[Fis] I do not understand some strange claims
Dear FISers, science talks about observables, i.e., quantifiable parameters. Therefore, describing the word "information" in terms of philosophers' statements, hypothetical useless triads coming from nowhere, the ridicolous Rupert Sheldrake's account, mind communication, qualitative subjective issues of the mind, inconclusive phenomelogical accounts with an hint of useless husserlian claims, and such kind of amenities is simply: NOT scientific. It could be interesting, if you are a magician or a follower of Ermetes Trismegistus, but, if you are (or you think to be) a scientist, this is simply not science. Such claims are dangerous, because they are the kind of claims that lead to NO-VAX movements, religious stuff in theoretical physics, Heideggerian metapyhsics. Very interesting, but NOT science.That's all: 'nuff said. Arturo TozziAA Professor Physics, University North TexasPediatrician ASL Na2Nord, ItalyComput Intell Lab, University Manitobahttp://arturotozzi.webnode.it/ ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Fw: Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism
Dear Joseph, This is great! I'm sympathetic to the view that a reconnection with physics is necessary and I too worry about the political implication of Luhmann's ideas, powerful work though I find it. I've started reading Logic in Reality, but am finding it quite hard. I have a question about "specificity" which relates to your "discontinuities". One of the central issues in physics is the broken symmetry of nature. In biological systems and art it manifests as fibonacci. In physics it may provide a link between relativity and quantum mechanical theory. Is specificity a break in symmetry? The challenge is to speak of specificity (in time, space, matter) whilst maintaining that our speaking (the discourse) is part of a set of relations within which the specific is identified. I agree that Spencer Brown (and Luhmann) can't do this because he flattens the specific into a general process. Peirce I can't reject completely because his fascination with quaternions suggests that he was chasing a kind of spiral logic, which may be correct (but he didn't get there). How does Lupasco do this? Is there a better notation? There are, for example, specific moments in the unfolding of a symphony where the symmetry is broken. It gives rise to new ideas which would not have happened if the break was not there. There seems to be a logic to this. Does Lupasco have a trick to articulate this? How does he avoid generalisation? Best wishes, Mark -Original Message- From: "Joseph Brenner" Sent: 08/11/2017 18:29 To: "fis" Cc: "javierwe...@gmail.com" Subject: [Fis] Fw: Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism Dear Jose Javier, Thank you very much for your constructive response to my note. I respect your view of Luhmann and his constructivism (?), which you have certainly correctly summarized in a few words. However, what the Lupasco theory of actuality and potentiality does is to offer some ontological basis for both, grounded in physics and is hence in my opinion hence worthy of some modicum of our attention. It is possible to talk about reality without the pretty little diagrams and calculus of Spencer-Brown. Luhmann talks about the "constant interplay" between actual and potential, their ineinanderstehen, but there is no functional relation to the mundane properties of real physical systems. As Loet showed at the time, Luhmannian structures can be defined analytically, but that is not enough for me. And a key point: why 'constant' interplay? Is there something wrong, or is it just too real, to include discontinuities as equally important as continuities? It should be clear that I completely disagree with the place given to Luhmann in current thought. Luhmann perhaps deserves some historical credit for basing his theory on information. However, I follow Christian Fuchs who said in 2006 that "The function of Luhmann's theory for society is that it is completely useless". Society does not "contain" human beings: society is a group of human beings composed of individuals and the group and their contradictorial relations and dynamics. Luhmann stated that the "ground of being" is at the same time actuality and potentiality, but tells us nothing about their nature and rules for their evolution. Meaning cannot be a unity of actualization and potentialization (or re- and re-). In unity, the two lose their necessary specificity and basis for change. Luhmann took human beings as agents out of his system, and replaced them with abstractions. Fascist ideology is not far away. If people would spend 1/20 the time on Lupasco that they do on Pierce and Luhmann, . . . Best regards, Joseph - Original Message - From: Jose Javier Blanco Rivero To: Joseph Brenner Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 11:20 AM Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism Dear Joseph, Luhmann's concept of meaning (Sinn) is defined exactly as the unity of the difference between actuality and potentiality. Maybe there an answer can be