### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 17 Aug 2012, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/17/2012 2:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Aug 2012, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must
be true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be
unprovable?  If we construct a Godel sentence, which corresponds
to This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an
arithmetic proposition.  I'm just curious as to what such an
arithmetic proposition looks like.

I forgot to mentioned also the famous Goodstein sequences:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodstein_theorem

Goodstein sequences are sequences of numbers which always converge
to zero, but PA cannot prove this, although it can be proved in
second order arithmetic.

I'd say they are not part of arithmetic, since they are generated by
substituting one number for another - not an arithmetic operation.

Come on. Arithmetic is Turing universal. You can program substitution
with only E, s, 0, + and *.
It is long and tedious, and not simple prove, but has been done by
Matiyasevich (or just Gödel if you add the symbol A, eliminated by
Davis, Robinson and Matiyasevich.

So I find it hard to see Goodstein sequences terminate in zero. as
a proposition of arithmetic or number theory.

It is.

It seems that they depend on positional notation.

You can program positional notations with the arithmetical little
language sketched above. If you want I can give more detail, but it is
obviously rather technical, and very long. You really need the
fundamental theorem of arithmetic, the chinese rest lemma,  the Gödel
beta function, etc. I can give a shorter sketchy description, as I
intent to do on the FOAR list soon or later. I can sent the relevant
post here on that occasion.

Bruno

You can google also on hercule hydra undecidable to find a game,
which has a winning strategy, but again this is not provable in PA.

But machine theologians are not so much interested in those
extensional undecidable sentences (in PA), as they embrace the
intensional interpretation of the undecidable sentence, like
CON(t), (t).

Bruno

Brent

If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable,
we know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them,
but we don't know what they are. A billion years from now,
whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into
will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a
proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding away at
numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it
wrong.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 16 Aug 2012, at 21:32, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:

I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot
solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm.

And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable

If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains
no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a
finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite
number of undecidable statements that you can not know are
undecidable.

The halting problem is insolvable. This is an absolute notion, with
Church's thesis.
Undecidability is relative to the choice of a theory, but once rich
enough, they all have undecidable sentences. But it is not the same
from one theory to another.

Bruno

then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could
decide on the halting of that algorithm.

There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might
not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't  so you will
keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if
its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop
and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need
to keep watching forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to
Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach
Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite
number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so
we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the
sum of  primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll
never find a proof to show it's correct. For a few years after Godel
made his discovery it was hoped that we could at least identify
statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we
could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking
for a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing
proved that sometimes even that was impossible.

If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we
know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we
don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper
intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in
thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is
correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking,
unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 16 Aug 2012, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:

I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one
cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm.

And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable

If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but
contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated
in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a
infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are
undecidable.

then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could
decide on the halting of that algorithm.

There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might
not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't  so you will
keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if
its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually
stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might
need to keep watching forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to
Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach
Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite
number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so
we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not
the sum of  primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means
we'll never find a proof to  show it's correct. For a few
years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at
least identify statements that were either false or true but had no
proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our
time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but
in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible.

Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be
true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be
unprovable?  If we construct a Godel sentence, which corresponds to
This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an
arithmetic proposition.  I'm just curious as to what such an
arithmetic proposition looks like.

Some problem like that have been studied by Paris and Harrington. A
famous problem by Ramsey has lead to undecidability in Peano
Arithmetic. This is explained notably in the following book:

http://www.ams.org/bookstore?fn=20arg1=whatsnewikey=CBMS-45
You can google on Ramsey undecidable Peano, for more on this.

Bruno

Brent

If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we
know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we
don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper
intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep
in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is
correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking,
unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 16 Aug 2012, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:

I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one
cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm.

And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable

If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but
contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated
in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a
infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are
undecidable.

then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could
decide on the halting of that algorithm.

There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might
not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't  so you will
keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if
its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually
stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might
need to keep watching forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to
Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach
Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite
number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so
we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not
the sum of  primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means
we'll never find a proof to  show it's correct. For a few
years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at
least identify statements that were either false or true but had no
proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our
time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but
in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible.

Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be
true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be
unprovable?  If we construct a Godel sentence, which corresponds to
This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an
arithmetic proposition.  I'm just curious as to what such an
arithmetic proposition looks like.

I forgot to mentioned also the famous Goodstein sequences:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodstein_theorem

Goodstein sequences are sequences of numbers which always converge to
zero, but PA cannot prove this, although it can be proved in second
order arithmetic.

You can google also on hercule hydra undecidable to find a game,
which has a winning strategy, but again this is not provable in PA.

But machine theologians are not so much interested in those
extensional undecidable sentences (in PA), as they embrace the
intensional interpretation of the undecidable sentence, like CON(t),
(t).

