Re: need for anthropic reasoning
Hello, I'm new in here. I apologize in advance for any inadvertent transgressions... Second, there is no way of knowing whether you are in a so called real world or in a virtual world. So if I don't care about virtual people, I don't even know whether or not I care about myself. That doesn't seem reasonable to me. I'd argue, all worlds are just as real, or unreal as you make them. Finding a common context as some mechanism to validate truth seems naive. One can only apply truth to issues in the context to be evaluated. Soon we may have AIs or uploaded human minds (i.e. human minds scanned and then simulated in computers). It seems to me that those who don't care about simulated thoughts would have an advantage in exploiting these beings more effectively. I'm not saying that is a good thing, of course. I enjoyed considering this possibility. It sounds a lot like freedom. My current understanding tells me that there is much more to mind than just logic and reasoning power. The power of the intellect is the ability to transcend the chaos of undisciplined thought and feeling. It's downfall is it's declaration of absolutism, that it stands as the pinnacle of understanding. The problem I find is that the intellect developed in this world, only knows *this world*. Some would argue that there is no other world. I'd argue it's the intellect defining it self in terms of the *apparent* world, and religiously maintaining the faith, less it find it's own demise. A truly powerful mind (imo) is one that quickly adapts to any rules found in any context it operates in. Clinging to one realm and making it the center of the universe sounds a lot like religion to me. You're assuming that the AIs couldn't fight back. With technology improving, they might be exploiting us soon. I do a lot of conceptual work in ai. I find without purpose, an entity is one step closer to conceptual death. An ai knowing enough to know it wants to exploit probably isn't burdened by the chaotic thinking humans are plaqued with. It is more likely ai's achieving this level of cognition and consciousness, will seek to cooperate. They would want to achieve things they would recognize that only humans act as a catalyst for. One scenario is that ai's might have less consciousness than just described, and that they operated in competition, not conscious of what they are actually doing. I think this is possible on a small scale, but would not continue very far. Insects are in effect, small machines without much in the way of consciousness. Aside from the occasional plaque or locust swarm, we don't worry about them too much. Do you think that, 150 years ago, white people who didn't care about blacks had an evolutionary advantage? I also value knowledge as an end in itself, but the problems is how do you know what is true knowledge? If you don't judge knowledge by how effective it is in directing your actions, what do you judge it by, I think this is an issue of consciousness. One may operate with knowledge on a small scale. They find harmony in there lives by keeping things simple. There are those that develop skills in applying vast amount of knowledge to complicated problems. You might ask: which is better? I think it depends on what a person wants out of life. To judge something, I think, requires a contextual awareness. What applies for one might not apply for another. In science, we maintain a rigid form of thinking to in effect, keep from deluding ourselves. It also applies as a language that spans over anyone who would join and uphold the principles of science (scientific method, etc). But again, the validity and applicability of the knowledge gained in this club depends on the context it is applied to. A scientist might say: This drug will improve your life. The farmer or other simple person might say: I don't care. The scientist might see statistics that say: These people are dieing needlessly. The simple person might say: That's life. You might make a limited scientist out of a given simple person, making them see your view point. But have you improved their life? Have you made them see? Or have you just blinded them. Robert W. __ Do You Yahoo!? Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail. http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Re: need for anthropic reasoning
On Tue, Feb 20, 2001 at 04:52:10PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote: I disagree on two counts. First, I don't consider self-consistency to be the only requirement to call something a reasonable goal. To be honest, I consider a goal reasonable only if it is not too different from my own goals. It is only this type of goal that I am interested in. That's fine, but when most people say reasonable the *reason* is not just similarity to one's own beliefs. Second, there is no way of knowing whether you are in a so called real world or in a virtual world. So if I don't care about virtual people, I don't even know whether or not I care about myself. That doesn't seem reasonable to me. That's right, you don't know which world you are in. The proposal I made was to consider your actions to affect all worlds that you can be in. But you may not care about some of those worlds, in which case you just don't take the effects of your actions on them into account when making your decisions. Evolution is just the process that leads to the measure distribution. (Conversely, those who don't believe in an absolute measure distribution have no reason to expect Darwin to appear in their world to have been correct.) I do believe in an absolute measure distribution, but my point is that evolution probably does not favor those whose utility function are just functions on the measure distribution. Also, I disagree that caring about others (regardless of who they are) is not likely to be popular. In my speculation, it's likely to occur in intelligent species that divide into groups, and then merge back into one group peacefully. Soon we may have AIs or uploaded human minds (i.e. human minds scanned and then simulated in computers). It seems to me that those who don't care about simulated thoughts would have an advantage in exploiting these beings more effectively. I'm not saying that is a good thing, of course. Anthropic reasoning can't exist apart from a decision theory, otherwise there is no constraint on what reasoning process you can use. You might as well believe anything if it has no effect on your actions. I find that a very strange statement, especially coming from you. First, I (and other people) value knowledge as an end in itself. Even if I were unable to take other actions, I would seek knowledge. (You might argue that it's still an action, but clearly it's the *outcome* of this action that anthropic reasoning will affect, not the decision to take the action.) I also value knowledge as an end in itself, but the problems is how do you know what is true knowledge? If you don't judge knowledge by how effective it is in directing your actions, what do you judge it by, and how do you defend those criteria against others who would use different criteria? Further, I do not believe that even in practice my motivation for studying the AUH (or much science) is really so as to make decisions about what actions to take; it is pretty much just out of curiousity. One so motivated could well say you might as well do anything, if it has no effect on your knowledge. (But you can't believe just anything, since you want to avoid errors in your knowledge.) Even if you study science only out of curiousity, you can still choose what to believe based on how theoretically effective it would be in making decisions. But again if you have a better idea I'd certainly be interested in hearing it. Secondly, it well known that you believe a static string of bits could be conscious. Such a hypothetical observer would, by definition, be unable to take any actions. (Including thinking, but he would have one thought stuck in his head.) I'm not confident enough to say that I *believe* a static string of bits could be conscious, but that is still my position until a better idea comes along. I'd say that consciousness and decision making may not have anything to do with each other, and that consciousness is essentially passive in nature. A non-conscious being can use my proposed decision procedure just as well as a conscious being. To be completely consistent with what I wrote above, I have to say that if a theory of consciousness does not play a role in decision theory (as my proposal does not), accepting it is really an arbitrary choice. I guess the only reason to do so is for the psychological comfort.
