 it
   matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.
 
 
   ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
   my point)
 
 
  I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?
 
John K Clark
 
 
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Oct 2013, at 20:35, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the  
Washington Man,


 Yes.

Thank you!

 and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what  
information he receives.


  Not at all.

What do you mean not at all?! The Helsinki Man has the neurons in  
his brain arranged in a certain way and the Moscow Man, being a  
exact copy, will have the neurons in his brain arranged in exactly  
the same manner and the two will evolve in exactly the same manner  
too UNLESS they receive different information, like one data stream  
coming from Helsinki and the other data stream coming from Moscow.  
Only then would they differentiate and only then would you be  
justified in giving them different names.



But if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit  
of information, then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.  
The bit of information reduces the uncertainty, so there was an  
indeterminacy.






 It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will have  
will confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for all  
possible he's relevant).


As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling  
of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or  
any other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor  
does it matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.


? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes  
my point)


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Oct 2013, at 22:36, LizR wrote:

Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H  
man. I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints,  
although as usual I may be missing something.


No I agree. Clark does understand the 1-indeterminacy, as he betrayed  
by saying that it is equivalent with throwing a coin.
Then the mystery is: why does Clark not pursue the reasoning and  
tackle the next step (step 4).





Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as  
Kermit suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question  
doesn't arise. But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea  
that the universe is analogue all the way down - with the problems  
that causes (like the ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's  
digital at any level, this will work.


Indeed. Kermit, like Craig, are logically coherent (unlike Clark).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Oct 2013, at 19:23, John Clark wrote:





On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  [your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in  
only one place.


If the copies are really identical then you feel to be in only one  
place (insofar as spatial position has any meaning when talking  
about consciousness)


Which it has not. We both have agreed already on this. And the copies  
are identical, as bodies reconstitiuted at the right substitution  
level, but they are in two different place, as they will notice when  
opening the door. And the Hesnki man knows that in advance, so he  
knows that (whoever he is and will be) there is 1/2 chance to see M  
(or W).




because you really are in only one place, regardless of how many  
copies are made or where those bodies are.


Exactly.




 The question is which city will [he] observed.

The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington  
Man,


Yes. And it is (and can be justified entirely with math) a non  
constructive OR.




and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information  
he receives.


Not at all. It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will  
have will confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for  
all possible he's relevant).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread Bruno Marchal
 some academics here have been  
offering.



I prefer avoiding authoritative arguments. Yet, as you mention this,  
my PhD thesis has been peer-reviewed by three juries, and the  
scientific members of those juries have all declare not having seen  
any errors.
Only literary continental philosophers have problems, but they refer  
explicitly to personal convictions, without any further ado. Some  
scientists seem to defend those philosophers for reason which seems to  
be academical solidarity (or worst, but that's beyond our topic).
Anyway, it is preferable to get the point by oneself, and not rely on  
any authority, as we live in a lasting era where many people identify  
science with Aristotle theology.


Best,

Bruno





All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many  
Worlds interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest  
part of the Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule  
from his ideas, but not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory,  
not that its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds  
interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum Mechanics  
works.


So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability  
and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:37, LizR wrote:

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100%  
probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places.  
Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100%  
probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes.  
This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The  
physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin- 
up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels  
the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains  
are wired to think in terms of the single universe view. I think  
Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about  
things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then  
has a 50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of  
always only being the single unique copy of himself would lead him  
to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno  
to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in  
Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the  
physicist).


OK.




However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our  
everyday attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the  
universe works.


The probabilities does not depend on how the universe work, but only  
on computer science, which does not assume anything physical (note  
even a physical reality).
Then the (easy) probability calculus we got here is part of the  
explanation of how the universe works, and indeed why we are  
confronted with an apparent universe/multiverses, although this is  
part of the difficult remaining work (to get the correct hamiltonian  
and things like that).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Oct 2013, at 05:50, chris peck wrote:


Hi Liz


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)

Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



Then we can be certain that we are all the same person. We all comes  
from the same duplicating amoeba.

And I can be certain to win all games based on randomness.

But the point is not on identity. It is only about predicting what I  
will (immediately) see when opening a door, after having pushed on a  
button.


It is possible to rephrase the protocol in a way such that the user  
does not know he will be duplicated, and only evaluate the  
probabilities from the frequencies obtained and described in the  
personal diaries of the copies. In that case some iterations is useful.


With the definition of 1p and 3p, given entirely in term of  
annihilation and reconstitution, of diaries, the 1p-indeterminacy is  
3p-justifiable.


In the math part, they are justifiable purely in terms of self- 
reference (Gödel, Löb, Solovay) logics. The indeterminacy is lived by  
1p, but that very fact is completely justified in the 3p discourse. We  
have to be careful not confusing the points of view involved.


Bruno









Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what  
Bruno means when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his  
chances of appearing in Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in  
talking about probabilities, because the whole situation is  
deterministic, but it does at least give a post-facto  
indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid to the  
extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI).  
(Which is to say, it isn't really valid at all, but I still think I  
know what is intended!)


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man,


  Yes.


Thank you!

 and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information he
 receives.



  Not at all.


What do you mean not at all?! The Helsinki Man has the neurons in his
brain arranged in a certain way and the Moscow Man, being a exact copy,
will have the neurons in his brain arranged in exactly the same manner and
the two will evolve in exactly the same manner too UNLESS they receive
different information, like one data stream coming from Helsinki and the
other data stream coming from Moscow. Only then would they differentiate
and only then would you be justified in giving them different names.

 It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will have will
 confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for all possible
 he's relevant).


As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling of
self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any other
prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it matter if
the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread LizR
Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man. I
don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I
may be missing something.

Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as Kermit
suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't arise.
But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is
analogue all the way down - with the problems that causes (like the
ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will
work.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread LizR
On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote:

 Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man.
 I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual
 I may be missing something.

 Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as
 Kermit suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't
 arise. But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe
 is analogue all the way down - with the problems that causes (like the
 ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will
 work.


 Even if it's digital it can't be cloned at the quantum level.  So the
 process couldn't be implemented if copying all the way down to the quantum
 state were necessary.  But I don't think this is the case.  Tegmark, among
 others, has shown that the brain is too hot to maintain quantum
 superpositions - so we can probably assume that classical copying is
 enough, with at worst a little loss of short term memory.  It's interesting
 to consider though how accurate the copying would have to be for Bruno's
 question to make sense. Suppose the M and W man only retained a random 10%
 of the H man's memories?


That is the famous substitution level. However, even if it did require
the quantum states to be duplicated, which the universe doesn't allow, if
we think the MWI is correct we can still ask the same questions using the
duplication that creates. E.g. suppose we have Helsinki man enter a room
and then we perform a quantum measurement, and as a result we either send
the room to Moscow or Washington by conventional means. Or we open one of
two doors, say, which lets him go to room 1 or room 2, and beforehand we
ask him what are the chances you will end up in room 1? He says 50%, I
imagine, but we know he ends up in both.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 10 October 2013 12:25, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
 Hi Bruno

 I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of
 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the
 protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive.

 This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in
 both your view and mine.

 P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first
 person) events.

 That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no
 person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment
 will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each
 outcome.

 Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in
 order to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I
 think what is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation,
 but there are none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the
 situation that is relevant.

 He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in
 Moscow, one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies'
 are related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same
 way. There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki
 than Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in
 time when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other
 relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.

 It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of
 50% to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future
 Bruno's shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your
 analysis violates the yes doctor axiom.

 This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked
 the same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington
 and Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the
 fact that asking the question at this point is far too late for
 Bruno-Helsinki, this is not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt
 that an identity maintaining version of him will be in each location.

 I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin
 to feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by
 Hillary Greaves Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic
 Multiverse. Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized
 setting and argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just
 intuitively. This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me
 confidence to know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion
 as I sometimes have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an
 analysis that has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and
 warrants more than the hand waving scoffs some academics here have been
 offering.

 All the best

When I toss a coin, I expect to see either heads or tails but not
both, and in fact I see heads or tails but not both. In a multiverse,
versions of me will see both heads and tails. Should I therefore
conclude that I don't live in a multiverse?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread meekerdb

On 10/10/2013 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote:

Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H 
man. I don't
see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I 
may be
missing something.

Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as 
Kermit
suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't 
arise. But
personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is 
analogue all
the way down - with the problems that causes (like the ultraviolety
catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will work.


Even if it's digital it can't be cloned at the quantum level.  So the 
process
couldn't be implemented if copying all the way down to the quantum state 
were
necessary.  But I don't think this is the case.  Tegmark, among others, has 
shown
that the brain is too hot to maintain quantum superpositions - so we can 
probably
assume that classical copying is enough, with at worst a little loss of 
short term
memory.  It's interesting to consider though how accurate the copying would 
have to
be for Bruno's question to make sense. Suppose the M and W man only 
retained a
random 10% of the H man's memories?


That is the famous substitution level. However, even if it did require the quantum 
states to be duplicated, which the universe doesn't allow, if we think the MWI is 
correct we can still ask the same questions using the duplication that creates. E.g. 
suppose we have Helsinki man enter a room and then we perform a quantum measurement, and 
as a result we either send the room to Moscow or Washington by conventional means. Or we 
open one of two doors, say, which lets him go to room 1 or room 2, and beforehand we ask 
him what are the chances you will end up in room 1? He says 50%, I imagine, but we know 
he ends up in both.


According to the paper I posted, even if we flipped a coin, the outcome would constitute a 
quantum measurement.  But as for knowing there's a duplication: Only if we know MWI, an 
interpretation we made up, is true.


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  [your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in only one
 place.


If the copies are really identical then you feel to be in only one place
(insofar as spatial position has any meaning when talking about
consciousness) because you really are in only one place, regardless of
how many copies are made or where those bodies are.

 The question is which city will [he] observed.


The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man,
and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information he
receives.

 It can only be one city, unless you introduce some non-comp telepathy.


No idea what that means.

 John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
 interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part
of the Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his
ideas, but not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that its
competitors can do better. The Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad
explanation of why Quantum Mechanics works.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread LizR
On 10 October 2013 06:35, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 The Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum
 Mechanics works.


Nicely summed up!

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread meekerdb

On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part of the Many 
Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but not in a way that 
feels entirely satisfactory, not that its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds 
interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum Mechanics works.


So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability and personal identity 
as Bruno's teleportation.


Brent

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread chris peck
Hi Bruno

 I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 
 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, 
 etc.) to find oneself alive. 

This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in 
both your view and mine.

 P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) 
 events. 

That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no 
person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment 
will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each 
outcome.

Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order 
to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I think what 
is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are 
none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the situation that is 
relevant.

He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, 
one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are 
related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. 
There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than 
Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in time 
when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other 
relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.

It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% 
to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's 
shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your analysis 
violates the yes doctor axiom.

This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the 
same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and 
Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the fact that 
asking the question at this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is 
not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt that an identity 
maintaining version of him will be in each location.

I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to 
feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary 
Greaves Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse. 
Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and 
argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. 
This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me confidence to 
know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion as I sometimes 
have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an analysis that has been 
peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants more than the hand 
waving scoffs some academics here have been offering.

All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


  

  
  
On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark
  wrote:



  On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:


  


 How do you explain quantum
  mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
  interpretation?





Not very well, assigning probabilities is
  unquestionably the weakest part of the Many Worlds theory.
  True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but
  not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that
  its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds
  interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum
  Mechanics works.


  

  



So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability
and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.



Brent

  





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread LizR
If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100%
probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a
physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him
splitting and observing all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how
people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say)
50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I
guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only
because our brains are wired to think in terms of the single universe
view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think
about things in everyday life.

Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man *then* has a
50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only
being the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this
was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how
he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology
is involved (ditto for the physicist).

However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday
attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread meekerdb

On 10/9/2013 6:37 PM, LizR wrote:
If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to him 
being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI 
will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes. 
This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that 
he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI,


The physicist is only interested in what he can publish in PhysRev. He knows that 
replication is essential.  So goes back to Helsinki and tries is again...and again...and 
again...  And he keeps careful notes.  After a few thousand replications he is ready to 
publish his findings that the probability of arriving in Washington via teleportation from 
Helsinki is 0.48_+_0.06.  Of course JKC will complain that I have used an ambiguous 
pronoun he, but in this case, except for a group of vanishing measure, it doesn't matter 
which he is meant.


