Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-17 Thread Krassimir Markov
Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish it in 
IJ ITA.
It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on 
Is information physical?
was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and to come 
to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.


For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos 
consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the 
relationships “between” and/or “in” real (physical) entities as well as 
“between” and/or “in” mental (physical) entities.

I.e. “physical” include “mental” include “structural”.

Finally, IF  “information is physical, structural and mental” THEN simply the  
“information is physical”!

Friendly greetings
Krassimir





From: Burgin, Mark 
Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es 
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

   Dear FISers,
   It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and 
creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many 
interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I would 
like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our intrinsic and 
often tacit assumptions.

   To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is information 
physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical means 
the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, the substance 
of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the 
way, expression “quantum information” is only the way of expressing that the 
carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar 
to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only forms 
or number representations and not numbers themselves.
 
  If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first, to 
answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers assume that 
information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our discussions. 
However, some people think differently (cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004) 
Information studies without information).

   Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely, to 
admit that information is physical because only physical things exist.
   If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we have 
three options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental  

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises three 
worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of structures, we 
have seven options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural  
- information is both physical and mental  
- information is both physical and structural  
- information is both structural and mental  
- information is physical, structural and mental  
  
The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to avoid 
unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information (in a 
general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical world, it is 
called energy, in the mental world, it is called mental energy, and in the 
world of structures, it is called information (in the strict sense). This 
conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of Mark Johnson that information 
is both physical and not physical only the general theory of information makes 
this idea more exact and testable.
   In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the strict 
sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations and carriers. 
Note that any representation of information is its carrier but not each carrier 
of information is its representation. For instance, an envelope with a letter 
is a carrier of information in this letter but it is not its representation.
   Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of information by the name 
energy - physical energy, mental energy and structural energy.
   
   Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this discussion, may be 
Krassimir will continue his excellent initiative combining the most interesting 
contributions into a paper with the title
  Is 
information physical?
   and publish it in his esteemed Journal.
   
   Sincerely,
   Mark Burgin


On 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:

  Dear Arturo,  


  There were some reports in clinical psychology, 

Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

2018-05-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Dear Arturo,


> On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
> 
> Daer Bruno, 
> 
> first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for a 
> mistake, I did not add the FIS list in the CC. 
> 
> 
> 
> Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic,
> 
I agree it is faith, but it is less faith than any scientists. Especially that 
we need only a tiny part of the arithmetical truth. 

Did you have heard about someone taking back his/her children from primary 
school when they are taught the laws of addition and multiplication, by 
claiming they have not that faith?



> this appraoch... simply does not work for the description of physical and 
> biological issues. 
> 
The approach just study the necessary logical consequence of assuming our 
bodies to be digitalisable.  I predicted all the quantum weirdness from this 45 
years ago. But then it took me 30 years to get precise mathematical 
predictions, which until now fits with the fact, when physicalism needs a 
brain-mind identity thesis which has been shown inconsistent. 
I am not sure why you say that Mechanism cannot work for physical and 
biological issues. You might confuse the computable (like automata), and the 
semi-computable (like the universal Turing machine).




> It is just in our mind.  See: 
> 
> http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132 
> 

What do you mean by “real world”?
I agree Euclid geometry is in our head. The whole physical reality is indeed 
shown to be “in the head” of *any* universal machine or universal number, etc.


> 
> I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of course, the 
> work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is exactly like 
> Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, without any 
> possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics to the whole 
> macroscopic world. 
> 
> 

For a logician; Everett is the Herbrand model of the Schroedinger equation, 
that is QM without the unintelligible “collapse” of the wave. Put simply: the 
“many-world” is just literal quantum mechanics without collapse.
Everett did not propose a new speculative theory: he just showed that we don’t 
need the collapse axiom, as QM + mechanism recovers it phenomenologically. Then 
my work shows this can work only if we recover also the wave itself from 
arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).

It is the collapse which is bad and unclear, and not needed, untestable, 
assumption. 


> When you state that:
> 
>> "the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing 
>> machine) and the physical is the border of the universal mind viewed from 
>> inside that universal mind".
> you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not understand 
> your emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, reduction, and 
> so on), needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the gold standard. 
> 
> 

What I did has been peer reviewed and verified by many people. Have you read my 
papers?
Did you find a problem, or are you just criticising the assumption/theory? Ask 
specific question, but normally all this has been clearly proofed. 


