Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Thanks Lou, you are surely right to point out the object-nature of concepts.

>There is no escape from sooner or later realizing that 2 exists only
in the mind or in the Mind.

Indeed. Our minds are full of such concepts. It seems that one of the
important activities of the mind is to generate 'things' from the
processes that impinge upon us. This makes living our lives much simpler
(we don't need to set about curating the collection of all couples).

>Mind as eigenform never happens except at the limit where
self-reference occurs.

I found it useful to read your paper on that is to be found at
eigenforms http://homepages.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/Eigen.pdf.

Best

Dai

On 24/05/18 05:08, Louis H Kauffman wrote:

Dai,
I start down a road toward attempting to understand information by
first understanding number and form.

|
||
|||

|
…

Is a number a thing?
Is 2 a thing?
Cannot say that this 2, this || “is” two. Rather it partakes in being
a couple.
2 is relational. We say that there are 2 signs in the word “is"
because a standard couple can be matched to the i and the s.

There is a potential process behind the concept 2.
2 is a concept, but you cannot point to any existent “thing” and say
“that is 2”.

You can only say there are 2 of them here, indicating relationship.
So process can also be subordinate to the existence of a something if
that something is a concept.

Numbers exist.
Numbers are concepts.
Numbers are related to processes of matching and comparing.
But numbers are not these processes only.
No thing is so real as the number 2.
Numbers are at the base of what we mean by information.
Do you want the actual couples to somehow allow 2 to emerge in the
proliferation of many many couples?

Russel said: “2 is the collection of all couples.”
Are you convinced that the collection of all possible couples captures
the concept of 2?

I doubt it unless you take collection to be a verb.
There is no escape from sooner or later realizing that 2 exists only
in the mind or in the Mind.
Mind as eigenform never happens except at the limit where
self-reference occurs.

I am the observed link between myself and observing myself (HVF).
Lou

On May 17, 2018, at 6:44 AM, Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com
<mailto:dai.griffith...@gmail.com>> wrote:

What is a 'thing'?

Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes exist,
and that for human convenience in living in the world we put
conceptual membranes around some parts of those processes and call
them 'things'. From this point of view we do not have two aspects
(things and predictions about those things), but simply the
monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we find. This does
not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms might be a
special kind of process).

Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully
reformulated as "Is information a thing?".

Dai

On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:

Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I
got an idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes
two kind of philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to
the existence of things) and predicative (what can we say and know
about things). Against Quine materialism I came across the idea that
ontological problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting
problem. The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All
we have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think
of Science as a communicative social system differentiated from its
environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree with me in
this point). As a system (I mean not the social system, but the set
of statements taken as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are
many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown (in this point I
confess I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I
think I have many points of agreement with him but also of
disagreement -but honestly I currently lack the knowledge to
undertake a thorough discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of
the most coherent ways to deal with it. But this means we have to
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
a set of statements that represent what we know about information.
The problem is that although we can have the intuition that
information is real, physical as has been said, it cannot be proved.
An external reference like "reality ", if we look carefully, acts as
regulatory function within the system. I remember that in the
"Science of the Society", Luhmann devised the concept of consistency
proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is
inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

(it contains what I have named a
Universal Dovetailer: a program which generates *and*
executes all programs).

So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim
that if we assume Mechanism (Indexical computationalism)
matter itself is also not *primarily* physical: it is all
in the “head of the universal machine/number” (so to speak).

And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough
to find if there is a discrepancy between the physics
that we infer from the observation, and the physics that
we extract from “the head” of the machine. This took me
more than 30 years of work, but the results obtained up
to now is that there is no discrepancies. I have compared
the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness (formally) on
the semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1)
propositions, with most quantum logics given by
physicists, and it fits rather well.

Best regards,

Bruno
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Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

Thanks everyone, all very stimulating!

On 25/04/18 03:47, Burgin, Mark wrote:
Any reasonable person will tell that the textbook contains knowledge
This is a metaphor. It is helpful in managing the complex relationships
of humans with media, but will lead us into tangles if we believe that
it is anything more.

