Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!

2018-02-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi John,


> On 26 Feb 2018, at 04:37, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> Inclined to agree with Joseph.

OK. Nice.


> I would like to point out that there are different meanings for "real', and 
> one has to be clear about ones metaphysics to make the idea (somewhat) clear.

Yes. That is a key point. Then if we want to adopt the scientific attitude in 
metaphysics/theology, we better be neutral at the start.

The god/non-god debate has hidden the original question raised (more or less 
explicitly) by Plato about what is ultimately real, and the doubt was about the 
primariness of the physical. The choice, for xeusippes was between physicalism 
(the ultimate reality is the physical or material universe) and mathematicalism 
or theologicalism, where the dispute is somehow between the numbers (the finite 
things) and the ideas (usually infinite).

Now, it can be shown that with the digital mechanist hypothesis (the invariance 
of consciousness for a digital functional substitution made at *some* level) is 
logically or at least epistemologically incompatible with materialism (in the 
weak sense of the ontological commitment in primary material substance, or 
dubbed as such (technically we can introduce more nuances here. Tegmark suggest 
a Mathematicalism which is still largely physicalist).

With digital mechanism, consciousness get contagiated to all computations 
supporting us so that we are first person indeterminate on an infinity of 
computations below our substitution level. (Like in Feynman-Everett formulation 
of QM). Physics get redefined by the observable by the universal machine, which 
in this case can be translated in arithmetical terms. 






> Peirce, for example, would call Plato's shadows (which aren't really shadows 
> at all, real, but not existent.


Here, the universal machines, when we listen to them (which today requires 
mainly studying Gödel’s proof and Kleene’s technic, or searching for the 
relevant papers as the literature is very rich, too much rich somehow) suggests 
a very simple Pythagorean ontology (only the natural numbers exists), and the 
only laws are the laws of succession, addition and multiplication. That already 
entails the 3p existence of all prime numbers, but also of all computations. So 
the existence becomes the existence is the semantic of the first order theory 
of arithmetic (ExP(x)).

Then, the incompleteness makes Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate into 
a (strange) believability predicate. The self-referentially correct universal 
machine quickly becomes modest and does not prove for all proposition that 
provable(p) -> p. []p->p is not a law in the provability logic.

But there is much more. This makes possible to “meta”define knowledge in the 
manner of Theaetetus (true belief), by []p & p. By a theorem of Traski, we 
cannot define the arithmetical truth in the arithmetical language, but for each 
proposition we can mimic its truth by its assertability (as we talk about 
simple machine which we can trust). But this associates the machine (played in 
arithmetic)  by the beweisbar predicate of Gödel to a semantic, and it obeys a 
very different logic from the logic of “[]” (provability/believability).It 
provides a notion of first person and a logic of evolving states of knowledge, 
close to intuitionist logic, and having topological semantics. Then 
incompleteness push further the nuances, by making the weaker nuance []p & <>t, 
where we attach only the consistency of the machine, instead of the truth. This 
is what we need to have a notion of certainty when doing an experience, and 
this, on the semi-computable p, provides the quantisation justifying a nest of 
quantum logics lurking there. 

I don’t claim any truth. If mechanism is correct, the physical reality is in 
the head of the universal Turing machine. That makes the theory easily 
refutable empirically, by comparing the physics in the head of the universal 
digital machine, with the physics we observe.

Up to now it fits, as we recover a quantisation at the place needed.

Consciousness of a person p supported by a machine m can be defined quasi 
axiomatically by what the machine m can assert as true, unprovable, 
undefinable, but also undoubtable. And invariant in the relative digital 
substitution for some level.

I think that the universal (Turing) machine might be maximally intelligent and 
conscious.  We can only make it more stupid (albeit more competent in some 
tasks). It will still take some time before they become as stupid as the 
humans, though.



> The sort of shadows that we normal experience are both real and existent on 
> Peirce's account.


OK.

