Re: The Reality of Observer Moments
Le 15-août-05, à 06:02, Lee Corbin a écrit : Stephen writes I would like for you to consider that we should not take OMs as objective processes but the result of objective processes. Of course, I will bow to whatever word usage is favored by most of the people, or by those who have the longest experience with the term. Well, but here we are divided. Those who thinks OM precede, logically, the physical world and those who thinks the physical world precedes the OM. It is a main point of discussion. I merely want to assert that I don't and never have found any real value in what is not objective. I would like to insist that most of us do the same assertion. It is just that we acknowledge the existence of subjectivity. Like you actually. Then, a reasoning shows that in some theory (like comp) subjectivity has a an objective role with objective, albeit indirect, verifiable consequences. (Where you think subjectivity is purely epiphenomenal. That cannot be! (unless you assume you are a subtantial infinite non turing emulable soul). For example, if I am poked with a needle and cry out, one may wish to proclaim to me see, you do have a subjective reality. Oh, that really hurt, I'll admit but if you want to really know what happened then the needle caused some nerves in my finger to fire, which caused other nerves to fire and so on. I am a process fashioned by evolution to object to actions like poking me. I have no problem with that. Actually by admitting that hurts you admit the subjectivity. By dismissing discourse on it, you agree on its ineffable aspect. And by admitting it is related to evolution, you admit implicitly the mind-body problem: why nature would have associate ineffable perception when only triggering neurons could make me behave in the right way. And so you are perhaps closer to the mind-body solution which emerges by itself from computer science, which is that any machine which introspect itself discover soon enough an objectively ineffable gigantic a-spatial atemporal, but mathematically and physically explorable reality. Godel did not only discover incompleteness. He discovered that machine can discover their incompleteness. That is what I exploit. The sufficiently rich (lobian) does discover the geometry of that incompleteness and why that geometry should operate in their most probable neighborhoods (in their most probable consistent extensions/ computational histories). I shudder every time I read of notions that imply some kind of knowledge of reality in itself! Yeah, well now you know how it feels! :-) Feels, that is, every time that someone speaks of inner truths not accessible to anyone else, not accessible in *principle* to anyone else. But this is the case of the *hurting* needle. If you can give me a purely third person communication that the needle hurts you, just give me it. I don't consider those things to rank very highly on the scale of truth. Take someone. Put the needle in the finger of that someone. Tell him now that you don't rank very highly his personal feeling on the scale of truth! Try to give him a third person proof of that! Tell him Come on, that's only some firing neurons!. You frighten me a little bit! It boils down, as you hint, to what we mean by knowledge. Casting aside the incredibly mistaken quest for certainty, we ought to speak of that which can be objectively known in principle. Here again I follow you completely. It doesn't ever do any good to speak of anything else. Absolutely. But to exclude the possibility of objective theory *on* subjectivity from that would be a category error. Sure, ask someone if he or she has a headache---but if you want to think about it strictly, then it is a state (or a succession of states constituting a process) in that person's brain. Suppose you explain me what is a succession of states and how that could give some person a feeling of headache. And suppose you are so good that you convince me. Now, 'to be convinced' is a first person subjective experience. Is that convincing not also just a succession of states? If you use that reduction for dismissing the headache, why shouldn't we use to dismiss the convincing? But then how could we still give sense to any argument? I repeat my challenge: find *one* thing that is subjectively known or investigable or knowable by introspection that was not known by the ancients. The first person comp indeterminacy. Theaetetus was close, but he missed it. :-) (but are not all theorem in math new such things?) Oh, here I agree with you. I consider the speculations of the Everything Platonic monists to be, er, speculations only. No no. It is only reasoning from assumption. Unless there is an error in my proof, of course, but in the case there is no error, the result changes the speculation-target. A physical universe? We don't need that hypothesis any
RE: The Reality of Observer Moments
