Re Without going into minute differences, the vast majority of
neurophysiologists and physicists would agree with Tegmark that consciousness
is an emergent property of matter.
Those who argue along those lines start to talk about a material object being
affected by surrounding objects. The
Re Without going into minute differences, the vast majority of
neurophysiologists and physicists would agree with Tegmark that consciousness
is an emergent property of matter.
Those who argue along those lines start to talk about a material object being
affected by surrounding objects. The
No. he's saying (not me), that relating to the "hard problem" of consciousness,
the feeling of the emergent properties of atoms/moleculs is consciousness; but
the emergence of such must have certain necessary conditions such as
Perceptronium, Computronium (which are nothing but more molecules ar
"Our subjective awareness of consciousness is the feeling of such
arrangements" - isn't that completely circular reasoning?
Tegmark's musings are reminiscent of medieval theologians. He thinks all
possible structures exist somewhere; the theologians argued that the immense
number of potentia
