subject:"The Name"



On 09 Oct 2013, at 19:23, John Clark wrote:





On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  [your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in  
only one place.


If the copies are really identical then you feel to be in only one  
place (insofar as spatial position has any meaning when talking  
about consciousness)


Which it has not. We both have agreed already on this. And the copies  
are identical, as bodies reconstitiuted at the right substitution  
level, but they are in two different place, as they will notice when  
opening the door. And the Hesnki man knows that in advance, so he  
knows that (whoever he is and will be) there is 1/2 chance to see M  
(or W).




because you really are in only one place, regardless of how many  
copies are made or where those bodies are.


Exactly.




 The question is which city will [he] observed.

The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington  
Man,


Yes. And it is (and can be justified entirely with math) a non  
constructive OR.




and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information  
he receives.


Not at all. It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will  
have will confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for  
all possible he's relevant).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

 some academics here have been  
offering.



I prefer avoiding authoritative arguments. Yet, as you mention this,  
my PhD thesis has been peer-reviewed by three juries, and the  
scientific members of those juries have all declare not having seen  
any errors.
Only literary continental philosophers have problems, but they refer  
explicitly to personal convictions, without any further ado. Some  
scientists seem to defend those philosophers for reason which seems to  
be academical solidarity (or worst, but that's beyond our topic).
Anyway, it is preferable to get the point by oneself, and not rely on  
any authority, as we live in a lasting era where many people identify  
science with Aristotle theology.


Best,

Bruno





All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many  
Worlds interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest  
part of the Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule  
from his ideas, but not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory,  
not that its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds  
interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum Mechanics  
works.


So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability  
and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.


Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:37, LizR wrote:

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100%  
probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places.  
Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100%  
probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes.  
This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The  
physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin- 
up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels  
the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains  
are wired to think in terms of the single universe view. I think  
Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about  
things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then  
has a 50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of  
always only being the single unique copy of himself would lead him  
to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno  
to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in  
Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the  
physicist).


OK.




However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our  
everyday attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the  
universe works.


The probabilities does not depend on how the universe work, but only  
on computer science, which does not assume anything physical (note  
even a physical reality).
Then the (easy) probability calculus we got here is part of the  
explanation of how the universe works, and indeed why we are  
confronted with an apparent universe/multiverses, although this is  
part of the difficult remaining work (to get the correct hamiltonian  
and things like that).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 10 Oct 2013, at 05:50, chris peck wrote:


Hi Liz


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)

Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



Then we can be certain that we are all the same person. We all comes  
from the same duplicating amoeba.

And I can be certain to win all games based on randomness.

But the point is not on identity. It is only about predicting what I  
will (immediately) see when opening a door, after having pushed on a  
button.


It is possible to rephrase the protocol in a way such that the user  
does not know he will be duplicated, and only evaluate the  
probabilities from the frequencies obtained and described in the  
personal diaries of the copies. In that case some iterations is useful.


With the definition of 1p and 3p, given entirely in term of  
annihilation and reconstitution, of diaries, the 1p-indeterminacy is  
3p-justifiable.


In the math part, they are justifiable purely in terms of self- 
reference (Gödel, Löb, Solovay) logics. The indeterminacy is lived by  
1p, but that very fact is completely justified in the 3p discourse. We  
have to be careful not confusing the points of view involved.


Bruno









Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what  
Bruno means when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his  
chances of appearing in Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in  
talking about probabilities, because the whole situation is  
deterministic, but it does at least give a post-facto  
indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid to the  
extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI).  
(Which is to say, it isn't really valid at all, but I still think I  
know what is intended!)


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man,


  Yes.


Thank you!

 and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information he
 receives.



  Not at all.


What do you mean not at all?! The Helsinki Man has the neurons in his
brain arranged in a certain way and the Moscow Man, being a exact copy,
will have the neurons in his brain arranged in exactly the same manner and
the two will evolve in exactly the same manner too UNLESS they receive
different information, like one data stream coming from Helsinki and the
other data stream coming from Moscow. Only then would they differentiate
and only then would you be justified in giving them different names.