> A suggestion: you cold try to correlate your "physical border of the 
> Universal mind viewed from inside that universal mind" with the holographic 
> principle and the cosmic horizon. 
> 
I prefer to invoke the physical reality only for the testing. There is some 
possible analogy here, which might be interesting, but Mechanism is an 
hypothesis in psychology, or theology, not in physics, which needs to be 
entirely recovered from arithmetic (or Turing equivalent). For this type of 
Mechanist (Neo)platonism: looking at the physical universe is … cheating. 
(Somehow).



> But in order to do that, you need a strong math, not to quote old 
> philosophers that,
> 

I have decided to study Mathematics for just that. My thesis is a PhD in 
mathematics and theoretical computer science. All what I say has been 
translated entirely in arithmetic, by using Gödel’s technic of arithmetisation 
of metamathematics. I got testable quantitative result which have been tested. 
I am not sure you have study my work, which is usually criticised for being … 
mathematics.


> for a simple matter of luck, were able to inconsciously predict some recent 
> developments of the modern science.
> 
? I predicted the non-cloning theorem 30 years before the physicist get it, and 
much more. 

Please study my papers before judging(*)



>   I like logic, I love logic, I read logic, I study logic, I read a lot of 
> the latin texts of the old philosophers that use it (in the Medioeval ones), 
> but I have to confess that the scientific value of logic is close to zero.  
> Both of the ancient and of the "novel" logics.
> 
> 

The logicians are the one who discovered the universal machine (computer), 
before it was build. You are using one just now. You seem to ignore Gödel’s 
contribution, which in my opinion is, when we 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-17 Thread Søren Brier
Dear Mark

Using 'physical' this way it just tends to mean 'real', but that raises the 
problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel's theorem or mathematics 
and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and self-awareness, 
qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot 
feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write 
and your behavior. And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we 
touch phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and 
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs in cognition 
and communication). We have problems encompassing these aspects in the natural, 
the quantitative and the technical sciences that makes up the foundation of 
most conceptions of information science.

  Best
  Søren

Fra: Fis  På vegne af Krassimir Markov
Sendt: 17. maj 2018 11:33
Til: fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark 
Emne: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish it in 
IJ ITA.
It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on
Is information physical?
was more-less chaotic - we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and to come 
to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark's letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.


For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos 
consciousness. I.e. "physical" include "mental".

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the 
relationships "between" and/or "in" real (physical) entities as well as 
"between" and/or "in" mental (physical) entities.

I.e. "physical" include "mental" include "structural".

Finally, IF  "information is physical, structural and mental" THEN simply the  
"information is physical"!

Friendly greetings
Krassimir





From: Burgin, Mark
Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

   Dear FISers,
   It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and 
creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many 
interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I would 
like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our intrinsic and 
often tacit assumptions.

   To great extent, our possibility to answer the question "Is information 
physical? " depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical means 
the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, the substance 
of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the 
way, expression "quantum information" is only the way of expressing that the 
carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar 
to the expressions "mixed numbers" or "decimal numbers", which are only forms 
or number representations and not numbers themselves.

  If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first, to 
answer the question "Does information exist? " All FISers assume that 
information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our discussions. 
However, some people think differently (cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004) 
Information studies without information).

   Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely, to 
admit that information is physical because only physical things exist.
   If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we have 
three options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises three 
worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of structures, we 
have seven options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
- information is physical, structural and mental

The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to avoid 
unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information (in a 
general sense) exists in all three worlds but ... in the physical world, it is 
called energy, in the mental world, it is called mental energy, and in the 
world of structures, it is called information (in the strict sense). This 
conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of Mark Johnson that information 
is both 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-17 Thread Jose Javier Blanco Rivero
Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an
idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind of
philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence of
things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against
Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological problems are
undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact is that we
cannot leave the predicative realm. All we have as scientists is
scientifical statements (therefore I think of Science as a communicative
social system differentiated from its environment by means of a code -I
think Loet would agree with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the
social system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are
incomplete. There are many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown
(in this point I confess I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's
ideas. I think I have many points of agreement with him but also of
disagreement -but honestly I currently lack the knowledge to undertake a
thorough discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent
ways to deal with it. But this means we have to learn to deal with
paradoxes.
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a set
of statements that represent what we know about information. The problem is
that although we can have the intuition that information is real, physical
as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external reference like "reality
", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the system. I
remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann devised the concept
of consistency proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an
sich, is inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be
asking us a question that cannot be answered.

