Re: [Fis] FIS newcomer

2015-06-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 23 Jun 2015, at 07:13, Emanuel Diamant wrote:


My dear FIS-friends,

I apologize for not withstanding the pace of our discussion – you  
are already busy with the problem of “meaning” (Steven) and I am  
still preparing to answer Howard’s letter about linguistic biology…


Dear Howard,

Thank you for your suggestion to “add yet one more approach to the  
list: linguistic biology”. Unfortunately, I cannot accept it –  
because it is redundant and tautological.


My definition of information is Information is a linguistic  
description of structures observable in a given data set. (I  
apologize for non-providing any arguments for justifying this  
statement. Interested people have to go to my old papers in arXiv,  
Research Gate or on my web site http://www.vidia-mant.info ).


For the reasons provided just above (and elsewhere), any use of the  
term “Cognitive” implies the use of the term  
“information” (information processing) and, thus, already contains  
linguistic descriptions of data structures in a given data set (in a  
given object). Therefore, strengthening Cognitive biology with  
Linguistic biology is simply a tautology.


I also cannot accept the allusion to the Guenther Witzany’s work (as  
an attempt to justify the backup of Linguistic biology). Meanwhile,  
Witzany himself illuminate the issue in his response to Jerry  
Chandler (20.06.2015). I myself was enlightened about the subject by  
a 2004 paper of Eshel Ben-Jacob (et al) “Bacterial linguistic  
communication and social intelligence”, Trends in Microbiology, vol.  
12, no. 8, pp. 366-372, August 2004. I have cited it in my 2009  
paper “Some considerations on how the human brain must be arranged  
in order to make its replication in a thinking machine possible”,  
(.arXiv:1002.0184 [pdf]). I do not want to spend much more time on  
this issue and to draw our discussion farther in this direction.


Finally, I do not agree either with your statement that “each  
approach uses a helpful metaphor”. Brain as a computer metaphor  
(dominating in the past century) has exhausted its life cycle,  
“Computational” approach today is a harmful and a dangerous relict.  
It would be wise not to galvanize it again.



People should not confuse the computationalist thesis in cognitive  
science, and the use of this or that type of machine as a metaphor to  
understand the brain functioning.


In fact those two things oppose themselves. It can be shown that IF we  
are machine, then we cannot know for sure which machine we are, nor  
which computations support us. Information arise from our statistical  
distribution in the infinitely many computations (already present in a  
tiny segment of arithmetic). The math shows that he quantum  
appearances are justified from that computationalist hypothesis.


In fact computationalism appears to be a vaccine against all  
reductionistic metaphors. The ideally correct machine, like Peano  
Arithmetic or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, already know that their  
soul is not a machine, when translating Theaetetus definition of the  
soul (the knower) with Gödel technic (as I did).


To believe in the negation of computationalism means to believe in  
some magic or in some special actual infinities playing some rôle in  
the brain.


Many people still believe that mechanism and materialism are  
compatible, but there are not.
Choose your favorite poison, but it seems to me that the evidences we  
have support much more mechanism than materialism.


Bruno







I apologize for the delayed response.

Best regards,
Emanuel.


From: howlbl...@aol.com [mailto:howlbl...@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, June 20, 2015 3:52 AM
To: emanl@gmail.com; jerry_lr_chand...@me.com; pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es; witz...@sbg.at
Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS newcomer

re: cognitive biology vs computational biology.

may i suggest that you add yet one more approach to the list:  
linguistic biology.  per the work of Guenther Witzany.  also  
reflected in my book The God Problem: How a Godless Cosmos Creates.


each approach uses a helpful metaphor.  no one approach sees the  
elephant in its entirety. so please let us use all three.


with oomph--howard

--
Howard Bloom
Howardbloom.net
Author of: The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the  
Forces of History (mesmerizing-The Washington Post),
Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From The Big Bang to the  
21st Century (reassuring and sobering-The New Yorker),
The Genius of the Beast: A Radical Re-Vision of Capitalism (A  
tremendously enjoyable book. James Fallows, National Correspondent,  
The Atlantic),
The God Problem: How A Godless Cosmos Creates(Bloom's argument will  
rock your world. Barbara Ehrenreich),
How I Accidentally Started the Sixties (“Wow! Whew! Wild!  
Wonderful!” Timothy Leary), and
The Mohammed Code (“A terrifying book…the best book I’ve read on  
Islam.” David Swindle, PJ Media).
Former Core Faculty Member, The 

[Fis] Ada Lovelace inspires a question: why are so few women in FIS list?

2015-06-24 Thread Moisés André Nisenbaum
Hi, Bob

Thank you for presenting Ada Lovelace to the list. It was great the link
you did with previous discussions.

Hi, all.

Have we ever had a discussion about why are so few women in FIS list?

