Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 10 Jan 2013, at 20:37, Quentin Anciaux wrote: It's not working just fine if *repeated* occurence of such *extremelly low probability* occurs. I recall that you are the one who insisted for fixing a final world/ date in which we evaluate the theories (MWI, ~MWI), without any forward shots. I agree that a sequence of little miracles can seem more miraculous than one big miracle. But the seeming can be deceiving/ misleading, and that is why we resume the discussion in term of probabilities. Then the problem is that in term of probabilities, the event of being selected in a big concrete set (MWI) is equivalent with the event of being selected concretely in a big set of mathematical possibilities (collapsing wave). The probability is just a very tiny one, so strongly tiny that the witnesses in the final world will get mad, I think. If you say it's fine, then you're simply saying probability is meaningless. The problem is that the witnesses in the final world have lived a stochastic miracle. I am sensible that it seems a bit less miraculous with MWI than with collapse, but this is just because the collapse does not make sense to me right at the start. If it did, I would no more see why the event would be more miraculous than without collapse, as the selection in both case appears with the same probabilities. A non null probability event can happen, whatever the probabilities come from. I wonder what measurement you'll accept to falsify a theory ? But here, due to the fact that we put ourselves at the place of people living a stochastic miracle, we have to admit that their experiences, challenge QM, that is both QM-MWI and QM-collapse. Starting from that, the point consists in defending if it is less miraculous with MWI or with ~MWI, and your point is not convincing in that respect, for the witness, even if, as we have agreed I think, it can be for the experimenter (but not completely: he might get a second thought and put the gun in the dress thinking he might have just been incredibly lucky: no one get a proof 'course). And it seems to me that this is made more obvious if you realize that in the normal worlds of the experimenter, she is the only one 'guy on the planet surviving, all the time, the super-gun shot. Like if both QM-MWI and QM-collapse continues to work perfectly, except when apply to her, where they are both statistically disconfirmed. Your argument is not valid on Tegmark's point, but it might be developed into an argument for MWI, following another line than probability. I would agree that the infinite case, where on a planet some family survives the QS since many generation and continue to do so, would make MWI more plausible, as in the limit the probability is zero (but of course we are never at that limit). Here your point that, MWI justifies, at least, the necessary existence of such impossible event might make sense. But you have to work out that more, imo. Hmm... They (the people on that planet) might just believe in the collapse by enough consciousness, so that only that family got the consciousness enough to prevent the collapse on the bang, I dunno, I try hard to find sense in your intuition. Bruno Regardsn Quentin 2013/1/10 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net You can as well say collapse is saved because P=10^-6 0 and so probability calculus is working just fine. Collapse and MWI use the same probability calculus. Brent On 1/10/2013 10:42 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yes but in QM + collapse it is a potentiality which happen according to the probability in mwi it is a proportion, it always happen. If the event always happen your prior probability calculus is severly broken. Mwi is saved because in mwi probability are not about happening but are proportions in qm+collapse it is about happening. Quentin Le 10 janv. 2013 19:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 1/10/2013 7:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No, I say it can no more happen in collapse theory without *a very good* explanation principle. I'm sorry but if the theory predict it happens with a 1/10⁹ probability of occurence and every time you test it, it happens... I'd say your prior probability calculus is screwed, so without a *good* explanation, your theory can be said to be falsified. As I said, the *good* explanation with MWI is that *it does* happen. But MWI also predicts P=10^-6. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 09 Jan 2013, at 20:02, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me, so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and immortality even well before. OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the Tegmark point in my 1991 Mechanism and Personal Identity paper, i.e. the point that the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter, who can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA. a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM +collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more fair ontologically, because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure. They just don't exist, in the non lucky collapse scenario. You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse. What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI, there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning). For the witnesses, your bet is more socially fair, but not in way making possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI. I still stand on repeated improbable outcome implies either MWI or QM false. If it's not the case then a 1/10⁶ probability outcome doesn't mean anything... if you notice 10⁹ validated outcome of a prior probability of 1/10⁶ I would say your prior probability calculus is wrong, if it's from your theory, I would say that your theory has been disprove. The point is in QM+collapse such outcome as 1/10⁶^10⁹ probability of occurence, it could not happen in our current universe lifetime *without* a *very good* explanation principle. Hence if that happened, I would say QM+collapse is falsified. *But* in MWI, such outcome **do** happen, probability calculus is not about happening but about distribution in MWI (contrary to QM+collapse) so it still stand. So if you see such event, you're left choosing between a new theory or MWI... QM+collapse *without* a very good explanation principle for such improbable occurence should
