[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[shanti2218411]

It has been clearly demonstrated that mental activity can change how  the 
brain(and other physical organs)function e.g biofeedback and placebo 
research.The latter would appear to suggest that mental choices can affect 
physical events.In fact a leading researcher on the question of free will and 
the brain named B.Libet has acknowledged that individuals can inhibit the 
enacting of behaviors. Obviously there is a limit on how much control 
individuals have over their behavior.However, to argue  that it  has been 
demonstrated that there exists a definitive exhaustive account of the 
relationship between mental activity and neural processing such that the 
concept of free will can be rejected is flat out wrong.To quote Carl Sagan 
extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, tartbrain  wrote:
>
> Many people seem to believe that morality depends for its existence on a 
> metaphysical quantity called "free will." This conviction is occasionally 
> expressed -- often with great impatience, smugness, or piety -- with the 
> words, "ought, implies, can." Like much else in philosophy that is too easily 
> remembered (e.g. "you can't get an ought from an is."), this phrase has 
> become an impediment to clear thinking.
> 
> In fact, the concept of free will is a non-starter, both philosophically and 
> scientifically. There is simply no description of mental and physical 
> causation that allows for this freedom that we habitually claim for ourselves 
> and ascribe to others. Understanding this would alter our view of morality in 
> some respects, but it wouldn't destroy the distinction between right and 
> wrong, or good and evil.
> 
> The following post has been adapted from my discussion of this topic in The 
> Moral Landscape (pp. 102-110):
> 
> --
> 
> We are conscious of only a tiny fraction of the information that our brains 
> process in each moment. While we continually notice changes in our experience 
> -- in thought, mood, perception, behavior, etc. -- we are utterly unaware of 
> the neural events that produce these changes. In fact, by merely glancing at 
> your face or listening to your tone of voice, others are often more aware of 
> your internal states and motivations than you are. And yet most of us still 
> feel that we are the authors of our own thoughts and actions.
> 
> The problem is that no account of causality leaves room for free will -- 
> thoughts, moods, and desires of every sort simply spring into view -- and 
> move us, or fail to move us, for reasons that are, from a subjective point of 
> view, perfectly inscrutable. Why did I use the term "inscrutable" in the 
> previous sentence? I must confess that I do not know. Was I free to do 
> otherwise? What could such a claim possibly mean? Why, after all, didn't the 
> word "opaque" come to mind? Well, it just didn't -- and now that it vies for 
> a place on the page, I find that I am still partial to my original choice. Am 
> I free with respect to this preference? Am I free to feel that "opaque" is 
> the better word, when I just do not feel that it is the better word? Am I 
> free to change my mind? Of course not. It can only change me.
> 
> 
> more at
> 
> http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/morality-without-free-wil_b_868804.html
> 
> 
> 
> Comment by Readers
> 
> 
> One of the more interestin­g discussion­s in a book called "I AM A STRANGE 
> LOOP" about free will involves the brain and our 'sense of self'. Billions of 
> neurons in the brain 'chatter' and signal one another constantly­. From that 
> chatter we become conscious of stimulus. The big question as relates to free 
> will and casual capabiliti­es is:, 
> 
> Which neurons do we control?
> 
> We are the result of the chatter and do not or can not control a single 
> neuron. Free will is an illusion caused by the neural activity of the brain. 
> It developed over many thousands of years. 
> 
> When we move our arms and legs, there are many neurons, nerves, muscle cells, 
> and chemicals involved. Which of these are we conscious of and control?
> 
> The most we can say about cause or free will is that the brain controls and 
> initiates actions. However, we (the sense of self) do not control the 
> neurons, the nerves, the muscle cells, etc. We might influence those things. 
> We could choose to breath water but our choice doesn't make it happen. Our 
> 'free will' is limited to the interpreta­tion of our perception­s.Our ability 
> to cause is limited to our opportunit­y to 'like or dislike' our perception­s.
> 
> The body and brain do quite nicely without 'us'.
> -
> 
> 
> Part 1:
> 
> There is no point in discussing "free will" - or even "morality" for that 
> matter - unless we first understand how the human brain operates.
> 
> The brain does not need us to think. It does that all on its own. In fact, 
> about 95% (or more) of what the brain does has nothing whatsoever to do with 
> us. Whatever w

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[WillyTex]

> > As one who leans toward determinism, I'm pleased to 
> > see such a clear explanation from Harris of why the 
> > standard notion of free will is untenable... 
> 
authfriend:
> At any rate, terrific find... 
>
Well, this is one thread we probably will not see
Barry responding to. I'm still laughing that Barry
got 'determinism' mixed up with 'pre-destination'.