 It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will have will
 confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for all possible
 he's relevant).


As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling of
self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any other
prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it matter if
the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread LizR

Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man. I
don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I
may be missing something.

Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as Kermit
suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't arise.
But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is
analogue all the way down - with the problems that causes (like the
ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will
work.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread LizR

On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote:

 Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man.
 I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual
 I may be missing something.

 Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as
 Kermit suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't
 arise. But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe
 is analogue all the way down - with the problems that causes (like the
 ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will
 work.


 Even if it's digital it can't be cloned at the quantum level.  So the
 process couldn't be implemented if copying all the way down to the quantum
 state were necessary.  But I don't think this is the case.  Tegmark, among
 others, has shown that the brain is too hot to maintain quantum
 superpositions - so we can probably assume that classical copying is
 enough, with at worst a little loss of short term memory.  It's interesting
 to consider though how accurate the copying would have to be for Bruno's
 question to make sense. Suppose the M and W man only retained a random 10%
 of the H man's memories?


That is the famous substitution level. However, even if it did require
the quantum states to be duplicated, which the universe doesn't allow, if
we think the MWI is correct we can still ask the same questions using the
duplication that creates. E.g. suppose we have Helsinki man enter a room
and then we perform a quantum measurement, and as a result we either send
the room to Moscow or Washington by conventional means. Or we open one of
two doors, say, which lets him go to room 1 or room 2, and beforehand we
ask him what are the chances you will end up in room 1? He says 50%, I
imagine, but we know he ends up in both.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 10 October 2013 12:25, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
 Hi Bruno

 I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of
 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the
 protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive.

 This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in
 both your view and mine.

 P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first
 person) events.

 That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no
 person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment
 will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each
 outcome.

 Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in
 order to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I
 think what is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation,
 but there are none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the
 situation that is relevant.

 He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in
 Moscow, one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies'
 are related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same
 way. There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki
 than Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in
 time when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other
 relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.

 It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of
 50% to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future
 Bruno's shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your
 analysis violates the yes doctor axiom.

 This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked
 the same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington
 and Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the
 fact that asking the question at this point is far too late for
 Bruno-Helsinki, this is not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt
 that an identity maintaining version of him will be in each location.

 I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin
 to feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by
 Hillary Greaves Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic
 Multiverse. Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized
 setting and argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just
 intuitively. This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me
 confidence to know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion
 as I sometimes have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an
 analysis that has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and
 warrants more than the hand waving scoffs some academics here have been
 offering.

 All the best

When I toss a coin, I expect to see either heads or tails but not
both, and in fact I see heads or tails but not both. In a multiverse,
versions of me will see both heads and tails. Should I therefore
conclude that I don't live in a multiverse?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-10 Thread meekerdb

On 10/10/2013 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote:

Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H
man. I don't
see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I
may be
missing something.

Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as
Kermit
suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't
arise. But
personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is
analogue all
the way down - with the problems that causes (like the ultraviolety
catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will work.

Even if it's digital it can't be cloned at the quantum level. So the
process
couldn't be implemented if copying all the way down to the quantum state
were
necessary. But I don't think this is the case. Tegmark, among others, has
shown
that the brain is too hot to maintain quantum superpositions - so we can
probably
assume that classical copying is enough, with at worst a little loss of
short term
memory. It's interesting to consider though how accurate the copying would
have to
be for Bruno's question to make sense. Suppose the M and W man only
retained a
random 10% of the H man's memories?

That is the famous substitution level. However, even if it did require the quantum
states to be duplicated, which the universe doesn't allow, if we think the MWI is
correct we can still ask the same questions using the duplication that creates. E.g.
suppose we have Helsinki man enter a room and then we perform a quantum measurement, and
as a result we either send the room to Moscow or Washington by conventional means. Or we
open one of two doors, say, which lets him go to room 1 or room 2, and beforehand we ask
him what are the chances you will end up in room 1? He says 50%, I imagine, but we know
he ends up in both.

According to the paper I posted, even if we flipped a coin, the outcome would constitute a
quantum measurement. But as for knowing there's a duplication: Only if we know MWI, an
interpretation we made up, is true.