Brent


and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because 
our brains are wired to think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's 
take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man /then/ has a 50% chance of 
being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the single unique copy 
of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for 
Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming 
folk psychology is involved (ditto for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude often 
doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread chris peck
Hi Liz

 This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
 feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
 knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
 arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to think in terms 
 of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
 terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

 Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
 chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
 the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
 chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the 
physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the 
single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance 
beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his 
chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto 
for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude 
often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.





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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread chris peck
Hi Brent

But one of the essential things about quantum mechanics is futures are 
uncertain even give complete knowldge. 

I disagree. This is still 'up for grabs' and dependent on whether the 
interpretation is indeterminsitic (copenhagen,etc) or deterministic (MWI). Its 
a feature of MWI that all outcomes get their branch, there isn't uncertainty 
about that.

If you use MWI then you expect that after observing a quantum random outcome 
that there will be two (or more) copies of you that share the same memories up 
to the observation, but are different after.  So Bruno is just trying to show 
that the uncertainty can be in which copy is observing instead of which 
value was observed.

I think which copy is observing and which value was observed are 
functionally equivolent vis a vis the step 3 experiment. Nevertheless, the 
question asked is definately 'what value will you see?'

Whether this uncertainty can be represented as a probability is, I think, a 
problem in both Bruno's thought experiment and in MWI of QM.

There are two problems I think. firstly, is there room for subjective 
uncertainty? and secondly, how does the proportionality of a 'copenhagen' 
random event get represented. MWI has the problem that if the outcome depends 
on say 1/3 vs 2/3 the world will still split into just 2 outcomes, with nothing 
to represent proportionality. Im not sure Bruno's UD suffers from that issue, 
though being 'comp' and presumably therefore dealing with things discretely, 
there maybe issues whenever irrational numbers appear in denominators. 1/PI vs. 
1-1/PI as you have said before.

All the best.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 02:21:01 +




Hi Liz

 This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
 feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
 knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
 arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to think in terms 
 of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
 terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

 Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
 chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
 the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
 chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the 
physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the 
single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance 
beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his 
chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto 
for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread LizR
I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means
when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of appearing in
Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities,
because the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a
post-facto indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid
to the extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI).
(Which is to say, it isn't *really *valid at all, but I still think I know
what is intended!)

Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread chris peck
Hi Liz


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.






(Or then again, I won't...)

Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means 
when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of appearing in 
Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities, because 
the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a post-facto 
indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid to the extent 
that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI). (Which is to say, 
it isn't really valid at all, but I still think I know what is intended!)


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread LizR
I will also be spontaneously combusting, rocketing to the Moon, and being
proclaimed Queen of the Universe.


On 10 October 2013 16:50, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz


 *
 *
 *Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.
 * *
 *
 * *
 *(Or then again, I won't...)*

 Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



 --
 Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300

 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 From: lizj...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno
 means when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of
 appearing in Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about
 probabilities, because the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at
 least give a post-facto indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so
 it's valid to the extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming
 the MWI). (Which is to say, it isn't *really *valid at all, but I still
 think I know what is intended!)

 Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

 (Or then again, I won't...)

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Oct 2013, at 18:23, John Clark wrote:




Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know  
what you are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like  
I and you and he and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know  
what those words mean in a world with duplicating chambers.


Very clear?
Each time I gave you the definition, you mocked it with pee pee, and  
two post later you come back with the idea that it is not clear,  
without ever quoting and cricticizing the definitions. I have  
introduced the key 1-person/3-person distinction, presented in a pure  
third person way, to address this issue, but you never commented it  
nor make any clearer.





Bruno says he has been duplicated, so now there are TWO,


In the third person sense. But the chance evaluation have been asked  
on the possible (accessible from Helsinki) first person experiences.





but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing


Yes, because in the comp context, you can, in Helsinki, understand  
that, although your body-copy will be in two places, you can feel to  
be in only one place.





and only the ONE thing that he will do; and this is nonsense.


Not will do. The question is which city will he observed. It can  
only be one city, unless you introduce some non-comp telepathy.


That is why it is like the throw of a coin, like you have already  
agreed, or like a quantum superposition, but for a different reason,  
and that is exploited in the next steps.


Nobody seems to understand your point, so try to make it more precise,  
and stop pretending it is very clear, as nobody understand you. I am  
still waiting for Chris explanation, as he pretend to follow your  
point, but I see not the explanation coming.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Oct 2013, at 19:38, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound  
importance  simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal  
pronouns. And that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician.


 That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please.

Bruno, are you trying to convince people that I haven't made DOZENS  
of specific complaints about your sloppy use of personal pronouns  
that is unacceptable in a world with duplicating chambers?



I have introduced the duplicating chamber to explain the difference of  
the 1-I and 3-I, and all I got from you where that is pee-pee stuff.

people can verify: you have not produced any specific complain.

On the contrary you have pretended that it is like antic throw of a  
coin, but that was exactly my point.


You are stuck in a denying psychological state.




Are you saying I've never asked Who the hell is he ? and gotten  
no reply?


I have always replied. Always. You have ignored the answer, and never  
comment them, except sometimes with your pee-pee vocabulary.





If duplicating chambers were not involved then it would indeed be  
ridiculous nit picking, but NOT if they do exist. In your thought  
experiments typically the guy is duplicated so now there are TWO,


Like in Everett QM self-superposition, but then you should condemn, as  
Quentin told you more than once, the use of probability in QM.





and then


?
Le us not mix the experiment that e are comparing.



the guy flips a coin and you demand to know what the ONE and only  
ONE result that the guy will see. And this is not just ridiculous  
it is logically inconsistent.


?
If a guy throws a coin, he will see only one outcome among two possible.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi John,


Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time

The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.


Who is the Y guy? I guess you mean the guy in Helsinki.




Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no  
consequential resolution?

Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!

It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M


Not with the protocol in step 3. You just push on a button, and you  
are read, annihilated, and reconstituted in two places (W and M) in  
the state which has just been scanned in Helsinki.
Some times go by, but not a lot, and the question is about what you  
will live. With comp, it is clear that you will live in W OR in M, but  
that any more precise prediction will fail.





that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you  
are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical  
you 'feel' to be.
That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it  
deserves) is false:
it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered  
usually as time???)


Then both the probability used in the throwing on a coin, or in QM, in  
fact all use of prediction become useless. You argument condemns the  
whole field of statistics and probability. If the whether broadcast  
says that if will rain at the end of the day, you might say that is  
nonsense, as we will be all dead before.






So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.


I can see that 'panta rhei', because I stay myself enough in the  
process.




...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use  
such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.)


The question is not about identity, but about predicting some  
happenings to first person view. With your argument I cannot believe  
that I will drink a cup of coffee when I am preparing it.
In fact your argument would entail that the probability is zero to  
survive with an artificial brain, so you are assuming non-comp. No  
problem with that, but my goal is the study of the consequence of comp.


Bruno





On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one  
(a case where Leibniz identity rule fails,


If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it  
most certainly has NOT failed.


I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will  
not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).


The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and  
which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many  
people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the  
he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after  
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or  
of both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation  
of their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and  
I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try  
to understand.


There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of  
the most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not  
interested in learning.


Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the  
indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability.  There's some  
good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret 
  especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.


I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local  
probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with  
QM, except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.


Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That  
problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense  
only in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some  
distinction. The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds,  
but there are only knowledge states of observer/dreamers.


But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the  
WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol  
given*, we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation.  
The quantum case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the  
lack of definition of world), but it seems to me that Everett use  
both Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly).


Bruno



Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 8:42 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 10/7/2013 7:02 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
 wrote:

 Quentin


 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the
 comp
 duplication experience.

 But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is
 taken
 very seriously by Everetians and their critics.

 In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
 chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will,
 I
 suspect, be similar in that regard.

 So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
 with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make
 sense
 at all.

 It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least
 in
 MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
 equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
 duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
 will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all,
 there
 is not two of me yet ...

 But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
 Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

 I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
 there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
 _both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
 continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
 each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
 Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
 perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
 probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
 models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
 weird idea of randomness that seems to defy explanation.


Hi Brent,

 But the complete symmetry of the duplication makes it too easy.  If the
 probabilities are 1/3 and 2/3 are three worlds instantiated in MWI or only
 two worlds with different weights.

Three world at least, I would say. Of course, I imagine n worlds where
n/3 worlds contain one outcome and 2n/3 the other. I imagine n to be a
very large number and each slice to contain many variations of other
outcomes we are not controlling for in this case.

  What if the probabilities are 1/pi and
 (1-1/pi)?

I don't think a probability with an irrational value would make sense
in this model.

  Or (1-epsilon) and epsilon, where epsilon is just to account for
 all those things you haven't thought of, but are really improbable?

No problem. A very small percentage of the gazillion worlds will
contain the improbable outcome.


 So when you make a statement about the probability of something
 happening, you are always making a statement about a possible


 There's where the problem comes in - what does possible cover?

It's easier to explain what impossible means - I die (not that it's
impossible for me to die, but that no continuation exists from that
state).
Possible means anything else, but specific outcomes will be more or
less numerous in the gazillion continuations. We are already in a very
specific are of the multiverse -- one where human beings exit on earth
and so forth. This comes with asymmetries.

I'm not surprised if this is very naif though, and I have no intention
of postulating.

Telmo.

 Brent

 continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
 fact, happening becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
 anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
 mysterious property called randomness.

 You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
 the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.

 I think.

 Telmo.

 
 From: allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200


 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

 Hi Bruno


 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say
 no
 to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

 I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
 Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the
 doctor.

 regards



 It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience
 a
 next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
 duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
 expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
 probability in MWI setting... it's the same.

 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both*
 from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
 consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
 duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
 destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
 MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
 Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
less odd than competing explanations.

*Bruno's proof is about the continuous feeling of self, and that has
nothing to do with predictions in general or probabilities in particular;
it is about remembering who you were yesterday.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 08 Oct 2013, at 18:05, John Clark wrote:





On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do  
*both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream  
of consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before  
duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for  
the destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE  
SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT  
IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better  
than random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works  
as well as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but  
only a little) less odd than competing explanations.


*Bruno's proof is about the continuous feeling of self,


It is a reasoning starting from the invariance of consciousness for a  
digital substitution (computationalism).




and that has nothing to do with predictions in general or  
probabilities in particular;



That invariance entails that physics has to emerge from a statistics  
on computations, and we can already technically compare many things in  
the comp-physics and the usual physics, so that we can already refute  
a version of comp (comp + the classical theory of knowledge).





it is about remembering who you were yesterday.


With a self-duplication in between. Yes, that step 3. You remember  
that you were in Helsinki, and you see that you are in Washington, for  
example. You see also that in the notebook you predicted that you will  
feel to be in Washington and in Moscow, but obviously you see only  
Washington, so you conclude that you were wrong or did not understand  
the question (and with some chance, now you know better, as we will  
reiterate the experience.


With step seven, there will be (like in Deutsch interpretation of  
Everett QM) aleph_0 copies in between, and things will get more  
interesting and precise about the relationship between consciousness  
and physical realities (and other realities). It might be better, at  
some point, to talk, like Deutsch, on consciousness differentiation,  
instead of universe multiplication, as the term universe is quite  
fuzzy.


IN AUDA (arithmetical universal dovetailer argument), we model the  
machine's believability by the assertability by an ideal correct  
universal machine believing in induction, which makes their logic of  
provability axiomatized by Löb's formula, and derive the quantum logic  
by defining the probability one by Bp  Dt (with all the technical  
details provided).


