Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you
mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would
not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the
Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a
look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a
different way.
In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person)
perspective?
Also,
I don't
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a
look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a
different way.
In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person)
2010/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to
make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient
(though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular
algorithm; one more specific
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to
make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient
(though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular
2010/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you
mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would
not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the instantaneous
state on signals
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the
computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it
one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP?
Is it just one that has the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the
computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it
one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP?
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the
computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it
one that has the same steps
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:
meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Interesting how the repeated copying and recopying of emails ends up
resembling the typography of modern poetry. m.a.
I know. I'm trying to see
what exactly is being
assumed
about the
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract
Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which
is
not the same) - in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by
the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two
machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating
systems. Once
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
It seems that you're saying the observer would notice that something
odd had happened if his program were paused and restarted in the way
described, but how is that possible when S1 and S2 are identical
whether generated continuously or
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
It seems that you're saying the observer would notice that something
odd had happened if his program were paused and restarted in the way
described, but how is that possible when S1 and S2 are identical
whether
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
S1 and S2 can be precisely delimited as machine states but only more
loosely as mental states. This is because, as you say, there may be a
thought that spans S1 and S2, and is therefore partly generated by M1
and
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract
Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is
not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued?
No, I'm at this point assuming
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract
Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is
not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued?
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by
the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two
machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating
systems. Once the program is loaded into M2
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If
S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your
brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be
experience
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:
meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:
meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker
On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Isn't it? Bruno presents comp as equivalent to betting that replacing
your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution
will leave your stream of consciousness unaffected. From this people
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin
Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Isn't it? Bruno presents comp as equivalent to betting that replacing
your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution
will leave your stream of consciousness
On Fri, Jan 08, 2010 at 11:00:19AM -0800, Johnathan Corgan wrote:
It's plausible that observer moments correspond to what are called
chaotic attractors in complex systems theory.
Well attractors in general - they don't have to be chaotic (or strange
as the terminology actually is). More
On 06 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/6 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them
computations? Why not just suppose all states of your
consciousness (and
even other parts of the world)
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false
memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a
perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with
all the others. If the UD is allowed to
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I think what I asked about is different from simply assuming idealism. It
is carrying your thread of reasoning a few steps further. Suppose Platonic
objects exist. Suppose computations, as Platonic objects, are enough to
instantiate
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false
memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a
perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with
all the
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com:
A program that generates S2 as it
2010/1/6 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it
generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next.
Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which
is generating what we understand to be
2010/1/6 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them
computations? Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and
even other parts of the world) exist. If they can be glued together by
inherent features or simply
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/
S2/S3
than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand
what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order.
Quentin
It seems strange
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
Nick Prince wrote:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
there. I can
On 05 Jan 2010, at 21:18, Nick Prince wrote:
It feels a bit lie a chicken and egg situation - do we pick out the
laws or do they pick us?. But I am still working my way through this
and and loads of other stuff, so I don't understand it yet.
The computable laws (definable in elementary
On 05 Jan 2010, at 23:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Nick Prince wrote:
OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident.
I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain
about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a
UD would know how to generate these law like
On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote:
Hi Brent
Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his
conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this:
So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner
experience only to
the type of computation
On 06 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
Nick Prince wrote:
Hi Brent
Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his
conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this:
So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner
experience only to
the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/6 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it
generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next.
Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which
is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/6 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them
computations? Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and
even other parts of the world) exist. If they can be glued together
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3
than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand
what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order.
Quentin
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
Nick Prince wrote:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote:
Hi Brent
Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his
conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this:
So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner
experience only to
the
Hi Bruno
OK so there is a good deal of the technical stuff that I've got to
catch up on yet before I can interpret what you are saying (although
I think I can understand why the everettian imperative based on comp +
UDA is there). However if I could for the moment get an intuitive
understanding
2010/1/5 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
there. I can understand this because all
2010/1/5 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
2010/1/5 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order
2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2
and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and
Le mercredi 06 janvier 2010 à 00:29 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences
2010/1/6 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in
other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that.
If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3
is
possible.
Thank you Stathis, That does make sense to me.
On Jan 5, 12:22 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2010/1/5 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut
As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it
generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next.
Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which
is generating what we understand to be some observer moments for us at
this particular
On 05 Jan 2010, at 15:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/6 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or
not... in
other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1
before that.
If you can directly compute step N
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mercredi 06 janvier 2010 à 00:29 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/4 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis. However,
one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time. You say the
mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and yet the
Nick Prince wrote:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal
On Jan 5, 6:59 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Nick Prince wrote:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident.
I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain
about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a
UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It
may well generate all possible programs that
Nick Prince wrote:
OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident.
