Hi Bruno Marchal We (I) don't know whether the comp models the brain or the brain models the comp, but it doesn't matter, if we consider the brain changes to occur according to the Leibniz model of monadic change. No actually forces are used, the states simply change synchronously:
mathematics (comp)<-----> brain <-------> mind as monads Like three little ballerinas with joined hands dancing sychronously in line . [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/26/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-26, 10:47:29 Subject: Re: no thanks, doctor On 25 Nov 2012, at 19:39, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, I think I may understand the issue of consciousness. Comp is what the brain does in the flesh, I see what you mean: the fleshy brain is supposed to do computation. But the wording is a bit loose. By definition comp is the belief that [the needed work done by the brain to make you consciousness present in our most probable environment] can be done by a computer. then consciousness is a product of what the brain does . Not really. That's the whole point. You can think like that in the begining of the reasoning, but in fine, despite it is highly counter-intuitive, the contrary happens to be the case. Brains, as material objects, do not exist. They are a product of consciousness coupled to deep and long computations. Don't take my word for it: this is really the conclusion of the reasoning. You must for that accept, if only for the sake of the argument, the definition of comp (which I call often step 0 on the list), then step 1, step 2 up to step 7 and/or 8 to see what I mean by "the brain is a product of consciousness". Note that I did not say that the brain is the product of human consciousness: it is far more complex, and there are many open problem, but they are translated in pure math, and they lead to an infinity of experimental device description capable of testing comp. Comp is associated to the brain, but not to consciousness at least directly. It is really the contrary. Comp is a belief that consciousness is invariant for some physical changes: brain=>computer, and it leads to the idea that matter emerge from consciousness, through the coherence (multi-consistence) of some numbers' dream (computation "seen from inside", like with the 1p and 3p distinction). This is not well know, so you can take all your time and perhaps even find a flaw. Is that right ? Comp bet on a relation between brain and consciousness, but in fine it will explains the physical structure of the brain through a theory of consciousness, itself explains in term of number relation. But please: don't try to understand this intuitively without getting familiar with the UDA steps. It is really something that you have to understand logically to give meaning to it. Comp is counter-intuitive, provably so. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/25/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-25, 09:51:05 Subject: Re: no thanks, doctor On 24 Nov 2012, at 14:53, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, I kept thinking that in comp, the computer calculations had to do everything. The phrasing is ambiguous. The computer calculations, or equivalently the (sigma_1) arithmetical relation makes only virtual physics, and virtual dreams of virtual physics, and the real physics is something emerging in the mind of those dreaming entities. Note that with comp, dreams obeys very strict mathematical laws. But you say that comp is not needed for consciousness to occur. But that is an assumption. I do not understand. Comp is just the hypothesis that the brain makes our consciousness manifestable in virtue of emulating some programs. One would need an additional assumption, that consciousness be the mediator in converting input physical sensory signals into nonphysical mental sensations such as hotness. In which theory? There is a sense that what you say is a consequence of comp. Obvioulsy if you say "yes" to the doctor, you believe that the brain-machine build by the doctor, from the scanning of your brain, will indeed interface correctly your first person consciousness to that machine and its environment. This is contained in the comp assumption, and this does not need to postulate a fundamental physical world, or a fundamental consciousness. At first it is better to be agnostic on this, so to see more easily if the reasoning is valid or not. And for consciousness to achieve the inverse output process, of converting a nonphysical mental intention into a nerve signal for action. And then, if you proceed step by step you will see that we don't have that problem, as the physical has no ontology at all. It does not exist per se. It is only dreamed by numbers. It emerges from the epistemology/theology of the numbers. Those assumptions are merely that-- assumptions. Comp is an assumption, and it is rather equivalent with what you say to paragraph above, but not with the one paragraph above. All theories *are* assumptions. Consciousness is the only thing which can be said not being an assumption (at least not a conscious one!), but it is not a theory, it is an experience. So thanks, doctor, but no thanks. Comp requires huge additional assumptions to be uised in my case for a transplant. This is incorrect. Non-comp is a stronger assumption. To make it you need to speculate on something far more complex than whatever we know about brain and universe. Likewise, to even make sense of it, you should tell us what you think is not Turing emulable in the brain. Comp is so weak that Diderot defined rationalism by its ancestor mechanist doctrine. Comp is phrased often by "no magic". It assumes the less, and then by UDA, it gives the simple TOE. Any Turing complete formalism (any Turing universal program, or system, etc.). And it explains constructively how to derive theology including physics, from just 0, 1, 2, 3 ... together with the laws of + and *. But you need to be familar with the first person indeterminacy to get a feeling how that is possible. You might need also some more knowledge of basic computer science, for the UD notion. And the theology is close to your intuition on Plato and Leibniz. So gain your "no thanks" seems premature, and the reason you give is wrong as it assumes less than any other theory (much less, as it do not assume a primitive physical universe. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-24, 07:03:29 Subject: Re: who is in control , you or the computer ? Hi Roger Clough, On 23 Nov 2012, at 18:18, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I blow hot and cold about comp because I am not really a theoretical thinker, I have to see how whatever works, and I' stuck on US(1) as I do not know who is in control: you or the computer ?. You. the computer, or even the brain, is just a tool used by your consciousness to manifest yourself in the environment. Brain and computer cannot, strictly speaking, think. Only person can think and take initiative. Comp does not assume a computer can think (if computer denotes the material machine), it assumes only that a computer can manifest the complex number relations, or programs relations needed for your consciousness to manifest itself in some environment. Feel free to ask any question (perhaps regrouped so as to avoid mailboxes panic). Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/23/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-23, 12:34:00 Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence On 23 Nov 2012, at 13:14, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal The problem is very basic and concerns at least UD(1). I would call it the "what's next" problem. Suppose you say yes, doctor and then wake up after the transplant of a computer for your brain. Everything feels fine, there is is no problem to solve, you have no immediate goal, so what do you do next ? That is a funny question. I do not see at all the point. I guess that what I do next will be the usual things. I will pay the doctor bill, and come back to work, or take some rest, perhaps. The same question can be asked to someone getting an artificial heart, or coming back from hospital for any reason. UD-1, actually UD-0, is just the definition of comp: the idea that the brain is a machine in the quasi-operational sense of accepting the transplant. Then UD-1 is do you accept that if UD-0 is correct (comp is true), then we can in principle use classical teleportation (as described in the paper) as a locomotion mean? Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/23/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-22, 10:09:27 Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence Hi Roger, On 22 Nov 2012, at 13:57, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with the computer in order for comp to hold ? You don't need a "perfect" correspondence. What would that mean? Even a brain has to make a lot of approximate representations all of the time, and to correct many error through redundant neuronal circuitry. But that would require the computer to know the future. Hence comp is false. You seem to be quite quick. I am not sure I see your point at all. For comp being false, you need to postulate that there are some activities which are not Turing emulable in the body, but up to now everything in nature seems to be based on computable (Turing emulable) laws (except the wave packet reduction, which is itself quite a speculation). Have you try to read the UD argument? Are you OK with the definition of comp, and step 1? Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/22/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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