Re: [Fis] Clarifying Posting

2016-05-07 Thread Rafael Capurro

dear all,

some days ago I sent a mail in spanish to pedro, and he suggested me to 
make an english translation with... google! hm... I try to translate it 
with my brain even if there might be (surely) a lot of 
misunderstandings. so... first the original spanish sentence by sentence

ortega era un gran fenomenologo y escribia
muy bien tambien, y no era un reduccionista claro, sino que buscaba
diferenciar los fenomenos, sin crear jerarquias, yo soy yo y mis

ortega y gasset was a great phenomenologist and he wrote in a wonderful 
style, he was not a redctionist but looked for phenomenological 
differences, without creating hierarchies, "I am I and my circumstances"

si, a diferencia del modo de ser de otros animales
(para decirlo en forma muy general) que estan muy condicionados por
sus circunstancias (o son 'pobres en mundo' es decir en la posibilidad
de salir o cuestionar las circunstancias y abrirse a un poder ser, que
nos permite a nosotros, construir otra realidad a la que vivimos en
una situacion determinada...

yes, there are differences between the way we humans are and the ways 
other living beings are,
(to put it in a crude way) as they are very conditioned by the 
circumtances (this is what I
meant my 'world poor') i.e. withou being able to question their 
circumstances or to open
themselves to other possibilities, build another reality/world as the 
one they belong to

bueno, por aqui va una fenomenologia de
los seres vivientes, de los cuales formamos parte, ciertamente y
muchas veces vivimos mas como meros seres vivientes que con las
posibilidades que nos da un poder ir mas alla de lo que nos condiciona
aqui y ahora, esto supone un riesgo, ya que el vivir abiertos a un
poder ser, y que cada realidad nos abra a otras posibilidades es algo
que produce angustia o por los menos la puede producir

well... a phenomenololgy of living beings, to which we belong and we 

live in the same way, without going beyond what is given, the given
circumstances, because this means taking a risk and provokes often
anxiety, but each reality or 'circmstances' we achieve immediatly opens
new possibiliies

 y asi, como en
la politca, intentantos quedarnos en lo que somos/estamos, los otros
animales, por su lado, tienen una mucho mayor sensibilidad para la
situacion que los condiciona y una riqueza de perception que nos
supera, las celulas son muy smart, me decia un dia koichiro matsuno
cuando visite su universidad en nagaoka en 1998 y ahora estamos
aprendiendo a valorar esa inmensa riqueza y variedad de los modos de
vida de otro seres vivientes con sus propiedades y las formas de
convivir con ellos no?

and so as in politics we often prefer to stay where we are... and
other animals for intancce have a much richer sensibility for the
circumstances they are facing, one day in 1998 when I visited
koichiro matsuno in nagaoka he told me: cells are very smart!
and now we are learning from the way of life o other living being,
with their properties and trying to live with them...

y para esto es bueno, 'salvar los fenomenos'
como decian los griegos, es decir ver de que formas son/viven otro
seres vivientes (o no...), la fenomeno-logia es una tarea conceptual
(logos) diferente a la tarea aritmologica y tambien a la tarea de
explicar los fenomenos por sus causas (aitiai, decian los griegos), lo
cual nos lleva de un fenomeno a otro, pero nos hace olvidar lo que
tenemos delante mismo...

and for this is good to "save the phenomena" or 'sozein ta phainomena"
as the Greek said, i.e. to try to see different forms of being, and
this is a conceptual task (logos) different from the task of quantifying
phenomena or of explaing them through cauality i.e. by going to other
phenomena (looking for the 'aitiai' or  causes) but this lets us
forget what we have in front of us...

y tambien es asi que la tarea fenomenologica
de juntar aspectos comunes (el eidos de husserl...) es algo dificil de
hacer, no menos dificil que el describir matematicamente los fenomenos
o buscar causas, siempre inseguro, tentativo, con bordes difusos... y
a veces, como en el caso del electromagnetismo, parecia que los dos
fenomenos son diversos hasta que vino maxwell y vio las cosas de forma
diferente ...

and... so the phenomenological task is trying to find our what is common
to the phenomena (Husserl's eidos) which is difficult to do, no less
difficult than describing them mathematically or explaining them
cauaally, always tentaive, no secure, with fuzzy borders and in some
cases as with maxwells's view of electromagnetism, it comes out that
we think there are two phenonmena, where in fact, there only one...



un abrazo

ortega y gasset was a

Dear FIS Colleagues,

Some parties have doubts on how to count the two messages per week
--the maximum allowed in this list except for the discussion chair,
which currently is Alex. Following the international business week,
the count starts on Monday and 

[Fis] Gödel discussion

2016-05-07 Thread Albert A Johnstone

Greetings everyone,
I’d like to say a few words about Smullyan’s thought experiment and its 
relevance to Gödel’s Theorem in the hope of putting an end to discussion 
of a topic somewhat tangential to the main one. Before doing so, I am 
forwarding an email from Lou Kauffman which gives a very clear account 
of Smullyan’s reasoning.

