Re: [Fis] A Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Mar 2018, at 07:48, Alex Hankey  wrote:
> 
> Current Information Science, particularly that purveyed by Fis, 
> is far too poverty stricken to tackle this problem Xueshan. 
> 
> Metaphor is a rich purveyor of meaning utlised by human consciousness, 
> even in the earliest epics written by mankind, like the Valmiki Ramayana, 
> simply because human awareness adopts 'forms' as its mode of information 
> content, and not digits. 

I agree with this.




> 
> The way that forms are encoded in experience is now well understood. 

OK. But using the digital mechanist hypothesis, it is amenable to mathematical 
precision, and so we can progress, and benefits of tuns of results in 
theoretical computer science and mathematical logic.





> A proof has even been given that 'ideas' and not 'digits' are the primary 
> content of human awareness. 

Absolutely! Indeed the proof has been given in arithmetic that any universal 
machine “enough rich" see this or get that conclusion.
The rich universal machine can prove its own incompleteness, and its soul 
(identified with the knower(*)) can correctly prove that she is not 
identifiable to any digit nor actually anything third person describable. The 
first person knower is unformalisable, no digits nor any form. Yet, its 
propositional logic is meta-formalisable by the modal logic S4Grz (as explained 
elsewhere).

If you add on the top of this the computationalist hypothesis, in the 
philosophy of mind, or fundamental cognitive science, then it becomes 
testable/refutable as physics should be retrieved by some variants of S4Grz.

The "enough rich”universal machine says already very interesting propositions 
about itself, in different modes, with respect to the inexhaustible and 
undefinable truth. They can already defeat the theories trying to reduce them 
to their form, not to talk about digits. But some can bet on the digits or 
trust the numerical doctors. Eventually the question is “are you ok your sun 
marry a woman who got a digital brain transplant?”.

Some people confuse computable and arithmetic. The computable is only a very 
tiny part of arithmetic, and the semi-computable, where the universal machine 
lives is really in between the computable and the non-computable. Most of the 
theoretical concerns have been about the degrees of unsolvability of the 
arithmetical problems.

Before Gödel, we thought we could secure the use of the infinite with precise 
use of the finite, but after Gödel we know we need already the infinite to 
partially control and understand the finite realm.

Best regards,

Bruno Marchal

(*) Following Theatetus, as incompleteness saves it from Socrates critics.



> 
> 
> 
> Alex Hankey 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 4 March 2018 at 06:47, Xueshan Yan  > wrote:
> Dear Dai, Søren, Karl, Sung, Syed, Stan, Terry, and Loet,
> 
> I am sorry to reply you late, but I have thoroughly read every post about the 
> paradox and they have brought me many inspirations, thank you. Now I offer my 
> responses as follows:
> 
> Dai, metaphor research is an ancient topic in linguistics, which reveals the 
> relationship between tenor and vehicle, ground and figure, target and source 
> based on rhetoric. But where is our information? It looks like Syed given the 
> answer: "Information is the container of meaning." If I understand it right, 
> we may have this conclusion from it: Information is the carrier of meaning. 
> Since we all acknowledge that sign is the carrier of information, the task of 
> our Information Science will immediately become something like an 
> intermediator between Semiotics (study of sign) and Semantics (study of 
> meaning), this is what we absolutely want not to see. For a long time, we 
> have been hoping that the goal of Information Science is so basic that it can 
> explain all information phenomenon in the information age, it just like what 
> Sung expects, which was consisted of axioms, or theorems or principles, so it 
> can end all the debates on information, meaning, data, etc., but according to 
> this view, it is very difficult to complete the missions. Syed, my statement 
> is "A grammatically correct sentence CONTAINS information rather than the 
> sentence itself IS information."
> 
> Søren believes that the solution to this paradox is to establish a new 
> discipline which level is more higher than the level of Information Science 
> as well as Linguistics, such as his Cybersemiotics. I have no right to review 
> your opinion, because I haven't seen your book Cybersemiotics, I don't know 
> its content, same as I don't know what the content of Biosemiotics is, but my 
> view is that Peirce's Semiotics can't dissolve this paradox.
> 
> Karl thought: "Information and meaning appear to be like key and lock." which 
> are two different things. Without one, the existence of another will lose its 
> value, this is a bit like the paradox about hen and egg. I don't 

[Fis] “model” and “mental model”

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear FIS Colleagues,



I agree with Joseph and Pedro that: 

“There are no ideal meta-observers; we are all, to a certain extent, both 
meta-observers of the discussion and participants in it. This is not a simple 
vertical hierarchy. We move between these two roles, switching from actualizing 
one to the other.”



