Hi meekerdb
There are all kinds of "truth", depending on which you have faith in or
which seems most appropriate. There's arithmetical truth, necessary
truth, contingent truth, pragmatic truth, truth by correspondence,
truth by coherency.... the list is long.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/3/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-02, 22:48:56
Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be
aproblem ?
On 11/2/2012 3:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).
2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?
Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012
Dear Roger,
I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers float in a
sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an infinite regress.
Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear.
Dear Bruno,
Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,
G?el + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any effective theory
that no such theory can get it. mathematical logic, and math, cannot have any
meaning without arithmetical truth being independent of theories.
Dear Bruno,
"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a meaningful
value in the primitive ontological level. The relation 'G?el + Tarski =>
Arithmetical Truth' cannot even exist as a meaningful expression because there
is no differentiation of expression at the ontologically primitive level. The
same argument that disallows for the existence of a self-aware Universal mind
applies. Let me step through a crude sketch of the argument here.
A Universal collection of facts is such that there is no facts that is not
included, it must cover all possible worlds (ala Kripke), it must be Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as there exists
facts in one world that are inconsistent with facts in some other possible
world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it is insane
or non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning its
existence or else it is not self-aware.
A universal mind must "know all facts of all possible worlds" or else it
would not be universal.
A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or non-self-aware.
I don't see any 'either/or'. Your premises imply an universal mind is
impossible - one cannot KNOW contradictory propositions; whether one is
self-aware or not.
but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it is
impossible for us to be able to know of it.
That is mathematical solipsism.
I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of a mind
(universal number that is the sum of all other universal numbers) that is
incapable of knowing what it is as there is nothing within its preview that is
it not. It is a Universal Mind
It is obviously false.
We disagree.
Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not depend on
the theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and also hid some other
piece of truth.
You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with innate
properties. I disagree with this concept as I see it as incoherent.
All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and on our
theories.
No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the
absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness.
So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow is not
white."?
Brent
In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and
sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value and
the absence of all other possible values. This is like claiming to know exactly
what is in a black box that cannot ever be opened or even located.
All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.
They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably,
some non provably). No problem.
Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth is
independent of any ability to prove it.
G?el's proof explains this very well. The idea that truth = proof is
intuitionism, and technically, it changes nothing for arithmetic (only for
analysis).
Wrong. G?el's proof does not prove that truth has a particular value
independent of the means to know that value. G?el's proof tells is that
theories what (as individuals) include Arithmetic will contain statements that
cannot be evaluated by those theories as individuals. We can build infinite
towers of theories that allow evaluation of the truth of statments, but int he
absence of those towers, there is no such thing as definiteness for truths.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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