Mark Johnson, thinking about music followed up with a pertinent question

What is the relation of the score to what occurs?

I'd say that both the book and the score are most usefully seen not as
the transfer of information, but as coordination in relation to an artifact.

Arturo warned against anthropomorphism, and said
I start to sweat. ... my body (without the need of my mind!) extracts
a termic information from its surrounding environment
As Lou says, "Information in the sense that you indicate is pattern that
is independent of the particular substrate on which it is ‘carried’."  I
sweat because of the interaction between my body and its environment,
through of a cascade of cellular interactions, mediated by chemical
processes. We can describe these chemical processes as patterns, and
from those descriptions learn something about physiology. But that does
not mean that the processes themselves are composed of pattern or of
information.

To my mind 'extraction' of information is a metaphor (and from Lakoff's
perspective it is therefore anthropomorphic). Does the body send out
emissaries to mine the information? Of course Arturo does not believe
that, and I'm not trying to score cheap points here. I just want to
point out that language is not a neutral tool when we are discussing
information. Lou's "in the sense that you indicate" correctly alerts us
to the fact that there is more than one meaning to the word
'information', and implies a warning that we will talk past each other
unless we are willing to clarify the distinctions we are making when we
use the word. There is a long and valuable intellectual tradition that
uses the word information in terms of entropy, but that is not the only
way that the word is used.

Best
Dai

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Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:

>To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between
“reality” and “data”

That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that
which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that
we cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black
holes.

> just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between
the note printed on the partiture,
> and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between
the description of the position
> in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his
hands.

I do not think that these are the same case.

The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I
could note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board,
mix them up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed
for the players. The physical chess set and the physical context are
also largely irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed
coffee or aquavit, go back into another room with a duplicate of the
game with different pieces on another board, and continue with little
disturbance.

But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From
the starting point of the sheet music, the performer has to decide on
volumes, intonation and timing, and in some cases also ornament and
variations. These issues arouse deep passions and ferocious debate! Nor
would we be happy to buy a recording of a symphony in which different
orchestras played different movements in different concert halls
(although it might be interesting to hear).

Dai
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Re: [Fis] Is Dataism the end of classical hypothesis-driven research and the beginning of data-correlation-driven research?

Mark Johnson wrote:

So I want to ask a deeper question: Effective science and effective
decision-making go hand-in-hand. What does an effective society
operating in a highly ambiguous and technologically abundant
environment look like? How does it use its technology for effective
decision-making? My betting is it doesn't look anything like what
we've currently got!

These are good questions, Mark.

Understanding 'science' as 'knowledge' it is plainly true that
"Effective science and effective decision-making go hand-in-hand".

As a gloss on that comment, I would add that there is an imbalance.
Decision-making aspires to universal applicability. If the state changes
the tax regime then it expects all citizens to conform, and increasingly
technology can be used to achieve that. But knowledge of the
consequences to society and individuals of those changes to the tax
regime is partial.

The state uses a regulatory framework, which is quite easily knowable,
to regulate the chaotic interactions of society, which are complex to
the degree that they are unknowable. In other words, governments use
policy instruments to attenuate the variety of the society that they set
out to regulate, and implicit in this is a recognition the impossibility
of a complete knowledge of society. An open question is whether the
tools of data surveillance can change or adjust that equation, and, if
they can, whether that is desirable.

In the past you have drawn my attention to Bataille's discussion of
transgression, which I think is relevant here. The question arises: is
it possible for political science, with technological support, to manage
the attraction of transgression? That seems to be the project that is
underway in China at the moment. We can watch the results with interest
(and perhaps trepidation).

> What does an effective society operating in a highly ambiguous and
technologically abundant environment look like?

My working suggestion for a guiding principle would be "An effective
society should be humble about its ability to understand its own
workings, and those of the people who constitute it"

Dai

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Dear Xueshan,

I suggest that we start by looking at what it might mean for information
or meaning to be 'contained' in a sentence. Lakoff would have told us
that this is a metaphor, and specifically the pervasive 'container
metaphor'. According to https://glossary.sil.org/term/container-metaphor:

===

Container metaphor.

