Re: [Fis] Article on panpsychism
Joseph, I take your points.In particular a more refined study of brain function is required to refine understanding of the functionality of consciousness. However, Bob Ulanowicz has used a similar measure for studying ecosystems, and it has proven to be of considerable value there. I realize that what is useful in one discipline might not be in another even if the mathematics apply, but establishing some basic measures, though it does not tell us everything we might want to know (and people do have different questions they want to answer, to complicate things), one has to start somewhere in any rigorous approach, and usually it is at a pretty general point like phi. In any case, I have found Ulanowicz' measure to be a good starting point for understanding functionality in ecosystems, and phi might also be a starting point for more refined measures in consciousness studies. Incidentally, the work referred to in the blog entry (which is original, published Jan. 1 2014) is from 2009, and that is probably based on work that was originally published earlier. I have subscribed to Scientific American since 1965 or so, and I don't recall it ever containing original work in articles on areas with which I was familiar. As I pointed out in my comment, Leibniz came up with pretty much the same idea a long time ago, distinguishing between confused and clear perceptions, with the latter only involved in what might be called self-consciousness. There isn't much genuinely new under the sun. I agree that the phi measure is "flat", but I see one of the advantages of information theory is that it can linearize the nonlinear once we understand what information is and how it flows. Just as more refinement of levels is required to understand consciousness, the same can be said of Ulanowicz' measure and levels in ecology, but that doesn't mean the gross measure is useless by any means. I am looking at ways to articulate his measures in ecological hierarchies along the lines of my work on natural instance (as opposed to general) hierarchies, hoping to get more local measures of functionality and competing functionalities at different levels in hierarchies. I have argued that we need to look at this in mental hierarchies, and I would guess that there are hierarchies within consciousness as well that have sometimes competing functionalities. I am a big fan of Damazio. John At 03:23 AM 2014/01/04, Joseph Brenner wrote: Dear John, The Koch article is worth reading as a kind of statement within the current reductionist paradigm I believe it is necessary to get beyond. It is all the more insidious because of Koch's research credentials, but it contains all the 'push-button' words that I have seen in his previous work, as well as that of others. Two of these are, in this connection, 'measure' and 'integration'. That 'the mental is too radically different to arise gradually from the physical' is a hypothesis, and begs the questions 'does it?' and 'why shouldn't it?' Despite your comment on the utility of his measure, it seems much too scalar to represent anything fundamental. There is no indication of the essentiality of properties of process and interaction in the concept of information used by Koch. It also opens the door, as I said in my previous note, to misinterpretations supporting anti-realist positions. I conclude that the lessons the article offers about how to think about subjective experience are (ideologically) biased and miss the necessary connection between subjective and objective. In his 2010 book, Self Comes to Mind, Anthony Damasio discusses how the consciousness is constructed as a result of what he calls master interoceptive processes that occur between the multiple structures at the level of the brain stem and the cerebral cortex. He first defines a protoself as an integrated collection of separate neural patterns that map, moment by moment, the most stable aspects of the organisms physical structure. The nuclei of the homeostatic processes involved generate one of the two key components of the self the feelings of knowing. The other component, derived from non-homeostatic processes in the brain stem, generate object saliency, Damasios term for the recognition of the self-as-object. The origin of the invariance or relative invariance of a singular self has been the subject of much discussion as we know, and a plausible basis for both the invariance and that singularity must be established. For Damasio, this basis is neither more or less than the organisms single body. Although this body is constantly undergoing change, many internal parameters, both structural and chemical, vary only within a very narrow range during the individuals lifetime. In Damasio's view, the couplings between conscious perceptions and memories and underlying processes at the physiological level are necessary but also sufficient to generate the value-laden processes commonly designated as the conscious self. No 'proto-self'
[Fis] Logic in Reality and QBism
Dear Joseph, Jerry, Pedro, and all:
"1. QBism seems not to consider the option of using non-standard,
non-Kolmogorivian probabilities to describe quantum and non-quantum nature,
that is, with values >0 but <1."
It is difficult enough to get physicists to consider the standard
interpretation of probability offered by Bayesianism, without straying off
into the unknown territory in which probabilities 0 and 1 are excluded!
However, it is true that those two cases do present special difficulties,
and it might be interesting to see what happens when they are forbidden.
The paper by Fuchs et al. strains to establish the case of probability 1,
which is called a "fact", as nothing more than a very,very strong belief.
(I enjoy astonishing my students by proving that even though most of them
believe that 0.999...<1 it actually equals 1.) If a non-standard formalism
is used, I would guess that a special category of probabilities very close
to 0 and 1 would still have to be singled out, because we have been so
thoroughly brainwashed that we parse the world around us in terms of
absolute certainties, i.e. of probabilities 0 and1.
"2. It excludes the case, impossible by classical logic, but basic to
physics and LIR, of a dynamic interaction between the subject and the
object which allows both views ("belief" and "facts") to be partly true or
better operative at the same time or at different times."
I don't know enough about LIR to understand what is meant by the word
"fact" in that context. The interaction between subject and object is a
central concept in QBism. It takes the place of the "measurement" of the
older literature, which has the connotation of revealing something
objective, real, and pre-existing. An interaction, on the other hand,
changes both the external world, and the agent's belief. It creates
brand-new "facts" that did not pre-exist the interaction. Thus we humans
participate in tiny ways in the ongoing creation of the world.
