A number of commentators, including the philosopher-logician G.
Spencer Brown and the anthropologist-systems theorist Gregory Bateson,
reframed variants of the Liar’s paradox as it might apply to real world
phenomena. Instead of being stymied by the undecidability of the logic or
the semantic
Dear Folks
I realize in replying to this I surely reach the end of possible comments that
I can make for a week. But nevertheless …
I want to comment on Terrence Deacon’s remarks below and also on Professor
Johnstone’s remark from another email:
"This may look like a silly peculiarity of spoken
Dear Alex,
I have considerable sympathy with the phenomenological backbone of your
argument. I would caution, however, about relying on quantum theory (a la
Planck) as a literal support of it.
I was trained as an engineer to place great emphasis on dimensional
considerations, specifically on the
Hi Alex,
On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:
RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
something material.
ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at
least
Unless I am misunderstanding Nagarjuna, he uses a form of reductionism to show
how all metaphysical positions are untenable. To illustrate this point in
further detail, I will provide the rest of my section on his thinking from my
manuscript on silence:
Following the implications of the middle
On 02 May 2016, at 03:38, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone wrote:
To all concerned colleagues,
I appreciate the fact that discussions should be conversations about
issues,
but this particular issue and in particular the critique cited in my
posting
warrant extended exposition in order to show the
Dear Steve,
What you have written is so supreme and beautiful!
Might I suggest a Deed-Poll application to
Un-Bind-a-man?
After reading your comments, I had to take time out and simply sit in
"Silence", and let my mind be filled with the 'energy' with which your
words had both filled it and
RE Bruno Marchal: Gödel's theorem implies that machines which are looking
at themselves (in a precise technical sense) develop a series of distinct
phenomenologies (arguably corresponding to justifiable, knowable,
observable, sensible).
ME: I find this a fascinating observation in that you are
Dear Bruno,
You have brought up a vitally important question.
Thank you so very much.
Best wishes
Alex
RE Bruno: How could the quantum correlations existence be definite if
nothing is objective?
ME: It does not really matter what the nature of the reality is, either
strongly objective (denied
RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
something material.
ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at least
one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave
It is good to note that Reductionism is not appropriate,
not in this particular context, maybe not in any context.
Most of the oriental philosophers were not aware of any
reductionist approach, since their teachers were purely
concerned with integrated and holistic approaches to
understanding and
Many thanks for your comments, Lou and Bruno. I read and pondered,
and finally concluded that the paths taken by each of you exceed
my competencies. I subsequently sent your comments to Professor
Johnstone—-I trust this is acceptable—asking him if he would care to
respond with a brief sketch of
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