Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
Another vapid criticism with no argument. Give me an idea, Jerry, give me an idea. You obviously think I don't have it, so it would be rude of you to just say this sort of thing and refrain. List some things that are involved with metaphysics that I have missed. Otherwise I will have to assume that you cannot do this. John At 05:27 AM 2013/05/27, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >On May 26, 2013, at 10:46 AM, John Collier wrote: > >>I don't have much idea. > > >I concur. > >Jerry -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
On May 26, 2013, at 10:46 AM, John Collier wrote: > I don't have much idea. I concur. Jerry___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics. Bit from It
Dear Folks, Julian Barbour wrote a paper entitled "Bit from It" for the 2011 FQXi Essay Contest, readily accessible on-line at Bit from It - FQXi. It won only 4th prize, but it shows pretty clearly that the It-from-Bit position mistakes abstraction for reality. As Barbour puts it, just because we can observe dots on a screen in a carefully prepared experiment is no proof that at root the world consists (or is constituted by) immaterial single-digit information. Barbour errs, however, in drawing the conclusion that continuity is an illusion and that nature is fundamentally digital. Reality can only be, in my logic, continuous and discontinuous. It is this "fact" that supports the proper meaning of John Collier's metaphysics that every /thing/ must go. Every /thing/ in the bad old sense must go, but not things as properties and relations, which go "all the way down". I would really hope that all of you read this short article and that we return to the discussion subsequently. Note that the subject of this year's Contest is It from Bit or Bit from It . . . Best, Joseph - Original Message - From: Bob Logan To: Bruno Marchal ; fis ; John Collier Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2013 6:17 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics Bruno - An interesting definition of God, omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. And equally mysterious. Turing emulable and Robinson Arithmetic. How does one derive an understanding of the real world (the acoustic world) from axioms. The scientific method of observation, generalization, hypothesis building and testing seems something worth emulating. Let's call it science method emulable. You cannot derive science from math or logic and prove anything with math or science about the real world. And I can prove it if you accept Popper's axiom that for a proposition to be scientific it has to be falsifiable. Well if you prove anything is true then it cannot be falsified and hence is not a scientific proposition. I think the trouble with your fallacy, Bruno, is that it is wrong (this is a Marshall McLuhan gag that he used all the time and made famous in his cameo appearance in Annie Hall.) Bruno, do not take this playful approach to your post as a personal attack. I am just playing with the ideas you put out there for our enlightenment. And as McLuhan said, if you don't like these ideas I have others. With kind regards and thanks for your stimulating post - Bob On 2013-05-26, at 11:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Jerry, On 26 May 2013, at 16:58, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: John: I have followed your writings for many years - perhaps more than two decades now. Frankly, from the perspective of a hardcore realist, I find much of your written work to be highly metaphysical in nature, including the sentences which I cited in the post of May 17, 2013. Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted that you can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition of metaphysics. In fact, the traditional usage of the term "metaphysics" is not narrowly restricted. On numerous occasions, you assert your views as a MIT trained physicist. Yet in this immediate exchange, the responsibility for the assertions are attributed to others. Puzzling. Have you every given any serious metaphysical thought to the scientific meaning of the phrase "it from bit"? Perhaps the dichotomy of your perspectives is amply illustrated by the title of your book: "Every Thing Must Go" This title itself is a simple logical assertion. It expresses logical necessity. If this assertion is true, what would remain? Life? Matter? Mentation? John Collier? MIT style physics? Mathematics? Philosophy of science? Metaphysics? Nothing? This title alone expresses a deep and profound metaphysical perspective. At heart, I am a simple man, in love with nature, logic and mathematics. From my perspective, your voluminous metaphysical writings tend to be contrary to my experience of nature, logic and mathematics. "It from bit"? Really? My question of May 17, 2013 remains open: How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective from witchcraft or magic? Cheers If we assume that there is a level of description such that we are Turing emulable, then ontologically everything can go except some term of a first order Turing universal theory. I use Robinson Arithmetic to fix the things. Then nothing does go, as it can be shown how the appearances of the physical laws can be explained in that theory (with computationalism at the metalevel, or not). This leads to a derivation of physics from the additive and multiplicative theory of numbers, making the theory testable (comp + classical theory of knowledge). Then
Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
Bruno - An interesting definition of God, omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. And equally mysterious. Turing emulable and Robinson Arithmetic. How does one derive an understanding of the real world (the acoustic world) from axioms. The scientific method of observation, generalization, hypothesis building and testing seems something worth emulating. Let's call it science method emulable. You cannot derive science from math or logic and prove anything with math or science about the real world. And I can prove it if you accept Popper's axiom that for a proposition to be scientific it has to be falsifiable. Well if you prove anything is true then it cannot be falsified and hence is not a scientific proposition. I think the trouble with your fallacy, Bruno, is that it is wrong (this is a Marshall McLuhan gag that he used all the time and made famous in his cameo appearance in Annie Hall.) Bruno, do not take this playful approach to your post as a personal attack. I am just playing with the ideas you put out there for our enlightenment. And as McLuhan said, if you don't like these ideas I have others. With kind regards and thanks for your stimulating post - Bob On 2013-05-26, at 11:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Jerry, > > On 26 May 2013, at 16:58, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > >> John: >> >> I have followed your writings for many years - perhaps more than two decades >> now. >> >> Frankly, from the perspective of a hardcore realist, I find much of your >> written work to be highly metaphysical in nature, including the sentences >> which I cited in the post of May 17, 2013. >> >> Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted that >> you can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition of >> metaphysics. In fact, the traditional usage of the term "metaphysics" is >> not narrowly restricted. >> >> On numerous occasions, you assert your views as a MIT trained physicist. Yet >> in this immediate exchange, the responsibility for the assertions are >> attributed to others. Puzzling. >> >> Have you every given any serious metaphysical thought to the scientific >> meaning of the phrase "it from bit"? >> >> Perhaps the dichotomy of your perspectives is amply illustrated by the title >> of your book: >> >> "Every Thing Must Go" >> >> This title itself is a simple logical assertion. It expresses logical >> necessity. >> >> If this assertion is true, what would remain? >> >> Life? >> Matter? >> Mentation? >> John Collier? >> MIT style physics? >> Mathematics? >> Philosophy of science? >> Metaphysics? >> Nothing? >> >> This title alone expresses a deep and profound metaphysical perspective. >> >> At heart, I am a simple man, in love with nature, logic and mathematics. >> From my perspective, your voluminous metaphysical writings tend to be >> contrary to my experience of nature, logic and mathematics. >> >> "It from bit"? Really? >> >> My question of May 17, 2013 remains open: >> >>> How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective from >>> witchcraft or magic? >> >> >> Cheers >> > > If we assume that there is a level of description such that we are Turing > emulable, then ontologically everything can go except some term of a first > order Turing universal theory. I use Robinson Arithmetic to fix the things. > > Then nothing does go, as it can be shown how the appearances of the physical > laws can be explained in that theory (with computationalism at the metalevel, > or not). This leads to a derivation of physics from the additive and > multiplicative theory of numbers, making the theory testable (comp + > classical theory of knowledge). Then, thanks to Gödel, Löb and Solovay makes > it possible to distinguish what is true for the subject and what the subject > can justify. > > It saves us form reductionism, as it shows that the universal machines can > defeat all complete theory about them. It shows that numberland is already > full of life, and where the information fluxes are born. Eventually it makes > us more ignorant, as the "arithmetical truth is big and beyond the > computable. And the computable lives there, surrounded by the non computable. > > Information is a key notion, but, imo, not as fundamental than the universal > machine, or the universal number, which can interpret that information, and > react to it: not always in a predictible way, though. Another key is the > distinction between first person and third person views, singular and plural. > A simple notion of first person indeterminacy explains why the psycho-brain > identity can't work, and suggest precise formulation of the mind-body problem. > > This approach generalizes to arithmetic what Everett did for quantum > mechanics. It shows that Church thesis rehabilates a Pythagorean form of > Neoplatonism. It is counter-intuitive, but it explains why. > > It from bit? Yes. Even already some shadows of t
Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
Jerry, On 26 May 2013, at 16:58, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: John: I have followed your writings for many years - perhaps more than two decades now. Frankly, from the perspective of a hardcore realist, I find much of your written work to be highly metaphysical in nature, including the sentences which I cited in the post of May 17, 2013. Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted that you can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition of metaphysics. In fact, the traditional usage of the term "metaphysics" is not narrowly restricted. On numerous occasions, you assert your views as a MIT trained physicist. Yet in this immediate exchange, the responsibility for the assertions are attributed to others. Puzzling. Have you every given any serious metaphysical thought to the scientific meaning of the phrase "it from bit"? Perhaps the dichotomy of your perspectives is amply illustrated by the title of your book: "Every Thing Must Go" This title itself is a simple logical assertion. It expresses logical necessity. If this assertion is true, what would remain? Life? Matter? Mentation? John Collier? MIT style physics? Mathematics? Philosophy of science? Metaphysics? Nothing? This title alone expresses a deep and profound metaphysical perspective. At heart, I am a simple man, in love with nature, logic and mathematics. From my perspective, your voluminous metaphysical writings tend to be contrary to my experience of nature, logic and mathematics. "It from bit"? Really? My question of May 17, 2013 remains open: How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective from witchcraft or magic? Cheers If we assume that there is a level of description such that we are Turing emulable, then ontologically everything can go except some term of a first order Turing universal theory. I use Robinson Arithmetic to fix the things. Then nothing does go, as it can be shown how the appearances of the physical laws can be explained in that theory (with computationalism at the metalevel, or not). This leads to a derivation of physics from the additive and multiplicative theory of numbers, making the theory testable (comp + classical theory of knowledge). Then, thanks to Gödel, Löb and Solovay makes it possible to distinguish what is true for the subject and what the subject can justify. It saves us form reductionism, as it shows that the universal machines can defeat all complete theory about them. It shows that numberland is already full of life, and where the information fluxes are born. Eventually it makes us more ignorant, as the "arithmetical truth is big and beyond the computable. And the computable lives there, surrounded by the non computable. Information is a key notion, but, imo, not as fundamental than the universal machine, or the universal number, which can interpret that information, and react to it: not always in a predictible way, though. Another key is the distinction between first person and third person views, singular and plural. A simple notion of first person indeterminacy explains why the psycho-brain identity can't work, and suggest precise formulation of the mind-body problem. This approach generalizes to arithmetic what Everett did for quantum mechanics. It shows that Church thesis rehabilates a Pythagorean form of Neoplatonism. It is counter-intuitive, but it explains why. It from bit? Yes. Even already some shadows of the qubit can be explained from bit. (See my URL for papers and references which explains all this in details, ... sometimes in French). I might be with John on this, perhaps. If we are Turing emulable, everything emerges in a precise and informative way from "2+2=4". So we can test if we are Turing emulable, and computationalism is made scientific, not philosophical. The few tests already done fit well with the quantum reality up to now. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Jerry On May 23, 2013, at 2:45 AM, John Collier wrote: Jerry, I don’t think I have a metaphysical position on information. I was classifying the way that active scientists use the concept (or concepts). I really don’t know what you are talking about. If you want to know the empirical basis for the uses of information I suggest you read the original authors I refer to. I use the concept as it has been introduced by others. Some concept I don’t find useful, so I ignore them, but all of the use of information I have made over the years has been in the context of its use in scientific theories. So I really don’t see what your concern about metaphysics is. I don’t think the issue is very important, if there is one. We detect information, we interpret it, we process it, we hypothesize it and its properties in order to explain our observations. It doesn’t seem much different from energy that way,
Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