"3. Since the QBism interpretation does not deal with points 1. and 2.
above (also in the Fuchs, Mermin, Shack paper), it leaves the door open to
an anti-realist interpretation not only of quantum mechanical reality, but
of reality /tout court/ which must be based on and reflect the
quantum 'situation'. "
Right! QBism seeks to establish a new worldview in which the entire
material universe is quantum mechanical and described in terms of Bayesian
probability -- even those things we think of as real, objective, and
factual.
Pedro wrote:
"What I most like of this new quantum approach is the radicalism regarding
meaning, experience, knowledge, science... This is good news for the people
who sees information science as an occasion to contemplate anew the
relationship of the individual with the increasing stock of knowledge
accumulated by our civilization, where the ratio of our individual
experience to the total is acceleratedly approaching zero!, and where the
blind spots of collective intelligence are shining in too many areas of
global life... It is healthy that the explicit limitation of the individual
is also a message contained in QBism, at least in my understanding."
I agree wholeheartedly. The way I see the interaction between the QBists
and FIS evolving is this: The physicists are busy trying to rewrite all of
quantum mechanics (not just its interpretation) along QBism-inspired lines.
This means principally re-casting the entire formalism in terms of
probabilities rather than wavefunctions. If they succeed (and the jury is
still out on that) they will have created an entirely new theory that is
mathematically equivalent to the Schroedinger-Heisenberg theory, but looks
completely different. Meanwhile others, including members of FIS, can
study the implications of QBism for a new worldview. By the success of
quantum theory, nature seems to be urging us into a more personalist,
anti-realist view of the world, a view that focuses on individual
experience. As Pedro implies, communication with other persons --
information exchange -- is a key component of this experience. I see that
tree out there myself, and I can even feel its bark, but the overwhelming
majority of what I think and do is triggered by my experience of reading
and listening and learning about the experiences of others. In this way
information and communication continue to be crucial concepts.
Another concept Pedro touches on is human limitation. I find it very
liberating to feel that there is no such thing as a grand "Theory of
Everything" -- only little patches of understanding of relationships
encoded in rules of thumb with names like Relativity, The Standard Model,
Quantum Field Theory, Evolution... With the help of the experiences of
generations of scientists I can incorporate these rules in my own personal
ordering and surveying of the world around me. So I don't worry, as the
Greeks did, about what the world really, really is.
It's good to talk to you all, as wee say in Virginia.
H
Re: [Fis] Article on panpsychism
Dear John, The Koch article is worth reading as a kind of statement within the current reductionist paradigm I believe it is necessary to get beyond. It is all the more insidious because of Koch's research credentials, but it contains all the 'push-button' words that I have seen in his previous work, as well as that of others. Two of these are, in this connection, 'measure' and 'integration'. That 'the mental is too radically different to arise gradually from the physical' is a hypothesis, and begs the questions 'does it?' and 'why shouldn't it?' Despite your comment on the utility of his measure, it seems much too scalar to represent anything fundamental. There is no indication of the essentiality of properties of process and interaction in the concept of information used by Koch. It also opens the door, as I said in my previous note, to misinterpretations supporting anti-realist positions. I conclude that the lessons the article offers about how to think about subjective experience are (ideologically) biased and miss the necessary connection between subjective and objective. In his 2010 book, Self Comes to Mind, Anthony Damasio discusses how the consciousness is constructed as a result of what he calls master interoceptive processes that occur between the multiple structures at the level of the brain stem and the cerebral cortex. He first defines a "protoself" as an integrated collection of separate neural patterns that map, moment by moment, the most stable aspects of the organism's physical structure. The nuclei of the homeostatic processes involved generate one of the two key components of the self - the "feelings of knowing". The other component, derived from non-homeostatic processes in the brain stem, generate "object saliency", Damasio's term for the recognition of the self-as-object. The origin of the invariance or relative invariance of a singular self has been the subject of much discussion as we know, and a plausible basis for both the invariance and that singularity must be established. For Damasio, this basis is neither more or less than the organism's single body. Although this body is constantly undergoing change, many internal parameters, both structural and chemical, vary only within a very narrow range during the individual's lifetime. In Damasio's view, the couplings between conscious perceptions and memories and underlying processes at the physiological level are necessary but also sufficient to generate the value-laden processes commonly designated as the conscious self. No 'proto-self' is required at the levels at which Koch sees consciousness. I had been an assiduous reader of Scientific American from high-school until the late-eighties, when it stopped publishing original scientific work. For me, today, it is not an acceptable reference. Thank you for calling the article to our attention. Best, Joseph - Original Message - From: John Collier To: fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Saturday, January 04, 2014 2:47 AM Subject: [Fis] Article on panpsychism Folks, The article on the Scientific American site at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-consciousness-universal&print=true might be of interest to this group. It discusses an information based measure of consciousness. Is Consciousness Universal? Panpsychism, the ancient doctrine that consciousness is universal, offers some lessons in how to think about subjective experience today By Christof Koch | Wednesday, January 1, 2014 | I am not a panpsychist, but this is the most reasonable version I have seen (barring, perhaps, Leibniz', with its distinction between confused and clear perceptions, which takes a similar route). I think the measure is of interest independently of panpsychism. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier -- ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