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  [your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in only one
 place.


If the copies are really identical then you feel to be in only one place
(insofar as spatial position has any meaning when talking about
consciousness) because you really are in only one place, regardless of
how many copies are made or where those bodies are.

 The question is which city will [he] observed.


The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man,
and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information he
receives.

 It can only be one city, unless you introduce some non-comp telepathy.


No idea what that means.

 John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
 interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part
of the Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his
ideas, but not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that its
competitors can do better. The Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad
explanation of why Quantum Mechanics works.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10 October 2013 06:35, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 The Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum
 Mechanics works.


Nicely summed up!

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread meekerdb


On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part of the Many 
Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but not in a way that 
feels entirely satisfactory, not that its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds 
interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum Mechanics works.


So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability and personal identity 
as Bruno's teleportation.


Brent

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Bruno

 I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 
 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, 
 etc.) to find oneself alive. 

This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in 
both your view and mine.

 P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) 
 events. 

That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no 
person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment 
will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each 
outcome.

Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order 
to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I think what 
is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are 
none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the situation that is 
relevant.

He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, 
one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are 
related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. 
There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than 
Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in time 
when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other 
relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.

It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% 
to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's 
shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your analysis 
violates the yes doctor axiom.

This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the 
same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and 
Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the fact that 
asking the question at this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is 
not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt that an identity 
maintaining version of him will be in each location.

I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to 
feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary 
Greaves Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse. 
Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and 
argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. 
This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me confidence to 
know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion as I sometimes 
have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an analysis that has been 
peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants more than the hand 
waving scoffs some academics here have been offering.

All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


  

  
  
On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark
  wrote:



  On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:


  


 How do you explain quantum
  mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
  interpretation?





Not very well, assigning probabilities is
  unquestionably the weakest part of the Many Worlds theory.
  True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but
  not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that
  its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds
  interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum
  Mechanics works.


  

  



So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability
and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.



Brent

  





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100%
probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a
physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him
splitting and observing all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how
people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say)
50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I
guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only
because our brains are wired to think in terms of the single universe
view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think
about things in everyday life.

Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man *then* has a
50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only
being the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this
was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how
he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology
is involved (ditto for the physicist).

However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday
attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread meekerdb

On 10/9/2013 6:37 PM, LizR wrote:
If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to him
being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI
will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes.
This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that
he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI,

The physicist is only interested in what he can publish in PhysRev. He knows that
replication is essential. So goes back to Helsinki and tries is again...and again...and
again... And he keeps careful notes. After a few thousand replications he is ready to
publish his findings that the probability of arriving in Washington via teleportation from
Helsinki is 0.48_+_0.06. Of course JKC will complain that I have used an ambiguous
pronoun he, but in this case, except for a group of vanishing measure, it doesn't matter
which he is meant.

Brent

and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because
our brains are wired to think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's
take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man /then/ has a 50% chance of
being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the single unique copy
of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for
Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming
folk psychology is involved (ditto for the physicist).

However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude often
doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Liz

 This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
 feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
 knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
 arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to think in terms 
 of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
 terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

 Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
 chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
 the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
 chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the 
physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the 
single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance 
beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his 
chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto 
for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude 
often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.





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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Brent

But one of the essential things about quantum mechanics is futures are 
uncertain even give complete knowldge. 

I disagree. This is still 'up for grabs' and dependent on whether the 
interpretation is indeterminsitic (copenhagen,etc) or deterministic (MWI). Its 
a feature of MWI that all outcomes get their branch, there isn't uncertainty 
about that.

If you use MWI then you expect that after observing a quantum random outcome 
that there will be two (or more) copies of you that share the same memories up 
to the observation, but are different after.  So Bruno is just trying to show 
that the uncertainty can be in which copy is observing instead of which 
value was observed.

I think which copy is observing and which value was observed are 
functionally equivolent vis a vis the step 3 experiment. Nevertheless, the 
question asked is definately 'what value will you see?'