Bruno writes Lee Corbin a écrit : Stephen writes I would like for you to consider that we should not take OMs as objective processes but the result of objective processes. Of course, I will bow to whatever word usage is favored by most of the people, or by those who have the longest experience with the term. Well, but here we are divided. Those who thinks OM precede, logically, the physical world and those who thinks the physical world precedes the OM. It is a main point of discussion. I think that you misunderstand. Stephen's contention as stated here is whether they're *objective* or merely the result of such objective processes and so subjective in nature. I had said that I thought they ought to be regarded as objective (I have little patience with subjective phenomena) and he was asking me to consider whether they should be considered subjective. So: you can suggest that the *meaning* of them be as subjective, or that the *meaning* be as objective processes, e.g., those available for scrutiny from a 3rd person point of view (even if it's kind of hard with our technology today). For example, if I am poked with a needle and cry out, one may wish to proclaim to me see, you do have a subjective reality. Oh, that really hurt, I'll admit but if you want to really know what happened then the needle caused some nerves in my finger to fire, which caused other nerves to fire and so on. I am a process fashioned by evolution to object to actions like poking me. I have no problem with that. Actually by admitting that hurts you admit the subjectivity. By dismissing discourse on it, you agree on its ineffable aspect. And by admitting it is related to evolution, you admit implicitly the mind-body problem: why nature would have associate ineffable perception when only triggering neurons could make me behave in the right way. Yes, except the last sentence: I for one cannot imagine any other way that nature could have done it without the intervention of Higher Powers. There has to be an ineffable perception: just what the hell is an entity to say to itself and to others if there were not? I shudder every time I read of notions that imply some kind of knowledge of reality in itself! Yeah, well now you know how it feels! :-) Feels, that is, every time that someone speaks of inner truths not accessible to anyone else, not accessible in *principle* to anyone else. But this is the case of the *hurting* needle. If you can give me a purely third person communication that the needle hurts you, just give me it. Sure, and I already did: the needle triggered nerves in my finger which caused other nerves to fire which cause other nerves to fire in my brain so that the machine (I mean me and my body) sought avoidance planning and actions. I spoke out loud to deter future such incidents. I remembered the incident. I don't consider those things to rank very highly on the scale of truth. Take someone. Put the needle in the finger of that someone. Tell him now that you don't rank very highly his personal feeling on the scale of truth! Of course, being a sensible fellow like you and me, he'll understand what is meant: the nature of his pain is, as you say, ineffable. Evolution also built in sympathy and altruism in us which causes me to feel his pain in a sympathetic way. I do feel his pain, if we are to take that phrase in the right way. Try to give him a third person proof of that! Tell him Come on, that's only some firing neurons!. You frighten me a little bit! That's ONLY SOME FIRING NEURONS!!??? You jest. Or rather, you may be putting up a straw man (that can be easily knocked down). Any doctor, for example, who is indifferent to firing neurons should seek another profession, presumably one that a psychopath would be comfortable in. Suppose you explain [to] me what is a succession of states and how that could give some person a feeling of headache. And suppose you are so good that you convince me. Now, 'to be convinced' is a first person subjective experience. Is that convincing not also just a succession of states? If you use that reduction for dismissing the headache, why shouldn't we use to dismiss the convincing? But then how could we still give sense to any argument? Remember: I'm not dismissing the headache any more than I would an animal getting cruelly jabbed with a needle. You seem to assume that a 3rd person description cannot be a sympathetic one. Your real knowledge, (for example, that some people have been to Hawaii or that you have two hands or that four gas giants revolve around the sun), has survived the tests of time. But that most humans suffer on the planet, and sometime somewhere more, this does not survive the tests of time? Of course it does. Even apes and elephants know it. They know, that is, that others can be in pain the way that they are. Naturally, they don't have any language at all with
The Reality of Observer Moments