Bruno

Brent

If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we
know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we
don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper
intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep
in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is
correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking,
unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 4:04 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

But there's also a different meaning of undecidable: a statement that can
be added as an axiom or it's negation can be added as an axiom

Axioms are important, you've got to be very careful with them! If you go
around adding axioms at the drop of a hat it's a waste of time to prove
anything because even if you are successful all you'll know is that there
is a proof in a crappy logical system, you still will have no idea if it's
true or not. For example, suppose you added the Goldbach Conjecture as a
axiom and then a computer found a even integer greater than 4 that is not
the sum of  primes greater than 2, it would be a disaster, everything
you've proved under that system would be nonsense. Axioms are supposed to
be simple and self evidently true and Goldbach is not.

e.g. the continuum hypothesis within ZFC.

In 1940 Kurt Godel himself proved that if you add the continuum hypothesis
to standard Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory you will get no contradictions.
Then in 1962 Paul Cohen proved that if you add the NEGATION of the
Continuum Hypothesis to standard set theory you won't get contradictions
either. Together Godel and Cohen proved that the ability to come up with a
proof of the Continuum Hypothesis depends on the version of set theory
used.  We were lucky with the Continuum Hypothesis, we know it's unprovable
under Zermelo-Fraenkel so nobody spins their wheels trying to prove or
disprove it, but not all unprovable statements are like that, Turing tells
us that there are a infinite number of propositions that are unprovable
that we can never know are unprovable.

Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true
or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable?

I think you mean propositions about numbers that are true but cannot be
shown to be true with Peano, if they are true or false under Peanao (and
not true AND false!) then they are not unprovable. We know from Godel there
must be a infinite number of such statements and we know from Turing there
is no surefire way of detecting them all, and that's what makes them so
dangerous, they are a endless time sink. And in fact although they are
infinite in number as far as I know nobody has been able to point to a
single one. So maybe trying to prove or disprove Goldbach is utterly
pointless and maybe it is not, there is no way to know.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
On 8/17/2012 2:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Aug 2012, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:

I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve
the
halting problem for a particular algorithm.

And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable

If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is
to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved
that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are
undecidable.

then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on
the
halting of that algorithm.

There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if
there isn't you can't know there isn't  so you will keep looking for one forever and
you will keep failing forever.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its
still
going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it
will
not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching
forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements
are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not
there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so
we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of  primes
greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's
correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at
least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could
do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could
move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was
impossible.

Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true or false
under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable?  If we construct a Godel
sentence, which corresponds to This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it
must be an arithmetic proposition.  I'm just curious as to what such an arithmetic
proposition looks like.

I forgot to mentioned also the famous Goodstein sequences:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodstein_theorem

Goodstein sequences are sequences of numbers which always converge to zero, but PA
cannot prove this, although it can be proved in second order arithmetic.

I'd say they are not part of arithmetic, since they are generated by substituting one
number for another - not an arithmetic operation.  So I find it hard to see Goodstein
sequences terminate in zero. as a proposition of arithmetic or number theory.  It seems
that they depend on positional notation.

Brent

You can google also on hercule hydra undecidable to find a game, which has a winning
strategy, but again this is not provable in PA.

But machine theologians are not so much interested in those extensional undecidable
sentences (in PA), as they embrace the intensional interpretation of the undecidable
sentence, like CON(t), (t).

Bruno

Brent

If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such
statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A
billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into
will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is
correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a
counterexample to prove it wrong.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 15 Aug 2012, at 16:59, Jason Resch wrote:

These are quite interesting:

Are these not forms of life?

I would say yes. Quite cute :)

Note that such automata, or more complex one actually, but behaving in
the same way, can be derived algorithmically, from phi_x() = x, itself
solvable with the Dx = xx trick. It is the key of all notions self
(self-reproduction, self-reference, dreams, G, G*, etc.).

Bruno

Jason

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 9:50 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com
wrote:

No, Langton's loops do not count.  Nor do any published
cellular automaton.

William,

Do these count:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor
?

Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory

and

Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.

I am interested in seeing these papers.  If you don't use e-mail to
interact with this list, you can go to the google group's page to
get any poster's e-mail address.  It has some anti-spam protection
which is slightly safer than posting one's e-mail address directly
to this list.

Jason

wrb

-Original Message-
l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

wrb

I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops

Cheers

--

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: Re: Why AI is impossible

```Hi Bruno Marchal

The Bible teaches that God spends much of his time
looking into men's hearts to see if love or evil rests there.
Would this be part of your definition of omniscience ?

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/16/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-08-15, 03:38:37
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

You?e turned things around.  The implication is context to information, not
information to context.

And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding
the computational
omniscience of the Turing machine.  Yes, you may call it universality but that
word is in fact too
strong; omniscience is more accurate.

Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This can be
proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly humans), never
omni. Universality concerns functions, or computations. By a sort of miracle
(Church's thesis) this can be universal.

Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive knowledge
is always incomplete.

Bruno

Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer? book Biosemiotics.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

Hi William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe
seems rather obvious.

I don't think anything is obvious here.
What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming?
What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience,
even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the
impossibility of omniscience.

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly
be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,
Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable
computations.

?

Somehow, where information is concerned, context
is king.

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### RE: Re: Why AI is impossible

```I used the term *omniscience* in a rather general way, as a substitute for the
term *universal*

though it should be said that the purpose was to serve as adjective to the term
*computational*

rather than the other way around, as might be expected when the phrase is given
in the form of

*computational omniscience*.  I like to play with language, and English has a
rather free form.