John: On May 26, 2013, at 10:26 AM, John Collier wrote: >> Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted that >> you can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition of >> metaphysics. In fact, the traditional usage of the term "metaphysics" is >> not narrowly restricted. > > Metaphysics has to do with two things, ontology and necessity Your response amply demonstrates my point. Cheers Jerry ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
John: I have followed your writings for many years - perhaps more than two decades now. Frankly, from the perspective of a hardcore realist, I find much of your written work to be highly metaphysical in nature, including the sentences which I cited in the post of May 17, 2013. Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted that you can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition of metaphysics. In fact, the traditional usage of the term "metaphysics" is not narrowly restricted. On numerous occasions, you assert your views as a MIT trained physicist. Yet in this immediate exchange, the responsibility for the assertions are attributed to others. Puzzling. Have you every given any serious metaphysical thought to the scientific meaning of the phrase "it from bit"? Perhaps the dichotomy of your perspectives is amply illustrated by the title of your book: "Every Thing Must Go" This title itself is a simple logical assertion. It expresses logical necessity. If this assertion is true, what would remain? Life? Matter? Mentation? John Collier? MIT style physics? Mathematics? Philosophy of science? Metaphysics? Nothing? This title alone expresses a deep and profound metaphysical perspective. At heart, I am a simple man, in love with nature, logic and mathematics. From my perspective, your voluminous metaphysical writings tend to be contrary to my experience of nature, logic and mathematics. "It from bit"? Really? My question of May 17, 2013 remains open: > How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective from > witchcraft or magic? Cheers Jerry On May 23, 2013, at 2:45 AM, John Collier wrote: > Jerry, I don’t think I have a metaphysical position on information. I was > classifying the way that active scientists use the concept (or concepts). I > really don’t know what you are talking about. If you want to know the > empirical basis for the uses of information I suggest you read the original > authors I refer to. I use the concept as it has been introduced by others. > Some concept I don’t find useful, so I ignore them, but all of the use of > information I have made over the years has been in the context of its use in > scientific theories. So I really don’t see what your concern about > metaphysics is. I don’t think the issue is very important, if there is one. > We detect information, we interpret it, we process it, we hypothesize it and > its properties in order to explain our observations. It doesn’t seem much > different from energy that way, at least to me. I am not even really clear as > to what having a metaphysical position on information would be. I suppose > that there are several: it is a “stuff”, it is an illusion, it is constructed > by us, and so on. I don’t really see much advantage in pursuing these issues, > and they have been applied in the past to energy without any gain in > understanding. > > The part you pasted you can find the basis of in work by David Layzer as the > earliest. Negative entropy was introduced by Schroedinger in the context of > explaining how living systems reproduce and maintain themselves, and related > explicitly to information in by Leon Brillouin in his studies of measurement. > Wheeler introduced the it-from-bit view, and it has been used to study black > holes and to explain why they don’t destroy order in the universe (See Leon > Smolin, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity). Scientific sources relating > information, order and entropy are too numerous to list, but they have been > sued to explain how order and disorder can increase together in the universe. > I don’t see anything especially metaphysical in any of this work. > > In general, as in the book I participated in, Every Thing Must Go, I prefer a > minimalist metaphyiscs that only commits to the kinds of things that are > required by our best science. I am not prepared to say to a scientist, “You > can’t use that concept; it violates my metaphysical preconceptions.” I don’t > really have metaphysical preconceptions except that I believe that there are > things in the world that we didn’t make or construct, and that we can have > fallible knowledge of them using fallible methodology, and that our best > guide to what there is is scientific investigation (pretty much like Peirce, > or more recently Sellars, or my sometime coauther C.A. Hooker, or the other > authors on the book I just mentioned). > > And that is why I didn’t understand what you were asking when you asked about > metaphysics, especially given your quoted section. > > John > > > From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] > Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2013 11:10 PM > To: fis@listas.unizar.es > Cc: John Collier > Subject: Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 571, Issue 5 > > John: > > Which does "this" refer to, Jerry? > > My response was to the section of your post that I pasted / cited