We exploit the gap between G and G*, to get namable but non rationally  
believable  truth for those machines, which provides natural candidate  
for qualia, and here too there are formal confirmations. this has been  
verified by many people, but you can verify it by yourself, in you  
study a bit of logic.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb

On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:




On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both* 
from a
3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of consciousness 
which is
*either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the probability (or 
measure
of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV if the guy 
standing in H.
*IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE 
ABOUT IT ON
EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than random guessing 
in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does 
that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less odd than competing 
explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread LizR
On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:


 On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

   You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do
 *both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
 consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
 duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
 destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
 MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
 Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


  And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

 *Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
 random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

 *Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
 as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
 less odd than competing explanations.


 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
 interpretation?


That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from,
so how do you get the Born rule there? (for example).

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb

On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:
On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do 
*both*
from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of 
consciousness
which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the 
probability
(or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV 
if the
guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR 
YOU
CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI 
as an
obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than 
random
guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well 
as it
does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less 
odd than
competing explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?


That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other 
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from, so how do you 
get the Born rule there? (for example).


In the CI the Born rule is just a postulate.  There are never an infinity of possible 
observed values because the finite resolution of all instruments.  If you can associate 
probabilities to worlds then you can apply Gleason's theorem to get the Born rule.  But 
it's not clear what constitutes 'a world' apart from the circular requirement that it's 
something you get a measurement in.


But I'm asking JKC specifically, because I'm curious as to how his explanation of 
probabilities under MWI is different from Bruno's in his duplication experiment?


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb

On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:

That is the $64000 question!


Incidentally I haven't heard anyone use that expression in thirty years.  But I'm old 
enough to remember when Johnny Carson was the quiz master on the radio program The $64 
Question.


How old are you Liz?

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread LizR
On 9 October 2013 10:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:

 That is the $64000 question!


 Incidentally I haven't heard anyone use that expression in thirty years.
 But I'm old enough to remember when Johnny Carson was the quiz master on
 the radio program The $64 Question.

 How old are you Liz?


Old enough to know better.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a  
case where Leibniz identity rule fails,


If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most  
certainly has NOT failed.


I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will  
not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).


The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and  
which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many  
people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the  
he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the  
duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of  
both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation of  
their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and I  
have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try to  
understand.


There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of  
the most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not  
interested in learning.


Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the  
indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability.  There's some  
good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret 
  especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.


I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local  
probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with QM,  
except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.


Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That  
problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense only  
in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some distinction.  
The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds, but there are  
only knowledge states of observer/dreamers.


But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the  
WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol given*,  
we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation. The quantum  
case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the lack of  
definition of world), but it seems to me that Everett use both  
Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


 The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the W-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday


But I am still Bruno Marchal, apparently. The FPI depends on that  
appearance.





 But the M-guy is not the W-guy

True, but the H-guy and the M-guy and the M-guy are all Bruno  
Marchal because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.


That's my point. OK.





The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks,

Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound importance   
simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal pronouns. And  
that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician.


That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please.




 and which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy,

The criticism some have with Quantum Mechanics is that what it says  
is very very odd, but odd or not and love it or hate it what Quantum  
Mechanics says is crystal clear


This is simply false. Look at the debate in the literature. See the  
link given just now by Brent.  In this list most believe that QM is  
slightly more understandable with the MWI. Not all problems are  
solved. Anyway, it is simpler in the first six steps of the UDA, where  
the situation is utterly transparent, given the protocol, and the  
definition of 1-I and 3-I.




and it gets the job done; in contrast when your ideas are not opaque  
they are logically inconsistent.


You should prove statement like that, with specific quote and  
references.






 Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer to the guy  
in Helsinki before the duplication,


If he refers to Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy then the correct  
prediction  he would make is that he will see Helsinki and only  
Helsinki;



You can apply that idea to the guy who throw a coin. You would say  
that such a guy can only predict that he will throw a coin. This is  
ridiculous, frankly.





not that predictions, good or bad, have the slightest thing to do  
with a feeling of continuity or feeling of self.


If that did not exist, no probabilities at all would ever make sense.
(Note that formally your remark is met by the  Dt in the formal  
approach, but it is met by simple common sense in UDA).





And if you want to say that Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy is dead  
then fine, but then you must also say that Bruno Marchal of  
yesterday is dead and personally I don't want to torture the  
language more that I have to under these very odd circumstances of  
self duplication.


And we can't do that, because it would make comp false.





 you fake misunderstanding

Why on earth would I, or anyone, pretend not to understand something  
when they really did?


Because you would ask question, instead of asserting that there is  
something false, without being able to say what.



Bruno




 of the most easy part of the reasoning.

If this is the clearest reasoning in your proof then I'm doubly  
glad I didn't read anymore.


  John K Clark




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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Oct 2013, at 06:24, chris peck wrote:


Hi Brent

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.  
If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at  
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,  
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next.


I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things  
remain the same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't  
flow. Or the human body has an underlying form and structure that  
gets maintained as the constituent matter comes and goes. It is the  
abstract relationship between elements that constitutes identity  
rather than the elements themselves. I would think this reading of  
Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a neo-patonist. I  
would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive  
steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he  
would really be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural  
numbers from which 'shadows of us' are derived.


In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in  
comp. This is the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he  
violates in step 3.


Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say  
no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?


Bruno






 I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as  
assigning a probability.


Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he  
explicitly assigns probability:


This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1- 
indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable  
without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable  
to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow  
(resp. Washington).”


All the best

Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If  
comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at  
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,  
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I  
thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If  
comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least  
in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly.  
Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be  
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated  
inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the  
size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show  
what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself  
objectionable?)



JC should read this: 
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret

I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning  
a probability.


Brent

Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit  
pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is  
computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical  
possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the  
multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.)


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:


On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


Thanks for noticing.


If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at  
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,  
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I  
thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If  
comp, then we exist as steps in a computation,


Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a  
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is  
simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter  
and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into  
account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so  
with pick-nickers)



and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into  
existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment  
digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could  
also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer  
MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the  
point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in  
principle itself objectionable?)


Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit  
pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is  
computation,


In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a  
1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:
G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly  
about herself.


That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my  
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.




a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?


I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical  
possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.
Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is  
phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is  
unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from  
post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and  
not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a  
reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it  
trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is  
thinking.



(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself  
is apparently doing it constantly.)


Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the  
physical reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.
People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are  
very rare. I know only one: Clark.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread chris peck
Hi Bruno

 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to 
 the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow 
(or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

regards

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200


On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark 
johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 
  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
  The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. 
Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) 
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same 
person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point 
that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a 
computation, 
Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a 
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler 
sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the 
point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so 
it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) 

and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence 
constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be 
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or 
it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. 
Or is in principle itself objectionable?)
 
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The 
question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, 
In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p 
notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:G* proves (Bp  
p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. 
That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my 
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.

a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? 
I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. 
he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.Except that even this is not 
clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of 
a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He 
contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy 
is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a 
reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is 
it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking.

(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is 
apparently doing it constantly.)

Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical 
reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.People accepting the 
consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very rare. I know only one: 
Clark.
Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

 Hi Bruno


 * Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say
 no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?*

 I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
 Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

 regards



It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a
next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
probability in MWI setting... it's the same.

Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
duplication experience.

Quentin




 --
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be

 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:

 On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you
 are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


 Thanks for noticing.


 If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at
 least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you
 aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was
 partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as
 steps in a computation,


 Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a
 computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is
 simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and
 get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at
 some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with
 pick-nickers)


 and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into
 existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital
 states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be
 duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be
 the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show
 what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?)

 Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless.
 The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation,


 In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p
 notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:
 G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about
 herself.

 That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my
 consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.


 a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?


 I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical
 possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.
 Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is
 phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is
 unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post
 to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep
 enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason
 to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We
 still don't know what John Clark is thinking.


 (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is
 apparently doing it constantly.)


 Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical
 reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.
 People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are
 very rare. I know only one: Clark.

 Bruno



  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread chris peck
Quentin

 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you 
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
 duplication experience.

But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken very 
seriously by Everetians and their critics.

In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine chance, 
because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I suspect, be 
similar in that regard.

So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated with 
one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense at all.

It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in 
MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no 
equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be 
duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I will 
survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there is not 
two of me yet ...

But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard 
Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com






Hi Bruno

 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to 
 the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow 
(or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.




regards


It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a 
next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, 
both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before 
duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... 
it's the same.




Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept 
them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
duplication experience.

Quentin



 


From: marc...@ulb.ac.be



To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



 
  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
 


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. 



Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) 
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same 
person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point 
that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a 
computation, 



Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a 
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler 
sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the 
point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so 
it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) 




and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence 
constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be 
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or 
it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. 
Or is in principle itself objectionable?)



 
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The 
question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, 
In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p 
notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:


G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about 
herself. 
That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my 
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.




a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? 
I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. 
he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.


Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is 
phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear 
why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, 
like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to 
proceed (like

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
 Quentin


 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
 duplication experience.

 But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken
 very seriously by Everetians and their critics.

 In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
 chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I
 suspect, be similar in that regard.

 So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
 with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense
 at all.

 It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in
 MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
 equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
 duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
 will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there
 is not two of me yet ...

 But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
 Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
_both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
weird idea of randomness that seems to defy explanation.

So when you make a statement about the probability of something
happening, you are always making a statement about a possible
continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
fact, happening becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
mysterious property called randomness.

You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.

I think.

Telmo.

 
 From: allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200

 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

 Hi Bruno


 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no
 to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

 I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
 Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

 regards



 It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a
 next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
 duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
 expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
 probability in MWI setting... it's the same.

 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
 duplication experience.

 Quentin




 
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be

 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:

 On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
 not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


 Thanks for noticing.


 If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least)
 then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the
 same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the
 point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a
 computation,


 Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a
 computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is
 simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and
 get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at
 some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with
 pick-nickers)


 and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence
 constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Chris,

On 07 Oct 2013, at 13:39, chris peck wrote:


 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to  
say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?


I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of  
experiencing Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say  
yes to the doctor.


I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of  
1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the  
protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive. P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and  
M are disjoint incompatible (first person) events.


Yet, the idea that using teleportation, or just saying yes to the  
doctor, is suicidal, is a reasonable argument against comp. This can  
be made clearer by allowing an overlapping of the original and the  
copy. That is, the copy is reconstituted before, and perhaps in  
front of the original, and then the original is annihilated. Here  
comp implies that you will still survive such an experiment, yet there  
is (before the duplication) a probability 1/2 that you will be  
annihilated.

I can imagine that some policy will forbid such overlapping.
I can imagine some policy enforcing them, as it is the only case where  
the original can be sure that the reconstitution is done.


This can be used to realize that we are probably all the same person,  
and so we survive anyway, with different forms of amnesia. But we  
don't need any of this for the UD Argument, and I do not allow  
amnesia, nor personal identity concerns (above what we need to say  
yes to the doctor) in the reasoning.


In a sense, I agree with the idea that the comp idea itself is a bit  
suicidal, but then, assuming comp is correct, we die in such sense at  
each instant, and here is another common point with some talk given by  
people having introspective experiences.


Best regards,

Bruno





regards

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200


On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:

On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.

Thanks for noticing.


If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at  
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,  
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I  
thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If  
comp, then we exist as steps in a computation,


Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not  
a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know  
it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be  
shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be  
taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful  
(even more so with pick-nickers)



and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into  
existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment  
digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could  
also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer  
MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the  
point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in  
principle itself objectionable?)


Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit  
pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is  
computation,


In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify  
a 1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:
G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly  
about herself.


That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that  
my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.



a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?

I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical  
possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.
Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is  
phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is  
unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself  
from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so  
trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step  
of a reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is  
it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is  
thinking.



(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself  
is apparently doing it constantly.)


Yes, without Everett, I

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 4:48 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you
 are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


  This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


Then Bruno is not always wrong.

 If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at
 least) then this is happening all the time.


And if comp (whatever that means) is not correct then it is STILL happening
all the time.

 we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease
 to exist and come back into existence constantly.


Yes.

 we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in
 principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer


Yes.

 The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a
 duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?


Obviously!

 Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless.


Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know what you
are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like I and you and
he and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know what those words mean in
a world with duplicating chambers. Bruno says he has been duplicated, so
now there are TWO, but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing and only
the ONE thing that he will do; and this is nonsense.

  John k Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/7 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 4:48 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as
 you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


  This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


 Then Bruno is not always wrong.

  If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at
 least) then this is happening all the time.


 And if comp (whatever that means) is not correct then it is STILL
 happening all the time.

  we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense,
 cease to exist and come back into existence constantly.


 Yes.

  we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in
 principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer


 Yes.

   The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a
 duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?


 Obviously!

  Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit
 pointless.


 Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know what you
 are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like I and you and
 he and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know what those words mean in
 a world with duplicating chambers. Bruno says he has been duplicated, so
 now there are TWO, but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing and only
 the ONE thing that he will do; and this is nonsense.


You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both*
from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.

Quentin




   John k Clark



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound importance
 simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal pronouns. And that's
 pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician.


  That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please.


Bruno, are you trying to convince people that I haven't made DOZENS of
specific complaints about your sloppy use of personal pronouns that is
unacceptable in a world with duplicating chambers? Are you saying I've
never asked Who the hell is he ? and gotten no reply? Are you really
saying that?!

 The criticism some have with Quantum Mechanics is that what it says is
 very very odd, but odd or not and love it or hate it what Quantum Mechanics
 says is crystal clear



  This is simply false.


What is false, that what Quantum Mechanics says is clear or that what
Quantum Mechanics says is very very odd? I believe both things are true.

  In this list most believe that QM is slightly more understandable with
 the MWI.


And I am a big MWI fan too, I think it's correct and who knows it might
even be correct; but Evolution didn't build my monkey brain for this sort
of thing so I'm not going to pretend I don't find it odd. And as I said
before, whatever the correct interpretation of Quantum Mechanics turns out
to be it's going to be odd.

 If he refers to Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy then the correct
 prediction  he would make is that he will see Helsinki and only
 Helsinki;



 You can apply that idea to the guy who throw a coin. You would say that
 such a guy can only predict that he will throw a coin. This is ridiculous,
 frankly.


If duplicating chambers were not involved then it would indeed be
ridiculous nit picking, but NOT if they do exist. In your thought
experiments typically the guy is duplicated so now there are TWO, and
then the guy flips a coin and you demand to know what the ONE and only
ONE result that the guy will see. And this is not just ridiculous it is
logically inconsistent.

 your remark is met by the  Dt in the formal approach


Well I'm glad you cleared that up.

 but it is met by simple common sense in UDA.


Common sense will be just as useful in understanding how things work in a
world with duplication chambers in it as it is in understanding how Quantum
Mechanics or your Universal Dance Association proof works. Not very.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread meekerdb

On 10/7/2013 7:02 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

Quentin



Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
duplication experience.

But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken
very seriously by Everetians and their critics.

In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I
suspect, be similar in that regard.

So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense
at all.

It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in
MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there
is not two of me yet ...

But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
_both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
weird idea of randomness that seems to defy explanation.


But the complete symmetry of the duplication makes it too easy.  If the probabilities are 
1/3 and 2/3 are three worlds instantiated in MWI or only two worlds with different 
weights.  What if the probabilities are 1/pi and (1-1/pi)?  Or (1-epsilon) and epsilon, 
where epsilon is just to account for all those things you haven't thought of, but are 
really improbable?




So when you make a statement about the probability of something
happening, you are always making a statement about a possible


There's where the problem comes in - what does possible cover?

Brent


continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
fact, happening becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
mysterious property called randomness.

You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.

I think.

Telmo.



From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200

Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

Hi Bruno



Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no
to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

regards



It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a
next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
probability in MWI setting... it's the same.

Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
duplication experience.

Quentin





From: marc...@ulb.ac.be

To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:

On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)


The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


Thanks for noticing.


If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least)
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the
same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the
point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a
computation,


Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread John Mikes
Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time

The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.
Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no consequential
resolution?
Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!

It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M that probably
did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you are not that
youngster who went to school, no matter how identical you 'feel' to be.
That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it deserves)
is false:
it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered usually as
time???)

So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.
...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use such
arguments as well in court, but that is another table.)

John M


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

  On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a case
 where Leibniz identity rule fails,


 If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most
 certainly has NOT failed.


  I was talking on the rule:

  a = b
 a = c
 entails that b = c

  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
 The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
 But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not
 remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).

  The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and
 which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people
 showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer to the
 guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the duplication, we mention
 if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at their
 individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done in Helsinki.
 We just look at diaries, and I have made those things clear, but you talk
 like if you don't try to understand.

  There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the
 most easy part of the reasoning.
 Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not interested
 in learning.


 Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the
 indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability.  There's some good
 discussion here,
 http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret
 especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.


 I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local probability
 for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with QM, except when using
 the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.

 Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That
 problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense only in
 the base where we have evolved abilities to make some distinction. The
 difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds, but there are only
 knowledge states of observer/dreamers.

 But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the WM
 duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol given*, we have
 an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation. The quantum case is
 notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the lack of definition of
 world), but it seems to me that Everett use both Gleason theorem + a sort
 of FPI (more or less implicitly).

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread meekerdb

On 10/7/2013 1:32 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time

The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.
Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no consequential 
resolution?
Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!

It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M that probably did (not? or 
quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you are not that youngster who went to school, no 
matter how identical you 'feel' to be.

That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it deserves) is 
false:
it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered usually as 
time???)

So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.
...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use such arguments as 
well in court, but that is another table.)


Who wrote that?  :-)

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread John Mikes
M


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/7/2013 1:32 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time

 The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.
 Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no consequential
 resolution?
 Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!

  It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M that
 probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you are not
 that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical you 'feel' to
 be.
 That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it deserves)
 is false:
 it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered usually as
 time???)

  So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.
 ...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use such
 arguments as well in court, but that is another table.)


 Who wrote that?  :-)

 Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread LizR
Why is there such a huge argument about this duplication chamber business?
It seems to be not getting anywhere. Could you perhaps go back to the
original statement of step 3 and use that to point out what is wrong?

From memory step 3 was - Helsinki man is teleported to both Washington and
Moscow. From his perspective, what is his chance of arriving in Moscow (or
Washington) ?

This strikes me as analogous to Schrodinger's Cat. The experimenter asks
what is the chance that he will see a live cat? He is talking in a folk
sense I suppose, because in reality he will split into two people and see
both. But like Moscow man, after the split it will seem as though he had a
50-50 chance of seeing either, so there is at least a sense of 1p
indeterminacy which is clealy, to anyone else 3p certainty - that he
will see both a live and a dead cat, or that H-man will see both W and M.
This is just Everett's explanation for quantum indeterminacy applied to a
mind, assumed to be duplicable (as comp assumes it is just the current
state of an ongoing computation).

Seems fairly straightforward to me, is there a problem with any of that?

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a  
case where Leibniz identity rule fails,


If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most  
certainly has NOT failed.


I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not  
remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).


The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and  
which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people  
showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer  
to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the duplication,  
we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at  
their individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done  
in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and I have made those things  
clear, but you talk like if you don't try to understand.


There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the  
most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not  
interested in learning.



Bruno




If the original and the copy are identical then exchanging there  
position will not make a observable difference to a outside observer  
nor to the original nor to the copy. So Leibniz would conclude that  
if objectively it makes no difference and subjectively it makes no  
difference then exchanging the position of the original and the copy  
just plain makes no difference.


 If in Helsinki [he] predicted {W  M} [blah blah]

SEE!  Bruno Marchal is incapable of expressing ideas without  
pronouns with no referent. Was he making a prediction about
the future of Bruno Marchal or about the future of Bruno Marchal the  
Helsinki Man? If it's about Bruno Marchal then the correct  
prediction would be Helsinki Moscow and Washington, if it's about  
Bruno Marchal the Helsinki Man the correct prediction can only be  
Helsinki. But who cares about predictions?


 the bruno marchal in W will see that his prediction failed, as  
[he] must admit that [he] is not seeing M.


But he must admit he is NOT the only Bruno Marchal because he  
HAS BEEN DUPLICATED!  Bruno Marchal admits that he has been  
duplicated but still insists on referring to he as if there were  
still only one, and that's what makes the whole thing incoherent.  
And what on earth does a prediction, correct or incorrect, have to  
do with a feeling of self anyway?


   and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be  
predicted by the guy in Helsinki.


 Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the  
precise question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a  
indeterminate answer, and just as important please make clear  
exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the question to.


 The question is what do [you] expect to live or feel, as a comp  
believer


SEE!  Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.

 More precisely, it concerns the seeing of the cities involved: do  
[you] expect W, M, both, etc.


SEE!  Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.

 The question is used in the traditional sense of you, before the  
duplication.


And that is exactly the problem, traditionally duplicating chambers  
do not exist so the poor little pronoun you doesn't have to worry  
about the complications such machines generate, but to really study  
this issue and move into the big leagues Bruno Marchal must worry  
about them.


 The guy reason in comp, and knows already many things: that he  
will survive (you have agreed on that), that he will not feel the  
split


OK, so far so good the use of he is  causing no problems.

 that he will see only city

WHO THE HELL IS HE??

  John K Clark






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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Oct 2013, at 01:29, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 10:34:11AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote:



I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp  p  
is

the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in
both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same
entity.


G* proves that they are the same, but G does not. It is (in God's
eye) the same entity, but the machine is unable to know, or to prove
that, and that explains the difference of the perspective. 3-I has a
name/description, but the 1-I has no name.


What is the modal logic statement corresponding to I? This is most  
unclear.


B is the modal operator, which through the arithmetical  
interpretation, describes the machine, in the language of the machine,  
and uttered by the machine. If you want, the machine is TOTO, and says  
something like TOTO has two legs. It is third person reference.


In term of modal statement: Bp means PA proves p, as is uttered by PA.

This is the standard theory of arithmetical self-reference. See  
Smoryinski book modal logic and self-reference or Boolos books.











English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between
3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have  
introduced,

with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are
pronouns?


Because 1-I and 3-I are variant of the pronoun I. Natural language
use the same word, because we tend to confuse them.


Above, you stated that 1-I was Bp  p and 3-I was Bp. How do those
modal concepts relate to the English language pronoun I? Sorry to
press on this - I just want to know if there is something  
interesting here.


The english language, like most language, does not distinguish Bp and  
Bp  p.
It is normal, as the difference needed duplication (UDA), of Gödel's  
theorem (AUDA) to be realized as being quite different. Of course  
people working on the mind-body problem knows that it is different, as  
Bp will usually refer to a code or body, and the Bp  p will refer to  
personal feeling or consciousness.


Bp can work for I have two legs
Bp  p can work for I am hungry

You can also use phantom limbs to sibgle out the difference. the  
fact that english language does not mlake the difference, and that the  
diffrence is not entirely obvious, if that for a long time, people  
having pain in a ohantom limb where considered as crazy, and where not  
believed.








The duplication
experiences are the simplest tool for distinguishing them. The
Theatetus' definition, when applied to Gödel's beweisbar also
distinguish them, rather miraculously.


At this point in time, I do not see any connection between the UDA and
the AUDA. They seem to be based on entirely different sets of
propositions:

UDA:
 COMP (Yes doctor, etc)

AUDA:
 Theatetus and brethren, Sigma_1 restriction


I made the connection precise in conscience  mécanisme, but I think  
that it is not necessary, as UDA shows only that physics has to be  
given by a statistic on computation, and AUDA use the classical theory  
of knowledge, and actually gives the physics from the math of the  
points of view.






If you are alluding to the distinction between communicable and
incommunicable statements, then I do understand the difference between
G and G*\G. But these don't seem to be pronouns...


G is the machine's logic of the machine's 3-I
G* is the true logic of the the machine's 3-I
Both G and G* talk about the same pronoun: the 3-I.
The start * does not change the reference of the pronouns, or points  
of view, unlike the intensional nuance (adding Dt and/or  p)





Whether the G-G* distinction can be related to the FPI of the UDA, I'm
not sure.