LoL!!!

"That is, just like Descartes, we still believe (much 
as we pretend otherwise) that there is a magic component 
to human behavior. Here I argue that the way we use the 
concept of free will is nonsensical..." 

http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full

"Yesterday I made one simple post about M.O. (Modus 
Operandi), relating it to a theoretical FFL poster's 
oft-stated beliefs in the non-existence of free will, 
contrasted with that theoretical person's M.O. of 
continually -- for *years* -- attacking and berating 
other people for not using their free will. I pointed 
out that this doesn't make any sense..."

Subject: M.O., cont. (cool, calm free will harassed by 
"Bloody Loco" determin 
Author: TurquoiseB
Forum: Yahoo! FairfieldLife
Date: Wed Mar 23, 2011 3:45 am
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FairfieldLife/message/272642

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[authfriend]

--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" 
 wrote:
>
> --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend"  wrote:
> 
> As one who leans toward determinism, I'm pleased to see such
> a clear explanation from Harris of why the standard notion
> of free will is untenable. I think he's somewhat less clear, 
> however, about the ramifications and implications
> 
> The following article might be germane to this issue:
> 
> http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full
> 

"Might" be germane?? It hits all the nails squarely on the
head and pounds them all the way in. I'd love to see a
staunch free-will advocate try to rebut it.

(I particularly liked Susan Blakemore's comment, "I think
nature has played this enormous joke on us," which echoes
the existential whine in my post to emptybill.)

I do think the author underestimates the slippery-slope
aspect, though. If we adjusted the criminal justice system
to reflect the recognition that free will is an illusion,
I'd be concerned that the recognition would begin to expand,
to seep into other areas of social relations, where it would
be likely to create chaos.

Unless, of course, we all became enlightened and transcended
the free-will illusion altogether on an experiential rather
than merely intellectual basis. Which leads me to wonder
what a fully enlightened society could possibly be like. I
can't begin to imagine it, but I don't think it would be
like the one we have with all the mistakes taken out. The
differences would be far more drastic.

At any rate, terrific find. Many thanks for throwing it into
the mix.

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[Xenophaneros Anartaxius]

--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend"  wrote:

As one who leans toward determinism, I'm pleased to see such a clear
explanation from Harris of why the standard notion of free will is
untenable. I think he's somewhat less clear, however, about the
ramifications and implications


The following article might be germane to this issue:

http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[emptybill]

His argument is a form of Scientism and Rationalism dressed up as
philosophical discourse. It is one of the bastard unions of our era.

As far as Scientism, he offers no empirical proof to support his
contention that he is free enough to choose what to say in this article.
It therefore is unproven.

Rationally, we must infer that he says what he "must" say
because he is causally constrained to do so. He even fails to explain
how he could knows this fact given that there is nothing in his
constitution that enables him to be objective about anything at all. How
could he even recognize his own subjectivity? By his definition he can
only be wrapped up in it, like an animal.

Transcendent intelligence and free will are the axioms of our lived
existence and our morality. However there are many types of personal,
ideological and social forces that can obscure these fundamental human
qualities. Palestinian men "freely" and frequently murder their
sisters and daughters to preserve their a presumed family value.This
would be considered psychotically criminal and/or sociopathic  in the
West and deserving of the death penalty but it is morally acceptable in
Palestine.

But why have morality at all if it is only a social definition? Even the
Khmer Rouge had a type of political-social morality.
…