Omniscience has a sense of universality to it, and it is not solely connected
to deity; there is also

notion of realm, and mathematics is such.  Hence, omniscience over computation
(computational

omniscience) represents not so much all knowing as all computable, and
remember, all that is

computable is so computable upon Turing machine as it might be anywhere else.

The Turing machine, simply by its construction, computes in this universal
fashion, and no other

means of computing provides answers beyond those provided by Turing machine.
Hence, the

Turing machine is not only universally competent as a computer, it also is
computationally

omniscient.

wrb

Sent: Thursday, August 16, 2012 8:12 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Re: Re: Why AI is impossible

Hi Bruno Marchal

The Bible teaches that God spends much of his time

looking into men's hearts to see if love or evil rests there.

Would this be part of your definition of omniscience ?

Roger ,  mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net

8/16/2012

Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function.

- Receiving the following content -

From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be

Time: 2012-08-15, 03:38:37

Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

You抳e turned things around.  The implication is context to information, not
information to context.

And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding
the computational

omniscience of the Turing machine.  Yes, you may call it universality but that
word is in fact too

strong; omniscience is more accurate.

Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This can be
proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly humans), never
omni. Universality concerns functions, or computations. By a sort of miracle
(Church's thesis) this can be universal.

Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive knowledge
is always incomplete.

Bruno

Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer抯 book Biosemiotics.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

Hi William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe

seems rather obvious.

I don't think anything is obvious here.

What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming?
What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience,
even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the
impossibility of omniscience.

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly

be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,

Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable

computations.

?

Somehow, where information is concerned, context

is king.

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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everything```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
On 8/16/2012 8:34 AM, William R. Buckley wrote:

I used the term **omniscience** in a rather general way, as a substitute for the term
**universal**

though it should be said that the purpose was to serve as adjective to the term
**computational**

rather than the other way around, as might be expected when the phrase is given in the
form of

**computational omniscience**.  I like to play with language, and English has a rather
free form.

Omniscience has a sense of universality to it, and it is not solely connected to deity;
there is also

notion of realm, and mathematics is such.  Hence, omniscience over computation
(computational

omniscience) represents not so much all knowing as all computable, and remember, all
that is

computable is so computable upon Turing machine as it might be anywhere else.

The Turing machine, simply by its construction, computes in this universal fashion, and
no other

means of computing provides answers beyond those provided by Turing machine.
Hence, the

Turing machine is not only universally competent as a computer, it also is
computationally

omniscient.

I should think that would be called computational omnipotence.

Brent

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:11, Roger wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

The Bible teaches that God spends much of his time
looking into men's hearts to see if love or evil rests there.
Would this be part of your definition of omniscience ?

I don't believe in any form of ommiscience. You might read a book by
Grimm on the subject:

http://www.amazon.com/The-Incomplete-Universe-Totality-Knowledge/dp/0262071347

The God of comp is not omniscient, and can be see as being non
potent at all, or omnipotent, according to the definition.

The bible teaches us that PI = 3, also. The bible can be inspiring,
but lacks some rigor.

Bruno

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/16/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function.

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-08-15, 03:38:37
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:
You抳e turned things around.  The implication is context to
information, not information to context.
And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement
regarding the computational
omniscience of the Turing machine.  Yes, you may call it
universality but that word is in fact too

strong; omniscience is more accurate.

Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This
can be proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly
humans), never omni. Universality concerns functions, or
computations. By a sort of miracle (Church's thesis) this can be
universal.

Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive
knowledge is always incomplete.

Bruno

Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer抯 book Biosemiotics.
wrb
] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal

Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
Hi William,
On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:
From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe
seems rather obvious.
I don't think anything is obvious here.
What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are
dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient
I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with
omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational
universality entails the impossibility of omniscience.

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly
be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,
Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable
computations.
?

Somehow, where information is concerned, context
is king.
I agree with this. I would say that information is really context
selection.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:46, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2012 8:34 AM, William R. Buckley wrote:

I used the term *omniscience* in a rather general way, as a
substitute for the term *universal*

though it should be said that the purpose was to serve as adjective
to the term *computational*

rather than the other way around, as might be expected when the
phrase is given in the form of

*computational omniscience*.  I like to play with language, and
English has a rather free form.

Omniscience has a sense of universality to it, and it is not solely
connected to deity; there is also

notion of realm, and mathematics is such.  Hence, omniscience over
computation (computational

omniscience) represents not so much all knowing as all computable,
and remember, all that is

computable is so computable upon Turing machine as it might be
anywhere else.

The Turing machine, simply by its construction, computes in this
universal fashion, and no other

means of computing provides answers beyond those provided by Turing
machine.  Hence, the

Turing machine is not only universally competent as a computer, it
also is computationally

omniscient.

I should think that would be called computational omnipotence.

