Dear Jerry, thanks a lot for your interesting comments. I like very much the logical approach, a topic that is generally dispised by scientists for its intrinsic difficulty. We also published something about logic and brain (currently under review), therefore we keep it in high consideration: http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2016/11/15/087874 However, there is a severe problem that prevents logic in order to be useful in the description of scientific theories, explanans/explanandum, and so on. The severe problem has been raised by three foremost discoveries in the last century: quantum entanglement, nonlinear dynamics and quantistic vacuum. Quantum entanglement, although experimentally proofed by countless scientific procedures, is against any common sense and any possibliity of logical inquiry. The concepts of locality and of cause/effect disappear in front of the puzzling phenomenon of quantum entanglement, which is intractable in terms of logic, neither using the successful and advanced approaches of Lesniewski- Tarski, nor Zermelo-Fraenkel's. The same stands for nonlinear chaotic phenomena, widespread in nature, from pile sands, to bird flocks and to brain function. When biforcations occur in logistic plots and chaotic behaviours take place, the final systems' ouputs are not anymore causally predictable. Quantistic vacuum predicts particles or fields interactions occurring through breaks in CPT symmetries: this means that, illogically, the arrow of the time can be reverted (!!!!!) in quantistic systems. Therefore (and I'm sorry for that), the explanatory role of logic in scientific theories is definitely lost.Here we are talking about brain: pay attention, I'm not saying that the brain function obeys to quantum behaviours (I do not agree with the accounts by, for example, Roger Penrose or Vitiello/Freeman). I'm just saying that, because basic phenomena underlying our physical and biological environment display chaotic behaviours and quantistic mechanisms that go against logic, therefore the logic, in general, cannot be anymore useful in the description of our world. I'm sad about that, but that's all. P.S.: A topological approach talks instead of projections and mappings from one level to another, therefore it does not talk about causality or time and displays a more general explanatory power. But this is another topic...
Arturo TozziAA Professor Physics, University North TexasPediatrician ASL Na2Nord, ItalyComput Intell Lab, University Manitobahttp://arturotozzi.webnode.it/ ----Messaggio originale---- Da: "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> Data: 05/12/2016 0.50 A: "fis"<fis@listas.unizar.es> Cc: <tozziart...@libero.it> Ogg: Re: [Fis] Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space ??? FISers:This is just a short note to communicate about two matters of substantial importance with respect to foundational issues.Several contributors to this list serve have proposed a relationship between phenomena and biological structures / processes and mathematics. Perhaps of greatest interest have been the informational assertions seeking to relate mind / consciousness / brain to either traditional mathematical forms and/or Shannon information theory (with barely a mention of either the semiotic or empirical necessities).A common scientific flaw inhabits these several proposals. In my view, this common flaw is the absence of the relationships between scientific causality and mathematical symbols that are necessary to meet the logic of Lesniewski / Tarski, that is, a method to valid the proposed methods of representations. (Krassimir’s post touched these concerns lightly.)While it is possible to cite hundreds (if not thousands) of texts that seek to relate scientific phenomenon with causality, one well-written account addresses the logical relations between scientific laws and the antecedent causes that generate consequences of importance for the study of the information sciences. see: Studies in the Logic of Explanation Carl G. Hempel; Paul Oppenheim http://www.sfu.ca/~jillmc/Hempel%20and%20Oppenheim.pdf I would like to emphasis that scientific inquiry necessarily requires the use of multiple symbol systems and hence intrinsically depends on the symbols used to express scientific laws. The second issue is relates to the various philosophical perspectives that are related to information theory.The web site http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/bois-reymond/present the views on numerous philosophers (see list below) AS WELL AS critical perspectives from a physical viewpoint.If time permits, I will add to this post in the coming week. CheersJerry Philosophers Mortimer AdlerRogers AlbrittonAlexander of AphrodisiasSamuel AlexanderWilliam AlstonG.E.M.AnscombeAnselmLouise AntonyThomas AquinasAristotleDavid ArmstrongHarald AtmanspacherRobert AudiAugustineJ.L.AustinA.J.AyerAlexander BainMark BalaguerJeffrey BarrettWilliam BelshamHenri BergsonIsaiah BerlinBernard BerofskyRobert BishopMax BlackSusanne BobzienEmil du Bois-ReymondHilary BokLaurence BonJourGeorge BooleÉmile