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 09 Jan 2013, at 20:56, David Nyman wrote: On 9 January 2013 18:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. Don't forget that we are speaking only of a heuristic, or guide for thought. The idea is to evaluate what consequences might follow, for the phenomenon of observation in general, if it were to be considered to be the exclusive property of a single, abstract knower which continuously sampled, one by one, the set of all possible observer moments putatively associable with some underlying 3p system. It is not however, as such, a proposal for a novel mechanism of any sort. Consequently ISTM that any fears relating to zombies would be justified only if one had a principled reason to suppose that observable continuations of very low measure would somehow be inaccessible to such a heuristic. OK. I am still not sure this does not simply add a layer of difficulty, because it is not clear (to me) what can possibly be such a sampling. My contention is that this could not be so, by definition, but that nonetheless such continuations would be highly atypical events in the universal stream of consciousness. OK. By this I don't simply mean that they are unusual in themselves, but rather that any given OM (like the one you are experiencing when you read this) is very unlikely to be such a continuation. In terms of the heuristic, all experiences in the universal stream are alike partitioned from each other by the intrinsic structure of global memory, but some experiences are destined to be remembered much less frequently than others. Of course, in some sense, whatever is being observed is always a zombie (i.e. we cannot discern consciousness by observable phenomena alone) but this should not be understood to mean that the relevant OMs, associated with each zombie avatar, are not accessible in due course and in due measure. OK. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
2013/1/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 09 Jan 2013, at 20:02, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me, so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and immortality even well before. OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the Tegmark point in my 1991 Mechanism and Personal Identity paper, i.e. the point that the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter, who can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA. a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more fair ontologically, because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure. They just don't exist, in the non lucky collapse scenario. You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse. What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI, there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning). For the witnesses, your bet is more socially fair, but not in way making possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI. I still stand on repeated improbable outcome implies either MWI or QM false. If it's not the case then a 1/10⁶ probability outcome doesn't mean anything... if you notice 10⁹ validated outcome of a prior probability of 1/10⁶ I would say your prior probability calculus is wrong, if it's from your theory, I would say that your theory has been disprove. The point is in QM+collapse such outcome as 1/10⁶^10⁹ probability of occurence, it could not happen in our current universe lifetime *without* a *very good* explanation principle. Hence if that happened, I would say QM+collapse is falsified. *But* in MWI, such outcome **do** happen, probability calculus is not about happening but about distribution in MWI (contrary to QM+collapse) so it still stand. So if you see such event, you're left choosing between a new theory or MWI... QM+collapse *without* a very good explanation principle for such improbable occurence should be
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 10 January 2013 15:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: *I am still not sure this does not simply add a layer of difficulty, because it is not clear (to me) what can possibly be such a sampling.* Well, as I've said, there need be no mystery about it - it's just a way of examining one's thinking about observation in a very general way. I had a number of motivations for this idea, not the least of which is that it is more-or-less implied by the Deutsch or Barbour view of the multiverse, as Gary has commented on the FOAR list. I realise that this is not necessarily the case for CTM, so it has been interesting to discuss this possibility with you. I am not of course suggesting that individual consciousness is literally consequential on a single knower sampling discrete moments at random (indeed I have no idea what literally would mean in this connection). However I do find it instructive, in certain cases, to consider the matter *as if* this were the case. It helps (me, at least) to analyse issues of extended personal identity that can otherwise be extremely puzzling and difficult to resolve. As an example, think of the interminable argument over who is who after replication. According to Hoyle the answer to which continuation is you in such scenarios is: all of them (to some degree), but not all together. This formulation focuses attention specifically on the momentary and retrospective nature of subjective identification and spatio-temporal localisation, and the context-dependent resolution of questions of before and after. IOW, subjectively speaking, moments just happen and the resolution of such happenings is always retrospective. This way of thinking can be of particular utility with respect to puzzles like Mitra's changing the future by forgetting the past. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 1/10/2013 7:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No, I say it can no more happen in collapse theory without *a very good* explanation principle. I'm sorry but if the theory predict it happens with a 1/10⁹ probability of occurence and every time you test it, it happens... I'd say your prior probability calculus is screwed, so without a *good* explanation, your theory can be said to be falsified. As I said, the *good* explanation with MWI is that *it does* happen. But MWI also predicts P=10^-6. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