I agree. that would be less misleading. Computational omniscience can
too much easily be intepreted as omniscience about computation, but no
machine can be omniscient on computations as the halting problem

But science is concerns with proposition, and computability is concern
with function and program. So William's vocabulary can misled people.
In the interdisciplinary field, my methodology is to use the most
frequently used terms by the people working in the field. When two
fields use a common term with different interpretations, like the term
model in physics and logics, then a case for a new word can be
proposed, but its meaning needs to be constantly reminded to the
different experts, in that case.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve
the halting problem for a particular algorithm.

And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable

If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no
proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number
of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite number of undecidable
statements that you can not know are undecidable.

then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on
the halting of that algorithm.

There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be,
and if there isn't you can't know there isn't  so you will keep looking for
one forever and you will keep failing forever.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its
still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe
it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching
forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some
statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of
these (and if its not there are a infinite number of similar statements
that are) it means that it's true so we'll never find a every even integer
greater than 4 that is not the sum of  primes greater than 2 to prove it
wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's correct. For a
few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at
least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof.
If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for
a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved
that sometimes even that was impossible.

If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know
that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know
what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent
entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking,
unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding
away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it
wrong.

John K Clark

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote:
If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is
to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved
that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are
undecidable.

But there's also a different meaning of undecidable: a statement that can be added as an
axiom or it's negation can be added as an axiom, e.g. the continuum hypothesiswithin ZFC.

Brent

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:

I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve
the
halting problem for a particular algorithm.

And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable

If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is
to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved
that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are
undecidable.

then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on
the
halting of that algorithm.

There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if there
isn't you can't know there isn't  so you will keep looking for one forever and you will
keep failing forever.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its
still
going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it
will
not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching
forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements
are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not
there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so
we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of  primes
greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's
correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at
least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could
do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could
move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible.

Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true or false under
Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable?  If we construct a Godel sentence,
which corresponds to This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an
arithmetic proposition.  I'm just curious as to what such an arithmetic proposition looks
like.

Brent

If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such
statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A billion
years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still
be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and
still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove
it wrong.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

You’ve turned things around.  The implication is context to
information, not information to context.

And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement
regarding the computational
omniscience of the Turing machine.  Yes, you may call it
universality but that word is in fact too

strong; omniscience is more accurate.

Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This
can be proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly
humans), never omni. Universality concerns functions, or
computations. By a sort of miracle (Church's thesis) this can be
universal.

Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive
knowledge is always incomplete.

Bruno

Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer’s book Biosemiotics.

wrb

] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal

Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

Hi William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe
seems rather obvious.

I don't think anything is obvious here.
What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are
dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with
omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational
universality entails the impossibility of omniscience.

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly
be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,
Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable
computations.

?

Somehow, where information is concerned, context
is king.

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context
selection.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:16, William R. Buckley wrote:

John:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus
universality, the Turing machine
can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue
of its construction.

It is deeper than that. It is in virtue of the fact that the set of
computable functions, unlike all other sets in math, is closed for the
diagonalization, and the price for this is incompleteness. It is not
trivial, and makes computational universality rather exceptional and
unexpected. The discovery of the universal machine is a very big
discovery, of the type: it changes everything we knew. I think.
For beliefs, knowledge, proofs, definability, etc. This never happens,
and the corresponding formal systems can always been extended.

Bruno

wrb

] On Behalf Of John Clark

Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com
wrote:

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]

Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing
Machine was to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible.
He rigorously proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no
computer, can determine in advance if any given computer program
will eventually stop.

For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for
the first even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two
prime numbers and then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The
Turing Machine doesn't know, I don't know, you don't know, nobody
knows. Maybe it will stop in the next  5 seconds, maybe it will stop
in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If you want to know
what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see, and even
the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 15 Aug 2012, at 04:22, William R. Buckley wrote:

Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

See my paper planaria, amoeba and dreaming machine (in the
publication part in my url).

Reproduction regeneration and embryogenesis are easily solved through
a theorem due to Kleene in theoretical computer science. They have all
be implemented, so it is also practical computer science.

As I said: the notion of self is where computer science is at its best.

I can sketch the main idea, if you desire.

Bruno

wrb

-Original Message-
l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 4:11 PM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:

John:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus

universality, the

Turing machine

can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue
of

its

construction.

wrb

John is right - omniscience is a different concept to
universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to
keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words Humpty
Dumpty like.

Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK
to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are
logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a
better one comes along.

Cheers

--

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-
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

wrb

I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops

Cheers

--

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: Re: Why AI is impossible

```Hi Bruno Marchal

This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to
speak of the world and mind
as objects.  But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and
mind as we live them,
not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds.

It is as if you talk about swimming in the water without actually diving in.

Or treating a meal as that which is on the menu, but not actually eating it.

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/15/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-08-14, 05:38:31
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

Hi William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe
seems rather obvious.

I don't think anything is obvious here.
What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming?
What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience,
even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the
impossibility of omniscience.

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly
be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,
Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable
computations.

?

Somehow, where information is concerned, context
is king.

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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```

### RE: Why AI is impossible

```No, Langton's loops do not count.  Nor do any published
cellular automaton.

Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory

and

Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.

wrb

-Original Message-
l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

wrb

I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops

Cheers

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote:

No, Langton's loops do not count.  Nor do any published
cellular automaton.