I was yesterday in a seminar that shows that it is a general problem in
Science, especially in hard disciplines. But there are many women in
Mathematics and Information Science fields, so I expected more women in FIS.

This makes me remember the great speak of Neil Degrasse Tyson (3 min) on
being Black and Women in Science (https://youtu.be/z7ihNLEDiuM).

What do you think about it?

All the best,
-- 
Moisés André Nisenbaum
Doutorando IBICT/UFRJ. Professor. Msc.
Instituto Federal do Rio de Janeiro - IFRJ
Campus Maracanã

moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br
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Re: [Fis] FIS newcomer

2015-06-24 Thread Bob Logan
Thanks to Moises Andre Nisenbaum I became acquainted with the very first person 
to write a computer program, namely Ada Lovelace. Her opinion which I also hold 
and seems to represent Bruno's opinion as well can be found in a quote of hers 
which can be found in the Wikipedia article about her. Here is an excerpt from 
that Wikipedia article, which I share for your edification and amusement. All 
the best - Bob

The notes are longer than the memoir itself and include (in Section G[57]), in 
complete detail, a method for calculating a sequence of Bernoulli numbers with 
the Engine, which would have run correctly had the Analytical Engine been built 
(only his Difference Engine has been built, completed in London in 2002).[58] 
Based on this work, Lovelace is now widely considered the first computer 
programmer[1] and her method is recognised as the world's first computer 
program.[59]
Section G also contains Ada Lovelace's famous dismissal of artificial 
intelligence. She wrote that The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever 
to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform. 
It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any analytical 
relations or truths.
__

Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto 
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications








On 2015-06-24, at 8:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 
 On 23 Jun 2015, at 07:13, Emanuel Diamant wrote:
 
 My dear FIS-friends,
  
 I apologize for not withstanding the pace of our discussion – you are 
 already busy with the problem of “meaning” (Steven) and I am still preparing 
 to answer Howard’s letter about linguistic biology…
  
 Dear Howard,
  
 Thank you for your suggestion to “add yet one more approach to the list: 
 linguistic biology”. Unfortunately, I cannot accept it – because it is 
 redundant and tautological.
  
 My definition of information is Information is a linguistic description of 
 structures observable in a given data set. (I apologize for non-providing 
 any arguments for justifying this statement. Interested people have to go to 
 my old papers in arXiv, Research Gate or on my web site 
 http://www.vidia-mant.info ).
  
 For the reasons provided just above (and elsewhere), any use of the term 
 “Cognitive” implies the use of the term “information” (information 
 processing) and, thus, already contains linguistic descriptions of data 
 structures in a given data set (in a given object). Therefore, strengthening 
 Cognitive biology with Linguistic biology is simply a tautology.
  
 I also cannot accept the allusion to the Guenther Witzany’s work (as an 
 attempt to justify the backup of Linguistic biology). Meanwhile, Witzany 
 himself illuminate the issue in his response to Jerry Chandler (20.06.2015). 
 I myself was enlightened about the subject by a 2004 paper of Eshel 
 Ben-Jacob (et al) “Bacterial linguistic communication and social 
 intelligence”, Trends in Microbiology, vol. 12, no. 8, pp. 366-372, August 
 2004. I have cited it in my 2009 paper “Some considerations on how the human 
 brain must be arranged in order to make its replication in a thinking 
 machine possible”, (.arXiv:1002.0184 [pdf]). I do not want to spend much 
 more time on this issue and to draw our discussion farther in this direction.
  
 Finally, I do not agree either with your statement that “each approach uses 
 a helpful metaphor”. Brain as a computer metaphor (dominating in the past 
 century) has exhausted its life cycle, “Computational” approach today is a 
 harmful and a dangerous relict. It would be wise not to galvanize it again.
 
 
 People should not confuse the computationalist thesis in cognitive science, 
 and the use of this or that type of machine as a metaphor to understand the 
 brain functioning.
 
 In fact those two things oppose themselves. It can be shown that IF we are 
 machine, then we cannot know for sure which machine we are, nor which 
 computations support us. Information arise from our statistical distribution 
 in the infinitely many computations (already present in a tiny segment of 
 arithmetic). The math shows that he quantum appearances are justified from 
 that computationalist hypothesis.
 
 In fact computationalism appears to be a vaccine against all reductionistic 
 metaphors. The ideally correct machine, like Peano Arithmetic or 
 Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, already know that their soul is not a machine, 
 when translating Theaetetus definition of the soul (the knower) with Gödel 
 technic (as I did).
 
 To believe in the negation of computationalism means to believe in some magic 
 or in some special actual infinities playing some rôle in the brain. 
 
 Many people still believe that mechanism and materialism are compatible, but 
 there are not. 
 Choose your favorite poison, but it seems to me that the