Yes but in QM + collapse it is a potentiality which happen according to the probability in mwi it is a proportion, it always happen. If the event always happen your prior probability calculus is severly broken. Mwi is saved because in mwi probability are not about happening but are proportions in qm+collapse it is about happening. Quentin Le 10 janv. 2013 19:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 1/10/2013 7:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No, I say it can no more happen in collapse theory without *a very good* explanation principle. I'm sorry but if the theory predict it happens with a 1/10⁹ probability of occurence and every time you test it, it happens... I'd say your prior probability calculus is screwed, so without a *good* explanation, your theory can be said to be falsified. As I said, the *good* explanation with MWI is that *it does* happen. But MWI also predicts P=10^-6. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 10 Jan 2013, at 17:27, David Nyman wrote: On 10 January 2013 15:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I am still not sure this does not simply add a layer of difficulty, because it is not clear (to me) what can possibly be such a sampling. Well, as I've said, there need be no mystery about it - it's just a way of examining one's thinking about observation in a very general way. I had a number of motivations for this idea, not the least of which is that it is more-or-less implied by the Deutsch or Barbour view of the multiverse, as Gary has commented on the FOAR list. I realise that this is not necessarily the case for CTM, so it has been interesting to discuss this possibility with you. I am not of course suggesting that individual consciousness is literally consequential on a single knower sampling discrete moments at random (indeed I have no idea what literally would mean in this connection). However I do find it instructive, in certain cases, to consider the matter *as if* this were the case. It helps (me, at least) to analyse issues of extended personal identity that can otherwise be extremely puzzling and difficult to resolve. Deustch, Barbour, I think Bitbol, still select a particular universal number infer by nature, but CTM says that we have to find the universal numbers in our head, including the physical, then we can compare with nature and if it does not fit, looks elsewhere. I can perhaps relate the samplings with the idea of trying to put oneself at the place of others, a good exercise for the thought experience. But self-sampling is not that easy even on simple domain like W and M, (see some discussions around here) so, sampling on all subjective experiences, which seems to be organized in an unfathomable continuum seems quite difficult. Now, as I said once, it is perhaps equivalent with the first person indeterminacy of the smallest (up to some constant) universal number. But that's not an easy notion. But yes that is quite interesting. As an example, think of the interminable argument over who is who after replication. With John Clark? I think the problem is solved. After the duplication, he stops to put himself at the place of any copy, by looking only to the third person view on the two first person view of the copies. He just abstract himself from the fact that the John Clark with the story WWMWWWMMMW remember not having be able to predict that particular outcome he has lived. he remembers having predicted all of them, yes, but not that one in particular. According to Hoyle the answer to which continuation is you in such scenarios is: all of them (to some degree), Which is correct in the 3p view. but not all together. Which is correct in the 1p view. This formulation focuses attention specifically on the momentary and retrospective nature of subjective identification and spatio- temporal localisation, and the context-dependent resolution of questions of before and after. IOW, subjectively speaking, moments just happen and the resolution of such happenings is always retrospective. This way of thinking can be of particular utility with respect to puzzles like Mitra's changing the future by forgetting the past. Yes, it is the comp erasure, analog of the quantum erasure procedure, on the global (Turing) universal indeterminacy. Of course, thought experiences with memory erasure are more complex, as it is less clear to find simple valid procedure to do so (beyond the mathematics of self-reference). But it is important, it is the fusion or dedifferentiation of the histories. It should be part of the reason why the histories interfere in a wavy way. Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