Whether this uncertainty can be represented as a probability is, I think, a 
problem in both Bruno's thought experiment and in MWI of QM.

There are two problems I think. firstly, is there room for subjective 
uncertainty? and secondly, how does the proportionality of a 'copenhagen' 
random event get represented. MWI has the problem that if the outcome depends 
on say 1/3 vs 2/3 the world will still split into just 2 outcomes, with nothing 
to represent proportionality. Im not sure Bruno's UD suffers from that issue, 
though being 'comp' and presumably therefore dealing with things discretely, 
there maybe issues whenever irrational numbers appear in denominators. 1/PI vs. 
1-1/PI as you have said before.

All the best.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 02:21:01 +




Hi Liz

 This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
 feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
 knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
 arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to think in terms 
 of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
 terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

 Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
 chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
 the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
 chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the 
physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the 
single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance 
beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his 
chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto 
for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means
when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of appearing in
Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities,
because the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a
post-facto indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid
to the extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI).
(Which is to say, it isn't *really *valid at all, but I still think I know
what is intended!)

Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Liz


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.






(Or then again, I won't...)

Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means 
when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of appearing in 
Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities, because 
the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a post-facto 
indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid to the extent 
that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI). (Which is to say, 
it isn't really valid at all, but I still think I know what is intended!)


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

I will also be spontaneously combusting, rocketing to the Moon, and being
proclaimed Queen of the Universe.


On 10 October 2013 16:50, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz


 *
 *
 *Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.
 * *
 *
 * *
 *(Or then again, I won't...)*

 Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



 --
 Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300

 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 From: lizj...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno
 means when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of
 appearing in Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about
 probabilities, because the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at
 least give a post-facto indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so
 it's valid to the extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming
 the MWI). (Which is to say, it isn't *really *valid at all, but I still
 think I know what is intended!)

 Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

 (Or then again, I won't...)

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 07 Oct 2013, at 18:23, John Clark wrote:




Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know  
what you are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like  
I and you and he and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know  
what those words mean in a world with duplicating chambers.


Very clear?
Each time I gave you the definition, you mocked it with pee pee, and  
two post later you come back with the idea that it is not clear,  
without ever quoting and cricticizing the definitions. I have  
introduced the key 1-person/3-person distinction, presented in a pure  
third person way, to address this issue, but you never commented it  
nor make any clearer.





Bruno says he has been duplicated, so now there are TWO,


In the third person sense. But the chance evaluation have been asked  
on the possible (accessible from Helsinki) first person experiences.





but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing


Yes, because in the comp context, you can, in Helsinki, understand  
that, although your body-copy will be in two places, you can feel to  
be in only one place.





and only the ONE thing that he will do; and this is nonsense.


Not will do. The question is which city will he observed. It can  
only be one city, unless you introduce some non-comp telepathy.


That is why it is like the throw of a coin, like you have already  
agreed, or like a quantum superposition, but for a different reason,  
and that is exploited in the next steps.


Nobody seems to understand your point, so try to make it more precise,  
and stop pretending it is very clear, as nobody understand you. I am  
still waiting for Chris explanation, as he pretend to follow your  
point, but I see not the explanation coming.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 07 Oct 2013, at 19:38, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound  
importance  simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal  
pronouns. And that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician.


 That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please.

Bruno, are you trying to convince people that I haven't made DOZENS  
of specific complaints about your sloppy use of personal pronouns  
that is unacceptable in a world with duplicating chambers?



I have introduced the duplicating chamber to explain the difference of  
the 1-I and 3-I, and all I got from you where that is pee-pee stuff.

people can verify: you have not produced any specific complain.

On the contrary you have pretended that it is like antic throw of a  
coin, but that was exactly my point.


You are stuck in a denying psychological state.




Are you saying I've never asked Who the hell is he ? and gotten  
no reply?


I have always replied. Always. You have ignored the answer, and never  
comment them, except sometimes with your pee-pee vocabulary.





