Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-20 Thread Marchal
Here is an old reply to Russell Standish and Stephen Paul King. Russell Standish wrote: I have often said myself the plenitude is not a set, however when trying to write up some of this work for another audience, I tried following up the web documents on set theory, I came up with nothing, so

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-09 Thread George Levy
Russell Standish wrote: ...The plenitude would include all sets that don't contain themselves, as well as sets that do. We know the plenitude contains itself. However, since the set of all sets that don't contain themselves is a logical contradiction, it is presumably excluded from the

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-09 Thread George Levy
Stephen Paul King wrote: ...I forgot to mention the notion of expressiveness... I am trying to keep my posts concise... Please read this paper by Peter Wegner which explains the notions of expressiveness and introduces Non-Well Founded sets, my thinking draws strongly from it:

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-09 Thread juergen
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sat Mar 3 18:05:53 2001 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jürgen wrote: - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2001 5:32 PM Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures Saibal

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-08 Thread Russell Standish
I'm not sure that it would actually. The plenitude would include all sets that don't contain themselves, as well as sets that do. We know the plenitude contains itself. However, since the set of all sets that don't contain themselves is a logical contradiction, it is presumably excluded from the

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-08 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear George, Interleaving... George Levy wrote: Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear George, George Levy wrote: Stephen Paul King wrote: I am suggesting that *all* objects are either an observer or a part of an observer. I am attacking the anthrocentrist definition

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-07 Thread Russell Standish
George Levy wrote: Saibal wrote: George Levy wrote: Even with the null set I have my doubt. Why not use the Not(null set) . which is the plenitude eh??? :-) How do you avoid Russel's paradox? The Plenitude is not a set so strictly speaking the operation Not(null set)

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-07 Thread hpm
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]: From the dim recesses of my memory, the set of all sets is a logical contradiction, although I can't remember why. Is the plenitude like the set of all sets in some way? I think you remember the set of all set that are not members of themselves Call it

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Hello Russell On 07-Mar-01, Russell Standish wrote: From the dim recesses of my memory, the set of all sets is a logical contradiction, although I can't remember why. Is the plenitude like the set of all sets in some way? It would include the set of all sets which are not members of

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-07 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear George, George Levy wrote: Stephen Paul King wrote: I am considering the idea that each observer (consciousness point) has its own set of a priori probable observations, it is when we introduce the possibility of communication between observers that these sets alter... [GL]

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-07 Thread George Levy
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear George, George Levy wrote: Stephen Paul King wrote: I am suggesting that *all* objects are either an observer or a part of an observer. I am attacking the anthrocentrist definition of observer. I am suggesting that any object that can have a

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-06 Thread George Levy
Stephen Paul King wrote: I am considering the idea that each observer (consciousness point) has its own set of a priori probable observations, it is when we introduce the possibility of communication between observers that these sets alter... I hope you are not suggesting that

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-06 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear George, Interleaving... George Levy wrote: Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] Umm, let me break this down into chucks and try to see if we are understanding each other. My notion of a previous time was couched within a notion that is similar to J. A. Wheeler's notion of

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-05 Thread James Higgo
: Re: on formally describable universes and measures Dear George, If I might ask a few questions... George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: A transition from one conscious point (observer moment) to the next must be logical at the conscious level and simultaneously

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-05 Thread George Levy
Stephen Paul King wrote: Logic just like phycical laws is not abolute. It only exists in the mind of the beholder. So a transition is logical only if it makes sense for the consciousness which experiences it. And a consciousness experiences such a transition only if it makes or can

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-05 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear George, If I might ask a few questions... George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: A transition from one conscious point (observer moment) to the next must be logical at the conscious level and simultaneously at the physical law level. I'm not sure what you mean by

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-05 Thread George Levy
Stephen Paul King wrote: Umm, let me break this down into chucks and try to see if we are understanding each other. My notion of a previous time was couched within a notion that is similar to J. A. Wheeler's notion of a Surprise 20 Questions Game and I did not state so

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-04 Thread James Higgo
I agree, except that there is no 'transition' from one OM to the next. What is it that 'transits' ? - Original Message - From: George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2001 8:03 PM Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures Brent

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-04 Thread George Levy
Brent Meeker wrote: On 03-Mar-01, George Levy wrote: I do not view these so called parallel universes as *separate*. It's really one single multiverse and the wave function exists in the multiverse How can this multiverse have a single wave function when it is supposed to have

