Re: subjective reality

2005-09-05 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Norman,

I agree that you can assume that one multiverse exists and that that implies
that everything describable exists. But If physical existence is not the
same as mathematical existence then there is nothing we can do to verify
this. So, this like postulating that a powerless God exists.

Saibal



- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 09:33 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


 Hi Saibal,
 While my simple mind believes that mathematical existence = physical
 existence, I do not assume that we owe our existence to the mere
existence
 of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it.
 To me, the reason that mathematical existence means physical existence
 is that in infinite space and time, everything that can exist must
exist.
 If it's describable mathematically, then it can exist, somewhere in the
 multiverse - therefore it must exist.  Tegmark claims, for example, that
 in his Level I multiverse, there is an identical copy of (me) about
 10^10^29 meters away.   (arXiv:astro-ph/0302131 v1  7 Feb 2003)

 Norman
 ~~

 - Original Message - 
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 7:10 AM
 Subject: Re: subjective reality


 Hi Godfrey,

 It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality
etc.
 here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it
 all all boils down to this:

 Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would
generate
 an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be
similar
 to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and
 GR).

 The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the
 transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state
to
 the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be
the
 case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when
 interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would
 violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because
 the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you
 believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you
assume
 that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a
 machine that executes it.


 Saibal


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Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
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Re: subjective reality

2005-09-03 Thread Norman Samish
Hi Saibal,
While my simple mind believes that mathematical existence = physical 
existence, I do not assume that we owe our existence to the mere existence 
of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it.
To me, the reason that mathematical existence means physical existence 
is that in infinite space and time, everything that can exist must exist. 
If it's describable mathematically, then it can exist, somewhere in the 
multiverse - therefore it must exist.  Tegmark claims, for example, that 
in his Level I multiverse, there is an identical copy of (me) about 
10^10^29 meters away.   (arXiv:astro-ph/0302131 v1  7 Feb 2003)

Norman
~~

- Original Message - 
From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 7:10 AM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


Hi Godfrey,

It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality etc.
here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it
all all boils down to this:

Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would generate
an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be similar
to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and
GR).

The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the
transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state to
the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be the
case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when
interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would
violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because
the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you
believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you assume
that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a
machine that executes it.


Saibal 



Re: subjective reality

2005-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has  
not been solved.



Not meet them so much in my experience. Positive Religious (like  
Muslim, Catholic, ...) have build-in solution. It is most of the time  
tabu to question them. Negative Religious (like Atheist) have build- 
in solution, but are generally not aware of the religiosity of their  
solutions. Only (serious) philosopher of mind/cognitive scientists  
are aware of the problem.





They would probably would also agree
 that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over  
the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind
 stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body- 
stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you  
try to figure
 out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your  
attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right?



Well OK. I guess you make the difference between solipsism and  
idealism which can be realist or platonist. The mind stuff is just  
numbers and their dreams ...





You do however
 invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of  
YD and than you turn the tables on it, so to speak, no?


YD has nothing with classical physicalism, unless you assume  
physicalism at the start. YD does not assume a universe physically  
exist, only that I exists and that I am supported by a relatively  
stable (sheaf) of computations. Actually the use of the YD in the UD  
reasoning is accompanied by an explicit postulation of a physical  
universe for making the reasoning easier, but that hypothesis is  
explicitly eliminated toward the end of the reasoning.






 I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain  
(a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable)



I really don't understand. To make YD false you must associate  
yourself to something non-turing emulable. Nobody has ever found a  
non, turing emulable process. Recall that quantum-like indeterminacy  
can be retrieved in the self-discourse of self-duplicating machine.  
Also, with some notable exception like Penrose, everybody accept YD.  
I teach about it since more than 30 years, and only strict dualists  
(with assumes explicit substancial soul) criticize it. I told you  
that those who get my point (of the UD Argument) and still soes not  
accept the conclusion prefer to abandon Arithmetical Realism. It is  
an empirical discovery in the sense that (I think we agree here), it  
is almost nonsense for me to abandon arithmetical realism.






to so
 if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all?



This is the eleventh time you confuse p - q with q - p. Unless  
(here) you mean by demolish YD, the non use of YD in the  
translation of UDA in arithmetic.





Why not proceed to that interview directly?


You can.  But this is like going from physics to the study of  
differential equation. Here it would consist to go from cognitive  
science to pure mathematics. Actually if you justify that probability  
*must* obey to the Bp - Dp rule (probability one of p entails the  
probability of ~p is not one), then OK, you can extract the comp- 
physics from math alone. But how will you explain the Bp - Dp rule  
in that context? Why suppress a motivation which also makes the link  
with theology: the fact that the comp-doctor cannot pretend that  
science has show that you can survive with an artificial brain (in  
case comp is true).




Can that be done and leave your argument intact? That would make it  
a lot more interesting in my opinion...



You are in minority here, but this is just because most people agree  
with YD (or at least it makes sense as an hypothesis in the cognitive  
science).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





Re: subjective reality

2005-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Brent MeekerWhy do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? Hi Brent,   At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno thinks so!  Just to be clear: comp gives the comp-correct physics, and from what can be qualitatively and/or quantitatively already be derived, YD is inconsistent with SWE + collapse. I guess you mean QM = Copenhagen QM. As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, meaning one scenario in which all your experience (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital computer.But YD entails much stronger form of non-locality! As, a priori, YD entails very strong form of non-locality. Proof: see the UDA in my URL. Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the reason I have not given myself the trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident that this can be done with a bit of patienceand the help of the many wonders of quantum states.No. If comp contradicts physics, it will be so by comp being much more non-local and much more non-deterministic (from the observers viewpoints). The mystery is that with comp physics could appears so much computational. Remember that if comp is true, whatever the physical universe appears to be it cannot be the output of a computation, nor can it be the result of a turing emulation other than a UD. Only the taking into account of incompleteness show that comp cannot be obviously false, as it could seem to be when you understand the hugeness of indeterminacy and non-locality it implies.remember also that comp (and thus YD ) is not incompatible with my brain being a quantum computer. Reason: quantum computer are classically emulable.You should read the proof, I think you have not yet grasped the enunciation of the result. It is all normal given the novelty. What seems to me to be less normal is that you don't want to read it and still want to say something.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:11, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are "conditions of observability" defined by CT? This is obviously  technical, but in a nutshell (see more in the papers):By the UD Argument (UDA, Universal Dovetailer Argument), we know, assuming comp, that all atomic or primitive observer moment corresponds to the states accessible by the Universal Dovetailer (CT is used here). This can be shown (with CT) equivalent to the set of true *Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences* (i.e those provably equivalent, by the lobian machines, to sentences having the shape EnP(n) with P decidable. For a lobian machine, the provability with such atomic sentences is given(*) by the theory G + (p - Bp). Now, a propositional event will correspond to a proposition A true in all accessible observer-moments (accessible through consistent extensions, not through the UD!).  And this in the case at least one such accessible observer-moments exists (the non cul-de-sac assumption). Modally (or arithmetically the B and D are the arithmetical provability and consistency predicates), this gives BA  DA. This gives the "conditions of observability" (as illustrated by UDA), and this gives rise to one of the 3 arithmetical quantum logic. The move from Bp to Bp  Dp is the second Theaetetical move. Dp is ~B~p. Read D Diamond, and B Box;  or B=Provable and D=Consistent, in this setting (the interview of the universal lobian machine). Part of this has been motivated informally in the discussion between Lee and Stathis (around the "death thread"). Apology for this more "advanced post" which needs more technical knowledge in logic and computer science.Bruno(*) EnP(n) = it exists a natural number n such that P(n) is true. If p = EnP(n), explain why p - Bp is true for lobian, or any sufficiently rich theorem prover machine. This should be intuitively easy (try!). Much more difficult: show that not only p - Bp will be true, but it will also be *provable* by the lobian machine. The first exercise is very easy, the second one is very difficult (and I suggest the reading of Hilbert Bernays Grundlagen, or Boolos 1993, or Smorinsky 1985 for detailled explanations).PS:  I must go now, I have students passing exams. I intent to comment Russell's post hopefully tomorrow or during the week-end.  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-09-01 Thread kurtleegod


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 14:47:17 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality


On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Brent MeekerWhy do you think YD is inconsistent with QM?


[GK]
Hi Brent,


 At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno 
thinks so!



[BM]
 Just to be clear: comp gives the comp-correct physics, and from what 
can be qualitatively and/or quantitatively already be derived, YD is 
inconsistent with SWE + collapse. I guess you mean QM = Copenhagen QM.


[GK]
 As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a 
situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum
 mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, 
meaning one scenario in which all your experience
 (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your 
life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital

computer.


[BM]
 But YD entails much stronger form of non-locality! As, a priori, YD 
entails very strong form of non-locality. Proof: see the UDA in my URL.


[GK]
 What are you talking about!? Much stronger form of non-locality? By 
what measure? If that was the case than YD would

be false by an even bigger measure!!!


  Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the 
reason I have not given myself the
  trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident 
that this can be done with a bit of patience

and the help of the many wonders of quantum states.


[BM]
 No. If comp contradicts physics, it will be so by comp being much more 
non-local and much more non-deterministic (from the observers 
viewpoints). The mystery is that with comp physics could appears so 
much computational.


 Remember that if comp is true, whatever the physical universe appears 
to be it cannot be the output of a computation, nor can it be the 
result of a turing emulation other than a UD. Only the taking into 
account of incompleteness show that comp cannot be obviously false, as 
it could seem to be when you understand the hugeness of indeterminacy 
and non-locality it implies.


[GK]
 But isn't your UD a turing emulation? Any hugeness of indeterminancy 
and non-locality would only show that it is
 obviously false! Only the exact amount of indeterminancy and 
non-locality would sugget that it may not be obviously wrong.
 Non-locality is a non-additive property, not a big pot from which you 
just take what you need!!!


[BM]
 remember also that comp (and thus YD ) is not incompatible with my 
brain being a quantum computer. Reason: quantum computer are 
classically emulable.


[GK]
 But that does not much help you either if your brain produces 
correlations that are other than EPR! Than it is NOT a

quantum computer either!!!

[BM]
 You should read the proof, I think you have not yet grasped the 
enunciation of the result. It is all normal given the novelty. What 
seems to me to be less normal is that you don't want to read it and 
still want to say something.



Bruno

[GK]
 I guess you are right. I think I am more confused about what you are 
saying than when we started this exchange.


Godfrey









Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and 
industry-leading spam and email virus protection.




Re: subjective reality

2005-09-01 Thread John M
Good argumentation, Russell, however...:

 Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
SNIP SNIP SNIP...

...From my point of view, it appears to be necessary
 to get the laws of physics as we known them. If there
were people  around with a different sort of mind, do
they see a different sort of  physics? 
Lots of questions. ...

What 'sort of mind'? instead of 'what this sort'? 
Our ideational development parallelled the notions we
formulated into our views about the world, including
the model of a physical world, with all its habitual
observations (laws), using something we nonchanatly
call mind. A different route would have (maybe) seen
different factors for the evolution (=total history)
of our universe and build a different model for the
physical world. We are the 3D-Abbott people. We
condone 2 poles in our physics: + and -, not more and
have problems what to do with the 4th dimension (time)
if we think reasonably. 

If one accepts my take on 'consciousness' as the
acknowledgement of and response to information (not in
the Shannonic sense), which is expandable to
everything in the world (ideation etc.) 'we' - or
whatever takes a 'thinking' role in a universe - would
(maybe) recognize other factors and the 'model' for
understanding the observations would be different. If
such different mindset (?) would have invented colors
and shade-compositions instead of numbers?

Is it possible at all to free ourselves from the
dungeon we incarcerated ourselves with our models? 
What may the 'mind' come up with, if it were free? 
New Nobel prizes? I doubt. The committee is enslaved.

Please, take a deep breath and do not be angry at me!

John Mikes





RE: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Quentin writes

 I think I've waited long enough... Kurt, you are just a guy who like read 
 himself  You'll never make your point, because you don't have one... you 
 just like insulting other people and show your big neck...
 
 By now, your messages goes directly to the trash bin... Ciao and good 
 continuation in your research to know if really you're the best...

grin What took you so long?  We have here the first instance I've seen
of entities I've only heard of: trolls. http://kb.iu.edu/data/afhc.html

I have not read any of his posts for a long time now, nor do I bother
reading the replies he's able to provoke people into making.

Now of course, human behavior is almost infinitely complicated, and
so I hesitate to embrace any concrete categorizations, but in a personal
exchange with him---when I vaguely described what trolls were and my
suspicions that he was one---he basically just said that he enjoyed
laughing at me. (It's really not worth further effort to figure out
if that was some kind of joke.)

Thanks for taking the time, Quentin.

Lee



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK]  Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there is a sense in which all theories are speculative but  some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense  in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though  people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either  an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another  item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for  which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!! My view, as addressed to physicist, is the following. I make it simpler for reason of clarity.Copenhagen QM: SWE Unintelligible dualist theory of measurement/observationEverett QM: SWE comp theory of observation/cognitionYour servitor: comp.The collapse is a speculation on a theory which does not exist, and which has been invented to make the (isolated, microscopic)  superposition non contagious on the environment. So if you want make the distinction between speculation and hypothesis, I would say the "collapse" is far more speculative.The problem of comp is that machine cannot know if they are supported by any computations and it is up to Everett Deutsch etc. to explain why the quantum computations wins the "observability conditions" on the (well defined by Church  Thesis) collection of all computations. This is not obvious at all and constitutes the first main result I got.For comp "philosophers of mind" (Alias theoretical cognitive scientists), the two main result I got can be seen as a "correction" of the "old" Lucas Penrose argument which try to refute comp by Godel's incompleteness.From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either 1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical theory with testable empirical predictions that falsify those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation of YD. I would very much like to see thattheory if you have it!On my web page you can find all the needed programs to run a theorem prover of that physics. With some time and training you could perhaps optimize it and ... refute or confirm comp (admitting quantum logic operates on nature).From what has been already derived, some non trivial quantum logical features did appeared. 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is empirically implementable This is nonsense. Better: with comp it is provably nonsense. (G G* confusion, for those who knows). It is a key point: if comp is true YD will never be proved to be implementable. (It is of the type Dt, or equivalently ~B~t, its truth makes it unprovable).and that would only require that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest yours?) by a digital computer version of the same.That is the act of faith needed for the comp practitionners. Recall that for many people such a question will be a weaker one at first, like should I accept an artificial hyppocampus instead of dying now. Well the real question will be: should I choose a mac, a pc, or what? The fact is that comp can justify by itself why it is a act of faith, and I am not sure it is entirely "comp-polite" to suggest such an operation to anyone but oneself. (Of course you can always claim that it has already occurred, as you sometimes suggest and that is cute but just plain silly,too. )I claim this in the context of comp + OCCAM. Amoeba's self-duplication, and even the high sexual reproduction of mammals involved rather clearly digital information processing.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following suggestive question: "Could your argument be made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing Test type argument, which would not require you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing simulation?". Just a thought... Perhaps I should give you my original motivation. My deeper goal has always been to just explain that the "mind-body" problem has not been solved. In term of the mind body problem, what I have done can be seen as "just" a reduction of a problem into another. With the comp hyp,  I have reduced the mind-body problem to the problem of explaining the appearance of the physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. For this YD is needed, if only to make palpable the relation with cognitive science.Then I interview the machine and YD is eliminated, although we should need to dig a little more in the technics for adding some nuances.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Russell

Thanks for your lucid comments. Maybe you are a better advocate
of Bruno's than Bruno himself...


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 09:30:07 +1000
Subject: Re: subjective reality




 [GK]
 Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's:
 
 On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  [GK]
 
  I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM
 which
 
  I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus
 Collapse, by the way.
 
   But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both 
that

 does it
 
  (and entanglement, of course!)



 [BM]
 This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus
 YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.

[RS]
All I see him saying here is that YD is incompatible with wavefunction
collapse, and also with the Bohm interpretation. His UDA does point to
the necessity of a Everett style Multiverse, which does not have
collapse nor a Bohmian-style preferred branch.

[GK]
 That would be fine if it was really what he is saying! But he insists 
that
 it is not out of the question that he can derive collapse from the 
same

premises. My point is that you can't have it both ways.


 [GK]
  I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that 
way

 and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day
 and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims
 before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these
 theories are just poorly put together.


[RS]
That is indeed true. It is cheaper to look for inconsistencies in a
theory that to perform experiments. Also, unbelievable founding
propositions should be eliminated wherever possible.

However, the claim (ontological reversal) I take as a sort of
metaphysical principle, ultimately unprovable, but a guide as to how
one thinks about the world. It has the same status as a belief in a
concrete reality, or in Occam's razor. Its utility must be in its
ability to form new scientific theories, rather than in its ability to
predict fact. In my book, I point to a number of specific theoretical
ideas in the theory of consciousness that are implied by ontological
reversal that are currently controversial in cognitive science. The
relationship between self-awareness and consciousness being one of
them. If these specific ideas prove to be of little worth as our
understanding of consciousness improves, then ontological reversal
will either be dropped as being of little value, or else appropriately
morphed to yield better theories.

[GK]
What you are here circumscribing with your careful prose is exactly the
 domain of philosophical speculation --- for which I have much regard 
but

try not to confuse with that of scientific prediction. One of the most
intriguing novelties which quantum mechanics has made possible is
the settling of some specific items of speculation by empirical means,
and the creation of what some people call experimental metaphysics.
That was the case of the Bell-EPR experiments which showed that a
good number of speculative departures from QM (local hidden-variable
theories) are largely inviable. Clearly we do not know what the limits
are to this type of approach but the parts of it that we already have
settled should definitely bind our future speculation.

I have not had a chance to check your book but, from the posts about
it, I confess I am much intrigued about it. When I manage to go thru it
I will try and give you some feed back along the same lines as I have
done with Bruno.

[RS]
The assumptions of COMP are actually widely supposed to be true, hence
the importance of Bruno's work. He demonstrates that under COMP,
ontological reversal is necessary, and a belief in concrete reality
false.

Curiously, I am in a position where I don't believe COMP to be
strictly true, but is perhaps an approximation of reality. I would be
intrigued in generalization of the COMP argument. However, I find
that the ontological reversal (or perhaps even ontological cycle
with the AP) is metaphysically less extravagant than belief on
concrete reality. Furthermore, the approach really does deliver most
of physics as we know it today, as I argue in my book. I am sceptical
that Bruno's approach of reducing knowledge to various modal logic
structures will deliver much of substance, but at very least I can
appreciate that it is a test of the theory.

[GK]
Now I am confused! So you do not believe Bruno's COMP=YD+CT+AP
but you still believe it is a good enough approximation of reality to
deliver most of physics as we know it today. Are you saying that,
without assuming COMP you derive all of that physics? I guess I
will have to read your book but a Yes/No answer would help me
decide whether I want to read it at all...

I would

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread kurtleegod


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 15:47:38 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality


On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

[GK]
 Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following 
suggestive question: Could your argument be
  made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing 
Test type argument, which would not require
  you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing 
simulation?. Just a thought...




[BM]
 Perhaps I should give you my original motivation. My deeper goal has 
always been to just explain that the mind-body problem has not been 
solved. In term of the mind body problem, what I have done can be seen 
as just a reduction of a problem into another. With the comp hyp, I 
have reduced the mind-body problem to the problem of explaining the 
appearance of the physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. For 
this YD is needed, if only to make palpable the relation with cognitive 
science.
 Then I interview the machine and YD is eliminated, although we should 
need to dig a little more in the technics for adding some nuances.


[GK]
 That actually makes a bit more sense to me (surely more than your 
other response!)


 I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has not 
been solved. They would probably would also agree
 that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over the 
centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind
 stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body-stuff=matter) 
and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you try to figure
 out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your 
attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right? You do however
 invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of YD 
and than you turn the tables on it, so to speak, no?


 I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain (a 
real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable) to so
 if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all? Why not 
proceed to that interview directly? Can that be done and leave your 
argument intact? That would make it a lot more interesting in my 
opinion...


Godfrey




Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/








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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread John M
Hi, Bruno,

Thanks for your considerate reply and for whatever you
expressed your consent to. I try to address the rest:

--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 You are using human natural science and human
 science (history) to  
 relativize religion.
 And then you are doing the same to relativize an,
 admittedly  
 widespread, religious belief in science (say).
 Religious with quote is always put for some
 pejorative view of  
 religion, that is a view with authoritative
 arguments.
 
 Somehow let me say that I agree 
 99,...%. But it remains a stubbornly
 infinitesimal point of disagreement (even if I  
 totally follow your critical conclusions on the
 religious science).
 
 To make clearer my critic, I will relate it with
 both Descartes  
 systematic doubting procedure (which I would argue
 is at the origin  
 of modern theoretical sciences), and the Buddhist
 notion of *the  
 center of the wheel which provides a good image.

JM:
I always had doubts about that 'center of the wheel'
idea: it MOVES with the wheel, whether we see it or
not.
 BM:
 Of course I don't know what is a human being. 
JM:
I am just working on how to view it (us?) - not as the
'model' (remember my term) but as a non-entity within
the totality, interconnected with 'them all' but in
various efficiency (strength? depth? closeness?) which
must be a natural(?) distinction in our 'modeling'. 
It may lead to a tie between wholistic and
reductionist
views beyond our choice and taste. 
I am tempted to apply (my so far denied) 'attractor'
concept used lately on the list by Ben Goertzel's
blog.
BM:
 But, as you know, for reason of clarity and modesty,
  I have *choosen* a theory, and I have  
 even choose a theory sufficiently precise so that we
 can derive precise conclusions.  All what I say must
 be remembered as having been  
 casted in the frame of that theory.
(JM:
Precision exactly pertinent to the model ways by
cutting out the uncomputable 'rest of the world')
 
BM:
 
 Now, with comp, there is a little problem in your
 strategy. If human  
 are machines, by using human sciences to relativize
 human science,  
 you will applied a computable transformation on the
 space of the  
 computable transformations, and it can be shown that
 you will get a  
 fixed point. It is like making rotating a wheel: all
 its points- 
 propositions will move (put in doubt) and be
 relativized except one:  
 the center of the wheel.

 
 What is the fixed point? in a nutshell it is science
 itself, but  
 where science is understood as an ideal of
 communication conditionned  
 by hypothetical statements (some scientists forget
 this; most forget  
 this when talking on colleagues' fields).
JM:
see my remark above. The fixed point is moving around
and can be regarded fixed only in a model-view of
itself - the reductionist science I mean. I see no
real disagreement, I just continue into a wholistic
image.
  JM earlier:
  I differentiate also the simulation model, as
 the
  mathematical or physical simulation of a thing to
  make it 'understandable(?)
  There is nothing wrong with model-thinking, it
 helped
  us to all we know of the world and to our
 technology.
  Not to 'understanding' the connections.
 BM: 
 Why? There is only a (necessary) problem with
 understanding  'understanding'
JM: a loaded word!
  Wriong it is,
  if we draw 'universal' conclusions from
 considerations
  upon a model - and regard it universally valid.
 
 BM: 
 I have no models in that sense. The theory which is
 isolated from the  
 machine's interview is embeddable in number theory.
 
