Dear All, I think that in the context of what Maxine, Lou, Soeren and others exchanged a little while ago it makes sense to refer to Kalevi Kull’s paper in the Biosemiotics section V of this collection below which initiated our discussion:
2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3> (note: free access to all articles until July 19th, 2016) Of course, you are welcome to read all papers there. Best wishes, Plamen On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 7:43 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov < plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear Maxine, Lou, Pedro, Loet, John, Soeren and Colleagues, > > first of all I wish to thank Maxine for providing a bit different > perspective upon the overall subject of the discussion theme, namely > phenomenology or better said “phenomenological philosophy” (since > “phenomenology” has acquired different meanings in the sciences in the > years). Despite that “action", as Pedro said, has been a widely discussed > topic, I think that Maxine’s note was meaning something else which deserves > attention and more thought. > > On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 6:41 AM, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone <m...@uoregon.edu> > wrote: > >> To all colleagues, >> >> I hope I may voice a number of concerns that have arisen in the course >> of the ongoing discussions that are ostensibly about phenomenology and >> the life sciences. >> >> The concerns begin with a non-recognition of what is surely the ground >> floor of real-life, real-time realities, namely, animation, not in the >> sense of being alive or in opposition to the inanimate, but in the sense >> of motion, movement, kinetics. As Aristotle cogently remarked, >> “Nature is a principle of motion and change. . . . We must therefore see >> that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too >> would be unknown” (Physics 200b12-14). >> >> Through and through--from animate organisms to an ever-changing world-- >> movement is foundational to understandings of subject and world, and of >> subject/world relationships, and this whether subject and world are >> examined phenomenologically or scientifically. In short, movement is at >> the core of information and meaning, at the core of mind and >> consciousness, >> at the core of both gestural and verbal language, at the core of nervous >> system and organic functionings, at the core of molecular transformations, >> at the core of ellipses, electrons, gravity, waves, particles, and so on, >> and further, at the core of time, the concept, measurement, and meaning of >> time. >> >> > That the origins of meaning and purpose can be found in movement and life > is an interesting thought. > I think that this is what one could say about the ultimate goal of > Aristotle’s physics. It began being explained with the equations of Newton > about inanimate matter and finally landed at its origin --- a curious loop > of recursion, reflection and self-reference --- with Schrödinger”s question > about what is life in the search of the lost purpose on the way to > explaining all kinds of movements. > > All this is to remind us, that there are two kinds of knowledge (and > meaning): the incremental one with which most of us are accustomed, and > the“forked” one, similar to Everett’s split universes, providing a new > options for scrutinising, interpretation and understanding of the world we > live in. I think that this is the message which Maxine disseminates in this > forum. Maxine, please correct me if I am wrong. Understanding Husserl, > Heidegger and Marleau-Ponty is almost that difficult as understanding > quantum mechanics by non-specialists (as Alex Hankey told me in one of our > conversations), or Gödel by non-logicians and non-mathematicians. It is > difficult to follow the reasoning in each one of these domains, without > investing years of dedicated study, that only a few can afford in a single > life span. But that’s the reason why we have come together in this forum to > state opinions, ask questions and clarify remote subjects that are tough to > grasp alone. > > > >> I enumerate below specifics with respect to what is essentially the >> foundational dynamic reality. The summary concerns are followed by >> references that document each concern. > > > These are indeed the concerns that motivated and moved human inquiry in > the era of the Greek philosophers, when theatre and mathematics were not > that far from each other. We need to come back to this kind of thinking and > understanding far-fetched stuff also by utilising our intuition, because > the roots of both science and the humanities are the same: our human > nature. Some folks from these remote fields, like Pauli and Jung, were able > to speak to each other. Others, despite being geniuses in their fields > remained stuck in them and could not follow a different viewpoint, and yet > they felt there is something beyond their own perspective and were longing > for it. > > Anyway, I will stop here thanking Lou for his note on Gödel that reminded > us that this man has spent many years pondering on his theorems before > revealing them to the world. How many people are doing this today in our > publish-or-perish modern world of science? > It is not easy to acquire groundbreaking knowledge. Thanks to the > philosophers for reminding us of Kuhn’s work. > > Have a nice week! > > Plamen > > > >> If further specifics are wanted or >> if specific articles are wanted, kindly contact m...