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-04 Thread George Levy
Brent Meeker wrote: A transition from one conscious point (observer moment) to the next must be logical at the conscious level and simultaneously at the physical law level. I'm not sure what you mean by logical transition - entailed by the previous theorems plus rules of inference

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-03 Thread George Levy
Brent Meeker wrote: On 03-Mar-01, George Levy wrote: ... Here is a thought experiment to illustrate this point. Let us say that a ***very reliable*** machine is designed to instantly kill several scientists unless the natural laws are modified to a different configuration than the

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-03 Thread Saibal Mitra
Jürgen wrote: - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2001 5:32 PM Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures Saibal Mitra wrote: I think the source of the problem is equation 1 of Juergen's paper

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-03 Thread James Higgo
describable universes and measures Jacques Mallah wrote: Sorry, that doesn't help. What do you mean by a real actual one? What other kind is there, a fake one? Either it exists, or not. OK. In that sense we agree that the DU exist. I am glad to see that you are a classical platonist

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-02 Thread George Levy
Marchal wrote: The difference between the first person and the third person is basically the same as the difference between having an headache and having a friend having an headhache. True, but I believe of much greater importance for this discussion is the difference in the obervations

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-03-01 Thread Jacques Mallah
From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jacques Mallah wrote: I really don't know what you mean by concrete. Math is math, but is physic math? By a concrete UD I was meaning a real actual one, like the one I have implemented on a macintosh SE/30, and which has been running during two weeks in 1990 at

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-28 Thread Marchal
Russell Standish wrote: Marchal wrote: Hi Juergen, I would like to nuance my last Post I send to you. First I see in other posts, written by you, that your computable real numbers are *limit* computable. It still seems to me possible to diagonalize against that, although it is

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-28 Thread juergen
The best you can achieve is an algorithm that outputs at least the computable infinite reals in the sense that it outputs their finite descriptions or programs. I am not sure I understand you here. Are you aware that the set of descriptions of computable reals is not closed for the

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-27 Thread Marchal
Hi Juergen, I would like to nuance my last Post I send to you. First I see in other posts, written by you, that your computable real numbers are *limit* computable. It still seems to me possible to diagonalize against that, although it is probably less trivial. But I think it isn't really

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-27 Thread Marchal
Jacques Mallah wrote: Pourquoi hurluberlu? Expliquez-moi ce mot (en anglais), s'il vous plait. (Je ne parle pas francais!) I cannot explain what hurluberlu means, except that it means crackpot. Sort of total fantasy ... I really don't know what you mean by concrete. If you believe

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-26 Thread Jacques Mallah
From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jacques Mallah wrote: We discussed it; as I said then, it's wrong. You call it the crackpot proof :-) (hurluberlu in french) Pourquoi hurluberlu? Expliquez-moi ce mot (en anglais), s'il vous plait. (Je ne parle pas francais!) Sorry to break it

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-24 Thread Marchal
Juergen wrote: Bruno, I am usually skipping those of your paragraphs that contain sentences such as physics is a branch of machine's psychology because I have no idea what that is supposed to mean. It is something the reasoning itself should clarify (hopefully). The expression gives the idea

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-23 Thread juergen
[EMAIL PROTECTED] to [EMAIL PROTECTED] : Certainly things that we can imagine even slightly, like real-valued observers, already have a kind of existence, in that they cause us to argue about them. [EMAIL PROTECTED] to [EMAIL PROTECTED] : That's a bit like saying there is some truth to

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-22 Thread hpm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] to hpm [re. the existence of non-computable real-valued observers] That's a bit like saying there is some truth to 1+1=3 just because we can argue about it [EMAIL PROTECTED] to GLevy [Re. Dubito ergo cogito] Many things are doubtful. 2+2=4 isn't. There you go again.