It works, following the axiomatics given. You need to agree only that  
G does well describe the logic of 3-I (this is standard), and that the  
first person is a knower, and that knowledge obeys S4 (that is  
standard too). Then the theaetetus' definition applied on the 3-I  
gives a knower (S4Grz), and the other intensional gives the quantum  
structure that we need to proceed.




Plausibly so, I would say, but not definitively proved,
AFAICT, as they seem to be quite different theories.


In UDA I interview the reader (you).
In AUDA, I interview the machine, and its guardian angel, so to speak  
(the * logics). You need only to understand Gödel's self-reference,  
and accept the traditional analytical definition of belief, knowledge,  
observation and in the qualia.


Best,

Bruno






Plotinus and most serious people approaching the mind body problem
saw the difference, but the 1-I is typically eliminated by the
Aristotelian theologian (like the atheists, the fundamentalists,
etc.).
It is almost the difference between the body and the soul. The first
does admit third person descriptions, the second has none (like
Truth).

Bruno







Cheers
--


Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-06 Thread meekerdb

On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a case 
where
Leibniz identity rule fails,


If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most certainly has NOT 
failed.


I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not remember having 
been the W-guy, and reciprocally).


The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and which, btw,  can be 
done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people showed to you. Each time we talk 
about the prediction the he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after 
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at 
their individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done in Helsinki. We 
just look at diaries, and I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't 
try to understand.


There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the most easy part of 
the reasoning.

Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not interested in 
learning.


Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the indeterminancy is to be 
interpreted as a probability.  There's some good discussion here, 
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret 
especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-06 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)


The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)


The  H-guy turns into the W-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday


  But the M-guy is not the W-guy


True, but the H-guy and the M-guy and the M-guy are all Bruno Marchal
because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.

The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks,


Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound importance  simply
glossed over with the slapdash use of personal pronouns. And that's pretty
damn sloppy for a mathematician.

 and which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy,


The criticism some have with Quantum Mechanics is that what it says is very
very odd, but odd or not and love it or hate it what Quantum Mechanics says
is crystal clear and it gets the job done; in contrast when your ideas are
not opaque they are logically inconsistent.



  Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer to the guy in
 Helsinki before the duplication,


If he refers to Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy then the correct
prediction  he would make is that he will see Helsinki and only
Helsinki; not that predictions, good or bad, have the slightest thing to do
with a feeling of continuity or feeling of self. And if you want to say
that Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy is dead then fine, but then you must
also say that Bruno Marchal of yesterday is dead and personally I don't
want to torture the language more that I have to under these very odd
circumstances of self duplication.

 you fake misunderstanding


Why on earth would I, or anyone, pretend not to understand something when
they really did?

 of the most easy part of the reasoning.


If this is the clearest reasoning in your proof then I'm doubly glad I
didn't read anymore.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-06 Thread LizR
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you
 are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is
correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this
is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person
even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that
Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a
computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back
into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment
digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be
duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be
the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show
what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?)

Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless.
The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a
duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can
accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently
doing it constantly.)

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-06 Thread meekerdb

On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com 
wrote:


On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not
identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to 
the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the 
time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. 
I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we 
exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come 
back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital 
states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may 
not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in 
principle itself objectionable?)



JC should read this: 
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret


I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a 
probability.

Brent


Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question 
is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of this sort is at 
least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the 
multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.)


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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-06 Thread chris peck
Hi Brent

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is 
 correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this 
 is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person 
 even from one second to the next.

I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things remain the 
same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't flow. Or the human 
body has an underlying form and structure that gets maintained as the 
constituent matter comes and goes. It is the abstract relationship between 
elements that constitutes identity rather than the elements themselves. I would 
think this reading of Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a 
neo-patonist. I would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive 
steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he would really 
be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural numbers from which 
'shadows of us' are derived.

In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in comp. This is 
the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he violates in step 3.


 I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a 
 probability.

Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he explicitly 
assigns probability:

This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 
1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any 
noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a 
probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).”

All the best

Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


  

  
  
On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:



  

  On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
wrote:


  
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno
  Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
  wrote:



  

  

  
 The M-guy
  is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been
  the H-guy)


  
   

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are
  not identical just as you are not identical with
  the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


  

  

  
  


This is true, but it's also something
  Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to the extent
  that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is
  happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the
  same person even from one second to the next. I thought that
  was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp,
  then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least
  in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence
  constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital
  states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could
  also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The
  computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not -
  however the point is only to show what is possible in
  principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?)


  





JC should read this:
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret



I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning
a probability.



Brent


  

  


Arguing about which man is which or who
  thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you
  agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of
  this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept
  it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is
  apparently doing it constantly.)

  


  
  -- 




  





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:00, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/4/2013 7:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Physical time, on the contrary is most plausibly a quantum notion,  
and should normally emerge (assuming comp) from the interference of  
all computations + the stable first person (plural) points of view.


I don't think physical time is even a single concept.  There is t  
that goes in the equations, there is a general relativistic time- 
like killing vector, there is the direction of increase of local  
entropy, there is expansion of the universe,...  A lot of  
interesting questions in physics arise from studying how these  
relate to one another.


I agree. Here by physical time I was thinking of the t in the time  
dependent Schroedinger equation. It might be, already in physics, a  
dispensable parameter (like in DeWitt-Wheeler equation H = 0).
All notions of time must be recovered from 0, 1, 2, 3, ... + addition  
+ multiplication (+ the points of view, but they are derived).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx
trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc.
but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the
reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were
allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and
got no problem with it).



Hi Bruno,

You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it
didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA
from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you
discuss formalisation of pronouns.

Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't read?  
Or perhaps

you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing?
Just wondering...


I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been  
unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted?


Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's  
beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like  
in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often to  
it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference.


Bp  p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in  
AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or  
name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner  
God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to  
feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective  
he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!).


The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp  Dt  
should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and  
definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a reality  
(Dt).


The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp  p  Dt).

OK?

To sum up:
Bp = 3-I,
Bp  p = 1-I.
The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into  
probability (which needs ([]p   -  p), in formal treatment).


Bruno







Cheers
--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
 pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx
 trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc.
 but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the
 reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were
 allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and
 got no problem with it).
 
 
 Hi Bruno,
 
 You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it
 didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA
 from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you
 discuss formalisation of pronouns.
 
 Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't
 read? Or perhaps
 you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing?
 Just wondering...
 
 I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been
 unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted?
 
 Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's
 beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like
 in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often
 to it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference.
 
 Bp  p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in
 AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or
 name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner
 God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to
 feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective
 he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!).
 
 The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp  Dt
 should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and
 definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a
 reality (Dt).
 
 The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp  p  Dt).
 
 OK?
 
 To sum up:
 Bp = 3-I,
 Bp  p = 1-I.
 The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into
 probability (which needs ([]p   -  p), in formal treatment).
 
 Bruno
 

I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp  p is
the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in
both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same
entity. English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between
3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced,
with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are pronouns?

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx
trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc.
but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the
reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were
allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and
got no problem with it).



Hi Bruno,

You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it
didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your  
AUDA
from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where  
you

discuss formalisation of pronouns.

Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't
read? Or perhaps
you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing?
Just wondering...


I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been
unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted?

Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's
beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like
in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often
to it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference.

Bp  p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in
AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or
name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner
God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to
feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective
he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!).

The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp  Dt
should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and
definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a
reality (Dt).

The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp  p   
Dt).


OK?

To sum up:
Bp = 3-I,
Bp  p = 1-I.
The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into
probability (which needs ([]p   -  p), in formal treatment).

Bruno



I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp  p is
the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in
both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same
entity.


G* proves that they are the same, but G does not. It is (in God's eye)  
the same entity, but the machine is unable to know, or to prove that,  
and that explains the difference of the perspective. 3-I has a name/ 
description, but the 1-I has no name.






English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between
3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced,
with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are  
pronouns?


Because 1-I and 3-I are variant of the pronoun I. Natural language  
use the same word, because we tend to confuse them. The duplication  
experiences are the simplest tool for distinguishing them. The  
Theatetus' definition, when applied to Gödel's beweisbar also  
distinguish them, rather miraculously.
Plotinus and most serious people approaching the mind body problem saw  
the difference, but the 1-I is typically eliminated by the  
Aristotelian theologian (like the atheists, the fundamentalists, etc.).
It is almost the difference between the body and the soul. The first  
does admit third person descriptions, the second has none (like Truth).


Bruno







Cheers
--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than
 Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no law of
 logic that demands every event have a cause.


  The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to the
 lack of precision in the data


Exactly, lack of precision in the data. In the Many Worlds interpretation,
and in all the duplicating chamber thought experiments I have see on this
list, probability is not a property of the thing itself but just a measure
of a lack of information.


  Not something like the self-duplication.


What randomness is there in that?


  we know in advance that each copies can only see one city,


Yes.


  and not both


Yes, Bruno Marchal the Washington Man will not see Moscow, and Bruno
Marchal the Moscow Man will not see Washington, and Bruno Marchal the
Helsinki Man will not see Moscow or Washington; and of course Bruno Marchal
will turn into things (PLURAL because Bruno Marchal has been duplicated)
that see all 3 cities.


  and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be predicted
 by the guy in Helsinki.


Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise
question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate answer, and
just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the
question to.


  You are playing with words


Words are the only way we have to communicate and I am not playing and this
is not a game. I have no doubt that if duplicating chambers were in common
use in Shakespeare's day by now the English language would be very
different, particularly in regard to personal pronouns; but that didn't
happen so we are left with a very imperfect instrument to discuss these
matters. Thus when talking philosophically about duplicating chambers
personal pronouns must be used sparingly and with great care even if that
results in inelegant prose.


  I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what you fail
 to understand.


I no longer think there is anything there to understand.

 You oscillate between not new and trivial, and wrong,

Yes, because your statements oscillate between not new, trivial, hopelessly
vague, and just wrong. I said a long time ago that no philosopher in the
last 200 years has said something that was clear, deep, non-obvious, and
true that a scientist or mathematician hadn't said long before, and you are
continuing in that grand tradition.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 5:05 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than
 Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no law of
 logic that demands every event have a cause.


  The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to the
 lack of precision in the data


 Exactly, lack of precision in the data. In the Many Worlds interpretation,
 and in all the duplicating chamber thought experiments I have see on this
 list, probability is not a property of the thing itself but just a measure
 of a lack of information.


Point? Flaw expressed as a complete idea and not as some partial attack on
terms from the hedges?




  Not something like the self-duplication.


 What randomness is there in that?


Point? Flaw expressed as a complete idea and not as some partial attack on
terms from the hedges?





  we know in advance that each copies can only see one city,


 Yes.


  and not both


 Yes, Bruno Marchal the Washington Man will not see Moscow, and Bruno
 Marchal the Moscow Man will not see Washington, and Bruno Marchal the
 Helsinki Man will not see Moscow or Washington; and of course Bruno Marchal
 will turn into things (PLURAL because Bruno Marchal has been duplicated)
 that see all 3 cities.


  and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be
 predicted by the guy in Helsinki.


 Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise
 question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate answer, and
 just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the
 question to.



You are playing, because the guy in Helsinki is a third person
description. The 3rd person pronoun is embedded in your question and you
are asking for it to be removed while providing an answer concerning it.
Whatever, John... I don't believe that you're seriously asking something
this semantically unsound.

 You are playing with words


 Words are the only way we have to communicate and I am not playing and
 this is not a game.


Your last question I responded to, is sufficient to let readers decide on
that. It's a fine example of how you play and/or your alien conception of
pronouns.


 I have no doubt that if duplicating chambers were in common use in
 Shakespeare's day by now the English language would be very different,
 particularly in regard to personal pronouns; but that didn't happen so we
 are left with a very imperfect instrument to discuss these matters.


Why literally and metaphorically baroque hypothetical from the guy that
hates philosophy?

Not teleporting in Shakespeare's time is responsible for use of pronouns
today?! Sorry, but this is worse than bad philosophy.

And no philosophers to blame. John Clark produced that statement and is the
philosopher he set out to shoot down in this thread.


