I agree completely. On Sunday, September 9, 2012 7:16:37 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > In the philosophy of materialism consciousness is > a bridge to nowhere, completely irrelevant and not worth > talking about unless you have a subject, missing > in materialism, who is conscious. Then consciousness > is like electricity, trivial to talk about unless it is > doing something. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <javascript:> > 9/9/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him > so that everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> > *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> > *Time:* 2012-09-08, 13:17:31 > *Subject:* Re: Re: The Unprivacy of Information > > Consciousness isn't conceptual. It conceives but it isn't limited to > detached modalities of instruction. Consciousness is carnal and terrifying, > awe-inducing, excruciating, dull, silly. Concepts, semes, memes, are all > second order arrangements and modulations of directly experienced and > irreducible qualia. > > On Saturday, September 8, 2012 8:56:10 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> They're close in mneaning, but a seme emphasizes meaning more than >> information( a meme) I think. >> >> Seme >> >> (s锟斤拷m) >> *n.* *1.* *(Linguistics)* A linguistic sign. *2.* *(Linguistics)* A >> basic component of *meaning *of a morpheme, especially one which cannot >> be decomposed into more basic components; a primitive concept. >> >> Meme >> >> <http://app.thefreedictionary.com/AdFeedback.aspx?bnr=Um9zMTYweDYwMEdvb2dsZURmcFVT> >> >> meme (mm) >> *n.* >> A unit of cultural information, such as a cultural practice or idea, that >> is transmitted verbally or by repeated action from one mind to another. >> >> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net >> 9/8/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him >> so that everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* Bruno Marchal >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-09-08, 04:23:38 >> *Subject:* Re: The Unprivacy of Information >> >> >> On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:49, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> Hi Craig Weinberg >> >> Although I don't follow Dawking's views on life and God, >> I think his idea of "semes", which are like genes but ideas instead, >> is a very good one. If the logic follows through, then >> man is the semes' way of propagating itself through society. >> >> >> semes? is it not the memes? >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 9/7/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him >> so that everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* Craig Weinberg >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-09-06, 13:39:10 >> *Subject:* The Unprivacy of Information >> >> (reposting from my blog <http://s33light.org/post/31001294447>) >> >> If I锟�right, then the slogan 锟�nformation wants to be free is not just an >> intuition about social policy, but rather an insight into the ontological >> roots of information itself. To be more precise, it isn锟� that information >> wants to be free, it is that it can锟�want to be anything, and that >> ownership itself is predicated on want and familiarity. Information, by >> contrast, is the exact opposite of want and familiarity, it is the empty >> and generic syntax of strangers talking to strangers about anything. >> >> I propose that information or data is inherently public such that it >> lacks the possibility of privacy. Information cannot be secret, it can only >> be kept a secret through voluntary participation in extra-informational >> social contracts. It is only the access to information that we can control >> - the i/o, we cannot become information or live *in* information or as >> information.* >> >> Information spreads only as controlled changes in matter, not >> independently in space or non-space vacuum. Information is how stuff seems >> to other stuff. Computation exploits the universality of how many kinds of >> stuff make sense in the same basic ways. It is to make modular or 锟�igital >> collections of objectified changes which can be inscribed on any >> sufficiently controllable substance. Not live hamsters or fog. They make >> terrible computers. >> >> To copyright information or to encrypt it is to discourage unauthorized >> control of information access. This underscores the fact that information >> control supervenes on (requires) capacities of perception and intent rather >> than the capacities of information itself. We have to be shamed or >> frightened or tempted into agreeing to treat information as proprietary on >> behalf of the proprietor锟� interests.*We can锟�train information not to >> talk to strangers*. >> >> The data itself doesn锟�care if you publish it to the world or take >> credit for writing Shakespeare锟�entire catalog. This is not merely a >> strange property of information, this is the defining property of >> information in direct contradistinction to both experience and matter. I >> maintain however, that this doesn锟�indicate that information is a neutral >> monism (singular ground of being from which matter, energy, and awareness >> emerge), but rather it is the neutral nihilism - the shadow, if you will, >> of sensorimotive participation divisible by spacetime. It锟�a protocol that >> bridges the gaps between participants (selves, monads, agents, >> experiences), but it is not itself a participant. This is important because >> if we don锟�understand this (and we are nowhere near understanding this >> yet), then we will proceed to exterminate our quality of life to a hybrid >> of Frankenstein neuro-materialism and HAL cyberfunction-idealism. >> >> To understand why information is really not consciousness but the >> evacuated forms of consciousness, consider that matter is proprietary >> relative to the body and experience is proprietary relative to the self, >> but information is proprietary to nothing. Information, if it did exist, >> would be nothing but the essence of a-proprietary manifestation. It has no >> dimension of subjectivity (privacy, ownership, selfhood) at all. It is >> qualitatively flat. Information as a word is a mis-attribution of what is >> actually, ontologically, 锟� ormations to be interpreted as code, to be >> unpacked, reconstituted, and reconstituted as a private experience. >> *Who and what we are is sensorimotive matter (or materialized >> participation if you prefer锟�here are a lot of fancy ways to describe it: >> Meta-juxtaposing afferent-efferent phenomenal realism, or private >> algebraic/public-geometric phenomenal realism, orthogonally involuted >> experiential syzygy, etc.) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/bymuNo_xJ2QJ. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/rSL_2UgTbWYJ. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >
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