  As in the ['topically reduced' models called the]
  sciences (including I think logics, which is cut
  to the thinking habits of the HUMAN brain (mind).
My Mail does not take a longer post and 'lost' the
rest of your writing, sorry
John M



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread kurtleegod



Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 13:08:16 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality


On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

[GK]

 Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there 
is a sense in which all theories are speculative but


 some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic 
evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense


 in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for 
example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though


 people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious 
intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either


 an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) 
depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another


 item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a 
theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for


 which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are 
proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!!







 My view, as addressed to physicist, is the following. I make it 
simpler for reason of clarity.



Copenhagen QM:
SWE
Unintelligible dualist theory of measurement/observation


Everett QM:
SWE
comp theory of observation/cognition


Your servitor:
comp.


 The collapse is a speculation on a theory which does not exist, and 
which has been invented to make the (isolated, microscopic) 
superposition non contagious on the environment. So if you want make 
the distinction between speculation and hypothesis, I would say the 
collapse is far more speculative.


[GK]
 You are probably right about this but I would say it differently: 
there is no Quantum Theory of collapse though something
 quite like that needs to occur to produce the classical world we know. 
Anything beyond this is... speculation either way! It
 is incorrect to say that EQM explains collapse because in EQM there 
is no collapse. It is also incorrect to say that EQM
 includes COMP for the reasons I already stated to you out of 
Preskill's lectures.


[BM]
 The problem of comp is that machine cannot know if they are supported 
by any computations and it is up to Everett Deutsch etc. to explain why 
the quantum computations wins the observability conditions on the 
(well defined by Church Thesis) collection of all computations. This is 
not obvious at all and constitutes the first main result I got.


[GK]
 This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are conditions of 
observability defined by CT?


[BM]
 For comp philosophers of mind (Alias theoretical cognitive 
scientists), the two main result I got can be seen as a correction of 
the old Lucas Penrose argument which try to refute comp by Godel's 
incompleteness.


[GK]
 If I remember it right this is an argument that aims to show why a 
mathematician cannot be a digital computer. Does your
 correction make it a better argument? I take it you are saying that it 
is correct after all!


[GK]
From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either


  1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical 
theory with testable empirical predictions that falsify
 those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation 
of YD. I would very much like to see that

theory if you have it!


[BM]
 On my web page you can find all the needed programs to run a theorem 
prover of that physics. With some time and training you could perhaps 
optimize it and ... refute or confirm comp (admitting quantum logic 
operates on nature).
 From what has been already derived, some non trivial quantum logical 
features did appeared.


[GK]
 I take it that this means you are trying out the route I labelled (1) 
or that you think that is the way to go. I am not sure
 that quantum logic operates on nature because there isn't one but 
many quantum logics and I am not acquainted
 with one that reproduces the quantum formalism with all its quirks. 
But what you say above already denotes the use

of some non-boolean logic from where I sit.


 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is 
empirically implementable


[BM]
 This is nonsense. Better: with comp it is provably nonsense. (G G* 
confusion, for those who knows). It is a key point: if comp is true YD 
will never be proved to be implementable. (It is of the type Dt, or 
equivalently ~B~t, its truth makes it unprovable).


[GK]
So it is (1), I guess!


[GK]
and that would only require
  that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest 
yours?) by a digital computer version of the same.



[BM]
 That is the act of faith needed for the comp practitionners. Recall 
that for many people such a question will be a weaker one at first, 
like should I accept an artificial hyppocampus instead of dying now. 
Well the real question will be: should I choose a mac, a pc, or what

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread kurtleegod


-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 18:12:43 -0700
Subject: Re: subjective reality

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  -Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200
 Subject: Re: subjective reality
   On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I 
have  concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two
  of your premises (CT  AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, 
though  they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic
  evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely 

speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that
  one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a 

digital computer without prejudice to that experience.
  Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to 

your derivation of the *whole of physics* you
  cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also 
aware  of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis,
  in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish 
such  replacement (which I assume might involve some

 physical interventions).

 YD is certainly speculative, but there is considerable evidence that 
human experience is an epiphenomena of brain activity - from which is 
follows that YD is possible. So far as I know there is nothing in QM 
that contradicts it. In fact Tegmark and others have shown that the 
operation of the human brain must be almost completely classical. So 
for YD to be inconsistent with physics it would have to inconsistent 
with classical physics.


Why do you think YD is inconsistent with QM?

Brent Meeker


Hi Brent,

 At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno 
thinks so! But you deserve a better answer. I don't
 quite think your statements above are quite accurate and one does not 
surely follow from the other. Human experience
 is surely NOT an epiphenomenon of brain activity though SOME of it 
very likely is. To me, at least human experience includes things like: 
we are born, we eat, we grow, we play, we work, we meet other people, 
we learn to dance, we drive cars, we get into accidents, we get sick, 
we go to war, we run into bullets, we get old, we forget, we die. It 
also includes things like, we
 are happy, we are sad, we pain, we dream, we crave, we wonder, we 
prove theorems. See what I mean? Are all these
 epiphenomena of barin activity? I don't think you can say that about 
the first set though I am sure you have experienced
 some of what I describe. About the second set you may be more 
convinced but I am sure you have heard the word
 intensionality associated to at least some of those. It reminds us 
that some of our so called mental states (brain configurations if you 
prefer have a certain directionality to them usually pointing to 
events that we take to be
 consensually external to us. So maybe you want to widen a bit your 
concept of 'human experience above.


 As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a 
situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum
 mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, 
meaning one scenario in which all your experience
 (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your 
life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital
 computer. Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that 
is the reason I have not given myself the
 trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident 
that this can be done with a bit of patience

and the help of the many wonders of quantum states.

 As far as I can tell you are correct in that Classical Mechanics does 
not, a priori, forbid such operation if the brain
 is indeed a fully classical functional system and Tegmark's argument 
has obvious merit. On the other hand there may
 be other technical impediments to this avatar that we don't know 
about since we do not really know much
 about brain function and surely about how it really pins down human 
experience (in the narrow or wide sense).



Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)


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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Hal,

Thanks for your clarifying comment. Yes I think
that is the basis of my objection to Bruno and I
am glad someone has gotten it!


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 14:20:00 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Re: subjective reality

 I wade into this dispute with trepidation, because I think it is for
the most part incomprehensible.  But I believe I see one place where
there was a miscommunication and I hope to clear it up.

Godfrey Kurtz wrote, to Bruno Marchal:


You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I
don't really have to study your argument because
it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are
incompatible with the conclusions you claim.


What is this incompatibility?  I believe he means it to be the 
following.

Bruno had written:


This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus
YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.


And yet, Bruno claims that his methods will lead to a derivation of
physics, which as far as we know includes QM.  Godfrey sees the previous
quote from Bruno as indicating that his Yes Doctor starting point is
*incompatible* with QM.  This is the contradiction that he sees.

I'll stop here and invite Godfrey to comment on whether this is the
admission of incompatibility between premises and conclusions that he
was referring to above.

Hal Finney




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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK]  You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I don't really have to study your argument because  it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are incompatible with the conclusions you claim.  Please explain what you mean. I have never say I got conclusions incompatible with the premises. I would have concluded the negation of comp. I am open that such event could occur of course, and that is why I say my derivation shows that comp is testable. I try hard to understand what you miss in my posts (not my work!). We are not yet at the point of agreeing about what we are not agreeing upon.To be clear my derivation does not involve an atom of speculation. Perhaps you could tell me what is the object of my speculation, but I'm afraid you are only confusing hypothetico-deductive reasoning and speculation (in which case all theories are speculative: in that large sense I agree.Brunohttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-30 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Russell,

Still have not had a chance to look up your book
but hope to do so shortly.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 10:44:00 +1000
Subject: Re: subjective reality

On Mon, Aug 29, 2005 at 12:41:23PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 [GK]
  You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And 
I

 don't really have to study your argument because
 it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are
 incompatible with the conclusions you claim.

[RS]
I've never seen Bruno admit that! I've only seen you claim that,
without proof.


[GK]
Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's:

On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 [GK]

  I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM 
which


  I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus 
Collapse, by the way.


  But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that 
does it


 (and entanglement, of course!)



[BM]
 This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus 
YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.



[GK]
 Since QM is generally believed to be a part of physics and Bruno 
claims to derive the whole of it from YD

it seems that my statement is accurate.

 Now if his claim was that what he derives is not QM but QM without 
collapse that would be different
 but he seems to claim instead (Bruno, correct me if I am wrong) that 
QM without collapse or at least the
 Everett version of it was introduced to accommodate YD! This I find 
quite bizarre both as an
 historical claim or as something that would help his program since, 
if that were true, he would not

have derived anything new!


 [GK]
 To claim that a TOE is physically complete you have to know ALL of
 Physics which is more than anyone in this world claims
 to know, least of all, me! So who am I to disagree? (;-)

[RS]
It is a claim, not a proof. Such a claim is readily falsifiable, by
means of counterexamples when such are discovered.

[GK]
I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that way
and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day
and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims
before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these
theories are just poorly put together.

I think there may be something of merit and interest in what Bruno is
trying out (though my doubts are growing) and that is why I am engaging
him. There are many ways of being wrong and some are more interesting
than others.

[GK]

 Now it appears to me that you are trying, at all costs (including
 logic), to save the remnants of the strong-AI thesis in some
 religious cultist form (The Grand Programmer-vision), thus your
 constant references to faith and theology. This, incidentally
  may be a better bet than actually doing science since there is 
better
  funding in the intelligent design camp these days, so maybe I 
wished

 you more luck than you need...

 Best regards,

 Godfrey

[RS]
Schmidhuber does the Great Programmer thing, not Marchal. And I
suspect Schmidhuber is being tongue-in-cheek anyway. Marchal uses
faith and theology in different ways to everyday use - he has
technical meanings for these terms, to which the everyday meaning is
but an approximation.

[GK]
 Maybe you are right about that and maybe I have been unfair with his 
theotropic

verbiage ; but don't you think there is already something weird about
needing to cast technical meanings to those terms? What for?


--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.

 


A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
 





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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-30 Thread kurtleegod


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality


On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

[GK]

 You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I 
don't really have to study your argument because


 it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are 
incompatible with the conclusions you claim.



[BM]
 Please explain what you mean. I have never say I got conclusions 
incompatible with the premises. I would have concluded the negation of 
comp. I am open that such event could occur of course, and that is why 
I say my derivation shows that comp is testable. I try hard to 
understand what you miss in my posts (not my work!). We are not yet at 
the point of agreeing about what we are not agreeing upon.
 To be clear my derivation does not involve an atom of speculation. 
Perhaps you could tell me what is the object of my speculation, but I'm 
afraid you are only confusing hypothetico-deductive reasoning and 
speculation (in which case all theories are speculative: in that large 
sense I agree.



Bruno


[GK]
 Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there 
is a sense in which all theories are speculative but
 some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic 
evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense
 in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for 
example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though
 people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious 
intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either
 an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) 
depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another
 item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a 
theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for
 which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are 
proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!!


 Now, you start with a number of what you call hypothesis (YD,CT,AR) 
from which you claim you can derive the *whole of
 physics*. Since I don't know what the *whole of physics* is but I 
think that QM is likely to be included in it since is the
 less speculative theory we have ever found I take your claim is that 
you either (1) derive QM as we know it or (2) derive
 a better theory than QM by which I understand some theory that makes 
all the same predictions that QM where QM
 makes right predictions and makes others that QM does not predict or 
predicts wrong.


 You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have 
concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two
 of your premises (CT  AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though 
they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic
 evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely 
speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that
 one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a 
digital computer without prejudice to that experience.
 Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to 
your derivation of the *whole of physics* you
 cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware 
of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis,
 in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such 
replacement (which I assume might involve some

physical interventions).

From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either

 1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical theory 
with testable empirical predictions that falsify
 those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation 
of YD. I would very much like to see that

theory if you have it!

 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is 
empirically implementable and that would only require
 that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest 
yours?) by a digital computer version of the same.
 (Of course you can always claim that it has already occurred, as you 
sometimes suggest and that is cute but just plain silly,

too. )

Which is it?

 Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following 
suggestive question: Could your argument be
 made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing Test 
type argument, which would not require
 you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing simulation?. 
Just a thought...



Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)







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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-30 Thread Hal Finney
I wade into this dispute with trepidation, because I think it is for
the most part incomprehensible.  But I believe I see one place where
there was a miscommunication and I hope to clear it up.

Godfrey Kurtz wrote, to Bruno Marchal:

 You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I
 don't really have to study your argument because
 it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are
 incompatible with the conclusions you claim.

What is this incompatibility?  I believe he means it to be the following.
Bruno had written:

 This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus 
 YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.

And yet, Bruno claims that his methods will lead to a derivation of
physics, which as far as we know includes QM.  Godfrey sees the previous
quote from Bruno as indicating that his Yes Doctor starting point is
*incompatible* with QM.  This is the contradiction that he sees.

I'll stop here and invite Godfrey to comment on whether this is the
admission of incompatibility between premises and conclusions that he
was referring to above.

Hal Finney



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-30 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Aug 30, 2005 at 10:26:46AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  [GK]
   You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And 
 I
  don't really have to study your argument because
  it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are
  incompatible with the conclusions you claim.
 
 [RS]
 I've never seen Bruno admit that! I've only seen you claim that,
 without proof.
 
 
 [GK]
 Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's:
 
 On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  [GK]
 
   I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM 
 which
 
   I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus 
 Collapse, by the way.
 
   But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that 
 does it
 
  (and entanglement, of course!)
 
 
 
 [BM]
  This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus 
 YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.


All I see him saying here is that YD is incompatible with wavefunction
collapse, and also with the Bohm interpretation. His UDA does point to
the necessity of a Everett style Multiverse, which does not have
collapse nor a Bohmian-style preferred branch.

...

 
 [GK]
 I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that way
 and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day
 and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims
 before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these
 theories are just poorly put together.
 

That is indeed true. It is cheaper to look for inconsistencies in a
theory that to perform experiments. Also, unbelievable founding
propositions should be eliminated wherever possible.

However, the claim (ontological reversal) I take as a sort of
metaphysical principle, ultimately unprovable, but a guide as to how
one thinks about the world. It has the same status as a belief in a
concrete reality, or in Occam's razor. Its utility must be in its
ability to form new scientific theories, rather than in its ability to
predict fact. In my book, I point to a number of specific theoretical
ideas in the theory of consciousness that are implied by ontological
reversal that are currently controversial in cognitive science. The
relationship between self-awareness and consciousness being one of
them. If these specific ideas prove to be of little worth as our
understanding of consciousness improves, then ontological reversal
will either be dropped as being of little value, or else appropriately
morphed to yield better theories.

The assumptions of COMP are actually widely supposed to be true, hence
the importance of Bruno's work. He demonstrates that under COMP,
ontological reversal is necessary, and a belief in concrete reality
false.

Curiously, I am in a position where I don't believe COMP to be
strictly true, but is perhaps an approximation of reality. I would be
intrigued in generalisations of the COMP argument. However, I find
that the ontological reversal (or perhaps even ontological cycle
with the AP) is metaphysically less extravagant than belief on
concrete reality. Furthermore, the approach really does deliver most
of physics as we know it today, as I argue in my book. I am sceptical
that Bruno's approach of reducing knowledge to various modal logic
structures will deliver much of substance, but at very least I can
appreciate that it is a test of the theory.

 I think there may be something of merit and interest in what Bruno is
 trying out (though my doubts are growing) and that is why I am engaging
 him. There are many ways of being wrong and some are more interesting
 than others.
 

...

 
 [GK]
  Maybe you are right about that and maybe I have been unfair with his 
 theotropic
 verbiage ; but don't you think there is already something weird about
 needing to cast technical meanings to those terms? What for?
 

I'll let Bruno justify these terms. I think it is probably his way of
translating modal logic expressions into plain English...


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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-30 Thread Brent Meeker

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality


On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have 
concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two
 of your premises (CT  AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though 
they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic
 evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely 
speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that
 one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a 
digital computer without prejudice to that experience.
 Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to 
your derivation of the *whole of physics* you
 cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware 
of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis,
 in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such 
replacement (which I assume might involve some

physical interventions).


YD is certainly speculative, but there is considerable evidence that human 
experience is an epiphenomena of brain activity - from which is follows that YD 
is possible.  So far as I know there is nothing in QM that contradicts it.  In 
fact Tegmark and others have shown that the operation of the human brain must be 
almost completely classical.  So for YD to be inconsistent with physics it would 
have to inconsistent with classical physics.


Why do you think YD is inconsistent with QM?

Brent Meeker




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi John,You referred me to your web page on "Science Religion, a Historical View". Here:http://pages.prodigy.net/jamikes/SciRelMay00.htmlI read it with great interest. I could agree up to a point, which I will try to make clear. And then I comment your last post.You are using human natural science and human science (history) to relativize religion.And then you are doing the same to relativize an, admittedly widespread, "religious" belief in science (say)."Religious" with quote is always put for some pejorative view of religion, that is a view with "authoritative arguments".Somehow let me say that I agree 99,...%. But it remains a stubbornly infinitesimal point of disagreement (even if I totally follow your critical conclusions on the "religious" science).To make clearer my critic, I will relate it with both Descartes systematic doubting procedure (which I would argue is at the origin of modern theoretical sciences), and the Buddhist notion of *the center of the wheel" which provides a good image.Of course I don't know what is a human being. But, as you know, for reason of clarity and modesty, I have *choose* a theory, and I have even choose a theory sufficiently precise so that we can derive precise conclusions. All what I say must be remembered as having been casted in the frame of that theory.I don't want to be specific on the details. The theory, in its intuitive description appears already in "The question of King Milinda" and many other old "religious texts", but in his modern form, applied to animals, it is attributed to Descartes and is called "mechanism", and I take the digital restriction: digital mechanism, or computationalism, or just comp.Now, with comp, there is a little problem in your strategy. If human are machines, by using human sciences to relativize human science, you will applied a computable transformation on the space of the computable transformations, and it can be shown that you will get a fixed point. It is like making rotating a wheel: all its points-propositions will move (put in doubt) and be relativized except one: the center of the wheel.This fixed point is related to the space of the un-doubtable, but the epistemological price of comp will be that science must be (provably!) modest. All (sufficiently rich, universal) theories are necessarily hypothetical. This happens when we enlarge the space of the sound human platonist reasoner into the space of the Lobian machines.What is the fixed point? in a nutshell it is science itself, but where science is understood as an ideal of communication conditionned by hypothetical statements (some scientists forget this; most forget this when talking on colleagues' fields).BM:You put the finger on one of the main difficulty tokeep the dialog between logician and physicist: they interchange,almost but alas not completely, the use of the words "theory" and"models". Logicians use the word "model" for the intended reality they wantto describe with a theory (like the painter how call the naked personin front of him, the model). The painting, is the theory, the littlethings we put on a paper. JM: $fine. I like that kind of 'model' if she(!) ispretty.I differentiate also the "simulation" model, as themathematical or physical simulation of a thing to makeit accessible to our feeble knowledge. Now MY model:as you know I think in totality (wholeness) at least Itry. Our mind is incapable of envompassing ALL, so weselect segments we can handle (if we can...) andREDUCE our vision to them (=MY reductionism). Suchsegment is a (MY) model if it disregards the 'rest ofthe world' (as it should to serve our feeble mind). Itcan be a person, a theory, a science-topic, a thought,a car, or anything topically (or functionally)surrounded by boundaries (our mental model-horizon). Itook the word from Robert Rosen. A limited model iswhat we can use in our thinking. If we widen it beyondALL boundaries it becomes a "natural system", maximummodel (nonsense) = the 'thing' itself. This is myvocabulary and you cannot argue about it - it is MINE(ha ha). There is nothing wrong with model-thinking, it helpedus to all we know of the world and to our technology.Not to 'understanding' the connections. Why? There is only a (necessary) problem with understanding 'understanding'Wriong it is,if we draw 'universal' conclusions from considerationsupon a model - regard it universally valid. I have no models in that sense. The theory which is isolated from the machine's interview is embeddable in number theory.As in thesciences (including I think logics, which is cut tothe thinking habits of the HUMAN brain (mind). No. It is build frrom the consideration of being the less dependent on prejudices or even just meanings. And there are many many logics. You should explain why you think science (and not its mediatic "religious" perception) is cut for human thinking habits, when the whole story of science and logic illustrates a (never ending) abstraction of all our contingent 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-29 Thread kurtleegod



-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sat, 27 Aug 2005 14:31:08 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality




[BM]
 I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is 
based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler 
assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp 
theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic.





[GK]
  That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says 
anything like that in his book) but I have read both
  Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and 
in no way shape or form does anything like YD

even figure in them!!!


[BM]
 Literally, of course. YD is just a tools for explaining what it is to 
be like an Everett memory machine. It is implicit in reducing the 
quantum uncertainty to the ignorance of which branch we are in a 
superposition. Mathematically it can be justified by Gleason theorem or 
by Graham Hartle type of infinite frequency operator. See the 
Preskill's course on quantum computation which makes a nice summary.


[GK]
 I don't quite know what you mean by an Everett memory machine 
neither could I find a definition (or a mention of it) in Preskill's 
lectures. If by this you mean something like a machine whose memory 
would track the successive branchings such
 thing is innimical to the Everett notion that all information 
contained in the universal wave function is relative and all 
probabilities
 are conditional. Otherwise all memory machines are either (1) 
classical and thus relativised to one branch or (2) quantal and
 permanently standing in a superposition of branches so that their 
memories would be as un situated as that of any other
 subject. As for your justification I will just quote Preskill on a 
piece of credo which is characteristic of Many-Worlders:


 My own view is that the Everett Interpretation of quantum theory 
provides a satisfying explanation of measurement and
 of the origin of randomness, but does not yet fully explain the 
quantum mechanical rules for computing probabilities. A full
 explanation should go beyond the frequency interpretation of 
probability --- ideally it would place the Bayesian view of

probability on a secure objective foundation.

 Though this is highly disputable in itself I think it shows quite well 
where your statement above is mistaken.




[GK]
  Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis 
which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow!



I have already answered.

[GK]
That is a Yes, than.

[BM]
 The current aim is to derive SWE (by which I mean the correct 
geometrical-gravity extension of Schroedinger Wave Equation) from comp. 
I don't expect to derive anything like SWE + collapse (although this is 
not entirely excluded!).

What I have already proved is that
 1) if you make the move from SWE + collapse to SWE + comp, then 
from purely arithmetical reasons you are forced to go the the quite 
simpler theory comp. This is the result of the UDA reasoning and you 
are invited to criticize it: it presuppose some folk-psychology and 
some passive understanding of Church thesis. See the slide of my 2004 
SANE paper for a presentation is eight steps.
 2) I translate that reasoning into the language of a large class of 
universal machine and got more constructive description of the physics 
you need (by 1)) to derive from comp. This is technically more 
involved. It suppresses the need of the folk psychology.



Bruno

[GK]
 I decrypt the above as a statement that you are NOT trying to derive 
QM but a more general TOE, so that assuming YD is no
 different than say, assuming subplankian determinism like 't Hooft or 
Hiley do. I guess you need a lot more good luck than I first wished 
you!


 Because you referred me to Deutsch's book I too a look at his own 
defense of the Everett interpretation and was reminded also
 of his not so passive understanding of the CT. As it turns out his 
whole masterplan hinges on his belief that *CT is a result of

Physics* so he is really no great help to you.

Best regards,

Godfrey







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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 29 Aug 2005, at 16:40, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Because you referred me to Deutsch's book I too a look at his own defense of the Everett interpretation and was reminded also  of his not so passive understanding of the CT. As it turns out his whole masterplan hinges on his belief that *CT is a result of Physics* so he is really no great help to you.  Yes sure, it is the point where if you asks David how he can defend such a revisionist form of CT, he just say that he disagrees with 100% of the mathemaéticians. Actually Deutsch's position is interesting because it illustrates the point that once you take comp seriously enough, you are forced to "physicalize" the math, for not making math more fundamental than physics.I prefer to follow Wheeler's view that the physical laws cannot be generated in any physical way.As for the rest of the post you turn around the pot., and adopt a tone like if I was doing something speculative, and this just illustrates what you have already confessed: you don't have study the argument I have given.  For example: I decrypt the above as a statement that you are NOT trying to derive QM but a more general TOEThis means you have not already grasped the main theorem in my work, although I have unsuccesfully try to give you the idea. I try one times again:The result is that there is only one TOE compatible with comp, and it is derivable from comp. That TOE is physically complete. To verify comp, just compare that TOE (already given) with QM (currently most believed physical theory) or compare directly with the physical facts. The tests already done confirm the quantum logical aspects of nature.Could you please stop trying to demolish theoretical works before grasping the enunciation of the main theorems? What is your goal?Brunohttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-29 Thread kurtleegod


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 17:37:34 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality


On 29 Aug 2005, at 16:40, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


[GK]
 Because you referred me to Deutsch's book I too a look at his own 
defense of the Everett interpretation and was reminded also


 of his not so passive understanding of the CT. As it turns out his 
whole masterplan hinges on his belief that *CT is a result of


Physics* so he is really no great help to you.



[BM]
 Yes sure, it is the point where if you asks David how he can defend 
such a revisionist form of CT, he just say that he disagrees with 100% 
of the mathemaéticians. Actually Deutsch's position is interesting 
because it illustrates the point that once you take comp seriously 
enough, you are forced to physicalize the math, for not making math 
more fundamental than physics.


[GK]
I don't really agree with Deutsch on this, by the way...

[BM]
 I prefer to follow Wheeler's view that the physical laws cannot be 
generated in any physical way.


[GK]
 ...but I don't think this is correct about Wheeler either. Sure he 
talked a lot about if from bit but never developed into
 anything usable. The origin of the physical laws is an interesting 
philosophical problem on its own but, if your suggestion
 is that they can be derived from math alone is somewhat spurious 
because the laws of physics are already mathematical!
 The main problem is that the physical laws are only one part of the 
information you need to build observable physics. The
 other are the boundary conditions, the symmetry-breaking accidents and 
such which really don't have an obvious place in the

Platonic world.

[BM]
 As for the rest of the post you turn around the pot., and adopt a tone 
like if I was doing something speculative, and this just illustrates 
what you have already confessed: you don't have study the argument I 
have given. For example:


[GK]
 You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I 
don't really have to study your argument because
 it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are 
incompatible with the conclusions you claim.


[GK]
  I decrypt the above as a statement that you are NOT trying to derive 
QM but a more general TOE


[BM]
 This means you have not already grasped the main theorem in my work, 
although I have unsuccessfully try to give you the idea. I try one 
times again:
 The result is that there is only one TOE compatible with comp, and it 
is derivable from comp. That TOE is physically complete. To verify 
comp, just compare that TOE (already given) with QM (currently most 
believed physical theory) or compare directly with the physical facts. 
The tests already done confirm the quantum logical aspects of nature.


[GK]
 To claim that a TOE is physically complete you have to know ALL of 
Physics which is more than anyone in this world claims

to know, least of all, me! So who am I to disagree? (;-)

[BM]
 Could you please stop trying to demolish theoretical works before 
grasping the enunciation of the main theorems? What is your goal?



Bruno

[GK]
 My goal was to try and understand whether there is a grain of anything 
interesting in what you claim you have done.
 Since you say above both that I have already grasped the main 
theorem and than demand that I grasp it before I

demolish it I can only conclude that it is... self-demolishing!

 Now it appears to me that you are trying, at all costs (including 
logic), to save the remnants of the strong-AI thesis in some
religious cultist form (The Grand Programmer-vision),  thus your 
constant references to faith and theology. This, incidentally
may be a better bet than actually doing science since there is better 
funding in the intelligent design camp these days, so maybe I wished 
you more luck than you need...


Best regards,

Godfrey








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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-29 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Aug 29, 2005 at 12:41:23PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 [GK]
  You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I 
 don't really have to study your argument because
  it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are 
 incompatible with the conclusions you claim.

I've never seen Bruno admit that! I've only seen you claim that,
without proof.

 
 [GK]
  To claim that a TOE is physically complete you have to know ALL of 
 Physics which is more than anyone in this world claims
 to know, least of all, me! So who am I to disagree? (;-)

It is a claim, not a proof. Such a claim is readily falsifiable, by
means of counterexamples when such are discovered.


[GK]
 
  Now it appears to me that you are trying, at all costs (including 
 logic), to save the remnants of the strong-AI thesis in some
 religious cultist form (The Grand Programmer-vision),  thus your 
 constant references to faith and theology. This, incidentally
 may be a better bet than actually doing science since there is better 
 funding in the intelligent design camp these days, so maybe I wished 
 you more luck than you need...
 
 Best regards,
 
 Godfrey

Schmidhuber does the Great Programmer thing, not Marchal. And I
suspect Schmidhuber is being tongue-in-cheek anyway. Marchal uses
faith and theology in different ways to everyday use - he has
technical meanings for these terms, to which the everyday meaning is
but an approximation.

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
I think I've waited long enough... Kurt, you are just a guy who like read 
himself  You'll never make your point, because you don't have one... you 
just like insulting other people and show your big neck...

By now, your messages goes directly to the trash bin... Ciao and good 
continuation in your research to know if really you're the best...

Quentin

Le Vendredi 26 Août 2005 23:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
  From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com; Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 16:53:41 +0200
  Subject: Re: subjective reality

  Sorry for answering late, but I got some hardware problem.


  On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  [GK]

I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM

 which

I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus

 Collapse, by the way.

But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that

 does it

   (and entanglement, of course!)

  [BM]
   This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus
 YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.



  [GK]

I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying

 that Everett

based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I

 strongly doubt that...

  [BM]
   I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based
 on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From
 a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be
 built but it is really out of topic.


  [GK]
   That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says anything
 like that in his book) but I have read both
   Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and in
 no way shape or form does anything like YD
  even figure in them!!!


  [GK]

Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a

 few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions

that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The

 general idea is that one has to be extremely

careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context

 because they may not even be definable...


  [BM]
   This is true for all context. Nevertheless my theory does not assume
 QM. My point is that QM must be derivable from comp in case comp is
 true (making comp completely testable). QM is NOT *assumed* in comp,
 indeed one of my goal is to explained where the laws of physics come
 from, so I should better not presuppose them.


  Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

  [GK]
   Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis
 which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow!

  I only have two words for you Bruno: good luck!

  Best regards,

  Godfrey,






 
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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 26 Aug 2005, at 23:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[BM] I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic.[GK] That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says anything like that in his book) but I have read both Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and in no way shape or form does anything like YDeven figure in them!!!Literally, of course. YD is just a tools for explaining what it is "to be like an Everett  memory machine". It is implicit in reducing the quantum uncertainty to the ignorance of which branch we are in a superposition. Mathematically it can be justified by Gleason theorem or by Graham Hartle type of infinite "frequency" operator. See the Preskill's course on quantum computation which makes a nice summary.[GK] Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow!I have already answered.  The current aim is to derive SWE (by which I mean the correct geometrical-gravity extension of Schroedinger Wave Equation) from comp. I don't expect to derive anything like SWE + collapse (although this is not entirely excluded!).What I have already proved is that 1) if you make the move from "SWE + collapse" to "SWE + comp", then from purely arithmetical reasons you are forced to go the the quite simpler theory "comp". This is the result of the UDA reasoning and you are invited to criticize it: it presuppose some "folk-psychology" and some passive understanding of Church thesis. See the slide of my 2004 SANE paper for a presentation is eight steps.2) I translate that reasoning into the language of a large class of universal machine and got more constructive description of the physics you need (by "1)") to derive from comp. This is technically more involved. It suppresses the need of the folk psychology.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-26 Thread scerir
Godfrey:
  I am not sure I can give you a decent answer to your
  query [...]

There are papers by Mark Rubin showing (perhaps)
that in the Schroedinger picture, information 
on splitting worlds must be inferred from 
*the history* of the combined system. While
in the Heisenberg picture this information 
is contained in mathematical quantities 
associated with a single time. 
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310186
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0209055

Rob Clifton in a paper on 'Phil. of Science'
(circa 1996) appeals to the magic properties 
of the Schroedinger Unitary-evolving 
*Universal* Wave-function. (This approach
seems to be similar to the concept of a global
wave-function in Bohmian mechanics. John
Bell pointed out a similarity between
Bohmian mechanics and MWI, btw.)

There are, imo, interesting ideas in the paper
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0507051
by D. Zeh. Mainly about the 'dynamics'
of entropy within a 'world' vs. the rest
of the 'worlds'.

Needlless to say, all that seems to have
something to do with what Hal Finney wrote
here recently, in search of a *consistent*
universal distribution.

Regards,
s.




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
Sorry for answering late, but I got some hardware problem.On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK] I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which  I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way.  But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that does it (and entanglement, of course!) This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying that Everett based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I strongly doubt that...I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic. Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The general idea is that one has to be extremely careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context because they may not even be definable...This is true for all context. Nevertheless "my theory" does not assume QM. My point is that QM must be derivable from comp in case comp is true (making comp completely testable). QM is NOT *assumed* in comp, indeed one of my goal is to explained where the laws of physics come from, so I should better not presuppose them.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 24 Aug 2005, at 05:02, Stephen Paul King wrote:BM: Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a machine, "Yes doctor", en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism: machine can behave *like*  if they had phenomenal qualia.  [SPK]     This looks suspiciously like confusing 1st person and 3rd person aspects! But whatever the case, I disagree. Unless a means can be found to record and playback (as in the movie Brainstorm) phenomenal qualia we have nothing but factually unjustified belief in YD. With out proof all that one has is BEC-MEC, i.e. the Turing Test. I don't understand any sentences in that paragraph. If you have the time to develop it a little bit, I would appreciate.To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis, you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences (or subjective, first person, private, etc.).[SPK]   Not really, all that is required is that it is in principle impossible for the class of Machines to emulate minds. IF minds are purely classical, AI goes through. IF minds as some aspect that is QM that is indispensable, the proof holds. QED. Remember that comp could be true even in the case my brain is a quantum computer. That makes the "doctor" and "teleportation" thought experiments more complex, but the once the Universal Dovetailer is invoked those supplementary difficulties  disappear.Unless there exists a subclass of Machines that satisfies the all of  the requirements to emulate an arbitrary Mind then Strong AI is ...You are unclear for me, I'm afraid.To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be turing emulable.[SPK]   This is too high a bar to ask for! In effect you have made comp unfalsifiable! Not at all. Remember that I have shown that if comp is true then physics is given by a precise theory. If that theory is in contradiction with known physical facts then comp is refuted. Comp has already pass the test of the non booleannity of the observable propositions.Like I stated in the first place, you are asking for a skeptic to prove a negative!Here too, if you could say a little more. The point is not a question of true and false, but of the consistency of related set of beliefs. I maintain that comp == STRONG AI == MEC-BEH, and I don't understand what is wrong with that.Have a nice week-end,Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-26 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Godfrey:

At 11:21 AM 8/25/2005, you wrote:


[HR]
 I am making a distinction between existence and reality. Reality is a 
transitory state that some definable objects can have. Further I think it 
is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set 
[sample] of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states of 
our universe - back to the system that embeds them.


[GK]
 Again, those (states of our universe) are exactly the objects whose 
reality attribution is more problematic! I am not sure
 how to drive this point accross to you. There is a paper posted today in 
the phsyics arXiv that you may want to read as it is

exactly on this subject:


I am still working on the model and will eventually update definitions of 
the terms used as needed.  By reality I mean that which allows a SAS to 
have a sense of observing.  Universe states exist continuously in my All 
but have transitory reality.




[HR]
 If it turns out that quantum mechanics is part of the valid description 
of our universe [The issue is I believe an open one] then the embedding 
system should allow for that. This does not preclude other universes for 
which quantum mechanics is not part of the description.


[GK]
 Well, I think it is hard to argue that QM is not a part of the valid 
description of our universe so I cannot agree with you above!
 All empirical indications, so far, are to the contrary. What is an open 
question is whether it is the ONLY valid part or whether it is the valid 
description of the WHOLE universe since we still lack one.


I think we may yet find that QM [as currently formulated] is approximate 
and/or emergent but Quantification of some sort seems likely to me.



Now if by reality you mean
  platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list 
may  exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician...


[HR]
 I am of the opinion that the line items on my list are just numbers. I 
believe that most participants in this venue would allow that Numbers 
exist is a possible starting point and that this is could be considered 
a type of Platonism. I just renamed numbers as properties so as to 
include all their interpretations [sets of other numbers].


[GK]
 Here I don't fully understand you. I am willing to admit that numbers 
exist or that they have a reality that is independent of
 my own existence or yours but I think that means that numbers have 
properties rather than numbers are properties (of
 something else); if I believe the latter I don't think I could claim to 
be a platonist...


My: I just renamed numbers as properties so as to include all their 
interpretations [sets of other numbers].   is the idea that to represent 
information, numbers must have meaning [interpretations].  A number plus 
its set of interpretations [other numbers] are a set of properties.  A 
property is also therefore a collection of numbers.



(I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?)

[HR]
 Well there is a difference between listing and counting. I may not be 
able to count the reals [at least in this universe] but I think a 
mathematician who allows for continuous dimensions in a 3D space will 
also allow that in such a space I can list the reals just by drawing a 
line segment of arbitrary length on a note pad. Since my list has no 
dimensionality restrictions I suspect it can be one for one with the continuum.


Hal Ruhl

[GK]
 Sorry Hal, I don't see very well how a list can be one-to-one with the 
continuum! That may be a default of my imagination...


In response to your question I was just speculating as to whether a list 
is exclusively a discrete item or if a list can also be continuous.  Cantor 
and Turing were using discrete [counting] lists - R1,R2,R3,... and 
P1,P2,P3...  If there is no difference between listing and counting then 
why have two words?  In the above discrete lists the line items are written 
out natural and real numbers.  Writing out a number is just a 
representation.  A discrete list contains representations.  A line segment 
also represents a number.  Since a line segment contains all shorter line 
segments is it a list of all these representations?  I do not think the All 
or the Everything should be restricted to just discrete lists.


Hal Ruhl





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-26 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Serafino,

I am not familiar with Rubin's papers but I know Clifton's
and I think you are indeed right. Bell wrote the most enlightening
observations about Everettiana and I think he correctly pin down
that it is akin to a (contextual) hidden-variable interpretation when
you try and extract any definite information from it. This is also
clear from his famous Como Lectures MWI for Cosmologists.

The myth of a Universal Distribution is just one square away from
the myth of a Universal Wave Function seems to me. There is
clearly a hint of something like that is all retractions from classical
determinism (Bohm's Implicate Order is another one but less
hooked on Universal notions).

I will check out the paper by Zeh.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: scerir [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 08:17:06 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Godfrey:
 I am not sure I can give you a decent answer to your
 query [...]

There are papers by Mark Rubin showing (perhaps)
that in the Schroedinger picture, information
on splitting worlds must be inferred from
*the history* of the combined system. While
in the Heisenberg picture this information
is contained in mathematical quantities
associated with a single time.
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310186
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0209055


Rob Clifton in a paper on 'Phil. of Science'
(circa 1996) appeals to the magic properties
of the Schroedinger Unitary-evolving
*Universal* Wave-function. (This approach
seems to be similar to the concept of a global
wave-function in Bohmian mechanics. John
Bell pointed out a similarity between
Bohmian mechanics and MWI, btw.)

There are, imo, interesting ideas in the paper
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0507051
by D. Zeh. Mainly about the 'dynamics'
of entropy within a 'world' vs. the rest
of the 'worlds'.

Needlless to say, all that seems to have
something to do with what Hal Finney wrote
here recently, in search of a *consistent*
universal distribution.

Regards,
s.





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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-26 Thread kurtleegod


From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com; Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 16:53:41 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Sorry for answering late, but I got some hardware problem.


On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

[GK]

  I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM 
which


  I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus 
Collapse, by the way.


  But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that 
does it


 (and entanglement, of course!)



[BM]
 This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus 
YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.




[GK]
  I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying 
that Everett
  based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I 
strongly doubt that...


[BM]
 I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based 
on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From 
a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be 
built but it is really out of topic.



[GK]
 That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says anything 
like that in his book) but I have read both
 Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and in 
no way shape or form does anything like YD

even figure in them!!!


[GK]
  Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a 
few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions
  that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The 
general idea is that one has to be extremely
  careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context 
because they may not even be definable...



[BM]
 This is true for all context. Nevertheless my theory does not assume 
QM. My point is that QM must be derivable from comp in case comp is 
true (making comp completely testable). QM is NOT *assumed* in comp, 
indeed one of my goal is to explained where the laws of physics come 
from, so I should better not presuppose them.



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[GK]
 Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis 
which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow!


I only have two words for you Bruno: good luck!

Best regards,

Godfrey,







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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-25 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Hal,

 I am not sure I can give you much feed back on what you advance below 
because these go
 well beyond the little I understand about these questions of 
metaphysics. In general I think you can
 strech some of conventional definitions in order to find out where 
that gets you but if you try
 and strech all of them at once you risk not knowing what you are 
talking about anymore.
 I'll give it a shot but please forgive me where I can't really say 
much...


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 17:42:13 -0400
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfrey:

At 03:10 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote:
snip

[GK]

Hi Hal,
  My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read  
something like: The list of course would have properties that seem  
incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but  
nevertheless definitions create such objects as the is not member of 
 the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, 
but  so what?  I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your 
Everything  list contains contradictory attributions like X is a car 
and X is not  a car for the same X. I obviously

misunderstood you.

[HR]
 The distinction is between existence and reality. While the whole list 
is taken as existing the assumption does not hold that every is and 
is not definable object can also have reality. I find it difficult to 
accept some combinations of X is ***... and X is not ***... as 
being simultaneous properties of the same object that can have reality 
or of any of its sub components but round square is perhaps not so 
unacceptable. For example in a discrete point universe where for one of 
its components half the applicable points are arranged square and 
half round this being a state in some sort of transition sequence of 
states wherein that component goes from being round to being square. 
Now when this particular state has reality in a sequence of such states 
does it not contain a round square?


[GK]
 I see but again I caution you about the use of those words, reality 
and existence. I think the first one has been more in
 the province of physics and that is why Einstein gave himself the 
trouble of defining it as a metatheoretic term. Mathematicians, even 
the ones who are not ashamed of professing platonism, never actually 
give you a definition of their
 platonic reality , since they don't quite believe they can map the 
whole realm of platonic forms or don't even believe
 that can be done (as Godel insisted). They will however prove 
Existence and Non-Existence theorems about some of
 these objects that you can build from attributions such as your 
infamous round square (though I am not aware of

any proof concerning this particular ontological thorn).

 I sympathize with the more liberal metaphysical point of view about 
what abstracta exist as defended, for example by
 Ed Zalta following Meinong and Mally (check is humorous Metaphysics 
Research Lab at Stanford: http://mally.stanford.edu/ )
 though I don't agree with his view of mathematical objects in 
particular. So I would grant you a list of sorts even
 containing fictional objects such as the round-square if you exclude 
from it any reference to physical objects. I just don't know how useful 
something like that would be



  About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture 
to  say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very 
unlikely if  by 'reality one understands physical reality as 
defined by EPR, that  is, as composed by distinct elements
  bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation 
used  to assign them to such objects. This is the gist
  of Einstein's famous question Is the moon there when nobody looks? 
and  all that folklore.


[HR]
 I am making a distinction between existence and reality. Reality is a 
transitory state that some definable objects can have. Further I think 
it is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set 
[sample] of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states 
of our universe - back to the system that embeds them.


[GK]
 Again, those (states of our universe) are exactly the objects whose 
reality attribution is more problematic! I am not sure
 how to drive this point accross to you. There is a paper posted today 
in the phsyics arXiv that you may want to read as it is

exactly on this subject:

http://arXiv.org/quant-ph/0508183

[HR]
 If it turns out that quantum mechanics is part of the valid 
description of our universe [The issue is I believe an open one] then 
the embedding system should allow for that. This does not preclude 
other universes for which quantum mechanics is not part of the 
description.


[GK]
 Well, I think it is hard to argue that QM is not a part of the valid 
description of our universe so I cannot agree with you above!
 All

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-25 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Serafino,

I am not sure I can give you a decent answer to your
query since I am not an Everrettista myself and so a lot
of their subtleties escape me. But I think they would
probably remind you that they believe that superpositions
only give way to more superpositions so that, after each
measurement event there will be more branches added
to each of the original two and you will find yourself on
the one that is factored out by the successive series of
eigenvalues you detect. What he will not tell you is
why you find yourself on that particular one since they
were all equiprobable to start with. If you insist they
will say that quantum mechanics does not tell you that
either, and than you will say: but regular QM does not
introduce many branches! and your head will start
spinning, etc...


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: scerir [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 23:38:05 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Godfrey:
'MWI + Projection postulates should reproduce
regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically
QM - Projection Postulates!'



Imagine a superposition like this

|'spin_z' +1 |'detector' +1 +
|'spin_z' -1 |'detector' -1

It describes a superposition of spin up/down
states, and the entagled (or relative) states of a
detector.

Now imagine a second - whatever, human? - device,
to measure a specific observable of the above
superposition.

Let this observable be such that the ray generated by
the above superposition state is an eigenspace of this
observable, corresponding to a definite eigenvalue,
the eigenvalue 'yes'. Since neither component of
the above superposition state lies in the eigenspace
of this observable, this observable fails to commute
with the 'spin_z' observable, and fails to commute
with the 'detector' observable.

We can write (canonically) ...
|'z-spin' +1 |'detector' +1 |yes +
|'z-spin' -1 |'detector' -1 |yes

In a MWI, a world should instantiate an eigenvalue
for an observable if the superposition term associated
with that world is an eigenstate of the observable
corresponding to that eigenvalue.

So, after the (second) measurement, what would
an Everettista write?

This one?

|'z-spin' +1 |'detector' +1 |? = world A
|'z-spin' -1 |'detector' -1 |? = world B

(Since, in each world, the observable measured by
the second - whatever, human? - device does not
commute with the 'spin_z' observable, so it has no
predeterminate value, that is to say that the outcome
of the (second) measurement must occur by chance.)

Or this one?

|'z-spin' +1 |'detector' +1 |yes = world A
|'z-spin' -1 |'detector' -1 |yes = world B

(In this case the fact that the second device would later
record the state |yes seems to be fixed ... in advance
of the measurement itself. And this is magic. White Rabbit?
What else?)

Godfrey:
'I believe that YD is incompatible with
the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite
think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution
plus Collapse, by the way.'

Maybe.

s.