--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend"  wrote:
>
> --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "emptybill" emptybill@ wrote:
> [quoting Frithjof Schuon:]
> > Relativism sets out to reduce every element of
> > absoluteness to a relativity, while making a quite
> > illogical exception in favor of this reduction
> > itself. In effect, relativism consists in declaring
> > it to be true that there is no such thing as truth,
> > or in declaring it to be absolutely true that
> > nothing but the relatively true exists; one might
> > just as well say that language does not exist, or
> > write that there is no such thing as writing. In
> > short, every idea is reduced to a relativity of
> > some sort, whether psychological, historical, or
> > social; but the assertion nullifies itself by the
> > fact that it too presents itself as a psychological,
> > historical, or social relativity. The assertion
> > nullifies itself if it is true, and by nullifying
> > itself logically proves thereby that it is false;
> > its initial absurdity lies in the implicit claim to
> > be unique in escaping, as if by enchantment, from a
> > relativity that is declared alone to be possible.
>
> It's not immediately obvious to me how this applies
> to Sam Harris's discourse on the nonexistence of free
> will; if you'd care to make the connection for me, I'd
> be grateful.
>
> I'm about to make a post suggesting that any proposal
> to *implement* the understanding that free will does
> not exist is automatically incoherent, e.g.:
>
> Let us base our thoughts and actions on the premise
> that we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions.
>
> But is it *logically* incoherent, as the relativist
> premise is, or is it *psychologically* incoherent? I'm
> not sure. Don't know if it matters, either. The problems
> with the two premises seem to have some kind of kinship,
> but I'm having trouble figuring out what it is.
>
> In any case, when I contemplate this maze of twisty
> little passages, I begin to get pissed off. If the
> maddeningly incomprehensible existential situation in
> which human beings find themselves is not some horrible
> accident of the evolutionary process, resulting in the
> self-consciousness that drives us to beat our heads to
> a bloody pulp against the wall trying to solve the
> insoluble, then it has to be the sadistic design of
> some malevolent higher power.
>
> Either way, it ain't fair!
>
> (I won't be at all surprised if someone jumps in to
> declare scornfully that the insolubility of it all is
> what's *fun* about being human, a glorious puzzle to be
> reveled in rather than decried, implying that the
> existential angst I just expressed is a sign of retarded
> spiritual evolution. I'd just point out that the
> ramifications of these intractable uncertainties lead to
> most of the misery on the planet, and some of us
> actually care about that.)
>
>
>
>
> > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, tartbrain  wrote:
> > >
> > > Many people seem to believe that morality depends for its
existence on
> > a metaphysical quantity called "free will." This conviction is
> > occasionally expressed -- often with great impatience, smugness, or
> > piety -- with the words, "ought, implies, can." Like much else in
> > philosophy that is too easily remembered (e.g. "you can't get an
ought
> > from an is."), this phrase has become an impediment to clear
thinking.
> > >
> > > In fact, the concept of free will is a non-starter, both
> > philosophically and scientifically. There is simply no description
of
> > mental and physical causation that allows for this freedom that we
> > habitually claim for ourselves and a

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[authfriend]

As one who leans toward determinism, I'm pleased to
see such a clear explanation from Harris of why the
standard notion of free will is untenable. I think
he's somewhat less clear, however, about the
ramifications and implications.

The assumption of free will is so deeply woven into
all our social structures and interactions and the
way we think about them that it's impossibly
difficult even to imagine how we could get along
without it. It's the foundational organizing
principle.

To try to live with each other on the contrary
assumption--that we are not the authors of our
thoughts and actions (leaving aside the question of
who the "real" author is)--would quickly render us
psychotic and utterly dysfunctional. If free will is
an illusion, it's a necessary one.

We cannot base our thoughts or actions, individually
or as a society, on the premise that we are not the
authors of those thoughts and actions. The idea of
doing so can't even be stated coherently, as the
previous sentence shows.

So we seem to be stuck with free will, even if we're
convinced it doesn't exist.

Maybe we can make little forays here and there into
the worst consequences of the belief in free will--for
one thing, as Harris suggests, dispense with tne notion
of retributive justice in our penal system. But boy,
it's a slippery slope. Where do we stop?

I'm not sure we're smart enough to take it on.