William,

Do these count:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ?

Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory

and

Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.

I am interested in seeing these papers.  If you don't use e-mail to
interact with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any
poster's e-mail address.  It has some anti-spam protection which is
slightly safer than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list.

Jason

wrb

-Original Message-
l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

wrb

I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops

Cheers

--

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```These are quite interesting:

Are these not forms of life?

Jason

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 9:50 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote:

No, Langton's loops do not count.  Nor do any published
cellular automaton.

William,

Do these count:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ?

Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory

and

Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.

I am interested in seeing these papers.  If you don't use e-mail to
interact with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any
poster's e-mail address.  It has some anti-spam protection which is
slightly safer than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list.

Jason

wrb

-Original Message-
l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

wrb

I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops

Cheers

--

---
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Principal, High Performance Coders
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University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience

I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being omniscient
but unfortunately I'm not.

the Turing machine can compute all computable computations,

Yes, and thus Turing proved that in general determining if a computer
program will ever stop is not computable; all you can do is watch it and
see what it does. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it
stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will
eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you
might need to keep watching forever.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```2012/8/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience

I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being
omniscient but unfortunately I'm not.

the Turing machine can compute all computable computations,

Yes, and thus Turing proved that in general determining if a computer
program will ever stop is not computable;

all you can do is watch it and see what it does.

No, all you can know is that no *general* algorithm (as you pointed out)
can solve that. And I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a
particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm.
And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable, then it
is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the
halting of that algorithm.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its
still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe
it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching
forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Quentin

John K Clark

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### RE: Why AI is impossible

```Again, not any published cellular automaton.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 7:51 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com
wrote:

No, Langton's loops do not count.  Nor do any published
cellular automaton.

William,

Do these count:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ?

Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory

and

Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.

I am interested in seeing these papers.  If you don't use e-mail to interact
with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any poster's
e-mail address.  It has some anti-spam protection which is slightly safer
than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list.

Jason

wrb

-Original Message-
l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish

Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

wrb

I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops

Cheers

--

---
-
Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
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University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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### RE: Why AI is impossible

```Let's not ignore the most important point.

The machine has Turing closure solely due to the details of its
construction.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Quentin Anciaux
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 11:25 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

2012/8/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com
wrote:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience

I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being omniscient
but unfortunately I'm not.

the Turing machine can compute all computable computations,

Yes, and thus Turing proved that in general determining if a computer
program will ever stop is not computable;

all you can do is watch it and see what it does.

No, all you can know is that no *general* algorithm (as you pointed out) can
solve that. And I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular
one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless
you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable, then it is still
possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that
algorithm.

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still
going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will
not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever.

It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Quentin

John K Clark

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
Hi William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe
seems rather obvious.

I don't think anything is obvious here.
What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are
dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with
omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational
universality entails the impossibility of omniscience.

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly
be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,
Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable
computations.

?

Somehow, where information is concerned, context
is king.

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context
selection.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```

On 14 Aug 2012, at 06:33, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of
course it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum
computing system as initial system, the derivation of the physical
laws will be confusing, and you will have an hard time to convince
people that you have derived the quantum from comp, as you will have
seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to start with
the less looking physical initial system, and it is preferable to
start from one very well know, like number + addition and
multiplication.

So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is
then given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing
universality.

Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where
the variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality
rules, but not logic!

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

x * 0 = 0
x*s(y) = (x *y) + x

This define already a realm in which all universal number exists,
and all their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is
sigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing-
complete. Note that such a theory is very weak, it has no negation,
and cannot prove that 0 ≠ 1, for example. Of course, it is
consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UD
through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can be
proved to exist in that theory.

Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are
multiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relative
computational state appears to be proved to exist relatively to
basically all universal numbers (and some non universal numbers
too), and this infinitely often.

So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping an
apple, for example, the first person indeterminacy dictates that
what you will  feel to be experienced is given by a statistic on all
computations (provably existing in the theory above) defined with
respect to all universal numbers.

Is every program given equal weight in this theory, or might
programs that run more efficiently, longer, or appear more
frequently (as embedded sub-programs) have greater weight in setting
the probability of future first person extensions?

Only appear more frequently in the UD* can play a role, by the
invariance of the probabilities for the first person indeterminacies.

Does the universal system have any bearing on the above?  For
example, intuitively it seems to me that when considering two
universal systems, say Java, and FORTRAN, that due to syntactical
differences, different programs might appear more or less often or
easily.

The UD in Java, and the UD in FORTRAN will generates all possible UDs.
If one particular one win the measure game, one (or many) special
universal systems will play bigger role than other, but that has to be
proved starting from any initial UD. So your question depends on the
points of view taken. Ontologically, the answer is no.
Epistemologically, the answer is yes, but that has to be deduced from
the ontology (and the definition of person, belief, knowledge,
observation, etc.). The theoretical result is that quantum universal
system wins (as proved by the fact that arithmetical observation leads
to an arithmetical quantization), and this is confirmed,
retrospectively, by the existence of the quantum features in Nature.

Perhaps all universal systems compete amongst each other, based not
only on the frequency of their programs, but how easily that
universal system is realized in some meta-system.