A containment metaphor is an ontological metaphor in which some concept
is represented as:

*      having an inside and outside, and
*      capable of holding something else.

Examples:
(English)

*      I’ve had a full life.
*      Life is empty for him.
*      Her life is crammed with activities.
*      Get the most out of life.

Source:
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago:
University of Chicago.

29–30,

The paradox is dissolved by proposing that "In everyday speech it is
usual to say that a sentence has 'an inside and an outside', and that it
is 'capable of holding something else', but this is no more than a
convenient fiction. Both 'information' and 'meaning' (in the senses you
are using) are constituted by social and cognitive processes, and
consideration of these processes can enable us to understand the
relationship between the two terms".

Best

Dai

On 26/02/18 09:47, Xueshan Yan wrote:

Dear colleagues,

In my teaching career of Information Science, I was often puzzled by
the following inference, I call it *Paradox of Meaning and
Information* or *Armenia Paradox*. In order not to produce unnecessary
ambiguity, I state it below and strictly limit our discussion within
the human context.

Suppose an earthquake occurred in Armenia last night and all of the
main media of the world have given the report about it. On the second
day, two students A and B are putting forward a dialogue facing the
newspaper headline “*Earthquake Occurred in Armenia Last Night*”:

Q: What is the *MEANING* contained in this sentence?

A: An earthquake occurred in Armenia last night.

Q: What is the *INFORMATION* contained in this sentence?

A: An earthquake occurred in Armenia last night.

Thus we come to the conclusion that *MEANING is equal to INFORMATION*,
or strictly speaking, human meaning is equal to human information. In
Linguistics, the study of human meaning is called Human Semantics; In
Information Science, the study of human information is called Human
Informatics.

Historically, Human Linguistics has two definitions: 1, It is the
study of human language; 2, It, also called Anthropological
Linguistics or Linguistic Anthropology, is the historical and cultural
study of a human language. Without loss of generality, we only adopt
the first definitions here, so we regard Human Linguistics and
Linguistics as the same.

Due to Human Semantics is one of the disciplines of Linguistics and
its main task is to deal with the human meaning, and Human Informatics
is one of the disciplines of Information Science and its main task is
to deal with the human information; Due to human meaning is equal to
human information, thus we have the following corollary:

A: *Human Informatics is a subfield of Human Linguistics*.

According to the definition of general linguists, language is a
vehicle for transmitting information, therefore, Linguistics is a
branch of Human Informatics, so we have another corollary:

B: *Human Linguistics is a subfield of Human Informatics*.

Apparently, A and B are contradictory or logically unacceptable. It is
a paradox in Information Science and Linguistics. In most cases, a
discoveries in a subject, but how should we understand this paradox?

Best wishes,

Xueshan

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Re: [Fis] Fw: Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism

s version, not the
common interpretation due to a dep misunderstanding about what
they were up to. I recommend a serous study of Peirce on te issues
of meaning and metaphysics. He wa deeply indebted to their work
iin logic.

Of course there may be no common ground, but the our project is
hopeless. Other things you have said on this group lead me to
think it is not a dead end of confused notions. In that case we
are wasting our time.

John

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Re: [Fis] Heretic

Thanks Loet, for a very clear and concise exposition of an approach that
I agree with.

suggests that there are two aspects to a single phenomenon. As I
interpret your post, you are saying that information and meaning are
separate concepts. Otherwise, we are led to inquire into the nature of
the unity of which they are both aspects, which gets us back where we
started.

So I interpret 'dualistic' here to mean 'two concepts that are
intertwined in the emergence of events'. Is this parallel to, for
example, atomic structure and fluid dynamics (perhaps there are better
examples)? If so, does that imply a hierarchy (i.e. you can have
information without meaning, but not meaning without information)? This
makes sense to me, though it is not what I usually associate with the
word 'dualistic'.

Dai

On 04/10/17 08:16, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Nobody of us is able to provide an operative framework and a single
(just one!) empirical  testable prevision able to assess "information".