--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, tartbrain  wrote:
>
> Many people seem to believe that morality depends for its existence on a 
> metaphysical quantity called "free will." This conviction is occasionally 
> expressed -- often with great impatience, smugness, or piety -- with the 
> words, "ought, implies, can." Like much else in philosophy that is too easily 
> remembered (e.g. "you can't get an ought from an is."), this phrase has 
> become an impediment to clear thinking.
> 
> In fact, the concept of free will is a non-starter, both philosophically and 
> scientifically. There is simply no description of mental and physical 
> causation that allows for this freedom that we habitually claim for ourselves 
> and ascribe to others. Understanding this would alter our view of morality in 
> some respects, but it wouldn't destroy the distinction between right and 
> wrong, or good and evil.
> 
> The following post has been adapted from my discussion of this topic in The 
> Moral Landscape (pp. 102-110):
> 
> --
> 
> We are conscious of only a tiny fraction of the information that our brains 
> process in each moment. While we continually notice changes in our experience 
> -- in thought, mood, perception, behavior, etc. -- we are utterly unaware of 
> the neural events that produce these changes. In fact, by merely glancing at 
> your face or listening to your tone of voice, others are often more aware of 
> your internal states and motivations than you are. And yet most of us still 
> feel that we are the authors of our own thoughts and actions.
> 
> The problem is that no account of causality leaves room for free will -- 
> thoughts, moods, and desires of every sort simply spring into view -- and 
> move us, or fail to move us, for reasons that are, from a subjective point of 
> view, perfectly inscrutable. Why did I use the term "inscrutable" in the 
> previous sentence? I must confess that I do not know. Was I free to do 
> otherwise? What could such a claim possibly mean? Why, after all, didn't the 
> word "opaque" come to mind? Well, it just didn't -- and now that it vies for 
> a place on the page, I find that I am still partial to my original choice. Am 
> I free with respect to this preference? Am I free to feel that "opaque" is 
> the better word, when I just do not feel that it is the better word? Am I 
> free to change my mind? Of course not. It can only change me.
> 
> 
> more at
> 
> http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/morality-without-free-wil_b_868804.html
> 
> 
> 
> Comment by Readers
> 
> 
> One of the more interestin­g discussion­s in a book called "I AM A STRANGE 
> LOOP" about free will involves the brain and our 'sense of self'. Billions of 
> neurons in the brain 'chatter' and signal one another constantly­. From that 
> chatter we become conscious of stimulus. The big question as relates to free 
> will and casual capabiliti­es is:, 
> 
> Which neurons do we control?
> 
> We are the result of the chatter and do not or can not control a single 
> neuron. Free will is an illusion caused by the neural activity of the brain. 
> It developed over many thousands of years. 
> 
> When we move our arms and legs, there are many neurons, nerves, muscle cells, 
> and chemicals involved. Which of these are we conscious of and control?
> 
> The most we can say about cause or free will is that the brain controls and 
> initiates actions. However, we (the sense of self) do not control the 
> neurons, the nerves, the muscle cells, etc. We might influence those things. 
> We could choose to breath water but our choice does

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[authfriend]

--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "emptybill"  wrote:
[quoting Frithjof Schuon:]
> Relativism sets out to reduce every element of
> absoluteness to a relativity, while making a quite
> illogical exception in favor of this reduction
> itself. In effect, relativism consists in declaring
> it to be true that there is no such thing as truth,
> or in declaring it to be absolutely true that
> nothing but the relatively true exists; one might
> just as well say that language does not exist, or
> write that there is no such thing as writing. In
> short, every idea is reduced to a relativity of
> some sort, whether psychological, historical, or
> social; but the assertion nullifies itself by the
> fact that it too presents itself as a psychological,
> historical, or social relativity. The assertion
> nullifies itself if it is true, and by nullifying
> itself logically proves thereby that it is false;
> its initial absurdity lies in the implicit claim to
> be unique in escaping, as if by enchantment, from a
> relativity that is declared alone to be possible.

It's not immediately obvious to me how this applies
to Sam Harris's discourse on the nonexistence of free
will; if you'd care to make the connection for me, I'd
be grateful.

I'm about to make a post suggesting that any proposal
to *implement* the understanding that free will does
not exist is automatically incoherent, e.g.:

Let us base our thoughts and actions on the premise
that we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions.

But is it *logically* incoherent, as the relativist
premise is, or is it *psychologically* incoherent? I'm
not sure. Don't know if it matters, either. The problems
with the two premises seem to have some kind of kinship,
but I'm having trouble figuring out what it is.

In any case, when I contemplate this maze of twisty
little passages, I begin to get pissed off. If the
maddeningly incomprehensible existential situation in
which human beings find themselves is not some horrible
accident of the evolutionary process, resulting in the
self-consciousness that drives us to beat our heads to
a bloody pulp against the wall trying to solve the
insoluble, then it has to be the sadistic design of
some malevolent higher power.

Either way, it ain't fair!

(I won't be at all surprised if someone jumps in to 
declare scornfully that the insolubility of it all is
what's *fun* about being human, a glorious puzzle to be
reveled in rather than decried, implying that the
existential angst I just expressed is a sign of retarded
spiritual evolution. I'd just point out that the
ramifications of these intractable uncertainties lead to
most of the misery on the planet, and some of us
actually care about that.)