You can as well say collapse is saved because P=10^-6 0 and so probability calculus is working just fine. Collapse and MWI use the same probability calculus. Brent On 1/10/2013 10:42 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yes but in QM + collapse it is a potentiality which happen according to the probability in mwi it is a proportion, it always happen. If the event always happen your prior probability calculus is severly broken. Mwi is saved because in mwi probability are not about happening but are proportions in qm+collapse it is about happening. Quentin Le 10 janv. 2013 19:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 1/10/2013 7:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No, I say it can no more happen in collapse theory without *a very good* explanation principle. I'm sorry but if the theory predict it happens with a 1/10⁹ probability of occurence and every time you test it, it happens... I'd say your prior probability calculus is screwed, so without a *good* explanation, your theory can be said to be falsified. As I said, the *good* explanation with MWI is that *it does* happen. But MWI also predicts P=10^-6. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2890 / Virus Database: 2637/6023 - Release Date: 01/10/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
2013/1/10 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net You can as well say collapse is saved because P=10^-6 0 and so probability calculus is working just fine. Collapse and MWI use the same probability calculus. And I repeat again, in MWI probability ***is not*** about happening, in QM+collapse ***it is***. In MWI it ***always always always always always*** happen so low is the probability is *irrelevant*, not in QM+collapse. Quentin Brent On 1/10/2013 10:42 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yes but in QM + collapse it is a potentiality which happen according to the probability in mwi it is a proportion, it always happen. If the event always happen your prior probability calculus is severly broken. Mwi is saved because in mwi probability are not about happening but are proportions in qm+collapse it is about happening. Quentin Le 10 janv. 2013 19:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 1/10/2013 7:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No, I say it can no more happen in collapse theory without *a very good* explanation principle. I'm sorry but if the theory predict it happens with a 1/10⁹ probability of occurence and every time you test it, it happens... I'd say your prior probability calculus is screwed, so without a *good* explanation, your theory can be said to be falsified. As I said, the *good* explanation with MWI is that *it does* happen. But MWI also predicts P=10^-6. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2890 / Virus Database: 2637/6023 - Release Date: 01/10/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 1/10/2013 11:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: It's not working just fine if *repeated* occurence of such *extremelly low probability* occurs. But that's exactly what happens in you hypothetical MWI example. If you say it's fine, then you're simply saying probability is meaningless. I wonder what measurement you'll accept to falsify a theory ? The theory is in how the probability is calculated. I'd regard that theory, QM, as falsified in your examples. In fact that has been used (wrongly I think) as a criticism of MWI since it implies infinitely many worlds where QM has been empirically falsified. Brent Regardsn Quentin 2013/1/10 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net You can as well say collapse is saved because P=10^-6 0 and so probability calculus is working just fine. Collapse and MWI use the same probability calculus. Brent On 1/10/2013 10:42 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yes but in QM + collapse it is a potentiality which happen according to the probability in mwi it is a proportion, it always happen. If the event always happen your prior probability calculus is severly broken. Mwi is saved because in mwi probability are not about happening but are proportions in qm+collapse it is about happening. Quentin Le 10 janv. 2013 19:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 1/10/2013 7:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No, I say it can no more happen in collapse theory without *a very good* explanation principle. I'm sorry but if the theory predict it happens with a 1/10⁹ probability of occurence and every time you test it, it happens... I'd say your prior probability calculus is screwed, so without a *good* explanation, your theory can be said to be falsified. As I said, the *good* explanation with MWI is that *it does* happen. But MWI also predicts P=10^-6. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2890 / Virus Database: 2637/6023 - Release Date: 01/10/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2890 / Virus Database: 2637/6023 - Release Date: 01/10/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 10 Jan 2013, at 16:37, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 09 Jan 2013, at 20:02, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me, so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and immortality even well before. OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the Tegmark point in my 1991 Mechanism and Personal Identity paper, i.e. the point that the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter, who can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA. a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM +collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more fair ontologically, because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure. They just don't exist, in the non lucky collapse scenario. You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse. What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI, there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning). For the witnesses, your bet is more socially fair, but not in way making possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI. I still stand on repeated improbable outcome implies either MWI or QM false. If it's not the case then a 1/10⁶ probability outcome doesn't mean anything... if you notice 10⁹ validated outcome of a prior probability of 1/10⁶ I would say your prior probability calculus is wrong, if it's from your theory, I would say that your theory has been disprove. The point is in QM+collapse such outcome as 1/10⁶^10⁹ probability of occurence, it could not happen in our current universe lifetime *without* a *very good* explanation principle. Hence if that happened, I would say QM+collapse is falsified. *But* in MWI, such outcome **do** happen, probability calculus is not about happening but about distribution in MWI (contrary to QM+collapse) so it still stand. So if you see such event, you're left choosing between a new theory or