Best,

JJ
El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark"  escribió:

>Dear FISers,
>It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and
> creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many
> interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I
> would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our
> intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.
>
>To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is information
> physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical
> means the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, the
> substance of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological or
> quantum. By the way, expression “quantum information” is only the way of
> expressing that the carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of
> nature. This is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal
> numbers”, which are only forms or number representations and not numbers
> themselves.
>
>   If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first,
> to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers assume that
> information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our
> discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for example,
> Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).
>
>Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely,
> to admit that information is physical because only physical things exist.
>If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we
> have three options assuming that information exists:
> - information is physical
> - information is mental
> - information is both physical and mental
>
> Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises
> three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of
> structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists:
> - information is physical
> - information is mental
> - information is structural
> - information is both physical and mental
> - information is both physical and structural
> - information is both structural and mental
> - information is physical, structural and mental
>
>  The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to
> avoid unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information
> (in a general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical
> world, it is called *energy*, in the mental world, it is called *mental
> energy*, and in the world of structures, it is called *information* (in
> the strict sense). This conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of
> Mark Johnson that information is both physical and not physical only the
> general theory of information makes this idea more exact and testable.
>In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the
> strict sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations and
> carriers. 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-17 Thread Dai Griffiths

What is a 'thing'?

Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes exist, and 
that for human convenience in living in the world we put conceptual 
membranes around some parts of those processes and call them 'things'. 
From this point of view we do not have two aspects (things and 
predictions about those things), but simply the monitoring of processes, 
and theorising about what we find. This does not preclude a taxonomy of 
processes (e.g. mechanisms might be a special kind of process).


Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully 
reformulated as "Is information a thing?".


Dai


On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:


Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I 
got an idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two 
kind of philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the 
existence of things) and predicative (what can we say and know about 
things). Against Quine materialism I came across the idea that 
ontological problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting 
problem. The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All 
we have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think of 
Science as a communicative social system differentiated from its 
environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree with me in 
this point). As a system (I mean not the social system, but the set of 
statements taken as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are many 
ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown (in this point I confess 
I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have 
many points of agreement with him but also of disagreement -but 
honestly I currently lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough 
discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent ways 
to deal with it. But this means we have to learn to deal with paradoxes.
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the 
constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a 
set of statements that represent what we know about information. The 
problem is that although we can have the intuition that information is 
real, physical as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external 
reference like "reality ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory 
function within the system. I remember that in the "Science of the 
Society", Luhmann devised the concept of consistency proofs 
(Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is 
inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be 
asking us a question that cannot be answered.


Best,

JJ

El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark" > escribió:


   Dear FISers,
   It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly
intelligent and creative individuals participated expressing
different points of view. Many interesting ideas were suggested.
As a conclusion to this discussion, I would like to suggest a
logical analysis of the problem based on our intrinsic and often
tacit assumptions.

   To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note
that here physical means the nature of information and not its
substance, or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which
can be physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the way,
expression “quantum information” is only the way of expressing
that the carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of
nature. This is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or
“decimal numbers”, which are only forms or number representations
and not numbers themselves.

  If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All
FISers assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not
participate in our discussions. However, some people think
differently (cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004) Information
studies without information).

   Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option,
namely, to admit that information is physical because only
physical things exist.
   If we assume that there are two worlds - information is
physical, we have three options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which
comprises three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and
the world of structures, we have seven options assuming that
information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-17 Thread Loet Leydesdorff
Perhaps, it is helpful to compare with the question whether the 
centimeter is physical. The meter is calibrated on a physical measure, 
but the centimeter is just a measure. We can provide it with a physical 
referent: "This is a centimeter".


Information is perhaps even more complex: a distribution can be expected 
to contain information. Is an expectation physical? a distribution?


I tend to disagree with Mark by cutting the world into physical / mental 
/ structural, unless the structural includes our codified conventions 
such as what is "a centimeter"? We can entertain the concept mentally, 
but therefore it is not yet mental. It is codified at an 
above-individual level as a structure in language. Is language physical? 
I doubt it: language carriers (human beings) are.