If duplicating chambers were not involved then it would indeed be  
ridiculous nit picking, but NOT if they do exist. In your thought  
experiments typically the guy is duplicated so now there are TWO,


Like in Everett QM self-superposition, but then you should condemn, as  
Quentin told you more than once, the use of probability in QM.





and then


?
Le us not mix the experiment that e are comparing.



the guy flips a coin and you demand to know what the ONE and only  
ONE result that the guy will see. And this is not just ridiculous  
it is logically inconsistent.


?
If a guy throws a coin, he will see only one outcome among two possible.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi John,

Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time

The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.

Who is the Y guy? I guess you mean the guy in Helsinki.

Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no
consequential resolution?

Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!

It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M

Not with the protocol in step 3. You just push on a button, and you
are read, annihilated, and reconstituted in two places (W and M) in
the state which has just been scanned in Helsinki.
Some times go by, but not a lot, and the question is about what you
will live. With comp, it is clear that you will live in W OR in M, but
that any more precise prediction will fail.

that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you
are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical
you 'feel' to be.
That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it
deserves) is false:
it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered
usually as time???)

Then both the probability used in the throwing on a coin, or in QM, in
fact all use of prediction become useless. You argument condemns the
whole field of statistics and probability. If the whether broadcast
says that if will rain at the end of the day, you might say that is
nonsense, as we will be all dead before.

So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.

I can see that 'panta rhei', because I stay myself enough in the
process.

...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use
such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.)

The question is not about identity, but about predicting some
happenings to first person view. With your argument I cannot believe
that I will drink a cup of coffee when I am preparing it.
In fact your argument would entail that the probability is zero to
survive with an artificial brain, so you are assuming non-comp. No
problem with that, but my goal is the study of the consequence of comp.

Bruno

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one
(a case where Leibniz identity rule fails,

If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it
most certainly has NOT failed.

I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will
not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).

The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and
which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many
people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the
he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or
of both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation
of their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and
I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try
to understand.

There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of
the most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not
interested in learning.

Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the
indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability. There's some
good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret
especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.

I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local
probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with
QM, except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.

Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That
problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense
only in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some
distinction. The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds,
but there are only knowledge states of observer/dreamers.

But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the
WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol
given*, we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation.
The quantum case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the
lack of definition of world), but it seems to me that Everett use
both Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly).

Bruno

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 8:42 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 10/7/2013 7:02 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
 wrote:

 Quentin


 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the
 comp
 duplication experience.

 But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is
 taken
 very seriously by Everetians and their critics.

 In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
 chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will,
 I
 suspect, be similar in that regard.

 So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
 with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make
 sense
 at all.

 It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least
 in
 MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
 equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
 duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
 will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all,
 there
 is not two of me yet ...

 But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
 Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

 I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
 there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
 _both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
 continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
 each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
 Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
 perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
 probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
 models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
 weird idea of randomness that seems to defy explanation.


Hi Brent,

 But the complete symmetry of the duplication makes it too easy.  If the
 probabilities are 1/3 and 2/3 are three worlds instantiated in MWI or only
 two worlds with different weights.

Three world at least, I would say. Of course, I imagine n worlds where
n/3 worlds contain one outcome and 2n/3 the other. I imagine n to be a
very large number and each slice to contain many variations of other
outcomes we are not controlling for in this case.

  What if the probabilities are 1/pi and
 (1-1/pi)?

I don't think a probability with an irrational value would make sense
in this model.

  Or (1-epsilon) and epsilon, where epsilon is just to account for
 all those things you haven't thought of, but are really improbable?

No problem. A very small percentage of the gazillion worlds will
contain the improbable outcome.


 So when you make a statement about the probability of something
 happening, you are always making a statement about a possible


 There's where the problem comes in - what does possible cover?

It's easier to explain what impossible means - I die (not that it's
impossible for me to die, but that no continuation exists from that
state).
Possible means anything else, but specific outcomes will be more or
less numerous in the gazillion continuations. We are already in a very
specific are of the multiverse -- one where human beings exit on earth
and so forth. This comes with asymmetries.

I'm not surprised if this is very naif though, and I have no intention
of postulating.

Telmo.

 Brent

 continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
 fact, happening becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
 anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
 mysterious property called randomness.

 You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
 the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.