Dear colleague,

One should not confuse the confusion on the list with the clarity of
the concept information in information theory. This definition is
operational (e.g., in bits). Your computer would not work without this
definition (1 byte = 8 bits). The problem is that this definition of
information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive.

The search for an intuitive definition of information has led to
unclear definitions. In a recent book, Hidalgo (2015, at p. 165), for
example, has defined “information” with reference “to the order
embodied in codified sequences, such as those found in music or DNA,
while /knowledge and knowhow /refer to the ability of a system to
process information.” However, codified knowledge can be abstract
and—like music—does not have to be “embodied” (e.g., Cowan, David, &
Foray, 2000).

Beyond Hidalgo’s position, Floridi (2010, p. 21) proposed “a general
definition of information” according to which “the well-formed data
are /meaningful/” (italics of the author). Luhmann (1995, p. 67)
posits that “all information has meaning.” In his opinion, information
should therefore be considered as a selection mechanism. Kauffman et
al. (2008, at p. 28) added to the confusion by defining information as
“natural selection.”

Against these attempt to bring information and meaning under a single
denominator--and to identify variation with selection--I argue for a
dualistic perspective (as did Prof. Zhong in a previous email).
Information and meaning should not be confounded. Meaning is generated
from redundancies (Bateson, 1972, p. 420; Weaver, 1949; see
Leydesdorff /et al./, 2017).

Best,
Loet

*References:*

Bateson, G. (1972). /Steps to an Ecology of Mind/. New York: Ballantine.

Cowan, R., David, P., & Foray, D. (2000). The Explicit Economics of
Knowledge Codification and Tacitness. /Industrial and Corporate
Change, 9/(2), 211-253.

Floridi, L. (2010). /Information: A very short introduction/. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.

Hidalgo, C. (2015). /Why Information Grows: The Evolution of Order,
from Atoms to Economies/. New York: Basic Books.

Kauffman, S., Logan, R. K., Este, R., Goebel, R., Hobill, D., &
Shmulevich, I. (2008). Propagating organization: an enquiry. /Biology
and Philosophy, 23/(1), 27-45.

Leydesdorff, L., Johnson, M., & Ivanova, I. (2017). Toward a Calculus
of Redundancy: Signification, Codification, and Anticipation in
Cultural Evolution.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3030525 .

Luhmann, N. ([1984] 1995). /Social Systems/. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.

Weaver, W. (1949). Some Recent Contributions to the Mathematical
Theory of Communication. In C. E. Shannon & W. Weaver (Eds.), /The
Mathematical Theory of Communication/ (pp. 93-117.). Urbana:
University of Illinois Press.

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

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Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?

Thanks Stan,

Yes, it's a powerful and useful process.

My problem is that in this list, and in other places were such matters
are discussed, we don't seem to be able to agree on the big picture, and
the higher up the generalisations we go, the less we agree.

I'd like to keep open the possibility that we might be yoking ideas
together which it may be more useful to keep apart. We are dealing with
messy concepts in messy configurations, which may not always map neatly
onto a generalisation model.

Dai

On 22/12/16 16:45, Stanley N Salthe wrote:

Dai --

{phenomenon 1}

{phenomenon 2}   -->  {Phenomena 1 & 2} ---> {phenomena 1.2,3}

{phenomenon 3}

The process from left to right is generalization.

‘Information’ IS a generalization.

generalities form the substance of philosophy. Info happens to a case

of generalization which can be mathematized, which in turn allows

it to be generalized even more.

So, what’s the problem?

STAN

On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 7:44 AM, Dai Griffiths
<dai.griffith...@gmail.com <mailto:dai.griffith...@gmail.com>> wrote:

>  Information is not “something out there” which “exists”
otherwise than as our construct.

I agree with this. And I wonder to what extent our problems in
discussing information come from our desire to shoe-horn many
different phenomena into the same construct. It would be possible
to disaggregate the construct. It be possible to discuss the
topics which we address on this list without using the word
'information'. We could discuss redundancy, variety, constraint,
meaning, structural coupling, coordination, expectation, language,
etc.

In what ways would our explanations be weakened?

In what ways might we gain in clarity?