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-22 Thread juergen
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sun Feb 18 01:16:16 2001 The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and constructive as it forces them to refine their positions. Where did I have to refine mine? JS That' right I guess. You didn't have to refine yours...I guess Dubito

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-22 Thread juergen
JS: Then there is your invariance lemma: the way you quantify 1-indeterminacy is independent of (3-)time, (3-)place, and (3-)real/virtual nature of the reconstitution. This does not make sense, because if the (3-) probability distribution on the possible futures and reconstitutions does depend

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-21 Thread Marchal
I hope this is our last *too long* post, Juergen. At the end of it, I propose we come back to the initial discussion, if you agree. Juergen wrote: Normally a constructive philosopher should abandon comp right here, because it follows from that theorem that we cannot be machine in any

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-20 Thread George Levy
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sun Feb 18 01:16:16 2001 The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and constructive as it forces them to refine their positions. Where did I have to refine mine? JS That' right I guess. You didn't have to refine

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-20 Thread George Levy
jamikes wrote: George, ... I have only some remarks: I I think (not a Cartesian wordageG) the first step would be: 0.1: Causality IS, then you may introduce your points. The whole point of starting with I is to avoid starting with a *bare* assumption such as the one you suggest

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-20 Thread Saibal Mitra
Jürgen wrote: ``Please read again. If "consciousness" is indeed a well-defined concept,and if there are any "conscious" computable observers, then they will becomputed. Otherwise they won't. In either case there is no need to defineconsciousness - I have not seen a convincing definition

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-20 Thread juergen
This time I'll repeat only a fraction of the 500 lines in your reply: From [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Suppose you survive only through a simulation of the big bang at the level of the quantum superstring, membrane, etc. then the correct level of substitution is the level of the quantum

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-19 Thread Marchal
Juergen Schmidhuber wrote: This time I'll annotate your entire message to demonstrate how many things I tend to find unclear in your texts. Thank you. (Hereafter TE means Thought Experiment) To derive consequences we need to know the assumptions. Of course, this holds for thought

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-18 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear George, If I might advance a minor change: Descartes' dictum should be: Cognito (I think), ergo eram (therefore I was). The observation of one's state of existence is always *after* the fact of the thought. This points to the possibility that the chaining implicit in conscious flow

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-18 Thread jamikes
describable universes and measures Dear George, If I might advance a minor change: Descartes' dictum should be: Cognito (I think), ergo eram (therefore I was). The observation of one's state of existence is always *after* the fact of the thought. This points to the possibility

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-17 Thread George Levy
The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and constructive as it forces them to refine their positions. However, while there is a need for some formalism, too much formalism gets in the way. As Einstein said, Imagination is more important than knowledge. Juergens'

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-16 Thread juergen
This time I'll annotate your entire message to demonstrate how many things I tend to find unclear in your texts. From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Juergen wrote (among things): But how to answer an ill-posed question? You promise that time and space will disappear at the end of the

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-15 Thread Marchal
Hereby, I comment posts by Brent Meeker, James Higgo, and George Levy. Brent Meeker wrote: In response to Bruno and Jesse, perhaps I should have used a different label in the first block of my diagram to make it correspond with past posting, as follows:

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-12 Thread juergen
Resent-Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2001 06:15:47 -0800 Subject: Re: on formally describable universes and measures From: Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] No, I do not. I suggest you first define a formal framework for measuring delays etc. Then we can continue. You should have told me

Re: on formally describable universes and measures (fwd)

2001-02-10 Thread Brent Meeker
On 09-Feb-01, Jesse Mazer wrote: So, if continuity of consciousness is real it is reasonable to expect that our theory of consciousness should allow for the possibility of splitting, and that from a first-person point of view, I-before-the-split would have an X% chance of becoming one copy

Re: on formally describable universes and measures (fwd)

2001-02-10 Thread Jesse Mazer
Brent Meeker wrote: So, if continuity of consciousness is real it is reasonable to expect that our theory of consciousness should allow for the possibility of splitting, and that from a first-person point of view, I-before-the-split would have an X% chance of becoming one copy and a Y%

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-09 Thread Jesse Mazer
Marchal wrote: What does your theory predict with respect to the following experience: You are scanned read and annihilate at Amsterdam. I reconstitute you in Washington tomorrow, and at Moscow in one billion years. Are your expectations different from the situation where the two

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-09 Thread Marchal
Asking Juergen if the first person should take delays of reconstitution into account when evaluating first person self-undeterminacy, he wrote: No, I do not. I suggest you first define a formal framework for measuring delays etc. Then we can continue. You should have told me this at the

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-09 Thread juergen
From Russell Standish Thu Feb 8 23:52:51 2001 Guys, I'm getting great enjoyment out of the titanic battle between Juergen and Bruno over the meaning of the UD. I'm learning a lot from Battle? The case is clear. You cannot battle over whether 2+2 equals 4 or 5. the exchange, however,

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-09 Thread Russell Standish
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have sympathy for one point of Juergen's though - in the space of descriptions (which we should agree by extension of logical positivism is all that can be discussed), computable descriptions must have higher measure than noncomputable ones. However, it seems

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-09 Thread Marchal
Hi Juergen, With (classical) comp it exists a level such that we survive a Washington-Moscou self-duplication where the reconstitution are made at that level (WM). (Later I will prove that no machine can ever know its correct levels of substitution, but still a machine could guess one

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-08 Thread Russell Standish
George Levy wrote: --97E70CB715203FAEFF2A2345 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I said: First person observation of consciousness is the self observing the self, or possibly part of the self observing other parts of the self.

