[Fis] [ Re: please correct]--From Karl Javorszky

2011-03-01 Thread Pedro C. Marijuan

Message from Karl Javorszky


Dear Qiao Tian-qing,

thank you for inviting my opinion in your viewpoints re information.

To the cultural embedding of the term information: this cannot be 
otherwise. If we had a clear and precise definition of any one logical 
term, we would posses that fixed point that Archimedes has looked for in 
order to displace the Earth from. All logical terms are interdependent 
and give/receive their meaning by their relations to other logical 
terms. Which perspective a culture takes while regarding the 
interdependences determines, which aspects are relevant for the definition.

Your idea that  ...information is the collection of three kinds of 
things´ attributes: things themselves (including cause or effect formed 
through their interaction), the attributes of things that someone thinks 
and simulates, and the attributes of tools someone or something uses 
when considers, expresses, or simulates something.  can be found in 
that system of references that is coming from a+b=c in the following ways:

1) Your basic - axiomatic - set of different facts, which you describe 
as ... properties of things, irrefutable and objective, which have 
nothing to do with any expressive way related to the thing ... would be 
the basic set of arguments {1,1,...,1,2,2,...,16}.
2) Your set of primary relations is built on this basic set. You 
describe it as ... some attributes of things that someone can find... 
...Among which some are true to the facts, but some are incompletely, 
while others are not in any way.   The attributes of things that 
someone can find are here distinguished from the things. (This goes 
slightly against Wittgenstein, who says that the thing is the 
collection of the possibilities of being included in a relation, so he 
thinks there is no real difference between the mental image of a number 
and that of what additions this number can take place in.) In actual 
fact, it may be that you are more profound than Wittgenstein, because:
the additive model makes a difference between the numbers that are 
sorted and the sorting order, and - more importantly - among different 
sorting orders among each other. The orders are in a different way 
distinct to each other than the numbers.
Also, order concepts mirror your idea very well, that some orders are 
congruent - even identical -, while some are only partly, and under some 
specific circumstances, congruent with each other, while there are 
collections of order concepts that are contradictory and cannot yield an 
existing result. This is mirrored exactly in the numbers.
3)  Your set of meta-orders you describe as: ... attributes of tools 
used by someone. The tools are the order concepts by means of which 
[the matches between place and amount being the result of an order 
concept being relevant, that is, in existence] the facts become visible 
as true or false (congruent or contradictory). We choose an order 
concept by which we try to explain the world. (We have a geographical, a 
sociological, an economical way of explaining some parts of History, and 
the explaining perspectives do not contradict, rather extend the other 
way of ordering the facts.) This is also very well reflected in the 
numbers. So far, we have talked about the relevance of the ordering 
aspects (primary relations, your Nr. 2), and now we investigate how the 
set of ordering aspects has come about. This is the importance property 
of the additions. Within a system, we have the discussion, which aspect 
is relevant, while the comparison of systems is maybe even more 
important. The importance brings the past and the future into the play, 
as it is the sequence of logical arguments that creates (individuates, 
makes unique) the three-dimensional picture's contents. It matters now, 
whether X has been or has not been the case.

Now, how do you add information in three levels? That the things are 
ordered in such a basic fashion (primary facts) may or may not depend on 
that these ordering aspects (primary relations, Nr. 2) have been 
selected as relevant from among the ordering aspects of this perspective 
point, while the fact that this perspective point has been selected is 

This seems to be well-defined and translatable into each other. There 
may be some more detail needed to be worked out, but the general idea 
that Info= info1+info2+info3 appears to be accessible to calculations.

Thank you for asking my insignificant opinion, and of course I am always 
ready to assist if there are steps planned to dissect this idea of 
information is additive over three levels: (facts, relations,history).

With great respect:

2011/2/28 whhbs...@sina.com mailto:whhbs...@sina.com

Dear Karl,

   These are my viewpoints, please correct my viewpoints.

