Hi Stephen P. King
The reason why I think of numbers as not being
primary to being is that they act as objects
in a sea of intelligence. It is the intelligence that
is primary because intelligence is subjective.
Intelligence operates on numbers. By themselves,
numbers can do nothing except indicate what
the driving force of intelligence is doing to them.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/2/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-31, 19:35:04
Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be
aproblem ?
On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).
>
> 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
> homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
> then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
> other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
> (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
> theories ?
>
>
> Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/31/2012
Dear Roger,
I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an
infinite regress. That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of
the One to be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator,
but if not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be
distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of numbers
is an infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot
be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this?
It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of the
numbers and that makes the numbers something "different" from the One
for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind does. My
point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be
incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts -
making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the
totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their
necessary properties?
The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument against
the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I argued
above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper parts is
the same as Bruno's measure problem.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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