 Original Message 
 Subject: Re: [Fis] _ FIS discussion
 Date: 2016-05-04 12:30
 From: Louis H Kauffman 
 To: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 

 Dear Maxine,
 I am writing privately to you since I have used up my quota of forum 
comments for this week.

 I am going to discuss a Smullyan puzzle in detail with you.
 I call this the Smullyan Machine.

 The machine has a button on the top and when you press that button, it 
prints a string of symbols using the following three letter alphabet.

 { P, ~ ,R}
 Thus the machine might print P~~~NRRP.
 I shall designate an unknown string of symbols by X or Y.
 Strings that begin with P, ~P, PR or ~PR are INTERPRETED (given 
meaning) as follows:

 Meaningful Strings
 (When I say “X can be printed by the Machine” I mean that when you 
press the button the machine will print exactly X and nothing else.)

 PX:  X can be printed by the Machine.
 ~PX: X cannot be printed by the Machine.
 PRX: XX can be printed by the Machine.
 ~PRX: XX can not be printed by the Machine.

 Thus it is possible that the machine might print
 This has meaning and it states that the machine cannot bring PR all by 
itself when the button is pressed.

 The Smullyan Machine always tells the truth when it prints a meaningful 

 THEOREM. There is a meaningful string that is true but not printable by 
the Smullyan Machine.

 PROOF. Let S = ~PR~PR. This string is meaningful since it starts with 
 Note that S = ~PRX where X = ~PR. Thus by the definition (above) of the 
meaning of S,  “XX is not printable by the Machine.”
We note however that XX = ~PR~PR = S. Thus S has the meaning that “S is 
not printable by the Machine.”
Since the Machine always tells the truth, it would be in a contradiction 
if it printed S. Therefore the Machine cannot print S.
 But this is exactly the meaning of S, and so S is true. S is a true but 
not printable string. The completes the proof.


Now I have an assignment for you.
 Please criticize the Smullyan Machine from your phenomenological point 
of view.
 If you wish you could include my description of the Machine and make a 
statement about it on FIS.
 My point and Smullyan’s point in his Oxford University Press Book on 
Godel’s Theorem, is that the Machine is an accurate depiction of the 
Godel argument, with
 Printabilty replacing Provablity. The way that self-reference works 
here, and the way the semantics and syntax are controlled is very much 
like the way these things happen in the
 full Godel theorem. The Machine provides a microcosm for the discussion 
of Godel and self-reference.

 Yours truly,
 Lou Kauffman
 P.S. “This sentence has thirty-three letters.”
is a fully meaningful and true English sentence.
 Self-referential sentence can have meaning and reference.

Johnstone again:

	In response to the above assessment, let us first distinguish syntactic 
self-reference which is reference to the words or sentence that one is 
using, from semantic self-reference, which is reference to the MEANING 
of the words or sentences one is using. There is nothing wrong with 
syntactic self-reference but semantic self-reference invariably 
generates vacuity and sometimes paradox.

Now Smullyan’s sentence ‘~PR~PR’ is often interpreted (as by Lou, Bruno, 
and by myself earlier) as making a syntactically self-referential 
statement that says that the sentence expressing that statement is not 
printable. On the supposition that such is the case, the statement it 
makes must also be semantically self-referential for the following 
reason. In Smullyan’s scenario, the printing machine prints only true 
statements. As a result, a sentence is printable if and only if the 
statement it makes is true. Consequently, the two predicates ‘is not 
printable’ and ‘is not true’ are logically equivalent. A sentence that 
says of itself that it is not printable is consequently logically 
equivalent (each entails the other) to a statement that says of itself 
that it is not true, that is, it is equivalent to a Liar statement. As 
such, it is semantically incomplete or vacuous; it does not make a 
statement, and hence is neither true nor false, and so cannot possibly 
be an unprintable true statement.
The equivalence of the two predicates has the result that ‘~PR~PR’ is 
both syntactically AND semantically self-referential.

	On reflection, however, I suspect that the sentence ‘~PR~PR’ has been 
incorrectly interpreted. The second