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 1/10/2013 11:39 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/10 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net You can as well say collapse is saved because P=10^-6 0 and so probability calculus is working just fine. Collapse and MWI use the same probability calculus. And I repeat again, in MWI probability ***is not*** about happening, in QM+collapse ***it is***. In MWI it ***always always always always always*** happen so low is the probability is *irrelevant*, not in QM+collapse. It only seems irrelevant because you assume infinitely many MW and so you no longer have a canonical probability measure, but you don't assume infinitely many instances of the collapse scenario. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 6:10 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. Quentin Agreed. But that also suggests that MWI has a measure problem except in the mind of an experimenter or witness who expect collapse probabilities. Richard -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me, so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and immortality even well before. OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the Tegmark point in my 1991 Mechanism and Personal Identity paper, i.e. the point that the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter, who can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA. a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM +collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more fair ontologically, because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure. They just don't exist, in the non lucky collapse scenario. You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse. What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI, there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning). For the witnesses, your bet is more socially fair, but not in way making possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI. Bruno Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
2013/1/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me, so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and immortality even well before. OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the Tegmark point in my 1991 Mechanism and Personal Identity paper, i.e. the point that the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter, who can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA. a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more fair ontologically, because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure. They just don't exist, in the non lucky collapse scenario. You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse. What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI, there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning). For the witnesses, your bet is more socially fair, but not in way making possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI. I still stand on repeated improbable outcome implies either MWI or QM false. If it's not the case then a 1/10⁶ probability outcome doesn't mean anything... if you notice 10⁹ validated outcome of a prior probability of 1/10⁶ I would say your prior probability calculus is wrong, if it's from your theory, I would say that your theory has been disprove. The point is in QM+collapse such outcome as 1/10⁶^10⁹ probability of occurence, it could not happen in our current universe lifetime *without* a *very good* explanation principle. Hence if that happened, I would say QM+collapse is falsified. *But* in MWI, such outcome **do** happen, probability calculus is not about happening but about distribution in MWI (contrary to QM+collapse) so it still stand. So if you see such event, you're left choosing between a new theory or MWI... QM+collapse *without* a very good explanation principle for such improbable occurence should be disproven... In MWI you have that good explanation principle, which is in MWI it *does* happen. Quentin Bruno
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 1/9/2013 3:10 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. Did you bother to calculate the expected value of playing this game? It's $98/0.99 whether you bet on survival or death. And since $98/0.99$100 you had to start with, it's better not to play at all. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
2013/1/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 1/9/2013 3:10 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. Did you bother to calculate the expected value of playing this game? It's $98/0.99 whether you bet on survival or death. And since $98/0.99$100 you had to start with, it's better not to play at all. ?? you only lose on first bet if the experimenter die, which in MWI happens in 99% of the worlds... so discounting that *first* and only bet where you lose, you win 100$ every time till the experimenter die. On 2nd bet, you win nothing if the experimenter die (100$ (from first bet) +100$ (from winning first bet)-100$(from losing second bet). At the third bet, you win 100$ if the experimenter die... and 100$ more every time you see the experimenter survive. Only on the first bet when the experimenter die you lose 100$ (and in that case, there is no more bet possible as there is no more experimenter). But after the second bet, all worlds following that 2nd bet if MWI is true, contains *only* winner witness. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 9 January 2013 18:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: * David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp.* Don't forget that we are speaking only of a heuristic, or guide for thought. The idea is to evaluate what consequences might follow, for the phenomenon of observation in general, if it were to be considered to be the exclusive property of a single, abstract knower which continuously sampled, one by one, the set of all possible observer moments putatively associable with some underlying 3p system. It is not however, as such, a proposal for a novel mechanism of any sort. Consequently ISTM that any fears relating to zombies would be justified only if one had a principled reason to suppose that observable continuations of very low measure would somehow be inaccessible to such a heuristic. My contention is that this could not be so, by definition, but that nonetheless such continuations would be highly atypical events in the universal stream of consciousness. By this I don't simply mean that they are unusual in themselves, but rather that any given OM (like the one you are experiencing when you read this) is very unlikely to be such a continuation. In terms of the heuristic, all experiences in the universal stream are alike partitioned from each other by the intrinsic structure of global memory, but some experiences are destined to be remembered much less frequently than others. Of course, in some sense, whatever is being observed is always a zombie (i.e. we cannot discern consciousness by observable phenomena alone) but this should not be understood to mean that the relevant OMs, associated with each zombie avatar, are not accessible in due course and in due measure. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 1/9/2013 11:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 1/9/2013 3:10 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. Did you bother to calculate the expected value of playing this game? It's $98/0.99 whether you bet on survival or death. And since $98/0.99$100 you had to start with, it's better not to play at all. ?? you only lose on first bet if the experimenter die, which in MWI happens in 99% of the worlds... so discounting that *first* and only bet where you lose, you win 100$ every time till the experimenter die. On 2nd bet, you win nothing if the experimenter die (100$ (from first bet) +100$ (from winning first bet)-100$(from losing second bet). At the third bet, you win 100$ if the experimenter die... and 100$ more every time you see the experimenter survive. Only on the first bet when the experimenter die you lose 100$ (and in that case, there is no more bet possible as there is no more experimenter). Let E=expected value of playing the game by always betting on survival E = 0.99(-$100) + 0.01($100 + E) Solve for E == E=98/0.99 Let F=expected value of playing the game and always betting on death F = 0.99($100) + 0.01(-$100 + F) solution is left as an exercise to the reader. Brent But after the second bet, all worlds following that 2nd bet if MWI is true, contains *only* winner witness. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2805 / Virus Database: 2637/6017 - Release Date: 01/07/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
On 1/9/2013 2:14 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: We start each with 100$ that we use to make the first bet, the column contains the $ we have in our pocket after the bet depending on the result. I don't know what Me and Brent mean in this? betting on survival or death? bet n° Experimenter surviveExperimenter die bet n° ME BRENT ME BRENT 1 200$ (win 100$) 0$ (lost 100$) 0$ (lost 100$) 200$ (win 100$) 2 300$ (win 100$) -100$ (lost 100$) 100$ (lost 100$) 100$ (win 100$) 3 400$ (win 100$) -200$ (lost 100$) 200$ (lost 100$) 0$ (win 100$) 4 500$ (win 100$) -300$ (lost 100$) 300$ (lost 100$) -100$ (win 100$) ... All bets on the column 'experimenter die' are finals, no more bets can be put after because the experimenter is dead and won't revive. Yes, that's why in the equation E = 0.99(-$100) + 0.01($100 + E) there is no +E in the first parentheses; 99% of time there is no continuation. Only on the first bet, do I lose money (yes it 99% of the resulting world *after and only* the first bet. But after that first bet if the experimenter has survived *all* next bet are winner bet (in *all* worlds weither the experimenter lives or not making it a final bet). But his survival is rare, so all those good looking 200$, 300$,...are rare. You write outcomes, but with not probabilities - that's not how to calculate expected values. I stand by my analysis. Brent Regards, Quentin 2013/1/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 1/9/2013 11:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 1/9/2013 3:10 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on the experimenter surviving (or not). So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet on him die. What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the experimenter will survive for the following reason: If MWI is true: 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, that make 300$ in your pocket. From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter lives from your POV or not. In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or win money. Did you bother to calculate the expected value of playing this game? It's $98/0.99 whether you bet on survival or death. And since $98/0.99$100 you had to start with, it's better not to play at all. ?? you only lose on first bet if the experimenter die, which in MWI happens in 99% of the worlds... so discounting that *first* and only bet where you lose, you win 100$ every time till the experimenter die. On 2nd bet, you win nothing if the experimenter die (100$ (from first bet) +100$ (from winning first bet)-100$(from losing second bet). At the third bet, you win 100$ if the experimenter die... and 100$ more every time you see the experimenter survive. Only on the first bet when the experimenter die you lose 100$ (and in that case, there is no more bet possible as there is no more experimenter). Let E=expected value of playing the game by always betting on survival E =
Re: Why you should do the unexpected bet in front of a QS experiment ?