@uoregon.edu >> >> (1). Instincts and/or feelings motivate animate organisms to move. >> Without such instincts or feelings there would be no disposition >> to move. An ‘animate organism’ would in truth be akin to a statue, >> a statue Condillac described two and a half centuries ago as having >> first this sense given to it, then that sense given to it, but that, >> lacking movement, is powerless to gain knowledge of the world. Such >> a movement deficient creature would furthermore lack the biological >> capacity of responsivity, a near universal characteristic of life. >> The startle reflex is a premier example. Can what is evolutionarily >> given be “illogical”? Clearly, feelings are not “illogical,” but move >> through animate bodies, moving them to move. Without feelings of >> curiosity, for example, or awe, or wonder, there would be no exploration >> of the natural world, no investigations, hence no “information.” >> Furthermore, without feelings of movement—initially, from an evolutionary >> perspective, no proprioception, and later, no kinesthesia--there would be >> no near and far, no weak and strong, no straight and curved, and so on, >> hence, no determinations of Nature. In short, there would be no >> information >> and no meaning. (See Note #1: The Primacy of Movement) >> >> (2). An excellent lead-in to scientific understandings of movement and >> its inherent dynamics lies in the extensive research and writings of >> J. A. Scott Kelso, Pierre de Fermat Laureate in 2007. Kelso was founder >> of the Center for Brain and Behavioral Studies and its Director for twenty >> years. His rigorous multi-dimensional experimental studies are anchored in >> coordination dynamics, an anchorage that is unconstrained by dogma. The >> breadth of his knowledge and his sense of open inquiry is apparent in the >> literature he cites in conjunction with his articles and books. His recent >> article in Biological Cybernetics that focuses on “Agency” is strikingly >> relevant to the present FIS discussion. It takes experience into account, >> specifically in the form of “positive feedback,” which obviously involves >> kinesthesia in a central way. Moreover his upcoming Opinion piece in >> Trends >> in Cognitive Science should be essential reading. (See Note #2: “The >> Coordination >> Dynamics of Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement” and The Complementary Nature) >> >> (3). As pointed out elsewhere, “Certainly words carry no patented >> meanings, >> but the term ‘phenomenology’ does seem stretched beyond its limits when it >> is used to denote either mere reportorial renderings of perceptible >> behaviors >> or actions, or any descriptive rendering at all of perceptible behaviors >> or >> actions. At the least, ‘phenomenology’ should be recognized as a very >> specific >> mode of epistemological inquiry invariably associated with the name >> Edmund Husserl. . . . ” >> Phenomenological inquiries are tethered to a very specific methodology, >> one as >> rigorous as that of science. Phenomenological findings are furthermore >> open to >> verification by others, precisely as in science. Moreover two forms of >> phenomenological analysis warrant recognition: static and genetic, the >> former >> being a determination of the essential character of the object of >> inquiry, the >> second being a determination of how the meaning of that object of inquiry >> came >> to be constituted, hence an inquiry into sedimentations of meaning, into >> protentions and retentions, into horizons of meaning, and so on. Thus too, >> what warrants recognition is the fact that bracketing is not the >> beginning and >> end of phenomenological methodology. On the contrary, bracketing is only >> the beginning. >> Phenomenological reduction follows bracketing and allows the essential >> character >> of the object of inquiry or the constitution of its meaning to come to >> light. >> (See Note #3: Animation: Analyses, Elaborations, and Implications”) >> >> (4). References made to Gödel’s theorem to uphold certain theses can be >> definitively >> questioned. The claim that Gödel makes on behalf of his theorem is >> inaccurate. >> Three articles that demonstrate the inaccuracy, one from a >> phenomenological >> perspective, two others from a logical-analytical perspective, warrant >> clear-headed >> study. In brief, self-referential statements are vacuous, hence neither >> true nor false. >> Moreover the sentences expressing the statements may be used to make two >> quite >> different statements, a fact ignored by Gödel.(See Note #4: >> “Self-Reference and >> Gödel’s Theorem,” “The Liar Syndrome,” and “Doctor’s Diagnosis Sustained") >> >> (5): Information is commonly understood as factual knowledge, thus >> empirically >> sustained and sustainable knowledge. It is thus a matter of the condition >> or >> nature or workings, etc., of something out there in the world, including >> even >> your liver if that is the source of information. Mathematics has its >> origin in >> arithmetic, the latter having its origins in counting things in the world, >> including if not beginning with one’s fingers, and in shape, including if >> not >> beginning with differentiating contours and size, thus with linear and >> amplitudinal >> dimensions of things in the world. As I wrote in my last posting, I hope >> that >> someone will take up the challenge of doing a phenomenological analysis >> of information. >> An inquiry into the relationship of meaning to information and of >> information to >> meaning might then be undertaken. That step, to my mind, would provide >> solid ground >> for linking informational sciences and phenomenology, linking by way of >> showing—- >> demonstrating—complementarities, precisely complementarities in the sense >> that >> Bohr and Kelso specify. >> >> Note #1: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2011. The Primacy of Movement, >> expanded 2nd ed. >> Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing >> >> Note #2: Kelso, J. A. Scott and Armin Fuchs. 2016. “The Coordination >> Dynamics of >> Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement,” Biological Cybernetics: DOI >> 10.1007/s00422-015-0676-0. >> Kelso, J. A. Scott and David A. Engström. 2006. The Complementary Nature. >> Cambridge, >> MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. >> >> Note #3: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2015. “Animation: Analyses, >> Elaborations, and Implications,” >> Husserl Studies, 30/3: 247-268. DOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9156-y >> >> Note #4: Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Self-Reference and Gödel’s Theorem: >> A Husserlian Analysis." >> Husserl Studies, 19: 131-151. >> Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “The Liar Syndrome,” SATS/Nordic Journal of >> Philosophy, 3/1: 37-55. >> Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Doctor’s Diagnosis Sustained,” SATS/Nordic >> Journal of Philosophy, >> 3/2: 142-153. >> >> Maxine >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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