I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain
about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a
UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It
may well generate all
Nick Prince wrote:
Hi Brent
Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his
conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this:
"So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner
experience only to
the type of computation involved. The reason is
On 02 Jan 2010, at 17:06, Nick Prince wrote:
HI Bruno
Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really
need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and
to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical
universal machine existing in the
On 03 Jan 2010, at 14:55, Nick Prince wrote:
Thank you Stathis
This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been
giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what
you said back just to check it is on the right lines.
As a possible example of one of
Thanks Bruno. I'll look this up and also I want to scan through your
seven steps series for November. The later posts in these I think
will help me make contact with the concepts.I want to be able to
understand your Sane paper - especially the later parts. Is there any
english translation of
2010/1/3 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
HI Bruno
Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really
need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and
to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical
universal machine existing in the
Thank you Stathis
This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been
giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what
you said back just to check it is on the right lines.
As a possible example of one of these “lurking computations” we could
consider the
2010/1/4 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Thank you Stathis
This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been
giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what
you said back just to check it is on the right lines.
As a possible example of one of
Stathis wrote
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the
brain is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed
everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2010 4:30 PM
Subject: Re: UDA query
Stathis wrote
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems
uot; everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2010 4:30 PM
Subject: Re: UDA query
Stathis wrote
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at fir
HI Bruno
Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really
need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and
to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical
universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a
great programmer
Bruno:
yes that is unfortunately true.
Ronald
On Dec 30, 10:25 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Dec 2009, at 03:29, ronaldheld wrote:
Bruno:
Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran?
I don't know. If you know Fortran, it should be a
On 30 Dec 2009, at 17:51, Nick Prince wrote:
Hi Bruno
If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to
generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are
you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these
programs
and each of their steps
On 30 Dec 2009, at 03:29, ronaldheld wrote:
Bruno:
Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran?
I don't know. If you know Fortran, it should be a relatively easy task
to implement one.
Note that you have still the choice between a fortran program
dovetailing on all computations by
On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote:
Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson
arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.
You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws
of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of
Bruno:
Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran?
Ronald
On Dec 29, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote:
Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson
arithmetic. You assume 0, the
On 27 Dec 2009, at 18:13, Nick Prince wrote:
Ok so I have come up with an argument to try and convince myself of
step 8 but it still has some catches to it. If anyone sees that I am
using incorrect thinking at any time please correct me.
Misunderstanding means bad foundations.
Up to step 7
Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson
arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.
You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws
of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal
machine and the UD follows as
Ok so I have come up with an argument to try and convince myself of
step 8 but it still has some catches to it. If anyone sees that I am
using incorrect thinking at any time please correct me.
Misunderstanding means bad foundations.
Up to step 7 all seems well and you begin step 8 by saying “but
Hi Nick, hi Quentin,
On 25 Dec 2009, at 04:13, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Nick Prince wrote
I can understand that numbers and arithmetic operations (as well as a
whole lot of other stuff) exist as some kind of objective reality
(called a platonic reality). These archetypal “things” are to me
On 24 Dec 2009, at 02:13, Nick Prince wrote:
Thanks Bruno
I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth
step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I
sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD
but you effectively
Hi Bruno
And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and
logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary.
Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive
(mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an
infinite mathematical structure.
2009/12/24 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk
Hi Bruno
And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and
logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary.
Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive
(mechanically decidable) thing, and its
Sorry I accidently posted my previous message twice. A pity because
now I think the conclusion I came to in them was wrong. Because I
assume comp to be true and the line of reasoning implies a simulated
realityy because of comp then it doesn't make comp any less
contingent. Oh well!, the rest
Hi Nick,
On 23 Dec 2009, at 01:55, Nick Prince wrote:
My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a
bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with
me.
However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any
of these is
Thanks Bruno
I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth
step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I
sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD
but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine
On 21 Dec 2009, at 22:33, Nick P wrote:
Thank you quentin and Bruno...
Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the
copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however
technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno.
What I had thought
Hence by it generating all possible emulations of
stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next
OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current
wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already
software constructs in a simulation).
On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote:
Hence by it generating all possible emulations of
stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my
next
OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current
wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact
Hi Bruno
My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a
bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with
me.
However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any
of these is fundamentally wrong.
I want to put aside the platonic
On Dec 23, 12:55 am, Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote:
Hi Bruno
My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a
bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with
me.
However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any
of
On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk
Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations”
that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting
process is just the description of a state of some Turing
Thank you quentin and Bruno...
Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the
copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however
technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno.
What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to
Sorry I should have added that I was assuming that the UD was
operating at some future time as in step 7 (fig 7) of Bruno's paper.
Is my reasoning correct in what I have said in the last post?
On Dec 21, 9:33 pm, Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote:
Thank you quentin and Bruno...
Right I
Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations”
that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting
process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine,
given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and
the experiencer can be
2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk
Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations”
that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting
process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine,
given that we assume comp. So its description
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