BoutrouxF.H.BradleyC.D.BroadMichael BurkeC.A.CampbellJoseph Keim CampbellRudolf CarnapCarneadesErnst CassirerDavid ChalmersRoderick ChisholmChrysippusCiceroRandolph ClarkeSamuel ClarkeAnthony CollinsAntonella CorradiniDiodorus CronusJonathan DancyDonald DavidsonMario De CaroDemocritusDaniel DennettJacques DerridaRené DescartesRichard DoubleFred DretskeJohn DupréJohn EarmanLaura Waddell EkstromEpictetusEpicurusHerbert FeiglJohn Martin FischerOwen FlanaganLuciano FloridiPhilippa FootAlfred FouilleéHarry FrankfurtRichard L. FranklinMichael FredeGottlob FregePeter GeachEdmund GettierCarl GinetAlvin GoldmanGorgiasNicholas St. John GreenH.Paul GriceIan HackingIshtiyaque HajiStuart HampshireW.F.R.HardieSam HarrisWilliam HaskerR.M.HareGeorg W.F. HegelMartin HeideggerR.E.HobartThomas HobbesDavid HodgsonShadsworth HodgsonBaron d'HolbachTed HonderichPamela HubyDavid HumeFerenc HuoranszkiWilliam JamesLord KamesRobert KaneImmanuel KantTomis KapitanJaegwon KimWilliam KingHilary KornblithChristine KorsgaardSaul KripkeAndrea LavazzaKeith LehrerGottfried LeibnizLeucippusMichael LevinGeorge Henry LewesC.I.LewisDavid LewisPeter LiptonJohn LockeMichael LockwoodE. Jonathan LoweJohn R. LucasLucretiusRuth Barcan MarcusJames MartineauStorrs McCallHugh McCannColin McGinnMichael McKennaBrian McLaughlinPaul E. MeehlUwe MeixnerAlfred MeleTrenton MerricksJohn Stuart MillDickinson MillerG.E.MooreC. Lloyd MorganThomas NagelFriedrich NietzscheJohn NortonP.H.Nowell-SmithRobert NozickWilliam of OckhamTimothy O'ConnorDavid F. PearsCharles Sanders PeirceDerk PereboomSteven PinkerPlatoKarl PopperPorphyryHuw PriceH.A.PrichardHilary PutnamWillard van Orman QuineFrank RamseyAyn RandMichael ReaThomas ReidCharles RenouvierNicholas RescherC.W.RietdijkRichard RortyJosiah RoyceBertrand RussellPaul RussellGilbert RyleJean-Paul SartreKenneth SayreT.M.ScanlonMoritz SchlickArthur SchopenhauerJohn SearleWilfrid SellarsAlan SidelleTed SiderHenry SidgwickWalter Sinnott-ArmstrongJ.J.C.SmartSaul SmilanskyMichael SmithBaruch SpinozaL. Susan StebbingGeorge F. StoutGalen StrawsonPeter StrawsonEleonore StumpFrancisco SuárezRichard TaylorKevin TimpeMark TwainPeter UngerPeter van InwagenManuel VargasJohn VennKadri VihvelinVoltaireG.H. von WrightDavid Foster WallaceR. Jay WallaceW.G.WardTed WarfieldRoy WeatherfordWilliam WhewellAlfred North WhiteheadDavid WiderkerDavid WigginsBernard WilliamsTimothy WilliamsonLudwig WittgensteinSusan WolfScientists On Nov 26, 2016, at 12:06 PM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:Dear Krassimir, Thanks a lot for your question, now the discussion will become hotter!First of all, we never stated that consciousness lies either on a n-sphere or on an Euclidean n-space.Indeed, in our framework, consciousness IS the continuous function. Such function stands for a gauge field that restores the brain symmetries, broken by sensations. Concerning brain and gauge fields, see my PLOS biology paper: http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1002400When consciousness lacks, the inter-dimensional projections are broken, and the nervous higher functions temporarily disappear. Concerning the question about which are the manifolds where brain functions lie, it does not matter whether they are spheres, or circles, or concave, or flat structures: we demonstrated that the BUT is valid not just for convex manifolds, but for all the kinds of manifolds. See our: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jnr.23720/abstract?userIsAuthenticated=false&deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=Therefore, even if you think that brain and biological functions are trajectories moving on concave structures towards lesser energetic levels, as suggested by, e.g., Fokker-Planck equations, it does not matter: you may always find the antipodal points with matching description predicted by BUT. Ciao!--Inviato da Libero Mail per Androidsabato, 26 novembre 2016, 06:23PM +01:00 da Krassimir Markov mar...@foibg.com:Dear FIS colleagues,I think, it is needed to put discussion on mathematical foundation. Let me remember that: The Borsuk–Ulam theorem (BUT), states that every continuous function from an n-sphere into Euclidean n-space maps some pair of antipodal points to the same point. Here, two points on a sphere are called antipodal if they are in exactly opposite directions from the sphere's center.Formally: if is continuous then there exists an such that: .[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borsuk%E2%80%93Ulam_theorem ] Who may proof that consciousness is a continuous function from reflected reality ???Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space ???After proving these statements we may think further. Yes, discussion is interesting but, I am afraid, it is not so scientific. Friendly regardsKrassimir _______________________________________________Fis mailing listFis@listas.unizar.eshttp://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis_______________________________________________Fis mailing listFis@listas.unizar.eshttp://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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