found. Besides, Luhmann's Sinn can also be translated as information since it regards redundancy and selection. Luhmann self referred to Sinn (which I'd rather to translate as sensemaking) as information processing. Best regards El nov 8, 2017 6:59 AM, "Joseph Brenner" escribió: Dear Colleagues, This is simply to register a dissenting opinion, for similar reasons, with the last two notes, if nothing else to say that there can be one: 1. Regarding John C.'s view of the value of Pierce, there can be no common ground. Scholastic, propositional logic is part of the problem. His metaphysics has no ground in physics. Only Pierce's intuitions, to which he gives less value, have some value for me. 2. Koichiro presents some good science, but it is misapplied. Nothing tells us that information, or another complex natural process, evolves according to the trajectories that he describes: Any robust loop
[Fis] Fw: Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism
Dear Jose Javier, Thank you very much for your constructive response to my note. I respect your view of Luhmann and his constructivism (?), which you have certainly correctly summarized in a few words. However, what the Lupasco theory of actuality and potentiality does is to offer some ontological basis for both, grounded in physics and is hence in my opinion hence worthy of some modicum of our attention. It is possible to talk about reality without the pretty little diagrams and calculus of Spencer-Brown. Luhmann talks about the "constant interplay" between actual and potential, their ineinanderstehen, but there is no functional relation to the mundane properties of real physical systems. As Loet showed at the time, Luhmannian structures can be defined analytically, but that is not enough for me. And a key point: why 'constant' interplay? Is there something wrong, or is it just too real, to include discontinuities as equally important as continuities? It should be clear that I completely disagree with the place given to Luhmann in current thought. Luhmann perhaps deserves some historical credit for basing his theory on information. However, I follow Christian Fuchs who said in 2006 that "The function of Luhmann's theory for society is that it is completely useless". Society does not "contain" human beings: society is a group of human beings composed of individuals and the group and their contradictorial relations and dynamics. Luhmann stated that the "ground of being" is at the same time actuality and potentiality, but tells us nothing about their nature and rules for their evolution. Meaning cannot be a unity of actualization and potentialization (or re- and re-). In unity, the two lose their necessary specificity and basis for change. Luhmann took human beings as agents out of his system, and replaced them with abstractions. Fascist ideology is not far away. If people would spend 1/20 the time on Lupasco that they do on Pierce and Luhmann, . . . Best regards, Joseph - Original Message - From: Jose Javier Blanco Rivero To: Joseph Brenner Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 11:20 AM Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism Dear Joseph, Luhmann's concept of meaning (Sinn) is defined exactly as the unity of the difference between actuality and potentiality. Maybe there an answer can be found. Besides, Luhmann's Sinn can also be translated as information since it regards redundancy and selection. Luhmann self referred to Sinn (which I'd rather to translate as sensemaking) as information processing. Best regards El nov 8, 2017 6:59 AM, "Joseph Brenner" escribió: Dear Colleagues, This is simply to register a dissenting opinion, for similar reasons, with the last two notes, if nothing else to say that there can be one: 1. Regarding John C.'s view of the value of Pierce, there can be no common ground. Scholastic, propositional logic is part of the problem. His metaphysics has no ground in physics. Only Pierce's intuitions, to which he gives less value, have some value for me. 2. Koichiro presents some good science, but it is misapplied. Nothing tells us that information, or another complex natural process, evolves according to the trajectories that he describes: Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must be either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the two. Rather, like this discussion, such processes follow follow a 'mix' but is by no means undisciplined, even if it is partly backwards and forwards at the same time. Such scare words should not be used. Pace John, I think what underlies both has been found in part, and it is the linked movement of systems from actual to potential and vice versa. What is missing from my picture, since no-one seems to point to it, are the detailed values of the path from actuality to potentiality, which themselves may go from maxima to minima, as discussed by Michel Godron. Michel has left us . . . Best regards, Joseph - Original Message - From: Koichiro Matsuno To: fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 1:18 AM Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism On 6 Nov 2017 at 5:30AM, John Collier wrote: In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to find what underlies both. Yes, there have already been serious attempts in this direction, though which may not yet have received due attention from the folks interested in the issue of information. One example is the entropy production fluctuation theorem by Gavin Crooks (1999). The agenda is on the distinction between states and events in thermodynamics. An essence is seen in the uniqueness of thermodynamics allowing for even the non-state or history-dependent variable such as