   Please allow me to frankly state my point of view:

   Professor Y.X.Zhong wrote that we should define information
   systematically. For 

[Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate, vol. 547, issue 1

2011-03-01 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

(Pedro: Please Post to FIS)

James Hannam, Stan, Pedro, List:


Thank you for taking the time to express your point of view.  For several years 
now, I have been studying the origins of molecular biology, seeking a coherent 
explanation for the meaning for its predictive powers and the methods which 
lead to scientific predictions. I certainly do not speak for the metaphysics of 
the physical information theorists, who, perhaps, may be more persuaded by your 
style than I.


Your assertion that:

“I sense some scepticism about my contentions that ancient science could never 
have developed into what we call modern science. “

is simply illogical and necessarily false.


Why do I confront your logic?

The simple facts are that the basic ideas of Aristotle remain the foundations 
of Western science.  The developments from Aristotle to the present day can be 
traced step-by-step.

By the basic ideas of Aristotle, I mean five specific notions that Aristotle 
wrote of:

Rules of thought [identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle]
Categories [substance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place, situation, 
condition, action and passion]
Causality [formal, material efficient, telos]
Logic of premises (sorites, pathways of statements from antecedents to 
consequences, graph theory, theory of categories]
hierarchy  [individual, species, genera, alone with ostension to greater levels]
During the intervening 23 Centuries, our notions of all these terms have 
changed substantially. Our very notion of language itself, as well as our 
notion of symbol systems, especially mathematics and chemistry has greatly 
improved our ability to be specific. Nevertheless, modern science developed 
directly from these few simple concepts, particularly of the concept of 
identity. The scientific terms of Aristotle continue to serve the sciences well 
and continue to be discussed routinely in both the theory and in practice of 
modern science.


If Western science did not develop from these Aristotelian concepts, what 
concepts did modern science develop from?


Your focus on motion, as an example, is, in my opinion, ill-advised for your 
thesis. The philosophy of physics continues to churn, century after century, it 
remains unsettled today. Personally, I smile a wide grin whenever a physicist 
announces once again that the foundations of physics must be revised. As one of 
my friends loves to say, physics is the only metaphysics we (“modern science”) 
have. The other sciences, intimately associated with the logic of calculus, 
thrive on the correspondence between observations and predictions.


Is it possible, James, that your training has embedded your thinking so deeply 
in the logic of language that the historical role of the logic of calculus in 
the development of science is submerged in your writings?




Two ideas are at issue:

The first is your most recent post on the role of the term, “properties.”
“There ARE NO properties of things unmediated by biology and culture.” The 
concept of properties is, of course, the bedrock of predicate logic and the 
grammar of physics. If you deny the existence of properties in your ontology, 
your metaphysics becomes much clearer.



Secondly, the notion of the term, “ostensive””.  What is it?
The Latin roots suggests the meaning

 “stretch out to view”,

 that is, demonstrable. In particular, are you using this term as if it is 
unrelated to the concept extension that merely stretches a concept out?  




Your defense of the fertility of Western intellectual history of periods 
between Aquinas and Newton are important in understanding how our world views 
of today are rooted in the deep sense of community that developed during that 
historic timeframe.


 I would add that the idea of a “University”, which developed more or less “ad 
hoc” from the Paris model, as place to transmit, reflect and create values 
should be acknowledged. 


The separation of the triverum from the quadriverum was a profound step in the 
history of thought as it separated the role of language (rhetoric, grammar and 
logic) from the logic of the calculus. James Hannam, as I noted above, appears 
to devalue this separation.  It is important to keep in mind that the ancient 
Summerians (3 rd millenium BC) concept of informational symbols completely 
lacked this ability to separate concepts in this manner.


I believe that this separation was critical to the development of our view of 
mind (the Modistae of the 1300’s), the development of signs (John of Poinsot) 
and most especially the continual development of explication via the technics 
of disputation. I might also add that the conceptualization of 
“Syncategorimaticism” by Peter of Spain became the foundation for extending 
mathematical logic in the 19th Century (by C S Peirce).   Of course, this is a 
further example of the role of Aristotle’s notion of “relational” categories.


Cheers to All