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-08 Thread Russell Standish
Guys, I'm getting great enjoyment out of the titanic battle between Juergen and Bruno over the meaning of the UD. I'm learning a lot from the exchange, however, I must admit I do see Bruno's point of view. His UD does seem to generate the reals (or equivalently the set of all infinite

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-03 Thread George Levy
Thanks to Bruno, I am experiencing a kind of nomenclatorial fusion with Gilles Henri. I have become Gille Levy. I wonder who George Henri is. :-) George Levy Marchal wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: Are you saying that you support the 2/3 view, meaning that the probability of my next moment

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-02-03 Thread Marchal
Jesse Mazer wrote: Are you saying that you support the 2/3 view, meaning that the probability of my next moment depends on a kind of integral over all possible future histories? Yes. I am less sure than Gille Levy for the precise computation of the probability, but I am sure (with the comp

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-30 Thread Marchal
George Levy wrote (in the everything list): Excellent, Bruno. Thank you for the explanation of computational indeterminacy for the first person point of view. Thanks. Most of the disagreement here originates from the failure of some participants to appreciate the distinction bewteen first

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-30 Thread Marchal
Juergen wrote: Your vague answers to questions I did not ask keep evading the issue of continuum vs computability in the limit. I give up. JS Let us try to be very precise, then. I propose you the iterated self-duplication experience. Assuming computationalism, we survive. (I

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-30 Thread juergen
Your vague answers to questions I did not ask keep evading the issue of continuum vs computability in the limit. I give up. JS

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-21 Thread Marchal
Saibal wrote: Bruno wrote: ''The probabilities are defined on infinite (continuous) set of infinite histories.'' Isn't this in conflict with measure theory, because one would expect that some sets would be non-measurable? No problem a priori, because the whole set can have some measure

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-19 Thread juergen
On Thu Jan 18 Bruno Marchal replied: Pi is enumerable. Most reals are not. Most of the dummy data is much less likely than extraordinary data (such as Pi), if the dummy data probability is approximable by a computer. Compare Algorithmic Theories of Everything:

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-18 Thread Marchal
Juergen wrote: [...] Pi is enumerable. Most reals are not. Most of the dummy data is much less likely than extraordinary data (such as Pi), if the dummy data probability is approximable by a computer. Compare Algorithmic Theories of Everything: http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/toesv2/node23.html

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-08 Thread juergen
From: George Levy, Wed, 3 Jan 2001 13:16:37 Talking about optimizing the universal Turing machine is completely ridiculous and pointless. It could be blindingly fast or slow as molasses. The point of optimizing it is precisely to build the theoretically fastest computer C. The results in

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2001-01-03 Thread George Levy
On Thu Dec 28 05:19:13 2000 Wei Dai wrote: Even within classic models of computation, there seem to be significant variations in speed. As far as I can tell from my theory of computation book, moving from a multi-tape TM to a single-tape TM can cause a squaring of running time for some problems,

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2000-12-27 Thread Wei Dai
On Wed, Dec 27, 2000 at 04:50:42PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: None of the quantum effects we observe forces us to give up the simple idea that our universe can be simulated on a classic TM, just like there is no evidence that forces us to assume the existence of complex and incomputable

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2000-12-21 Thread Wei Dai
On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 04:32:47PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's all in Section 6. Please read 6.1 to get the basic idea, read 6.2 to understand why Levin Search and FAST are optimal. FAST computes the n-th bit of each universe x as quickly as the fastest algorithm for x (save for a

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2000-12-17 Thread Wei Dai
I just got around to reading Schmidhuber's new paper, and noticed there is something strange about the Speed Prior S. With all of the candidate priors we have seen so far, the probability of a random (incompressible) string of length n is about 2^-n. But with the Speed Prior S, the probability is