Best,
Loet


Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net ; 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, University of 
Sussex;


Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. , 
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, 
Beijing;


Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck , University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en


-- Original Message --
From: "Jose Javier Blanco Rivero" 
To: "Burgin, Mark" 
Cc: "Fis," 
Sent: 5/17/2018 12:47:04 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got 
an idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind 
of philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence 
of things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things). 
Against Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological 
problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact 
is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All we have as 
scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think of Science as 
a communicative social system differentiated from its environment by 
means of a code -I think Loet would agree with me in this point). As a 
system (I mean not the social system, but the set of statements taken 
as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are many ways to deal with 
it, as logicians have shown (in this point I confess I would need to 
examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have many points of 
agreement with him but also of disagreement -but honestly I currently 
lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough discussion). Self-reference, 
I think, is one of the most coherent ways to deal with it. But this 
means we have to learn to deal with paradoxes.
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the 
constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a 
set of statements that represent what we know about information. The 
problem is that although we can have the intuition that information is 
real, physical as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external 
reference like "reality ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory 
function within the system. I remember that in the "Science of the 
Society", Luhmann devised the concept of consistency proofs 
(Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is 
inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be 
asking us a question that cannot be answered.


Best,

JJ

El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark"  
escribió:

   Dear FISers,
   It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent 
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of 
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this 
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem 
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.


   To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is 
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that 
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance, 
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical, 
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum 
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of 
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar to 
the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only 
forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.


  If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at 
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers 
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate 
in our discussions. However, some people think 

[Fis] Everett & quantum wave collapse

2018-05-17 Thread tozziarturo
Dear Bruno, 

as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic framework requires the 
tenet that quantum wave collapse does not exist.

In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett.



I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!), for the FISers 
unaware of the Everett's account:


You are in front of two streets, one turns left and the other turns rigth.

You have to choose where to turn.

If you turn left, you could not anymore turn right.

This is, very roughly speaking, what quantum wave collapse means: if you make a 
choice, it is irreversible in our Universe.



In order to avoid such irreversibility, Everett, who did not like quantum wave 
collapse, provided the following account:

every time you have to choose whether you have to turn left or right, the 
entire Universe splits in two different Universes: in one Universe you turn 
left, while another you turns right in another Universe.




Now, dear FISer, tell me if the Everett's approach is tenable or it is not, 
and, if your answer is that it is tenable, tell me how it could be even 
theoretically demonstrated.  



> Il 17 maggio 2018 alle 11.25 Bruno Marchal  ha scritto:
> 
> Dear Arturo,
> 
> 
> 
> > > On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, tozziart...@libero.it 
> mailto:tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > Daer Bruno, 
> > 
> > first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for 
> > a mistake, I did not add the FIS list in the CC. 
> > 
> > 
> > Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic,
> > 
> > > I agree it is faith, but it is less faith than any scientists. 
> > Especially that we need only a tiny part of the arithmetical truth. 
> 
> Did you have heard about someone taking back his/her children from 
> primary school when they are taught the laws of addition and multiplication, 
> by claiming they have not that faith?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > this appraoch... simply does not work for the description of 
> > physical and biological issues. 
> > 
> > > The approach just study the necessary logical consequence of 
> > assuming our bodies to be digitalisable.  I predicted all the quantum 
> > weirdness from this 45 years ago. But then it took me 30 years to get 
> > precise mathematical predictions, which until now fits with the fact, when 
> > physicalism needs a brain-mind identity thesis which has been shown 
> > inconsistent. 
> I am not sure why you say that Mechanism cannot work for physical and 
> biological issues. You might confuse the computable (like automata), and the 
> semi-computable (like the universal Turing machine).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > It is just in our mind.  See: 
> > 
> > http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> What do you mean by “real world”?
> I agree Euclid geometry is in our head. The whole physical reality is 
> indeed shown to be “in the head” of *any* universal machine or universal 
> number, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > 
> > I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of 
> > course, the work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is 
> > exactly like Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, 
> > without any possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics 
> > to the whole macroscopic world. 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> For a logician; Everett is the Herbrand model of the Schroedinger 
> equation, that is QM without the unintelligible “collapse” of the wave. Put 
> simply: the “many-world” is just literal quantum mechanics without collapse.
> Everett did not propose a new speculative theory: he just showed that we 
> don’t need the collapse axiom, as QM + mechanism recovers it 
> phenomenologically. Then my work shows this can work only if we recover also 
> the wave itself from arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).
> 
> It is the collapse which is bad and unclear, and not needed, untestable, 
> assumption. 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > When you state that:
> > 
> > > > > "the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the 
> > universal Turing machine) and the physical is the border of the universal 
> > mind viewed from inside that universal mind".
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not 
> > understand your emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, 
> > reduction, and so on), needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the 
> > gold standard. 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> What I did has been peer reviewed and verified by many people. Have you 
> read my papers?
> Did you find a problem, or are you just criticising the 
> assumption/theory? Ask specific question, but normally all this has been 
> clearly proofed. 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > A suggestion: you cold try to correlate your "physical border of 
> > the Universal 