 Thus when talking philosophically about duplicating chambers personal
 pronouns must be used sparingly and with great care even if that results in
 inelegant prose.


Not so fast... you can also use informal language use ambiguity of
interplay between pronouns, entities, and pov to obfuscate your own
bogosity.

Bruno's use corresponds to accepted standards in linguistics and, from what
I understand, in mathematical logic as well. What does your hyper-complex
use of pronouns correspond to?




  I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what you
 fail to understand.


 I no longer think there is anything there to understand.


You never wanted to, despite your intelligence, so cut the pretense.




  You oscillate between not new and trivial, and wrong,

 Yes, because your statements oscillate between not new, trivial,
 hopelessly vague, and just wrong. I said a long time ago that no
 philosopher in the last 200 years has said something that was clear, deep,
 non-obvious, and true that a scientist or mathematician hadn't said long
 before, and you are continuing in that grand tradition.


Again, you're that philosopher in this discussion, John. Not clear, deep,
non-obvious, and true. So that is consistent: the philosopher that sheds
light on nothing but obvious wrongs or redundant trivialities and
obfuscations (your 3rd person description of philosophers starting this
discussion) is first person John Clark making statements here.

Again you mix up the 1p and 3p pronouns. Whether deliberate or not, is not
the question. You claimed to have found a flaw; but if you keep mixing up
these two to your heart's content, and use that as a vector for attacking
from hedges with no theory or backup for your use of pronouns, then it is
clear why you think you have found a flaw. PGC



   John K Clark




















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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Oct 2013, at 17:05, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than  
Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no  
law of logic that demands every event have a cause.


 The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to  
the lack of precision in the data


Exactly, lack of precision in the data. In the Many Worlds  
interpretation, and in all the duplicating chamber thought  
experiments I have see on this list, probability is not a property  
of the thing itself but just a measure of a lack of information.


 Not something like the self-duplication.

What randomness is there in that?



The randomness is well described in the diaries of those doing the  
experience.







 we know in advance that each copies can only see one city,

Yes.

 and not both

Yes, Bruno Marchal the Washington Man will not see Moscow, and Bruno  
Marchal the Moscow Man will not see Washington, and Bruno Marchal  
the Helsinki Man will not see Moscow or Washington; and of course  
Bruno Marchal will turn into things (PLURAL because Bruno Marchal  
has been duplicated) that see all 3 cities.


But you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a  
case where Leibniz identity rule fails, like in modal logics), so why  
don't you listen to him, and indeed all of him.


If in Helsinki he predicted {W  M}, the bruno marchal in W will see  
that his prediction failed, as he must admit that he is not seeing M.


If in Helsinki he predicted W, then the bruno marchal in M will see  
that the prediction failed. And, with comp, we accept that both the  
people in W and in M are equal in bruno marchalness.


If in Helsinki he predicted (W or M), and that means he write W or M  
in his diary (which will be destroyed and recreated in two copies,  
then both bruno marchal will look at the diary, which assert W v  
M, and both will see that indeed one disjunct have been realized, and  
so both prediction win.


In UDA, first and third person are entirely described in term of  
annihilation and reconstitution.
The notion of first person plural is defined similarly in term of  
duplication of entire population, and this can already provide a  
definition of entanglement in classical computer science term (but  
that is premature here).






 and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be  
predicted by the guy in Helsinki.


Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise  
question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate  
answer, and just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno  
Marchal is asking the question to.


The question is what do you expect to live or feel, as a comp  
believer when experiencing the step 3 protocol. More precisely, it  
concerns the seeing of the cities involved: do you expect W, M, both,  
etc.


The question is used in the traditional sense of you, before the  
duplication. I just ask you the question, about what experience you  
can expect (as you will not die, and not feel to be in both cities at  
once).


The guy reason in comp, and knows already many things: that he will  
survive (you have agreed on that), that he will not feel the split,  
that he will see only city among W and M, that the experience will be  
smooth, etc.


He knows that from his first person perspective he will feel nothing,  
and find itself in one city, and that he could not have been sure  
about which one.


In the 2^big n movie experience, a simple calculus shows that white  
noise is the most reasonable answer.






 You are playing with words

Words are the only way we have to communicate and I am not playing  
and this is not a game. I have no doubt that if duplicating chambers  
were in common use in Shakespeare's day by now the English language  
would be very different, particularly in regard to personal  
pronouns; but that didn't happen so we are left with a very  
imperfect instrument to discuss these matters.
Thus when talking philosophically about duplicating chambers  
personal pronouns must be used sparingly and with great care even if  
that results in inelegant prose.


That is why I make it clear, and give precise definition, and notably  
use the duplication experience to distinguish clearly the 1-I from the  
3-I, and all this in a traditional third person discourse. The first  
person discourse being here mainly the history of the experiences  
described in the diaries.


I do the same later, in arithmetic, by showing that the oldest  
definition of knowledge, when applied in arithmetic, introduce a  
similar distinction between third and first person discourse.


You have usually mocked away all those precisions.







 I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what  
you fail to understand.


I no longer think there is anything there to understand.
 You oscillate 

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Personal pronouns with no referent


  You never made any assertion explicit. Quote a passage of me with a
 personal pronoun without referent.


The following is far far from complete, this just gives a taste of the
incoherent use of personal pronouns:

Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal said:

the question is about which differentiation [you] will live and The
Helsinki guy can not be sure if [he] will experience seeing W or M  and
[he] cannot predict [his] future 1view

On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Bruno Marchal said:

To evaluate [your] chance, in helsinki, to later feel to be the W or the M
man after the duplication is done [blah blah]   and  the question was:
where will [you] feel   and   [You] can do the thought experiment in a
setting where in Helsinki [you] take some drug so that [you] become
amnesic, and don't know more who [you] are

On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal said:

from the 1p, after pushing the button and opening the box, [you] *feel*
[blah blah]  and  it is simple to understand that [you]  [blah blah]

Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal said:

in all cases [we] have one future, in the first person pov

And just last Monday Bruno Marchal said:

I want only evaluate [my] chance to see M, or W, when in helsinki I am
told that I will be duplicated  and  by comp I know [I] will see only one
city.

  this explains the indeterminacy. If [you] don't die, and know in advance
 that [you] can logically feel only one city,  but that you are
 reconstituted in both city, you know that any program or god predicting
 where you will feel (you the guy still in Helsinki)


Bruno Marchal the guy in Helsinki will never experience and has never
experienced any city except Helsinki because otherwise the guy in Helsinki
would not be the guy in Helsinki.

 will be refuted by necessarily one of the copies, and that's enough to
 refute it.


Bruno Marchal the guy in Washington and Bruno Marchal the guy in Moscow
don't know anything about what happened to Bruno Marchal the guy in
Helsinki after the duplication was made, but whatever happened it is
obvious that as some point Bruno Marchal has experienced Helsinki and
Washington and Moscow.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a case
 where Leibniz identity rule fails,


If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most
certainly has NOT failed. If the original and the copy are identical then
exchanging there position will not make a observable difference to a
outside observer nor to the original nor to the copy. So Leibniz would
conclude that if objectively it makes no difference and subjectively it
makes no difference then exchanging the position of the original and the
copy just plain makes no difference.

 If in Helsinki [he] predicted {W  M} [blah blah]


SEE!  Bruno Marchal is incapable of expressing ideas without pronouns with
no referent. Was he making a prediction about
the future of Bruno Marchal or about the future of Bruno Marchal the
Helsinki Man? If it's about Bruno Marchal then the correct prediction would
be Helsinki Moscow and Washington, if it's about Bruno Marchal the Helsinki
Man the correct prediction can only be Helsinki. But who cares about
predictions?


  the bruno marchal in W will see that his prediction failed, as [he]
 must admit that [he] is not seeing M.


But he must admit he is NOT the only Bruno Marchal because he HAS
BEEN DUPLICATED!  Bruno Marchal admits that he has been duplicated but
still insists on referring to he as if there were still only one, and
that's what makes the whole thing incoherent. And what on earth does a
prediction, correct or incorrect, have to do with a feeling of self
anyway?

   and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be
 predicted by the guy in Helsinki.


  Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise
 question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate answer, and
 just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the
 question to.


  The question is what do [you] expect to live or feel, as a comp
 believer


SEE!  Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.

 More precisely, it concerns the seeing of the cities involved: do [you]
 expect W, M, both, etc.


SEE!  Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.


  The question is used in the traditional sense of you, before the
 duplication.


And that is exactly the problem, traditionally duplicating chambers do not
exist so the poor little pronoun you doesn't have to worry about the
complications such machines generate, but to really study this issue and
move into the big leagues Bruno Marchal must worry about them.

 The guy reason in comp, and knows already many things: that he will
 survive (you have agreed on that), that he will not feel the split


OK, so far so good the use of he is  causing no problems.

 that he will see only city


WHO THE HELL IS HE??

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread meekerdb

On 10/5/2013 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx
trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc.
but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the
reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were
allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and
got no problem with it).


Hi Bruno,

You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it
didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA

from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you

discuss formalisation of pronouns.

Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't
read? Or perhaps
you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing?
Just wondering...

I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been
unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted?

Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's
beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like
in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often
to it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference.

Bp  p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in
AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or
name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner
God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to
feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective
he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!).

The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp  Dt
should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and
definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a
reality (Dt).

The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp  p  Dt).
OK?

To sum up:
Bp = 3-I,
Bp  p = 1-I.
The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into
probability (which needs ([]p   -  p), in formal treatment).

Bruno


I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp  p is
the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course),


I'm suspicious of this definition of know anyway.  There are many things (infinitely 
many) that I can prove, but it would take me time and effort to do so; so I don't *know* 
them.  And in fact I can, in my life, only prove finitely many of them and I as I get 
older I suspect I'm forgetting old ones faster than I'm proving new ones. :-)


Brent


but in
both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same
entity. English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between
3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced,
with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are pronouns?

Cheers


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-05 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 10:34:11AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 
 I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp  p is
 the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in
 both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same
 entity.
 
 G* proves that they are the same, but G does not. It is (in God's
 eye) the same entity, but the machine is unable to know, or to prove
 that, and that explains the difference of the perspective. 3-I has a
 name/description, but the 1-I has no name.

What is the modal logic statement corresponding to I? This is most unclear.

 
 
 
 
 English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between
 3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced,
 with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are
 pronouns?
 
 Because 1-I and 3-I are variant of the pronoun I. Natural language
 use the same word, because we tend to confuse them. 

Above, you stated that 1-I was Bp  p and 3-I was Bp. How do those
modal concepts relate to the English language pronoun I? Sorry to
press on this - I just want to know if there is something interesting here.

 The duplication
 experiences are the simplest tool for distinguishing them. The
 Theatetus' definition, when applied to Gödel's beweisbar also
 distinguish them, rather miraculously.

At this point in time, I do not see any connection between the UDA and
the AUDA. They seem to be based on entirely different sets of
propositions:

UDA:
  COMP (Yes doctor, etc)

AUDA:
  Theatetus and brethren, Sigma_1 restriction

If you are alluding to the distinction between communicable and
incommunicable statements, then I do understand the difference between
G and G*\G. But these don't seem to be pronouns...

Whether the G-G* distinction can be related to the FPI of the UDA, I'm
not sure. Plausibly so, I would say, but not definitively proved,
AFAICT, as they seem to be quite different theories.

 Plotinus and most serious people approaching the mind body problem
 saw the difference, but the 1-I is typically eliminated by the
 Aristotelian theologian (like the atheists, the fundamentalists,
 etc.).
 It is almost the difference between the body and the soul. The first
 does admit third person descriptions, the second has none (like
 Truth).
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cheers
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 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
 
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 16:03, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:

However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states
(an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain
function, for example).


But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the  
subconscious.  If
one conceives a subjective moment as just what one is conscious  
of in a

moment it doesn't encode very much of the past.  And in the digital
simulation paradigm the computational state doesn't encode any of  
it.  So I
think each conscious moment must have considerable extent in  
(physical)

time so as to overlap and provide continuity.


But then comp is false, OK? As with comp the present first person  
moment can

be encoded, and indeed sent on Mars, etc.