I wish to emphasize that according to a traditional realist's beliefs, observer moments are objective and real, and hence do exist, so that there is nothing objectionable about speculations concerning them. Suppose that a mouse during some small time delta t is in a particular state (or set of states, if you wish to be picky). In the objective tradition we do not next inquire about what it seems like to the mouse, or what the mouse (read human) could report or recall about the moment, or whether this moment is the same to the mouse as some other moment. Instead, we suppose that at very *least* the entire brain state is what gives rise to the observer moment as a purely physical or ideal process. (In all likelihood, much less than the whole brain is required, but so far 21st century science can only speculate on what the proper subset of functioning is, or what the proper *calculation* is that's going on in those neurons which would be appropriate to use as the observer moment.) Since there is *some* objective process taking place, it must be the case that this same, identical process is taking place at other times and places. At this point I would usually branch off and discuss the total benefit accruing to the mouse-person, but it's really a different topic. The final word: OMs can be viewed as objective processes, and efforts to find the simplest explanation considering Everything seem quite appropriate. Lee
RE: The Reality of Observer Moments
Lee Corbin I wish to emphasize that according to a traditional realist's beliefs, observer moments are objective and real, and hence do exist, so that there is nothing objectionable about speculations concerning them. Suppose that a mouse during some small time delta t is in a particular state (or set of states, if you wish to be picky). In the objective tradition we do not next inquire about what it seems like to the mouse, or what the mouse (read human) could report or recall about the moment, or whether this moment is the same to the mouse as some other moment. Instead, we suppose that at very *least* the entire brain state is what gives rise to the observer moment as a purely physical or ideal process. (In all likelihood, much less than the whole brain is required, but so far 21st century science can only speculate on what the proper subset of functioning is, or what the proper *calculation* is that's going on in those neurons which would be appropriate to use as the observer moment.) Since there is *some* objective process taking place, it must be the case that this same, identical process is taking place at other times and places. At this point I would usually branch off and discuss the total benefit accruing to the mouse-person, but it's really a different topic. The final word: OMs can be viewed as objective processes, and efforts to find the simplest explanation considering Everything seem quite appropriate. Lee It sounds like a final word but I'd urge caution. It may be _your_ final word but not the natural world's final world. The system of observer moments could be just as 'mathematical'/computational and be an illusion - but a real illusion that is fit for purpose. Evolutionary considerations do not suggest that observation system be any better than that consistent with survival (not those necessities compatible with the survival of a mathematician's view of the observation system N million years later) :-) A cohort of elemental subjective experiences configured to present an emergent _apparent_ observation as an objective view equally fits the circumstances you describe and is a simpler solution. Simpler becasue a brain does not have to make a-priori assertions about everything that is 'not' brain. It can slap computational paint on reality and come up with an 'adequate' picture without knowing anything about how 'not brain' works. Isn't that what it has to do? How han a brain that knows nothing about the universe be created from the universe from nothing without making such shortcuts? This is an _apparent_ objective view of a 'just-as-real' reality. It also can be hypothesisesed to deliver what we have. If a theory insists that the objective view has any greater status than this then part of the theory should explain why it is necessarily that way and how its prescribed circumstances would deliver a solution preferred by the natural world and indeed a very specific detailing of the difference between the two. Hence my advice of caution in attributing the source of the 'observer moment' to anything more than a subjectively delivered virtual objective view. Cheers Colin Hales
Re: The Reality of Observer Moments
Hi Lee, I would like for you to consider that we should not take OMs as objective processes but the result of objective processes. I shudder every time I read of notions that imply some kind of knowledge of reality in itself! How is it that we simply can not seem to acknowledge what we can not know Existence in-itself and merely must rely upon logical rules, gleamed from multiple attempts, to figure out good models of what we think is going on and not try to fool ourselves that we can somehow abstract away ourselves from our deliberations about the nature of *Reality*? Let me try to boil this down a little, how is it even consistent to claim that some set of states completely represents a process? The assumption here seems to beg us to assume that a static representation can faithfully capture all of the transitive properties implicit in the notion of process. For me this is equivalent to claiming that Becoming can be derived from Being. I would truly like someone to explain this idea to me! From what I can figure it is easy to show how Being can derive from Becoming, so why the kicking against the pricks trying to go backwards? Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 5:07 PM Subject: The Reality of Observer Moments I wish to emphasize that according to a traditional realist's beliefs, observer moments are objective and real, and hence do exist, so that there is nothing objectionable about speculations concerning them. Suppose that a mouse during some small time delta t is in a particular state (or set of states, if you wish to be picky). In the objective tradition we do not next inquire about what it seems like to the mouse, or what the mouse (read human) could report or recall about the moment, or whether this moment is the same to the mouse as some other moment. Instead, we suppose that at very *least* the entire brain state is what gives rise to the observer moment as a purely physical or ideal process. (In all likelihood, much less than the whole brain is required, but so far 21st century science can only speculate on what the proper subset of functioning is, or what the proper *calculation* is that's going on in those neurons which would be appropriate to use as the observer moment.) Since there is *some* objective process taking place, it must be the case that this same, identical process is taking place at other times and places. At this point I would usually branch off and discuss the total benefit accruing to the mouse-person, but it's really a different topic. The final word: OMs can be viewed as objective processes, and efforts to find the simplest explanation considering Everything seem quite appropriate. Lee
RE: The Reality of Observer Moments
Stephen writes I would like for you to consider that we should not take OMs as objective processes but the result of objective processes. Of course, I will bow to whatever word usage is favored by most of the people, or by those who have the longest experience with the term. I merely want to assert that I don't and never have found any real value in what is not objective. For example, if I am poked with a needle and cry out, one may wish to proclaim to me see, you do have a subjective reality. Oh, that really hurt, I'll admit but if you want to really know what happened then the needle caused some nerves in my finger to fire, which caused other nerves to fire and so on. I am a process fashioned by evolution to object to actions like poking me. I shudder every time I read of notions that imply some kind of knowledge of reality in itself! Yeah, well now you know how it feels! :-) Feels, that is, every time that someone speaks of inner truths not accessible to anyone else, not accessible in *principle* to anyone else. I don't consider those things to rank very highly on the scale of truth. It boils down, as you hint, to what we mean by knowledge. Casting aside the incredibly mistaken quest for certainty, we ought to speak of that which can be objectively known in principle. It doesn't ever do any good to speak of anything else. Sure, ask someone if he or she has a headache---but if you want to think about it strictly, then it is a state (or a succession of states constituting a process) in that person's brain. I repeat my challenge: find *one* thing that is subjectively known or investigable or knowable by introspection that was not known by the ancients. How is it that we simply can not seem to acknowledge what we can not know Existence in-itself and merely must rely upon logical rules, gleamed from multiple attempts, to figure out good models of what we think is going on and not try to fool ourselves that we can somehow abstract away ourselves from our deliberations about the nature of *Reality*? First, the models (as you call them) were provided by evolutionary processes that finally led to one's own embryonic and fetal development. As a two year old, you know that sometimes it's light and sometimes it's dark, unless your brain is malformed or malfunctioning. There is *so* much true knowledge of that form accessible to a two-year old that it's staggering. Yet no one except a naive child supposes that there is any absolute certainty to his knowledge, or is unaware of the processes that put information about outside events (and some internal ones) into his brain. So I reject the claim that I or people like me believe we can know Existence in-itself as you write. Let me try to boil this down a little, how is it even consistent to claim that some set of states completely represents a process? The assumption here seems to beg us to assume that a static representation can faithfully capture all of the transitive properties implicit in the notion of process. Oh, here I agree with you. I consider the speculations of the Everything Platonic monists to be, er, speculations only. Those conjectures have not even *begun* to pass the test of time, i.e., have not endured much criticism as yet, and certainly cannot be said to have survived much criticism. Your real knowledge, (for example, that some people have been to Hawaii or that you have two hands or that four gas giants revolve around the sun), has survived the tests of time. Lee P.S. I'll reply to Colin's post in a while. For me this is equivalent to claiming that Becoming can be derived from Being. I would truly like someone to explain this idea to me! From what I can figure it is easy to show how Being can derive from Becoming, so why the kicking against the pricks trying to go backwards?