 I think.

 Telmo.

 
 From: allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200


 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

 Hi Bruno


 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say
 no
 to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

 I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
 Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the
 doctor.

 regards



 It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience
 a
 next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
 duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
 expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
 probability in MWI setting... it's the same.

 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both*
 from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
 consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
 duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
 destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
 MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
 Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
less odd than competing explanations.

*Bruno's proof is about the continuous feeling of self, and that has
nothing to do with predictions in general or probabilities in particular;
it is about remembering who you were yesterday.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 08 Oct 2013, at 18:05, John Clark wrote:





On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do  
*both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream  
of consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before  
duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for  
the destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE  
SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT  
IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better  
than random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works  
as well as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but  
only a little) less odd than competing explanations.


*Bruno's proof is about the continuous feeling of self,


It is a reasoning starting from the invariance of consciousness for a  
digital substitution (computationalism).




and that has nothing to do with predictions in general or  
probabilities in particular;



That invariance entails that physics has to emerge from a statistics  
on computations, and we can already technically compare many things in  
the comp-physics and the usual physics, so that we can already refute  
a version of comp (comp + the classical theory of knowledge).





it is about remembering who you were yesterday.


With a self-duplication in between. Yes, that step 3. You remember  
that you were in Helsinki, and you see that you are in Washington, for  
example. You see also that in the notebook you predicted that you will  
feel to be in Washington and in Moscow, but obviously you see only  
Washington, so you conclude that you were wrong or did not understand  
the question (and with some chance, now you know better, as we will  
reiterate the experience.


With step seven, there will be (like in Deutsch interpretation of  
Everett QM) aleph_0 copies in between, and things will get more  
interesting and precise about the relationship between consciousness  
and physical realities (and other realities). It might be better, at  
some point, to talk, like Deutsch, on consciousness differentiation,  
instead of universe multiplication, as the term universe is quite  
fuzzy.


IN AUDA (arithmetical universal dovetailer argument), we model the  
machine's believability by the assertability by an ideal correct  
universal machine believing in induction, which makes their logic of  
provability axiomatized by Löb's formula, and derive the quantum logic  
by defining the probability one by Bp  Dt (with all the technical  
details provided).


We exploit the gap between G and G*, to get namable but non rationally  
believable  truth for those machines, which provides natural candidate  
for qualia, and here too there are formal confirmations. this has been  
verified by many people, but you can verify it by yourself, in you  
study a bit of logic.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb


On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:




On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both* 
from a
3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of consciousness 
which is
*either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the probability (or 
measure
of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV if the guy 
standing in H.
*IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE 
ABOUT IT ON
EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than random guessing 
in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does 
that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less odd than competing 
explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread LizR

On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:


 On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

   You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do
 *both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
 consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
 duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
 destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
 MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
 Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


  And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

 *Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
 random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

 *Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
 as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
 less odd than competing explanations.


 How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
 interpretation?


That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from,
so how do you get the Born rule there? (for example).

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb


On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:
On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do 
*both*
from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of 
consciousness
which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the 
probability
(or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV 
if the
guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR 
YOU
CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI 
as an
obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than 
random
guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well 
as it
does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less 
odd than
competing explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?


That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other 
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from, so how do you 
get the Born rule there? (for example).


In the CI the Born rule is just a postulate.  There are never an infinity of possible 
observed values because the finite resolution of all instruments.  If you can associate 
probabilities to worlds then you can apply Gleason's theorem to get the Born rule.  But 
it's not clear what constitutes 'a world' apart from the circular requirement that it's 
something you get a measurement in.


But I'm asking JKC specifically, because I'm curious as to how his explanation of 
probabilities under MWI is different from Bruno's in his duplication experiment?


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb


On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:

That is the $64000 question!


Incidentally I haven't heard anyone use that expression in thirty years.  But I'm old 
enough to remember when Johnny Carson was the quiz master on the radio program The $64 
Question.


How old are you Liz?

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread LizR

On 9 October 2013 10:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:

 That is the $64000 question!