Of course physical time need not correspond in any simple way to
computational steps.


OK. With this remark, comp remains consistent, indeed. That last  
remark is
quite interesting, and a key to grasp comp and its relation to  
physics. I

think.


Could time arise from recursivity? A very caricatural example:

f(x) = x :: f(x + 1)

So f(0) would go through the steps:
(0)
(0 1)
(0 1 2)
...

If (in a caricatural way) we associated each step with a moment, each
step would contain a memory of the past, although the function I wrote
is just some static mathematical object I dug up from Platonia.
Furthermore, these moments would appear to be relates in a causality
sequence: (0) - (0 1) - (0 1 2) and so on. What do you think?


I have not problem. Many definitions of the natural numbers proceed  
like that, like 0 = { }, and n+1 = n union {n}.


You could have asked if the sequence of natural numbers does not  
already define a sort of time, and I would have answered  
affirmatively.  Of course, as you say it is a platonic static notion  
of time, and it is not related a priori to the physical time.


All computations defined a notion of time, through their notion of  
steps, and which is inherited from the sequence of the natural numbers.


Physical time, on the contrary is most plausibly a quantum notion, and  
should normally emerge (assuming comp) from the interference of all  
computations + the stable first person (plural) points of view.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:


On Wed, Oct 2, 2013  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 philosophically my low-tech experiment works just as well and is  
just as uninformative as your hi-tech version.


 Not at all. In your low tech (using a coin), you get an  
indeterminacy from coin throwing,


And the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than  
Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no  
law of logic that demands every event have a cause.



The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to the  
lack of precision in the data, or perhaps the quantum error addition.  
Not something like the self-duplication.






 You agreed some post before, that anyone remembering having been  
the Helsinki man can consider himself rightfully as the Helsinki man


Agreed? I'm the one who introduced the idea to this list!


Well I assumed you were agreeing with yourself.



And I was very surprised that I even had to talk about such a  
rudimentary concept to a bunch of people who fancy themselves  
philosophers.


 he has just been duplicated

Yes.

 and the 1p-indeterminacy comes from this.

Please note, if the following seems clunky it's because it contains  
no pronouns, but a inelegant prose style is the price that must be  
payed when writing philosophically about personal identity and  
duplicating chambers:


What question about personal identity is indeterminate? There is a  
100% chance that the Helsinki man will turn into the Moscow man  
because the Helsinki Man saw Moscow, and a 100% chance the Helsinki  
Man will turn into the Washington Man because the Helsinki Man saw  
Washington, and a 100% chance that the first person view of the  
Helsinki Man will be a view ONLY of Helsinki because otherwise the  
first person view of the Helsinki Man would not be the first person  
view of the Helsinki man.


And before Bruno Marchal rebuts this by saying John Clark is  
confusing peas with some other sort of peas please clearly explain  
exactly what question concerning personal identity has a  
indeterminate answer. AND DO SO WITHOUT USING PERSONAL PRONOUNS WITH  
NO CLEAR REFERENT!


I keep repeating that the indeterminacy is not related to personal  
identity, and that the indeterminacy is not bearing on who personal  
identity, given that with comp we know in advance that we are both  
copies.
But we know in advance that each copies can only see one city, and not  
both, and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be  
predicted by the guy in Helsinki.


You are playing with words, to deny a simple and obvious fact.





 if you change the meaning of the personal pronoun I you can  
change the probability to 100% for both cities. But no matter what  
I means it will always be the case that the man who sees Moscow  
will be the Moscow man.


 Sure. But this does not help to predict. As you have admitted the  
probabilistic equivalence with your low tech coin throwing


Who cares? I'm not interested in prediction


You are interested in something else, just stop saying that there is  
flaw in a reasoning which *is* concerned with prediction.





and certainly not a prediction about which way a coin will fall, I'm  
interested in the nature of personal identity,


That's another thread, and the UDA can bring light to that.



and correct predictions have zero effect on that, exactly the same  
as incorrect predictions do.


 So please, read the step 4

I never read step 4 of any proof unless I thoroughly understand step  
3.


I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what you  
fail to understand. You oscillate between not new and trivial, and  
wrong, like if you were stuck in a loop.


Bruno






  John K Clark



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Oct 2013, at 01:38, chris peck wrote:


Hi Bruno

[JC] Because step 3 sucks.

[Bruno] Why? You have not yet make a convincing point on this.

His point is convincing me.


Could you explain it?

Bruno





regards.


 Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 23:18:07 +0200
 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 From: te...@telmomenezes.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:37 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

  On 10/2/2013 7:03 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 
  On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
  On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
 
  On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
 
  However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce  
from the
  logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective  
moment is
  defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future  
states
  (an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of  
brain

  function, for example).
 
 
  But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the  
subconscious.

  If
  one conceives a subjective moment as just what one is  
conscious of in

  a
  moment it doesn't encode very much of the past. And in the  
digital
  simulation paradigm the computational state doesn't encode any  
of it. So

  I
  think each conscious moment must have considerable extent in  
(physical)

  time so as to overlap and provide continuity.
 
 
  But then comp is false, OK? As with comp the present first  
person moment

  can
  be encoded, and indeed sent on Mars, etc.
 
 
 
  Of course physical time need not correspond in any simple way to
  computational steps.
 
 
  OK. With this remark, comp remains consistent, indeed. That  
last remark

  is
  quite interesting, and a key to grasp comp and its relation to  
physics. I

  think.
 
  Could time arise from recursivity? A very caricatural example:
 
  f(x) = x :: f(x + 1)
 
  So f(0) would go through the steps:
  (0)
  (0 1)
  (0 1 2)
  ...
 
  If (in a caricatural way) we associated each step with a  
moment, each
  step would contain a memory of the past, although the function  
I wrote

  is just some static mathematical object I dug up from Platonia.
  Furthermore, these moments would appear to be relates in a  
causality

  sequence: (0) - (0 1) - (0 1 2) and so on. What do you think?
 
 
  They form a sequence of states which overlap and so have an  
inherent order.
  But that can't be the right model for conscious states because  
they don't
  contain all past conscious states; in general their content is  
very sparse

  relative memory.

 Sure but it would be trivial to define some recursive function that
 generates a sequence of states with sparse or even distorted  
memories
 of previous states. The recursive function could be as complex as  
you

 like.

 Telmo.

  Brent
 
 
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Oct 2013, at 02:19, LizR wrote:


On 3 October 2013 13:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Interestingly it appears that most coin tosses may be quantum  
random, arXiv:1212.0953v1 [gr-qc]


(snip)

I say most because I know that magicians train themselves to be  
able to flip a coin and catch it consistently.


Interesting. I think there's a slight bias (in non-magicians)  
towards the coin coming down one way or the other - either the same  
as it started or the opposite, I can't remember which (There could  
be an ig-nobel in finding out for sure...)


I gave this as exercise to my students some years ago (and I asked  
that to the FOR list too, but got no answer): how much have you to  
shake a box with a dice, so that the universe get into a superposition  
with the six outcomes.
Most quantitative rough computations shows that you don't have to  
shake it much, indeed. The quantum uncertain adds very quickly. Now, I  
would have said it is still take some time, and the fact that magician  
can trained themselves to get the wanted coin face makes me doubt that  
a simple throw can be enough (I have not yet find the time to look at  
the paper, busy days ...).



Bruno



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Oct 2013, at 17:51, John Clark wrote:


On Wed, Oct 2, 2013  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The origin of the indeterminacies is the random use of personal  
pronouns with no clear referents by Bruno Marchal such that all  
questions like what is the probability I will do this or that?  
become meaningless.


  ?

Which word didn't you understand?


I understand all words. It is the statement which seems ad hoc. There  
is no use of random pronoun, the referents are clear, and the  
probabilities are not concerned with anything the candidate will do,  
but with what he will feel to observe.


I get the feeling that you are just doing rethorical tricks.




 We need no more personal identity notion than we need to say I  
will survive with an artficial brain


The origin of the indeterminacies is the random use of personal  
pronouns with no clear referents by Bruno Marchal such that all  
questions like what is the probability I will do this or that?  
become meaningless.



Same remark.



Bruno Marchal is simply addicted to personal pronouns because it  
would be obvious to all that Bruno Marchal's ideas are held together  
with only spit and scotch tape without the logically inconsistent  
use of them.


Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each  
pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx  
trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc. but  
99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the  
reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were  
allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and got  
no problem with it).


It obviously leads to a sequence of open problems in logic. The first  
one has been solved by Eric Vandebussche.


AUDA, the arithmetic version of UDA, does not need UDA. The fact that  
you ignore that makes me suspect of you honesty in the game.







 You try to evade the indeterminacy by making it into an ambiguity,

Personal pronouns with no referent


You never made any assertion explicit. Quote a passage of me with a  
personal pronoun without referent.








are the cause of the ambiguity,



There is no ambiguity. Nowhere. Except apparently in your mind.
I think you renamed indeterminacy, into ambiguity, because it serves  
your purpose of denying the 1p-indeterminacy.




and although it results in clunky prose John Clark can explain John  
Clark's ideas without using them, Bruno Marchal can not explain  
Bruno Marchal's ideas without the liberal use of such pronouns.


 All that can be said is that from ANY point of view there is a  
100% chance the Helsinki man will turn into the Washington man, and  
a 100% chance  the Helsinki man will turn into the Moscow man; so if  
I is the Helsinki man then there is a 0% chance I will see  
either city because very soon I will turn into something that is  
not I.


 That contradicts many posts you sent.

BULLSHIT!

 In particular, this would mean that duplication entails death,

BULLSHIT! As you said yourself as you said yourself, we need only  
the fact that those remembering having been the guy in Helsinki;  
and in this case both the Washington Man and the Moscow Man remember  
being the Helsinki Man so the Helsinki Man is not dead. True, the  
first person point of view of the Helsinki man no longer exists  
because nobody is in Helsinki anymore, but that is of no more  
interest than the fact that the first person point of view that  
Bruno Marchal had yesterday no longer exists. And that is why all  
this Pov and pee pee stuff is crap.


OK, but this explains the indeterminacy. If you don't die, and know in  
advance that you can logically feel only one city,  but that you are  
reconstituted in both city, you know that any program or god  
predicting where you will feel (you the guy still in Helsinki) will be  
refuted by necessarily one of the copies, and that's enough to refute  
it.


You do understand, but for some unknown reason, you don't want to  
proceed.






 Huh? Uncertainty about what?

 Uncertainty in Helsinki about which city you

You? Bruno Marchal just can't wean Bruno Marchal off the use of  
personal pronouns even though it causes ambiguity when duplicating  
chambers are involved;


I do not see any ambiguity. Which ambiguity? Where. Can you do precise  
explicit comment?



John Clark believes the reason for this is because without ambiguity  
Bruno Marchal's ideas are obvious nonsense.


An insult is purely suited to make a reasoning invalid. It weaken your  
point considerably, and demotivated to try to understand what you  
attempt to communicate.


You are just doing *very* bad philosophy, here, I'm afraid.



Bruno


People have known since the stone age that people could seldom make  
good predictions about what people would see next, but good  
prediction or bad prediction people always felt like the same people.


  John K Clark





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Oct 2013, at 23:18, LizR wrote:


On 4 October 2013 05:59, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 , LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 What question about personal identity is indeterminate? There is  
a 100% chance that the Helsinki man will turn into the Moscow man  
because the Helsinki Man saw Moscow, and a 100% chance the Helsinki  
Man will turn into the Washington Man because the Helsinki Man saw  
Washington, and a 100% chance that the first person view of the  
Helsinki Man will be a view ONLY of Helsinki because otherwise the  
first person view of the Helsinki Man would not be the first person  
view of the Helsinki man.


 This is uncontraversially, one might say trivially correct,

I would have thought so too, but however trivial it may be for  
reasons I don't understand most on this list are unable to grasp  
this simple truth.


 but it doesn't refute anything about the first person indeterminacy,

I don't know what indeterminacy you're talking about. LizR may not  
be able to predict what LizR sees next, but as far as personal  
identity is concerned that is irrelevant because whatever LizR sees  
LizR will still feel like LizR.