 
 
> --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, tartbrain  wrote:
> >
> > Many people seem to believe that morality depends for its existence on
> a metaphysical quantity called "free will." This conviction is
> occasionally expressed -- often with great impatience, smugness, or
> piety -- with the words, "ought, implies, can." Like much else in
> philosophy that is too easily remembered (e.g. "you can't get an ought
> from an is."), this phrase has become an impediment to clear thinking.
> >
> > In fact, the concept of free will is a non-starter, both
> philosophically and scientifically. There is simply no description of
> mental and physical causation that allows for this freedom that we
> habitually claim for ourselves and ascribe to others. Understanding this
> would alter our view of morality in some respects, but it wouldn't
> destroy the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil.
> >
>

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[Xenophaneros Anartaxius]

--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "emptybill"  wrote:
Relativism sets out to reduce every element of absoluteness to a
relativity, while making a quite illogical exception in favor of this
reduction itself. In effect, relativism consists in declaring it to be
true that there is no such thing as truth, or in declaring it to be
absolutely true that nothing but the relatively true exists; one might
just as well say that language does not exist, or write that there is no
such thing as writing. In short, every idea is reduced to a relativity
of some sort, whether psychological, historical, or social; but the
assertion nullifies itself by the fact that it too presents itself as a
psychological, historical, or social relativity. The assertion nullifies
itself if it is true, and by nullifying itself logically proves thereby
that it is false; its initial absurdity lies in the implicit claim to be
unique in escaping, as if by enchantment, from a relativity that is
declared alone to be possible.  Frithjof Schuon
--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, tartbrain no_reply@ wrote:

Many people seem to believe that morality depends for its existence on a
metaphysical quantity called "free will." This conviction is...
(Quotation from Sam Harris)


When speaking about anything, when thinking about anything, we are being
relative, anything that might conceivably be absolute is relativised by
our forming the experience into word. What is an absolute? How many are
there? One absolute, two absolutes, three absolutes; more? Absolute is
not something that is definable, and thus is it not possible to
logically investigate it, though one can form concepts and logically
manipulate them, but this is a parallel representation of an unspeakable
and so inevitably our arguments are soaked through with mythology of our
own making. If anyone here has seen through the veil of illusion that is
called enlightenment or awakening, they know it cannot be really spoken
about, what absolute is.

I find Harris' attempt to bring morality under the purview of science
rather interesting; it has a lot of support from the findings of
leading-edge neuroscience. As our experience of our internal states
becomes broader, and our knowledge of the world, experimentally and
intellectually also broadens, we can expect that older ideas made by
foggier generations might just turn out to be kind of dumb, and we come
to a newer and clearer perspective on matters we had long taken for
granted. Other scientists have come to the same conclusion, and thus a
new debate, or at least a new form for the debate, about the nature of
man, crime and punishment and freedom begins.

[FairfieldLife] Re: Morality Without "Free Will -- Sam Harris

[emptybill]

Relativism sets out to reduce every element of absoluteness to a
relativity, while making a quite illogical exception in favor of this
reduction itself. In effect,

relativism consists in declaring it to be true that there is no such
thing as truth, or in declaring it to be absolutely true that nothing
but the relatively true exists; one might just as well say that language
does not exist, or write that there is no such thing as writing. In
short, every idea is reduced to a relativity of some sort, whether
psychological, historical, or social; but the assertion nullifies itself
by the fact that it too presents itself as a

psychological, historical, or social relativity. The assertion nullifies
itself if it is true, and by nullifying itself logically proves thereby
that it is false; its initial absurdity lies in the implicit claim to be
unique in escaping, as if by enchantment, from a relativity that is

declared alone to be possible.




Frithjof Schuon




This has been posted here before. Fergit?
….



--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, tartbrain  wrote:
>
> Many people seem to believe that morality depends for its existence on
a metaphysical quantity called "free will." This conviction is
occasionally expressed -- often with great impatience, smugness, or
piety -- with the words, "ought, implies, can." Like much else in
philosophy that is too easily remembered (e.g. "you can't get an ought
from an is."), this phrase has become an impediment to clear thinking.
>
> In fact, the concept of free will is a non-starter, both
philosophically and scientifically. There is simply no description of
mental and physical causation that allows for this freedom that we
habitually claim for ourselves and ascribe to others. Understanding this
would alter our view of morality in some respects, but it wouldn't
destroy the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil.
>