[It is too late here, I cannot write more, and I cannot
check the above :-)]









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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-24 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Russell,

Thanks for the clarification on the White Rabbit issue.
That is helpful.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 13:27:19 +1000
Subject: Re: subjective reality

On Tue, Aug 23, 2005 at 10:19:34AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 My argument is not based on the White Rabbit Problem since I don't
  even know what that is, in all honesty! From reading Brunos's 
popular

 account I gather it has something to do with the possibility of
 finding
 unruly or unexpected things once you believe the kind of theory he
 and, I guess you, profess. No?


[RS]
Another name for the White Rabbit problem is failure of
induction. Basically, it is the possibility that any/all of our laws of
science may suddenly stop being applicable. It bedevils most ensemble
theories of everything.

[GK]
Oh! In that case I don't think my argument qualifies as a White Rabbit
 but you may think otherwise. I have set it up the other way around, 
that
 is, imagining a situation in which the laws (or consequences) of QM 
defeat
 the possibility of the substitution envisaged in the YD hypothesis. 
You can
 always appeal for an exemption from the laws of physics that would 
still make
 the process go and that would be a White Rabbit, I guess. But I don't 
think

that qualifies as a loophole...

 There is a subtler style of argument involving the need for laws of 
nature
 altogether that occurs sometimes in QM and, blocks out an exit route 
from my

argument which is referred to sometimes as the Demiurge Problem.

 Without meaning to disrespect your solutions, I think Quantum
 Mechanics
 produces a very good deal of White Rabbits on its own, and by this
  I mean predictions that thwart any of the everyday type of 
expectations

 you place on reality!

[RS]
That is not what is meant by White Rabbits. Predictions of QM are
entirely lawlike even they're unexpected.

[GK]
Agreed (even if I would put the lawlike between quotes).

[RS]
Interestingly, someone pointed me at a paper by Esche the other day,
arguing that alternative projection postulates are compatible with
the MWI. The precise alternative projection postulate they supplied
turns out to be riddled with white rabbits - which makes me speculate
that the Born rule is precisely what you need to kill off all the
white rabbits in the MWI.

[GK]
 I can't say I follow you here. MWI + Projection postulates should 
reproduce
 regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection 
Postulates!
 Now killing white rabbits with the Born rule!??? If that could be 
done, seems to

me, would obviate all the need for MWI in the first place, no?


 The argument I believe I have is just a simple working out of the
 premise
  of YD till you get to a situation that our current knowledge of QM 
can

 defeat. I am sure there are many more that you can think up with a
 bit of reflection.

No, I have a complete failure of imagination in this department.


 [RS]
 So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine
 argument against the YD, let's hear it.

 Cheers

 [GK]
 As I stated before I don't react very well to that style of macho
 pressure
 in spite of my (clumsy) attempts to use it on Bruno!

I'm hardly pressuring you, but it is very frustrating to be constantly
told by you that you have an interesting point to make, without you
ever making the point. This is not an email list for egotistical
posturings - people come here to learn stuff. It is fine to post
poorly thought out speculations, noone think any the less of you -
other bright minds can quickly find the glaring flaws in these, and
one learns something in the process, often including the very person
demolishing an argument.

Cheers

[GK]
I get your point and I do agree with you, somewhat.
I am leaning towards sketching the argument even
 if not for Bruno's benefit any longer. Though it occurred to me as a 
fly

in his ointment I think it may play a more constructive role in another
dispute which I find interesting. I am much less certain about that
 last possibility and could certainly use your wits and those of the 
other

member of the list in checking it out

Please, bear with me for a little longer while I work this out in some
communicable shape.

Kindly,

Godfrey

 


A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
 





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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-24 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Hal,

Just a minimal comment to what you state below.
I erase a bit of the previous exchange.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 23 Aug 2005 10:33:45 -0400
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfrey

At 01:09 PM 8/22/2005, you wrote:

[HR]
 I do not derive YD, CT or AR. The model is based on a list of 
properties that objects can have. Definition divides this list into two 
sub lists. The Nothing has the sole property empty, the All has all 
the remaining properties. The list of course would have properties that 
seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but 
nevertheless definitions create such objects as the is not member of 
the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, 
but so what?


[GK]
 If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much 
like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and 
also their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and 
thus imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in
 all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it 
obviously contains it too).


(skipped)

[HR]
 As to falsifiability of my model I will try to list my assumptions, 
etc.:


 1) There exists a list [call it the Everything] of all possible 
properties of objects that can have reality.


 2) The list is divided into two sub lists by the process of definition 
[definition forms a definitional [is:is not] pair].


 3) The definition resulting in the [Nothing:All] definitional pair is 
unavoidable and thus this pair has simultaneous existence with the 
list.


 It is then noted that the Nothing can not respond to any meaningful 
question about itself and there is such a question: Does it persist? 
Thus the Nothing is incomplete. The necessary attempt at resolution of 
this incompleteness by the Nothing by accessing [incorporating] parts 
of the list [a symmetry breaking?] results in a random dynamic within 
the All producing a randomly evolving Something [that which the Nothing 
has become by incorporating parts of the list] [an evolving universe]. 
But by #3 the Nothing must be restored so the process of creating 
randomly evolving Somethings repeats [a form of an MWI]. A random 
evolution can produce long strings of states of universes that can 
support Self Aware Structures [SAS], YD, comp etc. [A state of a 
universe is one side of a definitional pair - a sub list, and I have in 
the past called sub lists kernels [of information] to tie in with 
some of my previous posts.]


That is my model in a nut shell.

[GK]
 Sounds solid to me! And because it includes Everything and more(!) 
what can I possibly add beyond the suggestion that you name it the... 
Whatever Theory (:-).



I don't want to sound like a big stickler for Popper or
anything but I am sure you are familiar with the infamous
libel often directed at String Theory that it is not even false!

 I believe that particular description is actually more like that is 
not even wrong [citation unknown] and may be older than string theory. 
In any event I think we should be careful how we use descriptions such 
as true/false, right /wrong, compatible/incompatible, in contradiction 
with, etc. because they seem to have different domains. I am now 
interested in how you and Bruno use such terms re comp, YD, UDA, QM, 
MWI, etc.


[GK]
 Oh, those tired dichotomies, true/false, right/wrong, bla-bla! There 
so confining, aren't they? No match for Everything/Nothing
 that is for sure(/unsure?)! I am sorry, Hal, but I am afraid my views 
may strike you as old fashioned as I am still a bit attached
 to those old notions you have already so dashingly transcended, 
like... common sense (;-)


 In that regard I think it is time you present your argument re YD/QM 
and see what the list has to say about it.


Hal Ruhl

[GK]
Working on it.

Regards,

-Godfrey,


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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-24 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Godfrey:

At 12:03 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote:

Hi Hal,

Just a minimal comment to what you state below.
I erase a bit of the previous exchange.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)


snip


[GK]
 If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much 
like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and also 
their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and thus 
imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in
 all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it 
obviously contains it too).


My first assumption says:

There exists a list of all possible properties of objects that can have 
reality.


Are you saying that this list taken as a whole is necessarily self 
contradictory and therefore you can not show it does not exist due to this 
internal self contradiction and this is your proof that it does not exist?


Let me first point out that the list is just a list - not a system of 
logic.  I give it only one property by assumption - existence.


Hal Ruhl

  





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-24 Thread kurtleegod


-Original Message-
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 14:15:43 -0400
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfrey:

At 12:03 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote:
Hi Hal,

Just a minimal comment to what you state below.
I erase a bit of the previous exchange.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

snip

[GK]
  If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much 
 like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and 
also  their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and 
thus  imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in
  all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it 

obviously contains it too).




My first assumption says:

 There exists a list of all possible properties of objects that can 
have reality.


 Are you saying that this list taken as a whole is necessarily self 
contradictory and therefore you can not show it does not exist due to 
this internal self contradiction and this is your proof that it does 
not exist?


 Let me first point out that the list is just a list - not a system of 
logic. I give it only one property by assumption - existence.


Hal Ruhl


[GK]

Hi Hal,
 My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read 
something like: The list of course would have properties that seem 
incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but 
nevertheless definitions create such objects as the is not member of 
the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, 
but so what?  I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your 
Everything list contains contradictory attributions like X is a car 
and X is not a car for the same X. I obviously

misunderstood you.

 About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture to 
say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very unlikely 
if by 'reality one understands physical reality as defined by EPR, 
that is, as composed by distinct elements
 bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation 
used to assign them to such objects. This is the gist
 of Einstein's famous question Is the moon there when nobody looks? 
and all that folklore. Now if by reality you mean
 platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may 
exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician...


(I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?)

Kindly,

Godfrey


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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-24 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Godfrey:

At 03:10 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote:
snip



[GK]

Hi Hal,
 My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read 
something like: The list of course would have properties that seem 
incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but 
nevertheless definitions create such objects as the is not member of 
the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but 
so what?  I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your Everything 
list contains contradictory attributions like X is a car and X is not 
a car for the same X. I obviously

misunderstood you.


The distinction is between existence and reality.  While the whole list is 
taken as existing the assumption does not hold that every is and is not 
definable object can also have reality.  I find it difficult to accept some 
combinations of X is ***... and X is not ***... as being simultaneous 
properties of the same object that can have reality or of any of its sub 
components but round square is perhaps not so unacceptable.  For example 
in a discrete point universe where for one of its components half the 
applicable points are arranged square and half round this being a state 
in some sort of transition sequence of states wherein that component goes 
from being round to being square.  Now when this particular state has 
reality in a sequence of such states does it not contain a round square?



 About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture to 
say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very unlikely if 
by 'reality one understands physical reality as defined by EPR, that 
is, as composed by distinct elements
 bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation used 
to assign them to such objects. This is the gist
 of Einstein's famous question Is the moon there when nobody looks? and 
all that folklore.


I am making a distinction between existence and reality.  Reality is a 
transitory state that some definable objects can have.  Further I think it 
is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set [sample] 
of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states of our 
universe - back to the system that embeds them.


If it turns out that quantum mechanics is part of the valid description of 
our universe [The issue is I believe an open one] then the embedding system 
should allow for that.  This does not preclude other universes for which 
quantum mechanics is not part of the description.



Now if by reality you mean
 platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may 
exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician...


I am of the opinion that the line items on my list are just numbers.  I 
believe that most participants in this venue would allow that Numbers 
exist is a possible starting point and that this is could be considered a 
type of Platonism.  I just renamed numbers as properties so as to include 
all their interpretations [sets of other numbers].



(I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?)


Well there is a difference between listing and counting.  I may not be able 
to count the reals [at least in this universe] but I think a mathematician 
who allows for continuous dimensions in a 3D space will also allow that in 
such a space I can list the reals just by drawing a line segment of 
arbitrary length on a note pad.  Since my list has no dimensionality 
restrictions I suspect it can be one for one with the continuum.


Hal Ruhl





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-24 Thread scerir
Godfrey:
'MWI + Projection postulates should reproduce
regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically 
QM - Projection Postulates!'



Imagine a superposition like this

|'spin_z' +1 |'detector' +1 +
|'spin_z' -1 |'detector' -1

It describes a superposition of spin up/down 
states, and the entagled (or relative) states of a
detector.

Now imagine a second - whatever, human? - device, 
to measure a specific observable of the above 
superposition. 

Let this observable be such that the ray generated by 
the above superposition state is an eigenspace of this
observable, corresponding to a definite eigenvalue, 
the eigenvalue 'yes'. Since neither component of 
the above superposition state lies in the eigenspace 
of this observable, this observable fails to commute
with the 'spin_z' observable, and fails to commute
with the 'detector' observable.

We can write (canonically) ...   
|'z-spin' +1 |'detector' +1 |yes +
|'z-spin' -1 |'detector' -1 |yes

In a MWI, a world should instantiate an eigenvalue 
for an observable if the superposition term associated 
with that world is an eigenstate of the observable 
corresponding to that eigenvalue. 

So, after the (second) measurement, what would 
an Everettista write? 

This one?

|'z-spin' +1 |'detector' +1 |?  = world A
|'z-spin' -1 |'detector' -1 |?  = world B

(Since, in each world, the observable measured by 
the second - whatever, human? - device does not 
commute with the 'spin_z' observable, so it has no 
predeterminate value, that is to say that the outcome 
of the (second) measurement must occur by chance.)

Or this one?

|'z-spin' +1 |'detector' +1 |yes = world A
|'z-spin' -1 |'detector' -1 |yes = world B

(In this case the fact that the second device would later 
record the state |yes seems to be fixed ... in advance 
of the measurement itself. And this is magic. White Rabbit?
What else?)

Godfrey:
'I believe that YD is incompatible with 
the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite 
think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution 
plus Collapse, by the way.'

Maybe.

s.

[It is too late here, I cannot write more, and I cannot
check the above :-)]








Re: subjective reality

2005-08-24 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Aug 24, 2005 at 10:34:30AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 [RS]
 Interestingly, someone pointed me at a paper by Esche the other day,
 arguing that alternative projection postulates are compatible with
 the MWI. The precise alternative projection postulate they supplied
 turns out to be riddled with white rabbits - which makes me speculate
 that the Born rule is precisely what you need to kill off all the
 white rabbits in the MWI.
 
 [GK]
  I can't say I follow you here. MWI + Projection postulates should 
 reproduce
  regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection 
 Postulates!
  Now killing white rabbits with the Born rule!??? If that could be 
 done, seems to
 me, would obviate all the need for MWI in the first place, no?
 

Don't worry too much - I'm indulging in a bit of idle speculation for
the benefit of Brent, amongst others. See my post msg07791.html
(available from
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg07791.html
as the other archive appears to be out of action).

Cheers

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Description: PGP signature


Re: subjective reality

2005-08-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 22-août-05, à 17:17, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :



I guess I spoke too soon...




Do you think that YD is incompatible with (SWE + collapse) or with only 
SWE?


(YD = accepting an artificial brain for some level of description (Yes 
Doctor);

SWE = Schroedinger Wave Equation).


Imo, YD is the driving motor of the Everett interpretation of QM.

What is your opinion about quantum suicide, quantum immortality, and 
their comp (a priori more general) form?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-23 Thread kurtleegod


-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]

On Mon, Aug 22, 2005 at 01:15:22PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hi Tom,

  Than you can surely understand how disappointed I feel! It's even 
more

 like the hooka-smoking-Caterpillar
 since Bruno pulled the mushroom right from under me!!! Oh! Maybe was
 just a pipe dream, like those of that
 Lob(otomy?) machine of his. How sad!!!

 Sorry guys. Looks like I have been scooped...

 Godfrey Kurtz
 (New Brunswick, NJ)


But was your argument based on the white rabbit problem? And in any
case, the white rabbit problem is merely a problem for Bruno's thesis,
not a show stopper. As far as I'm aware, my solution to the white
rabbit problem is compatible with Bruno's COMP, although it does
require some additional assumptions. Nobody has checked this
thoroughly, of course.

[GK]
Hi Russell,

My argument is not based on the White Rabbit Problem since I don't
even know what that is, in all honesty! From reading Brunos's popular
 account I gather it has something to do with the possibility of 
finding

unruly or unexpected things once you believe the kind of theory he
and, I guess you, profess. No?

 Without meaning to disrespect your solutions, I think Quantum 
Mechanics

produces a very good deal of White Rabbits on its own, and by this
I mean predictions that thwart any of the everyday type of expectations
you place on reality! Have you heard of the Mean King Problem, for
example? If you want a big hat from where loads of these come out

 The argument I believe I have is just a simple working out of the 
premise

of YD till you get to a situation that our current knowledge of QM can
defeat. I am sure there are many more that you can think up with a
 bit of reflection. If you want to consider those White Rabbit's is 
entirely

up to you as long as you start getting used to have them around...

[RS]
So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine
argument against the YD, let's hear it.

Cheers

[GK]
 As I stated before I don't react very well to that style of macho 
pressure

in spite of my (clumsy) attempts to use it on Bruno!
As it turns out my argument may be of interest for another issue that
some people have been disputing in the land of quantum marginalia,
but I am not entirely convinced of that yet. When I am I may try and
sketch it for the list, though I am doubtful that you would have any
interest in it since its speculative level is orders of magnitude below
what you guys are used to... (;-)

Cheers indeed,

-Godfrey,


--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.

 


A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
 



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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-23 Thread kurtleegod


Sorry Russell, Everyone

One of mys sentences got mangled in the middle in my last reply.
I meant to direct you to the recent book by

Aharonov, Y.  and Rohrlich D.
Quantum Paradoxes: Quantum Theory for the Perplexed.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/3527403914/qid=1124806729/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-8758662-2102523?v=glances=books

as a source of quantum mechanical white rabbits.

Enjoy,

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

   International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02




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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-23 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Godfrey


At 01:09 PM 8/22/2005, you wrote:

Hi Hal,

I am sorry I have not responded to you previously and I
thank you for the further clarifications your provide
about your theory. Sounds quite extraordinary but
unfortunately I don't feel I grasp it well enough
to make any useful comment as to its contents.


There is a recent thread I started An All/Nothing universe model that 
gives some of the model's recent development.  I can not access the archive 
right now so I can not give you a URL for the start of the thread.



From what you say before it seems that you claim that
you derive YD, CT and AR from it which happen to be
Bruno's points of departure! Is that the case? Does
your All include false statements too?


I do not derive YD, CT or AR.  The model is based on a list of properties 
that objects can have.  Definition divides this list into two sub 
lists.  The Nothing has the sole property empty, the All has all the 
remaining properties.  The list of course would have properties that seem 
incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but 
nevertheless definitions create such objects as the is not member of the 
definitional pair.   So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so 
what?


It would seem that the All contains YD, CT, and AR since these are 
potential properties of objects and would be on the list.  I gave an 
example of a universe that seems compatible with these and seems to become 
more  compatible with our universe if one adds noise which is the result of 
the random dynamic.  The fact that YD may be incompatible with QM or any 
other item on the list is not relevant to the All but only to sequences of 
states of universes that are given instantations of reality by the dynamic.


Thus if Bruno's reasoning from YD, CT, and AR is correct -  I am not one to 
judge - then the All would contain  potential sequences of universe states 
compatible with comp.  The noise causes such sequences to jump tracks here 
and there.



I am asking this out of curiosity not because I see any
obvious way of addressing the falsification of your model.


As to falsifiability of my model I will try to list my assumptions, etc.:

1) There exists a list [call it the Everything] of all possible properties 
of objects that can have reality.


2) The list is divided into two sub lists by the process of definition 
[definition forms a definitional [is:is not] pair].


3) The definition resulting in the [Nothing:All] definitional pair is 
unavoidable and thus this pair has  simultaneous existence with the list.


It is then noted that the Nothing can not respond to any meaningful 
question about itself and there is such a question: Does it persist?  Thus 
the Nothing is incomplete.  The necessary attempt at resolution of this 
incompleteness by the Nothing by accessing [incorportating] parts of the 
list [a symmetry breaking?] results in a random dynamic within the All 
producing a randomly evolving Something [that which the Nothing has become 
by incorporating parts of the list] [an evolving universe].  But by #3 the 
Nothing must be restored so the process of creating randomly evolving 
Somethings repeats [a form of an MWI]. A random evolution can produce long 
strings of states of universes that can support Self Aware Structures 
[SAS], YD, comp etc.  [A state of a universe is one side of a definitional 
pair - a sub list, and I have in the past called sub lists kernels [of 
information] to tie in with some of my previous posts.]


That is my model in a nut shell.


I don't want to sound like a big stickler for Popper or
anything but I am sure you are familiar with the infamous
libel often directed at String Theory that it is not even false!


I believe that particular description is actually more like that is not 
even wrong [citation unknown] and may be older than string theory.  In any 
event I think we should be careful how we use descriptions such as 
true/false, right /wrong, compatible/incompatible, in contradiction with, 
etc. because they seem to have different domains.  I am now interested in 
how you and Bruno use such terms re comp, YD, UDA, QM, MWI, etc.


In that regard I think it is time you present your argument re YD/QM and 
see what the list has to say about it.


Hal Ruhl 





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-23 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Bruno,

I might have partly answered your query in my response to
Russell. I am not sure.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:55:07 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Le 22-août-05, à 17:17, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

 I guess I spoke too soon...

[BM]
 Do you think that YD is incompatible with (SWE + collapse) or with 
only SWE?


 (YD = accepting an artificial brain for some level of description 
(Yes Doctor);

SWE = Schroedinger Wave Equation).

[GK]
I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which
 I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus 
Collapse, by the way.
 But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that 
does it

(and entanglement, of course!)

[BM]
Imo, YD is the driving motor of the Everett interpretation of QM.

[GK]
 I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying 
that Everett
 based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I 
strongly doubt that...


[BM]
 What is your opinion about quantum suicide, quantum immortality, and 
their comp (a priori more general) form?



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


[GK]
 The short answer to that is that I agree with Milan Circovic (and 
David Lewis) on the issue of quantum suicide:


arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412147

[Check what he says on Everett, by the way...]
 Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a few 
other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions
 that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The 
general idea is that one has to be extremely
 careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context 
because they may not even be definable...


I can give you a longer answer, but you would like it even less...