Re: [Fis] Everett & quantum wave collapse

2018-05-17 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson
I completely agree, Arturo! And Everett’s many world’s interpretation have been 
criticised, I would say, killed, since long, for example by Healy and Stein, 
both in NOUS XVIII, 1984. The problem is conceptual; what does Everett mean by 
a world? Referring to your simple example below, one might reasonably ask; 
which individual is the reference of ’me’ in the two scenarios? It cannot be 
the same, of course. So Everett suggests that I have innumerable replicas in 
innumerable worlds. Well if you are allowed to postulate whatever you like, you 
can explain anything, and refute any unpleasant scientific observation. Quantum 
mechanics certainly does not force us to do that.

Lars-Göran

17 maj 2018 kl. 16:30 skrev tozziart...@libero.it:


Dear Bruno,

as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic framework requires the 
tenet that quantum wave collapse does not exist.

In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett.


I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!), for the FISers 
unaware of the Everett's account:

You are in front of two streets, one turns left and the other turns rigth.

You have to choose where to turn.

If you turn left, you could not anymore turn right.

This is, very roughly speaking, what quantum wave collapse means: if you make a 
choice, it is irreversible in our Universe.



In order to avoid such irreversibility, Everett, who did not like quantum wave 
collapse, provided the following account:

every time you have to choose whether you have to turn left or right, the 
entire Universe splits in two different Universes: in one Universe you turn 
left, while another you turns right in another Universe.



Now, dear FISer, tell me if the Everett's approach is tenable or it is not, 
and, if your answer is that it is tenable, tell me how it could be even 
theoretically demonstrated.


Il 17 maggio 2018 alle 11.25 Bruno Marchal 
> ha scritto:

Dear Arturo,


On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, tozziart...@libero.it 
wrote:


Daer Bruno,

first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for a mistake, 
I did not add the FIS list in the CC.


Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic,

I agree it is faith, but it is less faith than any scientists. Especially that 
we need only a tiny part of the arithmetical truth.

Did you have heard about someone taking back his/her children from primary 
school when they are taught the laws of addition and multiplication, by 
claiming they have not that faith?




this appraoch... simply does not work for the description of physical and 
biological issues.

The approach just study the necessary logical consequence of assuming our 
bodies to be digitalisable.  I predicted all the quantum weirdness from this 45 
years ago. But then it took me 30 years to get precise mathematical 
predictions, which until now fits with the fact, when physicalism needs a 
brain-mind identity thesis which has been shown inconsistent.
I am not sure why you say that Mechanism cannot work for physical and 
biological issues. You might confuse the computable (like automata), and the 
semi-computable (like the universal Turing machine).





It is just in our mind.  See:

http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132


What do you mean by “real world”?
I agree Euclid geometry is in our head. The whole physical reality is indeed 
shown to be “in the head” of *any* universal machine or universal number, etc.




I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of course, the 
work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is exactly like 
Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, without any 
possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics to the whole 
macroscopic world.


For a logician; Everett is the Herbrand model of the Schroedinger equation, 
that is QM without the unintelligible “collapse” of the wave. Put simply: the 
“many-world” is just literal quantum mechanics without collapse.
Everett did not propose a new speculative theory: he just showed that we don’t 
need the collapse axiom, as QM + mechanism recovers it phenomenologically. Then 
my work shows this can work only if we recover also the wave itself from 
arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).

It is the collapse which is bad and unclear, and not needed, untestable, 
assumption.



When you state that:

"the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing 
machine) and the physical is the border of the universal mind viewed from 
inside that universal mind".

you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not understand your 
emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, reduction, and so on), 
needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the gold standard.


What I did has been peer reviewed and verified by many people. Have you read my 
papers?
Did you find a problem, or are you just