Re: [Evolution] SSL certificates and Man in the Middle attacks

2012-09-10 Thread Pete Biggs
However, I've been told that the Certificate Authorities system is fundamentally flawed, in the sense that CAs don't communicate with each other, any of them can sign for any domain name, and I've been told some CAs are quite un-trustworthy. This is a scary prospect. Are you saying that a

Re: [Evolution] SSL certificates and Man in the Middle attacks

2012-09-10 Thread Bastien Durel
Le dimanche 09 septembre 2012 à 22:40 -0400, Jeff Fortin a écrit : Hi there, As far as I can tell, Evolution uses a default set of SSL certificate authorities. [...] Will the user get (I hope) a big scary SOMETHING IS VERY WRONG warning like SSH does when server fingerprints don't match?

Re: [Evolution] SSL certificates and Man in the Middle attacks

2012-09-10 Thread Andre Klapper
On Mon, 2012-09-10 at 10:26 +0200, Bastien Durel wrote: As users (mostly) ignore security warnings[1], it should be useless, IMHO. Nice, didn't know that paper. I normally point to http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/phishing.pdf page 5 as another quick explanation of the effect of such

Re: [Evolution] SSL certificates and Man in the Middle attacks

2012-09-10 Thread Adam Tauno Williams
On Mon, 2012-09-10 at 10:26 +0200, Bastien Durel wrote: Le dimanche 09 septembre 2012 à 22:40 -0400, Jeff Fortin a écrit : As users (mostly) ignore security warnings[1], it should be useless, IMHO. SSH does not targets same users than browsers or mail readers, so users are more likely to