Re: [Fis] INFORMATION: JUST A MATTER OF MATH

2017-09-18 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson

18 sep. 2017 kl. 18:25 skrev Terrence W. DEACON 
>:

All of these claims and counter-claims are null hypotheses - hypothetical 
axioms yet to be tested, both for logical coherence and empirical usefulness. 
Place your bets. Mine are on contrary assumptions: i.e. non-Turing 
computability, fundamental incompleteness, and a deep entanglement between 
information (including reference and functional value) and its necessary 
physical substrates. Of course for this to be science all need to eventually 
yield testable hypotheses. This level of controversy over basic issues 
indicates to me that the science of information is still at an early stage and 
could be potentially held back by the hubris of certainty.
I fundamentally agree with Terry; the discussion is about concepts and their 
use, not about real things. In order to move on to testable empirical 
consequences one need to tell how to measure a proposed quantity. And if we 
disagree about how to measure e.g. information, we talk about different 
quantities while using the same word. The only way to establish that 
information as measured in two different ways really is the same quantity is to 
prove that these measurements without exception will yield the same output.
Lars-Göran



— Terry

On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
Dear Jose,

On 15 Sep 2017, at 16:37, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:


Dear Arturo,

Math is indeed a language that CAN describe scientific issues, but it is not 
the only one. And its ability to cuantify scientific issues do not necesarily 
make it superior.
Math and natural language face the same formal and logical problems: they 
cannot make staments about themselves without falling into contradictions or 
paradoxes (as can be inferred from Gödel).

You seem to be too much quick on this. On the contrary, I would say, Gödel 
showed that when we translate the paradoxes of self-reference in arithmetic, we 
get fundamental limitation theorems, not contradictions. In fact Gödel has led, 
with the work of Löb and Solovay, to a complete axiomatization of the logic of 
machine self-reference (complete at the propositional level), and that logic 
re-introduce the nuances discovered by Plato and exploited by the 
Neopythagoreans and the Neoplatonicians theologians. Those "theologies" are 
"theories of everything": they contain physics, and so are testable, and the 
physics of the machine can be shown to be necessary quantum-like already.

Bruno



And your statement is certainly self-contradictory: if it is true then it is 
contradicted by the form of its performance (semantics).

Best regards,

El sep 15, 2017 10:17 AM, "tozziart...@libero.it" 
> escribió:
Dear FISers,
I'm sorry for bothering you,
but I start not to agree from the very first principles.

The only language able to describe and quantify scientific issues is 
mathematics.
Without math, you do not have observables, and information is observable.
Therefore, information IS energy or matter, and can be examined through 
entropies (such as., e.g., the Bekenstein-Hawking one).

And, please, colleagues, do not start to write that information is subjective 
and it depends on the observer's mind. This issue has been already tackled by 
the math of physics: science already predicts that information can be 
"subjective", in the MATHEMATICAL frameworks of both relativity and quantum 
dynamics' Copenhagen interpretation.
Therefore, the subjectivity of information is clearly framed in a TOTALLY 
physical context of matter and energy.

Sorry for my polemic ideas, but, if you continue to define information on the 
basis of qualitative (and not quantitative) science, information becomes 
metaphysics, or sociology, or psychology (i.e., branches with doubtful 
possibility of achieving knowledge, due to their current lack of math).



Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/


Messaggio originale
Da: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
>
Data: 15/09/2017 14.13
A: "fis">
Ogg: [Fis] PRINCIPLES OF IS

Dear FIS Colleagues,

As promised herewith the "10 principles of information science". A couple of 
previous comments may be in order.
First, what is in general the role of principles in science? I was motivated by 
the unfinished work of philosopher Ortega y Gasset, "The idea of principle in 
Leibniz and the evolution of deductive theory" (posthumously published in 
1958). Our tentative information science seems to be very different from other 
sciences, rather multifarious in appearance and concepts, and cavalierly moving 
from scale to scale. What could be the specific role of 

Re: [Fis] INFORMATION: JUST A MATTER OF MATH

2017-09-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 Sep 2017, at 18:25, Terrence W. DEACON wrote:

All of these claims and counter-claims are null hypotheses -  
hypothetical axioms yet to be tested, both for logical coherence and  
empirical usefulness. Place your bets. Mine are on contrary  
assumptions: i.e. non-Turing computability, fundamental  
incompleteness,


Turing universal computability entails fundamental incompleteness.



and a deep entanglement between information (including reference and  
functional value) and its necessary physical substrates.