If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our
discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human
experience. But many scientific discussions are remote from
everyday human experience.

Dai

On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Dear colleagues,

A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms
of bits of information.

Alternatively: the expected information content /H /of a
probability distribution is .

/H/is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb’s
formulation of the entropy .

This definition of information is an operational definition. In
my opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by
answering the question of “what is information?” As the
discussion on this list demonstrates, one does not easily agree
information defined?” Information is not “something out there”
which “exists” otherwise than as our construct.

Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to
move forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman’s and Bob Logan’s
(2007) definition of information “as natural selection assembling
the very constraints on the release of energy that then
constitutes work and the propagation of organization.” I asked
several times what this means and how one can measure this
information. Hitherto, I only obtained the answer that colleagues
who disagree with me will be cited. JAnother answer was that
“counting” may lead to populism. J

Best,

Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>l...@leydesdorff.net
<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> ;
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/>http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU,
<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;

Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University
of London;

*From:*Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.sto...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM
*To:* l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>
*Cc:* James Peters; u...@umces.edu <mailto:u...@umces.edu>; Alex
Hankey; FIS Webinar
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?

List,

information stated below.

1. the definition of information as uncertainty is
counter-intuitive ("bizarre"); (p. 27)

I agree.  I struggled with this definition for a long time before
realising that Shann

Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?

n:

1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive
("bizarre"); (p. 27)

2. "In particular, information must not be confused with meaning." (p. 8)

The definition of information as relevant for a system of reference
confuses information with "meaningful information" and thus sacrifices
the surplus value of Shannon's counter-intuitive definition.

information observer

that integrates interactive processes such as

physical interactions such photons stimulating the retina of the eye,
human-machine interactions (this is the level that Shannon lives on),
biological interaction such body temperature relative to touch ice or
heat source, social interaction such as this forum started by Pedro,
economic interaction such as the stock market, ... [Lerner, page 1].

We are in need of a theory of meaning. Otherwise, one cannot measure
meaningful information. In a previous series of communications we
discussed redundancy from this perspective.

Lerner introduces mathematical expectation E[Sap] (difference between
of a priory entropy [sic] and a posteriori entropy), which is
distinguished from the notion of relative information Iap (Learner,
page 7).

) expresses in bits of information the information generated when the
a priori distribution is turned into the a posteriori one . This
follows within the Shannon framework without needing an observer. I
use this equation, for example, in my 1995-book /The Challenge of
Scientometrics/ (Chapters 8 and 9), with a reference to Theil (1972).
The relative information is defined as the /H///H/(max).

I agree that the intuitive notion of information is derived from the
Latin “in-formare” (Varela, 1979). But most of us do no longer use
“force” and “mass” in the intuitive (Aristotelian) sense. JThe
proliferation of the meanings of information if confused with
“meaningful information” is indicative for an “index sui et falsi”, in
my opinion. The repetitive discussion lames the progression at this
list. It is “like asking whether a glass is half empty or half full”
(Hayles, 1990, p. 59).

This act of forming forming an information process results in the
construction of an observer that is the owner [holder] of information.

The system of reference is then no longer the message, but the
observer who provides meaning to the information (uncertainty). I
agree that this is a selection process, but the variation first has to
be specified independently (before it can be selected.

And Lerner introduces the threshold between objective and subjective
observes (page 27).   This leads to a consideration selection and
cooperation that includes entanglement.

I don’t see a direct relation between information and entanglement. An
observer can be entangled.

Best,

Loet

PS. Pedro: Let me assume that this is my second posting in the week
which ends tonight. L.

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Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 32, Issue 13

Many (most?) linguistic interactions are not propositional in the sense
that you imply.

There is no verifiable equivalent to opening the fridge door for
utterances like "Cool", "Give us a hand won't you", "You're welcome",
"Justin Bieber is wonderful", "You go and sneak in round the back while
I distract them at the front door", and so on.

So I doubt your 'usually', and the application to natural language.

Dai

On 15/11/16 15:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A model is a mathematical structure making a sentence (proposition)
true or false, and this, in my opinion applies to meaning in the
natural language, where usually some notion of reality is involved:
the proposition "there is two beers in the fridge" is judged
meaningful because we believe in a reality with fridge containing, or
not, beers.