Sorry, I'm using indeterminacy because that's the term that was  
first introduced into quantum mechanics when it was believed that's  
what it was, and which I guess is still used even though if the MWI  
is correct it isn't the right word (for the subject the comp  
teleporter is directly parallel to MWI splitting, though it might in  
practice operate at a different level). However you can't call it  
uncertainty either - if you're being strictly accurate, you can  
only call it something like global determinism which gives the  
false appearance of first person indeterminacy / uncertainty /  
probability / whatever !


Bruno calls it first person indeterminacy and I can see why he  
uses that term. From the point of view of Moscow man, say, it  
appears (retrospectively, at least) that he had a 50-50 chance of  
going to either place. And for an experimenter it would appear that  
a photon has a 50-50 chance of being transmitted or reflected,  
especially after multiple measurements, and they might also still  
call that indeterminacy / uncertainty / probability / whatever  
even if they believe the MWI to be the correct interpretation of QM.


As I said, this is just a semantic quibble. All Bruno is showing in  
step 3 is that if consciousness is a computation, then in principle  
it could be treated as we already treat other digital processes -  
forking into two separate address spaces is, I think, the  
computational parallel for the teleporter. As I said earlier, if you  
imagine consciousness instantiated in a computer (as according to  
comp it could be) then it will perhap be clearer what's going on.


Personally I can't see any problem with step 3, given the  
assumptions. I certainly can't see why you couldn't teleport HAL9000  
via radio waves to two separate spaceships.



Yes, the all setting can be recasted in term of programs, trying to  
predict where some backup will resume. In UDA the definition of first  
person which is used (the personal diary which is teleported along  
with the subject) is purely third person.
And indeed, that's a step to understand that the whole set up will be  
recasted in terms, of purely arithmetical relations (most of them  
being even non computable, non recursively enumerable, etc.).


Thanks for helping John Clark, but his tones makes me suspect that he  
is not ready to be serious on this subject.



It is typical of pseudo-religious people, and this confirms my feeling  
that atheism is quite a pseudo-religion, very close to christianism  
with the creation being taken for granted, where mystics, poets, and  
Platonist are less sure, as they think it could be part of a dream, or  
the border of something else.
With comp that dream idea is very natural and economical, and thus  
compelling, as a tiny, constructive (by the UD) part of arithmetic  
already determine all possible dreams. Realities are just the dreams  
conjuncted with truth (true dream).


For truth, I use tarski definition of truth, which is not  
problematic for arithmetic.


Note that the inside mathematics of arithmetic is much more complex  
than arithmetic. This makes sense just with the FPI (our indeterminacy  
domain is a complex structure), and the metamathematics (self- 
reference logics).



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Oct 2013, at 19:28, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:





On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 6:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com  
wrote:

On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 , LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 What question about personal identity is indeterminate? There is  
a 100% chance that the Helsinki man will turn into the Moscow man  
because the Helsinki Man saw Moscow, and a 100% chance the Helsinki  
Man will turn into the Washington Man because the Helsinki Man saw  
Washington, and a 100% chance that the first person view of the  
Helsinki Man will be a view ONLY of Helsinki because otherwise the  
first person view of the Helsinki Man would not be the first person  
view of the Helsinki man.


 This is uncontraversially, one might say trivially correct,

I would have thought so too, but however trivial it may be for  
reasons I don't understand most on this list are unable to grasp  
this simple truth.


 but it doesn't refute anything about the first person indeterminacy,

I don't know what indeterminacy you're talking about. LizR may not  
be able to predict what LizR sees next, but as far as personal  
identity is concerned that is irrelevant because whatever LizR sees  
LizR will still feel like LizR.



You were kind enough to let the list know, along with Chris Peck,  
that the flaw in the reasoning concerning step 3 of the UDA is it  
sucks.


Unless you guys backtrack and quit abusing the fact that Bruno's  
politeness and dedication to critical debate puts him in default  
mode of taking your points seriously and granting you the benefit of  
the doubt that you would not in the faintest be inclined to grant in  
return, these discussions are a one way street into brick walls with  
you suck infantile graffiti sprayed on them at the end.


So unless you can state something more substantial than teenage  
insults and ruses á la I don't understand THIS AND THAT!!! or the  
more passive but nonetheless authoritative you're confusing first/ 
third person, everything is first person etc. , I submit you guys  
are trolling and wasting time on this.


Either be open for genuine discussion and finding of flaws or this  
is pointless as it does a disservice to the readers of this list. It  
is not difficult to see that refuting computationalism in this form,  
would be a major result.


Your aspirations are lofty gentlemen, but they don't jibe with the  
infantilization and the mockery masking itself as poised discourse  
and clear debate. PGC


Good post :)

Thanks.

Bruno





  John k Clark








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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Oct 2013, at 00:56, chris peck wrote:


Hi Liz / pgc

If I have been abusive to you or Bruno then I apologize without  
hesitation. If you would show where I have been abusive though I  
would appreciate that, because at the moment I regard the suggestion  
as low and mean spirited.


I have made my points and been misrepresented, misunderstood and  
disagreed with. I have clarified as far as I could. No doubt I have  
misrepresented and misunderstood people in return. In what way is  
that out of the ordinary in debate? In what way is that a disservice  
to anyone? The points under debate may seem obvious to you, well I  
apologise for my stupidity but they are not obvious to me. I find it  
stunning that people find anything in the realm of theoretical  
physics remotely obvious.


Bruno should be happy that people are still reading his papers. What  
more respect can anyone give him?


I do not follow his argument. I do not follow his or your attempts  
to clarify them. I see flaws in what you say. Does that really  
insult you?



Just focuse on the flaw.

Let me ask you a variant of the iterated WM-duplication.

I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during 1h30 (60 * 90), into as  
many copies can be sent in front of one of the 2^(16180 * 1)  
possible images on a screen with 16180 * 1 pixels, which can be  
black or white each.


OK?

What do you expect that you will live as experience among the one  
proposed below (non exclusive):


0) I will die instantaneously
1) I will experience seeing all movies (at once)
2) A black and white movie (perhaps quite avant-garde)
3) The always black movie
4) The always white movie
5) A (silent) Hitchcock movie
6) A (silent) Hitchcock movie with greek subtitle
7) A random movie (white noise)
?

And by definition of first person, the confirmation of the possible  
successful prediction are asked to all  2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90)  
* 24 copies which go out of the last movie theaters, when the movie  
is finished.
You can *define* The 1p indeterminacy, for that protocol, by a  
sampling on the conclusion (about the success of the prediction)  
contained in all diaries.



Bruno






--- Original Message ---

From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
Sent: 4 October 2013 7:20 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com, Charles Goodwin charlesrobertgood...@gmail.com 


Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 4 October 2013 06:28, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com 
 wrote:


You were kind enough to let the list know, along with Chris Peck,  
that the flaw in the reasoning concerning step 3 of the UDA is it  
sucks.


Unless you guys backtrack and quit abusing the fact that Bruno's  
politeness and dedication to critical debate puts him in default  
mode of taking your points seriously and granting you the benefit of  
the doubt that you would not in the faintest be inclined to grant in  
return, these discussions are a one way street into brick walls with  
you suck infantile graffiti sprayed on them at the end.


So unless you can state something more substantial than teenage  
insults and ruses á la I don't understand THIS AND THAT!!! or the  
more passive but nonetheless authoritative you're confusing first/ 
third person, everything is first person etc. , I submit you guys  
are trolling and wasting time on this.


Either be open for genuine discussion and finding of flaws or this  
is pointless as it does a disservice to the readers of this list. It  
is not difficult to see that refuting computationalism in this form,  
would be a major result.


Your aspirations are lofty gentlemen, but they don't jibe with the  
infantilization and the mockery masking itself as poised discourse  
and clear debate. PGC


I would like to frame this post and bring it whenever necessary :)

In fact I will keep a copy, just in case it's ever needed again.  
Thank you, PGC.



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 5:18 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:


  From the point of view of Moscow man, say, it appears (retrospectively,
 at least) that he had a 50-50 chance of going to either place.


Retrospective probability? In Many worlds and in these duplicating chamber
thought experiments probability is not a part of the thing itself it is
just a measure of our lack of information. And after something actually
happened we have more information, so it's easy to calculate the
probability that a past event that actually happened actually happened, it
is always exactly 100%.

And the answer to Bruno's profound question the Moscow man asks himself
why did I change from being the Helsinki Man to the Moscow Man? is really
not profound at all, the answer is simply because you saw Moscow. If the
Moscow Man had seen something else he would have turned into some other
sort of man, but he didn't so he's not.

 And for an experimenter it would appear that a photon has a 50-50 chance
 of being transmitted or reflected,


Yes but that has nothing to do with personal identity because regardless of
if the photon is reflected or transmitted the experimenter will still feel
like the experimenter due to the fact that the experimenter remembers being
the experimenter before the experiment was performed.


  Bruno is showing in step 3 is that *if *consciousness is a computation,
 *then* in principle it could be treated as we already treat other digital
 processes


I didn't need Bruno or his proof to figure that out.

 forking into two separate address spaces is, I think, the computational
 parallel for the teleporter.


Yes, and what is indeterminate in that?

 if you imagine consciousness instantiated in a computer (as according to
 comp it could be) then it will perhap be clearer what's going on.


Yes things are clear, except for where all this first person
indeterminacy stuff is that Bruno keeps talking about.

 I certainly can't see why you couldn't teleport HAL9000 via radio waves
 to two separate spaceships.


I can't see why you couldn't do that either, but where is the first person
indeterminacy that Bruno keeps talking about?

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread meekerdb

On 10/4/2013 7:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Physical time, on the contrary is most plausibly a quantum notion, and should normally 
emerge (assuming comp) from the interference of all computations + the stable first 
person (plural) points of view. 


I don't think physical time is even a single concept.  There is t that goes in the 
equations, there is a general relativistic time-like killing vector, there is the 
direction of increase of local entropy, there is expansion of the universe,...  A lot of 
interesting questions in physics arise from studying how these relate to one another.


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-04 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
 pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx
 trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc.
 but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the
 reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were
 allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and
 got no problem with it).
 

Hi Bruno,

You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it
didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA
from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you
discuss formalisation of pronouns.

Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't read? Or perhaps
you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing?
Just wondering...

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


 On 3 Oct 2013, at 11:12 am, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
 
 Hi Liz
 
  Is there something wrong with quantum indeterminacy?
 
 Apart from the fact the MWI removes it? And that that is the point of MWI? 
 And that probability questions in MWI are notoriously thorny?
 
 This is why I resort to the Quantum Suicide experiment or better still to 
 Quantum Russian Roulette. The experimenter is 1-p certain of his own 
 survival, not unsure about it. Otherwise, he'ld never take part. And this 
 certainty has nothing to do with the fact that in the other outcome he dies. 
 It doesn't matter what happens in that branch. His certainty is consequent on 
 the fact that all outcomes obtain and being a MWI believer he believes just 
 that.
 
 The Stanford Encyclopedia puts it:
 
  The quantum state of the Universe at one time specifies the quantum state 
 at all times. If I am going to perform a quantum experiment with two possible 
 outcomes such that standard quantum mechanics predicts probability 1/3 for 
 outcome A and 2/3 for outcome B, then, according to the MWI, both the world 
 with outcome A and the world with outcome B will exist. It is senseless to 
 ask: What is the probability that I will get A instead of B? because I will 
 correspond to both Levs: the one who observes A and the other one who 
 observes B.
 
 I agree with that analysis, and disagree with subsequent attempts to smuggle 
 some notion of probability back in. I'll read them again shortly just to see 
 if they are any more convincing but on the face of it MWI has an issue with 
 1-p indeterminacy. It shouldn't really be there.

Nevertheless I assume you follow some notion of probability in everyday life. 
If it is predicted that there is a 90% chance of rain you take your umbrella. 
You don't reason that as you will both get wet and not get wet, and it is 
bullshit to say you will get wet in more worlds or you are more likely to 
get wet, there is no point in the umbrella. So are you behaving irrationally, 
or is your behaviour indication that the MWI is false?

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