Only if that easiness entails a bigger measure. Then yes, and that is
even quite plausible, if not empirically obvious for the high physical
reality levels.

Keep in mind that if you are duplicated in virtual dreams in W and M,
and that in W you are executed with a quantum efficient computer, and
in M you are executed by monks playing inefficiently (but correctly)
with pebbles, comp entails that *you* will not feel any difference, as
you cannot be directly aware of the universal level which execute you
at (or below) your substitution level.

Bruno

So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like
'dropped apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority of
computation going in your actual comp state compute a state of
affair where you see the apple falling. If you want, the reason why
apple fall is that it happens in the majority of your computational
extensions, and this has to be verified in the space of all
computations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication
(weird with respect to the idea that we are unique and are living in
a unique reality). This translated the problem of why physical
laws into a problem of statistics ```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote:

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]

Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was
to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously
proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in
advance if any given computer program will eventually stop.

For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the first
even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers and
then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't know,
I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. Maybe it will stop in the next
5 seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop.
If you want to know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and
see, and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```2012/8/14 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote:

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]

Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was
to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously
proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in
advance if any given computer program will eventually stop.

For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the
first even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers
and then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't
know, I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows.

Hmmm... well the halting problem is that there is no *general* algorithm to
decide wether or not a given program will stop, it doesn't state that there
is no algorithm that can determine if a particular program will stop or not.

Quentin

Maybe it will stop in the next  5 seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion
years, maybe it will never stop. If you want to know what the machine will
do you just have to watch it and see, and even the machine doesn't know
what it will do until it does it.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

Hmmm... well the halting problem is that there is no *general* algorithm
to decide wether or not a given program will stop

Yes.

it doesn't state that there is no algorithm that can determine if a
particular program will stop or not.

Obviously. It's easy to tell that some programs, like the program add 1 to
the number 2  17 times then stop will stop, but its not so easy for other
programs and the only way to know if the program will stop it to watch it
and see. And if the program never stops you can never know that because no
matter how many billions of years you've been watching it for all you know
it might stop in the next 5 seconds, or maybe the next 5 billion years, or
maybe never.

John K Clark

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### RE: Why AI is impossible

```John:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the
Turing machine

can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its
construction.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com
wrote:

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]

Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was
to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously
proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in
advance if any given computer program will eventually stop.

For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the first
even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then
stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't know, I
don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. Maybe it will stop in the next  5
seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If
you want to know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see,
and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it.

John K Clark

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### RE: Why AI is impossible

```I think the limitation is better expressed as,

Halting problem - no one arbitrary algorithm can decide whether or not
another arbitrary algorithm will halt.

There are some cases, typically one to one, or one to some small and well
defined set, where decidability is

satisfied.  There is no case of one to all others where decidability is
satisfied.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 10:53 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

Hmmm... well the halting problem is that there is no *general* algorithm
to decide wether or not a given program will stop

Yes.

it doesn't state that there is no algorithm that can determine if a
particular program will stop or not.

Obviously. It's easy to tell that some programs, like the program add 1 to
the number 2  17 times then stop will stop, but its not so easy for other
programs and the only way to know if the program will stop it to watch it
and see. And if the program never stops you can never know that because no
matter how many billions of years you've been watching it for all you know
it might stop in the next 5 seconds, or maybe the next 5 billion years, or
maybe never.

John K Clark

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
John:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the
Turing machine

can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its
construction.

wrb

John is right - omniscience is a different concept to
universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to
keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words Humpty
Dumpty like.

Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK
to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are
logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a
better one comes along.

Cheers

--

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### RE: Why AI is impossible

```Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

wrb

-Original Message-
l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 4:11 PM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
John:

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus
universality, the
Turing machine

can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of
its
construction.

wrb

John is right - omniscience is a different concept to
universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to
keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words Humpty
Dumpty like.

Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK
to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are
logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a
better one comes along.

Cheers

--

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
On 8/14/2012 7:22 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:

Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

Every machine that built itself was not built by Russell.

Brent

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```John Russell and Katharine Russell might not agree.

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 8:23 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 8/14/2012 7:22 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:

Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

Every machine that built itself was not built by Russell.

Brent

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```

### RE: Why AI is impossible

```I have done exactly as I challenged Russell.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Brian Tenneson
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 8:26 PM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

John Russell and Katharine Russell might not agree.

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 8:23 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 8/14/2012 7:22 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:

Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not

Every machine that built itself was not built by Russell.

Brent

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
On 8/14/2012 8:35 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:

I have done exactly as I challenged Russell.

That you built a machine that built itself would imply that you built yourself.  Which
implies you arose from nothing, otherwise there would have been a prior part of you which
you didn't build.

