On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?
Human computationalism does.
But I want the simplest
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Why isn't computationalism the consequence
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 4:56:45 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
wrote:
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 11:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:41:26 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
Craig,
I agree with you that there is some building up required to create a
full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or
with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar
with
understanding your use. So when you throw around sense, qualia, aesthetic
experience; I have difficulty following because of the jungle of possible
complex interpretations. Which ones Craig? - is what this boils down to
somewhere, I guess. PGC
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 5:20 PM, Craig Weinberg
interpretations. Which ones Craig? - is what this boils down to
somewhere, I guess. PGC
I hear you. I think it's why I never was drawn to reading philosophy -
there's too much work that has been done, and too much of it is missing the
insights of later thinkers and scientists. I'm generally trying
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof
of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia -
the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is
quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used
for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.
Craig
I think.
So I think we are in agreement
On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content?
Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that
consciousness exists only in manifested form.
That's what I would say.
I
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
the qualia change the subject
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the
On 10/5/2013 1:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
On 6 October 2013 08:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went
unnoticed?
Yes, but it makes no difference to the argument, since subtle changes
may be missed with a normal brain. To disprove functionalism you would
have to show
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can
rather than a Planck level, granular realism.
Granularity is a model generated by visual and tactile perception as far as
I know.
Craig
Brent
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On 02 Oct 2013, at 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia,
On 02 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly
On 02 Oct 2013, at 22:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis
that a computer in a single reality (not an infinite sum of
calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p.
Yes. It has 1p, it is not a
On 03 Oct 2013, at 02:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce
the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM
On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I
On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some
On 5 October 2013 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I
On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has
not
integrated privacy into an authoritative worldview
On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has
pain
when it hits an error! I just can't conceive of the magical point at which
the computer goes from total indifference to giving a damn. That's the
point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree with. Something is missing from
our understanding.
What's missing is you're considering
neurons would notice that the qualia
were different and deviate from normal behaviour, and the same would
be the case if only one of the original neurons were present.
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
The experiment relates to replacement of neurons
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 7:36:10 PM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:
On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
I think
On 3 October 2013 14:40, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp, provided that brain physics
is computable
On 10/3/2013 4:36 PM, Pierz wrote:
The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable
redundancy.
Of course the universe doesn't care when the immense and inescapable redundancy is in our
model of it.
Brent
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On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which
will notice that the qualia
. That's
the
point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree with. Something is missing from
our
understanding.
What's missing is you're considering a computer, not a robot. As robot has
to have
values and goals in order to act and react in the world. It has complex
systems
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my
view
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia,
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
say.
On 02 Oct 2013, at 11:04, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person
of variable labels to represent machine states, I don't see why we
should assume they are qualitative. If anything, the unity of arithmetic
truth would demand a single sensory channel that constitutes all possible
I/O.
Craig
Bruno
Bruno
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You received this message because you
On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by
of the magical point at which the computer goes from total
indifference to giving a damn. That's the point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree
with. Something is missing from our understanding.
What's missing is you're considering a computer, not a robot. As robot has to have values
and goals in order
On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A
computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity
of
On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis that a computer in a
single reality (not an infinite sum of calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p.
Yes. It has 1p, it is not a zombie. But that 1p, for him, is really defined
Brent:
***But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.*
*
*
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only
one of our humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking
and HUMAN complexity with HUMAN language. Can you apply a similar criterion
On 10/2/2013 2:06 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
*//*/But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust./
/
/
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only one of our
humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking and HUMAN complexity with
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce
the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a
challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred
different and deviate from normal behaviour, and the same would
be the case if only one of the original neurons were present.
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
If you
assume it is possible that the prosthesis reproduces the I/O behaviour
but not the qualia
pain
when it hits an error! I just can't conceive of the magical point at which
the computer goes from total indifference to giving a damn. That's the
point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree with. Something is missing from
our understanding.
What's missing is you're considering
.