What I think is that from point of view of the observed system, object, event, 
etc., it is better to say “external observer” and “internal observer” in 
corresponded cases just because “this is not a simple vertical hierarchy”.



Now, let me continue with little explanation about “model” and “mental model”.



If one will visit the Wikipedia he/she will find series of examples of concept 
“model” [1].



As Marx Wartofsky remarks [2], the concept "model" has been used for denotation 
of the very large class of phenomena: mechanical, theoretical, linguistic, etc. 
constructions. He gave a good definition of the model relation and in [2] he 
made clear the main characteristics of the models. His definition is as follow: 



“

The model relation is triple M: 

M: (S, x, y) 

where "S" is subject for whom "x" represents "y". 

In other words only in this relation and only for the subject "S" the entity 
"x" is a model of the entity "y".

“



The easy but not serious definition of the “mental model” is to say: “it is a 
model in the subject’s consciousness”. 

Again, in Wikipedia, there are several examples [5]. 

This way is not good because it is very difficult to answer the question: who 
is “the subject” in this case? 



So, we need another definition.



In mathematics, a structure on a set, or more generally a type, consists of 
additional mathematical objects that, in some manner, attach (or relate) to the 
set, making it easier to visualize or work with, or endowing the collection 
with meaning or significance. A partial list of possible structures are 
measures, algebraic structures (groups, fields, etc.), topologies, metric 
structures (geometries), orders, events, equivalence relations, differential 
structures, and categories.



Sometimes, a set is endowed with more than one structure simultaneously; this 
enables mathematicians to study it more richly. For example, an order induces a 
topology. As another example, if a set both has a topology and is a group, and 
the two structures are related in a certain way, the set becomes a topological 
group.



Mappings between sets which preserve structures (so that structures in the 
domain are mapped to equivalent structures in the co-domain) are of special 
interest in many fields of mathematics. Examples are homomorphisms, which 
preserve algebraic structures; homeomorphisms, which preserve topological 
structures; diffeomorphisms, which preserve differential structures; [3], and 
the functors which preserve category structures.



To avoid misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal, human, 
society, humanity, living creatures, etc., in [4] we use the abstract concept 
“INFOS” to denote every of them as well as all of artificial creatures which 
has features similar to the former ones. 



Here we are interested only of three features of Infos: receptors, effectors, 
and memory. Infos has possibility to reflect the reality via receptors and to 
operate with received reflections in its memory. The opposite is possible - via 
effectors Infos has possibility to realize in reality some of its 
(self-)reflections from its consciousness.



If the following diagram exists and if it is commutative, then it represents 
all modeling relations:

- in reality: real models, 

- in consciousness: mental models;

- between reality and consciousness: perceiving data and creating mental models.

It is easy to imagine the case when the Infos realizes its reflections using 
its effectors, i.e. relation between consciousness and reality: realizing 
mental models and creating data. In this case the receptors’ arrows should be 
replaces by opposite effectors’ arrows.





In mathematical terms in diagram above:

― Source “s” and Recipient “r” are structured sets;

― Infos is an intelligent system;

― “e” is a mapping from s in r which preserves (all or partial) structures;

― mental source “si” and mental recipient “ri” are structured sets;

― “ei” is a mapping from si in ri which preserves (all or partial) structures.



Finally, the task of the external observer is to create the diagram above by 
using some experimental data and staying outside the system (consciousness) - 
above the dotted line. 

Respectively, the internal observer does the opposite. The task of the internal 
observer is to create the diagram above by using some (experimental) data and 
staying inside the system (consciousness) – below the dotted line.