Brent

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### RE: Why AI is impossible

```Ah, someone sharp enough to see the crux of the biscuit.

The machine has the interesting property that it can begin its behavior

with very much less than one half of itself still not constructed, and yet

it can with this small portion construct the remainder of its configuration.

Further, this configuration cannot self-replicate without having 100% of

its configuration in the constructed state.

wrb

Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 8:58 PM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

On 8/14/2012 8:35 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:

I have done exactly as I challenged Russell.

That you built a machine that built itself would imply that you built
yourself.  Which implies you arose from nothing, otherwise there would have
been a prior part of you which you didn't build.

Brent

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
William,

On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:

Roger:

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the
physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other
part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

QED.

You are quick here.

The physical universe is purely subjective.

That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the
means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any
first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws
of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the
initial universal system.

Bruno

wrb

] On Behalf Of Roger

Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Why AI is impossible

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly
experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
computers in AI ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact
999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is
unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a
study of

artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife
research

What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is
better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole
and

then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

William,

On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:

The physical universe is purely subjective.

That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means
to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order
logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and
the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal
system.

Bruno,

Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and
observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up
making the initial choice of system of no consequence?

Jason

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```Hi Roger,

Natural life and natural/biological intelligence, although in a very
slow pace, have more than a bilion years of evolution. New forms of life
and intelligence are just in its beginning, but in a very very high
evolution speed due to a kind of men/machine/web symbiosis. Be patient...:)

Roberto Szabo,  roberto.sz...@gmail.com

2012/8/12 Roger rclo...@verizon.net

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.
Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru
*Time:* 2012-08-11, 10:22:44
*Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers
in AI ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research

What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
Hi Jason,

On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

William,

On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:

The physical universe is purely subjective.

That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the
means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp
any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and
the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the
choice of the initial universal system.

Bruno,

Does the universal system change the measure of different programs
and observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the
UDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no consequence?

The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course
it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing
system as initial system, the derivation of the physical laws will be
confusing, and you will have an hard time to convince people that you
have derived the quantum from comp, as you will have seemed to
introduce it at the start. So it is better to start with the less
looking physical initial system, and it is preferable to start from
one very well know, like number + addition and multiplication.

So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then
given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing
universality.

Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where
the variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality
rules, but not logic!

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

x * 0 = 0
x*s(y) = (x *y) + x

This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and
all their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is
sigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing-complete.
Note that such a theory is very weak, it has no negation, and cannot
prove that 0 ≠ 1, for example. Of course, it is consistent and can't
prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UD through the fact that
all the numbers representing proofs can be proved to exist in that
theory.

Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are
multiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relative
computational state appears to be proved to exist relatively to
basically all universal numbers (and some non universal numbers too),
and this infinitely often.

So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping an apple,
for example, the first person indeterminacy dictates that what you
will  feel to be experienced is given by a statistic on all
computations (provably existing in the theory above) defined with
respect to all universal numbers.

So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like
'dropped apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority of
computation going in your actual comp state compute a state of affair
where you see the apple falling. If you want, the reason why apple
fall is that it happens in the majority of your computational
extensions, and this has to be verified in the space of all
computations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication
(weird with respect to the idea that we are unique and are living in a
unique reality). This translated the problem of why physical laws
into a problem of statistics in computer science, or in number theory.

Now, instead of using the four axioms above, I could have started with
the combinators, and use the two combinator axioms:

((K x) y) = x
(((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z))

This define exactly the same set of all computations, and the same
statistical measure problem, and that is what I mean by saying that
the initial axioms choice is indifferent as long as you start from
something which define a UD, or all computations (that is: is Turing
or sigma_1 complete).

Now, clearly, from the first person points of view, it does look like
many universal system get relatively more important role. Some can be
geographical, like the local chemical situation on earth (a very
special universal system), or your parents, but the point is that
their stability must be justified by the winning universal system
emerging from the competition of all universal numbers going through
your actual state. The apparent winner seems to be the quantum one,
and it has already the shape of a universal system which manage to
eliminate abnormal computations by a process of destructive
interferences. But to solve the mind body problem we have to justify
this destructive interference processes through the solution of the
arithmetical or combinatorial measure problem.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 8:35 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings, nonlife cannot do so.

And if Intelligence is defined as what ever a computer can't do (yet) then
it's not surprising that as of this date Artificial Intelligence has not
achieved its goal. If a human does it then its a wonderful example of
intelligence but if a computer does the exact same thing it has absolutely
nothing to do with intelligence. In 1960 solving complicated equations
required intelligence but not today, in 1980 beating a Chess Grandmaster
required intelligence but not today, in 1995 being a great research
Librarian required intelligence but not today, and in 2010 beating the two
best Jeopardy champions on planet Earth required intelligence but not
today.

For this reason I would humbly suggest that June 23 (Alan Turing's birthday
by the way) be turned into a international holiday called Image
Recognition Appreciation Day. On this day we would all reflect on the
intelligence required to recognize images. It is important that this be
done soon because although computers are not very good at this task right
now that will certainly change in the next few years. On the day computers
become good at it the laws of physics in the Universe will change and
intelligence will no longer be required for image recognition.

So if we ever intend to salute the brainpower required for this skill it is
imperative we do it now while we still can.

John K Clark

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### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 10:35 PM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.
Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..

I could say that computers can experience their surroundings, and
therefore they can have subjectivity, and intelligence, and by your
definition even life. Or, the computer could say that you can't
experience your surroundings, and therefore you can't be intelligent

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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```

### RE: Why AI is impossible

```Bruno:

From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe

seems rather obvious.