Re: need for anthropic reasoning
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Fri, Feb 16, 2001 at 10:22:35PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote: Any reasonable goal will, like social welfare, involve a function of the (unnormalized) measure distribution of conscious thoughts. What else would social welfare mean? For example, it could be to maximize the number of thoughts with a happiness property greater than life sucks. My current position is that one can care about any property of the entire structure of computation. Beyond that there are no reasonable or unreasonable goals. One can have goals that do not distinguish between conscious or unconscious computations, or goals that treat conscious thoughts in emulated worlds differently from conscious thoughts in real worlds (i.e., in the same level of emulation as the goal-holders). None of these can be said to be unreasonable, in the sense that they are not ill-defined or obviously self-defeating or contradictory. I disagree on two counts. First, I don't consider self-consistency to be the only requirement to call something a reasonable goal. To be honest, I consider a goal reasonable only if it is not too different from my own goals. It is only this type of goal that I am interested in. Second, there is no way of knowing whether you are in a so called real world or in a virtual world. So if I don't care about virtual people, I don't even know whether or not I care about myself. That doesn't seem reasonable to me. In the end, evolution decides what kinds of goals are more popular within the structure of computation, but I don't think they will only involve functions on the measure distribution of conscious thoughts. For example, caring about thoughts that arise in emulations as if they are real (in the sense defined above) is not likely to be adaptive, but the distinction between emulated thoughts and real thoughts can't be captured in a function on the measure distribution of conscious thoughts. Evolution is just the process that leads to the measure distribution. (Conversely, those who don't believe in an absolute measure distribution have no reason to expect Darwin to appear in their world to have been correct.) Also, I disagree that caring about others (regardless of who they are) is not likely to be popular. In my speculation, it's likely to occur in intelligent species that divide into groups, and then merge back into one group peacefully. So you also bring in measure that way. By the way, this is a bad idea: if the simulations are too perfect, they will give rise to conscious thoughts of their own! So, you should be careful with it. The very act of using the oracle could create a peculiar multiverse, when you just want to know if you should buy one can of veggies or two. The oracle was not meant to be a realistic example, just to illustrate my proposed decision procedure. However to answer your objection, the oracle could be programmed to ignore conscious thoughts that arise out of its internal computations (i.e., not account for them in its value function) and this would be a value judgement that can't be challenged on purely objective grounds. I've already pointed out a problem with that. Let me add that your solution is also a rather boring solution to what could be an interesting problem, for those who do care about virtual guys (and have the computer resources). Decision theory is not exactly the same as anthropic reasoning. In decision theory, you want to do something to maximize some utility function. By contrast, anthropic reasoning is used when you want to find out some information. Anthropic reasoning can't exist apart from a decision theory, otherwise there is no constraint on what reasoning process you can use. You might as well believe anything if it has no effect on your actions. I find that a very strange statement, especially coming from you. First, I (and other people) value knowledge as an end in itself. Even if I were unable to take other actions, I would seek knowledge. (You might argue that it's still an action, but clearly it's the *outcome* of this action that anthropic reasoning will affect, not the decision to take the action.) Further, I do not believe that even in practice my motivation for studying the AUH (or much science) is really so as to make decisions about what actions to take; it is pretty much just out of curiousity. One so motivated could well say you might as well do anything, if it has no effect on your knowledge. (But you can't believe just anything, since you want to avoid errors in your knowledge.) Secondly, it well known that you believe a static string of bits could be conscious. Such a hypothetical observer would, by definition, be unable to take any actions. (Including thinking, but he would have one thought stuck in his head.) - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL
