Wei Dai's theory

2005-06-05 Thread Russell Standish
I remembered Wei Dai posting on this topic in the early days of this
list, and indeed some of his postings influenced my Why Occam's
Razor paper. However, I do not recall his suggestions as being as
detailed as what you describe here. Do you have a reference to where
this might be written up? I'm also intrigued by the possibility of
demonstrating that transhumanist observer moments would have
substantially less measure than human observer moments. Such a result
would be a transhumanist counter to the Doomsday argument of course.

Cheers

On Fri, Jun 03, 2005 at 11:10:15AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:

...
 
 Years ago Wei Dai on this list suggested a better approach.  He proposed
 a formula for determining how much of a universe's measure contributes to
 an OM that it instantiates.  It is very specific and also illustrates
 some problems in the rather loose discussion so far.  For example,
 what does it really mean to instantiate an OM?  How would we know if a
 universe is really instantiating a particular OM?  Aren't there fuzzy
 cases where a universe is only sort of instantiating one?  What about
 the longstanding problem that you can look at the atomic vibrations in
 a crystal, select a subset of them to pay attention to, and have that
 pattern match the pattern of any given OM?  Does this mean that every
 crystal instantiates every OM?  (Hans Moravec sometimes seems to say yes!)
 
 To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what is an OM.
 We need a formal model and description of a particular OM.  Consider, for
 example, someone's brain when he is having a particular experience.  He is
 eating chocolate ice cream while listening to Beethoven's 5th symphony,
 on his 30th birthday.  Imagine that we could scan his brain with advanced
 technology and record his neural activity.  Imagine further that with the
 aid of an advanced brain model we are able to prune out the unnecessary
 information and distill this to the essence of the experience.  We come
 up with a pattern that represents that observer moment.  Any system which
 instantiates that pattern genuinely creates an experience of that observer
 moment.  This pattern is something that can be specified, recorded and
 written down in some form.  It probably involves a huge volume of data.
 
 So, now that we have a handle on what a particular OM is, we can more
 reasonably ask whether a universe instantiates it.  It comes down to
 whether it produces and contains that particular pattern.  But this may
 not be such an easy question.  It could be that the raw output format of
 a universe program does not lend itself to seeing larger scale patterns.
 For example, in our own universe, the raw output would probably be at
 the level of the Planck scale, far, far smaller than an atomic nucleus.
 At that level, even a single brain neuron would be the size of a galaxy.
 And the time for enough neural firings to occur to make up a noticeable
 conscious experience would be like the entire age of the universe.
 It will take considerable interpretation of the raw output of our
 universe's program to detect the faint traces of an observer moment.
 
 And as noted above, an over-aggressive attempt to hunt out observer
 moments will find false positives, random patterns which, if we are
 selective enough, happen to match what we are looking for.
 
 Wei proposed to solve both of these problems by introducing an
 interpretation program.  It would be take as its input, the output of the
 universe-creation program.  It would then output the observer moment in
 whatever formal specification format we had decided on (the exact format
 will not be significant).
 
 So how would this program work, in the case of our universe?  It would
 have encoded in it the location in space and time of the brain which
 was experiencing the OM.  It would know the size of the brain and the
 spatial distribution of its neurons.  And it would know the faint traces
 and changes at the Planck scale that would correspond to neural firings
 or pauses.  Based on this information, which is encoded into the program,
 it would run and output the results.  And that output would then match
 the formal encoding of the OM.
 
 Now, Wei applies the same kind of reasoning that we do for the measure
 of the Schmidhuber ensemble itself.  He proposes that the size of the
 interpretation program should determine how much of the universe's measure
 contributes to the OM.  If the interpretation program is relatively small,
 that is evidence that the universe is making a strong contribution to
 the OM.  But if the interpretation program is huge, then we would say
 that little of the universe's measure should go into the OM.
 
 In the most extreme case, the interpretation program could just encode the
 OM within itself, ignore the universe state and output that data pattern.
 In effect that is what would have to be done in order to find an OM
 within a crystal as described above.  You'd have to have the 

Re: Wei Dai's theory

2005-06-05 Thread Hal Finney
Russell Standish writes:
 I remembered Wei Dai posting on this topic in the early days of this
 list, and indeed some of his postings influenced my Why Occam's
 Razor paper. However, I do not recall his suggestions as being as
 detailed as what you describe here. Do you have a reference to where
 this might be written up? I'm also intrigued by the possibility of
 demonstrating that transhumanist observer moments would have
 substantially less measure than human observer moments. Such a result
 would be a transhumanist counter to the Doomsday argument of course.

Well, I tend to be a lot more long-winded than Wei.  He did not write up
the idea formally but it was just something he proposed in the context
of one of our discussions on the list.  I don't know if he even believes
in it now.

He proposed it in the context the thread on consciousness based on
information or computation? in January 1999, specifically
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m325.html , which I will take
the liberty of quoting here:

Wei Dai wrote:

: Let me be more specific and precise about my proposal. I propose that the
: measure of a conscious experience is related to the measure of the
: associated state information, and take this measure to be the universal a
: priori distribution.
:
: The universal a priori probability of a string is inversely related to the
: length of the shortest program that outputs that string (the distribution
: actually takes into account all programs, but the shortest ones contribute
: most to the distribution). Now take an AI running on some computer, and
: consider its state at some given time. The shortest program (P1) that
: produces this state as output probably consists of two parts. The first
: part of the program simulates the physical universe (which let's say is a
: newtonian universe) which contains the computer running the AI. The second
: part of the program extracts the AI's state from this simulation.
:
: Now if the *memory* elements containing the AI's state were doubled in
: size, that should allow the second part of the program to be shorter,
: since it would take less information to find the AI's state in the
: wavefunction simulation. The smaller program size implies a larger measure
: of the state.
:
: If the AI were simultaneously running on two computers, there would be two
: shortest programs that produce the state as output (they would be
: identical in the simulation part but slightly different in the extraction
: part), and these two programs together would make twice as much
: contribution to the universal a priori distribution as P1, and again the
: measure of the state would be increased.

This came out of a discussion in which I claimed it was obvious
that the size of an implementation should not matter, with regard to
its contribution to measure, and from this I concluded via a thought
experiment that the number of copies shouldn't matter(!), which causes
some problems.  Wei then challenged this assumption that size doesn't
matter and followed up with this detailed proposal, which I eventually
came to like very much.  The part about speed also mattering was my own
addition, but it is a pretty obvious corollary as speed is just a matter
of size in time.

Hal Finney