Now, the way forward is a modified version of Keynes's 
post-Second World War proposal


 C. T. Kurien


In 1936 when the world was groaning under the disrupttion 
caused by the Great Depression the influential Cambridge 
University economist John Maynard Keynes published his 
General Twheory of Employment, Interest and Money. It was a 
challenge to the orthodox economics of the time that 
maintained that the capitalist system was based on the 
self-adjusting market mechanism and so all that was needed 
to recover from the depression, particularly its mass 
unemployment was to make wage rates flexible downwards.


Keynes, on the other hand, claimed that the adjustment 
mechanism in advanced capitalist economies was not wages or 
prices, but the level of aggregate income which, in turn, 
depended on investment. Investment by individuals and 
corporates in the capitalist system would often turn out to 
be inadequate to maintain incomes at full employment levels 
and that under such conditions the only way to augment 
investment, employment and incomes was for the state to 
boost employment by undertaking investment, particularly in 
public infrastructural projects.


Keynes further argued that interest rates and money supply 
which influenced investment thus became unavoidable policy 
variables in the system.


There is one thing that all of them agree on - that Keynes 
is relevant even today because of the global depression that 
started in the U.S. in 2007 and soon spread to the rest of 
the world, but also because there is a strong economic 
lobby, including influential international agencies, that 
have revived the old orthodoxy and insist that the market is 
the agency to deal with all matters economic and that 
therefore the state and its agencies should leave the 
economy to its devices. Our contributors are against this 
creed and try to show the contemporary relevance of the 
perspective initiated by Keynes and which has been taken 
forward by successive generations of scholars.


Forms of finance


As economies grow over time, the state will come to have 
other roles too. It will have to step in to manage money and 
finance, for long considered to be the exclusive realm of 
banks, including Central Banks (the 'Fed' in U.S.). The 
growth of finance and the variety of forms it takes and the 
dominance it comes to have over the economy -- described by 
one of the contributors as the 'financialisation' of the 
economy -- is the contemporary rationale for increased state 
involvement in the economy. It must be noted too that while 
banks and corporations were the custodians of capital for 
long, in recent decades, especially after 1980, there has 
been a proliferation of funds and fund-managers each one 
generating paper (or not even paper) assets to make profit. 
It is now well-known that this chase for profit and more 
profit led to the crash of 2007 and the crisis that followed 
and still lingers on. The contributors to the volume justify 
their championing of a renewed Keynesian approach on this 
ground.


Keynes knew that capitalism is not, and cannot be, confined 
to national boundaries. The economic relationship between 
capitalist countries, those in Europe, particularly and the 
United States had engaged his attention after World War I 
and World War II. He had come to be considered as an 
"international systems planner". Towards the end of World 
War II, when it was evident that the Allied powers would win 
the war, Keynes was specifically asked to make a proposal 
for post-War international transactions. Keynes had learned 
that the failure of the gold standard was mainly because 
national economies had to subordinate their domestic 
policies to the strict demands of the international system. 


To avoid that Keynes had proposed an international currency 
called 'bancor' and an International Clearing Union (ICU) 
which would deal exclusively with balance of payments 
problems of member countries. He was particular that the 
national currency of no country should emerge as the global 
reserve currency because that would give special privileges 
to that country. Keynes's proposal was rejected. Instead, 
the International Monetary Fund was set up to deal with 
inter-country adjustments, and the American dollar (which up 
to 1971 was convertible to gold) became, almost by default, 
but certainly because of the economic and military might of 
the U.S., the global reserve currency and continues to be 
so. About half a dozen essays in the volume examine the 
features and consequences of the present-day global payments 
system (more accurately non-system) and show why a modified 
version of Keynes's post-Second World War proposal is the 
only way to go forward.


This reviewer endorses the view expressed in the blurb of 
the volume that the essays in it "not only engage with 
Keynesian economics, but also adapt and go beyond it, 
keeping in mind the context of the global financial crisis".


( C.T. Kurien is an economist and former Director of the 
Madras Institute of Development Studies )

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