2013/1/10 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 1/9/2013 2:14 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: We start each with 100$ that we use to make the first bet, the column contains the $ we have in our pocket after the bet depending on the result. I don't know what Me and Brent mean in this? betting on survival or death? Me = Betting on survival Brent = Betting on death bet n° Experimenter survive Experimenter die bet n° ME BRENT ME BRENT 1 200$ (win 100$) 0$ (lost 100$) 0$ (lost 100$) 200$ (win 100$) 2 300$ (win 100$) -100$ (lost 100$) 100$ (lost 100$) 100$ (win 100$) 3 400$ (win 100$) -200$ (lost 100$) 200$ (lost 100$) 0$ (win 100$) 4 500$ (win 100$) -300$ (lost 100$) 300$ (lost 100$) -100$ (win 100$) ... All bets on the column 'experimenter die' are finals, no more bets can be put after because the experimenter is dead and won't revive. Yes, that's why in the equation E = 0.99(-$100) + 0.01($100 + E) there is no +E in the first parentheses; 99% of time there is no continuation. Only on the first bet, do I lose money (yes it 99% of the resulting world *after and only* the first bet. But after that first bet if the experimenter has survived *all* next bet are winner bet (in *all* worlds weither the experimenter lives or not making it a final bet). But his survival is rare, so all those good looking 200$, 300$,...are rare. You write outcomes, but with not probabilities - that's not how to calculate expected values. I stand by my analysis. Brent Well let's see and let's count, if MWI is *true* (this is important and not to be overlooked) and let's take for the sake of argument as if after each bet the universe was split in 100 worlds : After first bet: There is one world where I have 200$ in my pocket and 99 worlds where I did lost 100$ and have now 0$ in my pocket. There is one world where you lost 100$ and have 0$ in your pocket and 99 where you did win 100$ and have 200$ in your pocket. The 99 you winners here are not elligible for a second bet (they are in a world where the experimenter is dead), only the you who lost the 100$ can do a second bet, likewise for the 99 me who lost 100$ they can't make a second bet, only the one who win. After the second bet: There is one world where I have 300$ in my pocket and 99 world where I have 100$ in my pocket (like before starting). There is one world where you have -100$ in your pocket and 99 world where you have 100$ in your pocket (remember that the you who's bet here was the one who lost the first bet). The 99 you who have now only 0$ in your pocket are not elligible for a third bet, only the one who lost and have now a 100$ debt can do a third bet, likewise, only the me who has won and has 300$ can make a third bet. After the third bet: There is one world where I have 400$ in my pocket and 99 world where I have 200$ in my pocket (100$ more than before starting). There is one world where you have -200$ in your pocket and 99 world where you have 0$ in your pocket (100$ less than before starting). The 99 you who have now a debt of 100$ are not elligible for a fourth bet, only the one who lost and have now a 200$ debt can do a fourth bet, likewise, only the me who has won and has 400$ can make a fourth bet. After the fourth bet: There is one world where I have 500$ in my pocket and 99 world where I have 300$ in my pocket (200$ more than before starting). There is one world where you have -300$ in your pocket and 99 world where you have -100$ in your pocket (200$ less than before starting). Let's just stop here and count: There are 99 versions of me who lost 100$. There is 1 version of me who has 500$ (400$ more). There are 99 versions of me who have 300$ (200$ more). There are 99 versions of me who have 200$ (100$ more). There are 99 versions of me who have 100$ (0$ more). Just here after the fourth bet, there are already 199 versions of me who are richer and *only* 99 versions who are poorer and 99 version who did not win or lost anything. There are 99 versions of you who win 100$. There is 1 version of you who has -300$ (400$ less). There are 99 versions of you who have -100$ (200$ less). There are 99 versions of you who have 0$ (100$ less). There are 99 versions of you who have 100$ (same as before starting). In this setup, only 99 version of you have win, but 199 versions of you have lost money and 99 versions of you did not win or lost anything. If you continue to bet on death, soon loser will vastly outnumber winners... Remember that if MWI is true *all* those world exists. In the contrary in a QM+collapse scenario, I agree *you should* bet on death because if the experimenter die... well he die, no branches where they are winners exists. So if MWI is true, you should bet the improbable and not the sure bet ! Regards, Quentin Regards, Quentin 2013/1/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 1/9/2013 11:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/1/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 1/9/2013