Best regards,

-Godfrey


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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Norman,

Le 20-août-05, à 20:25, Norman Samish a écrit :


Bruno,
I don't know what you mean by this comment.  Could you please go 
into
more detail?  I realize this is speculation, nevertheless I'd like to 
know

what your speculation is.  Thanks,
Norman Samish
~~~
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2005 10:54 AM
Subject: Rép : subjective reality


. . . The next millenia?  It will be pschhht! or, something like an
uncontrollable creative big bang, from what I smell from comp.





To be alive, or conscious, or even just consistent always entail the 
possibility of being dead or inconsistent soon or later. To be alive is 
necessary to be in a fragile state. My version of Godel theorem for 
babies illustrates already this: it is when you stand up that you can 
fall.
I don't know if we are divine creature, but by comp we can already say 
that IF we are divine creature we can only be hypothetical. We would be 
divine *hypotheses*, and we would be infinitely wrong to take our 
existence as granted. In particular such a contempt would lead us to 
the fall, and like the dinosaurs we would disappear (the psct). If 
our modesty prevails we will continue to grow and multiply. For purely 
economical reason we will, or those who bet on comp will, live in 
virtual reality on computers that Robots will develop in Space and we 
will extend ourself in the galaxy. Humanity will perhaps divide into 
those who will take refuge at the center of the galaxy in or on its 
main black hole using his surface as a sort of quantum computer and 
into those who will escape the galaxy, and explore other galaxies. But 
all this is a little too much third person, when in reality, like 
always, first person reality will prevail and grow much faster than 
anything 3-person describable. And this of course I cannot describe.
We will always feel incomplete and always feel there is something more 
to say or to do.
Many will have bigger brain, but other will have lesser brain and learn 
to control amnesic path or how to born again without dying, and how to 
fuse identities and personalities.

Of course if YD is shown false, forget what I say.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 22-août-05, à 00:21, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

 By now you should have understood that I will not be taunted, so no 
use in trying. I do not pretend anything. What I
 have told you and maintain is that I can sketch an argument that 
shows that your YD is incompatible with QM being the
 correct physics of the world and I will do so as soon as you admit 
that this will invalidate ALL your thesis (not just the
 part of it you feel like conceding). This was my proposal all along 
and I have not changed it. So there is no point in

challenging me in these terms. I made clear already.



I thought you said you get a proof that YD is false. (Confirmed by my 
looking at your posts).
This would have invalidate the Universal Dovetailer Argument (but not 
its arithmetical translation as I explained before).


Now you are saying  that YD is just inconsistent with QM. This is a far 
much weaker statement,  which would not refute anything at all. On the 
contrary, given that my UDA-point says that comp entails verifiable 
physical statements (a whole comp-phys). And for me it is still an open 
problem if comp-phys is compatible with QM or not, or is even equal to 
QM or not.
Actually, if you read my thesis you will see that I arrive at a point 
where I conclude that comp (thus YD) seems to be  in contradiction with 
QM, because it gives a priori much more relative computational 
continuations than QM (the white rabbit problem), but then I explain 
that computer science and incompleteness phenomena force us to add many 
nuances, and this is what has lead me to make a  complete translation 
of UDA in arithmetic.


So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would 
still be very  interesting of course, so, please make your point.
Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis 
that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you 
don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a 
thesis that you admitted not having read).


Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't 
it?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Russell,

Touche' (:-)! I am going to claim a typo, on this one.
I will be more careful with my time from here on,
though come to think of it, 3.4 hours maybe
a good estimate on the time I manage to
dedicate to pure platonic contemplation
in a week, sadly...

Thanks for the humorous nit-picking.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Mon, 22 Aug 2005 09:19:40 +1000
Subject: Re: subjective reality

On Sun, Aug 21, 2005 at 06:21:13PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 I agree with you but I am a platonist 24/7 (=full-time)!


24/7 = 3.4285714... Why is this full time? Its a little bigger than Pi
(so a little bigger than a half a turn), maybe a bit more in the state
of Indiana (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi).

I'm jesting with you of course - you must mean 24 (hours) x 7 (days)
(per week), but I ask you, why do you confuse division and
multiplication?

Cheers

--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.

 


A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
 





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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Bruno,

I guess I spoke too soon...

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Mon, 22 Aug 2005 16:05:58 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Le 22-août-05, à 00:21, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

[GK]
  By now you should have understood that I will not be taunted, so no 

use in trying. I do not pretend anything. What I
  have told you and maintain is that I can sketch an argument that  
shows that your YD is incompatible with QM being the
  correct physics of the world and I will do so as soon as you admit  
that this will invalidate ALL your thesis (not just the
  part of it you feel like conceding). This was my proposal all along 

and I have not changed it. So there is no point in

 challenging me in these terms. I made clear already.

[BM]
 I thought you said you get a proof that YD is false. (Confirmed by my 
looking at your posts).
 This would have invalidate the Universal Dovetailer Argument (but not 
its arithmetical translation as I explained before).


 Now you are saying that YD is just inconsistent with QM. This is a far 
much weaker statement, which would not refute anything at all. On the 
contrary, given that my UDA-point says that comp entails verifiable 
physical statements (a whole comp-phys). And for me it is still an open 
problem if comp-phys is compatible with QM or not, or is even equal to 
QM or not.


[GK]
 I have never claimed to have a proof that YD is false only that I can 
give you an argument that QM can shoot down YD
 and this being the case, from what I understand from your previous 
post, means that your proof that physics is necessarily
 reducible to computer science is incorrect in the CT and AR are true. 
I quite sure you have stated that much in your

previous post.

 To be more specific my argument aims to show you that if QM is the 
correct microscopic description of the world (in which
 you apply YD) than YD is contradicts it. I am quite sure that I never 
stated anything different. I might have used the
 expression if YD is false as a condition but that means if my 
argument is correct.


[BM]
 Actually, if you read my thesis you will see that I arrive at a point 
where I conclude that comp (thus YD) seems to be in contradiction with 
QM, because it gives a priori much more relative computational 
continuations than QM (the white rabbit problem), but then I explain 
that computer science and incompleteness phenomena force us to add many 
nuances, and this is what has lead me to make a complete translation of 
UDA in arithmetic.


[GK]
 This is news to me! If I read you right it means that you already 
proved my point! That is reassuring. I had some lingering
 doubts about my argument, of course, but seems that my intuitions are 
correct at least since you have anticipated them.


 Now which one of those nuances that you speak of salvages an 
hypothesis that contradicts QM? I'm curious...


[BM]
 So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would 
still be very interesting of course, so, please make your point.
 Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis 
that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you 
don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a 
thesis that you admitted not having read).


[GK]
 Bruno, you are just too kind! I would describe it the other way round: 
I am way behind your thesis since you already argued
 my point out affirmatively! I guess that is the problem with us White 
Rabbits always arriving late...



 Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't 
it?


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[GK]
 Well, I am kind of discouraged now. It would no longer be my point 
since you already proved it and made it yours.

Let me think about it.

Best regards,

Godfrey

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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread daddycaylor
Well, Godfrey, I just want to voice my reaction that I am 
disappointed that in the end you really have no new point.

It seems that you are more like the Mad Hatter or Cheshire Cat.

Tom

[BM]
 So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would 
still be very interesting of course, so, please make your point.
 Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis 
that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you 
don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a 
thesis that you admitted not having read).


[GK]
 Bruno, you are just too kind! I would describe it the other way round: 
I am way behind your thesis since you already argued
 my point out affirmatively! I guess that is the problem with us White 
Rabbits always arriving late...


 Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't 
it?


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[GK] 
 Well, I am kind of discouraged now. It would no longer be my point 
since you already proved it and made it yours. 

Let me think about it. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Godfrey 




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Tom,

 Than you can surely understand how disappointed I feel! It's even more 
like the hooka-smoking-Caterpillar
 since Bruno pulled the mushroom right from under me!!! Oh! Maybe was 
just a pipe dream, like those of that

Lob(otomy?) machine of his. How sad!!!

Sorry guys. Looks like I have been scooped...

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: kurtleegod; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Mon, 22 Aug 2005 13:06:03 -0400
Subject: Re: subjective reality

 Well, Godfrey, I just want to voice my reaction that I am 
disappointed that in the end you really have no new point.

It seems that you are more like the Mad Hatter or Cheshire Cat.

Tom

[BM]
 So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would 
still be very interesting of course, so, please make your point.
 Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis 
that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you 
don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a 
thesis that you admitted not having read).


[GK]
 Bruno, you are just too kind! I would describe it the other way round: 
I am way behind your thesis since you already argued
 my point out affirmatively! I guess that is the problem with us White 
Rabbits always arriving late...


 Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't 
it?


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[GK]
 Well, I am kind of discouraged now. It would no longer be my point 
since you already proved it and made it yours.

Let me think about it.

Best regards,

Godfrey




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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Hal,

I am sorry I have not responded to you previously and I
thank you for the further clarifications your provide
about your theory. Sounds quite extraordinary but
unfortunately I don't feel I grasp it well enough
to make any useful comment as to its contents.

From what you say before it seems that you claim that
you derive YD, CT and AR from it which happen to be
Bruno's points of departure! Is that the case? Does
your All include false statements too?

I am asking this out of curiosity not because I see any
obvious way of addressing the falsification of your model.
I don't want to sound like a big stickler for Popper or
anything but I am sure you are familiar with the infamous
libel often directed at String Theory that it is not even false!

It is always easy to marvel at a construction in the sky
when we don't see the strings (pass the pun) that hold
it up...

Best regards,


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 16:34:22 -0400
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfrey:

 My model starts with what I describe as unavoidable definition - of 
the All and [simultaneously] the Nothing.


 Any definition defines a pair of two objects. The target object such 
as a flower [the is part of the pair] and an object that has the 
remainder of the list of all properties etc. of all possible objects 
[the is not part of the pair]. Generally the is not part of the 
pair is of little use. The All and the Nothing are an interesting is, 
is not definitional pair. The All is the entire list and the Nothing 
is the absence of the entire list.


The Nothing is inherently incomplete and this results in the dynamic.

 This is a brief semi intro and I have posted on this model before as 
it has developed.


 Now the All part contains all possible states of all possible 
universes. This should include the one I believe represents ours. 
Therefore my All seems to contain universes that support YD and thus 
comp if Bruno is correct.


To answer your questions as best I currently can:

 My model appears to contain YD, CT, and AR so if Bruno's follow on 
reasoning is correct and if in fact my model contains YD, CT, and AR 
then it contains comp but it is not the same as comp - it would embed 
comp.


 Is my model falsifiable? I will have to think about that - after all I 
just recently got to where it supports a flow of consciousness. Since 
the model does not say exactly what is on the list that is the All and 
the 'instantation of reality dynamic is random then what indeed is the 
scope of all possible states of all possible universes and the 
resulting actually implemented evolving universes?


 In any event it would be interesting to see if YD can be shown to be 
false. I think that might start to constrain the All and that would be 
interesting - [why that constraint and what others are there?].


Hal

At 10:44 AM 8/19/2005, you wrote:
Hi Hal,

  From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your 
model is  identical or
  distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so 
let  me ask you:


  Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still dance if 
that  is the case?


  I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less  
interesting than

falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand

Best regards,

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)




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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-22 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Aug 22, 2005 at 01:15:22PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hi Tom,
 
  Than you can surely understand how disappointed I feel! It's even more 
 like the hooka-smoking-Caterpillar
  since Bruno pulled the mushroom right from under me!!! Oh! Maybe was 
 just a pipe dream, like those of that
 Lob(otomy?) machine of his. How sad!!!
 
 Sorry guys. Looks like I have been scooped...
 
 Godfrey Kurtz
 (New Brunswick, NJ)
 

But was your argument based on the white rabbit problem? And in any
case, the white rabbit problem is merely a problem for Bruno's thesis,
not a show stopper. As far as I'm aware, my solution to the white
rabbit problem is compatible with Bruno's COMP, although it does
require some additional asumptions. Nobody has checked this
thoroughly, of course.

So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine
argument against the YD, let's hear it.

Cheers

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02



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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-21 Thread kurtleegod


Hi Bruno,
Not quite there yet, but making progress

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sat, 20 Aug 2005 19:44:44 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Le 19-août-05, à 18:13, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : 
 
 [GK] 
  I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those  
would actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into 
  a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is  
amiss in your world! 


[BM] 
 OK if it is a temporary interdiction. The YD will entail that we are 
duplicable in a weak sense (which does not contravene the no-cloning 
theorem (but here I anticipate the reasoning)). 

You pretend YD is false, show the proof. 
 
[GK]
 By now you should have understood that I will not be taunted, so no 
use in trying. I do not pretend anything. What I
 have told you and maintain is that I can sketch an argument that shows 
that your YD is incompatible with QM being the
 correct physics of the world and I will do so as soon as you admit 
that this will invalidate ALL your thesis (not just the
 part of it you feel like conceding). This was my proposal all along 
and I have not changed it. So there is no point in

challenging me in these terms. I made clear already.

 
 [GK] 
  What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. 

That allows me to dismiss anything you say based 

 on that premise. 
 
 Of course. But of course, everything I say from CT and AR alone will 
survive. I hope you see this clearly. 

 
[GK]
 If you claim that you derive the whole of physics (including QM) from 
CT and AR alone there is no point in my showing you that
 physics invalidates YD! Is there? You would know that already, or you 
could derive it independently! Whether I am right or
 wrong would be completely indiferent to you. Why would you even 
consider my argument?

 
  That is actually not general at all but extremely specific. From 
here  on I will make no comment on 
  any sentence you preface with But from COMP (or YD) I can prove  
that... . Nothing personal, please understand. 

   
[BM]
 Sure. Except that in a second round (the interview of the lobian 
machine) I translate comp in arithmetic, and I extract *a* physics 
from that COMP. To understand that translation YD is very useful, but 
no more. Then if the physics that is extracted from the arithmetical 
COMP corresponds to the empirical physics, your proof of the falsity of 
the YD would show that a falsity has helped in discovering the origin 
of the physical laws. Funny but not entirely impossible. Except that, 
without wanting to discourage you in advance, it is very hard for me to 
believe you have find a proof or an argument showing comp is wrong. But 
that makes me just more curious. 


[GK] 
 OK. Let me ask you this than and maybe help you avoid any more painful 
contortions: can you even imagine a situation in
 which you could be proven wrong? (Please remember how many times you 
have underscored that COMP is verifiable!)

 
(skipped)
 
I take it like that. 
 You are telling me you are platonist the week and not platonist the 
week-end? 

Or ditto means you agree with *me*, I guess. 
[GK] 
I agree with you but I am a platonist 24/7 (=full-time)!

 [GK] 
  In that case enjoy the prize! If you derived the laws of physics 
from  CT and AR alone you surely deserve the recognition you 
  will enjoy because that is a remarkable accomplishment!  
Congratulations! 

 
 
 But there is a derivation of a physics from CT and AR. Just to 
understand *that* intuitively you need YD. I have done two things the 
universal dovetailer argument (UDA) which shows that YD + CT + AR 
entails that physics emerges necessary from a web of machine dreams 
(say, dream being entirely defined in term of computer science or 
number theory). 
 But then in the second part, called sometime the arithmetical 
universal dovetailer argument (AUDA), or more simply the interview of 
the lobian machine, I translate (UDA) in arithmetic (because comp 
makes it possible and necessary). YD disappears or is translated in 
arithmetic (by Godel-like devices). The derivation of physics is purely 
mathematical of course, I am not a magician extracting the galaxies 
from someone saying yes to a doctor. 

It looks like it disappoints you, but there is two parts in my work: 
 
 UDA: an argument that YD + CT + AR implies physics is necessarily a 
branch of computer science. 
 AUDA: a translation of the argument in arithmetic, with the (modest) 
result that the logic of the observable proposition is given by the 
composition of three mathematical transformations operating on a 
well-known modal logic (G). And it already looks enough like some 
quantum logics to encourage further research. Alas the math are not 
easy and not well known. 

 
[GK]
 This hardly sounds like a derivation to me. But if your first 
statement above (UDA

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Aug 21, 2005 at 06:21:13PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 I agree with you but I am a platonist 24/7 (=full-time)!
 

24/7 = 3.4285714... Why is this full time? Its a little bigger than Pi
(so a little bigger than a half a turn), maybe a bit more in the state
of Indiana (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi).

I'm jesting with you of course - you must mean 24 (hours) x 7 (days)
(per week), but I ask you, why do you confuse division and
multiplication?

Cheers

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02



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Description: PGP signature


Re: subjective reality

2005-08-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Stephen,

Le 19-août-05, à 22:47, Stephen Paul King a écrit :

   It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof 
that a Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about 
falsifying YD not a requirement that we prove a negative proposition?



Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a 
machine, Yes doctor, en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine 
have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism: 
machine can behave *like*  if they had phenomenal qualia.


To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note 
one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis, 
you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences 
(or subjective, first person, private, etc.).


To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show 
that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be 
turing emulable.


Logically (that is, without OCCAM) we have

comp == STRONG AI == MEC-BEH

Note that STRONG AI does not entail comp, because machine could think 
does not entail only machine could think (of course if machine can 
think then with OCCAM, it is reasonable to suppose comp. But given I 
propose a proof it is important to keep in mind we cannotI use OCCAM. I 
mean I doen't propose any original theory, I take the oldest one and 
show it is incompatible with another old prejudice: 
materialisme/naturalism/physicalism).


So comp is the strongest hypothesis. Now, comp is weaker than any 
theory which fixe a level of description. In that sense comp is very 
weak. Indeed comp is weaker that quantum mechanics (without collapse), 
or any actual theory except Penrose one (despite defect in Penrose 
reasoning, the conclusion are similar: comp and materialism are 
incompatible.


Regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: [offtopic] Re: subjective reality

2005-08-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 19-août-05, à 20:00, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :



No harm done. I think I understand your comment and I fully
agree that I sound like I am bluffing.



To say the less ... :-)




But I still have hope that
Bruno will come to his senses




Well thanks Godfrey. I also hope I will come to my senses. Actually I  
hope I am in my senses.
And I hope you are in your senses too, or, if not, that you will come  
to your senses, too.






and accept my bargain (which is
much less risky than the one his Doctor proposes, by the way!)




Yes but some will think that accepting an artificial part of the brain  
is much less risky when the alternative is dying and suffering  
quasi-surely the next month.


Technology has already invaded the brain. Comp is already practiced.

I show that comp is falsifiable.

You pretend that the YD is already false! I can understand Quentin's  
impatience.


I know already you can't be serious, because you pretend talking about  
something I would not have anticipated, but you acknowledge not having  
the need to read what I wrote (!?).
And at the same time you are saying something very big. To refute YD  
you need to show that there are no level of description of ourselves  
capable of being Turing-emulable.
You would refute my reasoning at step 0! Go ahead. You are the first  
one who tries this. In general people try at least at step 3!


(I follow the numbering (8 steps) of the Universal Dovetailer Argument   
like in this pdf slides:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf
Explanations are in the SANE paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ 
SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html)


Oh I see you have another post still without your argument! I will  
answer it quickly because I indulge your little diversions but it is  
probably a weakness of my part.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 19-août-05, à 18:13, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :



[GK]
 I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those 
would actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into
 a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is 
amiss in your world!



OK if it is a temporary interdiction. The YD will entail that we are 
duplicable in a weak sense (which does not contravene the no-cloning 
theorem (but here I anticipate the reasoning)).

You pretend YD is false, show the proof.




[GK]
 What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. 
That allows me to dismiss anything you say based

 on that premise.



Of course. But of course, everything I say from CT and AR alone will 
survive. I hope you see this clearly.




 That is actually not general at all but extremely specific. From here 
on I will make no comment on
 any sentence you preface with But from COMP (or YD) I can prove 
that... . Nothing personal, please understand.




Sure. Except that in a second round (the interview of the lobian 
machine) I translate comp in arithmetic, and I extract *a* physics 
from that COMP. To understand that translation YD is very useful, but 
no more. Then if the physics that is extracted from the arithmetical 
COMP corresponds to the empirical physics, your proof of the falsity of 
the YD would show that a falsity has helped in discovering the origin 
of the physical laws. Funny but not entirely impossible. Except that, 
without wanting to discourage you in advance, it is very hard for me to 
believe you have find a proof or an argument showing comp is wrong. But 
that makes me just more curious.





Now, although 99, % of the mathematician  are platonist 
during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the

week-end!).


 [GK]

 Ditto.

Hope you are not serious!

[GK]
Sorry! Ditto over here in the States is used as a note of agreement.




I take it like that.
You are telling me you are platonist the week and not platonist the 
week-end?

Or ditto means you agree with *me*, I guess.



[GK]
 In that case enjoy the prize! If you derived the laws of physics from 
CT and AR alone you surely deserve the recognition you
 will enjoy because that is a remarkable accomplishment! 
Congratulations!




But there is a derivation of a physics from CT and AR. Just to 
understand *that* intuitively you need YD.  I have done two things the 
universal dovetailer argument (UDA) which shows that YD + CT + AR 
entails that physics emerges necessary from a web of machine dreams 
(say, dream being entirely defined in term of computer science or 
number theory).
But then in the second part, called sometime the arithmetical universal 
dovetailer argument (AUDA), or more simply the interview of the lobian 
machine,  I translate (UDA) in arithmetic (because comp makes it 
possible and necessary). YD disappears or is translated in arithmetic 
(by Godel-like devices). The derivation of physics is purely 
mathematical of course, I am not a magician extracting the galaxies 
from someone saying yes to a doctor.

It looks like it disappoints you, but there is two parts in my work:

UDA: an argument that YD + CT + AR implies physics is necessarily a 
branch of computer science.
AUDA: a translation of the argument in arithmetic, with the (modest) 
result that the logic of the observable proposition is given by the 
composition of three mathematical transformations operating on a 
well-known modal logic (G). And it already looks enough like some 
quantum logics to encourage further research. Alas the math are not 
easy and not well known.





 I feel like saying: my work here is done!



But it is done. Yes of course.And  if YD is false (which I doubt), UDA 
will be dead, ok, but it will make the AUDA much more enigmatic!





Without even trying I have let you relinquish one of your hypothesis!



It looks your goal is shooting me completely:  the UDA and AUDA!
I have absolutely no worry about YD, but it is a logical fact you ask 
me to make clear: even if that were true (that YD is false), that would 
kill one halve only, the one some people ask me sometimes to drop out, 
but I prefer to keep it for preventing positivistic interpretation of 
machine's discourses.





[GK]
 Well, YD is so secondary to your purposes, why do you care?



Because many people take YD for granted, already. Because it makes the 
comp-physics obligatory making the whole of comp testable. YD is 
secondary for the extraction of physics, but it is necessary for having 
an understanding why it is a derivation of physics. I am anormaly 
patient, you could understand this by reading the UDA, and the 
beginning of the AUDA.






I am almost sure you would approve my version but I am not
putting it down until you give me a good reason to do it!!!



Because that would kill the first half of my PhD thesis and makes the 
second part enigmatic.
But many in this list find YD plausible and if you can show it false, 
please 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-20 Thread Norman Samish
Bruno,
I don't know what you mean by this comment.  Could you please go into 
more detail?  I realize this is speculation, nevertheless I'd like to know 
what your speculation is.  Thanks,
Norman Samish
~~~
- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2005 10:54 AM
Subject: Rép : subjective reality


. . . The next millenia?  It will be pschhht! or, something like an 
uncontrollable creative big bang, from what I smell from comp. 



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Godfrey,

Le 18-août-05, à 20:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :


[BM]
 OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything 
lists that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a 
solution of the measurement problem. All measurements are just 
interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to 
me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM 
where F = ma can be deduced from the sum on all histories. But this 
is going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand 
the comp derivation. We can come back on this latter.


[GK]
 Here we part company. MWI (I prefer to call it Everett's 
Interpretation or EQM) is NOT a solution to the measurement
 problem of QM but an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that does 
not lead to that problem! It does however have
 a tripartite problem of its own that, in my opinion, is just the 
measurement problem blown up. In any case what you say
 afterwords does not follow (from EQM or QM). There are 
non-interactive measurements that people have been looking
 into for a while now (Dicke, Elitzur-Vaidman, etc...). I am sure you 
guys touched on these sometime ago...


 But all of this is irrelevant for my purpose at hand which is for you 
to commit to the proposition that No-YD: no Bruno!




We agree it is not relevant for our purpose! Just two words: As a 
logician I don't consider Everett proposed a new interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, but a new formulation of quantum mechanics. It is 
really SWE + comp. (as opposed to the Copenhagen formulation which is 
SWE + an unintelligible dualist theory of mind. Then what I say can 
be sum up like this: Everett theory is redundant: SWE follows from 
comp. But this is another thread, and we can come back on Everett 
later.

No YD, no Bruno!?!   You make me anxious :)

SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation
YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital 
generalized brain. First axiom of comp.
(Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them 
once by mail).





 It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite 
care if you take refuge in another Everett World.

That
 would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I 
digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies!




Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really 
the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD).






[GK]
 I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that 
COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would
 shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my 
non-existence if YD is false.




Only if YD is *proved*  false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from 
the SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if 
SWE is false!). You are saying something very general here!





 BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more 
precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can 
use the term axioms, postulates, theses, premises, 
assumptions, hypotheses, etc.. in a similar way.


[GK]
 I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am 
pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses
 tout court. These three assumptions do not have the same epistemic 
status and it is misleading to call them the same.
 If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your 
point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising 
either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore 
below:




Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most people 
to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist).