So you are coherent. Mechanism is not compatible with materialism. If  
you have fundamental substrates, you have to assume non mechanism. My  
main result is


NOT Mechanism OR NOT materialism.   (materialism in the weak sense of  
assuming primitive physical elements).


You keep materialism, I keep mechanism. We are just working in  
different theory.



Of course for this to be science all need to eventually yield  
testable hypotheses.


The hypotheses are general and can never been tested, but we can test  
the consequences, and improve our abandon the theory.




This level of controversy over basic issues indicates to me that the  
science of information is still at an early stage and could be  
potentially held back by the hubris of certainty.



I have not claimed any truth, if this was not clear. I just say that  
Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and that if we keep  
mechanism, the appearances of matter have to be derived in some way  
from the universal machine introspection.  The physical propositional  
logic has been derived in that way, and up to now, it fits with the  
quantum facts.


You can read the following papers:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body  
problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40
Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in  
Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.


I just keep mechanism, but take very seriously the mind-body problem.

Bruno Marchal





— Terry

On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

Dear Jose,

On 15 Sep 2017, at 16:37, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:


Dear Arturo,

Math is indeed a language that CAN describe scientific issues, but  
it is not the only one. And its ability to cuantify scientific  
issues do not necesarily make it superior.
Math and natural language face the same formal and logical  
problems: they cannot make staments about themselves without  
falling into contradictions or paradoxes (as can be inferred from  
Gödel).




You seem to be too much quick on this. On the contrary, I would say,  
Gödel showed that when we translate the paradoxes of self-reference  
in arithmetic, we get fundamental limitation theorems, not  
contradictions. In fact Gödel has led, with the work of Löb and  
Solovay, to a complete axiomatization of the logic of machine self- 
reference (complete at the propositional level), and that logic re- 
introduce the nuances discovered by Plato and exploited by the  
Neopythagoreans and the Neoplatonicians theologians. Those  
"theologies" are "theories of everything": they contain physics, and  
so are testable, and the physics of the machine can be shown to be  
necessary quantum-like already.


Bruno


And your statement is certainly self-contradictory: if it is true  
then it is contradicted by the form of its performance (semantics).


Best regards,

El sep 15, 2017 10:17 AM, "tozziart...@libero.it"  escribió:

Dear FISers,
I'm sorry for bothering you,
but I start not to agree from the very first principles.

The only language able to describe and quantify scientific issues  
is mathematics.
Without math, you do not have observables, and information is  
observable.
Therefore, information IS energy or matter, and can be examined  
through entropies (such as., e.g., the Bekenstein-Hawking one).


And, please, colleagues, do not start to write that information is  
subjective and it depends on the observer's mind. This issue has  
been already tackled by the math of physics: science already  
predicts that information can be "subjective", in the MATHEMATICAL  
frameworks of both relativity and quantum dynamics' Copenhagen  
interpretation.
Therefore, the subjectivity of information is clearly framed in a  
TOTALLY physical context of matter and energy.


Sorry for my polemic ideas, but, if you continue to define  
information on the basis of qualitative (and not quantitative)  
science, information becomes metaphysics, or sociology, or  
psychology (i.e., branches with doubtful possibility of achieving  
knowledge, due to their current lack of math).



Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/



Messaggio originale
Da: 

Re: [Fis] INFORMATION: JUST A MATTER OF MATH

2017-09-18 Thread Terrence W. DEACON
All of these claims and counter-claims are null hypotheses - hypothetical
axioms yet to be tested, both for logical coherence and empirical
usefulness. Place your bets. Mine are on contrary assumptions: i.e.
non-Turing computability, fundamental incompleteness, and a deep
entanglement between information (including reference and functional value)
and its necessary physical substrates. Of course for this to be science all
need to eventually yield testable hypotheses. This level of controversy
over basic issues indicates to me that the science of information is still
at an early stage and could be potentially held back by the hubris of
certainty.

— Terry

On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Dear Jose,
>
> On 15 Sep 2017, at 16:37, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:
>
> Dear Arturo,
>
> Math is indeed a language that CAN describe scientific issues, but it is
> not the only one. And its ability to cuantify scientific issues do not
> necesarily make it superior.
> Math and natural language face the same formal and logical problems: they
> cannot make staments about themselves without falling into contradictions
> or paradoxes (as can be inferred from Gödel).
>
> You seem to be too much quick on this. On the contrary, I would say, Gödel
> showed that when we translate the paradoxes of self-reference in
> arithmetic, we get fundamental limitation theorems, not contradictions. In
> fact Gödel has led, with the work of Löb and Solovay, to a complete
> axiomatization of the logic of machine self-reference (complete at the
> propositional level), and that logic re-introduce the nuances discovered by
> Plato and exploited by the Neopythagoreans and the Neoplatonicians
> theologians. Those "theologies" are "theories of everything": they contain
> physics, and so are testable, and the physics of the machine can be shown
> to be necessary quantum-like already.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> And your statement is certainly self-contradictory: if it is true then it
> is contradicted by the form of its performance (semantics).
>
> Best regards,
> El sep 15, 2017 10:17 AM, "tozziart...@libero.it" 
> escribió:
>
> Dear FISers,
> I'm sorry for bothering you,
> but I start not to agree from the very first principles.
>
> The only language able to describe and quantify scientific issues is
> mathematics.
> Without math, you do not have observables, and information is observable.
> Therefore, information IS energy or matter, and can be examined through
> entropies (such as., e.g., the Bekenstein-Hawking one).
>
> And, please, colleagues, do not start to write that information is
> subjective and it depends on the observer's mind. This issue has been
> already tackled by the math of physics: science already predicts that
> information can be "subjective", in the MATHEMATICAL frameworks of both
> relativity and quantum dynamics' Copenhagen interpretation.
> Therefore, the subjectivity of information is clearly framed in a TOTALLY
> physical context of matter and energy.
>
> Sorry for my polemic ideas, but, if you continue to define information on
> the basis of qualitative (and not quantitative) science, information
> becomes metaphysics, or sociology, or psychology (i.e., branches with
> doubtful possibility of achieving knowledge, due to their current lack of
> math).
>
>
> *Arturo Tozzi*
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
>
> Messaggio originale
> Da: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
> Data: 15/09/2017 14.13
> A: "fis"
> Ogg: [Fis] PRINCIPLES OF IS
>
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> As promised herewith the "10 principles of information science". A couple
> of previous comments may be in order.
> First, what is in general the role of principles in science? I was
> motivated by the unfinished work of philosopher Ortega y Gasset, "The idea
> of principle in Leibniz and the evolution of deductive theory"
> (posthumously published in 1958). Our tentative information science seems
> to be very different from other sciences, rather multifarious in appearance
> and concepts, and cavalierly moving from scale to scale. What could be the
> specific role of principles herein? Rather than opening homogeneous realms
> for conceptual development, these information principles would appear as a
> sort of "portals" that connect with essential topics of other disciplines
> in the different organization layers, but at the same time they should try
> to be consistent with each other and provide a coherent vision of the
> information world.
> And second, about organizing the present discussion, I bet I was too
> optimistic with the commentators scheme. In any case, for having a first
> glance on the whole scheme, the opinions of philosophers would be very
> interesting. In order to warm up the discussion, may I ask John Collier,
>