Re: comp and functionalism

2012-10-26 Thread Stephen P. King

On 10/26/2012 3:00 PM, meekerdb wrote:
ot so much fun for the mathematics journal that accepted one of these 
for publication a couple of months ago.


http://thatsmathematics.com/blog/archives/102


Turing test anyone?


Not a Turing test; simply a demonstration of the Peter Principle.

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Onward!

Stephen


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Re: comp and functionalism

2012-10-26 Thread meekerdb

On 10/26/2012 5:07 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stathis Papaioannou

It is suggested that computers can possibly simulate the mind at least
functionally, perhaps it has already been done:


At least they've already simulated the mind of mathematicians. :-)


... this is pure math-fun,
http://thatsmathematics.com/mathgen/


Not so much fun for the mathematics journal that accepted one of these for publication a 
couple of months ago.


http://thatsmathematics.com/blog/archives/102


Turing test anyone?

Brent

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comp and functionalism

2012-10-26 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Stathis Papaioannou  

It is suggested that computers can possibly simulate the mind at least 
functionally, perhaps it has already been done:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29

"Since mental states are identified by a functional role, they are said to be 
realized on multiple levels; in other words, they are able to be manifested in 
various systems, even perhaps computers, so long as the system performs 
the appropriate functions. While computers are physical devices with electronic 
substrate that perform computations on inputs to give outputs, so brains are 
physical devices with neural substrate that perform computations on inputs 
which produce behaviours"


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/26/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stathis Papaioannou  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-25, 18:25:17 
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p 


On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:28 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 

> If you believed that our brains were already nothing but computers, then you 
> would say that it would know which option to take the same way that Google 
> knows which options to show you. I argue that can only get you so far, and 
> that authentic humanity is, in such a replacement scheme, a perpetually 
> receding horizon. Just as speech synthesizers have improved cosmetically in 
> the last 30 years to the point that we can use them for Siri or GPS 
> narration, but they have not improved in the sense of increasing the sense 
> of intention and personal presence. 
> 
> Unlike some others on this list, I suspect that our feeling for who is human 
> and who isn't, while deeply flawed, is not limited to interpreting logical 
> observations of behavior. What we feel is alive or sentient depends more on 
> what we like, and what we like depends on what is like us. None of these 
> criteria matter one way or another however as far as giving us reason to 
> believe that a given thing does actually have human like experiences. 

You're quick to dismiss everything computers do, no matter how 
impressive, as "just programming", with no "intention" behind it. 
Would you care to give some examples of what, as a minimum, a computer 
would have to do for you to say that it is showing evidence of true 
intelligence? 


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Stathis Papaioannou 

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