[GK]
 Agreed, than . In any case one unassailable counterexample would 
shoot down CT, deep and  Kleene as it is (:-)




Exactly!





[BM]
 Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my 
reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying Ah, but you are a 
platonist!. So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a 
sort of cop out. Now, although 99, % of the mathematician 
are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the 
week-end!).


[GK]

Ditto.


Hope you are not serious!





(skiip)

 (1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR

'course.

[GK]
Good!




Well, you will perhaps accuse me of weaseling out again, but thinking 
twice, I believe I have answer too quickly in the sense that for saying 
yes for an artificial *digital* brain to a Doctor you need to know a 
bit what digital means, and for this you need CT (Church Thesis), and 
for this, I think, you need AR (Arithmetical Realism). But as you say, 
CT and AR are mainly bodyguards of YD.







  (2) GK: CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically 
(or we

both like them that way, which is the same).


[BM]
 I give the opportunity to make comp false in more than one way. If 
you read the Maudlin paper, you will see that he 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Hal,

 From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model 
is identical or
 distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let 
me ask you:


 Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still dance if 
that is the case?


 I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less 
interesting than

falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand

Best regards,

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 17:34:48 -0400
Subject: Re: subjective reality

 With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe 
consists of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral 
locations arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is 
confined to a region of discrete locations that surround its neutral 
location in the grid. I like this grid because its symmetries appear to 
allow a set of first order oscillations of the points within their 
regions in a unit cell consisting of 12 points around one with all 
triples being on straight lines that pass through the central point to 
represent the basic particles of the Standard Model. I call such 
oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move through the grid 
but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a SAS) consist of 
semi stable associations of nearby [small] dances.


 The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region 
asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its 
region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA].


 At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at 
all.


 The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of 
universal computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the 
done effectively part] since large dances can be self interactive.


 The other things that are in my model which is derived from my is 
is not definitional approach is that the imbedding system:


 1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist 
[multi world and the model's link to AR],


 2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of 
reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the 
accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of 
the noise] recently observed),


 3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality 
that overlap [the flow of consciousness].


In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp.

 I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some 
degree convergent.


Hal Ruhl



Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and 
industry-leading spam and email virus protection.




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, I apologize if I misunderstood your differents posts here as I'm not an 
english native but I find very insulting your way to discuss with people...

Either you have an argument to the YD hypothesis, either you haven't... stop 
turning around the hole...

Quentin
Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
 Hi Hal,

   From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model
 is identical or
   distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let
 me ask you:

   Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still dance if
 that is the case?

   I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less
 interesting than
  falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand

  Best regards,

  Godfrey Kurtz
  (New Brunswick, NJ)

  -Original Message-
  From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 17:34:48 -0400
  Subject: Re: subjective reality

   With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe
 consists of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral
 locations arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is
 confined to a region of discrete locations that surround its neutral
 location in the grid. I like this grid because its symmetries appear to
 allow a set of first order oscillations of the points within their
 regions in a unit cell consisting of 12 points around one with all
 triples being on straight lines that pass through the central point to
 represent the basic particles of the Standard Model. I call such
 oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move through the grid
 but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a SAS) consist of
 semi stable associations of nearby [small] dances.

   The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region
 asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its
 region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA].

   At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at
 all.

   The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of
 universal computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the
 done effectively part] since large dances can be self interactive.

   The other things that are in my model which is derived from my is
 is not definitional approach is that the imbedding system:

   1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist
 [multi world and the model's link to AR],

   2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of
 reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the
 accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of
 the noise] recently observed),

   3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality
 that overlap [the flow of consciousness].

  In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp.

   I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some
 degree convergent.

  Hal Ruhl


 
 Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and
 industry-leading spam and email virus protection.



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Godfrey,

As you wrote in reply to others, local deterministic models seem to be ruled
out. The class of all formally describable models is much larger than that
of only the local deterministic models. So, although 't Hooft may  be proved
wrong (if loopholes like pre-determinism don't save him), non-local models
can reproduce QM.


Saibal




- Original Message - 
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 06:07 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


 Hi Saibal,

   Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our
 cis-plankian
   one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go
 theorems of
   quantum physics are in small print is because his reading glasses
 are no
   longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of
 simple
   deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as his
 little
  examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree.

   However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth
 looking
   into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world
 we know
  and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some
   discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) and
 all
   indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models
 alone.
  't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and
  he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him less
   than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for
 non-abelian gauge
   theories in his youth I suspect god's dice are loaded against him
 this time.

  However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at Harvard
   this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous
 animations...

  Godfrey Kurtz
  (New Brunswick, NJ)

  -Original Message-
  From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Sat, 13 Aug 2005 01:34:19 +0200
  Subject: Re: subjective reality

  Hi Godfrey,

  't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
  physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
   deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists
 working on
   ''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such
 bold
  assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.

   As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models.
 It
   seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any
 serious
   work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say
 that
   anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One
 could
   imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could
 yield
  the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
   fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists,
 then
  you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''.

  Saibal



   Hi Saibal,
  
   You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in
   QFTh.
But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in
 which
non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet).
 Understandably
   't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
   very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
   slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of
   Physics).
  
   So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from
   which one
can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no
 way
   bypasses
   the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.
  
He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an
 thus
   classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out
   just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him!
   That much I will grant you...
  
   (Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell
   you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- )
  
   Best regards
  
   Godfrey Kurtz
   (New Brunswick, NJ)
  
   -Original Message-
   From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
   Sent: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 21:11:30 +0200
   Subject: Re: subjective reality
  
   Godfrey Kurtz wrote
  
More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any
   non-quantum
mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things,
   Bruno.
Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
to be.
  
  
   There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't
   Hooft.
  
  
  
   http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021
  
  
   http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Bruno,

 OK. I think we are making progress. I will start the other thread 
after this message
 as I don't really have more obvious divergences from you and you are 
kind enough
 to indulge me in this little diversion. As before I will erase the 
obvious points of

agreement below...


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 11:48:06 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfrey,

Le 18-août-05, à 20:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
(skipped)

[BM]
No YD, no Bruno!?! You make me anxious :)

[GK]
 I am sorry! That was very callous of me! I really did not mean to 
imply that you would be eliminated
 by my argument! Much on the contrary, I am hoping you will be... 
illuminated (;-) !!!


[BM]
SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation
 YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital 
generalized brain. First axiom of comp.
 (Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them 
once by mail).



  It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite  
care if you take refuge in another Everett World.

 That
  would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I  
digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies!


[BM]
 Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really 
the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD).


[GK]
 I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those would 
actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into
 a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is 
amiss in your world!


 [GK]
  I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that 

COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would
  shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my  
non-existence if YD is false.



 Only if YD is *proved* false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from 
the SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if 
SWE is false!). You are saying something very general here!


[GK]
 What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. 
That allows me to dismiss anything you say based
 on that premise. That is actually not general at all but extremely 
specific. From here on I will make no comment on
 any sentence you preface with But from COMP (or YD) I can prove 
that... . Nothing personal, please understand.



  BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more  
precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can  
use the term axioms, postulates, theses, premises,  
assumptions, hypotheses, etc.. in a similar way.


 [GK]
  I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am 

pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses
  tout court. These three assumptions do not have the same epistemic 

status and it is misleading to call them the same.
  If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your  
point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising  
either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore  
below:


[BM]
 Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most 
people to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist).


[GK]
 Oh I would not worry! Computer scientists are by, now, used to have 
their hopes dashed (;-). And you strike me as a real

grown-up since you are not afraid of facing up to empirical testing!

(skipped)

 [BM]
  Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my  
reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying Ah, but you are a  
platonist!. So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a  
sort of cop out. Now, although 99, % of the mathematician  
are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the 

week-end!).


 [GK]

 Ditto.

Hope you are not serious!

[GK]
Sorry! Ditto over here in the States is used as a note of agreement.


(skipped)

[BM]
 Well, you will perhaps accuse me of weaseling out again, but thinking 
twice, I believe I have answer too quickly in the sense that for saying 
yes for an artificial *digital* brain to a Doctor you need to know a 
bit what digital means, and for this you need CT (Church Thesis), and 
for this, I think, you need AR (Arithmetical Realism). But as you say, 
CT and AR are mainly bodyguards of YD.


[GK]
 Oh. No problem there. Maybe I did not make it clear enough. What I am 
suggesting is that we (you and I) agree implicitly
 that CT and AR are unassailably true for the purposes of my argument! 
I will in fact need that to be the case at the very least
 for CT. As for digital brain I am sure we can reach some agreement 
on that.


(skipped)



 [GK]
  Bruno, you are weaseling out again, here! Let me ask you this in  
clear terms again:


  Can you, Yes or No, derive your whole grand manege from CT and AR 

alone?


  Because if it is a yes here I will give you the Oscar

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread kurtleegod

Dear Quentin,

Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you
 since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you 
personally!


 I have used some irony in discussing with Bruno but meant no harm by 
it.
 My feeling from reading the different posts is that people in this 
list have

some sense of humor and do not take their theories so
seriously that any play around is taken in personal terms!

I take turning around the hole to mean something like beating around
 the bush. In that case, I am afraid I cannot comply just yet. Please 
see my
 last message to Bruno. I am not bluffing, just hoping to break his 
bluff and I

don't think he is insulted (Bruno?)

---

 To the rest of the crowd: if this is a generalized feeling, please let 
me know,
 and I will withdraw from the list. I surely don't want to ruffle any 
feathers!


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 17:15:47 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

 Hi, I apologize if I misunderstood your differents posts here as I'm 
not an
 english native but I find very insulting your way to discuss with 
people...


 Either you have an argument to the YD hypothesis, either you 
haven't... stop

turning around the hole...

Quentin
Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
 Hi Hal,

 From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model
 is identical or
  distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so 
let

 me ask you:

 Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still dance if
 that is the case?

 I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less
 interesting than
 falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand

 Best regards,

 Godfrey Kurtz
 (New Brunswick, NJ)

 -Original Message-
 From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 17:34:48 -0400
 Subject: Re: subjective reality

 With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe
 consists of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral
 locations arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is
 confined to a region of discrete locations that surround its neutral
  location in the grid. I like this grid because its symmetries appear 
to

 allow a set of first order oscillations of the points within their
 regions in a unit cell consisting of 12 points around one with all
  triples being on straight lines that pass through the central point 
to

 represent the basic particles of the Standard Model. I call such
  oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move through the 
grid
  but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a SAS) consist 
of

 semi stable associations of nearby [small] dances.

 The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region
  asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in 
its

 region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA].

 At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at
 all.

 The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of
 universal computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the
 done effectively part] since large dances can be self interactive.

 The other things that are in my model which is derived from my is
 is not definitional approach is that the imbedding system:

 1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist
 [multi world and the model's link to AR],

 2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of
 reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the
 accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of
 the noise] recently observed),

 3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality
 that overlap [the flow of consciousness].

 In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp.

 I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some
 degree convergent.

 Hal Ruhl


  


 Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and
 industry-leading spam and email virus protection.




Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and 
industry-leading spam and email virus protection.





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Saibal,

You are entirely correct about that. Non-local models can indeed
reproduce QM. No surprise than that all the remaining approaches to
 the unification of physical theories still fighting it out (string/M 
theories,
 loop quantum gravity, twistor theory) are non-loca,l unlike the old 
QFTs.

That is not the case with 't Hooft's CA models, of course. But he has
later began to play with (deterministic) M-brane type ideas (since he
started teaching string theory) and those may hold better promise.

He is also no longer insisting on the pre-determinism loophole notion
(at least the last time I heard him this year). Maybe he realized that
made him sound a bit foolish...

His web site is always entertaining:

http://www.phys.uu.nl/~thooft/

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)


-Original Message-
From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 18:06:23 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfrey,

 As you wrote in reply to others, local deterministic models seem to be 
ruled
 out. The class of all formally describable models is much larger than 
that
 of only the local deterministic models. So, although 't Hooft may be 
proved
 wrong (if loopholes like pre-determinism don't save him), non-local 
models

can reproduce QM.


Saibal




- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 06:07 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


 Hi Saibal,

 Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our
 cis-plankian
 one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go
 theorems of
 quantum physics are in small print is because his reading glasses
 are no
 longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of
 simple
  deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as 
his

 little
 examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree.

 However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth
 looking
 into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world
 we know
 and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some
  discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) 
and

 all
 indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models
 alone.
 't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and
  he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him 
less

 than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for
 non-abelian gauge
 theories in his youth I suspect god's dice are loaded against him
 this time.

  However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at 
Harvard

 this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous
 animations...

 Godfrey Kurtz
 (New Brunswick, NJ)

 -Original Message-
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Sat, 13 Aug 2005 01:34:19 +0200
 Subject: Re: subjective reality

 Hi Godfrey,

  't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck 
scale

 physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
 deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists
 working on
  ''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make 
such

 bold
 assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.

  As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of 
models.

 It
 seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any
 serious
  work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would 
say

 that
 anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One
 could
  imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory 
could

 yield
 the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
  fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really 
exists,

 then
  you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden 
variables''.


 Saibal



  Hi Saibal,
 
   You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents 
in

  QFTh.
  But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in
 which
  non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet).
 Understandably
  't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
  very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
   slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future 
of

  Physics).
 
   So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models 
from

  which one
  can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no
 way
  bypasses
  the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.
 
  He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an
 thus
   classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him 
out
   just yet. If any one

[offtopic] Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Dear,

Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 18:27, vous avez écrit :
 Dear Quentin,

  Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you
   since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you
 personally!

No, none directed to me... I don't know if it's my poor comprehension of 
english... but anyway I don't really like when people just want to show by 
acting as if they knew the real knowledge... I apologize for feeling it 
like that... But as it was not your intention.

I would feel shame to ask you to unsubscribe, it wasn't at all my intention, 
just let the discussion stay sane (with a message like mine, I understand it 
's not the better way for it to stay sane ;).

Quentin



Re: [offtopic] Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Quentin,

No harm done. I think I understand your comment and I fully
agree that I sound like I am bluffing. But I still have hope that
Bruno will come to his senses and accept my bargain (which is
much less risky than the one his Doctor proposes, by the way!)

I take it that French is your native language from your reply header.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 18:48:48 +0200
Subject: [offtopic] Re: subjective reality

Dear,

Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 18:27, vous avez écrit :
 Dear Quentin,

 Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you
 since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you
 personally!

 No, none directed to me... I don't know if it's my poor comprehension 
of
 english... but anyway I don't really like when people just want to 
show by
 acting as if they knew the real knowledge... I apologize for feeling 
it

like that... But as it was not your intention.

 I would feel shame to ask you to unsubscribe, it wasn't at all my 
intention,
 just let the discussion stay sane (with a message like mine, I 
understand it

's not the better way for it to stay sane ;).

Quentin




Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and 
industry-leading spam and email virus protection.





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Godfrey:

My model starts with what I describe as unavoidable definition - of the All 
and [simultaneously] the Nothing.


Any definition defines a pair of two objects.  The target object such as a 
flower [the is part of the pair] and an object that has the remainder of 
the list of all properties etc. of all possible objects [the is not part 
of the pair].  Generally the is not part of the pair is of little 
use.  The All and the Nothing are an interesting is, is not 
definitional pair.  The All is the entire list and the Nothing is the 
absence of the entire list.


The Nothing is inherently incomplete and this results in the dynamic.

This is a brief semi intro and I have posted on this model before as it has 
developed.


Now the All part contains all possible states of all possible 
universes.  This should include the one I believe represents 
ours.  Therefore my All seems to contain universes that support YD and thus 
comp if Bruno is correct.


To answer your questions as best I currently can:

My model appears to contain YD, CT, and AR so if Bruno's follow on 
reasoning is correct and if in fact my model contains YD, CT, and AR then 
it contains comp but it is not the same as comp - it would embed comp.


Is my model falsifiable?  I will have to think about that  -  after all I 
just recently got to where it supports a flow of consciousness.  Since the 
model does not say exactly what is on the list that is the All and the 
'instantation of reality dynamic is random then what indeed is the scope 
of all possible states of all possible universes and the resulting 
actually implemented evolving universes?


In any event it would be interesting to see if YD can be shown to be 
false.  I think that might start to constrain the All and that would be 
interesting - [why that constraint and what others are there?].


Hal

At 10:44 AM 8/19/2005, you wrote:

Hi Hal,

 From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model is 
identical or
 distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let 
me ask you:


 Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still dance if that 
is the case?


 I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less 
interesting than

falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand

Best regards,

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread Stephen Paul King

Dear Bruno and Godfrey,

   It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof that a 
Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about falsifying YD not a 
requirement that we prove a negative proposition?



Onward!

Stephen

- Original Message - 
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 12:13 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality



Hi Bruno,

 OK. I think we are making progress. I will start the other thread after 
this message
 as I don't really have more obvious divergences from you and you are kind 
enough
 to indulge me in this little diversion. As before I will erase the 
obvious points of

agreement below...


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 11:48:06 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfrey,

Le 18-août-05, à 20:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
(skipped)

[BM]
No YD, no Bruno!?! You make me anxious :)

[GK]
 I am sorry! That was very callous of me! I really did not mean to imply 
that you would be eliminated
 by my argument! Much on the contrary, I am hoping you will be... 
illuminated (;-) !!!


[BM]
SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation
 YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital 
generalized brain. First axiom of comp.
 (Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them 
once by mail).



  It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite  
care if you take refuge in another Everett World.

 That
  would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I  
digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies!


[BM]
 Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really 
the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD).


[GK]
 I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those would 
actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into
 a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is amiss 
in your world!


 [GK]
  I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that

COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would
  shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my  
non-existence if YD is false.



 Only if YD is *proved* false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from the 
SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if SWE is 
false!). You are saying something very general here!


[GK]
 What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. That 
allows me to dismiss anything you say based
 on that premise. That is actually not general at all but extremely 
specific. From here on I will make no comment on
 any sentence you preface with But from COMP (or YD) I can prove that... 
. Nothing personal, please understand.



  BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more  
precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can  use 
the term axioms, postulates, theses, premises,  assumptions, 
hypotheses, etc.. in a similar way.


 [GK]
  I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am

pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses

  tout court. These three assumptions do not have the same epistemic

status and it is misleading to call them the same.
  If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your  
point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising  either 
CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore  below:


[BM]
 Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most people 
to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist).


[GK]
 Oh I would not worry! Computer scientists are by, now, used to have their 
hopes dashed (;-). And you strike me as a real

grown-up since you are not afraid of facing up to empirical testing!

(skipped)

 [BM]
  Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my  
reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying Ah, but you are a  
platonist!. So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a  
sort of cop out. Now, although 99, % of the mathematician  are 
platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the

week-end!).


snip 



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread John M

Hi, Hal,

I wrote lately that 'our' (two but distinct and
different) theories started from a somewuat similar
way 
of thinking. That startup was more than a decade ago.
Since then you transformed yours in its aspects and I
did so as well. You went the theoretical way, I
followed a practical thinking acceptable (?) to human
logic as an inevitable origination of the Multiverse. 

I had to add this remark, because I don't want to
'ride' the theoretical merits of your theory in any
sense. My narrative is by now completely different
from your theory.

Please forgive me my superficial words.

John Mikes





--- Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Hi Godfrey:
 
 My model starts with what I describe as unavoidable
 definition - of the All 
 and [simultaneously] the Nothing.
 
 Any definition defines a pair of two objects.  The
 target object such as a 
 flower [the is part of the pair] and an object
 that has the remainder of 
 the list of all properties etc. of all possible
 objects [the is not part 
 of the pair].  Generally the is not part of the
 pair is of little 
 use.  The All and the Nothing are an interesting
 is, is not 
 definitional pair.  The All is the entire list and
 the Nothing is the 
 absence of the entire list.
 
 The Nothing is inherently incomplete and this
 results in the dynamic.
 
 This is a brief semi intro and I have posted on this
 model before as it has 
 developed.
 
 Now the All part contains all possible states of all
 possible 
 universes.  This should include the one I believe
 represents 
 ours.  Therefore my All seems to contain universes
 that support YD and thus 
 comp if Bruno is correct.
 
 To answer your questions as best I currently can:
 
 My model appears to contain YD, CT, and AR so if
 Bruno's follow on 
 reasoning is correct and if in fact my model
 contains YD, CT, and AR then 
 it contains comp but it is not the same as comp - it
 would embed comp.
 
 Is my model falsifiable?  I will have to think about
 that  -  after all I 
 just recently got to where it supports a flow of
 consciousness.  Since the 
 model does not say exactly what is on the list that
 is the All and the 
 'instantation of reality dynamic is random then
 what indeed is the scope 
 of all possible states of all possible universes
 and the resulting 
 actually implemented evolving universes?
 
 In any event it would be interesting to see if YD
 can be shown to be 
 false.  I think that might start to constrain the
 All and that would be 
 interesting - [why that constraint and what others
 are there?].
 
 Hal
 
 At 10:44 AM 8/19/2005, you wrote:
 Hi Hal,
 
   From what you say below I am not able to
 determine whether your model is 
  identical or
   distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am
 interested in so let 
  me ask you:
 
   Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you
 still dance if that 
  is the case?
 
   I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out
 to be a lot less 
  interesting than
 falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand
 
 Best regards,
 
 Godfrey Kurtz
 (New Brunswick, NJ)
 
 
 



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Godfrey,

Le 17-août-05, à 19:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :


[BM]
 Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be 
extracted from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman 
integral (see my paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CCQ.pdf
for a little summary.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[GK]
 I did not say, nor do I believe, that one can extract the classical 
world from QM, as I pointed out to Lee,



OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything lists 
that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a 
solution of the measurement problem. All measurements are just 
interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to 
me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM where 
F = ma can be deduced from the sum on all histories. But this is 
going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand the 
comp derivation. We can come back on this latter.





but one can surely object to a third party theory from the fact that 
it does not reproduce a classical world any better than quantum

mechanics. This is a complicated issue because:

 (a) Classical physics does not explain the classical world either 
as it cannot account for the stability of matter, for instance,

which only QM explains.
 (b) Quantum mechanics predicts some entirely macroscopic phenomena 
that we do observe as part of the classical world
 i.e. superfluidity of He, superconductivity, stability of the vaccuum 
etc...




OK.






 In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a 
way that would not obviously violate the correspondence
 limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above. 
But do not worry because I think you are a lot better

shot by QM.




To anticipate a little bit, I think this will be hard. From comp you 
can deduce quickly the qualitative many-relative state/worlds 
feature, the no-cloning theorem, the appearance of indeterminacy. I 
told you Newtonian physics (with a single universe-history) would cause 
much more problem to my approach.









Now my logistic COMPlaints about your COMP:

 I have searched through your web site to see whether I could find a 
full statement of your hypothesis since you were not
 kind enough to reproduce it in the previous exchange. I don't read 
French that well and your English paper is somewhat

sketchy on this, so I can only refer to what you state in the page :

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm

 where I found what looks like a definition. My first objection is to 
the following sentence:


 Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical 
Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following 
three sub-hypotheses:


 after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and 
will just short as 1) YD for Yes-doctor, 2) CT for

Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism.

 My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be 
called an hypothesis!




Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more precise 
definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can use the 
term axioms, postulates, theses, premises, assumptions, 
hypotheses, etc.. in a similar way.





CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable 
but favored by overwhelming heuristic support.



Not only overwhelming supports: there is the deep conceptual argument 
that Kleene has discovered when he failed to refute Church's 
definition of the computable functions. The argument is the closure 
of the set of partial computable functions for the most transcendental 
mathematical operation: diagonalization. Kleene invented the vocable 
Church thesis. The first to get Church's thesis is Emil Post (in the 
early 19-twenties).


See (perhaps later) the diagonalization posts in this list (mentionned 
in my web page).





 I know that there are
 some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation 
could produce a counterexample to
 shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is 
unlikely.



OK.




And AR is a metaphysical position which I
 happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove 
or empirically test (nor do I have any idea

on how to do it! Do you?)



Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my 
reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying Ah, but you are a 
platonist!. So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a 
sort of cop out. Now, although 99, % of the mathematician are 
platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the 
week-end!).







 Now I suppose that you need for these three things to be true for the 
rest of your argument to go. But I find that
 it is extremely unfair to force your most excellent hypothesis YD to 
have to stand in company of the other two to assert

its merits!!! In 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-18 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Bruno,

 It is maybe time to change the name of the thread. But I'll get to 
that below.


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 15:41:12 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

(skipped)
...

[BM]
 OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything lists 
that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a 
solution of the measurement problem. All measurements are just 
interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to 
me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM where 
F = ma can be deduced from the sum on all histories. But this is 
going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand the 
comp derivation. We can come back on this latter.


[GK]
 Here we part company. MWI (I prefer to call it Everett's 
Interpretation or EQM) is NOT a solution to the measurement
 problem of QM but an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that does not 
lead to that problem! It does however have
 a tripartite problem of its own that, in my opinion, is just the 
measurement problem blown up. In any case what you say
 afterwords does not follow (from EQM or QM). There are non-interactive 
measurements that people have been looking
 into for a while now (Dicke, Elitzur-Vaidman, etc...). I am sure you 
guys touched on these sometime ago...


 But all of this is irrelevant for my purpose at hand which is for you 
to commit to the proposition that No-YD: no Bruno!
 It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite care 
if you take refuge in another Everett World. That
 would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I 
digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies!


(skip)

  In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a  
way that would not obviously violate the correspondence
  limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting 
above.  But do not worry because I think you are a lot better

 shot by QM.

[BM]
 To anticipate a little bit, I think this will be hard. From comp you 
can deduce quickly the qualitative many-relative state/worlds 
feature, the no-cloning theorem, the appearance of indeterminacy. I 
told you Newtonian physics (with a single universe-history) would cause 
much more problem to my approach.


[GK]
 I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that 
COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would
 shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my non-existence 
if YD is false.



(skipped)

  Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical  
Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following  
three sub-hypotheses:


  after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and 

will just short as 1) YD for Yes-doctor, 2) CT for

 Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism.

  My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be 

called an hypothesis!



 Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more precise 
definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can use the 
term axioms, postulates, theses, premises, assumptions, 
hypotheses, etc.. in a similar way.


[GK]
 I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am 
pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses
 tout court. These three assumptions do not have the same epistemic 
status and it is misleading to call them the same.
 If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your 
point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising 
either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore 
below:


[BM]
  CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely 
unprovable  but favored by overwhelming heuristic support.


 Not only overwhelming supports: there is the deep conceptual argument 
that Kleene has discovered when he failed to refute Church's 
definition of the computable functions. The argument is the closure 
of the set of partial computable functions for the most transcendental 
mathematical operation: diagonalization. Kleene invented the vocable 
Church thesis. The first to get Church's thesis is Emil Post (in the 
early 19-twenties).


 See (perhaps later) the diagonalization posts in this list (mentionned 
in my web page).



 I know that there are
  some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation  
could produce a counterexample to
  shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is 

unlikely.


OK.

[GK]
 Agreed, than . In any case one unassailable counterexample would shoot 
down CT, deep and  Kleene as it is (:-)



 And AR is a metaphysical position which I
  happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove 

or empirically test (nor do I have any idea

 on how to do it! Do you?)

[BM]
 Well, I have decided to put

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe consists 
of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral locations 
arranged on a face centered cubic grid.  Each point is confined to a region 
of discrete locations that surround its neutral location in the grid.  I 
like this grid because its symmetries appear to allow a set of first order 
oscillations of the points within their regions in a unit cell consisting 
of 12 points around one with all triples being on straight lines that pass 
through the central point to represent the basic particles of the Standard 
Model.  I call such oscillations a [small] dance.  A [small] dance can move 
through the grid but individual points can not.  Larger dances (such as a 
SAS) consist of semi stable associations of nearby [small] dances.


The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region 
asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its 
region based on the results.  It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA].


At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at all.

The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of universal 
computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the done 
effectively part] since large dances can be self interactive.


The other things that are in my model which is derived from my is is 
not definitional approach is that the imbedding system:


1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist [multi 
world and the model's link to AR],


2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of 
reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the 
accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of the 
noise] recently observed),


3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality that 
overlap [the flow of consciousness].


In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp.

I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some degree 
convergent.


Hal Ruhl 





Re: subjective reality

2005-08-18 Thread Hal Ruhl

Typo:

In my last post the sentence:

At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at all.

of course should be:

At this level YD seems straight forward since there is no change at all.

Hal Ruhl





RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes

 I would like to refute your [Lee's] common sense Realism and
 show that it is missing the most salient point of Realism: that
 it not have any cracks through which anything unreal might
 slip.

An interestingly stated goal: it *sounds* as though you've written
as preamble to the rest of your post that we need to abandon any
system that keeps out the unreal.  Well, to each his own!

  Stephen writes
  Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a Realist
  accept that a wholly independent world out there exists and existed
  before he did and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
  independent world are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
  particular observational context?
  [LC]
  My opinion is that realists, even those completely up to speed on quantum
  physics, will assert that many macroscopic properties of the independent
  world are indeed *definite* before specification of an observational
  context (as you write).
 
 If we are to be consistent with the dictum all is amplitudes that add 

Well, my phrasing of that observation of what QM really boils down to is:
At the basis of things are amplitudes that add.

 we must admit that such assertions are a posteriori and not a priori, thus 
 the problem of explaining the appearance of *definiteness*.

They are epistemologically later (as our knowledge of objects came first),
but ontologically prior. That is, we believe that QM provides a theoretical
basis to most of physics.

 It can be unassailably proven that one cannot embed a quantum universe 
 inside a classical universe and that one can embed *at least one* classical 
 universe within a quantum universe. What does this imply? It implies that 
 the *property definiteness* that comes along with classical universes is 
 something that cannot be taken as *existing prior to the specification* of 
 an observational context!

I'm not too sure what you mean by to embed.  If we are seeking to *explain*
---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical physics,
but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to
be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating in---*explaining*.)

You speak of A existing prior to B.  I'm not real clear what that means.
Ontologically or epistemologically?

 All of the claims that many macroscopic properties of the independent 
 world are indeed *definite* before specification... are ignoring that that 
 entire independent world is knowable AFTER the fact of comparing the 
 observations of many observers. When we assume the contrary we are ignoring 
 the fact that what we know - the content of our OMs as it were- was 
 specified after the act of having the experience.

It seems rather false to me that the entire independent world is knowable
only AFTER the fact of comparing observations. Indeed no. The tiger, for
example, is a device for ascertaining the most important aspects of its
existence. Robinson Crusoe also makes hypotheses and conjectures (and
refutes many of them!) with help from no one. His primate nervous system
is pretty good at it. So a single observer can know quite a bit.

You say that what we know is specified (or becomes definite) only after
the act of having an experience.  I submit that 99% of the knowledge of
a particular human does not work this way: the knowledge implantation
occurs at the same time that the experience occurs. It would have been
a costly mistake for nature to wait around for the internal philosopher
to ponder the importance of his experience before some knowledge generated
and some actions taken.

Time and space compel me to ignore the remainder of your long post, sorry.

Lee


 We can point to the idea that Numbers and their relationships exist as 
 such without any dependence on some mathematician's scribbles on a 
 blackboard, and I would say that that is true, but the notion of the 
 meaningfulness of the concept of numbers, here a case of *property 
 definiteness*, requires that at least one mathematician scribble on a 
 blackboard somewhere AND that that scribbling means something to some 
 other mathematician.
 
 A skeptic could point out that chickens scratching in the dirt could 
 reproduce exactly the same arrangements of points, lines, etc. that make up 
 2+2 = 4, but does it mean anything to the chickens? No! Meaningfulness 
 requires something *to whom it has meaning* and the same applies here to our 
 idea of an independent world.
 
 
 
  [LC]
  For example, if today I ascertain certain properties of, oh, say, the
  relative sizes and populations of a number of North American cities,
  then it is best to regard those as entirely fixed. That is, that they
  are *completely* unaffected by measurement. (Which is entirely true
  up to bone-picking.)  Evolution in fact did not at all prepare me to
  deal with things whose properties emerge only upon measurement, as
  witnessed by the 

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes

 I admire Descartes as a man [I would have said scientist and mathematician],
 not so much as a philosopher. I admire his method more than his results,
 he looked inwards.

He also did a tremendous amount of good work in science and math.

 Like Hume, Berkley , Locke and countless others. These people were the
 forefathers of science, not the resistance to it. Europe, having been freed
 from the authority of dogma by commerce and free enterprise, these people
 voiced a challenge that had been long suppressed.

Yes

 Brent wrote

  I think you are attacking a straw man realist.

 Im challenging comments and attitudes I saw on this board. Introspection was
 deemed an archaic relic of pre 16th century superstition, when in fact the
 cogito was the cornerstone of the enlightenment and has been important ever
 since.

Interesting that you denigrate the guy's philosophy (so do I), but
then say this. Yes, he did contribute to the foundations of rationalism.

 Not just in substance but in method too. People might not be happy
 about 'souls' and worse 'soul stuff', but really Descartes participated in
 putting thinking and rationalising back on the map.

Yes.

 I doubt very much for instance that there would be cognitive psychology were
 it not for the work of Descartes filtered through Chomskian Linguistics. Our
 ‘conscious’ robot is a product of the idea that there are innate mental
 structures. It’s the pattern and/or process – computable function - that has
 become important in philosophy of mind - even if its at the most basic level
 of a stimulated neural nets, weighted sums et al. We have reached this point
 because in a subjective sense we all experience these intractable
 ‘processes’ first hand, like finding a word once lost at the tip of your
 tongue. How do we know about that? Because we experience it!

Yes, that's right. That's how we first knew something was going on
in humans. So far as I know, the best way to then investigate the
phenomenon is not through further introspection---however helpful
that may be in suggesting hypotheses---but by actual lab work in
psychology.

 It’s the method that’s worth saving, not the indivisible soul languishing
 somewhere near the penal gland. Its not even whether souls provide a good
 account of identity, it’s the method that Im defending, and the method that
 I saw attacked. So far, I’m still convinced Im right, which is very rare.

Might you say a few more words about the method you refer to?

I know that I may be asking a lot with the following so please ignore
it if inconvenient: about this method: is there a body of work
based upon this method?  Is it at all falsifiable?  (perhaps an
unfair question---I don't know.)  What other practitioners have
there been?

Lee



RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Colin writes

 ACCURACY
 Extent to which a measurement matches and international standard.
 
 REPEATABILITY
 Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement.
 
 For example the SICK DME 200 laser distance measurement instrument
 has an accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a repeatability of 0.7mm
 
 Why does this matter?
 
 Because _within_ the measurement system is simply does not
 matter what the accuracy is! As long as systematic errors are 
 repeatable, the systems behaviour will be repeatable...

Sounds reasonable.  And indeed, matches the *reliability* vs.
*validity* of statistical measurements and performance. Does
this distinction between accuracy and repeatability get the
same kind of press that reliability vs. validity does?

 So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion,
 but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable 
 illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where 
 its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the 
 observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic 
 presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to
 the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally
 standardized RED #12398765).
 
 This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT 
 and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not 
 have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be
 completely different and as long as the experience is 
 consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will
 be the same OUCH.

Well, wait a minute.  The experience of HOT *does* have to
be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would
not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an
extremely important function for our survival as animals.

 Haven't we all asked 'is my red the same as your read'?
 Haven't we all concluded that we'd never be able to
 ascertain the difference because it really does not
 matter?

No, only the philosophically inclined ever ask that. And
yes, they conclude (or should conclude) that it doesn't
matter and is actually a wrong question. It's analogously
bad to What is it like to be a bat? another question 
that only a philosopher would ask, and which just derails
thinking into unproductive channels IMO.

 ...we all point to the object and agree its red
 repeatability meanwhile the actual physical reality
 of 'redness' is simply irrelevant and may not represent
 any real quality of the observed system at all...

That's *possible*, of course. Sometimes brains malfunction from
the viewpoint of evolution. It was, after all, actual physical
reality of redness

WARNING WARNING WARNING PHILOSOPHICAL DANGER ALERT USE OF
COLOR IN PHILOSOPHY EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS

okay, okay, It was, after all, properties of objects conveyed
by the wavelengths of photons they reflected that gave a survival
advantage to some species while other species (e.g. canines) found
that information to be irrelevant to survival.

 I really wish mathematicians and philosophers and theoreticians
 would get out and get dirty in the real world some times.
 half of the damned wordfest would disappear immediately.

Hear! Hear!

 Grumpy today sorry.

You ain't seen 'nothin.  Wait until you are in your late fifties, pal.

Lee




RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Lee Corbin writes:


The realist does *not* want the world to be as it seems to be.  No,
the realist focuses on the fact that a wholly independent world out
there exists and existed before he did.  In fact, it is the subjectivists
who start calling their own unassailable introspections reality.

The only real problems about perception and subjectivity are scientific
ones, having to do with the way that brains create models of (outside)
reality and also of themselves in it, and also---often to the point of
diminishing returns---models of themselves thinking about their
perceptions.

 But subjectivity is certain.

Since the only thing that is certain is I think therefore I am or
...I am thinking, it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile
knowledge is certain.  All knowledge is conjectural.  To be fair,
you should google for Pan Critical Rationalism if you have not
already read up on it.


From:  http://clublet.com/c/c/why?PanCriticalRationalism

Currently, Pancritical Rationalists are people who believe that there is an 
external reality but that they will never be sure they know it, that no 
position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one, (or 
some) will turn out to be better (closer to reality) than others in the 
light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all 
its positions and propositions open to criticism.


In other words, you believe that there is a real physical world (because 
this theory has great explanatory power and is absolutely consistent with 
every experience you have ever had, as well as the fact that it is obvious 
and intuitive), but if evidence should come to light showing that the theory 
is wrong, then you'll change your mind. Is this correct? I can't see much 
that could be found objectionable in this position.


--Stathis Papaioannou

_
Don’t just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! 
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread John M
Russell wrote:
*I'm using the term concrete reality to refer to
what some people
call common sense reality, that there is stuff out
there,
independent of us as observers. Sometimes I might use
objective 
reality
for the 1st person plural reality that the AP
guarantees for subsets
of observers.
Isn't this what was called earlier the perception of
reality?
John M

--- Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 On Tue, Aug 16, 2005 at 01:08:12PM -0400,
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
SNIP



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Godfrey,

Le 15-août-05, à 21:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :


[GK]
 The point I am trying to make is that a lot of your back and forth 
discourse on the 1st versus the 3rd person misses the
 2nd person in between them! More specifically: I am quite convinced 
that one good part of what we call the Mind or
 the Self and perhaps even Consciousness is generated by social 
interaction rather than by any inner realm of subjectivity.
 I suspect this is true about all of what we call symbolic or 
meaningful including a lot of the support for mathematical
 understanding though I guess I am a platonist to the extent that I 
think of mathematical objects as existing independently

of any of our semantics in a realm of their own.



Nice your platonism. Although it is not entirely relevant, I do not 
believe consciousness is generated by social interactions. I think 
consciousness has evolved with the ability of self-moving by the need 
to anticipate collisions (thus consciousness evolved from interaction 
but not necessarily social interaction (unless you call the invention 
of the cables by amoebas a social interaction). Self-consciousness is 
perhaps due to social interaction. I will give you a definition of 
consciousness below.






 As for consciousness I do agree with you that whatever explains it 
may seriously require a revision of our oldest and,
 very possibly, some of our newest prejudices about reality but 
certainly most of outr old prejudices about... consciousness-

yours (and mine) included! ;-)


Consciousness can be defined by the first person high level description 
of the result of an unconscious (totally automated) *guess* that there 
is at least one observer-moment (world, state, etc.). More simply: 
consciousness is the belief in a world.

With such a definition it is possible to explain both
1) why consciousness has a role and which one: the role consists in 
giving us the ability of self-speeding up ourself relatively to our 
most probable (Turing) universal environment.

2) why consciousness is ineffable (not justifiable).

But then it explains also how the physical laws are generated logically 
by the Lobian machine's dream (in that verifiable way described in my 
papers).

See also the work by Helmholtz on perception.


 I would rather not bring Penrose to this discussion though he is 
someone I much appreciate and will not easily dismiss. Unfortunately I 
can't claim I understand his Byzantine time-asymmetric proposals as 
alternatives for QM and GR enough

to criticize them, and I am not alone in this.



In the emperor new clothes Penrose is wrong in its use of Godel's 
theorem. In the shadows of the mind Penrose made the necessary 
correction, but he puts it into parentheses and does not take it really 
into account. But I find Penrose very courageous to tackle the 
fundamental questions. Godel's incompleteness cannot be used to show 
that we are not machine, just that we cannot known which machine we are 
(and thus which computations support us). This is related to the 
mathematical form of the first person comp indeterminacy. The physical 
laws emerge from the border of machine's intrinsic ignorance; a measure 
on or of  incompleteness.





 But I thought about your COMP and such over the weekend and I 
realized I have to take back what I said above! I can
 perfectly well imagine a world in which no one has yet built a 
conscious machine from scratch but someone has found a
 procedure for replacing one's consciousness by a digital one in the 
way you describe. Why should one imply the other?



To make a conscious machine (if that can be tested!) from scratch does 
not logically imply we are machine (machine think does not entail that 
only machine think (no OCCAM in logic or math).
And to be able to copy a human machine (assuming comp) does not imply 
we can build a conscious machine from scratch).

None of the implications exist.





[GK]
 Oh, I am sorry, than! As you speak so much of acts-of-faith I 
concluded, too soon I gather, that you took all those years of toil

as a consequence of your beliefs. Silly me!


No problem. Some people would like to think I am a defenser of comp. 
But I am not. I am a defenser of the idea that we can do philosophy or 
theology still keeping the modesty of the scientific attitude. It needs 
just courage if only to acknowledge that we are just at the very 
beginning, and that until now many fundamental questions are just tabu.






 [GK]
  Oh but you make it sound so easy! See: its is the derive physics  
from computer science that I have my first problem with!


 That is the object of the proof I gave. The proof is 100% third 
person accessible, like any proof. What is hard, perhaps, is that the 
proof is done in a field which is in the intersection of theoretical 
physics, theoretical computer science and theoretical cognitive 
science.


[GK]
 And just how sure are you that there is such an intersection? Or is 
that also an article 

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread kurtleegod

Hi Lee,

 As much as I sympathise with your call for preservation of naive 
realism

and agree entirely with your opinion on the demerits of introspection
I have to take issue with half of what you say below:

-Original Message-
From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
...

 I'm not too sure what you mean by to embed. If we are seeking to 
*explain*
 ---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical 
physics,
 but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary 
activity to
 be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating 
in---*explaining*.)


...

Lee

 Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics but NEITHER can we 
explain

from QM the classical world we know and love with its well defined and
 assigned elements of (naive) physical reality that you so much 
cherish, I am afraid!

If we did there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky
 long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger Cat's around to 
haunt us...


You see, amplitudes don't just add! They also multiply and square!

I hope this does not add to your grumpiness. The miracle of experience
you talk about is still there, of course. Even more so, perhaps.

Regards,

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)






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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Bruno Marchal





Chris Peck:

But subjectivity is certain.


Lee: Since the only thing that is certain is I think therefore I am 
or

...I am thinking, it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile
knowledge is certain.  All knowledge is conjectural.  To be fair,
you should google for Pan Critical Rationalism if you have not
already read up on it.





Only scientific knowledge is conjectural.
Only third person communicable knowledge is conjectural.
You did acknowledge the ineffable knowledge of what is is like having a 
friend putting a needle in your finger.
And, of course, I would not be happy if when I complain about headache 
to my Doctor if he tells me your headache? Pure conjecture!


First person knowledge is not conjectural, at least not consciously so, 
nor consistently so.
It is Descartes fixed point of its systematic doubting procedure, when 
you doubt that you doubt making up an unavoidable place for an 
indubitable reality, though ineffable.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 16-août-05, à 04:59, John M a écrit :


(The original went only to Bruno's addressw)
To: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED],
everything-list@eskimo.com
In-Reply-To:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Bruno, your postulate of testability is falling into
obsolescence.


Thanks John! (I agree that testability should not be an obsession, but 
once you get it in a field traditionnally considered has making 
untestable propositions , it is hard to resist pointing on the feature, 
and also, it is the best way to attract people for many other 
scientific community, among the contemplators, for example.




 Proof within the model can be applied
to testable events within the model.


Logicians make jumps back and forth between theories and models (note 
the plural).




If the model
proves too narrow, you have to 'assume' beyond and
'theorize' beyond the in-model testability. Then,
later on, you may find indications whether your
assumed novelty is 'solid' or discardable.


OK.



Most of the discussions on this list since the early
90s are non-testable.


I would add many nuances. Thay are degree of non-testability. Tests can 
be indirect, or on some horizon. Tests can address matter of 
consistency or necessity.




 I cannot measure the blood
pressure of the white rabbit or the length of all the
universes. Hal Ruhl (and myself, not far from his)
presented some worldview without testable origins.


But it is very hard to prove something is not testable. You need to 
anticipate many conclusions of your saying before.





We should not 'wall in' ourselves into the existing
framework of a testable ambiance if we want to think
further.


We should not wall ourself. Comma.



Justifiability is another question, but it
can be raised later on.
The same may apply to the 'screening' by human logic
(formal or not) and we have plenty of examples on this
list when human logic was not applied as a liiting
model.


Take Lobian logics.  (I am joking, partially ;)




 I would not restrict nature (te wholeness) to
anything we can muster in our capabilities.



No. But my point is that if we just take digital mechanism seriously 
enough then, necessarily, the observable wholeness emerges from what 
lobian machines can dream about their capacities.


The beauty of it, is that, continuing assuming comp after that 
reversal, it can be shown that it is NOT a restriction of Nature or of 
Whatever. By incompleteness, to believe it is a restriction, is a lack 
of modesty in front of the unknown (assuming comp!!!).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread kurtleegod


Hi Bruno,

 Thanks for indulging my skepticism. I think I am getting a clearer 
picture of what you are up to. There is only one
 point in our exchange below to which I would like to respond and than 
I have some unrelated comments. I will

erase the rest of the conversation to which I don't have much to add.

Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Hi Godfrey,

Le 15-août-05, à 21:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :



  Also if Newtonian physics is enough to shoot down your hypothesis  
than it must be dead already since Newtonian physics
  is the correspondence limit of QM and QM is right!!! I really don't 

follow you here...