With Mechanism, we get the “ontological” existence, or the basic objects that 
we assume, and I took the numbers 0, 1, 2, … because everyone is familiar, but 
any terms of a Turing universal machinery would do. Theology and Physics are 
machine independent, as it depends on *all* computations, and that is mimicked 
by 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

2018-02-27 Thread Francesco Rizzo
Caro Sun, e cari tutti, ecco la traduzione in inglese del messaggio del 21
febbraio scorso.
Cari saluti.
Francesco

Dear everyone,
on February 8 I sent you a message whose content, without any presumption,
can be useful to resolve the over-epistemo-logical issues that have arisen.
Then I send it again.
Dear Terry extensible to everyone,
It is always a pleasure to read and understand you. The general theory of
information is preceded by a system (or semiotic) of signification and
followed by a system (or semiotic) of communication. Except when there is a
communicative process such as the passage of a Signal (which does not
necessarily mean 'a sign') from a Source, through a Transmitter, along a
Channel, to a Recipient. In a process between machine and machine, the
signal has no 'significant' power. In this case there is no signification
even if we can say that we have information. When the recipient is a human
being (and it is not necessary that the source is also a human being),
there is a process of signification. A system of signification is an
autonomous semiotic construction, independent of any possible act of
communication that actualizes it. On the other hand, every process of
communication between human beings - or between any type of intelligent
apparatus or structure, both mechanical and biological, - presupposes a
system of signification as its own or specific condition. In conclusion, it
is possible to have a semiotic of signification independent of a semiotic
of communication; but it is impossible to establish a semiotic of
communication independent of a semiotic of signification.
I learned a lot from Umberto Eco to whom I dedicated chapter 10. Umberto
Eco and the process of re-interpretation and re-enchantment of economic
science (pp. 175-217) of "Value and evaluations. 'economy of science'
(FrancoAngeli, Milan, 1997). In my own book you can find:
- chapter 15. Economic-estimative semiotics (pp. 327-361) that is part of a
global theory of all signification systems and communication processes;
- subparagraph 5.3.3 The genetic psychology of Jean Piaget and the
neurobiology of Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela. a new experimental
epistemology of quality and uniqueness (pp. 120-130).
I apologize to everyone if I get tired of you or if once again my writing
in Italian creates some problems. I think the gift you give me is, in terms
of QUALITY and UNITY, much greater than the (for) gift I ask of you. Thank
you.
A warm greeting.
Francesco

2018-02-21 17:17 GMT+01:00 Sungchul Ji :

> Hi Francesco, FISers,
>
>
> Can someone translate your post in English so that everyone can understand
> what you are saying?
>
>
> Sung
>
>
> --
> *From:* Fis  on behalf of Francesco Rizzo <
> 13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 21, 2018 6:11 AM
> *To:* y...@pku.edu.cn
> *Cc:* FIS Group
>
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
> Cari Tutti,
> l'8 febbraio Vi ho inviato un messaggio il cui contenuto, senza alcuna
> presunzione, può essere utile per dirimere le questioni
> onto-epistemo-logiche che sono sorte.
> Allora lo trasmetto nuovamente.
> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
> è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information
> è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
> sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un
> processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
> necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore,
> lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
> il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
> significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
> Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
> sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
> significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
> autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
> l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
> tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
> biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
> specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
> significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
> impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
> semiotica della significazione.
> Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto
> Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza
> economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia
> o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso
> libro si trovano:
> - il capitolo 

Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!

2018-02-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Dear John, Dear colleagues,

> On 25 Feb 2018, at 20:51, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> Daer Krassimir, List
> 
> I basically support what you are saying. I understand the mathematics you 
> presented, I am good at mathematics and studied logic with some of the best. 
> However, and this is a big however, giving a mathematical or logical proof by 
> itself, in its formalism, does not show anything at all. One has to be able 
> to connect teh mathematics to experience in a comprehensible way. This was 
> partly the topic of my dissertation, and I take a basically Peircean 
> approach, though there are others that are pretty strong as well.
> 
> I fgenerally skip over the mathematics and look for the empirical 
> connections. If I find them, then generally all becomes clear. Without this, 
> the formalism is nothing more than formalism. It does not help to give formal 
> names to things and assume that this identifies things, Often trying to 
> follow up approaches kine this is a profound waste of time. I try to, and 
> often am able to, express my ideas in a nonformal way. Some mathematically 
> oriented colleagues see this as automatically defective, since they think 
> that formal representation is all that really rigorously explains things. 
> This sort of thinking (in Logical Positivism) eventually led to its own 
> destruction as people started to ask the meaning of theoretical terms and 
> their relation to observations. It is a defunct and self destructive 
> metaphysics. Irt leads nowhere -- my PhD thesis was about this problem. It 
> hurts me to see people making the same mistake, especially when it leads them 
> to bizarre conclusions that are compatible with the formalism (actually, it 
> is provable that almost anything is compatible with a specific formalism, up 
> to numerosity).