Craig
Eventually the qualia is determined by infinitely many number relations,
and
a brain filters them. It does not create them, like no machine can
create
PI, only re-compute it, somehow. The anlogy here break sown as qualia
are
purely first person notion, which explains why
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, September 30, 2013 6:12:45 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
Hi Liz,
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
exactly: all persons
, and a step that one has no
choice but to
make.
Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have
it that
brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
non-mechanical seeming
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has
convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness
Sorry, this list behaves strangely on my iPad. I can't reply to individual
posts. The post above was meant to be a reply to stathis and his remark that
it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its observable
behaviour (a brain's) without also replicating its consciousness.
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It
seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view
I had a similar thought about a chameleon brain (I call a p-Zelig instead
of a p-zombie), which would impersonate behaviors of whatever environment
it was placed into. Unlike a philosophical zombie, which would have no
personal qualia but seem like it does from the outside, the chameleon brain
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation
has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation
can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia.
Why an infinity of
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Bruno's UDA eventually removes the requirement for a copy being
primitively real. That's one of the things that impressed me about the
argument. I think your position requires that you find a way to refute
the UDA.
I think that it does so
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be
different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it vary?
Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to build intelligent
machines and
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it
that
brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't have
cables
present problems of its own! Craig
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it that
brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't have
cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly
On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
absurdity of philosophical zombies.
The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least
conceivable, it is partial zombies.
Those arguments did have
Stathis
Could you provide the proof or a link to it?
Richard
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:
On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
absurdity of
On 30 Sep 2013, at 11:07 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Stathis
Could you provide the proof or a link to it?
Richard
It's the Chalmers Fading Qualia paper cited before. The paper refers to
computer chips replacing neurons. The objection could be made that we do not
know
, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it that
brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
non-mechanical seeming.
Actually not. The aesthetic qualities of living organs do seem
non-mechanical
awareness that has sub-personal,
super-personal, and impersonal (public physical) facets.
Thanks,
Craig
On Monday, September 30, 2013 2:08:23 PM UTC+10, stathisp wrote:
On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pie...@gmail.com wrote:
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
It seems
problems of its own! Craig
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have
it that brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are
soft and non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they
don't have cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
pass it by telling the truth.
Actually Turing already thought of this. If you read his paper you find that the
On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
pass it by telling the truth.
Actually
natural to
step into the god-level third person perspective that the elision of
private experience starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one
has no choice but to make.
Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig
frequently seems to slip into a kind
Fascinating post. The illusion of qualia is perhaps something like the
illusion of consciousness - who is being fooled? (Who is the Master who
makes the grass green?)
My 2c on the Turing Test is that ELIZA passed it, so if you're being
pernickety that was solved in the 60s (I think it was) - but
own! Craig
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it that
brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't have
cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly be hardware. A lot
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
Hi Craig (and all),
Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to
confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three
possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than me
or you're
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Craig (and all),
Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to
confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Craig (and all),
Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to
confront you with a thought experiment. Some
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Craig (and all),
Now that I have
Hm. I don't understand. Looks like an ecological study of flies in the mud.
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 9:20:56 AM UTC-4, Roger wrote:
Hello group,
Please read the attached document and respond with feedback, but only if
your name is in the subject line. For the rest of you, I don't
On Thu, Feb 2, 10:49 pm, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 5:25 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
There is an important difference though. You are using the
conventional notion of 'forces' like 'laws' which govern interaction
rather than what
On Jan 31, 5:24 pm, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:
Craig - see below...
On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 11:35 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote:
They are part of the same thing, although perpendicular (organization
is material forms across volumetric space, experience
Craig - see below...
On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 11:35 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
They are part of the same thing, although perpendicular (organization
is material forms across volumetric space, experience is entangled
perceptions through sequential time...exact opposites
in
logic. Intelligence and compassion are just an android away...
Craig
On Sun, Jan 29, 2012 at 10:11 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Jan 29, 10:20 am, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:
OK, I think I understand you a little better. You are a vitalist who
makes
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