 Incidentally I haven't heard anyone use that expression in thirty years.
 But I'm old enough to remember when Johnny Carson was the quiz master on
 the radio program The $64 Question.

 How old are you Liz?


Old enough to know better.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a
case where Leibniz identity rule fails,

If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most
certainly has NOT failed.

I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and
which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many
people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the
he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the
duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of
both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation of
their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and I
have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try to
understand.

There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of
the most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not
interested in learning.

I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local
probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with QM,
except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.

Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That
problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense only
in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some distinction.
The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds, but there are
only knowledge states of observer/dreamers.

But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the
WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol given*,
we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation. The quantum
case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the lack of
definition of world), but it seems to me that Everett use both
Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


 The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the W-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday


But I am still Bruno Marchal, apparently. The FPI depends on that  
appearance.





 But the M-guy is not the W-guy

True, but the H-guy and the M-guy and the M-guy are all Bruno  
Marchal because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.


That's my point. OK.





The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks,

Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound importance   
simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal pronouns. And  
that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician.


That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please.




 and which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy,

The criticism some have with Quantum Mechanics is that what it says  
is very very odd, but odd or not and love it or hate it what Quantum  
Mechanics says is crystal clear


This is simply false. Look at the debate in the literature. See the  
link given just now by Brent.  In this list most believe that QM is  
slightly more understandable with the MWI. Not all problems are  
solved. Anyway, it is simpler in the first six steps of the UDA, where  
the situation is utterly transparent, given the protocol, and the  
definition of 1-I and 3-I.




and it gets the job done; in contrast when your ideas are not opaque  
they are logically inconsistent.


You should prove statement like that, with specific quote and  
references.






 Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer to the guy  
in Helsinki before the duplication,


If he refers to Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy then the correct  
prediction  he would make is that he will see Helsinki and only  
Helsinki;



You can apply that idea to the guy who throw a coin. You would say  
that such a guy can only predict that he will throw a coin. This is  
ridiculous, frankly.





not that predictions, good or bad, have the slightest thing to do  
with a feeling of continuity or feeling of self.


If that did not exist, no probabilities at all would ever make sense.
(Note that formally your remark is met by the  Dt in the formal  
approach, but it is met by simple common sense in UDA).





And if you want to say that Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy is dead  
then fine, but then you must also say that Bruno Marchal of  
yesterday is dead and personally I don't want to torture the  
language more that I have to under these very odd circumstances of  
self duplication.


And we can't do that, because it would make comp false.





 you fake misunderstanding

Why on earth would I, or anyone, pretend not to understand something  
when they really did?


Because you would ask question, instead of asserting that there is  
something false, without being able to say what.



Bruno




 of the most easy part of the reasoning.

If this is the clearest reasoning in your proof then I'm doubly  
glad I didn't read anymore.


  John K Clark




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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 07 Oct 2013, at 06:24, chris peck wrote:


Hi Brent

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.  
If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at  
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,  
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next.


I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things  
remain the same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't  
flow. Or the human body has an underlying form and structure that  
gets maintained as the constituent matter comes and goes. It is the  
abstract relationship between elements that constitutes identity  
rather than the elements themselves. I would think this reading of  
Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a neo-patonist. I  
would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive  
steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he  
would really be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural  
numbers from which 'shadows of us' are derived.


In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in  
comp. This is the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he  
violates in step 3.


Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say  
no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?


Bruno






 I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as  
assigning a probability.


Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he  
explicitly assigns probability:


This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1- 
indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable  
without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable  
to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow  
(resp. Washington).”


All the best

Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If  
comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at  
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,  
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I  
thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If  
comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least  
in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly.  
Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be  
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated  
inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the  
size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show  
what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself  
objectionable?)



JC should read this: 
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret

I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning  
a probability.


Brent

Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit  
pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is  
computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical  
possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the  
multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.)


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:


On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as  
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


Thanks for noticing.


If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at  
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,  
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I  
thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If  
comp, then we exist as steps in a computation,


Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a  
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is  
simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter  
and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into  
account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so  
with pick-nickers)



and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into  
existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment  
digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could  
also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer  
MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the  
point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in  
principle itself objectionable?)


Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit  
pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is  
computation,


In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a  
1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:
G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly  
about herself.


That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my  
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.




a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?


I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical  
possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.
Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is  
phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is  
unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from  
post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and  
not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a  
reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it  
trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is  
thinking.



(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself  
is apparently doing it constantly.)


Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the  
physical reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.
People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are  
very rare. I know only one: Clark.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread chris peck

Hi Bruno

 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to 
 the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow 
(or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

regards

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200


On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark 
johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 
  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
  The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. 
Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) 
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same 
person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point 
that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a 
computation, 
Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a 
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler 
sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the 
point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so 
it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) 

and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence 
constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be 
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or 
it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. 
Or is in principle itself objectionable?)
 
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The 
question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, 
In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p 
notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:G* proves (Bp  
p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. 
That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my 
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.

a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? 
I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. 
he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.Except that even this is not 
clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of 
a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He 
contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy 
is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a 
reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is 
it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking.

(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is 
apparently doing it constantly.)

Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical 
reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.People accepting the 
consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very rare. I know only one: 
Clark.
Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

 Hi Bruno


 * Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say
 no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?*

 I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
 Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

 regards



It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a
next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
probability in MWI setting... it's the same.

Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
duplication experience.

Quentin




 --
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be

 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:

 On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you
 are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


 Thanks for noticing.


 If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at
 least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you
 aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was
 partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as
 steps in a computation,


 Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a
 computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is
 simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and
 get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at
 some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with
 pick-nickers)


 and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into
 existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital
 states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be
 duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be
 the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show
 what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?)

 Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless.
 The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation,


 In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p
 notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:
 G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about
 herself.

 That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my
 consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.


 a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?


 I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical
 possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.
 Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is
 phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is
 unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post
 to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep
 enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason
 to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We
 still don't know what John Clark is thinking.


 (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is
 apparently doing it constantly.)


 Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical
 reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.
 People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are
 very rare. I know only one: Clark.

 Bruno



  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




 --
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 Visit

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread chris peck

Quentin

 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you 
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
 duplication experience.

But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken very 
seriously by Everetians and their critics.

In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine chance, 
because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I suspect, be 
similar in that regard.

So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated with 
one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense at all.

It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in 
MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no 
equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be 
duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I will 
survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there is not 
two of me yet ...

But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard 
Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com






Hi Bruno

 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to 
 the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow 
(or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.




regards


It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a 
next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, 
both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before 
duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... 
it's the same.




Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept 
them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
duplication experience.

Quentin



 


From: marc...@ulb.ac.be



To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



 
  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
 


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. 



Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) 
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same 
person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point 
that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a 
computation, 



Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a 
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler 
sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the 
point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so 
it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) 




and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence 
constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be 
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or 
it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. 
Or is in principle itself objectionable?)



 
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The 
question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, 
In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p 
notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:


G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about 
herself. 
That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my 
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.




a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? 
I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. 
he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.


Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is 
phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear 
why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, 
like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to 
proceed (like

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-07 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
 Quentin


 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
 duplication experience.

 But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken
 very seriously by Everetians and their critics.

 In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
 chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I
 suspect, be similar in that regard.

 So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
 with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense
 at all.

 It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in
 MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
 equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
 duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
 will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there
 is not two of me yet ...

 But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
 Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
_both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
weird idea of randomness that seems to defy explanation.

So when you make a statement about the probability of something
happening, you are always making a statement about a possible
continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
fact, happening becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
mysterious property called randomness.

You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.

I think.

Telmo.

 
 From: allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200

 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

 Hi Bruno


 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no
 to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

 I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
 Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

 regards



 It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a
 next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
 duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
 expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
 probability in MWI setting... it's the same.

 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
 duplication experience.

 Quentin




 
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be

 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:

 On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
 not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.


 Thanks for noticing.


 If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least)
 then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the
 same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the
 point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a
 computation,


 Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a
 computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is
 simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and
 get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at
 some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with
 pick-nickers)


 and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence
 constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?