[BM]
 Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be 
extracted from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman 
integral (see my paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CCQ.pdf
for a little summary.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[GK]
 I did not say, nor do I believe, that one can extract the classical 
world from QM, as I pointed out to Lee, but one can surely object to a 
third party theory from the fact that it does not reproduce a 
classical world any better than quantum

mechanics. This is a complicated issue because:

 (a) Classical physics does not explain the classical world either as 
it cannot account for the stability of matter, for instance,

which only QM explains.
 (b) Quantum mechanics predicts some entirely macroscopic phenomena 
that we do observe as part of the classical world
 i.e. superfluidity of He, superconductivity, stability of the vaccuum 
etc...


 In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a way 
that would not obviously violate the correspondence
 limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above. 
But do not worry because I think you are a lot better

shot by QM.


Now my logistic COMPlaints about your COMP:

 I have searched through your web site to see whether I could find a 
full statement of your hypothesis since you were not
 kind enough to reproduce it in the previous exchange. I don't read 
French that well and your English paper is somewhat

sketchy on this, so I can only refer to what you state in the page :

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm

 where I found what looks like a definition. My first objection is to 
the following sentence:


 Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical 
Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following 
three sub-hypotheses:


 after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and 
will just short as 1) YD for Yes-doctor, 2) CT for

Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism.

 My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be 
called an hypothesis! CT, as the name indicates,
 is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable but favored by 
overwhelming heuristic support. I know that there are
 some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation 
could produce a counterexample to
 shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is 
unlikely. And AR is a metaphysical position which I
 happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove or 
empirically test (nor do I have any idea

on how to do it! Do you?)

 Now I suppose that you need for these three things to be true for the 
rest of your argument to go. But I find that
 it is extremely unfair to force your most excellent hypothesis YD to 
have to stand in company of the other two to assert

its merits!!! In other words as

(1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR
 (2) CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically (or we 
both like them that way, which is the same).
 (3) No one that we know has been able to extract conclusions such as 
yours from CT  AR without YD (right)


 would you have any objections to us concentrating, from here on, on 
your YD hypothesis?


 I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real 
interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not
 need those two other huge body guards which I happen to be friends 
with. OK?


 If you agree with this I may have something interesting to tell you 
about your idea that you have not anticipated!


Please,don't COMP out! Say yes, Doctor Bruno!

-Godfrey



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Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Godfray,

I must leave my office, and I let you know just my first impression of 
your last post. First I hope you will accept my apologies for having 
skip unintentionally your demand for my hypotheses.


 I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real 
interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not
 need those two other huge body guards which I happen to be friends 
with. OK?


I can say yes. Nevertheless, the bodyguards will appear necessary 
when you go through the reasoning at some point. Actually most computer 
scientist who does not want to abandon physicalism after the reading of 
my reasoning, does abandon comp under the form of abandoning the 
Arithmetical Realism (AR) part of it!

Few abandon the YES doctor part (curiously enough).
None, until now, abandon Church thesis, but it *is* a logical way out.
But I will comment more carefully your post tomorrow. I will just print 
it now.


A demain,

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread kurtleegod


Hi Bruno,

 Thanks for your assent on this. I am sure that CT and AR are needed, 
at some point, for your really outrageous
 conclusions. But I am sure you agree that they cannot save them if the 
Yes doctor presumption can be shot
 down by itself. Right? This would save me from having to read through 
your Dovetail-Lob etc... argument which

is probably way above my head!

 We obviously move in very different circles because I was taught by 
very stubborn old strong AI types and cognoscendi
 cognitivists and I have never heard anyone argue for something like 
that YD hypothesis! But as you have conceded no one
 needs it to defend the old-fashioned materialist functionalism credo 
that you (and I) do not subscribe to anyway.


But I will wait for your other comments.


Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 19:48:35 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Hi Godfray,

 I must leave my office, and I let you know just my first impression of 
your last post. First I hope you will accept my apologies for having 
skip unintentionally your demand for my hypotheses.


  I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real  
interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not
  need those two other huge body guards which I happen to be friends 

with. OK?


 I can say yes. Nevertheless, the bodyguards will appear necessary 
when you go through the reasoning at some point. Actually most computer 
scientist who does not want to abandon physicalism after the reading of 
my reasoning, does abandon comp under the form of abandoning the 
Arithmetical Realism (AR) part of it!

Few abandon the YES doctor part (curiously enough).
None, until now, abandon Church thesis, but it *is* a logical way out.
 But I will comment more carefully your post tomorrow. I will just 
print it now.


A demain,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Lee Corbin 
 
 Colin writes
 
  ACCURACY
  Extent to which a measurement matches an international standard.
 
  REPEATABILITY
  Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement.
 
  For example the SICK DME 2000 laser distance measurement instrument
  has an accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a repeatability of 0.7mm
 
  Why does this matter?
 
  Because _within_ the measurement system is simply does not
  matter what the accuracy is! As long as systematic errors are
  repeatable, the systems behaviour will be repeatable...
 
 Sounds reasonable.  And indeed, matches the *reliability* vs.
 *validity* of statistical measurements and performance. Does
 this distinction between accuracy and repeatability get the
 same kind of press that reliability vs. validity does?
 

I’m just talking about data sheets. Reliability is a 'mean time between 
failure' number in hours. 'Validity'? Dunno what that is. 'Availability' is 
another figure like reliability a %uptime, if you like, more to do with how 
much time is spent with the instrument out of service being calibrated. 

When you buy instruments you have to understand the use to which it will be 
put. ‘Repeatability’ is an Ockham’s razor solution for instrumentation: it 
costs less! If the measurement’s accuracy matters outside the system being 
measured you must go for accuracy and get out your cheque book. All else equal 
it stands to reason that the cheaper option (repeatability) is what will be 
used by nature it will be selected.


  So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion,
  but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable
  illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where
  its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the
  observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic
  presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to
  the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally
  standardized RED #12398765).
 
  This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT
  and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not
  have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be
  completely different and as long as the experience is
  consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will
  be the same OUCH.
 
 Well, wait a minute.  The experience of HOT *does* have to
 be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would
 not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an
 extremely important function for our survival as animals.

Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are saying is that the 
experiential quality of HOT, which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the 
meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the measurement probe), is that our 
brain literally becomes hot? I don;t know about you, but to me very cold things 
feel like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to different thermal 
behaviour in the world. 

Also this is not what is found in any experimental tests. The transduction at 
your fingertip (in the candle flame) makes use of the thermal effects on cell 
excitability in your finger nerves. Thinking the way you suggest is like saying 
that the voltmeter indicates voltage by altering the voltage of the volt meter 
chassis, as opposed to altering the display. A fairly agricultural analogy but 
descriptive enough.

There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences do not match the 
physics of the real world. Take phantom limb! An amputee can have a feel a 
whole arm where there is none! That phantom experience of the arm is generated 
by brain material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves. 

We simply don't have to have the argment: it's over.  

 
  Haven't we all asked 'is my red the same as your red'?
  Haven't we all concluded that we'd never be able to
  ascertain the difference because it really does not
  matter?
 
 No, only the philosophically inclined ever ask that. And
 yes, they conclude (or should conclude) that it doesn't
 matter and is actually a wrong question. It's analogously
 bad to What is it like to be a bat? another question
 that only a philosopher would ask, and which just derails
 thinking into unproductive channels IMO.
 

I was trying to instill an understanding of the implications of repeatability 
vs accuracy from the point of view of ‘being’ the instrument.
The last thing I need to do is get philosophical! :-)

  ...we all point to the object and agree its red
  repeatability meanwhile the actual physical reality
  of 'redness' is simply irrelevant and may not represent
  any real quality of the observed system at all...
 
 That's *possible*, of course. Sometimes brains malfunction from
 the viewpoint of evolution. It was, after all, actual physical
 reality of redness
 
 WARNING WARNING WARNING PHILOSOPHICAL DANGER ALERT USE OF
 COLOR IN PHILOSOPHY EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS
 
 okay, okay, It was, after all, properties of objects conveyed
 by the wavelengths 

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Colin writes

   So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion,
   but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable
   illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where
   its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the
   observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic
   presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to
   the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally
   standardized RED #12398765).
  
   This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT
   and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not
   have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be
   completely different and as long as the experience is
   consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will
   be the same OUCH.
  
  Well, wait a minute.  The experience of HOT *does* have to
  be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would
  not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an
  extremely important function for our survival as animals.
 
 Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are
 saying is that the experiential quality of HOT,
 which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the
 meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the
 measurement probe), is that our brain literally
 becomes hot?

You think that I am saying that when one has an
experience of something being hot, the brain is
hot?  What kind of a fool do you take me for,
anyway?  How early do they teach 98.6 degrees F
where you went to elementary school?

So *I* will take the time to reread the discussion
above and put my finger on the trouble. It turns
out to be in your use of the word intimately,
which I failed to infer correctly what you meant
by it.

I took you to mean intimately related in the sense
that there is a tight *causal* connection in the nervous
systems of animals between outside objects and inside
readings, and of course, it is *generally* true that
there is such a tight causal connection. But you meant
something a bit different, and I should have picked up
on it, sorry.

 I don't know about you, but to me very cold things feel
 like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to
 different thermal behaviour in the world. 

Yes, I've heard of that before. Doesn't happen to me,
though. In any case, we easily see what is happening
here (we know all the facts).  Evolution programmed 
you to remove your hand post haste from anything 
extreme in temperature either way, and I guess it didn't
affect the survival rates of our ancestors, as the idea
was just to bring the dangerous phenomenon to the 
attention of your higher centers.

 There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences
 do not match the physics of the real world. Take phantom limb! 
 An amputee can have a feel a whole arm where there is none!
 That phantom experience of the arm is generated by brain 
 material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves. 

You are quite correct, but the statement the experiences
do not match the physics of the real world is really
misleading. Of course they have to match---to a certain
fidelity---the physics of the real world, or our ancestors
would have been unable to propagate as well. I needn't give
you countless examples of how, for example, your hand 
reaches out rather unerringly for door handles when you
approach them. My reading of experiences matching the
physics of the real world include those numerous examples.
But I hope that you don't think that I'm ignorant of how
phantom limbs work (the very best book is Ramachandran's
Phantoms of the Brain, which I highly recommend). But
after assuming that I thought that brains get hot, I just
don't know.

 We simply don't have to have the argument: it's over.  

If you say so!  (I did agree with the remaining parts of 
your email.)

Lee




RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Lee Corbin 
 
 Colin writes
So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion,
but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable
illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where
its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the
observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic
presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to
the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally
standardized RED #12398765).
   
This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT
and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not
have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be
completely different and as long as the experience is
consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will
be the same OUCH.
  
   Well, wait a minute.  The experience of HOT *does* have to
   be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would
   not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an
   extremely important function for our survival as animals.
 
  Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are
  saying is that the experiential quality of HOT,
  which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the
  meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the
  measurement probe), is that our brain literally
  becomes hot?
 
 You think that I am saying that when one has an
 experience of something being hot, the brain is
 hot?  What kind of a fool do you take me for,
 anyway?  How early do they teach 98.6 degrees F
 where you went to elementary school?
 
 So *I* will take the time to reread the discussion
 above and put my finger on the trouble. It turns
 out to be in your use of the word intimately,
 which I failed to infer correctly what you meant
 by it.

Sloppy me. Yes you are right. Gazzumpt by the language again.
I was actually going to quote Ramachandran. Glad you did, for the rest of the 
list... there's a didactic role here...

Back to the measurement thing, just to be very clear 

The _event_ of the expression of the experiential quality in the brain is 
directly causally connected to the act of measurement(peripheral sensory 
neurons behaving appropriately). The experience itself (the detail of the 
quality thereof) could be anything (you could make sensing heat a sound if you 
wanted - synthesthesia, Ramachandran again). Exactly what experiential quality 
is selected for representation of hotness will be something for future 
biophysics to work out. My 'hot' and you 'hot' could be different. 

In terms of brain operation as long as the resultant behaviour is appropriate 
and consistently used the quality of the experience is irrelevant.

The result is that an assumption that one can necessarily claim similarity of 
the physics of the real world and the brain physics of the behind experience is 
simply not justified. This does not mean that the physics of the distal world 
is not in some conformally mapped/useful way _similar_ to the physics of the 
experience. It just means that you cannot assume that the relationship.

Exactly what 'ism this is I don’t know. Indirect realism? It doesn’t matter 
much. Naïve realism is out. The philosophers of perception can retrofit the 
actual nomenclature situation after it’s sorted out by the biophysicists.

I think this encapsulates the position.

I declare you the winner of today's grumpy old guy contest.. :-)

Colin





RE: subjective reality

2005-08-16 Thread John M
Lee and Stephen:
since we have only our subjective access to out
there does it make any difference if it is REALLY?
like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner:
different?
Provided that there IS indeed something - not 'out
there' because we are IN IT as well. We assume so.
Then again Descart has been updated to:
I am thinking therefore I think I am

All the rest of this thread is up to our model we
chose to abide by, including quantum science or the
soul.

Happy solipsism! - your own one, not Google's.

John Mikes

--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


SNIP 
  But subjectivity is certain.
 
 Since the only thing that is certain is I think
 therefore I am or 
 ...I am thinking, it's not a stretch to say that
 no worthwhile 
 knowledge is certain.  All knowledge is conjectural.
  To be fair,
 you should google for Pan Critical Rationalism if
 you have not
 already read up on it.
 
 Lee
 
 



RE: subjective reality

2005-08-16 Thread Lee Corbin
John writes

 Lee and Stephen:
 since we have only our subjective access to out
 there does it make any difference if it is REALLY?
 like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner:
 different?

You write we have only our subjective access to
[what is out there].  Yes, and from that we have
two choices: we can focus on the *appearances* of
the outside world, and try to formulate and understand
how it seems to us and how it looks to us

OR

We can formulate theories about what is really out
there, constantly trying to compensate for the errors
and partial understandings those theories will have.

To do the latter means keeping firmly in mind that
the best understandings will come from objective
scientific study of neurons, physics, people, and
things. 

So you ask, does it make any difference if it is REALLY?
like we interpret it?

It is a scientific fact that it *cannot be*  like we
interpret it, except in the most wonderful and marvelous
way that evolution has provided: namely, the myriad ways
that one has an extremely good idea of about where 
visible objects really are in relation to oneself,
amazing sensitivity to motions out there via sound
waves, and so on. We must constantly bow to the utter
marvelousness of how accurate on the whole the mappings
are.

 Provided that there IS indeed something - not 'out
 there' because we are IN IT as well. We assume so.

Well, I don't assume so.  WHAT is not 'out there'?
That which Bruno (and I) call the ineffable impressions
we get of that which is out there?  Yes---but so what?
The machine *must* have (or rather *be*) a map of what
is out there, or it doesn't work right.

Lee



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-16 Thread daddycaylor

John:

Perhaps I'm intruding since you didn't address this to me, regarding 
your rhetorical question:



since we have only our subjective access to out
there does it make any difference if it is REALLY?
like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner:
different?


Didn't you practically give the answer in your recent 
memory-prediction post?


You wrote:

I hate to include my solution, but I think I ought to:
since the (undefined) mind is a-temporal and
a-spatial, we can go back to the event to be
remembered and take a second look. And a 3rd one. What
we see NOW is not entirely identical to what we saw
with the past mindset earlier, so our recollection is
not machine-like.


In other words, if we take only one instance of subjective access to 
reality and note that there is a difference between what we observe 
and the true reality, even though we don't know what the difference 
is, how do we know we won't be able to ascertain some (if not all) of 
that difference by (possibly later in time, but not necessarily) 
looking at is from a different perspective, ad infinitum?  A belief in 
an objective reality gives us motivation to keep going back and 
looking at things from a different perspective.  Otherwise we would end 
up in one of the other camps I've mentioned before:  insanity or 
despair.  (By the way, Russell, I think that using the anthropic 
principle is a cop out at this point.)


Tom Caylor



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-16 Thread Stephen Paul King

Hi Lee,



   First I would like to thank you for working hard on this question. In 
doing this you are challenging me to refine my ideas and explanations and 
thus you are helping me a great deal. That being said, I would like to 
refute your common sense Realism and show that it is missing the most 
salient point of Realism: that it not have any cracks through which 
anything unreal might slip.




- Original Message - 


From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com

Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 1:37 AM

Subject: RE: subjective reality




Stephen writes

Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a 
Realist

accept that a wholly independent world out there exists and existed
before he did and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
independent world are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
particular observational context?

[LC]
My opinion is that realists, even those completely up to speed on quantum
physics, will assert that many macroscopic properties of the independent
world are indeed *definite* before specification of an observational
context (as you write).




[SPK]



   If we are to be consistent with the dictum all is amplitudes that add 
we must admit that such assertions are a posteriori and not a priori, thus 
the problem of explaining the appearance of *definiteness*.


   It can be unassailably proven that one cannot embed a quantum universe 
inside a classical universe and that one can embed *at least one* classical 
universe within a quantum universe. What does this imply? It implies that 
the *property definiteness* that comes along with classical universes is 
something that cannot be taken as *existing prior to the specification of 
an observational context!


   All of the claims that many macroscopic properties of the independent 
world are indeed *definite* before specification... are ignoring that that 
entire independent world is knowable AFTER the fact of comparing the 
observations of many observers. When we assume the contrary we are ignoring 
the fact that what we know - the content of our OMs as it where- was 
specified after the act of having the experience.


   We can point to the idea that Numbers and their relationships exist as 
such without any dependence on some mathematician's scribbles on a 
blackboard, and I would say that that is true, but the notion of the 
meaningfulness of the concept of numbers, here a case of *property 
definiteness*, requires that at least one mathematician scribble on a 
blackboard somewhere AND that that scribbling means something to some 
other mathematician.


   A skeptic could point out that chickens scratching in the dirt could 
reproduce exactly the same arrangements of points, lines, etc. that make up 
2+2 = 4, but does it mean anything to the chickens? No! Meaningfulness 
requires something *to whom it has meaning* and the same applies here to our 
idea of an independent world.





[LC]
For example, if today I ascertain certain properties of, oh, say, the
relative sizes and populations of a number of North American cities,
then it is best to regard those as entirely fixed. That is, that they
are *completely* unaffected by measurement. (Which is entirely true
up to bone-picking.)  Evolution in fact did not at all prepare me to
deal with things whose properties emerge only upon measurement, as
witnessed by the absolute and dumbfounded astonishment of early 20th
century physicists.




[SPK]



   I strip and fall headlong over your use of the phrase ...then it is 
best to regard those as...! This is what convinces me that you are arguing 
for a common sense realism and not a realism that can be used without such 
caveats!


   I have tried many times to talk to you on the phone about the problem in 
Einstein's quip, in reaction to Bohr's ideas, that the Moon does not top 
existing just because he is not looking at it, or something along those 
lines. The problem is that Common Sense Realist, like yourself and Einstein, 
neglect the simple fact that while they are not looking at the moon 
directly, the particular world that they are contemplating includes causal 
relations that include the moon with its particular properties.


   The problem is that if we are going to be consistent with our claim that 
the properties of the world or anything in it are *fixed* and *completely* 
unaffected by measurement then one must be sure to remove each and every 
aspect of their actuality that goes into the act of fixing that 
definiteness. Here, again, is that crack that through which unreality is 
oozing.


   I do not like this unreality one bit and thus am trying to patch up 
Realism so it does not have this problem.





[LC]
My bottom line: the specification of a particular observational context
makes a difference *only* on the microscopic level. Now yes, it's true
that solid objects---according to our best theories---retain their
integrity

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-16 Thread chris peck

Brent wrote:


I'm sure that more than one philosopher has made this criticism.


Including yourself. I agree with the criticism, but I don’t see its 
relevance with regards to the importance of subjectivity and introspection 
with regards to knowledge. I admire Descartes as a man, not so much as a 
philosopher. I admire his method more than his results, he looked inwards. 
Like Hume, Berkley , Locke and countless others. These people were the 
forefathers of science, not the resistance to it. Europe, having been freed 
from the authority of dogma by commerce and free enterprise, these people 
voiced a challenge that had been long suppressed.



I think you are attacking a straw man realist.


Im challenging comments and attitudes I saw on this board. Introspection was 
deemed an archaic relic of pre 16th century superstition, when in fact the 
cogito was the cornerstone of the enlightenment and has been important ever 
since. Not just in substance but in method too. People might not be happy 
about 'souls' and worse 'soul stuff', but really Descartes participated in 
putting thinking and rationalising back on the map.


I doubt very much for instance that there would be cognitive psychology were 
it not for the work of Descartes filtered through Chomskian Linguistics. Our 
‘conscious’ robot is a product of the idea that there are innate mental 
structures. It’s the pattern and/or process – computable function - that has 
become important in philosophy of mind - even if its at the most basic level 
of a stimulated neural nets, weighted sums et al. We have reached this point 
because in a subjective sense we all experience these intractable 
‘processes’ first hand, like finding a word once lost at the tip of your 
tongue. How do we know about that? Because we experience it!


It’s the method that’s worth saving, not the indivisible soul languishing 
somewhere near the penal gland. Its not even whether souls provide a good 
account of identity, it’s the method that Im defending, and the method that 
I saw attacked. So far, I’m still convinced Im right, which is very rare.


Best Regards

Chris.

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RE: subjective reality

2005-08-16 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 From: Lee Corbin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 12:48 AM
 John writes
 
  Lee and Stephen:
  since we have only our subjective access to out
  there does it make any difference if it is REALLY?
  like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner:
  different?
 

Colin the Control System (Instrumentation) Engineer says.

It's the old repeatability and accuracy issue again. Subjective experience can 
be considered to be a very elaborate measurement. People not involved in 
real-world measurement continually get mixed up as they don’t understand the 
difference between accuracy and repeatability.

ACCURACY
Extent to which a measurement matches and international standard.

REPEATABILITY
Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement.

For example the SICK DME 200 laser distance measurement instrument has an 
accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a repeatability of 0.7mm

Why does this matter?

Because _within_ the measurement system is simply does not matter what the 
accuracy is! As long as systematic errors are repeatable, the systems behaviour 
will be repeatable. For example if the above instrument was in a warehousing 
system you are NOT interested in whether the crane gets to exactly 150.3 
meters! You are interested in it getting to what it THINKS is 150.3 meters so 
that it won’t crash into the shelving! Systematic errors are quite ok _within_ 
a system.

So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, but a systematically 
erroneous, relentlessly repeatable illusion driven by measurement of the 
natural world where its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to 
the observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic presentation, need 
only be repeatable (my red/attached to the linguitic token RED), not 'accurate' 
(internationally standardized RED #12398765).

This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT and the actual hotness 
of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not have to be intimately/directly related_!!! 
They can be completely different and as long as the experience is consistently 
used the behaviour of the experiencer will be the same OUCH.

Haven't we all asked 'is my red the same as your read'? Haven't we all 
concluded that we'd never be able to ascertain the difference because it really 
does not matter?...we all point to the object and agree its red 
repeatability meanwhile the actual physical reality of 'redness' is simply 
irrelevant and may not represent any real quality of the observed system at 
all...

I really wish mathematicians and philosophers and theoreticians would get out 
and get dirty in the real world some times. half of the damned wordfest 
would disappear immediately.

Grumpy today sorry.

Cheers,

Colin Hales



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