[Fis] Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism
Dear Colleagues, This is simply to register a dissenting opinion, for similar reasons, with the last two notes, if nothing else to say that there can be one: 1. Regarding John C.'s view of the value of Pierce, there can be no common ground. Scholastic, propositional logic is part of the problem. His metaphysics has no ground in physics. Only Pierce's intuitions, to which he gives less value, have some value for me. 2. Koichiro presents some good science, but it is misapplied. Nothing tells us that information, or another complex natural process, evolves according to the trajectories that he describes: Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must be either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the two. Rather, like this discussion, such processes follow follow a 'mix' but is by no means undisciplined, even if it is partly backwards and forwards at the same time. Such scare words should not be used. Pace John, I think what underlies both has been found in part, and it is the linked movement of systems from actual to potential and vice versa. What is missing from my picture, since no-one seems to point to it, are the detailed values of the path from actuality to potentiality, which themselves may go from maxima to minima, as discussed by Michel Godron. Michel has left us . . . Best regards, Joseph - Original Message - From: Koichiro Matsuno To: fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 1:18 AM Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism On 6 Nov 2017 at 5:30AM, John Collier wrote: In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to find what underlies both. Yes, there have already been serious attempts in this direction, though which may not yet have received due attention from the folks interested in the issue of information. One example is the entropy production fluctuation theorem by Gavin Crooks (1999). The agenda is on the distinction between states and events in thermodynamics. An essence is seen in the uniqueness of thermodynamics allowing for even the non-state or history-dependent variable such as heat. This perspective is powerful enough to precipitate a dependable synthesis out of integrating both the state and the process descriptions. When a microscopic system of interest contacts a heat bath, its development along an arbitrary trajectory of the state attributes of the system necessarily accompanies the associated event of heat flow either to or from the bath. If the trajectory is accompanied by the heat flow to the bath over any finite time interval, it would be far more likely compared with the reversed trajectory absorbing the same amount of heat flow from the bath. This has been a main message from Crooks’ fluctuation theorem. One practical implication of the theorem is that if the trajectory happens to constitute a loop, the likely loop must be the one having the net positive heat flow to the bath. For the reversed loop trajectory would have to come to accompany the same amount of heat flow from the bath back into the inside of the system, and that would be far less likely. Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must be either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the two. A lesson we could learn from this pedagogical example is that thermodynamics is a naturalized tool for making macroscopic events out of the state attributes on the microscopic level irrespectively of whether or not it may have already been called informational. It is quite different from what statistical mechanics has accomplished so far. Something called quantum thermodynamics is gaining its momentum somewhere these days. Koichiro Matsuno From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of John Collier Sent: Monday, November 6, 2017 5:30 AM To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism Loet, I have no disagreement with this. at least in the detailed summary you give. In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to find what underlies both. My mention of the Scholastics was to Pierce's version, not the common interpretation due to a dep misunderstanding about what they were up to. I recommend a serous study of Peirce on te issues of meaning and metaphysics. He wa deeply indebted to their work iin logic. Of course there may be no common ground, but the our project is hopeless. Other things you have said on this group lead me to think it is not a dead end of confused notions. In that case we are wasting our time. John
