Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism
As my last posting for the week, replying to Pedro's interesting rejoinder to an earlier one of mine - On Fri, Dec 10, 2010 at 8:20 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan < pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote: > Dear Stan and colleagues, > > Taking it literally, isn't it a pure contradiction, an oxymoron, attempting > a "scientific" "mythology"? The mythos is the way of knowing purely based on > tradition and on the firmest doubtlessness, where the source of authority > comes only from magnificent ancestors... > Here I use the term 'mythology' in an ethnographic sense, meaning 'stories that are believed to be true'. I use it deliberately in connection with my understanding that scientific knowledge is a social construct every bit as much as were the various knowledges gained by more 'primitive' cultures by whatever means. Of course, science itself, as a practice, does not claim 'truth' in the sense of unchanging status; even the Second Law of thermodynamics might someday be falsified. But persons brought up in a scientific culture more or less instinctively assume that what is taught in the classroom is true (unless other cultural forces working through the family cast doubt on this), especially if this knowledge is useful in technology. Putting a fine point on it, let me say that I personally do BELIEVE that the Second Law is a truth about Nature. But I also know that it is merely a social construct. > Well, I am going happily with Stan in the attempt of a renewed Natural > Philosophy (and I think that future info outcomes may play a significant > role there), but it does not necessarily mean to be engaged in a > confrontation with other legitimate ways of seeing the world --and > legitimately influencing in social practices, particularly by shared morals > and ethos... Given the antecedents of previous historical "revolutions" I > am afraid that a funny world would not result from a unilateral scientifist > vision (Orwell's 1984?). > This is a good point. Here our experience in the US may be bearing upon me. Here we have religious groups actively engaged in contesting some scientifically accepted truths -- e.g., the theory that biological evolution has occurred. In other countries this may no longer (or for the moment anyway) be an issue, but the conflict clearly raises the possibility of the contestability of belief, however grounded. Allied religions in other nations MIGHT take up the same position as some of those in the US, since all (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) have the same root myths, and that puts them all constitutively aligned against any new mythology, even if based in science, and even if they use Jesuitical means to avoid literal understandings of the ancient Middle Eastern myths. We can see today that mythology can motivate considerable activity in the adventures of the current group of fundamentalists in Eurasia. > > Also, reflecting on Bob's advocation of "dualism", I would like to bring to > attention again the informational scheme where "agency" is implied. The > philosophical outcome may be some form of "trialism", as one finds now the > triplet: "world", "agents", "scientific observers". Casually I have found an > interesting philosophical doctrine on trialism, as an alternative to > Cartesian dualism, by John Cottingham (1985). The trialist interpretation > keeps the two substances of mind and body, but introduces a third attribute, > sensation, alongside thought and extension and belonging to the union of > mind and body... There are many other nuances and complexities on the term, > and probably some adjustments have to be made to properly fit the info > scheme, but it looks OK. > I feel I should mention here the triadic philosophy of Charles Peirce, which now is gaining considerable traction. Here 'world-agents-scientific observers' would appear as 'object-interpretant-sign'. Working from this, one reaches my position viv-a-vis scientific knowledge. The cultural 'system of interpretance' creates both the sign (using information from the object) and the interpretation. Knowledge in this view, including scientific knowledge, cannot be 'objective'. The context for knowledge is the knower. STAN > > > At a quick glance, and just looking at the discussions we have here, every > party plays at his/her own with a "world" where information of different > kinds impinge on active/perceptive "agents", endowed with transformative > capabilities and with some form of intelligence (embodiment, > self-production, etc may enter here, or not); and the scientific "observer" > establishes the cutoffs and constraints through a narrative following a > particular disciplinary pathway. I have also argued that in different angles > of that story, at least in Nature (cells, nervous systems, people), one has > to re-enter populational thinking, optimality guidance, and the doctrine of > limitation. The hierarchy/heterarchy theme is also of importance in the > populational aspect (as what we see
[Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION (by Y.X.Zhong)
Dear All, I return to the original definition of this project because I am not satisfied with its evolution. There are points in Professor Zhong's perspective on (natural) intelligence that I still would like to call attention to, apart from the connection between intelligence and information. 1. "intelligence as wealth" implies something acquired, a posteriori, from experience, as well as some innate capacity for processing that experience. There are thus two aspects and their interaction to be taken into account. 2. "the secrets of intelligence, human thinking in particular" could be sought in the above. 3. "how intelligence is produced by brains". Neurology and cognitive science have provided fantastic new insights, and even possible semi-quantitative measures of intelligence as capacity for processing some simple stimuli, but something is still being missed. I therefore make this plea for a phenomenological approach, recognizing that since Petitot and Varela, responsible phenomenology, like responsible dualism, can be naturalized, that is, made part of science. A coherent phenomenological approach might for example distinguish between the operation of intelligence leading to a variety of options vs. a simple cognitive process ending in a more or less clear-cut thought. In any case, I have taken to heart comments that suggest that I am trying somehow to overturn the results, and subvert the use, of the scientific method. As a physical scientist, I can only conclude that I have badly expressed my intention, which is to support physical science by pointing out aspects and implications that may have been missed, due to a reliance on classical logic. Thus I have a positive reaction to Pedro's concept of "trialism", since my logical approach is "ternary", but the connection should be explored in another thread. Thanks and best wishes, Joseph - Original Message - From: Pedro C. Marijuan To: fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Friday, November 05, 2010 1:55 PM Subject: [Fis] INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION (by Y.X.Zhong) Intelligence and Information Yi-Xin-Zhong Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing100876, China yxzh...@ieee.org 1. The Study of Intelligence Science Intelligence has been very well regarded as the most valuable wealth for mankind, compared with other attributions like constitution and strength, and the study of intelligence science should therefore be the greatest issue in modern science and most urgent demand from human society, particularly for the 21st century. The study of intelligence is consisted of two branches, i.e., natural intelligence study and artificial intelligence study. The aim for the former is to explore the secrets of intelligence, human thinking in particular. Neurological science and cognitive science are typical disciplines in this field. The aim for the latter is to create intelligent machines based on the understanding of the secrets of intelligence. The two branches are closely related to, and mutually interacted to, each other. The crucial problem that is still widely open to the study of intelligence is the great mystery on how it is produced by brains. The major problem that the study of artificial intelligence confronts is how to effectively reproduce intelligence on computing machineries. During the past decades, the studies of both branches have made good progresses but at the same time faced difficulties and challenges too. For the information about the progress made in neurology and cognitive science, please see the reference [1] and for the detailed progress in artificial intelligence, please refer to the references [2-3]. 2. The Problems of Artificial Intelligence One of the major problems and challenges that the study of artificial intelligence confronts is that there have been three schools carrying on the same study with different approaches, namely the structuralism approach (neural network systems), the functionalism approach (expert systems), and the behaviorism approach (sensor-motor systems), and they never cooperate with each other. There has been no unified theory in the field so far. Moreover, none of the three schools have paid necessary attentions to such issues as consciousness, emotion and cognition that are extremely fundamental to the study of intelligence. In the meantime, there is little cooperation with the study of natural intelligence. Another big problem existing in the fields of intelligence study, also in other scientific fields of course, is the methodological issue. Researchers have been used to the traditional methodology called "divide and conquer". They divided the study of intelligence into different respects (the structural respect, the functional respect, and the behavioral respect), and carried on the research within the limits of each respect of intelligence. As a result, each one of them cannot individually get the global