RE: The Reality of Observer Moments
Colin writes Lee Corbin [wrote] The final word: OMs can be viewed as objective processes, and efforts to find the simplest explanation considering Everything seem quite appropriate. It sounds like a final word but I'd urge caution. It may be _your_ final word but not the natural world's final world. Well, I *did* say can be viewed, and in the rest of the sentence merely stated that I did *not* have an argument with OMs per se. :-) The system of observer moments could be just as 'mathematical'/ computational and be an illusion - but a real illusion that is fit for purpose. I have to admit that I don't know what you mean. Evolutionary considerations do not suggest that observation system[s] be any better than that consistent with survival (not those necessities compatible with the survival of a mathematician's view of the observation system N million years later) :-) Yes, that's right! (I mean, of course, I agree.) A cohort of elemental subjective experiences configured to present an emergent _apparent_ observation as an objective view equally fits the circumstances you describe and is a simpler solution. Simpler because a brain does not have to make a-priori assertions about everything that is 'not' brain. It can slap computational paint on reality and come up with an 'adequate' picture without knowing anything about how 'not brain' works. Isn't that what it has to do? How can a brain that knows nothing about the universe be created from the universe from nothing without making such shortcuts? You say simpler because a brain does not have to make a-priori assertions that is 'not' brain. At the risk of perhaps misunderstanding you, I would say that the brain was built by evolution first to make not assertions but as a machine, to simply respond. For some of us humans, we indeed go further and make assertions and what not, but it's all based on our primary functioning. Are you saying that our brains know nothing? (I'm trying especially hard on this last sentence.) Or are you asking how it can be created (but I think you know the answer to that)? Earlier you say that the brain slaps computational paint on reality and I am not sure at *all* that I know what you are talking about. It can slap computational paint on reality and come up with an 'adequate' picture without knowing anything about how 'not brain' works. But our brains do store at least a kind of knowledge exactly about how not brain (the outside world) works. That's what they were designed to do. So if you know that red means stop (and that operationally you want to stop the vehicle when the light turns red to avoid accidents and penalties) then you know something about the world. I guess I would say that the brain knows that. How can a brain that knows nothing about the universe be created from the universe from nothing without making such shortcuts? This is an _apparent_ objective view of a 'just-as-real' reality. Sorry, I'm baffled. It also can be hypothesized to deliver what we have. If a theory insists that the objective view has any greater status than this then part of the theory should explain why it is necessarily that way and how its prescribed circumstances would deliver a solution preferred by the natural world and indeed a very specific detailing of the difference between the two. The objective view should have better status (and it does except when people start talking too abstractly to other abstract thinkers or when they get behind a keyboard). Here are the reasons why the objective view should have higher status: 1. When conflicts have arisen in the past---not temporary, accidental, or quickly resolvable conflicts---the objective view triumphs. For example, the objective view of the solar system in which the Earth circles the sun has more validity than the system of appearances from here on Earth, which was incorporated into more primitive and more error prone understandings. Yes, I know that many here will retort that it's only from such a system of appearances that the correct view was generated. While I don't talk that way, you'll agree that it was the final product has the higher status and ought to be regarded as true. 2. Just as a naive realist---a child, say, who believes that their experiences of an object are all there is to an object---isn't aware of all the processes (in principle quite error prone processes) that convey information from distant objects to visual system to the rest of his brain, so some naive subjectivists, if you will, don't seem to appreciate that their entire experiences are simply nerve firings. They don't keep that image continually in mind, and fail when you talk to them to speak about what is objectively occurring, just as Kepler's, Copernicus's, and Galileo's critics refused to keep in mind the picture of the solar system from outside. 3. The objective view can be communicated
