To all colleagues,
I hope I may voice a number of concerns that have arisen in the course
of the ongoing discussions that are ostensibly about phenomenology and
the life sciences.
The concerns begin with a non-recognition of what is surely the ground
floor of real-life, real-time realities, namely, animation, not in the
sense of being alive or in opposition to the inanimate, but in the sense
of motion, movement, kinetics. As Aristotle cogently remarked,
“Nature is a principle of motion and change. . . . We must therefore see
that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too
would be unknown” (Physics 200b12-14).
Through and through--from animate organisms to an ever-changing world--
movement is foundational to understandings of subject and world, and of
subject/world relationships, and this whether subject and world are
examined phenomenologically or scientifically. In short, movement is at
the core of information and meaning, at the core of mind and
consciousness,
at the core of both gestural and verbal language, at the core of nervous
system and organic functionings, at the core of molecular
transformations,
at the core of ellipses, electrons, gravity, waves, particles, and so
on,
and further, at the core of time, the concept, measurement, and meaning
of
time.
I enumerate below specifics with respect to what is essentially the
foundational dynamic reality. The summary concerns are followed by
references that document each concern. If further specifics are wanted
or
if specific articles are wanted, kindly contact m...@uoregon.edu
(1). Instincts and/or feelings motivate animate organisms to move.
Without such instincts or feelings there would be no disposition
to move. An ‘animate organism’ would in truth be akin to a statue,
a statue Condillac described two and a half centuries ago as having
first this sense given to it, then that sense given to it, but that,
lacking movement, is powerless to gain knowledge of the world. Such
a movement deficient creature would furthermore lack the biological
capacity of responsivity, a near universal characteristic of life.
The startle reflex is a premier example. Can what is evolutionarily
given be “illogical”? Clearly, feelings are not “illogical,” but move
through animate bodies, moving them to move. Without feelings of
curiosity, for example, or awe, or wonder, there would be no exploration
of the natural world, no investigations, hence no “information.”
Furthermore, without feelings of movement—initially, from an
evolutionary
perspective, no proprioception, and later, no kinesthesia--there would
be
no near and far, no weak and strong, no straight and curved, and so on,
hence, no determinations of Nature. In short, there would be no
information
and no meaning. (See Note #1: The Primacy of Movement)
(2). An excellent lead-in to scientific understandings of movement and
its inherent dynamics lies in the extensive research and writings of
J. A. Scott Kelso, Pierre de Fermat Laureate in 2007. Kelso was founder
of the Center for Brain and Behavioral Studies and its Director for
twenty
years. His rigorous multi-dimensional experimental studies are anchored
in
coordination dynamics, an anchorage that is unconstrained by dogma. The
breadth of his knowledge and his sense of open inquiry is apparent in
the
literature he cites in conjunction with his articles and books. His
recent
article in Biological Cybernetics that focuses on “Agency” is strikingly
relevant to the present FIS discussion. It takes experience into
account,
specifically in the form of “positive feedback,” which obviously
involves
kinesthesia in a central way. Moreover his upcoming Opinion piece in
Trends
in Cognitive Science should be essential reading. (See Note #2: “The
Coordination
Dynamics of Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement” and The Complementary
Nature)
(3). As pointed out elsewhere, “Certainly words carry no patented
meanings,
but the term ‘phenomenology’ does seem stretched beyond its limits when
it
is used to denote either mere reportorial renderings of perceptible
behaviors
or actions, or any descriptive rendering at all of perceptible behaviors
or
actions. At the least, ‘phenomenology’ should be recognized as a very
specific
mode of epistemological inquiry invariably associated with the name
Edmund Husserl. . . . ”
Phenomenological inquiries are tethered to a very specific methodology,
one as
rigorous as that of science. Phenomenological findings are furthermore
open to
verification by others, precisely as in science. Moreover two forms of
phenomenological analysis warrant recognition: static and genetic, the
former
being a determination of the essential character of the object of
inquiry, the
second being a determination of how the meaning of that object of
inquiry came
to be constituted, hence an inquiry into sedimentations of meaning, into
protentions and retentions, into horizons of meaning, and so on. Thus
too,
what warrants recognition is the fact that bracketing is not the
beginning and
end of phenomenological methodology. On the contrary, bracketing is only
the beginning.
Phenomenological reduction follows bracketing and allows the essential
character
of the object of inquiry or the constitution of its meaning to come to
light.
(See Note #3: Animation: Analyses, Elaborations, and Implications”)
(4). References made to Gödel’s theorem to uphold certain theses can be
definitively
questioned. The claim that Gödel makes on behalf of his theorem is
inaccurate.
Three articles that demonstrate the inaccuracy, one from a
phenomenological
perspective, two others from a logical-analytical perspective, warrant
clear-headed
study. In brief, self-referential statements are vacuous, hence neither
true nor false.
Moreover the sentences expressing the statements may be used to make two
quite
different statements, a fact ignored by Gödel.(See Note #4:
“Self-Reference and
Gödel’s Theorem,” “The Liar Syndrome,” and “Doctor’s Diagnosis
Sustained")
(5): Information is commonly understood as factual knowledge, thus
empirically
sustained and sustainable knowledge. It is thus a matter of the
condition or
nature or workings, etc., of something out there in the world, including
even
your liver if that is the source of information. Mathematics has its
origin in
arithmetic, the latter having its origins in counting things in the
world,
including if not beginning with one’s fingers, and in shape, including
if not
beginning with differentiating contours and size, thus with linear and
amplitudinal
dimensions of things in the world. As I wrote in my last posting, I hope
that
someone will take up the challenge of doing a phenomenological analysis
of information.
An inquiry into the relationship of meaning to information and of
information to
meaning might then be undertaken. That step, to my mind, would provide
solid ground
for linking informational sciences and phenomenology, linking by way of
showing—-
demonstrating—complementarities, precisely complementarities in the
sense that
Bohr and Kelso specify.
Note #1: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2011. The Primacy of Movement,
expanded 2nd ed.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Note #2: Kelso, J. A. Scott and Armin Fuchs. 2016. “The Coordination
Dynamics of
Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement,” Biological Cybernetics: DOI
10.1007/s00422-015-0676-0.
Kelso, J. A. Scott and David A. Engström. 2006. The Complementary
Nature. Cambridge,
MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Note #3: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2015. “Animation: Analyses,
Elaborations, and Implications,”
Husserl Studies, 30/3: 247-268. DOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9156-y
Note #4: Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Self-Reference and Gödel’s Theorem:
A Husserlian Analysis."
Husserl Studies, 19: 131-151.
Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “The Liar Syndrome,” SATS/Nordic Journal of
Philosophy, 3/1: 37-55.
Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Doctor’s Diagnosis Sustained,” SATS/Nordic
Journal of Philosophy,
3/2: 142-153.
Maxine
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