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly

be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,

Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable

computations.  Somehow, where information is concerned, context

is king.

wrb

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 6:09 AM
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

William,

On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:

Roger:

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the

physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other

part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

QED.

You are quick here.

The physical universe is purely subjective.

That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means
to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order
logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and
the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal
system.

Bruno

wrb

Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Why AI is impossible

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,

nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.

So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,

only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,

because only living items can experience the world..

Roger ,  mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net

8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -

From: Evgenii Rudnyi mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru

Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44

Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI
ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research

What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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### RE: Why AI is impossible

```Please, a few foundational references on COMP that I

wrb

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```William,

I hope these might help:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm

Jason

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:05 PM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote:

Please, a few foundational references on COMP that I

** **

wrb

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Hi Jason,

On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

William,

On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:

The physical universe is purely subjective.

That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the
means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first
order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics
and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial
universal system.

Bruno,

Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and
observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up
making the initial choice of system of no consequence?

The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course it
does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing system as
initial system, the derivation of the physical laws will be confusing, and
you will have an hard time to convince people that you have derived the
quantum from comp, as you will have seemed to introduce it at the start. So
it is better to start with the less looking physical initial system, and
it is preferable to start from one very well know, like number + addition
and multiplication.

So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then
given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing
universality.

Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where the
variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality rules, but
not logic!

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

x * 0 = 0
x*s(y) = (x *y) + x

This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and all
their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is sigma_1
complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing-complete. Note that
such a theory is very weak, it has no negation, and cannot prove that 0 ≠
1, for example. Of course, it is consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1
either. yet it emulates a UD through the fact that all the numbers
representing proofs can be proved to exist in that theory.

Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are
multiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relative
computational state appears to be proved to exist relatively to basically
all universal numbers (and some non universal numbers too), and this
infinitely often.

So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping an apple, for
example, the first person indeterminacy dictates that what you will  feel
to be experienced is given by a statistic on all computations (provably
existing in the theory above) defined with respect to all universal
numbers.

Is every program given equal weight in this theory, or might programs that
run more efficiently, longer, or appear more frequently (as embedded
sub-programs) have greater weight in setting the probability of future
first person extensions?

Does the universal system have any bearing on the above?  For example,
intuitively it seems to me that when considering two universal systems, say
Java, and FORTRAN, that due to syntactical differences, different programs
might appear more or less often or easily.

Perhaps all universal systems compete amongst each other, based not only on
the frequency of their programs, but how easily that universal system is
realized in some meta-system.

So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like 'dropped
apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority of computation going
in your actual comp state compute a state of affair where you see the apple
falling. If you want, the reason why apple fall is that it happens in the
majority of your computational extensions, and this has to be verified in
the space of all computations. Everett confirms this very weird
self-multiplication (weird with respect to the idea that we are unique and
are living in a unique reality). This translated the problem of why
physical laws into a problem of statistics in computer science, or in
number theory.

Now, instead of using the four axioms above, I could have started with the
combinators, and use the two combinator axioms:

((K x) y) = x
(((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z))

This define exactly the same set of all computations, and the same
statistical measure problem, and that is what I mean by saying that the
initial axioms choice is indifferent as long as you start from something
which define a UD, or all computations (that is: is Turing or sigma_1
complete).

Now, clearly, from the first person points of view, it does look like many
universal system get relatively more important role. Some can be
geographical, like the local chemical situation on earth (a very special
universal system), or your parents, but the point is that their ```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
Life is an ill defined phenomenological concept.

Saibal

Citeren Roger rclo...@verizon.net:

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.
Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers
in AI ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research

What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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```

### RE: Why AI is impossible

```Roger:

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the

physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other

part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

QED.

The physical universe is purely subjective.

wrb

Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Why AI is impossible

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,

nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.

So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,

only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,

because only living items can experience the world..

Roger ,  mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net

8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -

From: Evgenii Rudnyi mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru

Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44

Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI
ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research

What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
Hi Roger,

We distinguish between computers as physical objects and
computations which are not necessarily only those things that physical
computer objects do. My definition of a computation is any
transformation of information (which is defined as the difference
between two things that makes a difference to a third thing).

On 8/12/2012 8:35 AM, Roger wrote:

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.
Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.
Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.
Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.
Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.
Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Evgenii Rudnyi mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru
*Time:* 2012-08-11, 10:22:44
*Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
computers in AI ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact
999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is
unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a
study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife
research

What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is
better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous
whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

--

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Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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```

### Re: Why AI is impossible

```
Hear hear! It is the shared delusion of many first person content.

On 8/12/2012 12:01 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:

Roger:

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the

physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other

part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

QED.

The physical universe is purely subjective.

wrb

*Sent:* Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
*To:* everything-list
*Subject:* Why AI is impossible

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,

nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.

So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,

only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,

because only living items can experience the world..

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net

8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -

*From:*Evgenii Rudnyi mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru

*Time:*2012-08-11, 10:22:44

*Subject:*Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
computers in AI ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact
999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is
unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a
study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife
research

What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is
better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous
whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

--

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Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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