Friendly greetings

Krassimir



[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model

[2] M.W.Wartofsky. Models. Representation and the Scientific Understanding. 
D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht: Holland /Boston: USA, London: 

Re: [Fis] A Paradox

[Francesco Rizzo]

Cari Alex e Bruno, nonché Tutti,
ho pensato di fornirVi la traduzione in inglese del messaggio inviato 12
ore fa. Pur correndo il rischio di una infedele traduzione, desidero in tal
modo dirVi che quel che avete scritto dopo è compreso nel mio medesimo
messaggio.
Ancora auguri.
Francesco

Dear everyone, let me tell you some things: * IN-FORM-ACTION is a process
through which they take shape: people, animals, plants, ideas, things, etc.
* Information is preceded by signification and followed by communication; *
it is possible to classify four types of information: natural or
thermodynamics, genetics, mathematics and semantics; * one thing is the
concept-meaning of information, another thing is the MEASURE of information
that, following the "Science of Hegel's logic, can be quantitative,
qualitative and quantitative-qualitative or qualitative-quantitative; *
TRANSDUCTION is the transformation of a physical quantity, e.g. acoustic,
in another, e.g. electric, preserving the signal waveform: - in the
biological field it is the transfer of a hereditary character from one
bacterial cell to another without contact between the two particles; - in
the economic field it can coincide with the transmutation of liquidity -
the most important property of the currency - from a good-capital (which
loses value) to another an asset-capital (which gains value) by checking
the passage of a FORM D MONETARY WAVE which is conserved by enriching some
and impoverishing others, a sort of wealth effect or effect poverty; * in
my "New economy" I have defined financial entropy (monetary liquidity moves
from a low-value asset-capital to a good-value asset) and financial
neg-entropy (monetary liquidity moves from a high-value asset-capital to a
low-value asset-capital). This last point deserves a more complete and
mathematical exposure that is found in many of my books. Once again I beg
you to apologize for the use of the Italian language and I send you an
affectionate greeting. Really!
Francesco

2018-03-05 16:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 5 Mar 2018, at 07:48, Alex Hankey  wrote:
>
> Current Information Science, particularly that purveyed by Fis,
> is far too poverty stricken to tackle this problem Xueshan.
>
> Metaphor is a rich purveyor of meaning utlised by human consciousness,
> even in the earliest epics written by mankind, like the Valmiki Ramayana,
> simply because human awareness adopts 'forms' as its mode of information
> content, and not digits.
>
>
> I agree with this.
>
>
>
>
>
> The way that forms are encoded in experience is now well understood.
>
>
> OK. But using the digital mechanist hypothesis, it is amenable to
> mathematical precision, and so we can progress, and benefits of tuns of
> results in theoretical computer science and mathematical logic.
>
>
>
>
>
> A proof has even been given that 'ideas' and not 'digits' are the primary
> content of human awareness.
>
>
> Absolutely! Indeed the proof has been given in arithmetic that any
> universal machine “enough rich" see this or get that conclusion.
> The rich universal machine can prove its own incompleteness, and its soul
> (identified with the knower(*)) can correctly prove that she is not
> identifiable to any digit nor actually anything third person describable.
> The first person knower is unformalisable, no digits nor any form. Yet, its
> propositional logic is meta-formalisable by the modal logic S4Grz (as
> explained elsewhere).
>
> If you add on the top of this the computationalist hypothesis, in the
> philosophy of mind, or fundamental cognitive science, then it becomes
> testable/refutable as physics should be retrieved by some variants of S4Grz.
>
> The "enough rich”universal machine says already very interesting
> propositions about itself, in different modes, with respect to the
> inexhaustible and undefinable truth. They can already defeat the theories
> trying to reduce them to their form, not to talk about digits. But some can
> bet on the digits or trust the numerical doctors. Eventually the question
> is “are you ok your sun marry a woman who got a digital brain transplant?”.
>
> Some people confuse computable and arithmetic. The computable is only a
> very tiny part of arithmetic, and the semi-computable, where the universal
> machine lives is really in between the computable and the non-computable.
> Most of the theoretical concerns have been about the degrees of
> unsolvability of the arithmetical problems.
>
> Before Gödel, we thought we could secure the use of the infinite with
> precise use of the finite, but after Gödel we know we need already the
> infinite to partially control and understand the finite realm.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Bruno Marchal
>
> (*) Following Theatetus, as incompleteness saves it from Socrates critics.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Alex Hankey
>
>
>
>
> On 4 March 2018 at 06:47, Xueshan Yan  wrote:
>
>> Dear Dai, Søren, Karl, Sung, Syed, Stan, Terry, and Loet,
>>
>> I