Since Gödel, in mathematics we have to distinguish between truth and proof, and 
even when we restrict ourself to arithmetic, we know that the truth escape 
*all* formalism. Logical positivism is dead since long for logicians and 
mathematicians.

Then, when we assume mechanism (the brain is a digitalizable natural 
machinery), and as elementary arithmetic emulates all Turing universal 
machinery and all computations (we assume the Church-Turing thesis, and a small 
amount of passive understanding of Gödel’s method or proofs), it becomes an 
open problem in (scientific) metaphysics if there could be a physical primary 
universe.

The evidence we get so far is that there are none. Mechanism and materialism 
can be shown incompatible logically. Mechanism forces a reduction of the 
physical appearance to computer science, which embeds itself in number theory. 
Mechanism becomes empirically testable: extract physics from arithmetic, and 
compare to the observation. This has been done, and the result sustain 
mechanism, and not materialism.

So, we in that frame, we have to come back to Plato, where the shadow on the 
wall, mentioned by Krassimir,  is given by the empirical reality, which appears 
to be the logical border of the mind of the universal machine. To get this, it 
is imperative to well understand that the notion of computation and of 
universal machine have been discovered in pure mathematics (and quickly after 
even in elementary arithmetic).

The God/non-God debate hides since long the original debate among the antic 
greeks, which was about the existence or inexistence of a primary physical 
universe. Is physics or mathematics the fundamental science/realm? Now with 
Mechanism, we do have a testable explanation of consciousness. It is testable 
because physics *is* reduced to the statistics on the first person view that we 
can associate to the machine.

How to define such first person notions? Gödel’s incompleteness shows that 
proof and truth are different, but also that the machine will makes a 
difference between all the modal variants of provability, and this leads to 
eight different logic of self-reference. Most of them were foreseen by the 
Neoplatonist inquirers.

p (truth)
[]p (provability, Gödel’s beweisbar)
[]p & p (theatetus’ notion of knower, the first person: that notion is not 
definable in the language of the machine: it is non nameable self)
[]p & <>t. (Observability, measure one on the computable consistent extension) 
——> this gives a quantum logic
[]p & <>t & p. (Perception, sensibility)

Those are 8, not fives, because not only incompleteness does makes those 
vertical distinction, but it separates three of those modes in two, along the 
separation of truth and what the machine can prove Abi-out itself. We get six 
quantum logics, making us able to distinguish the sharable quanta and the 
private non sharable qualia which actually extends the quanta. So even the 
quanta are not “objective” but belongs to the “shadow” which hides the deeper 
and simpler reality of the numbers (or of anything Turing equivalent).

So, yes, the shadow are real, and include the whole of 

Re: [Fis] "Mental model" ???

2018-02-27 Thread Francesco Rizzo
Caro Krassimir e cari Tutti,
i fenomeni naturali e sociali sono dei messaggi da comprendere. Il "modello
mentale" è una specie di codice per interpretarli escludendo il rumore di
fondo.
Cambiando l'astrazione del codice muta il significato dei messaggi: quel
che erano le cose rilevanti diventano rumore e quel che era rumore diventa
un significato importante.
Scusate il mio italiano.
Francesco

2018-02-27 0:00 GMT+01:00 Guy A Hoelzer :

> Hi Krassimir,
>
> Thanks for asking this important question.  I’m curious to see how others
> might answer it.  For me, the “mental model” is a centralized system for
> information processing that receives inputs from multiple sensory
> mechanisms and can induce action as a consequence.  In biology, this can be
> a centralized nervous system and whole organism behavior as the form of an
> output.  We illustrate this process as we read and write FIS posts.
>
> Are you looking for more detail about the “mental model”, or is this the
> sort of thing you have in mind?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Guy
>
> Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor
> Department of Biology
> University of Nevada Reno
>
> Phone:  775-784-4860 <(775)%20784-4860>
> Fax:  775-784-1302 <(775)%20784-1302>
>
>
>
> On Feb 26, 2018, at 2:48 PM, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
> I understand that it is not so easy to answer to the simple question.
>
> But the mental models are very important for understanding the information
> and communication phenomena.
>
> So, again the same simple question: What is the “mental model”?
>
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>
>
>
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