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Re: [Fis] Scientific communication

;> --
>>> -
>>> Pedro C. Marijuán
>>> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
>>> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
>>> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
>>> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
>>> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
>>> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 <tel:%2B34%20976%2071%203526> (& 6818)
>>> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es <mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
>>> -
>>>
>>>
>>> _______
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>>
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University of Liverpool

Visiting Professor
Far Eastern Federal University, Russia

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<http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com>

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Office: T3 02
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Re: [Fis] Scientific communication (from Mark)

To trying to answer this question, I find myself asking "Do patterns
exist without an observer?".

A number of familiar problems then re-emerge, which blur my ability to
distinguish between foreground and background.

Dai

On 13/10/16 11:32, Karl Javorszky wrote:

Do patterns contain information?

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Bolton, BL3 5AB

Office: T3 02
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Re: [Fis] Scientific Communication and Publishing

ot;reputation" is the real
is very good: VAN RAAN, Anthony FJ. The interdisciplinary nature of science: theoretical
framework and bibliometric-empirical approach. Practising interdisciplinarity, p.
66-78, 2000.)

Kind regards,

Moisés

2016-09-26 4:55 GMT-03:00 Mark Johnson <johnsonm...@gmail.com>:

Dear FIS Colleagues,

To kick-start the discussion on scientific publishing, I have prepared
a short (hopefully provocative) video. It can be found at:

(if anyone's interested, the software I used for producing it is
called 'Videoscribe')

I have also produced a paper which is attached.

I hope you find these interesting and stimulating!

Best wishes,

Mark
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Institute of Learning and Teaching
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Doutorando IBICT/UFRJ. Professor. Msc.
Instituto Federal do Rio de Janeiro - IFRJ Campus Rio de Janeiro
moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br

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Office: T3 02
http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC

SKYPE: daigriffiths
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Re: [Fis] What are information and science?

Thanks Loet, that is helpful, and makes intuitively good sense. But I
remain puzzled. I see two distinct cases:

Case 1: For molecules 'communication' consists of interaction between
the molecules themselves, resulting in biology.
Similarly, for atoms 'communication' consists of interaction between the
atoms themselves. They bang into each other and exchange their components.

Case 2: For words and sentences (in my view of the world) it is human
beings who communicate, not words and sentences. From a Maturana
perspective, language is a recursive coordination between autopoietic
entities, not interaction between linguistic items.

In case 1, there is no mediating domain. Molecules and atoms interact
directly.

But in case 2, there is a hierarchy. Communication is between human
beings, but interaction is through words and sentences in a linguistic
domain. When I respond to your email, I do not have an effect on that
email. Rather, I hope to have an effect on your thought processes.

Of course there are other interactions between people which correspond
to my case 1, for example when someone barges another person out of the
way, or when they dance together. But I think Maturana would distinguish
these examples by describing them in terms of structural coupling rather
than languaging.

By calling both of these cases 'communication' we gain some valuable
traction on patterns of interaction in different domains. But I am
concerned that we also make it more difficult to disentangle our idea of
what information is, by equating it with a catch-all notion of
'communication'.

Dai

On 20/05/15 11:12, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Dear colleagues,

I see informational processes as essentially being proto-scientific
– how is any science not an informational process?

The sciences, in my opinion, are different in terms of what is
communicated. As Maturana noted, the communication of molecules
generates a biology. Similarly, the communication of atoms generates a
chemistry, etc. The communication of words and sentences generates the
interhuman domain of communication. One can also communicate in terms
of symbolic media such as money. This can be reflected by economics.

Thus, the sciences are different. The formal perspective (of the
mathematical theory of communication) provides us with tools to move
metaphors heuristically from one domain to another. The assumption
that the mathematics is general is over-stated, in my opinion. One has
to carefully check and elaborate after each translation from one
domain to another. In this sense, I agree with “proto-scientific”.

