[Fis] _ Re: : Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[steven bindeman]

I want to thank Alex for his insightful comments and questions regarding my 
contribution concerning the nature of the self, with regards  to  Nagarjuna’s 
reductionism. I even like Alex's pun on my name, since there is something 
unbinding and liberating about Nagarjuna’s ruthless undermining of all forms of 
metaphysical certainty. I also like his reference to Thomas Traherne’s 
wonderful poem My Spirit, especially the line That Being Greatest which doth 
Nothing Seem!  Alex argues that Traherne  is suggesting that being surrounded 
and within the 'strange extended orb of joy' is a necessary precondition for 
our experience of apparent individuality within the world of phenomenological 
experience. I would agree with this idea, especially within the context of 
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. It requires the bracketing off,  or the 
withholding of judgment, regarding our examination of the natural world, 
replacing it with analysis of our experience  of it instead. The eidetic 
reduction, in turn, focuses on the nature of  mental objects, with the 
intention of removing what is perceived, and leaving only what is required in 
its place.  (The notion of individuality would indeed be an example of such a 
mental object.) For Nagarjuna, it is not merely sentient beings that are 
"selfless" or non-substantial, however; all phenomena are without any inherent 
existence and thus without any underlying essence. They are thus empty of being 
independently existent.  While Nagarjuna does indeed seem to be trying to show 
us how to silence our intellects, Husserl seems to be trying to silence our 
naive belief in the authority of  isolated empirical evidence. We are thus 
mistaken when we uncritically accept the necessary implications of denotative 
experience without  further consideration of connotative experience as well. 
Denotation has limits while connotation does not.

Steve Bindeman


On May 2, 2016, at 3:01 PM, Alex Hankey  wrote:

> Dear Steve, 
> 
> What you have written is so supreme and beautiful! 
> Might I suggest a Deed-Poll application to 
> Un-Bind-a-man?
> 
> After reading your comments, I had to take time out and simply sit in 
> "Silence", and let my mind be filled with the 'energy' with which your words 
> had both filled it and emptied it. 
> 
> And currently being with Indian friends in San Jose, I did so in front of the 
> apartment sacred space, which is adorned with a Buddha, a Radha-Krishna, a 
> Ganesha, the family Guru and other such pictures. 
> 
> As regards this discussion of phenomenology, it seems to me that your 
> marvellous contribution stands both inside phenomenological experience AND 
> beyond it, and what takes human awareness to those more permanent states of 
> Being.
> 
> May I request Maxine who seems to me more experienced in technical 
> phenomenological analysis of language and expression than any of us to see 
> how well Steve's contribution conforms to Husserlian requirements to be 
> considered a valid expression within the boundaries / limitations of 
> phenomenology? I myself certainly do not feel adequately empowered to do so 
> in such company as Pedro and his Fis have arranged for us. 
> 
> Further: 
> 
> RE: ... silence becomes a conduit to enlightenment. One recognizes that the 
> use of concepts, and the use of reason to work with concepts and to help 
> distinguish between true and false views, and the very idea of having views 
> in the first place, are all highly problematic in the sense that they are but 
> imperfect manifestations of true reality.  
> 
> ME: Amen - Omayne - Om / Aum 
> Is not the Role of Zen to silence the intellect so that the person becomes 
> open to Sartori?
> 
> May I add the following: one of the most wonderful statements of realization 
> in the English language can be found in the work of the 17th century poet and 
> essayist, Thomas Traherne, in his poem, My Spirit, which I append in full 
> below. 
> 
> Note particularly the following sequence from successive stanzas: I have put 
> in bold those from stanzas 5 & 6 to emphasize that for me these statements 
> constitute the heart of the poem, and that I equate them with the position of 
> Advaita Vedanta - though Steve is more than welcome to state how he relates 
> them, and any other part of the poem, to the position of Nagarjuna (or not 
> so?). 
> 
> Again, I regard these statements as the culmination of phenomenological 
> experience, and in that sense of the 'phenomenology of life'. In one of his 
> early books, Deepak Chopra quipped that life is not a material process with 
> an occasional spiritual experience, but rather a spiritual process with an 
> occasional spiritual experience. 
> 
> Excerpts from 'My Spirit' by Thomas Traherne. Full poem below the quoted 
> sections. 
> 
> 1.  My Naked Simple Life was I
> 
>   That Act so strongly shined
> 
>  Upon the Earth, the Sea, the Sky,
> 
>  It was the substance of my mind,

[Fis] Fwd: _ Re: _ Gödel discussion

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Fis Colleagues,

I received this comment on Lucas's argument that seems to me short and
sweet,
so I am posting it for our general edification.

Best wishes,

Alex

-- Forwarded message --

“Proving” that we are not machines is somewhat quixotic from my point of
view, in that it should be obvious that we are not machines!

But so many people imagine that we could be nothing more than mechanisms
that the Lucas-Godelian argument is helpful.

But let us look at this argument. We start by assuming that I am a
consistent Turing machine (CTM) (consistency being needed to apply Godel’s
Theorem.)

If I am a CTM, then I can be completely specified by at text T which I put
out on the table here in front of me.

And I then apply the Godel argument to T, producing a Theorem G that T
cannot prove, but that I can prove.

But I am identical with T. SO this is a contradiction.
We have contradicted that I am a CTM.
Therefore I am not a CTM.

I cannot be a Consistent Turing Machine.
If I am consistent then I am not a Turing machine.
Otherwise I might be an inconsistent Turing machine.

The argument shows that I must be consistent in order to conclude that I am
not a Turing machine.

I believe that I am consistent.
I conclude that I am not a consistent Turing machine.
And being consistent, I am not an inconsistent Turing machine.

Therefore, I am not a Turing machine.

(P.S. Another champion of the Lucas viewpoint is Roger Penrose in his books
“The Emperor’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind”.)

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy

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