Best,

Loet

First, I think this places me in the camp of Peirce's view. Second, I
am unsure of how to regard the focus on higher-order
interdisciplinary discussions when a much more essential view of
lower-order roles (i.e., What are science and information?) has not
been first established.

From my naive view I find myself wondering how informational
process is not the ONE overarching discipline from which all other
disciplines are born (is this too psychological of a framework?). As
such, I argue for one great discipline . . . and thus wouldn't try to
frame my view in terms of science, mostly because I am unclear on
how the term science is being formally used here. Thoughts?

*Marcus Abundis*

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Re: [Fis] What are information and science?

Thanks Robert,

I agree with what you say about DNA, so I may be on the same slippery
path to catastrophic heterodoxy!

In responding to the question what is information, started by Marcus,
I was pointing out what seemed to me to be a shifting definition of
'communication', and wondering if this corresponded to a shifting
definition of 'information'.

Loet stated that the communication of words and sentences generates the
interhuman domain of communication. I am not taking issue with this. My
question is whether we are using the word 'communication' and 'generate'
in the same sense when we also say the communication of molecules
generates a biology.

Your comments raise a related question. Perhaps it is not that molecules
generate biology, but rather it is that biology (in the shape of the
network of proteomic and enzymatic reactions) generates the
communication of molecules?

Perhaps the problem is one of keeping track of the system in focus, and
demarcating it clearly (as Stafford Beer might have argued at this
juncture).

Dai

On 20/05/15 16:05, Robert E. Ulanowicz wrote:

Dear Dai:

To say that molecules only interact directly is to ignore the metabolic
matrix that constitutes the actual agency in living systems. For example,
we read everywhere how DNA/RNA directs development, when the molecule
itself is a passive material cause. It is the network of proteomic and
enzymatic reactions that actually reads, interprets and edits the
primitive genome. Furthermore, the structure of that reaction complex
possesses measurable information (and complementary flexibility).

Life is not just molecules banging into one another. That's a physicist's
(Lucreatian) view of the world born of models that are rarefied,
homogeneous and (at most) weakly interacting. (Popper calls them vacuum
systems.) The irony is that that's not how the cosmos came at us! Vacuum
systems never appeared until way late in the evolution of the cosmos. So
the Lucreatian perspective is one of the worst ways to try to make sense
of life. We need to develop a perspective that parallels cosmic evolution,
not points in the opposite direction. To do so requires that we shift from
objects moving according to universal laws to processes giving rise to
other processes (and structures along the way).

The contrast is most vividly illustrated in reference to the origin of
life. Conventional metaphysics requires us to focus on molecules, whereby
the *belief* is that at some point the molecules will miraculously jump up
and start to live (like the vision of the Hebrew prophet Ezekiel). A
process-oriented scenario would consist of a spatially large cycle of
complementary processes (e.g., oxidation and reduction) that constitutes a
thermodynamic work cycle. Those processes then can give rise to and
support smaller cycles, which eventually develop into something resembling
metabolic systems. A far more consistent progression!

Of course, this view is considered catastrophically heterodox, so please
don't repeat it if you don't already have tenure. ;-)

Peace,
Bob U.

I see two distinct cases:

Case 1: For molecules 'communication' consists of interaction between
the molecules themselves, resulting in biology.
Similarly, for atoms 'communication' consists of interaction between the
atoms themselves. They bang into each other and exchange their components.

Case 2: For words and sentences (in my view of the world) it is human
beings who communicate, not words and sentences. From a Maturana
perspective, language is a recursive coordination between autopoietic
entities, not interaction between linguistic items.

In case 1, there is no mediating domain. Molecules and atoms interact
directly.

But in case 2, there is a hierarchy. Communication is between human
beings, but interaction is through words and sentences in a linguistic
domain. When I respond to your email, I do not have an effect on that
email. Rather, I hope to have an effect on your thought processes.

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Professor David (Dai) Griffiths

Professor of Educational Cybernetics
Institute for Educational Cybernetics (IEC)
The University of Bolton
http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC

SKYPE: daigriffiths
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Re: [Fis] THE FRONTIERS OF INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE--Zhao Chuan

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Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 ( 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
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